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CONTENTS.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA. BY H. G. W. WOODHEAD,
C.B.E.

RECENT PERSIAN HISTORY. BY LIEUT.-COLONEL W. G. GREY.

CAUCASIA AND THE COMMUNISTS. BY GEORGE YOUNG, M.V.O.

CHINESE NOTES.

REVIEWS:

MANUEL DE POLITIQUE MUSULMANE. THE HEART OF ARYAVARTA.
THROUGH KHIVA TO GOLDEN SAMARKAND. THE PEOPLE OF THE
STEPPES. A THOUSAND YEARS OF THE TARTARS. MOSUL AND ITS
MINORITIES. WITH LAWRENCE IN ARABIA. THROUGH INNER DESERTS
TO MEDINA. THE LOST OASES. THE EARLY HISTORY OF BENGAL.
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Part I

EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA*

By H. G. W. WOODHEAD, C.B.E.

I SHALL not keep you very long with the history of extra-territoriality, but shall pass on as rapidly as possible to the practical aspects of a problem which is to-day exercising the minds of so many Chinese and foreigners who reside in Chinese territory. Extraterritoriality has been defined as "an exemption from the operation of local law, granted either by usage or by treaty, on account of the differences in law, custom, and social habits of civilized nations from those of uncivilized nations."† In Europe and the Near East it has been known for many centuries, but has arisen from usage rather than

* This lecture was first delivered in Chicago, under the auspices of the Harris Memorial Foundation in the University of Chicago. It is being published by the University of Chicago Press in a volume entitled, "Occidental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem."

It was first given in London at a meeting of the Central Asian Society held on Thursday, October 8, 1925, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W. In the absence of Viscount Peel the chair was taken by Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen—the subject on which we are going to be addressed this evening is "Extraterritoriality in China." It sounds something very formidable. I wish our Chairman, Lord Peel, were here to preside on this occasion, because I am conscious of not knowing a great deal about China and still less about extraterritoriality: probably many of you here are in the same position as myself. However, we are very fortunate in having with us a gentleman well calculated to enlighten us, Mr. Woodhead, who has spent twenty-three years in China. He has lived in Tientsin during most of that time, has edited the most influential paper in China, and is responsible for that monumental work which gives all the accurate information about China that is available—that is, the *China Year Book*. He has come here and is going to introduce the discussion this evening. I see here various gentlemen who have a knowledge of China from within, and I hope they will reinforce the discussion by joining in and giving us the benefit of their experience. We all want enlightenment on this subject, and an ounce of practical experience is worth a ton of theory; therefore I hope that natural modesty and reticence will not keep them back from joining in the discussion. (Applause.)

† Moore's "International Law," II., p. 593.

treaty rights. In China it is based entirely upon treaties. You will find in Morse's "International Relations of the Chinese Empire," and in Wellington Koo's "The Status of Aliens in China," accounts of its origin from the foreign and the Chinese points of view respectively. You will be convinced by the former that it was an essential condition of foreign residence and trade in China. You will be asked to believe by the latter that it originated in the contumacy and lawlessness of British and other foreign adventurers, who "early began to withdraw themselves, by open defiance, from the operation of local laws." The reasons given by foreign authorities for its introduction in China are numerous, but I will confine myself to a few. First I would place the attitude of the Chinese official towards foreigners during the early days of foreign intercourse. To the Chinese the foreigner was a barbarian, to be treated "like beasts, and not ruled on the same principles as citizens. . . . Therefore to rule barbarians by misrule is the true and best way of ruling them."* Foreigners, therefore, were restricted to trading at a single port—Canton; and with an officially recognized monopoly, known as the co-Hong. In Canton they were permitted to reside only in the Factory district, a confined space on the river front. They were not permitted to engage Chinese servants (though this rule was generally relaxed), to bring women or arms into the factories, to use sedan chairs, or to enter into any direct relations with the local Chinese officials. They were not allowed to row for pleasure on the river, or to enter the city, and only on three days per month were they permitted, under the escort of an interpreter, to take the air at the flower gardens across the river. They had to return to Macao after each trading season.† They were held collectively responsible for the misdeeds of individuals. And the local Chinese authorities would not recognize, or have any dealings with, foreign officials entrusted with the protection of their interests.

Secondly, I would place the difference between Chinese and foreign law, especially in relation to homicide. Except that decapitation was the punishment for murder, and strangulation for manslaughter, there was no distinction between the two offences. A typical instance is that of the gunner of the country ship *Lady Hughes*, who was accused of causing the death of a Chinese by firing a saluting gun, in November, 1784.‡ His surrender to the local authorities was immediately demanded, and when it was refused the supercargo of the ship was arrested and carried off into the city as a hostage. Eventually the gunner was surrendered, and on January 8, 1785, was strangled under orders from Peking, which must have been sent before there had been a semblance of a trial. When Chinese writers refer to British contumacy and lawlessness, it seems pertinent to point out that in the century

* Morse's "International Relations," I., 111, 112.

† Morse, *op. cit.*, I., 69-71.

‡ *Ibid.*, 102.

preceding 1833 not more than half a dozen cases have been recorded in which homicide was alleged against British subjects, including several which were obviously accidental.*

Thirdly, there was the Chinese doctrine of collective responsibility. Again and again all commerce was stopped, and foreigners were subjected to all kinds of restraints and indignities, because of the alleged misconduct of one or more of their number. As the East India Company's Select Committee recorded, in one case in which an attempt was made to hold it responsible for a fracas between British Bluejackets and Chinese villagers:

"Thus we see our situation clearly made responsible for the acts of between two and three thousand individuals who are daily coming in contact with the lowest of the Chinese, and are exposed to assaults so wanton, and often so barbarous, as well as to robberies so extensive, that self-defence imposes upon them the necessity of attacking their assailants in a manner from whence death must ensue. A great and important commerce is instantly suspended, whole fleets at times detained, ourselves liable to seizure, and to be the medium of surrendering a man to death whose crime is only self-defence or obedience to orders, or else to lend ourselves to the most detestable falsehoods, in order to support a fabricated statement which may save the credit of the officers of the Chinese Government."†

As early as 1833 the British Parliament passed an "Act to Regulate the Trade to China and India,"‡ which included provision for the establishment of a Court of Justice with Criminal and Admiralty jurisdiction, but it was not until the conclusion of the so-called Opium War that Britain's extraterritorial rights were recognized by China.

The Treaty of Nanking of 1842 did not itself concede extraterritorial rights, but the General Regulations attached to that Treaty provided that:

"Regarding the punishment of English criminals, the English Government will enact the laws necessary to attain that end, and the Consul will be empowered to put them into force; and regarding the punishment of Chinese criminals, these will be tried and punished by their own laws, in the way provided for by the correspondence which took place at Nanking after the concluding of peace."§

The Treaty did, however, provide for the cession of Hongkong and the opening of five ports—Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai—to British trade. It is noteworthy that Sir Henry Pottinger, the British Envoy who negotiated that Treaty, was instructed constantly to bear in mind "that we seek for no exclusive advantages, and

* "Studies in Chinese Diplomatic History," by C. L. Hsin, 6.

† Morse, *op. cit.*, 106x.

‡ Koo, "Status of Aliens in China," 95 sqq.

§ Koo, *op. cit.*, 134.

demand nothing that we shall not willingly see enjoyed by the subjects of all other States.”*

The American Envoy, Caleb Cushing, who reached China in March, 1844, with instructions to negotiate a treaty that was just, with no unfair advantage on either side, learning what the British had done, and having actual proof of what submission to Chinese jurisdiction might involve, as the result of some American citizens firing on a mob in self-defence,[†] secured a definite grant of criminal jurisdiction over American citizens in Article XXI. of the Treaty of Wanghia. The extraterritorial rights of the Treaty Powers were more clearly defined in subsequent treaties, from only one of which, the Chefoo Agreement of September, 1876, between Britain and China, need I quote here :

Section II. (ii.) The British Treaty of 1858, Article XVI., lays down that “Chinese subjects who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities, according to the laws of China.

“British subjects who may commit any crime in China shall be tried and punished by the Consul, or any other public functionary authorized thereto, according to the laws of Great Britain.

“Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.”

The words “functionary authorized thereto” are translated in the Chinese text “British Government.”

In order to the fulfilment of its Treaty obligations, the British Government has established a Supreme Court at Shanghai, with a special code of rules, which it is now about to revise. The Chinese Government has established at Shanghai a Mixed Court; but the officer presiding over it, either from lack of power or dread of unpopularity, constantly fails to enforce his judgments.

It is now understood that the Tsungli Yamen will write a circular to the Legations, inviting foreign representatives at once to consider with the Tsungli Yamen the measures needed for the more effective administration of justice at the ports open to foreign trade.

(iii.) It is agreed that, whenever a crime is committed affecting the person or property of a British subject, whether in the interior or at the open ports, the British Minister shall be free to send officers to the spot to be present at the investigation.

To the prevention of misunderstanding on this point, Sir Thomas Wade will write a note to the above effect, to which the Tsungli Yamen will reply, affirming that this is the course of proceeding to be adhered to for the time to come.

It is further understood that so long as the laws of the two countries differ from each other, there can be but one principle to guide judicial proceedings in mixed cases in China—namely, that the case is to be tried by the official of the defendant's nationality; the official of the plaintiff's nationality merely attending to watch the proceedings in the interests of justice. If the officer so attending be dissatisfied with the proceedings, it will be in his power to protest against them in detail. The law administered will be the law of the nationality of the

* Morse, *op. cit.*, 663.

+ *Ibid.*, 327.

officer trying the case. This is the meaning of the words *hui t'ung*, indicating combined action in judicial proceedings in Article XVI. of the Treaty of Tientsin; and this is the course to be respectively followed by the officers of either nationality.

As a consequence of extraterritoriality, therefore, a Chinese or American or any other national who charges a British subject with any crime, or wishes to sue him for any civil cause, must institute proceedings before a British Court. The latter, however, cannot, in a civil suit, entertain a counter-claim against a national of another State. Nor has it any authority, other than that accorded by courtesy, over non-British witnesses. And it is easy to understand that complications may arise in which three or more parties of different nationalities may be involved, requiring decision by three or more different tribunals. Moreover, it not infrequently happens that persons of different nationalities are implicated in the same crime, in which case separate trials must take place under their respective laws in the Courts exercising jurisdiction.

I shall now briefly describe the situation to-day. The so-called Treaty Powers, either under definite Treaty stipulations or by virtue of "most-favoured nation treatment," still enjoy extraterritorial privileges, to the exclusion of Chinese jurisdiction. These Governments are: Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Austria-Hungary and Germany* lost their extraterritorial rights as a result of the abrogation of their treaties with China, following the latter's participation in the Great War. Russians were deprived of extraterritorial rights by a Presidential mandate suspending recognition of the Tsarist Minister and Consuls, promulgated on September 23, 1920.†

British jurisdiction is exercised, in minor criminal and civil cases, in the outposts by Consular officers, and in Shanghai by an Assistant Judge and Police Magistrate. Serious criminal charges, and civil cases in which serious issues are involved, are heard by the Supreme Court sitting in Shanghai (or elsewhere) with appeal to the full Court and eventually to the Privy Council. American jurisdiction is exercised locally by American Consular officers, and in important cases, civil and criminal, by the U.S. Court for China, which was established by Act of Congress of June 30, 1906. The French and Japanese have judicial officials in China. In the case of other Treaty Powers jurisdiction is exercised by their Consular officials, usually with right of appeal to some home tribunal.

A curious feature is the Shanghai Mixed Court.‡ The International

* *China Year Book*, 1921-2, 789, and 1925, 783, 785.

† *Ibid.*, 1921-2, 626.

‡ For further information see Kotenev's "Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council."

Settlement at Shanghai was an area set apart for foreign residence and trade, and consists to-day of the former British and American Settlements and an extension thereto, administered by an International Foreign Municipal Council. There was an influx of Chinese refugees during the Taiping rebellion, and the Chinese population has since increased until it numbers nearly one million. There were obvious difficulties in the way of permitting a purely Chinese Court to function in a foreign-administered Settlement, and at first jurisdiction was exercised by the British Consul-General. In 1864 a so-called Mixed Court was established, presided over by a deputy of the Shanghai Magistrate, with a foreign Assessor on the bench in cases in which foreign or municipal interests were involved. The history of the development of the Mixed Court would take too long in the telling, and I can only say here that its authority gradually increased, in spite of Chinese opposition and obstruction, until 1911, when the outbreak of the revolution compelled the Treaty Power Consuls to take over control of the tribunal. It is to-day staffed by magistrates whose appointment is subject to the approval of the foreign Consuls, and who sit in rotation with foreign Assessors, the records being kept by the municipal police. Prisoners sentenced to imprisonment serve their term in gaols controlled by the Municipal Council. Criminals sentenced to capital punishment are sent to the Chinese City authorities to be executed. The Mixed Court probably handles a greater volume of business, civil and criminal, than any other tribunal in the world. Its jurisdiction now extends to Germans, Russians, and other non-Treaty Power nationals in Shanghai. The Chinese now claim that the Mixed Court ought to become a purely Chinese institution, instead of, as to-day, remaining under Consular and Municipal control.

Before dealing in some detail with the objections to the abolition of extraterritoriality, I propose briefly to refer to some of the arguments against its perpetuation. In the first place, it is argued, and quite correctly, that it constitutes an infringement of China's sovereign rights and independence. Secondly, it leads to a multiplicity of jurisdictions, and, as I have already mentioned, the application of different laws, even where the same issues are involved, and uncertainty as to the issue of any particular case. But the main objection to its perpetuation, and the one most difficult to answer, is its abuse, chiefly by Governments which have infinitesimal, or at least insignificant, interests in China. The worst offenders have been the Spanish, Cuban, Brazilian, and other South American Consulates. The Spanish Consulate of recent years appears to have made a speciality of extending its protection on the flimsiest of pretexts to Chinese who desire to evade the jurisdiction of their own authorities. Its latest performance has been to claim jurisdiction over a Jew born of Turkish parents in India who repudiated his British nationality some years ago, sought

French protection as a Turk, and now claims that he has become entitled to Spanish protection as the result of an ordinance restoring Spanish nationality to Sephardic Jews who like to avail themselves of it. The Brazilian Consulate seems to exist solely for the purpose of extending its protection over public gaming establishments, which are at present functioning under Brazilian protection in Shanghai and Tientsin. The Cuban Consulate used to exist for the same end. The scandal of foreign protection of Chinese has attained such proportions that at the annual Conference of British Chambers of Commerce in 1921 a resolution was adopted unanimously which read :

"That this Conference deprecates the growing tendency of certain foreign Consulates in China to afford protection to Chinese by process of naturalization or other means, as it is notorious that in the majority of cases the applicants for naturalization are not actuated by any desire to leave their own country to take up their residence in a foreign State, but take this simple means of evading their just obligations and liabilities, and escaping from the jurisdiction to which they would otherwise be amenable."

It is only fair to say that the Spanish Consul, who was the most notorious offender, was dismissed, and the naturalization certificates issued by him were cancelled. But other Consuls—notably those of Portugal, and more recently of Chile—have also been offenders.

Finally, there is the objection that as long as extraterritoriality prevails it is impossible for the Chinese Government to throw open the whole country to foreign trade. The necessity of sending every foreigner entitled to extraterritoriality who commits the most trivial offence to the nearest Treaty Port at which one of his Consular officers functions for trial, is cited as an insuperable obstacle to permitting foreign residence and trade outside the fifty Treaty and Open Ports. To this day foreigners are not entitled by treaty to reside in Peking for business purposes, or to own or lease business premises elsewhere than in the open ports.

I now turn to the problem of abolishing extraterritoriality and the objections to such abolition.

Grand Secretary Wensiang in 1869 said to the British Minister, Sir R. Alcock: "Do away with your extraterritoriality clause, and merchant and missionary may settle anywhere and everywhere; but retain it, and we must do our best to confine you and our trouble to the Treaty Ports." Extraterritoriality has always been resented by patriotic Chinese; but it was not until the signature of the Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902 that any definite stipulation was made regarding its abolition. Article XIII. reads:

"China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system, and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform; and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights when she

is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations, warrant her in so doing."

Great Britain had relinquished extraterritorial rights in Japan a few years previously. Similar provisions appeared in the American and Japanese Commercial Treaties of 1903, while Sweden, in the Commercial Treaty of 1908, agreed to relinquish Consular jurisdiction "as soon as all other Powers have agreed to relinquish their extraterritorial rights." The last Treaty signed by China in which extraterritorial rights were conceded was that with Switzerland, signed in Tokio in June, 1918. In treaties since signed with Bolivia, Persia, Germany, and Soviet Russia, China has retained jurisdiction over their nationals.

China's first formal claim for the abolition of extraterritoriality was presented, in 1919, to the Peace Conference at Versailles. It was included in the "Questions for Readjustment submitted by China to the Peace Conference,"* which, among other things, demanded the renunciation of Spheres of Influence or of Interest, the withdrawal of foreign troops from China, and of foreign wireless stations and post-offices, the relinquishment of Leased Territories, the restoration of Foreign Settlements and Concessions, and tariff autonomy. Some of the objections I have already mentioned were set forth, and it was urged—that China now had a National Constitution, prescribing, among other things, the separation of Government powers, and assuring to the people their inviolable fundamental rights of life and property, and guaranteeing the complete independence and ample protection of judicial officers and their entire freedom from interference on the part of the executive or legislative powers; that China had prepared a number of Codes, some of which were provisionally enforced, and which had been carefully adapted from those of the most advanced nations; that new courts and procuratorates of various kinds had been established, etc.; and that, in view of the "satisfactory results China has already obtained, and the progress she has been making from day to day in the domain of legislative and judicial reforms, Consular jurisdiction should be abolished by the end of 1924." This question was not taken up at Versailles, but was again raised at the Washington Conference, and supported by much the same arguments in 1921. In this instance the Chinese Delegation had not the audacity to name a date for its abolition, but asked the Powers to agree to relinquish their extraterritorial rights in China at the end of a definite period.

The Washington Conference adopted a resolution,† which, after reciting the provisions of the Commercial Treaties of 1902 and 1903, and expressing sympathy with China's aspirations, provided for the

* For full text see *China Year Book*, 1921-2, 719 *sqq.*

† *China Year Book*, 1924, 1164.

establishment of an International Commission, to which each of the signatories should appoint one member "to inquire into the present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, and into the laws and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration of China, with a view to reporting to the Governments of the several Powers above named their findings in fact in regard to these matters, and their recommendations as to such means as they may find suitable to improve the existing conditions of the administration of justice in China, and to assist and further the efforts of the Chinese Government to effect such legislation and judicial reforms as would warrant the several Powers in relinquishing, either progressively or otherwise, their respective rights of extraterritoriality." This Commission was to be constituted within three months after the adjournment of the Conference, and to submit its findings and recommendations within one year from its first meeting. Each of the Powers reserved the right to accept all or any portion of its recommendations, and China reserved the right to a seat on the Commission, and undertook to afford it every possible facility for the successful accomplishment of its tasks.

The Commission should have met on or before May 6, 1922, but in the meantime China was involved in another civil war, and since then she has made repeated requests for a postponement.

It will be remembered that Great Britain, America, and Japan, in 1902 and 1903, undertook to relinquish their extraterritorial rights when satisfied that—

1. The state of the Chinese Laws ;
2. The arrangements for their administration ; and
3. "Other considerations" warranted them in doing so.

THE STATE OF THE CHINESE LAWS.

A Law Codification Commission has been at work since 1914, in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, and since the Washington Conference a Commission on Extraterritoriality has also been organized to prepare for the visit of the International Commission. With the assistance of French and Japanese experts a number of new codes have been drafted, of which the Criminal Code,* the Code of Criminal Procedure,† and the Civil Procedure Code have, after several revisions, been promulgated. English translations of these codes are now available. A number of other new laws, criminal, commercial, mining, Trade Mark‡ and Copyright, and labour, and regulations relating to courts and procedure and prisons, have also been promulgated. Mr. Escarra, (French) Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, is my authority for the statement that "apart from a few special texts, the provisions of which are often very poor from the technical point of

* *China Year Book*, 1921-2, 372 *sqq.*

† *Ibid.*, 1924, 267 *sqq.*

‡ *Ibid.*, 1925, 816.

view, the civil codification remains in its infancy. Several years, at least, are required to provide China with a body of civil and commercial laws exhaustive enough to meet the needs of the foreigners. Till then, should the training and goodwill of the judges be out of discussion, nothing can be said about a proper administration of justice."* He mentions that in 1920, when a crisis in the piece-goods trade occurred at Shanghai, resulting in numerous bankruptcies among the Chinese, it was impossible for the Mixed Court "to deal with the Chinese law on the matter, because the latter had been regarded as repealed by a decision of the Supreme Court," and "a special procedure of winding-up" had to be devised.†

M. Georges Padoux, a distinguished Frenchman, who is a member of the Commission on Extraterritoriality, more recently wrote :

"The present administration of civil and penal justice in China affords a striking illustration of the difficulties attending the application of legislative provisions which are not in harmony with the customs and prevalent ideas of the population. In civil matters the law in force is mostly the *Ta Ching Lu Li*, many parts of which have become practically obsolete. The judges of the Supreme Court have to display a great deal of ingenuity in order to adapt these old rules to the needs of contemporary China, and to the evolution which takes place now in the organization of the Chinese family. The adaptation sometimes goes so far as to almost entirely set aside the old rule (see the recently published summaries of Judgments of the Supreme Court). In penal matters a new Code has been enacted in 1912, but it is far ahead of the social conditions of a large part of the territory. It is not applied in the remote corners of most of the provinces, and it is sometimes ignored even in Peking. During the last few years, for instance, it has been a common practice to order by Presidential mandate the confiscation of the property of overthrown political leaders, although general confiscation has been expressly abolished by the Penal Code."‡

The fundamental law of the Republic is, or should be, the Constitution. No one knows which of the various constitutions that have been promulgated from time to time is at present supposed to be in force though that, perhaps, is not a matter of very great importance, as at no time during the history of the Republic has any constitution been more than a scrap of paper.

There are two other features of China's laws to which I must direct your attention. The first is the immunity of the civil official from the ordinary courts of the land. There is a special court, known as the Administrative Court, whose duties are "to try all illegal acts of public officials with the exception of cases expressly placed by law under the jurisdiction of other organs."§ An attempt is thus made to apply the French system of *droit administratif*, but without the safeguard of the

* "The Extraterritoriality Problem," 20.

† *Ibid.*, 16.

‡ *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, April, 1925, 360.

§ *China Year Book*, 1925, 609 *sqq.*

Tribunal of Conflicts, whose duty it is to decide which cases come within the scope of the Administrative Court. Moreover, the Administrative Court is expressly prohibited from entertaining claims for damages.* The plaintiff can only ask for rescission of the ruling of an official, or such modification thereof as the court may consider equitable. It is not the custom to accept oral testimony, but to try each case on written arguments. A civil official charged with a criminal offence is supposed to be brought before the ordinary court, but this is seldom done if he is a man of any status, immunity being conferred by extending the definition of what constitutes an "administrative act." It is not, therefore, possible in the usual way to secure redress for the wrongdoings of civil officials.

Secondly, there is the peculiar status of the military man in China. Soldiers, from the lowest to the highest ranks, who commit offences against the Military Penal Ordinance, the Criminal Code, the Police Regulations, or any other law for which punishment is provided, are tried, not by the ordinary courts, but by a court-martial. Any claim against them for damages must also be tried by a court-martial. There are at present nearly one and a half million men under arms in China, and they are the most notorious breakers of the laws of the Republic. Yet a civilian plaintiff or complainant can only secure the trial of a military man as an act of grace on the part of his superior or commanding officer. The proceedings, if allowed, are heard *in camera*, no lawyer being allowed to the plaintiff, no access to the record of testimony being permitted, and the decision of the court being subject to confirmation or annulment by the officer who authorizes the convening of the court-martial. Many Chinese officials, occupying what we should regard as civil posts, have military titles, and are thus removed from the jurisdiction of the civil courts and the Administrative Court.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW.

I now turn to the actual administration of the law in China. It is a sweeping but nevertheless accurate statement that, under existing conditions, no attempt is or can be made to enforce the laws of the Republic. The Law Codification Commission may work overtime compiling new codes, some of which are not altogether unsatisfactory, but even in Peking itself the courts are unable to enforce them. China has had three Constitutions since the establishment of the Republic. No one can say definitely which of them is supposed to be in force at the moment, as the present Government does not even claim to be constitutional. But at no time have the rights and privileges which these constitutions are supposed to guarantee to her citizens been aught but a myth. The most glaring example of the wholesale violation of

* Law on Administrative Cases, Art. 8, *China Year Book*, 1925, 611.

the law is to be found in the present position of opium. The Criminal Code promulgated in March, 1910, and amended in December, 1914, contains a whole chapter* devoted to penalties for cultivating, smoking, trafficking in, or transporting opium. Yet it is estimated that, in 1923, China produced between thirteen and fourteen thousand tons of opium, more than twelve times as much as India, and nearly eight times as much as the whole of the rest of the world (India included).† And in most provinces this opium was produced, sold, and smoked, not against, but in accordance with, the orders of the local officials, chiefly the militarists, who derived the bulk of the revenues for the support of their overgrown armies from this source.

I am now going to give you a series of cases, a few among those which have come to my notice, to give you some idea of the manner in which Chinese laws are actually administered.

THE TIENTSIN LAND CASE.

There lives in Tientsin a wealthy family, known as the Chang family, which had inherited a quantity of property from their father, the late Chang Yen-mao. This property had been acquired by purchase between the years 1898 and 1904. Last year the Chang brothers were told by the Police Commissioner of the Province, a most powerful official, that he would like to acquire a large tract of their land at a nominal price. This land happened to be mortgaged to a French bank, and the brothers refused to sell it below the ordinary market price. A few days later the elder brother was practically kidnapped from a restaurant in the ex-German Concession in Tientsin, taken down to the Police Headquarters in the city, and there detained until he had, under duress, signed a document, a facsimile of which is in my possession, to the effect that "with the desire to assist and promote the development of the municipality in the city" he would sell his land "at a price which the police authorities might consider reasonable." This undertaking he repudiated after his release, and the Police Commissioner thereupon took possession of his land, and charged him with claiming ownership on forged title-deeds. The Chang brothers then had to leave Tientsin to escape arrest. What is their remedy? They cannot sue the Police Commissioner in an ordinary court, as he is an official, and not amenable to its jurisdiction. They cannot take proceedings in the Administrative Court, because he holds the rank of a General in the Chinese Army. And if they were able to induce the higher military authorities to convene a court-martial—which is extremely unlikely—they would not be permitted to be represented by a lawyer, to examine or cross-examine witnesses, or to see the record, while all the proceedings would be

* *China Year Book*, 1921-2, 404. † *Ibid.*, 1924, chapter xix.

held *in camera*. They have, therefore, been unable to obtain any redress for what, on the face of it, appears a most glaring outrage on the part of a high official.

THE TIENTSIN COTTON CASE.*

Tientsin is the centre of a large export trade in raw cotton. It has been the custom locally for years past to contract forward in July and August—when some idea of the extent of the crops can be obtained—for cotton to be delivered in October, November, and December. There were good cotton crops in 1923, and forward contracts at Tls. 23 to 28 per picul were made by foreign exporters for some 250,000 piculs. Then came the Japanese earthquake, with the destruction of large quantities of cotton and cotton goods in Japan, with the result that there was a sudden and unexpected demand for cotton in that country. The price soared from Tls. 23 to 28 to Tls. 43. The dealers repudiated nearly all their forward contracts in order to take advantage of the Japanese demand, and resorted to every conceivable form of trickery to get their cotton through Tientsin without delivering it to the original buyers. The Civil Governor, Police Commissioner, and Chinese Chamber of Commerce were appealed to for aid in preventing this wholesale fraud. But the Police Commissioner maintained that the best he could do would be to secure 50 per cent. of the cotton contracted for. The Civil Governor declared that forward purchase of cotton was an illegal gambling transaction. The foreign buyers, who naturally sustained heavy loss from their failure to meet their own obligations in Japan and America, then endeavoured to sue the defaulting dealers. Writs were applied for, through the foreign Consulates, in the ordinary way, but the Chinese courts refused even to serve them, and to this day no proceedings have been permitted against the defaulters.

THE CASE OF COLONEL CHEN.

On February 1, 1924, when the afternoon express train from Peking was about to leave Fengtai, about seven miles from the capital, a passenger car, which had come through from the Peking-Hankow Railway, carrying one of the President's concubines with a military escort, suddenly appeared, and it was demanded that it should be coupled on to the express. The latter was already carrying its full load, and the couplings of the special car were not of the type required by the regulations for a passenger express, so the demand was refused by the British Traffic Inspector. Thereupon one of the military escort drew a pistol and pointed it at his head, and the Inspector had to agree to couple on the car. There was some misunderstanding at this point,

* Proceedings at the Annual Conference of British Chambers of Commerce, Shanghai, February, 1924.

the train moving further up the platform, presumably to make room for shunting the car into position. Thereupon, under instructions from their superior officer, the military escort set upon Mr. Bessell, knocked him down, struck him with a pistol, and brutally kicked him. The train then went on its way with the car attached, and Colonel Chen, the concubine's brother, who was in charge of the escort, proceeded to Taku. Mr. Bessell was seriously injured, and had to undergo two operations. A strong protest, with a demand for the trial of the officer in charge of the escort, was made by the British Legation. Mr. Bessell was a servant of the Chinese Government, who had been assaulted in the execution of his duty, and while endeavouring to carry out the Government's railway regulations, and one would naturally have expected it to take prompt action. Instead, it resorted to every form of mendacity and procrastination to shield the culprits. It was pretended, at first, that Colonel Chen was at Wuchang, in Mid-China, and that the Hupeh Tuchun had been instructed to deal with him. Though the fact that he was at Taku, within a few miles of Tientsin, could no longer be concealed, it was not until February 25, after repeated evasions, that action was taken. On that date the Chief Judge of the Military Court of the Ministry of War, the Chief of the Medical Department of the same Ministry, and a personal representative of the President, proceeded to Taku, where they interviewed Colonel Chen without the presence of any of the witnesses to the assault, reported that he was too ill to be moved, and subsequently announced that he had been sentenced to "twenty-eight days' detention in his own quarters." This farcical decision the British Government refused to recognize, demanding the formal trial of Colonel Chen, in the presence of a British official, in accordance with the Treaties. The Chinese argued that the Treaties did not provide for the presence of a foreign official at a court-martial upon a military offender, and delayed, and prevaricated, and it was not until June 3, 123 days after the assault, that Colonel Chen was actually brought up for trial. I heard some details of that trial subsequently from Mr. Bessell. He was, of course, not permitted to be legally represented. He was still suffering from the injuries he had received, and unable to stand for more than a few minutes. But the Military Court announced that it could not accept testimony unless the witness stood up to give it, and Mr. Bessell, therefore, had to give his evidence fragmentarily, retiring to rest whenever the pain of standing became unendurable. The officer who ordered his assault on February 1 was in uniform, and wore a moustache. The officer who appeared as Colonel Chen on this occasion was in mufti, and without a moustache. Mr. Bessell had seen him only for a few moments in the twilight, four months previously, and was therefore unable to make positive identification, and Colonel Chen, who had been found guilty at the farcical inquiry of

February 25, was acquitted on this occasion, scapegoats being made of the soldiers and a subordinate officer who were alleged to have participated in the assault, and several Chinese railway officials being dismissed for alleged breaches of regulations.

THE CHRISTIAN GENERAL.

As a final instance of the immunity of the militarist from the law of the land, I may refer briefly to the case of the Christian General, Feng Yu-hsiang. He had been invited, on February 16, 1924, to dine with the American Minister, Dr. Schurman. The regulations of the Legation Quarter, which is administered and policed under the orders of the Diplomatic Body, prohibit motor-cars from entering the Quarter at excessive speed, with blinding headlights, or with armed escorts on the footboards. All these regulations were violated by the Christian General on the night in question, and after wild blowing of police whistles, his car was eventually compelled to pull up by a policeman who stood directly in its path. The Christian General thereupon alighted in a fury, struck the policeman, took away his baton, and, according to the statements of the police and an eyewitness, ordered his escort to kill the policeman, and he would be responsible. Fortunately, this order, if actually given, was disobeyed. The car then proceeded on its way to the American Legation, two more policemen being struck with the captured baton *en route*. Needless to say, no redress was given, nor apology offered, by the perpetrator of this assault.

THE GERMAN DOCTORS.

I have in my possession notes of two cases in which German doctors in Tientsin were defendants in criminal charges, which throw considerable light upon the treatment to which foreigners deprived of their extraterritorial rights are now subjected. In the first case the doctor was charged, under Article 326 of the Chinese Criminal Code, with causing the death of a boy patient upon whom he had performed an operation. The Article in question reads:

"Whoever fails to give the necessary attention to his occupation, and in consequence causes death or injury to any person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not severer than the fourth degree (*i.e.*, more than one year, but less than three years), or detention, or fine of not more than two thousand *yuan*" (dollars).

The operation which was the basis of this charge was performed on the neck of the patient, under an anæsthetic, on June 3, 1922. The patient died during the operation, and the doctor testified that the amount of chloroform used was very small, that it was quite fresh, having been purchased the day before, and that the heart of the patient was probably too weak to support an anæsthetic, though this

weakness was not apparent in the examination that took place previous to its administration. He ascribed the death to one of those rare cases of inability to support chloroform, which should be considered a misfortune for which no one was to blame. On the death being reported, the Chinese coroner made an examination. This functionary was a barber—who in China comes from the lowest class—without any scientific training. He made a superficial examination of the body, declared that the boy was dead, and that he had died not from the operation, but from the anæsthetic—which was what the doctor had told him. The doctor was then charged before the local court, which gave judgment on July 6, condemning the accused to a fine of 2,000 *yuan* (the maximum) for a violation of Article 326.

An appeal was taken to the Higher Provincial Court, which on September 28, 1922, gave a judgment upholding the decision of the local court. The case was then carried to the Taliyuan, or Supreme Court, in Peking, which on December 14 ordered a retrial. This took place in the Higher Provincial Court, which on April 3 again found the accused guilty, but lowered the fine to \$1,000. The case was again appealed to the Supreme Court, which on August 9, 1923, dismissed the second judgment of the Provincial Court, and ordered yet another trial. The third judgment of the Provincial Court was delivered on May 12, 1924, accused once more being condemned to a fine of \$1,000. The Supreme Court on October 27 ordered yet another trial, and on January 21 of this year the case against the accused was withdrawn by virtue of the general amnesty proclaimed by the Provisional Chief Executive. It is understood, however, that a civil action for damages is still pending. During the trials of this case, facts, the opinions of the complainants, and arguments, were inextricably mixed up by the court. Much of the evidence offered by the defendant was refused. The report of the coroner, who, as already stated, had no scientific experience, and made no attempt to perform an autopsy, was accepted as definite evidence, although it contained a quantity of superstitious nonsense. Expert evidence from competent medical men was rejected. In the Higher Court the cause of the death and the blame for bringing it about were treated as one and the same thing, the onus of proving that there had been no negligence being placed on the accused. In the sixth judgment (May, 1924) the court refused to take into consideration evidence favourable to the accused; and the coroner's report was again made use of, though its introduction had been one of the reasons of the Supreme Court for ordering a retrial. As further evidence of accused's guilt the relatives on this occasion stated that they had not been willing that chloroform should be used. The Supreme Court in its final judgment held that there was no proof of the lack of consent of the relatives.

The other case was similar in the course it ran, but even more

glaring in its continuous miscarriages of justice. For in this case the woman who died had been successfully operated upon and had made satisfactory progress for seven days, when a friend called upon her and violently upbraided her for undergoing the operation. There was, according to the evidence, a heated quarrel, as a result of which the patient's heart collapsed, and though every effort was made to undo the mischief she became weaker and weaker, and died the following afternoon. In this instance the original penalty of \$2,000 was imposed at successive retrials until the case was terminated by the amnesty. And it is alleged that the accused was found guilty mainly as a result of a mistranslation of the evidence of a foreign medical practitioner. The evidence of the quarrel which caused the patient's collapse was ignored.

It is not surprising, I think, that one of these German doctors, who was in attendance on Dr. Sun Yat-sen during his stay in Tientsin, told me that under no circumstances would he undertake a serious operation on any Chinese.

These cases are also of interest as revealing the reluctance of the Supreme Court, probably for fear of being defied by provincial tribunals, finally to quash proceedings in which there has obviously been a miscarriage of justice.

I might go on here to quote some ridiculous instances which followed the assumption of jurisdiction over the Russians in Manchuria, where a man charged with breaking a window found that he was being tried for "murdering Mr. Window," where complainants sometimes found that they had been mistaken for the accused, and sentenced accordingly; and on one occasion at least judgment was given in a civil case against one of the witnesses, the judge remarking, when this was brought to his attention, that "the Court knew what it was doing."

I have time only to cite one case in which Russians are involved, which will show how hollow are China's pretensions that the judiciary is independent and free from all interference on the part of the executive or legislative powers.

THE CASE OF M. OSTROUMOFF.

After the failure of the Koltchak régime in Siberia, the Chinese Government reached an agreement with the Russo-Asiatic Bank regarding the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, then virtually bankrupt, as a result of which it was to be controlled by a board consisting of five Chinese and three Russian members. Following this agreement, B. V. Ostroumoff, an engineer of considerable experience, who had been concerned in the construction of the Siberian, South Siberian, and Bokhara Railways, was appointed General Manager. Under his management, and with the approval and authority of the board, he introduced reforms which had the result of converting the

railway from a virtually bankrupt concern into a paying enterprise, with trains and rolling-stock excelled by few other railways in any part of the world. Ostroumoff was no politician, and was not in sympathy with Bolshevism, and accordingly incurred the animosity of the Soviet, who were only biding their time to revenge themselves upon him. On May 31, 1924, China signed an agreement with Soviet Russia, under which she recognized the Russian Government, and agreed to the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway by a Board of Directors, composed of five Chinese and five Russians, nominated by their respective Governments. This agreement Chang Tso-lin refused to recognize, with the result that it was inoperative in Manchuria and over the Chinese Eastern Railway. During the civil war of the autumn of 1924, however, Chang Tso-lin realized that the Soviet might make themselves troublesome in his rear, and accordingly he entered into a separate agreement on much the same terms as that signed in Peking. This agreement was signed at Mukden on September 20. On October 3 Ostroumoff was summarily dismissed from his position, arrested, and placed in solitary confinement, the same treatment being meted out to Gondatti, chief of the land department of the railway. No charge whatsoever was preferred against either of them, although the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code prescribes that no person may be arrested without a charge being formulated. He was questioned from time to time by the public prosecutor, who pretended that he had been arrested to save his extradition to Russia. I cannot enter into the numerous violations of the Code of Criminal Procedure that have been perpetrated since his arrest. It was not until December 20 that he was summoned before the examining magistrate and told the nature of the charges against him. These charges related to transactions which had been inquired into and sanctioned by the old Board of Directors (which had a majority of Chinese), and their refutation required access to numerous documents in the railway company's archives. This access Ostroumoff has been consistently denied, though on several occasions the judge has undertaken to secure and produce the documents required—a promise he has never fulfilled. Ostroumoff, a man certified to be in a dangerous state of health, has been kept in solitary confinement, and treated little differently from a condemned criminal ever since October 3. The general amnesty which, as promulgated, unquestionably applied to his and Gondatti's cases—though they asked not for pardon, but for justice—has been overruled by the Manchurian authorities. Successive judges have been entrusted with the conduct of the case, and have pleaded illness, obtained a transfer elsewhere, or resigned. Bail, which would have been forthcoming to the extent of hundreds of thousands of dollars if necessary, has been refused. And I understand that an appeal to the Soviet Ambassador, who is

unquestionably responsible for this travesty of justice, met with the curt response that he would intercede for Ostroumoff only if he undertook to stand his trial in Moscow—for offences, be it noted, which are alleged to have been committed outside of Russian jurisdiction during a period when the Soviet Government was not recognized by China, and under orders of a Sino-Russian directorate.

I may sum up the present condition of the administration of justice in China by saying that if the rule of law is understood to mean, as Dicey says, that "no man can be lawfully made to suffer, except for a distinct breach of a law established in the ordinary manner, before the ordinary courts," and that "no man is above the law," it is non-existent in China. The provincial courts are for the most part under the control of the militarists in power in the particular locality. Peking will issue a Trade Mark law, prescribing the levy of substantial fees for the protection of trade marks throughout China, and Canton will retort with a Trade Mark law of its own, which prescribes local registration and payment of fees to secure protection within its jurisdiction. Peking will order the establishment of certain Courts of Justice which the Governor of Chekiang will abolish a few months later because he does not approve of them.* All the leading authorities agree that, far from the state of Chinese laws and the arrangements for their administration having improved of late, there has been serious retrogression.

"Indeed, so far as the control by the Central Government of China of the Courts in the Provinces is concerned, the situation is not as satisfactory under the Republic as it was under the Empire." †

"Although circumstances have not altered, except for the worse, the extraterritoriality problem enters upon a new phase with the decision now reached. . . . Now and for a remote future abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction is out of the question." ‡

"Save that the necessity to the Chinese people of European and American commodities has immeasurably increased, there is little, if any, improvement in the situation at the present time" (compared with that in 1840).§

The law to the contrary notwithstanding, torture is still in general use in Chinese tribunals. As a Chinese official put it, in attempting to justify the use of torture in a case in which it had admittedly been employed :

"If you are going to adopt foreign methods you will never recover the stolen property; you can never get evidence, and you can never

* Willoughby's "Foreign Rights and Interests in China," 69.

† *Ibid.*, 69. (Dr. Willoughby was Legal Adviser to the Chinese Republic, 1916-17.)

‡ Escarra, *op. cit.*, I and 18. (M. Escarra is Legal Adviser to the Chinese Government.)

§ Sir Havilland de Soumarez, Chief Judge, H.M. Supreme Court, Shanghai, 1905-21, in a lecture at King's College, April, 1923.

depend on it. We have got a code of regulations, but underneath the surface we have to carry on in our own old way." *

Summary executions are still frequent. A despatch from Shangsha, dated May 18 of this year, records the execution of a newspaper editor there, after a summary trial by court-martial, because the local General was enraged at the publication of an article alleging extortion on the part of the Army. The unfortunate man offered to bring evidence in support of this allegation, but permission to do so was refused, and he was shot.†

I have here a photograph of the scene following a round-up of alleged bandits in Lintsing county, not more than a day's journey from Tientsin, early in 1924. It is a harrowing picture, but the fact is that scores of men, women, and children were butchered in cold blood, and subsequently mutilated by the troops, who were so proud of their work that they suspended the butchering for an hour or two while half a dozen of the victims were still living, in order to have a photograph taken of this massacre. It was openly sold in the vicinity.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

I come, finally, to the "other considerations" which must be taken into account when discussing the question of the abolition of extraterritoriality. I shall do no more than mention the fact that it is to extraterritoriality that the foreigner in China owes his immunity from the arbitrary and haphazard taxation imposed by the local Chinese authorities upon their own countrymen, and from the exactions and levies of the militarists. It is to extraterritoriality that he owes the existence of foreign settlements and concessions, where he can reside under hygienic regulations and in conditions of reasonable safety, free, as a rule, from incursions of Chinese troops and bandits (often it is difficult to distinguish between them), and enjoy a measure of self-government. These are privileges not lightly to be sacrificed. But I am going to urge in conclusion that the most important of those "other considerations" are not foreign but Chinese interests. Irresponsible Chinese may clamour for the abolition of extraterritoriality, but they flock into the Concessions for safety whenever a civil war is in progress. And it is, after all, not unreasonable that the Treaty Powers should demand that certain standards of justice should be applied to the Chinese themselves, before their courts are permitted to experiment upon foreigners. The only foreign advocates of the abolition of extraterritoriality that I know of are small groups of missionaries, who are actuated more by the spirit of martyrs than by practical considerations in advocating this step. Their view is not shared by the majority of the missionary body. I cannot, perhaps, do better than conclude this

* Quoted at British Chamber of Commerce Conference, 1923.

† *Shanghai Evening News*, May 19, 1925.

lecture with a quotation from an address given by a veteran missionary in a lecture at Kuling, in August, 1910:

"But the thought which I am anxious to emphasize in closing this lecture is this—that China cannot come to deal fairly, rightly, and humanely with *foreigners alone*. Every guarantee given to *foreigners* for their proper treatment as dwellers in China must soon become a guarantee also to the people of China that they, too, shall henceforth receive for themselves a like justice and consideration to that which the superior power of the Western nations has *demand*ed as a *right* in the case of every citizen coming from Western lands. . . . Let every patriotic Chinaman . . . think with himself:

"This state of liberty, this security for life and property in China, this immunity from torture and from official oppression, corruption, and injustice which foreign Governments to-day *demand* from China for their respective countries, enforcing the demand where necessary through foreign consuls and by diplomatic pressure—this, and nothing less than this, is what *we Chinese* have to seek to obtain as a matter of course from our rulers for ourselves. We shall *not* get it, however, by first depriving the foreigner of it, or by subjecting him to all the injustice to which our own nationals subject us."*

DISCUSSION.

Mr. H. G. SIMMS: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I will not detain you very long. When I was asked to say a few words on this question of extraterritoriality I did not know what my friend Mr. Woodhead would say, so I wrote down a few words on this question. I have listened with great interest to what he has said on the question of the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China, and am glad to find they are consistent with the views to which I have often given expression in various capacities in Shanghai. Events which have happened since the deplorable incident of May 30 last in Shanghai, however disconcerting those events may be, must not be allowed to prejudice our outlook, and we must not allow ourselves to be stampeded by intensive propaganda. Even the propagandists who are busy broadcasting their own peculiar commentary on British history in China to suit their own ends must admit that in 1902 Great Britain, and subsequently the United States and Japan, made a real gesture towards adopting a just, liberal, and sympathetic policy towards China. In 1902, as Mr. Woodhead said, China expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations. At that time the Government in Peking was able to speak for China as a whole. In the most statesmanlike way Great Britain availed herself of this opportunity to prove her friendliness to China by offering her every assistance in effecting reforms she very much desired. In addition she was prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights as

* "Extraterritoriality in China," by Arnold Foster, B.A., London Missionary Society.

soon as she was satisfied that the state of Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warranted her in so doing. In the interests of the British communities in China those safeguards were prudently incorporated in the terms of the Mackay Treaty. Since 1902 China has had ample opportunity to make substantial progress in carrying out the reforms she so much desired, but the unpalatable truth is that she has squandered those years of opportunity, and notwithstanding what the Chinese Information Bureau circulates, the position in 1925 is worse than in 1902, because there is no Government to-day which can speak for China as a whole, and what is most extraordinary to us who have lived in China and have heard so much about China's sovereign rights, there are at the present time wild men from Moscow misruling her second greatest city, Canton, and those men have no extraterritorial rights. If they were citizens of one of the Powers possessing those rights their own Government would make short work of their antics in Canton. China not having what the students call an unequal treaty with Moscow, must turn them out herself, and the sooner she does it the better for the citizens of Canton. Young China raves about their country's humiliation and unequal treaties, but her humiliation is not due to what they call unequal treaties; it is due to the rapacity of her own officials who have done nothing to help their country and have totally ignored the 1902 gesture. With all the goodwill and sympathy in the world no Conference of the Treaty Powers, having in mind the interests of their own nationals, could take the responsibility of recommending to their respective Governments the abolition of extraterritorial rights until China makes an honest and sincere effort to fulfil the eminently reasonable conditions under which the Powers are prepared to relinquish those rights as laid down in the Mackay Treaty of 1902. She knows well that the Treaty Powers are friendly disposed towards her, that they have no territorial ambitions, that all they insist on is to be able to carry on their long-established trade, which has been of such immense benefit to China herself. In 1921 the considered opinion of the British business men in China was expressed in a resolution passed at a meeting of the Associated British Chambers of Commerce. That was at the time of the Washington Conference. I would like just to read that resolution to you now. It was sent to our delegates in Washington: "That this Conference of British Chambers of Commerce in China, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, consisting of representatives of British banks, shipping and insurance companies, manufacturers and merchants, who by reason of their widespread business interests and the considerable capital invested in this country, are deeply concerned with the commercial and industrial development of China, desire to place on record their conviction that the cause of China will not be advanced if, as is reported on good authority, the

Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference put forward far-reaching demands for the abolition of extraterritoriality, tariff autonomy, and cancellation of existing agreements regarding railways, mines, etc., which are not justified in view of the present inability of the Chinese Government to maintain order in the country, to protect the lives and property of foreigners, to establish a course of law where justice shall be freely and impartially administered, and to devote the revenue accruing from the taxation of trade to the development of the country's resources." That was the considered view of every foreigner in the East at that time, 1921. Since 1921 the position has become actually worse, and I think what we have got to do is to be consistent in our policy. Our Government must have one policy: unless there is very good reason to change what is laid down in that resolution we must stick to it, no matter what has happened since. In my own remarks, when I moved that resolution at the Associated Chambers of Commerce, I said it was not helpful to content ourselves with flattering Young China on the progress she is making. China must frankly realize the difficulty of trying to develop on modern lines by her own efforts only, and it behoves her to consider seriously what course other Eastern nations have adopted under similar circumstances, and to follow their example. With the natural impulsiveness of youth the Western-educated Chinese have desired to have complete control of their own tariffs, and to see their country free from the humiliation of extraterritoriality and foreign control of railways, etc. Who is there that does not sympathize with their aspirations? Like the word itself, extraterritoriality is cumbersome alike to Chinese and foreigners. It retards commercial and industrial development. On the other hand, who, viewing the state of China to-day, would have the courage to advocate the abolition of extraterritoriality? In the most friendly way we would strongly urge those representatives who have gone to Washington in the name of China not to prejudice her case by putting forward demands which cannot be conceded. We would warn them that the path they have to tread is a long and arduous one. They must begin at the beginning. If they desire to adopt Western methods they must think Western, and one of the fundamental principles underlying Western administration is the subordination of self-interest to the service of the State. Building on that sure foundation, corruption, dishonesty, and many other obstacles which hamper their progress will disappear, and all those things which they so ardently desire to-day will be added to them. Those, gentlemen, are the remarks made in 1921, which showed that we had great sympathy with China; but we are business people, and we are not going to give up any rights until we are sure we have got equally good safeguards from China. (Applause.)

Dr. HAROLD BALME: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I do

not intend to detain you for long this evening after the very interesting and illuminating lecture that we have listened to. But there are two or three aspects of this subject in which I venture to differ from our lecturer, and it seems to me that we want to consider all sides in an audience such as we have here to-night. The first point that I want to emphasize is the fact that, whatever we may quote of happenings in previous years, we are dealing with a new situation to-day in China, and a situation in which the psychological element is probably one of the most important. Underlying the whole of this difficulty of extraterritoriality as seen from the point of view of the Chinese (and, unlike Mr. Woodhead, I live among them in the interior), the important fact which is impressing all of us who are concerned about the restoration of good relations, is the sense of inferiority to which Mr. Woodhead alluded when remarking that the existence of extraterritorial rights is a stigma upon sovereignty. We cannot forget that the main article of the Washington Conference of 1921 was a frank recognition on the part of the signatory Powers of the full sovereignty and independence of China, and until extraterritorial rights are abandoned by those foreign Powers that are dealing with China in trade and in other forms of mutual intercourse, you have the acknowledged fact that that sovereignty has not yet been fully restored. There may be a thousand reasons against the restoration. Mr. Woodhead has supplied us with some very lurid ones this evening, and I have no doubt that he could produce more—I could produce a few myself from my knowledge of the interior—but even those excellent and melodramatic reasons do not get away from the major fact, that so long as these rights, or whatever you may call them, are withheld, you have a psychological condition which is always apt to express itself in boycotts, anti-foreign disturbances, or at least in that form of misunderstanding which, unfortunately, has poisoned our relationships with China on so many occasions. We were reading in *The Times* to-day, most of us, Lord Willingdon's remarks at Eastbourne yesterday. Speaking of the great India problem, he said that there is only one solution to it, and that is a frank recognition that the day of superior races and superior domination is over. Although there may be many differences of civilization—and I think sometimes we are apt to forget that the Chinese can point to as many defects in our civilization from their estimation of values, as we are able to do in theirs—this greater problem cannot be satisfactorily solved until this full relation of equality is established. I want to suggest, in the first place, that the big problem in extraterritoriality is the fact that you have a discontented China to-day, whereas the greatest asset we know in trade and in all such relations is the goodwill and confidence of the people. In the second place, I want to suggest that when people talk about the abolition of extraterritoriality it does not necessarily involve, as is often

suggested, the immediate sweeping away of those precautions which have had to be set up in the past in order to make commerce stable. I think there is no question about it that in the past it has been a necessary *modus operandi* to have some form of extraterritorial rules. As to the suggestions made to-day by the more reasonable of the Chinese, such as the educators, with whom I am more particularly in contact, immediate abolition is the last thing they want to see. What they want is to see a definite series of stages by which mixed courts and mixed tribunals shall be set up in the larger centres, so that whenever a matter occurs affecting the Chinese and foreign nationals, it can come before the mixed tribunal, whose two members for the first few years should both adjudicate, and then, when the new laws have been put in practice so far as these foreign cases are concerned, a further stage should be developed in which the foreign assessor or co-judge should merely listen in to protect the interests of his fellow national if occasion demands, the major responsibility being put on the Chinese judge, this again paving the way for the Chinese judge to take full possession. Those of us who believe that Chinese extraterritoriality must go in the near future, believe that this is the natural process. I was sorry to hear Mr. Woodhead close his lecture with that series of incidents. I do not doubt the truth of any one of them. I know of some of them, but it seems to me that to-day we have to get to larger principles, and not continue to exacerbate the already strained relationships by the use of these various unhappy events. As I listened to him I could not help thinking of a talk which I had with Mr. Alfred Sze a few years ago, when he was Chinese Minister to Great Britain. I was asking him to take the chair at a meeting on the development of Chinese education. He replied: "I am sorry to refuse. I would gladly do so, but on more than one occasion I have had to listen to men of influence and repute using incident after incident culled from the sordid side of Chinese civilization, and saying hardly a single word on the other side. I could very easily produce such a lecture about life in England, as I have seen it in Limehouse and other places, full of very unfortunate incidents of English life; but it would not be a fair picture of the England in which I have lived." I really feel to-day that we are faced with such an enormous problem that we have got to look upon it in the largest and most generous way, never forgetting that unless we can secure the goodwill and confidence of the Chinese people no kind of rights that are guaranteed by treaties will ever take their place. (Applause.)

General Sir NEILL MALCOLM: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I cannot pose as an authority on so complicated and vast a subject as this one of extraterritoriality in China, but I should like, if I may, to express the pleasure with which I listened to the words of the last speaker; because I think the most important aspect of this

whole question is the one which he emphasized. It is that we are not only in China but throughout the East dealing with a vast problem of anti-Western feeling. It is a stirring in the East of a consciousness of nationality which is comparatively new, a great feeling of patriotism throughout the East which is new to us too, a sinking of individualism in the general sense of consciousness of race and racial rights. That is a movement which we cannot face with an absolutely rigid non-possumus. We cannot simply face that demand with a flat No. We have got to realize that if we do not act reasonably, give way here and give way there, the problem will get bigger, and we shall probably, I will not say be forced by armies or military strength, but sooner or later we shall give way, and probably go much further than we should have to do if we dealt with it on the lines suggested by the last speaker. I may say that the knowledge of the Chinese which I have acquired during the last two or three years in Singapore bears out the words of the last speaker. On municipal councils and elsewhere—we have Chinese on the Legislative Council also—their co-operation with the British is undoubtedly of the greatest possible value. They know their problems in a way the British could not, and their advice is undoubtedly a very considerable source of strength to the Executive Government. I speak with great diffidence on questions affecting China itself. It is many years since I was there last; but I feel that in this problem of dealing with four hundred millions of people we must seek for co-operation and gradually give way as gracefully as possible. (Applause.)

THE LECTURER: I have not a great deal to say in reply to what the speakers subsequent to myself have said. I agree to a certain extent with Dr. Balme that we have got to give way gradually on the question of extraterritoriality. The question is how far we are to give way, and when we are to begin. I hope I have persuaded you that now is hardly a fortunate moment to go so far as to fix dates or principles, when there is no Government capable of fulfilling a single obligation into which it enters. That lies at the root of China's troubles. You can enter into what engagements you like with the Government at Peking. It does not follow it will be obeyed in Canton, or Hankow, or Manchuria. I believe that at Washington one of the strongest reasons actuating the Conference in agreeing to go as far as it did in the question of tariff autonomy was the fact that the Government a few months previously had entered into an arrangement with the foreign cigarette companies that on payment of certain taxes to the Central Government all forms of illegal taxation on cigarettes in transit would cease, and if this regulation was ignored or evaded by any of the Provinces the Central Government was to refund the amounts illegally exacted. But the ink was hardly dry on the agreements before, first Chekiang, and then province after province, proceeded to enforce

illegal cigarette taxation, which in the aggregate must amount to far more than the Government can collect and refund. We are always up against a problem of that kind. It is all very well to talk about Chinese co-operation in Singapore. Of course the Chinese will co-operate with the British if he is assured of safety of life and property—he will do it even in foreign Concessions in China—if he is not intimidated. But you cannot expect that where he is constantly liable to the exactions and coercion of his own officials. I have only tried to put practical aspects of extraterritoriality before you. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before we separate I am sure you would like me on your behalf to thank the lecturer, and the other gentlemen who have taken part in the discussion, for all the information they have given us. I have rarely heard so lucid and clear an exposition of a difficult subject as we have heard to-night from Mr. Woodhead. (Applause.) His remarks were very appositely and eloquently supplemented by what Mr. Simms has told us. I was particularly glad to hear Mr. Simms, because he represents British capital in China. That British capital is represented sometimes as rapacious, but we have had ample proof, not only from what he said to-day, but from what he quoted from the resolution passed by the Associated Chambers of Commerce in 1921, that the British capitalist in China, so far from being a bloodsucker, or thinking nothing of the welfare of the people amongst whom he lives, has the keenest interest in their welfare, and the greatest sympathy with their aspirations economical and political. But we have to remember that the British capitalist in China is one of us. He goes there under the protection of the British flag. Before we ask him to sacrifice the protection that flag affords him we are entitled to demand, and he is entitled to ask, of the Chinese Government, "What guarantee do you give this man representing Britain abroad that he shall receive justice and fair treatment from the tribunal to which you propose he shall be made amenable?" That practically is the key to the situation between us and China. From 1902 down to to-day we have told the Chinese, "We sympathize with your desire to get rid of extraterritoriality. It is a stigma on your sovereignty and cumbersome to our trade; but before we can allow it to be got rid of, before we can make our subjects amenable to your tribunals, satisfy us that your tribunals are honest, fair, impartial; that your laws are reasonable laws, and not laws which allow of torture and coercion. Give us assurances on these points, and then we will dispense with the present safeguards." But I think it would be folly at this stage, when such authority as there has been in China has since 1902 made absolutely no step or gesture to comply with any of the conditions we have laid down, that we should come forward voluntarily, and from so-called psychological reasons—forgetting altogether the practical issues at stake—say, "We renounce these safe-

guards. We follow the Bolsheviks." It is all very well for the Bolsheviks to say they are content with the Chinese tribunals. No doubt these are better than the Cheka. They benefit by the change. But it is a different thing to ask British subjects to run the risk of the judicial atrocities which are perpetrated in China. The lecturer put before us the situation as it is to-day. We do not wish to dwell unnecessarily on the abuses in the administration of justice and law, but while those abuses not only exist but flourish, our people may at any time come up against them. It was right, therefore, in explaining the position to-day, that the lecturer should give recent instances showing how justice is administered in China, and what our people would have to fear if we give away those safeguards by which at present they are protected. That is quite consistent with our desire that China should justify us in removing those safeguards. Therefore those of us—and I think we are all—actuated by a spirit of goodwill to China, should say, "For heaven's sake try to put your house in order; establish a strong Government, establish a decent judiciary, pass laws which will not be so much waste paper, but which will be capable of being and will be enforced. When you can do something practical and tangible, come forward, and your claim, if a reasonable one, will be met and satisfied." That is what we said to Japan fifty years ago, and Japan accepted the advice, with the result that Britain was the first Power to renounce extraterritoriality in Japan over twenty years ago. If we were to renounce it in China *now* we should be exposing for an indefinite period, not only our own people, but the four hundred millions of Chinese to the evils of one of the most backward and corrupt judicial systems in the world. Of all nationalities who have dealt with China I think our hands are cleanest. We may have some flaws on our escutcheon, but it is the irony of fate that the Government whose attitude towards China has been the most sympathetic, and whose dealings have been the fairest, should be the one most malignantly attacked by Young China. That is not a spontaneous movement, but a very clever exploitation of the present Young Chinese psychology by our friends the Bolsheviks. (Applause.) I would ask you to thank the lecturer, and those who have taken part in the discussion, for the very interesting evening we have had. (Renewed applause.)

RECENT PERSIAN HISTORY *

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL W. G. GREY

SIR GEORGE MACMUNN, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I must first express regret that we have been unable to get together a sufficient number of interesting slides for this lecture. We have done our best, but it does not amount to very much. I hope the subject-matter will be sufficiently interesting to atone for the lack of illustrations.

The title of the lecture is "Recent Persian History." I suppose it is correct to say that until the latter part of last century Great Britain's position as chief guide, counsellor, and friend to Persia was not menaced; but when the Russians occupied Trans-Caspia, and the line extending from the Caspian Sea to Penjeh, which lies along the Persian border, it was inevitable that Russian influence in Persia should make itself felt in increased measure. This commenced in the North, and when I first came to Persia in 1902 there were already visible signs of every effort being made to extend it to the South. So much so that I was once or twice called away from Bander Abbas, where I was stationed, to find out whether such and such a place close by had not been leased to a Russian company. The report turned out in each case to be nonsense, but it kept one busy and amused, and interested the natives of the place very largely. This attempt of the Russians to establish their influence throughout the country naturally led to a great deal of friction with British representatives. This friction got worse and worse at the beginning of this century. So

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held on Thursday, November 12, 1925, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., when Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Grey delivered a lecture on "Recent Persian History." In the absence of Lord Peel (Chairman of the Society), Major-General Sir George MacMunn presided.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel sure that in the constant interest that Persia and Persian subjects arouse in everyone who cares for the East, and the recent constitutional change in Persia having brought the Persian subject once again to the front, you will welcome very much a lecture from Colonel Grey—whom I have the pleasure of introducing to anyone who does not know him—who has been a great many years of his life in Persia and Arabia, and can tell us a great deal of the internal happenings there during the last few years, of which very few of us know the inner history. I will ask him to address the meeting. (Applause.)

acute was it on occasions that it prejudiced the continuance of cordial relations in Europe; and in 1907 an agreement was signed between England and Russia which it was hoped would put an end to this particular form of trouble. It divided the country into "spheres of influence." This is common knowledge. I need not dwell on it except to state the effect it had on the three Powers concerned. The British, of course, complained rather at first because it was said that Russia had got the best of the bargain. This in a sense was true, in that nearly all the more populated and flourishing towns and districts were included in the Russian sphere. However, this criticism died down gradually when it came to be more and more realized that a real act of statesmanship had been performed, and that on the whole this agreement would be beneficial. It was pointed out that as we had no intention of making it a prelude to the partition of Persia between the Russians and ourselves, it was not really of much consequence that they should have the best of the bargain. I never heard any complaint of this agreement on the part of any Russian. No doubt they were quite satisfied, and in the light of their subsequent conduct in Persia, which I will come to presently, it is likely they had no complaint to make. The Persians, of course, were very much upset indeed, as they naturally would be. Suspicious by nature, they naturally thought that this was merely the prelude to the partitioning that they had been so afraid of ever since the Russians appeared on the scene. They were quite convinced on the point; one said that this was all right for a time, and then the Powers concerned would find that it was not sufficiently satisfactory, and would have to replace it by something else until Persia and her people were at the mercy of foreigners, and their existence as an independent nation would altogether cease. Between this time, 1907, and the outbreak of the war, the conduct of the Russians in Persia was certainly such as to lend strong colour to this view. They hanged mullahs and mujtahids in Tabriz and elsewhere, and in May, 1912, in spite of the vigorous protests of Sir Percy Sykes, then Consul-General at Meshed, they actually bombarded the sacred shrine of Meshed. This created a great deal of feeling, for it is the most sacred place in Persia, and after Mecca and Medina the most sacred in the world, with the exception of Kerbela and Nejd, to the Shia Moslem. The Persians became more and more convinced that the Russians were going to take part of their country, and regarded the act as something done to promote disturbance which would compel the Russians to take over the country in the interests of law and order. Another difficulty at this time was the conduct of the German officials. They sought to sow what ill-feeling they could between the Russians and ourselves. This is no vain accusation. It was admitted by a German consul. When asked what was the occupation of himself and friends in Persia, he said, "Oh, it is quite simple; in the Russian sphere we support the British,

and in the British sphere we support the Russians." (Laughter.) I think one is justified in assuming now that it was the result of their anxiety not to see too close relations come into existence between Great Britain and Russia. If we asked at the Foreign Office here whether they thought the Russian Government had any idea at that time of dividing Persia with us, we usually received the reply which I have already received more than once, "Oh, I don't think so."

They may or may not have had such a view, but in 1916, when passing through Petrograd on my way to take up the position of Consul-General at Meshed, I was asked to go and call on the head of that part of the Foreign Office there which dealt with Persia, as he could give me some interesting hints and information. I had an interesting conversation with this gentleman. As I was going away he said, "You will find your colleague at Meshed a very pleasant fellow. Don't quarrel with him, it is not at all necessary that you should; because, as no doubt you know, we are going to partition the country: we are only waiting for a convenient opportunity, so try and keep the peace all the more—try and keep the peace until it comes." I was very much surprised. I did not make any remark, but might have told him that if there was any such idea it was entirely confined to Russia, I was quite certain. As a result of various things, principally the 1907 agreement and the conduct of the Russians that followed it, we found ourselves and the Russians very unpopular in Persia at the beginning of the war. Of course we were not as unpopular as they were, because they had been the actual authors of those actions which inspired the Persians with so much fear. But we were also blamed because we had not, in Persian opinion, restrained them sufficiently, and it was not surprising when war broke out that a large number of the educated classes in Persia were more inclined towards our enemies than towards ourselves. In spite of this the British and Russian Legations succeeded, with what I may say was great skill, in inducing the Persian Government to maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Allies during the first two or three years of the struggle; although in July, 1916, when the enemy forces advanced beyond Hamadan and it looked as if they were threatening the capital itself, there was a panic, and the Shah decided to run away with his court and throw himself into the arms of the invaders. Well, fortunately, within two or three days there was a set-back to the invading force, and so this project was not carried out; but it was considered to be near enough at hand for numbers of European ladies and children to be sent away down to the coast of the Caspian Sea and for some Legation—say it was the Russian Legation—to send one night a chauffeur to put all the Shah's automobiles out of condition. (Laughter.) Very shortly after this, our successes in Mesopotamia changed the situation altogether and that particular fear ceased to exist. When the revolution

broke out in Russia, of course that meant a decline of Russian influence, and it was followed a little later by the departure from Northern Persia of Russian troops. These troops had been strongly disliked by the public. I saw a good deal of them when I was in Meshed; they behaved in a very high-handed fashion. If there was any dispute between a Persian and a Russian subject, Cossacks were always on the spot and took possession of the property in dispute without any hesitation. In their possession it remained, because the Karguzar, or whoever tried the case, was always sufficiently intelligent to give a decision in favour of the Russian. When I asked one of these officials one day why he did this, he said, "Well, you see, it is their sphere of influence." (Laughter.) However, in the course of a very short time after the departure of the Russian troops, it was obvious that Russian influence had entirely disappeared and that all questions of spheres of influence had ceased to exist. The troops in Northern Persia were replaced by our own, and the Persians soon came to understand that there was a great difference between their behaviour and that of the Cossacks who had preceded them. During the whole of the time troops were with me in Meshed I never had one serious complaint against them, and when they went away there was whole-hearted regret. This was partly because the Persians had made some money out of them, but there was honest regret that they should be going; and one or two people—I think they were contractors—asked whether they could not stay. When the war came to an end the position so far as we were concerned had very greatly improved. We had regained some of our popularity, thanks to the conduct of our troops and our officials generally, and I think then there was a very good opportunity for us to do something for Persia if we had happened to take a line which was suitable to the occasion. In 1919 the Persians sent a deputation to the Peace Conference at Versailles, and this deputation was sent in the hope that in the general settlement that was expected to be made, something might be done for Persia which would at all events ensure her continuance as an independent nation. While this deputation was there, the Prime Minister of the time was engaged, with two of his colleagues and the representative of Great Britain, in preparing a secret convention—known afterwards as the Anglo-Persian Convention. What was going on, so far as I have been able to make out by asking nearly everybody in Persia who is of any importance, was known only to five people. In the meantime the delegation to the Peace Conference was refused a hearing, on the very natural and reasonable ground that Persia, not having participated in the war, was not qualified to be represented at the Conference. There was no fault to be found with that. In August, 1919, the Convention was signed and the matter came to light. Immediately the whole of the Democrats and Nationalists—large and powerful political bodies in Persia

and elsewhere—rose up against it and used very strong language. I am sorry to say that in this they were backed up, perhaps not with the same language, but with equal force, by certain Allied legations in Tehran, who apparently thought they ought to have been consulted in connection with any arrangement that might be made for a settlement of Persia.

This Convention provided for a great deal which was beneficial to Persia. The Government was to receive a loan from Great Britain of two million pounds; Persia was to be provided with advisers in finance and other departments; and a joint military commission was afterwards set up—its President was my friend General Dickson, who had previously been commanding the forces in Eastern Persia—with the object of drawing up a report on what was required for the reorganization of the Persian army. At the same time Mr. Armitage-Smith, the officer selected by the Government in London as Financial Adviser to the Persian Government under this Convention, came out with his staff, and they were ready to begin work. The military report was actually drawn up, and a copy of it is in my possession. The Prime Minister, seeing the opposition aroused among the Democrats and Nationalists, tried to stem it by deporting some of their leaders to undesirable places in Southern Persia, and it was considered possible that this heroic measure would help in putting in force the conditions of the Anglo-Persian Convention. It was, however, specially laid down that the Convention had to pass the Mejlis or Persian Parliament before such could be done. Time passed and the Mejlis was not assembled, although it had recently been elected. For one reason or another its assembly seemed to be impossible. The matter therefore was at a standstill for some time, and the fate of the Convention was ultimately sealed by events which perhaps could not have been—at all events they were not—foreseen. I refer to the evacuation of the Caucasus and Baku by British troops, and the landing without opposition from us of a Bolshevik force at Enzeli on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea. The Persian Prime Minister gave out on one or two occasions that after these events it was obvious that he would not be able to proceed with the Convention, and until the May of the following year nothing further was done. At that time Sir Percy Cox, who had acted on behalf of the British Government for the Convention, left Persia and was relieved by Mr. Norman. Before Mr. Norman left England he asked Lord Curzon what policy his Lordship desired him to pursue when he arrived in Persia. Lord Curzon said: "I want you to follow Sir Percy Cox's policy." Mr. Norman came out to Tehran, and according to my information was told nothing by Sir P. Cox. Colonel Sir T. W. Haig, who had served under the late chargé d'affaires as Counsellor of Legation, remained to advise Mr. Norman, and recommended him to press the Prime Minister to proceed with the Convention. But

this seems to have been impossible, as the Premier had already remained quite inactive for a considerable time. It is hard to imagine a more difficult position than that in which Mr. Norman found himself on taking over. So far as he knew this Anglo-Persian Convention was still to be brought into force, and yet it was, on the spot, as completely defunct as if it had never existed. After two or three months, seeing that the Prime Minister did nothing for the Convention, Mr. Norman consented to his replacement by another, in whose goodwill he had more confidence. This was Mushir-ed-Dowleh, one of the leading Nationalists of the country. This man, however, so far from doing anything to put the conditions of the Convention in force, or helping in any way in the extrication of Mr. Norman from his dilemma, sent away the military officers who had come for the reorganization of the army, and deputed Mr. Armitage-Smith to Europe to arrange some matters which were outstanding between the Persian Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Mr. Armitage-Smith had no objection to going, but Mushir-ed-Dowleh told him when he left that he was afraid he would not be able to ask him to return, as the feeling against the Anglo-Persian Convention in the country was so strong. Mr. Armitage-Smith therefore departed, and it was some time before he came back, in circumstances I shall relate presently. For some time Mushir-ed-Dowleh carried on in the fashion of many Persian Premiers—that is to say, he did nothing. At the end of the autumn of 1920, the General Officer commanding the troops in North-Western Persia had reason to consider it advisable that the Russian officers (belonging, of course, to the old régime) who were entrusted with the work of training and advising the Cossack division stationed at Kazvin, about eighty miles to the west of Tehran, should be dismissed and replaced by British officers. His reasons were entirely military, and, so far as one who has done no military service for some years can tell, they were exceedingly sound. The matter was represented to the Mushir, but he feared to carry it out and preferred to resign office. He resigned and was succeeded by another Nationalist, the Sipadar. This man carried out the measure required. The Russian officials left, and were replaced by Colonel Smyth and some other British officers. The Sipadar, however, showed after this, if possible, more signs of weakness and inertness than his predecessor, and after three months another of those upheavals in the country occurred which are always to be expected—even if they do not occur they may be expected—when you have a Prime Minister of that kind. A *coup d'état* was organized, mainly by a Persian journalist, the editor of one of the best daily papers in Tehran, a person of great intelligence, and, so far as one can see, an honest well-wisher for the good of his country. This man, in conjunction with the Cossack Division at Kazvin, organized a march on Tehran, and perhaps the British military officers with the Cossack Division thought it advisable,

on being applied to, to give advice as to how this expedition should be carried out. I asked Colonel Smyth, when passing through Kazvin shortly afterwards, whether he did not think it was a little queer his taking part in political movements in the country. His reply was: "I was asked for military advice, and as Instructor I had to give it." It is certain that if a thing like this is going to take place, it is better that it should be carried out in an orderly manner, as it was. The Cossack Division occupied Tehran, there was practically no bloodshed, they sent the Sipadar about his business, and they set up Saiyid Zia-ud-Din, the journalist, as Prime Minister. The Shah accepted the position, and Saiyid Zia-ud-Din was entrusted with the formation of a Cabinet. His rule began very well—too well, there is no doubt about it; for he proceeded to imprison a number of the Conservative party, the only party, you may say, who could have been believed to remain friendly to us. He put a number of them in prison; they were all people who were supposed to have robbed the State and he desired to squeeze them. Unfortunately they were not sent out of the country, but were kept in Tehran, and one or two of them managed by the judicious manipulation of certain causes of friction between Saiyid Zia-ud-Din, his War Minister, who was in command of the Cossack Division on the occasion of the expedition from Kazvin, and His Majesty the Shah, to bring about the fall of Saiyid Zia-ud-Din towards the end of May, 1921. After a reign of only three months he was obliged to quit the country in a hurry, and so far as I know he is at the present moment in Switzerland. When it was necessary to appoint an officer of ability to command the Cossack Division in their march from Tehran, Riza Khan had been at once selected, and the selection seems to have been an admirable one, because he has since shown a very great deal of power and influence as an individual, not to speak of his qualities as a military commander. This man twenty-two years ago was in the ranks of the Persian Cossacks, and used to present arms at the public buildings when on sentry in his turn. He is now Prime Minister, War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief. He is Dictator for the moment, and has a very strong chance of becoming Shah before many days are over. This man, when Saiyid Zia-ud-Din formed his Cabinet, had no difficulty in obtaining, after some little delay—there was someone, I think, before him for a few weeks—the post of War Minister in addition to that of Commander-in-Chief. He made it his business to attach all the soldiery to himself personally. In a country where money is always short and supplies deficient, he saw to it that every month a very large percentage of the money that happened to be in the Government Treasury was handed over to him for payment of the troops. The troops saw that their wants were looked after before any other employé of the Government was paid, and therefore they recognized

they must have a man of some consequence and distinction as their Commander-in-Chief.

When Saiyid Zia-ud-Din fell, the prisoners to whom I referred just now were at once let out. I arrived in Tehran on May 18, Mr. Armitage-Smith having arrived a few days before in response to a telegraphic invitation from Saiyid Zia-ud-Din. I went to Mr. Armitage-Smith's house, as I was to be his Political Assistant. I found that he was about to appoint a man as officer in charge of the military finances. I had heard something about Riza Khan on the way up from Colonel Smyth and others, and asked, "Have you the consent of the War Minister?" He said, "I and So-and-so will see him this afternoon to arrange. So-and-so talks Persian, and if the Minister cannot understand that we will have an interpreter in and we will talk French." In the evening I asked how they got on. Mr. Armitage-Smith said, "It is all right, So-and-so is to go on Saturday afternoon at two o'clock and take charge of his duties." The man went at two o'clock on Saturday afternoon accordingly. I was away that Saturday, but came back in the evening; Mr. Armitage-Smith said to me, "I have been insulted. So-and-so went there at two o'clock this afternoon, and he waited for two and a half hours, but nobody came." I suggested that the only thing to do now was to get an interview for me with the War Minister. This was done, and it was arranged for Monday at ten o'clock. I went up to the place appointed punctually at ten o'clock, and was shown with great ceremony into a small room where two men were sitting. One was a distinguished-looking person in military attire, and the other a very foxy person alongside him. They rose, shook hands without speaking, and pointed to a chair, in which I sat. I waited for half a minute for someone to begin the conversation, but nobody did so. I told them who I was, where I had been, and the precise reason for my waiting upon them that morning. I said that Mr. Armitage-Smith had been very much hurt, and did not understand how it was that after His Highness had accepted the service of one of his officers the officer had been treated in this manner. The War Minister did not open his mouth. After slight hesitation the other man said, "He is not a diplomat." I said, "There is nothing about diplomacy here, this is simply a friendly conversation." Then the War Minister found his tongue. He said, "I don't want anybody serving with the army. I can run the finances of the army myself. Please don't send anybody to that." I said, "That is splendid; now we know where we are. May I tell my friend that you are quite agreeable to his reforming the finances of the country generally?" He said, "Please do, provided he does not interfere with military affairs." I said, "Now we know where we are, and I hope we shall have your support." By this time he had thawed a little. He said, "The Cabinet is about to fall; who do you think ought to be the next Prime Minister?" I said, "What is the use of asking

me? I have only just come to the place and do not know anybody." He said, "Never mind that; who do you think ought to be the next Prime Minister?" I have a shrewd suspicion that he wanted me to say, "You ought to be"; I said, "I do not know anybody except one man who is in prison." He said, "That is out of the question if he is in prison." I said, "I don't know; this is Persia—queer things happen here. Why not take him out of prison and make him Prime Minister?" They laughed, we became friendly, and I went back to Mr. Armitage-Smith. He still felt sore, but understood the position, and was prepared to make the best of it. My suggestion may, or may not, have had something to do with it, but the next morning we heard sure enough that the Government had fallen, that Saiyid Zia-ud-Din was going, that these prisoners had been released, and that my friend had been asked to form a Cabinet. The friend I had alluded to was called Ghavam-us-Sultaneh, brother of the Vasough-ed-Dowleh who signed the Anglo-Persian Convention. I knew him very well, and was certain that if anybody could help us in regard to the continuance of Mr. Armitage-Smith in his work it would be he, although of course one knows perfectly well that because a man has been friendly to you in one place that is no reason why you should count on his friendship in another, especially if he is in a different situation. But I thought it the best chance we had, and recommended him. As soon as I heard the prisoners had been let out I went and called on my old friend. He said, "This is funny. I only came out of prison this morning, and they have already asked me to form a Cabinet." (Laughter.) I said, "How did you like being in prison?" He said, "I did not mind that so much, but I did not like the rough manner in which I was treated by the Cossacks. When they arrested me and put me in a carriage to go to Tehran they would not let me sit on a seat, but kept me down on the floor, and when I tried to get up they prodded me with their bayonets. They stole not only the gold watch out of my pocket, but the gold stopping out of my teeth." Of course, the Persian never has been known to lose an opportunity of making any money. I paid frequent visits to the Ghavam during the next few days. He said, "I am in a very difficult position as regards you people, because you positively have not got a friend in the country except myself, and what can one person do?" I replied, "It cannot be as bad as that." He said, "It is. The Anglo-Persian Convention estranged from you the Democrats and Nationalists, and now the Conservatives suppose you have been putting them into prison"—the rumour had got about that the *coup d'état* was our doing. No doubt that was chiefly because the Cossack Division was under the tuition of British officers. It was rather natural that such a report should get about, but it was most unfortunate and added still more to Mr. Norman's extremely difficult position. The Ghavam having said this to me, continued: "Never mind, I am going

to form a Cabinet of the best people I can get. Go round and call on them, and convert them to British friendship." I called on them and found them all very sore. One of them had been deported. He said, "Do you think I have anything to complain of against the British or not? I was asked by your Minister what I thought of the Convention. I said, 'Do you want me to tell you what I think, or what I think will please you?' He said, 'I want you to tell me what you think.' I said, 'It is a bad thing for us, and bad for you.' He walked away, and three days later I was arrested by the Persian soldiery, and sent down to Kum, a very unpleasant place where I certainly did not want to go." I commiserated with the man, and said it was the Prime Minister's doing. I advised him to let bygones be bygones, and so forth, and he was friendly enough. However, it was decided that the Mejlis must assemble before we could find out whether the people were really agreeable to putting the English Financial Adviser to work, and after two or three weeks' delay the Mejlis was assembled and opened by the Shah. That evening I was with the Prime Minister, and he said, "Go down and listen to the speeches to-morrow, and come back and tell me what you have heard." I went down and got into the visitors' gallery. The first thing on the programme was an examination of the qualifications of Prince Nusrat-ed-Dowleh—the Foreign Minister who had signed the Anglo-Persian Convention and subsequently been imprisoned by Saiyid Zia-ud-Din—to enquire into his qualifications to sit as a Member of Parliament. An opponent got up, abused the British, and abused the Prince. His object was to show that the Prince was not at all a fit person to be in the Parliament. He accused him openly of having endeavoured to sell his country to foreigners, and he told him that he had received for signing the Anglo-Persian Convention one hundred thousand tomans.

I came back and told the Prime Minister this. I said that nobody seemed to mind the English being abused in this fashion, and that the general feeling of the place seemed to be against us. He said, "I was afraid you would find that. Go down and see if any of the other speakers are better." Everybody who could possibly bring in something unpleasant for us did so, and although all the members of this Mejlis had been supposed to be friends of the heroes of the Anglo-Persian Convention, all their ideas had changed, and they were violently anti-British. The Prime Minister said, "I will get some members together every night, and you visit them all singly one after another, and try to convert them." We tried for some time, but it was useless, and finally the Prime Minister had to dispense with the services of Mr. Armitage-Smith and his staff. They all left the place, but I remained on to try and help the Prime Minister in his relations with the British Legation. He did not remain in power very long. Riza Khan, the War Minister, was gradually gaining in strength and

influence, and getting together the amount of experience that he required in other departments to enable himself to be Prime Minister, which was undoubtedly his ambition. After a few months he detected, or imagined he detected, the Ghavam in an intrigue against himself and forced him to resign. One or two other Nationalists followed him, but did nothing, and then the Ghavam returned to office. This brings us up to the autumn of 1923, and by this time the War Minister saw that his time had come, and 'imagining another intrigue, he dismissed the Ghavam from office, and ordered him to leave the country—which he did, and is still in France. Riza Khan then became Prime Minister himself, which frightened the life out of the Shah; he almost at once left for Europe, and has not yet returned. In the following spring Riza Khan made a rather serious mistake. He had been long an admirer of Mustapha Kemal, the President of the Turkish Republic, and thought the time had come to eject the Shah and his dynasty from office and have a republic. He therefore arranged for telegrams to be sent to Tehran, and to the Government and Parliament, demanding a change of régime, and it looked as if this was coming off, and that there would be a republic with him as President. But fortunately, or unfortunately, the Clerical party were afraid that subsequent events in Persia would much resemble those which had followed the republican movement in Turkey, and as they did not want to lose their influence and position in the country they opposed this, and Riza Khan was obliged to issue an edict, which he did after a few days, that it would be an offence against the State for anybody to say that a republic would be a good thing for Persia. I have often wondered how he performed such a complete *volte-face*. At the time I wondered what he was going to do next. It seems now that he was drawing back to jump better next time, and sure enough that is what he has done, as a few days ago we heard that the Shah had been dethroned and that the Kajar Dynasty was no more. A Provisional Government has been set up to carry on until the Mejlis meets to consider who shall be the next Shah, or what kind of government they shall have. We have heard various rumours since as to what is likely to happen, and many think that the Soviet authorities will contrive somehow to prevent Riza Khan remaining in power. It is rather difficult to see what they can do, but the Persians are very apprehensive, and although I am told that the Soviet representative in Tehran was the first to call upon Riza Khan and congratulate him on the dethronement of the Shah, there is great fear of them, because Riza Khan has shown from the first such definite hostility to Bolshevik ideas, and such disgust at their proceedings, that they regard him not only as a barrier to the extension of their influence in Persia, but also to the spread of it in the East at all. It is believed that the Soviet will not only try to get rid of Riza Khan, but that they will afterwards take further steps beyond what they have done hitherto,

to get a Government in the country which will be subject to Bolshevik direction. Riza Khan has not been altogether successful in his dealing with some of the influential tribes. But those tribes from time immemorial have been very difficult for successive Persian Governments to manage. There is nothing extraordinary in that. My own opinion is that in the event of an offensive movement on Persia they would join with the Persian soldiery, especially if the soldiery were properly led and their morale not affected by the removal of this leader who has inspired them with such devotion. One thing is certain, that he is the most remarkable man that has arisen in the country since the time of Nasr-ed-Din Shah, and it would be a good thing on the whole for the country if he remained in power.

Sir LOUIS DANE : I can only voice what I am sure is the general feeling of the Society, that it is a thousand pities that the Anglo-Persian Convention was perhaps rushed a little hurriedly, and that it did not remain as stable as its originators hoped for. But I think that was not altogether the fault of the framers of the Convention, because the conditions of the world are such that I am afraid instability is the general rule, and stability is the very rare exception. Persia being always an unstable country, the Convention that we all hoped so much from did not realize its full fruition. However, since then Persia seems to have fallen into strong hands, and history always shows, as the lecturer told you, that the strong man is what is required in Persia, as everywhere else in the world at the present time.

Mr. DONALD MELLOR : I have a question or two to ask the lecturer. Could he give any information with regard to the state of the country for anyone wishing to go there, say, for sight-seeing or on business? Could he say whether the main roads are in such a condition that you can go comfortably by motor from the frontier to Tehran, and then down to the Caspian at Resht, or could you go across country to Kum, or in the direction of Meshed? Then again as regards Shiraz, is it possible to go to Shiraz without much difficulty? I know the road is extraordinarily difficult. The road was built during the war; and I should be glad if the lecturer could tell us whether the roads are kept in passable condition.

The LECTURER : First of all as regards security. Generally speaking, Persia is in a more secure position for travellers than it has been for years. It is a long time since we have heard of anything happening to a traveller in Persia, such as happened when General Douglas and a companion were plundered. That is one of the things Riza Khan has done in the country. He has completely changed the question of security. As regards transport, from Khariskin on the frontier there is a motor service up to Tehran; whether it is continued to the Caspian I cannot say. The road from Meshed to Tehran is bad, and it is not advisable to traverse it by motor; but I think some

steps are being taken, or will be taken, to put it in order. In the meantime the journey can be done in eight or ten days by good carriage. There is no difficulty in getting from Shiraz to Tehran or Bushire, but I cannot tell you what the road is like. There is a good deal of talk just now among the American advisers of making transport companies, and so on. But nothing more has yet been done. Whatever difficulties there may be, I think you can always hire a motor in each place to get to the next one, provided the road is traversable, and as regards the question of security you may be perfectly happy about that.

A MEMBER: Might I ask the speaker if he knows whether Riza Khan has any plans for railway development, and if so, does he think it probable that Riza Khan would be guided by British officers in the matter rather than by American or some other nationality?

The LECTURER: So far as Riza Khan is concerned I do not think he has any choice between English and American, provided as good terms can be offered to the Persian Government. But, of course, you must remember that the gentleman in charge of Persian finances is Dr. Millspaugh, who has been on leave to America, and is supposed to have come back with a very good thing in his pocket, and promises from financiers in America to give a loan for the express purpose of railway construction if the terms are suitable.

The MEMBER: Would there be any connection with the Chester concession in Anatolia?

The LECTURER: I have never heard anything of the kind, and I think I should if there had been any suggestion of it.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I think you will agree with me that we have had a most interesting lecture from a man who knows this complicated story of recent events in Persia from the inside. I happened to have the privilege of being Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia and North Persia at the time of the Convention, and was in Tehran with Sir Percy Cox shortly after its promulgation, and met most of the Ministry. It seemed then as if the Convention was going through and would be a success, and it must have been a very great disappointment to Lord Curzon, the Foreign Office, and to Sir Percy Cox's successors in the Ministry at Tehran, that through causes perhaps beyond anybody's control—through the disturbed condition of the world, and the long delay after the Armistice in settling peace terms—it was almost impossible to keep things in Persia in hand. I am quite sure what the lecturer told you is true, that the Convention, or something analogous, was full of promise for Persia, but the jealousies of the other Powers allowed it to fall through. Personally, I feel sure that in due course Persia must come back as friendly disposed towards Great Britain, because I look upon Great Britain as the only

adjacent friend Persia has—at any rate, the only really disinterested friend. Whether or no Riza Khan is going to be able to make good in whatever capacity he can develop himself I am not in a position, and I do not suppose anybody else is, to know, but undoubtedly he is what Persia wants, a strong man. He can keep things going. This absurd succession of tumbling bogus Cabinets leads to nothing. Under his control there is some hope of railways and roads being developed. Such roads as have been made, chiefly by the British Government or British enterprise, in the country are not being kept up in decent condition. We had a fine motor road from Baghdad to meet the Russian road at Hamadan, but I hear it is pretty bad now. Without a strong control the whole thing is hopeless. Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure you will join with me in thanking the lecturer heartily for the extraordinarily interesting lecture we have had, and for the interesting slides. (Applause.)

CAUCASIA AND THE COMMUNISTS *

By MR. GEORGE YOUNG, M.V.O.

My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is a great pleasure, although in some ways a little alarming, to find myself, so to say, bringing Soviet Central Asia into Mayfair. I hope that we may all agree this afternoon, if only in view of the heat, that we will not take a fire in our hands in thinking of the frosty Caucasus, and that we will approach this rather burning question of Russian Communism from the cool and remote altitudes of Kasbek. Let us see if we cannot get a dispassionate bird's-eye view, in the short time that I intend to keep you, of the broad plain of the social system of the Russian régime that surrounds that island of the Caucasus.

Now, I do not propose for a moment to appear before you either as an authority on Central Asia or on the Caucasus. I have, to a certain extent, ever since the war, made as close a study as I could of the Russian social system. I was, I think, the first Russian-speaking Englishman, other than in the Secret Service, to get into Russia after the Revolution. I was out with the first Labour Delegation in 1920, at the time when the Russians had got their War Communism screwed up to its very highest pitch, probably the nearest thing to straight, theoretic Communism that any State, certainly in this stage of civilization, will ever reach. It was obviously a hopeless experiment. We told them so at the time, and about two months after we had left that whole experiment was abandoned, and they started their new system, which is not Communism really at all—although I have referred to it as Communism for convenience—but State Socialism. It is, therefore, purely as an observer of the relation between this State Socialism and the very peculiar condition of affairs in Caucasia, that I am speaking to you to-night. I want you to look upon me rather as a member of the rank and file, who has gone out across the front into the fog of war, and comes back with certain impressions—as he believes certain facts—which he is anxious to put before you as the Intelligence Service. It is for you to see the significance of these facts, and to draw your conclusions from them. My principal purpose is not to put my own conclusions before you. I merely want to give you the impressions that I got during this short visit, quite a short visit, to the Caucasus with the Trades Union Delegation last winter.

* Lecture given at 74, Grosvenor Street, on June 12, 1925.

One of the difficulties in reporting about the Caucasus is that you go there, not only through the fog of war between races and religions, the smoke screens of various propagandas, and the poison gas of all manner of press reports; but you also go there in a sort of pink cloud of romance. It is the most romantic region, I suppose, that still exists on the face of the earth. You see this at first glance, when you get among the mountains, those magnificent snow-clad peaks, rocky gorges, and tremendous precipices, clothed with primeval forest, where are remote valleys in which relics of ancient races are living their own lives as they have lived since they first went there ages ago, entirely cut off from the world and one another. You have there, in fact, in these valleys of the Caucasus, cold-storage chambers in which are preserved specimens of the civilizations of Central Asia and Asia Minor for the past two or three thousand years. "Cold storage" may, indeed, be not a mere metaphor: I was told, when I was up there, that there is inside a glacier a Persian army of two hundred years ago. They marched in there, got frozen up in the snows, and drifted down into the glacier. They say that in a few years' time this army of centuries ago is going to come out at the foot of the glacier in perfect preservation, and that you can already see the advance guard behind the ice. I cannot say I saw them, so you need not accept them as one of the facts I have to report. Another more authentic cold storing is that of the Second Crusade. That crusade, you may remember, happened to be conducting a great many of the leading ladies of Europe out to join their brothers and husbands in Palestine, but was overwhelmed in Asia Minor, and is generally assumed to have perished, been made prisoners, or, in the case of the ladies, been put into harems. But it seems that some of them escorting many of the ladies fought their way through to the Caucasus. In one of the remoter valleys there is a tribe that once a year puts on ancient crusading armour and holds a mediæval tournament. That gives you an idea of the mediævalism of the Caucasus—of the sort of contrast that you get there between mediæval feudalism and tribalism and ultra-modern Socialism.

Moreover, man is not the only wild animal in the Caucasus. It is a refuge for fauna as formidable as any "White" Cossack or "Red" Communist. The aurochs survives there, and I believe it is the last place in Europe where there still are tigers. Indeed, most of the species are peculiar. A few weeks ago I was asked by a young man if I would help him to go out there, as he was collecting for a museum. I am rather suspicious of people who go out shooting for museums, so I asked him what he was intending to shoot, and he told me that what he was after was a unique sort of wild white mice. (Laughter.) He was prepared to contract a reciprocity treaty with Russia by which he was to trade off a rhinoceros for a supply of these white mice. Let us hope he won't find they have been turned red. (Laughter.)

There are about sixty distinct tribes in the Caucasus, but there are only four races that really count politically. Those four are: the Georgians, the Armenians, the Tartars of Azerbaijan, and the Russians. The problems of the Caucasus are a curious interplay of the rivalries between these races intertwined with the economic collisions between the world empires interested in the natural resources of that region. The Caucasus is generally considered as a citadel of Empire on which sits the Great Russian Bear and from which he descends imperially into Central Asia. But it would be more correct to look on it as an island of Nationalism that has never been quite submerged by the rising tide of Russian Imperialism. A hundred years ago the Russian tide flowed over the lowlands between the Caucasus and Caspian to Baku, and so round to the south of the range. Another tidal wave flowed more slowly between the Caucasus and Black Sea to Batoum. Fed by these two streams the Russian inundation spread swiftly southwards, gradually settling the fertile country with colonies of Russian exiles and other emigrants, until checked by the barren mountains of Armenian Turkey. But the more mountainous regions of the Caucasus, such as Daghestan, even after fifty years' fighting still remained practically unabsorbed. The Russian tax-collector, even under Tsarist military despotism, had hardly penetrated it, and even the British lady tourist hardly ever set foot in the remoter regions.

The three main Caucasian races are the Georgians, the Armenians, and the Tartars. When the Great War broke up the Tsarist control all these races went off on their own lines. The Georgians at the beginning went in with the Germans because they were against the Russians. For the Georgians had been fighting Russia for a century, and went with anybody who seemed willing and able to support them against the Russians. So they looked to the Germans. The Tartars, on the other hand, turned to the Turks, for racial and religious reasons. Nevertheless, Georgians and Tartars were never working together. The Armenians, having been terribly persecuted by the Turks and at times protected by the Tsar, were pro-Russian. Indeed, the Russian front in Asia Minor was largely supported by Armenians fighting for their national existence. When this front collapsed at the Russian Revolution, the Russian armies flowed back in a mob and their Russian rank and file filtered off into Russia, spreading the revolution to the Russian colonists as they went. But the Armenian soldiers, of which there was a considerable force, stopped in Baku and set up the Soviet System in that industrial region. On the other hand, a good many of the Russian officers stayed in the Caucasus, among the Cossacks and Caucasian tribes, and organized the "White" armies under Denikin and Korniloff which subsequently invaded revolutionary Russia. The Turks, following slowly up behind the retreating Russians, advanced as far as Batoum and Baku. But the Georgians, who are extraordinarily

clever diplomats, had an agreement with the Germans by which the latter kept the Turks out of Tiflis and Batoum. So they pushed up between the Caucasus and Caspian, abolishing the first Soviet Government in Baku, and pressed on up the railway on the Russian side of the Caucasus. Incidentally, they drove out of Baku a detachment of our Dunsterville force. Then came the Armistice, the British took charge of Transcaucasia, and the Turk-German forces were all evacuated southwards. They took with them a good deal of loot, but it was a creditable feat that our small detachments should have cleared such a country of such armies without bloodshed.

There followed then the allied occupation of Transcaucasia, a system of British political officers working with middle-class, or, as they call them now, Menshevist Governments in all the Caucasian States. The British occupation might have lasted indefinitely had it been possible to establish relations of confidence between London and Moscow. But we could not maintain our occupation once it became a military menace to Moscow, and in our operations against Soviet Russia we were easily discomfited because we had not made up our minds what our policy was to be. We had two points of view following different policies. This is what the Russians told me. There are those here who know much better than I do our view of what happened—I am reporting the Russian view. There were, then, two centres of British policy: one in Meshed aiming at a pan-Islamic resistance to the Russian Revolution by getting all the Turcomans and Tartars and Turks together; and another centre of policy in Tiflis aiming at using the Nationalist movements of the Transcaucasian races, Armenians, Georgians, and Tartars, against the Russian Revolution. The reason we were forced to evacuate by the Russians was because we could not make up our minds as to which possible allies to work through. For, of course, a direct conflict between our small detachments and the Red Army was out of the question.

So the allied occupation came to an end, and our policy changed into supporting "White" raids and "White" risings against Revolutionary Russia. The raid that came nearest to success, that of Denikin, started from the Caucasus and got within a few miles of Moscow. But this policy, the military coup having failed, contributed to our discomfiture politically in the Caucasus, because in supporting Denikin our idea was to restore a liberal, constitutional, Russian Empire. That made it impossible for us to recognize the full national status claimed by the nationalist Georgians, Armenians, and Tartars. We therefore gave the Russians the opportunity of saying: "We Russians will make you nations; we are the people to look to if you want to retain your liberties. The British are for restoring the Russian Empire, which you fought for a hundred years." That is the appeal that brought the Russians back, first to Baku, where in 1919 they re-established their

Soviet System with the help of the Tartar proletariat. The Tartar industrial population, working in the oilfields under conditions disgraceful to that very wealthy industry, easily abolished the Menshevist régime of the commercial middle-class and oil millionaires. These latter were Tartar oil magnates, who had not reached the stage of becoming public benefactors, and who were even more hated than the foreign companies.

At about the same time the Armenians and the Turks fell out. The Armenians having most of their territory in Turkey and only a small part in Russia, were primarily dependent on the new Angora National Government, not on the new Moscow Social Government, in respect of their national State. It had looked as though Europe might take on this task of establishing Armenia. Relying possibly on Europe and America, the Armenians now had a quarrel with Angora about their frontiers. We had lost all hold over the Turkish Nationalists, and could do nothing when the Turks simply overran Armenia. The Tartars then joined forces with the Turks, and got the unfortunate Armenians between two fires. We could do nothing for them in spite of our obligations. The Russians, to whom the Armenians have always been useful allies, did their best for them, but were hampered by the difficulty that at that time the Turks were the allies of Russia in resisting Anglo-French action in the Black Sea and Bosphorus. At that time the Russian Communists were still fighting against our "White" protégés for the possession of Moscow, while the Turkish Nationalists were fighting against our Old Turk protégés for the possession of Constantinople. So when the Russians made their Treaty of Kars with the Turks, they had to give up to Turkey the greater part of Armenia, including Kars and neighbouring Armenian districts. All that was left of Armenia was the old Russian-Armenian province, and even that rather reduced. This remainder of Armenia within the Russian frontier then set itself up as a Soviet State and entered the Russian system. Thus there were these two Soviet States of Tartars and Armenians almost encircling Georgia, which still retained a middle-class Government. For the Georgians were so anti-Russian that they would have resisted the Soviet System, if for no other reason, because it was Russian. But this middle-class Government in Georgia found itself in a very difficult position. It was continually at war with the Soviet States on its frontier. It was also sitting on the pipeline from the oilfield to Batoum which it was essential for Moscow to hold, or to have in hands it could trust. Further, it controlled some of the most valuable manganese mines in the world, whose foreign owners were suspect to Russia of working for an allied occupation. Finally, its own industrial population were very much attracted by the Soviet Socialism they saw all round, and were continually trying to set up a Soviet State in Georgia. So the middle-class Government of Georgia had about two risings every year, which they repressed

with ever greater difficulty, driving the insurgents for the most part into the neighbouring Soviet States.

What finally brought Georgia into the Soviet federation is very controversial, and I am not going to go into that controversy. A Soviet State was set up in Georgia, without serious fighting, with the sympathy and support of Moscow. Exactly who did it, whether it was Georgian citizens who had been driven out of Georgia for being Communists, as the Georgian Communists say, or whether it was Red Army soldiers, more or less disguised as Georgians, as the Georgian Menshevists say, is still an open question. By insurrection as I believe, by invasion as you probably believe, there was established a Soviet State in Georgia that has lasted to the present day. It was that State which more particularly we were concerned in inspecting during the short time we were in the Caucasus.

I think there is no doubt at all that from the material point of view all these Caucasian States have been better off under the Soviet System than ever before. Georgia is financially, commercially, industrially, and socially better off than under the bankrupt Menshevik Government. It is not a point on which one can have any great hesitation in speaking, because it is a thing that is pretty obvious, even to a casual visitor. Figures, of course, one does not trust very much nowadays, but there are obvious facts that one can see. Moreover, not only did we come to that conclusion—that is to say, the Labour Delegation, who might be supposed to have been anxious to see the best—but Mr. Hodgson, our representative in Moscow, with Mr. O'Malley of the Foreign Office, now in the Caucasus, have subsequently come, in respect of material prosperity and progress, to the same conclusion. Therefore, I think we may consider that question of material improvement settled.

The moral advantages of Soviet rule in Georgia are not so clear. As against great improvements in education of the town workers and their social condition, combined with improved policing of the wild tribesmen and peace on the frontiers, we have to set the subterranean conflict between Georgian nationalist and individualist sentiment and the Russian Socialist and Centralist authority. The Georgians, as an autonomous State in a federation, resent Russian control as passionately as when not only their laws and liberties but even their language was suppressed by Tsarism. I think there is no doubt that the majority of the pure Georgians, the Georgian race, earnestly desire an independent Georgian State with full sovereignty. On the other hand, there is no doubt that a majority of the industrial population, which is mostly of Russian stock, would fight very hard indeed to maintain the present system. The Georgians are not a race to resist long odds, and I doubt much whether the Georgian Nationalists, the landed gentry and the peasantry who follow them, will go on rising as the Communists did in order to upset a Government they dislike. For

example, there was a little rising just before we got there, of which we were able to see some of the melancholy results. That rising gives evidence that the present system will have to be accepted by those who dislike it, as having the support of a majority of the inhabitants of Georgia. The insurgents could only raise small bands in certain remote districts, perhaps some few thousand altogether, and that only by the most grossly fraudulent misrepresentations. Thus the leaders of the rising sent, in hearing of their followers, telephone messages—I did not get this from the Russians, but from one of the insurgent leaders—telephone messages that there was a French fleet coming up the Black Sea to Batoum and a British force from India detaining at Baku to help them. Further, they made the most unscrupulous use of messages of sympathy sent to the previous middle-class (Menshevist) Government by various British and French statesmen, as indications that the British and French Labour Governments would support them. The unfortunate Georgian peasants were so far deceived that they welcomed the first Russian aeroplanes as being French and British scouts. The result of that rising was a strong reaction against the emigré Mensheviks who had misled them, and a very severe repression by the Communists—severer than circumstances at all justified; though there is always the argument in the case of repressions that it is kinder to be cruel—an argument that I do not hold myself. The repression of all opposition in Georgia was much severer than anything else we saw in the Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics. Even the old Tcheka was at work there, though it had been abolished in Russia four or five years before. The very name of the Tcheka is almost enough in itself to constitute a reign of moral terror. Therefore, no impartial observer could consider the moral atmosphere of Soviet rule in Georgia as satisfactory, even though it has given Georgia peace at home and abroad.

On the other hand, if we want to help the Georgians—and those of us who are most in sympathy with the Russian Revolution want to help the Georgians as much as anyone—we must avoid doing anything that will encourage them to insurrect or intrigue against the Russians. All the Russians want with Georgia is to feel safe there. They want to feel safe as to the oilfields and the pipeline, and they want to feel safe against the risk of further foreign intervention raising the Caucasus and Cossacks against them again. They realize that the Caucasus, which they have never assimilated, and never will assimilate, is a weak spot. They want to feel safe, and as soon as they feel safe they are prepared to give the Georgian State a larger freedom from interference. They have already adopted one recommendation the Trades Union delegation urged upon them, that they should amnesty the prisoners taken in the insurrection. They also told us they were ready to withdraw the small garrison of Russian troops in Tiflis and leave Georgia

as they have left other Autonomous States, entirely to its own national militia. That could, I believe, be got now from the Russian Government by a British Government who could make them feel safe.

We must now leave Georgia, although I know that is what especially interests most of you, because the results of Soviet rule in Baku are really more interesting. The Communists have there got a very free scope for experiments in Socialism, and it is the result of such experiments that interests one most when one goes to Russia. It is no use reporting what they write about what they are doing—one wants to see what they have done. Well, here they have not had to rebuild from the foundations a ruined industry and restore its markets. The oil flows, and the world wants it, no matter how Russia is ruled. So in the oil-fields they are a stage ahead of elsewhere. They began by entirely centralizing the whole management of the oilfields. The schemes of electrification and general centralization and co-ordination that were being discussed under private ownership, are now all in force, and are on an average about half finished. They have been able to do this because they take all the profits that previously went in dividends, mostly abroad, and put them back into reconstruction. A considerable proportion of those profits and a considerable part of that reconstruction is devoted to bettering the condition of the worker. This, at least, those of us who have known Baku will look upon with a great deal of sympathy. The position of the worker in Baku was very bad indeed under the old régime. He was generally a Tartar or a tribesman, a man of a very low type and standard of civilization. He lived in the Black Town of Baku under perfectly appalling conditions. They are gradually abolishing the Black Town and rebuilding it as what they call the White Town, a garden city of decent workmen's dwellings. It seems fair to assume that if they continue at the rate of progress that they have been working at for the last two years, in the course of the next five or six years they will have made Baku, not only industrially but also socially, the equal, if not the superior, of some of the American oilfields. That seems to me a very great feat, and may seem to you some compensation for any material sacrifices imposed on foreign investors and moral sacrifices imposed on Georgian Nationalists.

I cannot take you further into Central Asia, into States further east, because I did not go there. But undoubtedly the Central Asian States, like the Caucasian, all conform to the peculiar compromise that the Soviet System has established between Nationalism and Socialism. You have got to remember that what we talk about still as Russia is the Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics, of which the Russian Republic is only the largest constituent containing the Central Government. But there are four other federations, or sub-federations, associated with the Russian Federation, which have an equal sovereignty with it. Below that there is a whole hierarchy of various forms of autonomy and

home rule. For the Communist theory is this—that if you get people bound together by any relationship so strong as their Socialist system, then, without any great risk, you can allow them a measure of home rule which need only stop short of complete sovereignty. It is the old conception of the Christian super-State with Communists for clergy. The Federal Government retains control of foreign affairs, but the autonomous Republics manage their own national or local affairs, cultivate their own language and literature, raise their own finances and forces, and all this without the smallest hindrance, and even with every encouragement.

When you go to the Caucasus, and still more in Central Asia, you will readily see how far this works out—how far they are really able to allow lesser nations within their system to run their own show, and how or why the central authority intervenes. For example, after the Delegation left, I stayed on in Russia, and went down into Moldavia. There I found them starting up a new little Moldavian Republic, a State that was to cultivate the Moldavian language and literature, and be a little Moldavia within Russia. The experiment had some political importance because most of Rumania, and all Bessarabia now annexed to Rumania, is Moldavian. Not only were the Communists giving the Moldavians within Russia a right of running their own show, but they were also making it very awkward for the Rumanian Government, which was holding down by military force the Moldavians of Bessarabia. That is just the situation you find all along the frontier of the Soviet System. You find that this system, by being able to give these borderlands complete rights to run their own affairs, can make themselves far more unpleasant if they like to neighbouring Governments who are oppressing minorities than ever could the old Tsarist Imperialism by massing and moving troops. People often ask me whether the Russian Soviet System is becoming imperialistic. The answer is "No." They are becoming far more dangerous to people who cannot get on with them than was the old military imperialism, because they are able to enlist against a neighbour the nationalism of communities of which a large part are within the territories of that neighbour. You get such a situation in Armenia. The Russian-Armenians are absolutely devoted to the Russian system, and are prepared to fight for it to any extent. They prosper exceedingly under Russian Socialism, and hope that it will some day spread over Asia Minor at the expense of Turkish Nationalism, and recover for them their Armenian homelands in Turkey. And as Turkey has not been able to come to terms with the Armenians—for Turkey has not got any Socialism, only pure Nationalism, and is fighting both the Armenians and the Kurds—I think it is quite possible some day there will be a larger Armenia included in the Russian Federation. You find the same thing when you cross the Caspian Sea into Central Asia. The Communists



have lately rearranged the States in Central Asia so as to be more effective exponents of this moral penetration of neighbours. They have set up an Uzbek State, for example, of which the authority is confined to a small territory, but the attraction affects all Uzbek tribesmen far across the Soviet frontiers. There you have the Nationalist method of the Russian menace in Asia. It must not be confused for a moment with any menace there may be to European Governments from Russian Socialism. This working on the new Nationalist forces of Asia is entirely a different thing from the possibility of the Russian Soviet System spreading into countries like Germany, or still more, countries like Great Britain. Panics as to this possibility have their origin in press stunts and party tactics. No one, who like myself has been a student of Communism ever since it sprang full-armed from the Great War, could really fear a Communist coup in England. On the other hand, our Empire in Asia may suffer considerably from Russian support of Nationalist and Socialist forces.

If you want to understand what the Soviet policy is towards European Governments you must look to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs under Tchitcherin, which is pursuing a restoration of commercial and political relations under the *status quo*. But if you want to understand what the Soviet power in Asia amounts to, you can best do it by studying the methods of the Comintern under Zinoviev. The Comintern is a missionary organization which is having great effect in Central Asia, and which comes consequently into collision with the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs very much in the way as do our Foreign Missions with our Foreign Legations.

Now I have spoken for as long as anybody could be expected to listen on so hot an afternoon as this. But there is one thing I want to put before you before I conclude. The Russians, of course, are supposed to be very hostile to us in Central Asia; and one hears a good deal about the propaganda they are making against us. I heard a great many of these libels on our rule in India, Persia, and Transcaucasia during the short time I was in Baku and Tiflis. But there was only one story that had made any real impression on the minds of Transcaucasian and Transcaspien peoples. When you said to them of any yarn, "This is absurd; you know perfectly well that is not the sort of thing that British troops do," they always returned to this one story. They said, "This story anyhow is true; and if you can do this you are capable of doing anything; and if you doubt this story, if you doubt that it was the British that murdered the twenty-six Commissars, you have only got to go to the central square at Baku, and there you will see where they are buried, and you will see the plan of the monument that is to be put over them, and the inscription that is to be put on the monument."

This story that it was the British authorities in Central Asia who

murdered twenty-six Russian Commissars has done an infinity of harm to British prestige. The absence of any attempt to refute it has been most unfair to British officers of the highest standing, especially to certain British political officers in Transcaucasia and Transcaspia. It has made it impossible for some of them to continue earning their living in the Middle East. One in consequence lives under a false name. For those twenty-six Commissars were some of them men who had acquired the affection and admiration of the wild peoples they governed, by whom their murder has never been forgotten. Now the story that British officers were responsible for the murders rests, I ascertained, entirely on the report of spy-propagandists who were sent by the Central Asian Communists on a secret mission during our occupation to intrigue against us. One of these two men on whose evidence the report rests has now thrown over the Communists, fled to Paris, and entered the service of the principal counter-revolutionary organization. I had an opportunity recently of confronting him with his report on the Commissars and forced from him a retraction. We are now therefore in a position to clear it up, and some of us of all parties are trying to get something done. It has gone on now for nearly five years, that story taking deeper and deeper root. Moscow, I believe, would now join in a joint enquiry, and would subscribe to a report that would exonerate the British Army of this charge. They would, I think, do this no doubt for diplomatic reasons; but anyway, if we could get them to join in such a report, then the story would be definitely and finally killed. I consider this is our duty, not as a party matter at all, but as a matter of pure patriotism. It is our duty as civilians to clear the good name of British officers and officials who cannot do so themselves. It is our duty as Englishmen to clear our good name as a nation. I have been very glad to have this opportunity of speaking to this audience, in order that I might bring this particular matter forward as something we might all join in doing. (Applause.)

Among other speakers in the discussion—

Mrs. HAROLD WILLIAMS said: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I wanted to point to two mistakes. First, Russia has never had a single war with Georgia—never in the history of Russia. The first war with Georgia was during the Soviet régime, and if you look up the history of Georgia and Russia you will see there was never any war between the two countries. Russia was fighting the other nations of Caucasia, but never Georgia. The second point is that I think in a scientific lecture it is best to be very strict in terminology. The lecturer used two words, Russia and Soviets, and Russian Government and Russian people interchangeably. But it is not the same. You know that the Soviet Government has not the name of Russia on their official Government documents, and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, when he

was Foreign Minister, followed their example, and gave an order in the Foreign Office not to use the word Russia when speaking of the Soviet Republics; and he was quite right. In the same way the lecturer says the Georgian people do not like the Russian rule; it is the Bolshevik rule they do not like. I want to make things clear and not give different meanings to the same word. The word Russia is not to be used when you speak of the Soviet Government, and the words Russian people should not be used until the Russian people have some possibility of explaining. As they have no freedom they have no voice, and you do not know what is the Russian nation. Those are the only two points I wanted to make. (Applause.)

Sir LOUIS DANE: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—Nobody else seems to have a local knowledge of Caucasia; perhaps, as one who has studied in the past for a good many years the Russian system of advance in Asia, I may be able to add something to what the lecturer has told you, showing that names may change and systems of government may alter, but the intention of Russia is the same as it has been for centuries, and I do not believe has altered a little bit.

In addition to making a general study of this part of the country, which is very important from the Indian and other points of view, I had occasion to make a special study of what was going on there, as in the autumn of 1913 I was asked by Prince Sayid Halim, the Grand Vizier of Turkey, to take up the post of Governor-General of the six or twelve eastern *vilayets* of Anatolia. It was said to mean a real attempt on the part of Turkey to introduce reforms, and I was to have a staff of twelve British officers, six military and six civil, no one over me except the Grand Vizier, and a separate budget provision in the Ottoman Bank. It was said that Russia would accept such a proposal, but our engagements with her blocked it. The Turks appeared to be very keen on the proposal, and suggested that I might go as Special Adviser to Talaat Pasha, Minister of the Interior, with practically the same powers. There were demurs even to this, and then the war broke out. I often wonder if this handful of British officers could have kept Turkey out of the war. Stranger things have happened. At any rate I can claim a special interest in that part of the world, and my opinion is, with great respect to the lecturer, that a great deal of the intrigues and measures and those devices of holding out flattering promises of autonomy and almost entire independence, which are no doubt granted when the matters are not important, is very much what Russia has always practised throughout the ages on its neighbours in the East. It has happened in Afghanistan, Persia, China, India—the same devices, the same things, under the Tsars and under the Soviets—and I am afraid that will go on. Because in one or two places they have shown sufficient intelligence to leave the people to manage things in their own way, and make them comfortable, you must not suppose from that that

the idea of the country is changed in the least thing as regards internal autonomy, and as regards its interests in the Mediterranean and the East. As regards those three cardinal points, I believe Russian policy, no matter what the government may be, will be more or less the same. I believe under the somewhat disorganized Soviet System which now exists it is even more difficult to cope with than it was under a more regular and more ordered government under the Tsars. The lecturer has referred to one rather shining instance of Soviet good government (I think it almost amounted to that), and it was at Baku. No doubt it is exceedingly desirable that they should have made excellent buildings on the cliffs above, a White City for the Tartar workmen in the oil wells, but I would rather like you to observe the way it has been done. I speak subject to correction, but I believe that the wells have been practically expropriated, and the buildings and improvement of condition of the workmen have been carried out at the expense of the former wretched proprietors. Is that so, sir?

THE LECTURER: Oh, yes. (Laughter.)

SIR LOUIS DANE: I am afraid that even an Indian administrator with such admirable arrangements as that for expropriating the great tea, jute, cotton and coal industries could make the most excellent advances in the material uplift of the masses of India, but, unfortunately, we have not yet seen our way to carry out such things. As regards the Armenians, I am very glad to hear that the wretched fragment in the East of that portion of an ancient and brave old nation, which I hoped to be more intimately associated with at one time, is now fairly content. I can imagine they will be. They are rather well out of the way for the moment, and exceedingly useful to the Soviets; I have no doubt that they will be treated as well as can be expected.

THE LECTURER: I do not intend to be drawn into controversy, for, as I said before, it is very much too hot. Besides, I am not here as a Devil's Advocate. If you consider the Bolshevik as Diabolos it is not my business to defend him—I am only here as a witness to throw light on any point that I can. A speaker at the back of the room asked how the present system affected the tribes. Of course it does not affect the wild tribes at all anywhere within the Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics. The wild tribes are as yet unaffected, though already they have come up against the Communists' sanitary campaigns. There was found one tribe, for instance, that never had known any use for water except to dilute strong drink. They got one man to wash himself as an experiment, and he died of fright. (Laughter.) More important tribes like the Avkhazes of the Caucasus have no complaint against the system. They are not Socialist in the least, and all it means to them is that they run their own show with such an amount of help as they ask for. One reason why the Georgians in the end would inevitably have been defeated if they had tried to

fight the Russians, is that the Avkhazes, Tchetchens, and other Caucasian tribes all support the present system. There were two technical questions raised by Mrs. Harold Williams: one was whether Tsarist Russia had ever gone to war with Georgia. I am quite prepared to let it go at this—that if the invasion of Georgia and overthrow of the Georgian kingdom by Tsarist armies a century ago and the suppression of subsequent risings was not war, then certainly the overthrow of the Georgian Republic by a few thousand irregulars of mixed race three years ago was not war, but revolution. The fact remains that Georgians hate Russians. As regards nomenclature and the use of the word “Russian,” it is very difficult in speaking colloquially always to be perfectly accurate, and I dare say I have sometimes said Russian when I should have said Federation of Socialist Sovietic Republics. But I explained the difference very fully, and, in speaking of Georgia, I intended to speak of the Russians and not of the Socialist Soviet Federation. Georgia is a Republic of the Transcaucasian Federation, which is one of the four Sovereign Federations. Georgia has an autonomy within that Transcaucasian Federation which enables it to have an army of its own, and its own budget—which is as much as the Irish Free State has. But that does not satisfy the Georgians. They don't like the Russian race, and it is because there are a lot of Russians in Georgia, settled there intentionally by the Tsarist Government as Cromwell settled Ulster, that the present difficulty has arisen. Imagine a Communist Ulster, supported by London and the Dublin workers, ruling all Ireland within the Empire, and you get an idea of the split in Georgia. Sir Louis Dane raised the question of the oilfields. Of course there is no question about the Russian system being based on expropriation, and expropriation is very unpleasant to the interests expropriated. Nobody is questioning that at all. What one has to find out is whether anybody benefits by it, whether the money that is taken away from shareholders and proprietors, whether Tartar and American millionaires, or British and French middle-class investors—whether that money is being spent to good advantage. The question of compensation is a different matter and does not concern Baku.

Finally, I want to thank you for the very patient hearing given me by numerous dissentients among you. Although I hope I have dealt with Communism in the Caucasus from the altitudes of a remote objectivism, I have no doubt some of the things I may have said have given offence to some of you as unreasonable or possibly nonsensical.

The Council wish to express to Mr. Young their regret that in a report of his lecture, which appeared in the press without their authority, currency was given to a misunderstanding which arose at the meeting regarding a portion of his lecture.

CHINESE NOTES

CHINESE POINTS OF VIEW

"Divided long—unites," so runs a Chinese proverb.

LATTERLY many eyes have been turned towards China, and a few remarks from one who has had nearly twenty years' intercourse with them may be of interest.

The Chinese are a proud and, some say, a conceited people, but they have very good reasons for both their pride and conceit. They have for thousands of years been living their own life with their own civilization, while other races have been striving to better the world with a so-called civilization and a set religion.

The main idea of Chinese cult is filial piety, and in no other country has the commandment "Honour thy father and thy mother" been so fully given effect to; it is the foundation of their family, social, and national life.

The Chinese possess quite as many admirable qualities as other nations which are characteristic of the race. They are well behaved, intelligent, economical and industrious, they can learn anything, and there is nothing under the sun they cannot do. They are most polite, admire talent, and believe in right so firmly that they do not comprehend why it requires to be supported by might.

They rarely if ever forget a favour, and make rich return for kindness shown them; they are wonderful workers, greatly gifted with common sense, and are famed for good faith in their commercial dealings.

Many people look on China as a land with an enormous population, but so wanting in all that other nations possess as to be ready and eager to purchase whatever is offered for sale. The reverse is true, for China needs neither import nor export trade, and she can do without foreign intercourse.

The Chinese can produce any kind of food; their soil is most fertile. The climate is such that any class of fruit or vegetable can be produced; and agriculture, the industry which feeds and clothes, is their principal occupation. They have the best of clothing—cotton, silk and fur; one of the best of drinks—tea, and a tea that has no tannin, and is therefore harmless; and rice, one of the most sustaining of all cereals.

The Chinese are born traders; their population is so great that the sales to each other make up an enormous trade in itself alone, and

foreigners can only hope to dispose of their wares by creating new wants.

Taxes are very light, and if they become too burdensome the traders have merely to close down, when a remedy is soon found by the officials.

With the advent of the foreigner, however, changes began; and though at first these changes only affected the coast towns, they gradually made themselves felt inland.

Treaties have had unwholesome effects; foreigners approached the Chinese in a more or less submissive manner, and the Chinese agreed to treaty relations, which, once exchanged, the advantages became "treaty rights," and China has to look out for herself if she does not live up to the letter of the treaty. These treaties are, therefore, a thorn in the side of the Chinese, and the native population will always feel sore when supplanted in business by privileged foreigners. The fact that concessions made in one part of China are applicable to the whole, without the general consent, causes ill-will.

Time on time the railways constructed by foreign enterprise have been torn up and destroyed, which is a clear sign of the resentment of foreign intrusion.

China has an immense trade of her own, beside which foreign trade is a mere fleabite, and although foreign commerce is growing, there is a tendency for it to pass finally into the hands of the Chinese themselves.

There would seem to be no bounds with such a huge population to the demands of consumers; but taste for novelty has to be cultivated and customers' wishes consulted; eagerness on the part of the foreigner to supply does not mean a corresponding demand, and success will only be attained by the consideration of native prejudices and sentiment.

To live and let live is a common ideal with Chinese traders; their strength lies in business organization and combination, and they are quite, if not more than, a match for the foreign trader who is inclined to the idea that competition is the very thread upon which the life of trade hangs. It will be difficult for China and the foreign Powers to come to a better agreement unless a better understanding exists between them.

The Chinese are suspicious, and naturally so, of the aims and objects and demands of foreign Powers. At present she is in a state of chaos, and some people are inclined to think that the only salvation for China is to divide her up—possibly because they believe the Chinese easily ruled—and that such a suggestion would meet with welcome from the Chinese. Anyone who knows their character will, I think, agree that all the so-called progress, civilization, and liberty that foreigners could offer would be nothing more than a curse; the only civilization, liberty, and progress that the Chinese really appreciate is their own.

A divided China will ultimately be the means of cementing the will of the people against the foreigner, and if the joint Powers were to set up an emperor, and later withdraw their support, the imperial edicts would have no attention paid them. The whole idea of a divided China must ultimately meet with failure and futility in the end. The detestation of the foreigner will not cease until we treat China and the Chinese in just the same way that we treat other civilized Powers—like the French, for instance.

We desire that our people shall be safe, and receive as much protection in China as in other foreign countries.

Missionaries, who from the medical side do admittedly a great deal of useful work, have from time to time irritated the people and officials in many provinces by giving support to the scheming of certain unscrupulous converts, and again by the intervention of the priests between their converts, the non-Christians, and the officials.

A more friendly attitude towards China by the Powers is desirable, and something done to remove the sting of humiliation which the irritating privileges given to foreigners undoubtedly have on the Chinese.

The Chinese are not a military race, and a Chinese once said to me, "The Chinese, as you know, are a peace-loving nation, and I think we make more of learning and learned people than you English do. When in London I noticed that the majority of statues set up to great men seemed to be chiefly on account of the fact that they had won some great victories, entailing, of course, the killing off of a great number of people."

If there is to be a "Yellow Peril" it is because China is being forced to change, though it cannot be her real wish; in just the same way that businesses successfully started by Europeans in China usually fall into the hands of the Chinese, so may the Powers govern this or that part of China for a while, and she will at the start probably not be able to object, yet all the while she will be assimilating knowledge and Western information likely to be of use, and without any ostentation quietly developing herself, then one day the European will wake up to realize that he who laughs last laughs best. That last laugh will come from the intelligent, sober, industrious, cultivated Chinese living peaceably in their own fertile and well-watered land; who, after thousands of years, have been forced by circumstances into relations with the rest of the world, a position from which they can see no benefit. They are only looking to the day when they may do away with foreign intercourse and interference, and revert to that seclusion which they have enjoyed for thousands of years.

Common sense will doubtless keep the Chinese from going to extremes. They never invited foreigners to enter China; when they came they agreed to allow them to trade—opium smuggling was the result. The Chinese kicked against that—war was the outcome; they

lost and Hongkong fell into our hands, and this island has become a refuge and home for many Chinese who have flown from justice in their own country.

In many of our Government officials in the past we have been lucky. The most acceptable and successful in dealing with Chinese is he who is a gentleman always in the best sense of the word, polite and tactful, avoids fussiness, and only steps in with a touch that settles and does not upset, who can readily sympathize with the Chinese; who will not be constantly ramming down their throats that foreign methods are best, appreciating the fact that all crops will not grow on the same soil, and realizing that with the Chinese there exists an innate pride of race, pride of civilization and intellect.

Those who know the Chinese and admire them can only hope that the present differences may soon come to an amicable settlement, and that our officials may tactfully bring round matters to a successful and closer understanding with this most ancient and civilized of races.

One reads in the papers that our trade with China is at a standstill; can anything be more deplorable? Chinese are by no means an impossible people to deal with, and left alone to manage their own affairs in their own way will be in the long run the better for all concerned, but the fact that the present trouble is very real must not be lost sight of.

Everything, it appears, is being done by the Bolshevik agents in Canton to enrage the Chinese against the British, and as China is in a state where no responsible Government can be appealed to, little or nothing can be done. The majority, the ignorant labouring classes, will naturally listen to the various war lords holding power in their districts, and disobedience to orders would at once meet with the severest punishment.

Those who can read the papers are swayed by the lies with which they are filled, and they read only about the worst side of the British. The Bolsheviks naturally introduce all sorts of laws directly against the Chinese ideals of life and their customs, and let it be known that such are British ideals, striking at the very root of Chinese ideals.

Though our trade has been so enormous with China, it is surprising how little the people at home know about the Chinese, and how little they realize the great necessity of sending out gentlemen who will not only interest themselves in their business, but in the people with whom they come in contact.

I have seen Europeans coming to the East as travellers who have gone out of their way to make friends with the Chinese traders, entertaining them and being entertained in return; they studied the people, and by their friendly manner and the way they went about their business were always welcome on their annual visits, while others simply went about their business without associating or trying to

associate with the people with whom they desired to trade. Such men though handsomely treated by their firms in the matter of travelling expenses and allowances, are, from a business point of view, of little value to their firms.

The enormous amount of damage done to our trade in China is a good example of the benefits that Bolshevism and Communism, etc., are to us, for it is chiefly through their medium that the present conditions of China and the hate of the British are fostered.

The introduction of all that is bad is ascribed to the British. The loss of our big trade with China will throw more people in England out of work and cause further discontent, and they will probably be the last to realize the real cause.

MALACCA.

THE VIEWS OF A CHINESE STATESMAN ON THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM (1921)

By W. G. STIRLING

SHORTLY after the conclusion of the Great War a correspondent put certain questions before an eminent Chinese statesman since deceased. This statesman's answers throw considerable light on the points of view of the educated Chinese, and the Council consider that they may be of interest to Members of the Society.

Q. 1.—Can Japan exist in the world without contact with the rest of the world? I venture to think in the negative, for she must expand.

A. 1.—The community of interests among the different nations of the world being so close, can any nation now exist in the world without contact with the rest of the world? There is plenty of room for Japan's surplus population in the undeveloped northern part of Japan and Formosa. The assertion that Japan must have room for expansion is merely an excuse for her aggression in China and Siberia.

Q. 2.—If, however, she asserts herself and goes so far as to take control of Northern China, can she then exist? The chances would appear to be in her favour, because China can be self-supporting, and she does not need contact with the outside world to keep her going.

A. 2.—Even if Japan went so far as to take control of Northern China by force she could not hope to remain there permanently, for the Chinese people are now unlike the people twenty years ago. They are now too patriotic and nationally conscious to tolerate foreign usurpation. Moreover, Japanese people are accustomed to warm climate and picturesque surroundings, and the cold plains of Manchuria are not suited to Japanese colonization, where they cannot compete successfully with the Chinese either as farmers or traders, as experiences have shown.

Q. 3.—New China, having no traditions, has a very different task to perform compared with the former Empire. Tradition no doubt had a great deal to do with the success of the Manchus. But New China would appear to be purely superficial. The New Chinese retain all the old and inborn characteristics, which may be temporarily set aside but to which they will inevitably revert.

A. 3.—The Chinese have traditions, and they have not set aside any inborn characteristics. It is generally believed that their retention is the factor that keeps China intact and makes an insolvable problem for Japanese swallowing.

Q. 4.—China would seem to be a conquered nation for many years of its history, but it remains like a huge piece of blotting-paper, conquered as it were by the colour of the liquid it absorbs, but remains blotting-paper all the same. If the Japanese took possession they would ultimately become absorbed into China. China is a huge helpless country; her vastness makes government difficult, and the northern people appear different to the southern. Certain national traits make unity seem impossible—one of them seems to me to be mutual suspicion.

A. 4.—Japan may have encroached in many parts of Chinese territory, but as Japanese morality and equity have not won the Chinese heart and spirit, which are the essentials of conquering a nation, her encroachments will only become sources of trouble and danger to themselves. China is, no doubt, a vast country, but she never had, and will not have, any difficulties in government if she is not hampered by foreign intrigues and interference. "North" and "South" must be understood as political terms and denote no geographical division; for the people of the North and those of the South have no quarrel with each other.

Q. 5.—As a business people of high moral repute, the Chinese rank in the first line. Would not the combination of English and Chinese business seem to be impregnable?

A. 5.—There are no two opinions on this—viz., that the combination of English and Chinese business would be impregnable.

Q. 6.—It is surprising to me that as Japan would appear to be a danger to China, so many officials have Japanese advisers. One cannot help wondering whether these Japanese do anything in the shape of fomenting trouble between the North and South to serve their own ends.

A. 6.—Japan will be no real danger to China for long, for her methods are too disagreeable to the world. Japanese advisers are in most cases appointed owing to diplomatic pressure. Except the pro-Japanese crowd, most Chinese officials do not have Japanese advisers. The Japanese may mean to foment trouble between North and South

to serve their own ends, but the gulf is not deep, and China will soon be reunited when a few of the northern militarists are removed.

Q. 7.—How can one have much sympathy in its present state with this great nation, who were civilized long before a nation like the English could read, write, and do anything but behave like the savage people they were?

A. 7.—It is a great mistake for one to judge the Chinese as a savage nation by taking a few things which may be different to his own, especially at a time when she has trouble and there is so much intrigue directed against her own free will and action. Could Europe be called civilized in the Chinese idea during the last Great War? Those so-called civilized Great Powers of the world do not seem to show any sympathy to any country which is militarily weak, though exceedingly civilized—*e.g.*, Korea. On the other hand, England's sympathies with Japan have not resulted in any protest against her action in face of the savagery and atrocities inflicted upon the poor Koreans by the Japanese. The world seems only to sympathize with might.*

Q. 8.—The Chinese would not appear to relish foreign assistance. Certain Chinese state that a tranquil China is essential to peace in the East, and yet there are so many examples which only prove that the Chinese cannot manage their own affairs, such as the government of the country.

A. 8.—The Chinese have a great relish for foreign assistance in the ways of modern developments. So far no foreign countries have offered it in an unselfish, fair, and honest way. "Tranquil China" should be interpreted in the sense that China should be militarily strong enough to keep tranquillity herself—*i.e.*, to ward off foreign grabbing; otherwise there will be a scramble for interests by foreign Powers. What are the other examples that the Chinese cannot manage their own affairs? She has been managing her affairs for thousands of years quite smoothly.

Q. 9.—It would seem that even to-day many Government officials, Consuls, etc., are able to purchase their posts, whether fit or unfit, and have eventually (or rather do eventually, or are tempted) to recuperate themselves for the initial outlay.

A. 9.—No official posts can be bought nowadays. Foreigners may mistake some of the farmers of monopolies for officials.

Q. 10.—Many Chinese officials seem to be strongly influenced by Japanese; Japan must be a far greater source of danger to China than America or England?

A. 10.—Some of the officials in the North are no doubt influenced by Japanese because they are corrupted by Japanese money. America

* The question here was misunderstood; the questioner referred to England as a once savage country

or England may not be a greater source of danger to China, but they have been weak and selfish enough to help or allow Japan to exercise her sinister designs.

Q. 11.—It is difficult to understand why Japan does not now take the upper hand in China. What is to stop them? She can force her will on China at the point of the bayonet step by step; she can deal with those in power; the masses can be overpowered in a drastic way; she can repeat her policy in Korea on a more cruel basis.

A. 11.—The answer is very simple. Prudence stops them. Japan knows her own morality and China's real strength. Overpowering a nation at the point of the bayonet is one thing, and keeping the people in peaceful working order to their benefit is another. Japanese policy in Korea has begun already to show indications of its failure.

Q. 12.—Presumably Japan is not afraid of England or America; they cannot interfere. They have no bases, ships, or army in the East. Japan has everything near at hand, with the finest fleet in the Eastern waters. She will, it may be expected, take a large lump of China very soon, and no doubt is playing for this at the Washington Conference. England or America can say or do nothing.

A. 12.—It is an open secret that Japan is not afraid of England or America, for she knows their positions. The Washington Conference was prompted by the anxiety of America and England to find out the way of how to grease Japanese hands or to prevent her from giving trouble.

Q. 13.—It would appear that possession or control of the Yangtze River for the North, and of the Canton River in the South would go far to stop any export from the interior.

A. 13.—Possession or control of the Yangtze and Canton Rivers may go far to stop any export from the interior. But the Chinese can do very well without exportation or importation.

Q. 14.—If England starts building a naval base in Singapore, it will take ten years to complete anything of any use. Japan is not going to stand by and wait till England is ready to argue the point?

A. 14.—Japan will not permit England to do anything of the kind.

Q. 15.—America may build ships till she is black in the face; it will avail her nothing at all, having no supply base in the East. Manila is not a factor to be reckoned with, and would be seized by Japan easily should war break out between these two nations.

A. 15.—If America once begins to build ships, Japan will challenge her to fight.

Q. 16.—England is approaching a stage when she will be too big and unable to control her own house. Her interest in China would appear to only maintain business relations with, and the concessions she has in that country; but I do not think she would care to be out

of it and allow Japan sole rights in China. I also do not think England is anxious to have any more.

A. 16.—It is doubtful that England can prevent Japan from getting more concessions out of China in spite of England not getting any. Japan is obtaining them now.

Q. 17.—The Chinese dislike the Japanese and other foreigners—probably the Japanese most of all—as they, the Japanese, understand them better than any other nation in the world.

A. 17.—It is a natural instinct for one to dislike another who robs him of his properties. On the contrary, the Chinese would like foreigners better if they studied their institutions without prejudice.

Q. 18.—The average Chinese is so keen on business and making money that they have no time, so to speak, for Government matters. It is a remarkable thing that an individual Chinese can run a huge business in the most capable way in the world. But set down in a Government office, he fails hopelessly.

A. 18.—The average Chinese is getting to be as keen in governmental matters as in business. But as the foreign Governments support a few corrupt officials by recognition and loans in order to create chances for them, it will take some time for the honest Chinese to adjust matters. Withdraw the recognition and loans, China will soon be in order. It is dangerous for foreigners to generalize about China without seeing recent changes.

Q. 19.—Can education alter the ingrained national characteristics of the Chinese?

A. 19.—Chinese national characteristics are not at fault. They need no alteration, but modern education will prepare the Chinese to meet modern circumstances and environments.

Q. 20.—Can the Chinese prevent the action of the Japanese? With the almost fanatical patriotism imbued in the Japanese, who put their backs into anything for the benefit of Japan, the Japanese would, by degrees, force themselves on China, to be eventually absorbed. The history of China makes one think that they are used to being conquered. They cannot help themselves, and I cannot help but think that the Japanese will gain from the Washington Conference a large slice of China, the resources and wealth of China being far too great a temptation to them. A very old friend of mine who was on the staff of a mission in Paris told me, when I enquired how the Chinese military experts were getting on, that they stayed at their hotels the whole time gambling and enjoying themselves, paying no attention or trying to learn anything from the War, while the Japanese were searching about for every kind of information.

A. 20.—The Chinese are no less patriotic than the Japanese, but they believe that patriotism in disregard of justice will eventually

bring demoralization of the race. The Chinese strictly observe justice and will invariably survive. Japan cannot possibly conquer China, but in time will be absorbed by latter in accordance with the Law of Mass. The Japanese may gain through the Washington Conference a large slice of China, but it will only be a temporary matter. It is wrong to say that the Chinese are used to being conquered. In four thousand years of history they have had foreign rulers but twice, aggregating about 350 years. Compare that with the history of any European country, say England. Your friend must understand that the so-called Chinese military experts sent to Paris by the Peking Government were the old mandarins whom the progressive Southern Government have been striving so hard to eliminate. To put the matter in a nutshell, if China is left alone without interference in any way by foreign Powers—and the continued recognition of the Peking Administration should be withdrawn by the Foreign Powers—China would soon be reunited and peace be restored.

REVIEWS

MANUEL DE POLITIQUE MUSULMANE. Editions Bossard, 48 Rue Madame Paris. 1925.

The writer of this remarkable book hides his identity under the *nom de plume* of "Un Africain," having spent many years in the French African Empire—Morocco, Algeria, Tunis.

His aim is to define the policy which should guide France in dealing with her African Islamic subjects and with independent Islamic states. He does this with a precision of thought and clarity of style characteristic of the best French writers. Incidentally he refers frequently to the British experience in handling similar problems in Egypt and India, and the book is therefore full of interest and instruction to all who are concerned with the politics of the Near and Middle East. The policy advocated by "Un Africain" is one based (to use his own words) on a knowledge of Islamic sentiment and aspirations, and at the same time calculated to further the moral and material prestige of France.

He defines the four cardinal principles of that policy as follows:

1. To understand Islam and its followers and thus steer clear of the perils of an *Islama mania*, founded on ignorance and sentimentalism. In this connection he makes scathing comments on the general ignorance of French official and political circles; on the false sympathy with Islam derived from the misleading pictures of the Sheikh and the desert presented by the bazar and the theatre; on the folly of those who, having come in contact with a few cultured Muslims, hastily conclude that all the Arabs and Berbers are ripe for full citizen rights. He points out that the ignorant masses, often steeped in superstitions of an earlier date than Islam itself, are France's most loyal subjects and bravest soldiers, if tactfully handled and capably led; while the young Intellectuals of Algiers and Tunis, who talk so big about their national rights and "war services," took good care not to risk their skins in the war. (In this he finds a striking parallel with Egypt and India in the same crisis.)

2. To establish by material force and moral superiority France's influence over Islamic peoples, whether subject, protected, or independent. This principle the author sums up in the phrase, "*memento tu regere*"—i.e., "govern or go." He rightly points out that European conquest must from the nature of the case be unpopular to start with. The force behind it causes it to be accepted with resignation; and pacific penetration, with the material advantages it brings, tends to overcome the hostile sentiments with which it is at first regarded.

The author has some interesting remarks to make on (a) the relative advantages of direct French administration, as in Algiers and Tunis, and (b) the protectorate system so successfully worked in Morocco since 1912 by Marshal Lyautey and others. On the whole he is inclined to favour the latter as being more elastic and offering an economy of time, labour, and money. He vigorously attacks the French legislature for having, in 1919, deprived the heads of villages in Algeria of their summary powers of punishing evil-doers, and for having given the people at the same time the rights of French citizenship, including the unrestricted possession of firearms. The results were a wave of crime and lawless-

ness which shook the whole administrative fabric and drove many French colonists to sell out their property and leave Algeria.

The rights of summary punishment were then restored; indeed, the village headmen insisted on exercising them, whether the French agreed or not, and the restrictions on firearms were reimposed. But in the meantime immense mischief had been done by the levity of the French Chamber.

He further describes how, as the exploiting trader and the annoying petty civil official take the place of the conquering soldier, respect for the conqueror diminishes. This tendency is furthered by the fact that in broadcasting French education, France has raised up a discontented Intelligentsia who already look on themselves as equal, if not superior, to their rulers.

Hence has arisen an unrest (*malaise*) from the contact of two different civilizations, in which a sentiment of nationality, hitherto non-existent, at least in Algiers and Tunis, and only very vague in Morocco, may grow strong and may prove very dangerous in a time of crisis. To meet this, French policy, while benevolent and just, must always be based on the principle, *memento tu regere*.

3. To grant to those under France's rule or protectorate their reasonable claims in a form suited to their needs and mentality—i.e., *bienfaits nécessaires*. These are:

(a) Religious liberty; respect for all religious rites, customs, and institutions; no interference with religious grants or with the authority of religious heads; but a close surveillance of educational institutions which may be used to promote fanaticism and racial hatred. (We have the example of El Azhar to reinforce this.)

Not to encourage Islamic propaganda among heathen tribes. Your new convert is often the most dangerous fanatic.

(b) Security and honest, efficient administration. To start with, a national system of taxation and the restraint of the gross abuses in collection associated with the grossly oppressive indigenous system. Later, material development by roads, bridges, irrigation works, medical relief. These are what the masses desire and appreciate.

(c) Allow all equal justice—which is the more appreciated as it is commonly sold and bought all over the East. But the author does not advocate European judges, for they are presumably ignorant of Muhammadan law and local custom.

(d) To carry out the above theories France must provide executive and supervising officers, who understand the people, speak their languages, love them without being duped by them and thus win their confidence. Frequent transfers of officials are to be avoided.

The failure of Spain in Morocco is, according to the author, traceable to neglect of those principles. Her attitude there has been that of Pizarro towards the Peruvians.

4. To avoid granting the people *bienfaits périlleux*—i.e., institutions which they do not as a whole want and the working of which they do not understand.

Among the dangerous "gifts of Artaxerxes" the author notes:

(a) Education, distributed in the past broadcast like quinine, instead of being reserved as an honour for the limited number who could profit by it. The results of fifty years of the system in Algeria have not been encouraging, and this has been frankly admitted by successive Governor-Generals. The tone of the native press before the war gave testimony to this; the hostile attitude of the "Young Algerians" and "Young Tunisians" during the war underlined it. A surfeit of western education may well become a poison, stimulating vanity and idleness, creating *déclassés*.

(b) Electoral rights. Foolish theorists think that education alone fits the

native for liberty and civic rights. To impose on an old social system, based on authority, Western liberal and individualist principles is to bring about a revolution and to prepare a whip for our own scourging. France should have taken warning from the ever-recurring scandals attending on the elections in French India, based on so-called universal suffrage.

But in an orgy of sentimentalism and in crass ignorance of Islamic mentality the French Parliament of 1919 (compare the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of the same year) gave the franchise and civil rights to the majority of male adults in Algeria. The result was that at the ensuing elections all candidates well-disposed to France were denounced as renegades and were beaten at the polls; French influence was largely shattered by appeals to fanaticism and race-feeling. The author quotes the remarks of the great Governor-General, Jules Ferry: "We must have the strength of mind to recognize that French institutions cannot be transported blindly; they do not possess the magic quality of 'francising' the soil to which it is sought to import them."

5. France's rôle in Islam is that of tutor and guide. The premature application of doctrinaire liberalism is infinitely dangerous. The masses are not yet ripe for the direction of their own destinies, their only conception of the liberty which foolish idealists would force on them is as a means of gratifying passion or oppressing weaker peoples. The so-called *élite* only want power for the personal advantages it will bring them. Such powers as can be suitably transferred should certainly be given, but without undue haste and after prior training and experience to prevent its abuse or misuse.

It was from the want of such preliminary training of the electorate that the 1919 reforms in Algeria broke down (many will say the same of the Indian reforms of 1819). The more cautious policy followed in Tunis of granting the native population increasing control of local administration is proving more successful.

6. Conclusion. France's future is in Islam, or at least with Islam. The day when she allows her African provinces or protectorates to rally to a Muhammadan federation headed by Turkey, and become again Turkish dependencies, her existence as a Mediterranean power and a great power will come to an end. Turkey aims at the hegemony of a reawakened Islam. With Islam behind her, with the open or secret support of Russia, and, if Germany wants to throw in her lot with Mongol and Slav, the vanquished powers of the Great War would fling themselves against an over-civilized extreme West. The remedy is to bring Turkey into the Western European sphere by wide concessions. The author envisages a Mediterranean alliance of France, Italy, and Turkey, which would dominate the great Mediterranean basin. But strangely enough he leaves Great Britain, the greatest Muhammadan power, out of the picture.

Apart from this omission the book is a most forcible and convincing exposition of the policy which should guide France in North Africa and the Near East.

M. F. O'D.

THE HEART OF ARYAVARTA. By the Earl of Ronaldshay, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. Constable and Company Ltd. 14s.

If, as may be hoped by anyone honestly desirous of seeing a serious effort made to grapple with the problem of modern India, Lord Ronaldshay goes to Delhi next year as Viceroy and Governor-General, he will go to his task equipped as none of his predecessors has been—not even excepting Lord Curzon. A successful and distinguished term of office as Governor of one of the great Indian provinces may or may not of itself indicate the possession of those rare qualities which are

requisite to a successful tenure of the highest office under the British Crown. But Lord Ronaldshay has not rested on the laurels he gathered in Bengal. He has had the courage to place on record the results of a deep and sympathetic study of the problems which are agitating modern India—the India of the twentieth century—which have hitherto completely baffled the statesmanship of Great Britain. And it will readily be conceded by serious students of the subject that his trilogy, the last volume of which is the subject of the present review, marks him out not only as one of the greatest administrative philosophers of our time, but as the person most obviously suitable to be entrusted with the task of carrying out a policy—his policy—which alone affords any hope of a satisfactory solution of the greatest problem confronting the British Empire.

Whatever the distant future may hold in store for us and India, self-government within the British Empire is and must, perhaps for a generation, remain the one and only practical aim to which the statesmen of this country and its great dependency should direct their efforts. That is, for all practical purposes, the declared policy of His Majesty's Government. But their failure to secure the active co-operation of Indian statesmen to that end has been the result of a radical and genuine divergence of opinion as to the methods to be pursued. We have during the last twenty years been content to pursue a negative course. We have step by step sought to dam the flood let loose by a century's evolution on Western lines, and step by step we have had to recede before the impact of the unmanageable waters. We have persisted unwisely in regarding the problem as "what it originally was, a mere question of administration . . . one with which British genius is particularly well adapted to cope." In other words, we have been working on wrong *data* at an impossible task, and Lord Ronaldshay's greatest service to this country has been to point out and to explain in these pages that "a factor of fundamental importance in the present problem is the *spirit of modern India*."

With skilful touches of a master's brush he has portrayed the basic elements of Indian psychology as it has developed through the ages out of a maze of dialectic and metaphysics, whose ultimate bedrock is after all the same divine inspiration to which all other religions appeal, postulating a God whose existence cannot be proved by any method of human reasoning. He then shows—in point of fact he reverses the logical sequence and deals with this aspect before considering the sources of Indian psychology—how the spirit thus fashioned amid the forests and glens of old India came, about a century ago, into violent collision with the material civilization of the West. He is inclined to minimize the blameworthiness of Macaulay and his associates, who, being utterly unable and unwilling to understand the art, literature, and philosophy of a country incapable of turning those assets to material account, deliberately connived at the process of soul-destruction to which India in the first glamour of a widened knowledge of the world delivered herself with whole-hearted contempt for her own great traditions. Great indeed is the blame attaching to them; greater even than that attaching to our modern statesmen, who have failed to realize that not India but their own predecessors sowed the harvest which has already too long awaited the reaper.

Lord Ronaldshay then tells us of the inevitable reaction against Western civilization and of the frantic efforts of the leaders of Indian thought to rescue their country from the toils which can never be altogether thrown off. A century of European influence has left an indelible mark on the genius of the country. The old religion is restored only to provide a sanction for anarchy and assassination—it is only through religion that the masses can be approached. Yet Tolstoy is shown to be the real *guru* of Gandhi; Rabindra Nath Tagore, for all

his world-wide reputation as the poet of India, is but the interpreter of his own country on Western lines; while Sir J. C. Bose has shown how European "analytical methods of experimental science can be grafted upon the genius and character of the Indian nation." Indian psychology can never again be what it was. The real danger is that it may lose its native characteristics. Reactionary movements in the direction of archaic simplicity cannot but be artificial and even detrimental to an India already irrevocably committed to membership of the civilized world. At the best they but illustrate the striving of all that is best in the country towards the ideal of Indian nationality. In the peaceful realms of art, literature, and philosophy they have already produced substantial and admirable results in alliance with the ideals of Western civilization. In the troubled field of politics they have produced murder and arson, not for the sake of crime itself, but in the name of an ideal in conflict with a Western point of view, which will not yield its ground or yields it only grudgingly.

Lord Ronaldshay is not deterred by the obviously undesirable effects of such a movement from seeing the ideal behind the veil, and realizing how that ideal can be brought out and encouraged for the permanent benefit of humanity. For him the conflict between Britain and India is as unreal as is the material universe to the Vedantin. For all the importance attached by the British Government and the British Press to the oscillations of the political balance between the "extremists" and the "moderates"—the ideals of both parties are essentially the same, as has been shown time and again when the "moderates" have been temporarily in the ascendant—the real conflict is in the Heart of Aryavarta itself, where the consciousness of essential good in that which is Indian struggles with inevitable recognition of the fact that there is also good in the Western civilization which has come to stay.

And so Lord Ronaldshay, out of the depths of his experience and sympathetic study, draws the inevitable conclusion that Great Britain, instead of struggling vainly with the task of tempering Indian participation in the government of India to the imagined but evanescent requirements of the moment, should devote her efforts to the achievement of a more positive object—the direction of the blended good of East and West into a channel which has already been dug, and which leads to the goal long since marked out for itself by the idealism of India under the sanction of an Imperial Government which has directed the destinies of that country for two centuries. The spirit of India must be conciliated and nourished into self-realization by a policy of positive effort on educational lines rather than girded into an attitude of hostility and intransigence by what it cannot but regard as the arrogance of the West.

In the space of a few pages it is quite impossible to do full justice to Lord Ronaldshay's great effort to educate his countrymen to a true understanding of the Indian problem. He deliberately limits his field to the Heart of Aryavarta or Hinduism, and necessarily draws his illustrative material from his rich experience of Bengal. But his analysis and his conclusions are none the less generally applicable to India as a whole. Whether or not the model constitution suggested for Mysore, by which he is obviously impressed, will provide the basis of a settlement for all India it is yet too early to judge, and Lord Ronaldshay himself would probably not desire to be understood as accepting it in advance of that further study of the Indian problem which—let us hope—he is yet to make. No one will gainsay his general conclusion that the Parliamentary institutions evolved in a Western atmosphere are unlikely to provide a suitable framework for the web of self-government which is envisaged for India. The framework must be essentially Indian in design, and must be sought in the golden mean which lies somewhere between the philosophy of the Vedas and the

materialism of the modern world. To find that mean is the task to which the future Viceroy must devote himself with singleness of purpose, disturbed neither by the clamour of the extremists nor by the diffidence of the old British administrative school.

H. St. J. B. P.

THROUGH KHIVA TO GOLDEN SAMARKAND. By Ella R. Christie. Seeley, Service. 21s.

This is the record of two journeys in Russian Turkestan. The first, which occupies the greater part of the book, was from Krasnovodsk, by the Trans-Caspian railway to Charjui on the Oxus; thence by river steamer to Khiva and back; then on by rail to Bokhara, Samarkand, Khokand, and the remote terminus of Andijan. The authoress was impelled, as she writes, "by the desire to see for herself what lay on that bare part of the map east of the Caspian, and lured by the magic names of Bokhara and Samarkand."

Miss Christie's enthusiasm as an explorer survived the difficulties and discomforts of Central Asian travel. Both journeys were made before the war, so the reader must not expect any lifting of the veil that is now drawn over Turkestan; only the concluding chapter relates, by hearsay, the ruin wrought by Bolshevik rule.

In her descriptions the writer has interwoven her personal experiences with past history in such a manner as to give realistic impressions. The simple narrative of her intercourse with Russian officials and their families gives a good idea of Russian life in Central Asia before all was changed by the revolution, while visits to native dignitaries and wanderings in the bazaars gave the writer an insight into the life and manners of the indigenous races.

The story opens with the dreary journey from Krasnovodsk to Ashkabad—a journey that illustrates the Russian railway enterprise and engineering skill in constructing a line through a desert of shifting sand. The engines are not run on petrol as is stated, but on crude oil, known as "mazut."

A true picture is given of the typical Russian settlement at Ashkabad, but my recollection does not bear out the statement that the town has a river, the Murghab. The stream that waters Ashkabad may have the same name as the river of the Merv oasis, but it does not attain the dignity of a river.

Passing on to Merv, over ground that has acquired new fame by the subsequent campaign of 1918, the writer relates how the ancient glories of the "Queen of the World" have crumbled till little more remains than a desolate expanse of shapeless mounds. The mausoleum of Sultan Sanjar stands up alone and conspicuous, and it, too, was falling into ruin when I visited it seven years ago. Modern Merv is, indeed, in sharp contrast, and still more so the Emperor Alexander III. model settlement of Bairam Ali, with its up-to-date system of irrigation. Some features are so conspicuous that their omission from the book suggests the possibility that they were not completed at the time of Miss Christie's visit. The golden dome of the beautiful Russian church formed a landmark visible from afar. A well-equipped power station twenty-five miles up the Murghab river lit Merv and Bairam Ali by electricity and worked the modern machinery of the oil and soap factory at the latter place. The handsome stone residence mentioned on p. 42 was occupied by British Headquarters in 1918-19. It was built as an Imperial Palace, the furniture and appointments bearing the Russian double eagle. A marble pedestal in front had formerly borne a statue of the Tsar Alexander III., destroyed by the Bolsheviks in their insensate fury. A first visit was to have been made by the late Emperor Nicholas in February, 1918.

The journeys by river steamer between Charjui and Khiva were an experience that can be known to few of Miss Christie's fellow-countrymen. More notice is given to the amenities of life on the crowded steamer than to the country on either bank, and it may be inferred that the lack of inspiration to be derived from the desolate regions of the lower Oxus led the writer to fall back upon romantic quotations from others who knew it only by ancient tradition. In the visit to Khiva perhaps the most interesting incident is the introduction to the colony of the strange Mennonite sect. A chapter entitled, "Battle, Murder, and Sudden Death," exposes a murky page of Russian ruthlessness in their Asiatic conquests.

A graphic picture is drawn of the bazaars of Bokhara, but it is in the description of Samarkand's wonderful market square, "the Registan," that the writer's enthusiasm rises to its highest pitch. There is a womanly touch in the abrupt transition from sublime heights of admiration before the soaring monuments of ancient splendour down to—the contents of the food stalls in the market below!

The second journey is narrated briefly in the latter part of the book. It was made by the Orenburg railway to Tashkent, with General Sukhomlinoff, the Minister of War, as a fellow-traveller.

A description of the capital city and of the neighbouring "town of Turkestan" brings to a close the story of a lady's plucky adventures, in which she was hampered rather than helped by her inefficient interpreter couriers. There are numerous illustrations from photographs.

J. K. T.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STEPPES. By Ralph Fox. Twelve illustrations and map. Constable and Co. 1925. Pp. 246. 8s. 6d.

Here we have a book which might well have been notable—at least amongst the descriptions of Central Asia. It is, however, spoilt by the propaganda which permeates nearly every page. The author, who has the gifts of observation and sympathy, has allowed himself to be mazed by the "brittle intellectualism" which nowadays trots anæmic and puking at the coat-tails of red-blooded revolution. He deals it out to us in all its mawkish nastiness, its emasculate sneers at virile ideals and loyalties and its palaver with internationalism.

Mr. Fox has very clearly allowed himself to be blinded by the sentimentally harmless and good-natured aspect of the Russian peasant taken superficially as an individual. He makes much of this, and cannot see any evil in the "mujik." Patently he has not encountered the "mass-psychology," of that same Russian peasant, otherwise he could not but realize the savage ferocity of the Russian crowd. He has never seen the queer workings of that mongrel half-Mongol mind, when it reverts as it does to the brute beast.

This is one of Mr. Fox's mistakes, and a sufficiently big one. He adds to it by a hearty misconception of the abyss between the theory of Communism, depicted as it is as a sort of early Christian Garden of Eden or New Jerusalem, where all are good and unselfish and the reality of its practice, the spates of blood, the unimaginable tortures, the stupendous injustices, violations, and robberies which are the real Bolshevism.

Curiously enough, our author appreciates the existence of the spirit of Changiz, Timur-Leng, and Hulaku to-day, both in Central Asia and in Moscow, its appanage. He even seems to be able to trace the tradition of slaughter by which Hulaku attacked urbanization and capitalism down to its renaissance under Lenin.

He fails, however, to see and point the moral. Yet again, he displays some

perception in appreciating the almost idyllic life of the Kaizak-Kirghiz of the Steppes. He sees the beauty of its primitive simplicity, its lack of individualistic emulation and competition between man and man, its aloofness from the corruption of unclean gold and its close affinity to Nature.

He blunders again in hinting of such a mode of life as being applicable to Western Europe, merrily oblivious of the fact that five-and-twenty million English stomachs are every day fed by means of a foreign imperial trade whose very being is capitalism and imperialism.

Perhaps, however, Mr. Fox, with the "pacifist" ruthlessness and fiendish cruelty of the humanitarian of the idealistic intellectual sort, would like to alter England to suit Communism.

He is, perhaps, an advocate of the method of both Procrustes and Lenin.

Apart from the author's maniacal ideas on sociology, the book has its points.

It contains a charming picture of the Central Asia of the Steppes, those levels which spread over three million square miles from Afghanistan to the Arctic.

It hints, as we have seen, at the psychic origins of those outbreaks of frenzy which really have their home in these same Steppes, and are born, perhaps, of the bottled energy which their endless monotony, not century long, but cycle long, accumulates.

Central Asia is to-day moving and seething again with the great forces that impelled Attila and Changiz, and Central Asia is now no more remote from the hearths of the English people than was Frisia or Aquitaine in the days of the third Edward. Chaucer had cause to write of "Tamburlaine" as a very present affliction. Mr. Fox begins, dimly it is true, to realize that our writers of the next ten years may find that Moscow will make the Steppes once more the *place d'armes* of the "Scourges of God."

L. V. S. B.

A THOUSAND YEARS OF THE TARTARS. By E. H. Parker, Professor of Chinese in the Victoria University, Manchester. Fourth Edition. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. 1924.

Tartary lies north of 45° of longitude, and extends from the Caspian to the Pacific; it consists of rolling plains, sparsely diversified by mountain ranges. A third of this vast region, now a waterless desert, in prehistoric times was thickly peopled. It is probable that the cosmic upheavals of the third millennium B.C., which drove our Aryan ancestors from their lush pasture-grounds, were equally felt in Tartary. Professor Parker has undertaken the stupendous task of tracing the history of its inhabitants from Chinese records. His narrative opens in the third century B.C., when Tartary was occupied by nomad tribes which had much in common. They lived on horseback, moving from place to place with their herds of cattle in search of fresh grazing grounds. They were expert bowmen, and in the brief intervals of peace they hunted assiduously. Raiding was, however, their normal pursuit, and their young warriors enjoyed the lion's share of booty, the aged being relegated to menial employments. The Tartars were loosely organized in tribes, each of which had a recognized territory until it fell under the dominion of a more powerful neighbour.

All were ramifications of two hordes, known as the Hiung-nu and the Sien-pi: Professor Parker believes that the Scythians and Huns of old and the Turks of our own day were different phases of the Hiung-nu. These freebooters developed a royal or imperial caste system, which afforded ample scope to supermen born in the purple. The history of Asia was moulded by conquerors whose exploits rivalled those of Alexander and of imperial Rome. Amongst them was a Hiung-nu chieftain named Baghdur, who, ere his death in 178 B.C.

had established an empire extending over the whole of Northern Asia. The following century witnessed the rise of a great empire in the south of Tartary. A chieftain named T'sin succeeded in crushing the innumerable feudal clans scattered over the territory which is now known as China, and founded the Han dynasty, which lasted from 206 B.C. till 220 of our era. One of his generals named Mêng T'ien pushed the Tartars far northwards, and consolidated previous barricades into a fortified wall, which often proved an effectual check to their inveterate raiding. This, however, is not the "Great Wall" of our day, which dates only from A.D. 555. The Chinese custom of beheading failures in war and diplomacy furnished the nomads with a succession of able advisers, who joined them in order to escape from death. Moreover, Chinese Emperors were wont to plant a princess of their house in the harem of a Tartar leader; but their hopes of peaceful penetration were often defeated by the claims to the imperial throne which thus arose.

"Western civilization," writes Professor Parker, "possessed much in art and science for which China never cared, but, on the other hand, the Chinese developed a historical and critical literature, a courtesy of demeanour, a luxury in clothing, and an administrative system of which Europe might have been proud. In one word, the history of the Far East is quite as interesting as that of the Far West; it only requires to be able to read it. When we brush away contemptuously from our notice the tremendous events which took place on the plains of Tartary, we must not blame the Chinese too much for declining to interest themselves in the doings of what to them would appear insignificant states dotted round the Mediterranean and the Caspian."

The Sien-pi, or Tungus horde roamed over a vast territory eastwards of the Hiung-nu empire. They were able, vigorous, open to new ideas, and in every way superior to their neighbours. Supreme command over their tribes passed by election, and the democratic principle seems incompatible with unity or lasting empire. But it brought a great conqueror to the front in the person of Dardjegwe, at whose death in A.D. 190 the Sien-pi had ousted the Hiung-nu from their far-flung realm.

In the fifth century of our era the Turks emerged from obscurity as a conquering race. They were a branch of the old Hiung-nu, and inherited their ancestors' ineptitude for administration. However, they made short work of the decadent Sien-pi, but were soon rent by schism. A branch, and that the weaker of the two, founded a dynasty in Northern China, but their empire fell to pieces after a stormy career of two centuries. They were succeeded by the Kitans, a ramification of the Sien-pi, whose designation was popularised by Marco Polo as "Cathayans." They overran the Turkish Empire, but fell under the all-conquering sway of Genghiz Khan (A.D. 1162-1227).

Professor Parker's work, though a monument of industry and linguistic attainment, fails to give the Western reader any connected view of Tartar history. The task was, perhaps, impossible of achievement, for, as he says with perfect truth, "no nomad empire was ever more than an ill-digested political agglomeration," and their kaleidoscopic changes become wearisome in the extreme. The contempt for exotic religions which characterised early Chinese chroniclers serves to explain his reticence with regard to Islam, which so profoundly influenced the course of Asiatic history from the seventh century onwards. It is to be hoped that in future editions of this valuable work dates will be substituted for the meaningless proper names which appear in the margins, and that its index will be remodelled to serve the purpose of reference.

F. H. S.

MOSUL AND ITS MINORITIES. By Harry Charles Luke. Martin Hopkinson. 10s. 6d.

Until a few years ago Mosul and its Vilayet was an inaccessible province of the Turkish Empire. The world war, however, which changed so many frontiers and affected so many remote regions, has brought this province into closer contact with the West. The dispute between this country and Turkey as to the disposal of this town which has now been referred to the League of Nations for decision, has given this region an additional interest; so that Mr. Luke's book appears at an opportune moment. In the opening chapter the author describes briefly his journey to Mosul. His reference to the Crusades reminds us how long the European Powers have been concerned with the fate of Christianity in the East. was Charlemagne who, after the victorious Arabs had been checked at Poitiers, first obtained from Baghdad the right of protection over the Christian minorities in the Holy Land. The author insists on the essentially Eastern outlook of Damascus and traverses Maurice Barrés saying that "*Là Damas se rencontrent, non pour tâcher de se détruire l'un et l'autre, mais pour se comprendre et s'unir l'Orient et l'Occident.*" Recent events in that city give considerable point to the criticism. In the chapters on Mosul is included a short account of the strange mosaic of races which inhabit that part of the world. They constitute an ethnographic puzzle which no one has succeeded in unravelling as yet. Even of such an important race as the Kurds, who number five-eighths of the population, the Mosul Commission was fain to remark that "its ethnical composition was as obscure as its history." In the long era of conflict and racial intermixture, in the chequered history of this region, the origin of many of its inhabitants has been completely lost. The Assyrians claim, for instance, that large numbers of so-called Armenians who perished in the massacres were, in reality, Armenian-speaking Assyrians. It is a pity the author has included no illustrations of the churches in Mosul.

In the two following chapters are traced the causes of the separation of the Eastern and Western churches and the rise of the Nestorian Church. At this distance of time it is surprising to read of the angry passions which were aroused by the controversy between the Monophysites and the Nestorians. It was apparently a conflict between two opposing schools of theology, that of Syria and Egypt, which was heightened by the rivalry of the Patriarchates, when Constantinople was elevated to the second place in order of importance. It is not an edifying story in the history of Christianity, and resulted in a disastrous division of the Eastern Church.

The author next deals with the missionary enterprises of the Nestorian Church. Their mission to China in the seventh century to spread the "Luminous Religion," as the Chinese called it, is surely one of the most remarkable undertakings of this kind the world has seen. Though they must have made a considerable number of conversions all trace of them seems to have disappeared and their very existence was forgotten until the discovery of the famous Nestorian monument by the Jesuits at Hsi-an-fu in A.D. 1625. A replica of this monument has been set up on the top of Mount Koya—the Holy Land of Japan—and the reviewer was informed by a member of the Assyrian Delegation to the Lausanne Conference that the Japanese representative was so interested to find the Assyrians were the descendants of the Nestorians referred to in the monument that he did all he could to help their cause. The author does not seem to be aware of the important work of the Japanese scholar, Professor Saeki, on this subject.

In chapter vii. the author brings down the story of the Nestorians to the present time. The Assyrian mountaineers are a brave and hardy race and, as

the writer remarks, are very much a Church militant. The reviewer, who was on the Repatriation Staff during the Arab rebellion in Irak, can testify that they set out for war with much the same light-hearted zest that the Englishman sets out for his cricket and football match. They are ready not only to fight their enemies, but also to quarrel among themselves, as there is a good deal of tribal jealousy. The author offers no suggestion as to the future of these people. The question is of considerable importance to the future of Irak. At the Conference at Constantinople in May, 1924, it was the claim made by our representative for the cession of the Hakkari country to Irak that largely caused the breakdown of the negotiations. Since Mr. Luke's book was written the Turks have cleared these unfortunate people out of this country. After an interesting chapter on the monasteries of Monophysites the book deals with the Yezidies. This curious people have excited much interest, but their religion and origin remain very obscure. They have suffered much persecution at the hands of the Turks and Layard describes how on one occasion the Great Elohî intervened successfully on their behalf. How much more might have been done for the minorities in the Turkish Empire if in these later years we had possessed at Constantinople an Ambassador with the personality and commanding influence of Stratford Canning! Professor Bittners' book on the Yezidees, "*Die Heiligen Bücher der Yeziden oder Teufelsanbeter*," might have been included in the Bibliography. Mr. Luke's interesting book should prove welcome to those who wish to study the problems connected with our mandate in Irak.

F. F. R.

WITH LAWRENCE IN ARABIA. By Lowell Thomas, Hutchinson, 21s.

Mr. Lowell Thomas does not profess to be a historian of the Arab campaign (1916-1918) of the Great War, and one must not expect to find in the volume, which is the subject of this review, either a complete account or even an accurate summary of the events which led up from the revolt of the Sharif of Mecca in June, 1916, to Faisal's triumphal entry into Damascus with the vanguard of his Arab army in October, 1918. And yet Mr. Thomas' story is far from being a romance of the "Books for Boys" type with which G. A. Henty used to entertain the British schoolboy of a quarter of a century ago. He has to some extent sought to combine the methods of Henty with those of the serious historian and the journalist to create a legend round the person of a young Englishman of extraordinary distinction, who did in fact play the leading rôle in a campaign as strange as any that has ever been recorded in the annals of war. Lawrence's reputation is safe for all time without the legendary halo with which an importunate biographer has sought to proclaim it abroad, and it is a pity that the true and unadorned narrative of the part he and his fellows played in the Arab campaign has been reserved by him for the delectation of a generation yet unborn and of a few discreet persons who are prepared to read and hold their tongues. In the circumstances he has only himself to blame if others step in to glean in a field that is peculiarly his own, and the tale told by Mr. Thomas, for all its frequent and excessive fulsomeness, is not unpleasant reading.

It would be interesting to know where Mr. Thomas got the story, which he first made public in his travelogue and with which he persists in this volume, of Lawrence's elevation to the rank of Prince of Mecca and of his admission into the already by no means small circle of the family of the Prophet. There would seem to be no solid foundation for it, and the mere fact of his wearing princely raiment—for which he seems indeed to have had a very human weakness to judge by the admirable series of photographs of his hero with which the author adorns his book—provides no authority for such an assumption. Nor would

there seem to be any solid reason for believing Mr. Thomas' tales of the wholesale reconciliation by Lawrence of tribes long separated by blood-feuds and other differences. If such reconciliation ever took place it was but skin-deep and temporary, as anyone knows who had any experience of those same tribes—Ruwalla, Huwaitat, Bani Sakhr and the rest—during the years immediately following the war. The appearance of reconciliation, which deceived the author, was due to another cause than the new-born spirit of Arab unity under the aegis of a Sharifian prince—save the mark!—it was due to the simple fact that Lawrence was for the time being an inexhaustible gold-mine to which the Arabs flocked from far and near to receive of his bounty regardless of their own petty feuds, which could be looked to at leisure in the future. In truth the outstanding feature of Lawrence's personality was not so much his knowledge of the Arab character and his ability to turn that knowledge to good account, as his supreme contempt for British gold and British red-tape. He had a single object in view—the urgent military necessity of keeping the Turks on the Arabian frontier in a state of constant alarm and nervousness, while Allenby dealt with their positions in Palestine. In that object he succeeded brilliantly by methods entirely his own—by riding roughshod over the restrictions inherent in the methods of British officialdom. His triumph over British officialdom was by no means the least of his triumphs, but such methods were only possible under abnormal conditions; and Mr. Thomas, in what is perhaps the best part of his book, tells us how the triumphs of wartime were followed by the disappointments of the peace, when his hero found the drafts he had made on British good faith dishonoured by the officials, who had by then once more come into their own.

The Lawrence drama has ended on a tragic note. It is true that Faisal has a throne in Iraq to console him for the loss of his Syrian crown, but the Sharifian foundation on which Lawrence built the Arabian empire of his dreams has already, within seven years of the great victory, been swept into the sea by the Wahhabi flood presaged even in those days by a cloud no bigger than a man's hand afar off above the deserts of Central Arabia. There is no doubt whatever that the Allied cause profited very substantially by the revolt of the Sharif of Mecca against the Turks, and by the subsequent operations of the Amir Faisal guided by Lawrence, but it was a blunder of the first magnitude to suppose that the Arab campaign could be the starting-point of a new era in the history of Arabia. New eras generally begin with apparently insignificant events, and the new Arabian era had in point of fact started in 1912 with the founding of the first *Ikhwan* colony at Artawiya. But these matters are beyond the purview of Mr. Thomas, whose tale—limited to the adventures of a certain Arabian Knight and other Arabian Knights with occasional Knights of the Air and sons of Ishmael and others—may be commended to the attention of the reader. And if it so be that he played himself any part, however insignificant, in that strange campaign he will find himself suitably commended for his exploits or his acumen or his good looks or, maybe, the colour and texture of his beard. Mr. Lowell Thomas knows how to use paint and he puts it on in great daubs. Everybody he can think of is a hero, but the hero of heroes is Lawrence.

THROUGH INNER DESERTS TO MEDINA. By the Countess Malmignati.

Philip Allan and Co. 10s. 6d.

In Part I. of the *Central Asian Society's Journal* for 1914 it was announced that "the exploration of the Ruba el Khali desert . . . is the object of an expedition by the Countess Molitor." The book, which is the subject of this

notice, is by the Countess Malmignati, whose primary object was to traverse and explore the same desert, and who appears on her own showing to have consoled herself for failure in that object by making a remarkable journey through the "Inner Deserts" to Madina, where in the motley throng, which one would expect to find in that famous centre of Muslim pilgrimage, she finds a sprinkling of Chinamen and Japanese. The book is so full of mistakes or misprints that one is tempted to read "Javanese" for "Japanese." It is natural enough to speculate whether the Countess Molitor and the Countess Malmignati are in fact one and the same person. And a careful reading of the book forces one instinctively to echo a question asked of herself by the author in the closing paragraph: "Those last three months—were they but a dream?" One is tempted to answer in the affirmative, while applauding the brave words with which she takes leave of her readers: "And the Ruba-el-Kali will still be my goal. *Inshallah!*"

Countess Malmignati is a romantically-minded lady, always ready to find a page or chapter of the "Arabian Nights" in the least likely places. She feels herself "transported back into the times of Abraham," and her heart is "gripped" by the sight of Arab women marching by their camels "barefooted, with elastic step, singing their wild, passionate Bedouin songs." She is mildly put out at discovering that the Shararat are not "too proud to beg," but is consoled to find that the fellow who had offended her "really only wanted a new *abba*." The Ruwalla Arabs are her *beau idéal* of what mankind should be, and she admires their "clean-living" manliness. She does not appear to be, and does not claim to be, a fluent speaker of Arabic, but she explains the fact that she conducted her conversation with the Sultan of the Ruwalla through her dragoman, a Syrian dentist by profession, somewhat naively: "First of all, because it is not considered good form for persons of importance to speak directly to one another, but always to use an interpreter; and, secondly, because on these evenings . . . the language was of such great beauty and eloquence . . . that I felt it impossible sometimes even to understand, much less to answer in the same words." Golden bowls are produced in the Ruwalla tents for her to wash her hands in after meals, which even in mid-desert consisted on special occasions of "a regiment of roasted chickens swimming in brown butter." But these are minor blemishes in a work which is open to criticism on far more serious grounds.

The author is as sparing of chronological and geographical details as she well could be. It is not quite obvious whether she means her travel record to be taken seriously or not, but no serious student of matters Arabian can afford to dismiss as nonsense the claim of a European lady to have travelled from Damascus to Zilfi and thence to Madina—Zilfi and Madina have never yet been visited by a European lady—without subjecting the personal narrative of her journey to the closest examination. Countess Malmignati's book provides the evidence on which one would seem to be justified in believing that she has not made good her claim to have visited these places. And the carelessness with which it has been written (or published) adds to the exasperation of the reader who knows anything about Arabia. The well-known town of Homs, for instance, defies identification in the guise of Houss on p. 61 and elsewhere. And it takes some thinking to realize that the "Têdem" (p. 61) and the "Tedan" (p. 78) tribe is none other than the Fad'an, while on p. 78 the Saba'a tribe becomes the "Gaba'a." And we hear a great deal about the "Dalma Desert" (e.g., in the heading of Chapter IX.) before we realize that the author means the Dahna. Minor mistakes are too frequent to notice in detail—e.g., Sahiya (for Salihiya), Rachmed (? Ahmad), *eraci* (p. 20, ? *ragi*), *beben* (p. 108, for *liban*), etc.

Finally, the climax of the story turns on the attitude of a certain tribe described as the Ruwalla "Sultan's fiercest enemies, the El Faidassi." Who are they? It is impossible to identify them even though we are told they were camping at some wells south of Zilfi.

The Countess does not tell us in what year her travels took place, though she gives us a date or two within that year—unfortunately for her. Internal evidence helps us to fix the year as 1914 or possibly a year or two earlier. At any rate, there was still a *Wali* at Damascus, and the guide, philosopher, and friend selected by the Countess to share her adventures was no other than that delightful individual, Muhammad al Bassam (she invariably refers to him as Mahmoud), who, as we are told on p. 57, was considered to be "absolutely trustworthy," as he had previously been with Gertrude Bell. The latter certainly, therefore, penetrated the "Inner Deserts" before the Countess, whose travels, whatever may have been their extent, preceded the Great War. We take her at her word, and are prepared to believe (1) that she went to Zilfi, (2) that she went to Madina, and (3) that she started from Damascus during the month of *Ramadhan*. We are not prepared to accept any one of these three claims as established in preference to any of the others, and she gives us ample reason to believe that two of them are inconsistent with known facts.

Muhammad al Bassam having gone off to buy camels for the great adventure, the Countess "really did not mind very much having two weeks longer in Damascus as the Ramadan had just begun." A few days later, being "rather sick of Damascus by this time," she goes off on a visit to Mount Hermon. And on June 5 she leaves Damascus to join Muhammad al Bassam at Adra, whence she would start on the great expedition. At Adra she stays a few days, on one of which she "heard the cry of the *muezzin*, announcing that the time of fasting was over." We are justified, from the Countess's account, in assuming at the least that June 5 fell in that particular year during the month of *Ramadhan*, but we know that in 1914 the month of *Ramadhan* did not begin till about July 21. In any year earlier than 1914 it would have begun later still, and the earliest year in which June 5 could have fallen in *Ramadhan* would be 1919, when the war was over and there was no longer a *Wali* at Damascus. It is quite obvious either that the Countess is romancing about her *Ramadhan* experiences at Damascus or that she did not start on her great adventure on June 5. In either case her credit is seriously shaken.

At any rate, she gives us an itinerary of her five days' march from Adhra to Palmyra via Mossul (*sic*) and Homs. At Palmyra she finds the house of the local *Shaiikh* "built like a fortress, surrounded by four strong walls, but once inside it was a dream of beauty and peace. It was a small oasis, full of the most exquisite fruit and flowers, with fountains and small lakes everywhere." That is all she has to say about Palmyra!

Leaving Palmyra after a sojourn of some days she arrives with the Ruwalla after three days' march at the northern border of the Hamad, and camps in Wadi Majsar (*sic*). Thence moving in a south-westerly (*sic*) direction, she enters the desert of El Wadian, crossing Wadi el Fuhr (*sic*) and Wadi Handra (*sic*), to reach the wells of Mbekara (*sic*). After that—presumably in the month of July—she passes "many Wadis which would have supplied the whole caravan with sufficient water to remain for weeks at a time." She then enters a stony desert east of Wadi Sirhan, marching with all the impedimenta of a great tribe at the rate of sixty miles a day towards the "vapid desert." In due course the procession heads for Wadi al Umstarri (shown as Wadi al Mustawi in a very inadequate sketch-map), and the Ruwalla Sultan takes it into his head to go to Zilfi to exchange camels for horses, and at Zilfi they duly arrive on September 8.

The Countess here presents us with an initialled sketch of the mosque of Zilfi, which, to say the least, is a pure fiction of her imagination. Zilfi is entirely innocent of anything so beautiful as the dome and minaret of the sketch.

From Zilfi, recognized as a European and a Christian, she is conducted by ill-mannered *Shaikhs* to Buraida and across Arabia to Madina. Before entering that holy city she had "to take off my Arab dress, and adopt that of a Moslem woman." Her troubles were now over. She was able to visit the Prophet's tomb, and after a bout of severe fever she returned to Damascus by the Hijaz railway. And then apparently she woke up to write an account of her experiences which leaves us entirely in the dark as to how much of the "Inner Deserts" she ever really saw. It would certainly be interesting to have Muhammad al Bassam's account of the same adventure. But perhaps Countess Malmignati does not intend us to take her story too seriously.

H. ST. J. B. PHILBY.

THE LOST OASES. By A. M. Hassanein Bey. Messrs. Thornton Butterworth, Ltd. 21s.

In this book Hassanein Bey, who holds the Founders' Medal of the Royal Geographical Society, describes his memorable journey over some two thousand miles of desert from the Mediterranean coast down into the Sudan.

Starting from Sollum, Egypt's most western port, he travelled to Kufra, which he had visited in 1921 with Mrs. Rosita Forbes, now Mrs. A. McGrath. Leaving Kufra, he struck south into desert which had never previously been traversed by a civilized man. It was his ambition to locate and to fix upon the map the two oases of Arkenu and Ouenat, whose whereabouts were unknown to geographers, and whose very existence was almost a legend among the Arabs of the Libyan Desert. He discovered these "lost oases," and found in them a permanent water supply and a population of Tebu and Goran tribesmen. From there he trekked southwards, through the eastern edge of Wadai, through Darfur, and to El Obeid in Kordofan, the terminus of the Sudan Railway, which he reached almost seven months after his start from Sollum.

The journey was an important geographical achievement, and much valuable scientific information was collected by the author, which is contained in the appendices at the end of the volume, and the separation of this technical information makes the body of the book all the more interesting to the general reader.

Only a brave man and an intrepid traveller could have attempted and succeeded in making such a journey, but it has been the ambition of several men to accomplish this feat which Hassanein has performed. I have heard it discussed many times on the Western Desert, and some time before Hassanein visited Kufra in 1921 the Government refused permission for an attempt to make this journey.

The difficulties and the dangers which were met with are so modestly described that people with no experience of the desert would hardly realize how serious they were. There was the constant possibility of the caravan losing its way in that trackless desert which is so often swept by terrific sandstorms, and that would have meant a certain and terrible death. Although the Senussi chiefs were friendly to Hassanein, many of the Arabs resented the idea that he was spying out their land, and the demeanour and the number of the tribesmen in the two oases were unknown. Hassanein's caravan never contained more than twenty men.

The description of the journey is an intensely interesting and human story

It is written in plain, straightforward English, without any of those literary flourishes which one associates with books which are written in a language which is foreign to that of the author. There is a careful study of the history of the Senussi, and many descriptions of local customs and superstitions, which are of great ethnological interest.

But, perhaps, the most interesting feature of the book is the point of view of the author. He is an Egyptian gentleman, a sincere Mahomedan, and of Bedouin descent; at the same time he is a scientist, a scholar, and a man with not only an English University education, but with many of those traits which are typical of English University men. In the Middle Ages there were many famous Arab travellers, but in later years Egyptians have not been so much associated with enterprises of this description. Hassanein Bey's journey is eventful not only in itself, but also as a sign of the new spirit of Egypt to-day.

The book is dedicated to His Highness King Fouad of Egypt, who was largely responsible for the expedition, and it contains an appreciative introduction by Sir Rennell Rodd. It is illustrated by numerous excellent photographs; those of Arkenu and Ouenat remind one of some of the small uninhabited oases which lie south of Siwa. There is only one photograph of the author, which is rather a change from many travel books, in which photographs of the authors appear in almost every chapter.

The discovery of the oases is of military and political importance. According to Hassanein Bey, Arkenu is within the Egyptian frontier and Ouenat lies inside the borders of the Sudan. These places are valuable because they contain a water supply, and because of this they could be used as a base, possibly for further exploration of that part of the desert which lies between the oases and the Nile, which is now one of the few unexplored parts of that country. Now that they have been marked upon the map, it is possible for a camel caravan to travel from the Mediterranean coast to Darfur, and where camels have gone motors may follow. During the war British forces were fighting against the Senussi on the coast and against the army of the Sultan of Darfur in the Western Sudan. One wonders whether this route was used at that time for conveying arms, which were landed on the coast, down to the Sudan.

Altogether "The Lost Oases" forms a valuable contribution to the literature of the Libyan Desert, and Hassanein Bey is to be congratulated on a most fascinating and admirable book.

C. DALRYMPLE BELGRAVE.

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1. THE EARLY HISTORY OF BENGAL. By the late F. J. MONAHAN, Indian Civil Servant. Oxford University Press. 1925.
 2. THE EARLY HISTORY OF BENGAL. By R. C. Mazumdar, Professor of History in the University of Dacca. Dacca University Bulletin No. 8. Oxford University Press. 1925.

A book and a pamphlet on the Early History of Bengal. Professor Mazumdar's pamphlet is of twenty-seven pages only. In the absence of any explanation as to the ground which a Dacca University Bulletin is intended to cover, it is difficult to see what useful purpose this bulletin is intended to serve, unless as a cram book for the Professor's students. Its perusal leaves one with a sense of confusion. The opening pages appear unintelligible except to a Sanscrit scholar or student, and such scholar would expect something more detailed. In the absence of definite information regarding the details of early Bengal and Bihar history, social or political, the ethnological origins of the

people deserve more than the passing notice given. No effort has been made to explain the political geography of early Eastern India, until, two-thirds through the pamphlet, and dealing with the seventh century A.D., the author has "placed" certain petty kingdoms under their modern divisional and district names. For the rest, the pamphlet, confining itself to a record of the rise and fall of obscure dynasties, without telling the general reader anything about the religious, social, and political developments of the people, appears neither up to the standard of a learned paper to a historical society, nor sufficiently clear and interesting to act as an introduction to the study of the history of an important part of India. Altogether it is a disappointing production for the Dacca University. The bibliographical referencing is well done.

It is refreshing to turn from the pamphlet of the professional to the book of the amateur historian. The late Mr. Monahan, of the Indian Civil Service and the Bengal Presidency, had the reputation of being a revenue officer of deep and extensive knowledge—and revenue officers are generally credited with the clearest insight into the real India. His sympathies, his abilities, and his opportunities all tended towards a study of the language, religion, and social life of the people rather than towards administrative success, although at the close of his career he was Member of the Board of Revenue, Bengal. After his retirement he set himself to the task of writing a history of Bengal from the earliest times covered by historical records rather than legends and religious myths. His unexpected death set a quick limit to this task, and in the result all that had been completed was a history of the institutions, manners and customs of the Maurya Empire, with its capital at Patna in Bihar, and of which Bengal was but an unmentioned province, though doubtless extremely high in the estimation of the Maurya Treasury officials. The book is a delight to read and should appeal to a wider circle of readers than those immediately concerned with Indian polity and problems, and its survey of Maurya institutions should form a useful corrective to such as are carried away by sympathy for the anti-Government diatribes of certain Indian political groups.

After a comparative study of the geography of Eastern India and a brief résumé of outstanding events in the reigns of Candragupta, Bindusāra, and Aśoka, Mr. Monahan has dissected the Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra, a handbook for Princes by Kauṭilya or Cāṇakya, the Minister of Candragupta. This as a dissertation on the elements of politics cannot compare with Aristotle, but as a picture of the Maurya governmental machine and of the manners, customs and trade of Bihar and Eastern India generally, it is most illuminating, and Mr. Monahan has treated it with sympathetic humour and historical perspective. He has then compared Greek and Roman accounts of India with what he found in the Arthaśāstra, and finally has briefly examined the evidence to be obtained from Aśoka's Edicts, Rock, Pillar, and Cave.

The picture is one of a bureaucratic despotism, not too scrupulous in its methods, yet working for the people, when the king's interests are not contrary. There was an astonishing amount of royal interference with the flow of trade and the level of prices. Other features that have impressed themselves upon the reviewer are the privileged position of the Brahman, and the power of the priesthood generally; the cynical frankness about the dishonesty of ministers and officials, the activities of the C.I.D. and of *agents provocateurs* and spies, and the striking similarity—which on analysis is not really so striking—between the measures to be taken for dealing with badmashes in Maurya times and under sections 109 and 110 Criminal Procedure Code to-day. The description of how a bad character behaved in 300 B.C. reads like the final report of a bad livelihood case in 1920; which makes one all the more amused at the support given to the

anti-Government agitation to wipe out 109 and 110 from the Criminal Procedure Code.

In Service gossip Mr. Monahan was often credited with a distrust of the police. This distrust, if it really existed, may have had its origins in Mr. Monahan's nationality and in his early experiences in Bengal before Police Reform had gone very far. It must have tickled his sense of humour, therefore, to have transcribed the passages in the Arthashastra about the utility to the Maurya polity of *agents provocateurs*, political assassins and spies. It is pleasing to think of the cleanness of the Bengal Police in these days.

Mr. Monahan's referencing is excellent.

D. S. F.

CENSUS OF INDIA, 1921. Vol. IV.: BALUCHISTAN. By Major T. C. Fowle and Rai Bahadur Diwan Jamiat Rai, C.I.E.

"Each successive census advances towards the ideal of statisticians, but perfect records cannot be expected without the employment of well-trained and intelligent officials."

Baluchistan could not have secured a higher-trained, more intelligent or enthusiastic official than Diwan Jamiat Rai, whose every interest is bound up with what may well be called the country of his adoption. Trusted by high and low, he is equally at home with Baluch or Pathan. Major Fowle had a congenial task to one of his literary ability and deep interest in the people of the frontier. We can sympathize with him in his desire to have had charge of operations from the beginning of the census to the final report, but he will never regret the knowledge he has gathered in the compilation, even though the data were collected under another's authority.

The interest of the report under review lies when read in conjunction and compared with that of the 1911 census, and will well repay such a study to anyone interested in India frontier problems. One might even suggest that all successful British candidates at the India Civil Service examinations should attend a few lectures on the psychology of the people based on the gazetteers and census reports of the province to which they were to be posted. They would probably be able to read, mark, learn and inwardly digest these valuable but, when unexplained, forbidding tomes with pleasure as well as profit to themselves and the people they will later on have to rule over.

It is true that the report of 1911 was most comprehensive, and the compiler has quoted freely therefrom; however, one cannot but think that some fresh material for "descriptive matter of interest" must have been forthcoming during a decade of such exceptional interest. The World War, the Afghan War, two or three tribal outbreaks have surely left some mark worthy of note even in a census report. For one thing the war caused a great revival not only in the province, but all along the borderland, in religion, and the condition of the Muslim faith throughout the world; this interest will not easily be laid aside, and will affect the numbers of the priestly class.

The Marri and Jalawan outbreaks, as well as the raids on the Persian border, caused much dislocation of tribal life as well as definite losses in lives and prisoners.

When the innate prejudices against census operations prevalent among the more backward tribesmen are taken into account, the fact that the census was completed without any untoward incident gives yet another proof of the excellence of the Sandeman policy, under which the administration is conducted as far as possible by and through the natural leaders of the people.

The author need not excuse himself for following in the footsteps of that

wise headmaster who only just sat about and smoked cigars while subordinates carried on. One may be sure that Major Fowle, like that same headmaster, got good work out of his staff because they knew he was all the time watching and noting their labours without too much fuss and unnecessary interference. If only some of our super-efficient administrators would learn this useful lesson, how much greater would be the content and happiness not only of the harassed officials, but of the poor, over-administered people.

The population of India is the most extensive aggregate in the scope of uniform census, and probably nowhere, even in India's widely differing lands, are such natural physical difficulties to be encountered in enumeration work as in Baluchistan, remembering at the same time that the larger portion of the population is nomadic.

In these circumstances the importance of a preliminary record, even with a very simplified schedule, as well as the necessity for non-synchronous areas, can be readily understood. Considering all the difficulties, the information obtained is truly wonderful, and reflects the greatest credit on all those who have laboured in this important work.

An innovation, and a useful one, in this census was the enumeration of cattle. The maps also are of great value.

It is well to note that "though the province is distinctly larger than the United Kingdom, its total population is only about that of Liverpool." This population is practically stationary, except for a decrease, as in this decade, due to war, pestilence, and famine, chief of which was the exceptionally virulent outbreak of influenza. It was not the number of new graves that caught one's eye passing near some lonely village after the visitation, but an entirely new "God's acre" with a full harvest.

Although there are plenty of fine open plains in Baluchistan waiting for agriculture, they are all valueless through the lack of water for irrigation, and desiccation is going on apace. The desert is advancing, not retreating, and this over some of the most fertile valleys, such as Mastung.

Great interest in the report of 1911, and continued in the present one, was shown in sex questions; perhaps another reason, in addition to all the hypothetical ones mentioned for the paucity of female births, may be that well known to the Baluch horse-breeder in determining sex!

The person who probably knows more about the women of Baluchistan than anybody else is that well-beloved and devoted missionary doctor, Miss Stewart, and a note by her would illumine any future report.

It does not appear to have been noticed that similarly to the seasonal migration to Kachhi from the highlands there is a similar migration to Sind by landed proprietors—that is, a considerable number of Sardars and tribesmen own land in Sind as well as in Baluchistan, the former being Darbaris in both provinces.

The best term in the "Analysis of Occupations" used by the author is that of "Jack of all trades," as applied to the indigenous tribesman, for this he truly is. Primary malik of his own plot, as he prefers to call himself, he is flock-owner, camel-owner, levy sowar, railway employee, petty trader, transport worker, or in fact good for any game that pays. If only these census reports help towards a better understanding of the problems concerning the tribesmen, and a closer and more sympathetic bond between the provincial administration and the Government of India, they will be worth much more than only their statistical value. We must not forget to commend the valuable appendices, especially No. 8, by Diwan Jamiat Rai.

ALIF SHAHNAH.

ENGLISH-BALUCHI COLLOQUIAL DICTIONARY. By Major George Waters Gilbertson, assisted by Ghano Khán Haddiani. Published by the Author.

Those to whom the study of Baluchi is a necessity will with difficulty liquidate their debt to the author, already great on account of "The Baluchi Language." He has evidently laboured long and with care to compile a work so full of detail. Departing from the system used in an ordinary dictionary, he has presented what might perhaps be better described as a live dictionary. Each English word carries a Baluchi sentence embodying that word, or its meaning when no particular Baluchi word is available, and thus prevents the risk of translating a word in a wrong sense.

This system is surely sound if it is true that "The influence of climate and of religion have to be considered, as well as the character of the people, if we wish to obtain a real hold on the language of our study." It is only by learning the everyday idioms and context in which words are used that a language can be truly mastered. Leitner always maintained that the ethnographical study of a people best explained the grammar of its language. In fact, the present work recalls to mind Leitner's "Languages and Races of Dardistan."

In the foreword it is stated that Baluchi has no literature; but in all primitive languages literature in its early stages is chiefly in verse, and this is not only so with the Baluch, but practically all the poetry, history, and records of that quaint conglomerate, called "The Confederacy of the Kalat Brahui Clans," contained in its sagas, such as "The Brahui-Jadgal War," are in the Baluchi language.

Baluchi is the household speech of many Brahui chiefs, as well as that of H.H. the Khan—either western or eastern, according to the recruiting centre. In the Khan's house the western, since all the slaves came from Mekran; in that of the Raisani Sardar's the eastern, because, originally Pathans, their wealth and property is chiefly in Kachhi and Sind.

Baluchi took its rise in Baluchistan maybe, but in Persian Baluchistan—not the British Baluchistan of to-day. The Baluchi-speaking tribes are not a large proportion of the population of Baluchistan. We may note that nearly all Baluch are bilingual, mostly speaking Jatki or Lahnda as a second language. It is certainly correct in a general sense that idioms and not words indicate nationality, and this is probably because the idioms are acquired with the original mother-tongue. Take the Marris and Bugtis, recruited originally by "Hamsayahs" from anywhere, and, having proved their fitness, were then given women and became clansmen, the offspring naturally learning pure Baluchi from their mothers.

The author has no doubt made an exhaustive study of the connecting link between the Iranian and Indian languages, but it would be hard to forgo one's lifelong opinion that the Baluch is originally of Iranian stock. It is doubtful, of course, if a race like the Baluch are not destined to be absorbed by other people unless carefully fostered by Government, and one of the best ways to ensure a future for these very interesting people would be a confederacy embracing all Baluch from Dera Ghazi Khan to the Mekran border. Perhaps this could hardly be hoped for from a foreign and utilitarian administration.

It is perhaps more difficult to agree entirely with the author on the subject of Appendix V.—one on which opinions widely differ, more especially so amongst the leaders in pedagogics. We join issue with him on the subject of Borstal, which is yet in its early stages and needs improvement, but has done a world of good in many instances. The stick is no more infallible than other methods, as the records of the time of its general use prove, keeping in mind, of course, the increase in the population. Probably the truest word in this sermon on how to

learn is at page 817 : "It is the one and only key to a knowledge of a people. If you would govern a people you must know them. And the better you know them the easier the thing becomes." One might also say that a living language can only be learnt thoroughly by living amongst the people whose mother-tongue it is.

We may hope that Major Gilbertson will meet his loyal and helpful companion later on, even without the aid of Messrs. Oliver Lodge and Conan Doyle, and the present writer trusts they will not mind his sitting on a lower step to hear a Baluchi hymn of praise sung by professors in the language :

"*Wath-i chana an jawá 'en gushokk en.*"

ALIF SHABNAM.

NOTICES

The following books have been received for review :

- "Mosul and its Minorities," by H. C. Luke. $8\frac{1}{2}" \times 5\frac{1}{4}"$. Pp. 161. Illustrations. (London : Martin Hopkinson. 10s. 6d.)
- "Things Seen in Constantinople," by A. Goodrich-Freer. $5\frac{3}{4}" \times 4\frac{1}{2}"$. Pp. 158. Illustrations and plan. (London : Seeley Service and Co. 3s. 6d.)
- "The Lost Oases," by A. M. Hassanein Bey. $9" \times 6"$. Pp. 316. Maps and illustrations. (London : Thornton Butterworth. 21s.)
- "Periods of Chinese History." Chart, folded in manila container. 8s. 6d. Also obtainable on stick as wall map. 22s. 6d. (Messrs. Gunn and Co., Boston and London.)
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The Council wish to thank Mrs. Frazer for a copy of "Un Manuel de Politique Musulmane," by Un Africain. Éditions Bossard, 43, Rue Madame, Paris.

Contributors only are responsible for their statements in the *Journal*.

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VOL. XIII - 1926

PART. II

CONTENTS.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TRANSCASPIA, 1918-1919.

BY BREVET LIEUT.-COLONEL. D. E. KNOLLYS, D.S.O

INDIA'S DEFENCE AS AN IMPERIAL PROBLEM. BY E. HAWARD.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PERSIA.

THROUGH THE GORGE OF THE TSANGPO.

BY CAPTAIN F. KINGDON WARD.

A VISIT TO THE ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL-FIELDS.

BY SQUADRON-LEADER A. R. C. COOPER.

MOSUL. BY F. W. CHARDIN.

COLONEL LAWRENCE'S MANUSCRIPT.

REVIEWS:

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE CHINESE REPUBLIC. PEKING TO LHASA: THE
NARRATIVE OF JOURNEYS IN THE CHINESE EMPIRE MADE BY THE
LATE BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE PEREIRA. IN THE HEART OF ASIA.
THRO' THE GATES OF MEMORY: FROM THE BOSPHORUS TO BAGHDAD.
FOUR CENTURIES OF MODERN IRAQ. ADVENTURES IN TURKEY AND
RUSSIA. FREIE WEGE VERGLEICHENDER ERDKUNDEN.

APPENDIX: "THROUGH THE INNER DESERTS TO MEDINA,"

OBITUARY.

NOTICES.

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Part II

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TRANSCASPIA, 1918-1919*

BY BREVET LIEUT.-COLONEL D. E. KNOLLYS, D.S.O.

(Lecture given before the Central Asian Society on December 10, 1925.)

BEFORE starting on the operations we must briefly review the circumstances that led to their being undertaken.

During the war the Indian Government was called upon to supply large forces in many theatres, and in order to comply as far as possible

* The CHAIRMAN (Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn): Ladies and gentlemen, before I introduce the lecturer to you, the Hon. Secretary has an announcement to make.

The HON. SECRETARY: I have to announce that nine new members have been elected by the Council. On each occasion when the Council has met, five, six, or eight have been elected, and our numbers now amount to 850 or 860, leaving a small margin for us to attain the number we should like to attain, of 1,000, and I am sure there are amongst the audience those who are not already members who are likely recruits.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, Colonel Knollys, of the 1/14th, formerly 19th Punjabi Regiment, is going to lecture this evening on the military operations in Transcaspia in 1918 and 1919, and before I call upon him I should like to say a few words for the benefit of anyone who is here to-night, who does not happen to know what these astounding adventures in Transcaspia amounted to. While in the Western theatres of war millions were opposed to millions, and while Lord Allenby's forces were gathering in Palestine for their final smash up of the Turkish army, and while several divisions were on the Tigris, there was a small force in 1918 and 1919 that had been pushed up hundreds and hundreds of miles away into Central Asia, and hardly anybody knew what was going on. There were two dangerous anti-civilization and anti-British movements going on. Firstly, Pan-Islamic, because though the Young Turk had thrown Islam by the board, yet at the same time they were not slow to use Islamic propaganda as a means of disturbing India generally; and, secondly, because the Turks had tried to throw their influence right across into Manchuria and form a Pan-Turk association with the Central Powers and Turkey. To stop this a force was gradually pushed up into Transcaspia to interpose a cordon between Afghanistan and the West, and also if need be to help any Russian party that could contribute to the same end. The story is one of great adventure, of intense difficulty at the time, when the resources of the Government

with these demands it adopted a policy which I think was described as that of maintaining a minimum force in India for the passive protection of her frontiers. How dangerously low this minimum was may be judged from the difficulty experienced in bringing to a conclusion the Third Afghan War, which took place after the Great War had ended and India's obligations had been greatly lessened elsewhere. Had Afghanistan attacked us during the critical period of the war we can imagine how very seriously she would have embarrassed us. It was, therefore, of paramount importance to keep peace with Afghanistan while the Great War lasted.

Fortunately the Amir, Habibullah, was a far-seeing ruler, who realized that his best interests lay in peace with India, and who kept loyally to his treaty with her throughout the war. The autocratic powers of the Amir are, however, more apparent than real, and Kabul exercises but little control over Herat or other distant centres. Communications are bad, orders travel slowly, and punishment follows disobedience at a long interval, and there are many and various ways of diverting it. There was already in Afghanistan an anti-British faction headed by Nasrullah, the Amir's brother, and Germany established two notorious Indian agitators, Mahendra Pertab and Barkatullah, the self-styled President of the Provisional Indian Government, in Kabul, which they used as a centre to foment trouble in India.

ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDON.

Afghanistan was for all practical purposes only approachable for agents and propaganda work from the north or the west—that is to say through Transcaspia or Persia. The former route was closed by the Russians, but the latter was an easy and open road. In order to close this as far as possible a cordon called the East Persian Cordon was established along the eastern boundary of Persia, and, in accordance with the pre-war division of that country into spheres of influence, Russia held the northern part of this line and we the southern. Several Indian revolutionary agents from Kabul were captured trying to get through this cordon.

TAKING OVER FROM THE RUSSIANS.

In 1917 came the Russian Revolution, shortly followed by the first signs of Bolshevism, and by the beginning of 1918 the Russian troops

and the Indian army were strained to the utmost, the operations demanding hundreds of miles of railway, hundreds of miles of motor roads, on which every sort of heterogeneous motor transport alone was available, and thousands of camels were also required, which died in large numbers. I have great pleasure in introducing to you Lieut.-Colonel Knollys, of a regiment that was the mainstay of that force, the 19th Punjabis, and I will now ask him to tell you some of the adventures the force met with.

in Persia had decided it was time they went to look after their own homes, and incidentally to share in any loot that might be available, and walked out of Persia.

We accordingly extended our line north to Meshed, and by March one cavalry regiment (29th Light Cavalry) and one infantry battalion (19th Punjabis) were spread out from Khwash to Meshed, a distance of 800 miles.

GEOGRAPHY.

As regards the geography and nature of the country over which the operations took place.

From Meshed a reasonably good road runs to Askabad, a distance of about 160 miles. In addition there are alternative routes, suitable with more or less difficulty for mules or camels, running directly north through the mountains from Meshed to Dushak and from Kuchan to Mohomedabad, but very little information seemed to be available about these at that time.

The portion of Turkistan with which we are concerned consists of a flat sandy desert with here and there areas of small sandhills. In the few places where water is available it is extremely fertile, producing grain, cotton, and grapes of excellent quality. The two main oases are those of Tejend and Merv, watered respectively by the rivers Tejend and Murgab, which, flowing down from the Persian hills, lose themselves in the sand after most of their water has been taken for irrigation.

The climate is one of extremes, varying from about zero in winter to somewhere round 100° in the shade in summer, and no rainfall at all so far as I know. The railway is a broad-gauge single line running from the Caspian at Krasnovodsk through Askabad, Merv, across the Oxus, and so up to Samarkand and Tashkent.

Water is only available at a few stations along it, and the remainder are supplied by the trains for which oil was the main fuel used.

The country had made a remarkable development in the forty years or so the Russians had been in possession of it, and from the point of view of creature comforts, such as electric light and accommodation for troops and the railway employees, compared very favourably with India.

SITUATION IN TURKISTAN.

By the beginning of August, 1918, a strong Bolshevik centre had been established at Tashkent, and, being dissatisfied with the mildness of the rule of their brothers in Askabad, they sent a commissar to instil the new gospel into their backward brethren. This he proceeded to do in accordance with the best tenets of Bolshevism by shooting down the representatives of the railway workmen who had come to discuss

matters with him. Thereupon the Askabadis gave a practical demonstration of their readiness to learn and shot both him and his wife and set up their own committee, calling themselves Mensheviks. This committee was, however, just as Bolshevik at heart as those against whom they were fighting.

These Mensheviks got together a scratch force and the Bolsheviks were driven back beyond Bairam Ali. Reinforcements were sent down from Tashkent, and it was obvious that the Mensheviks could not keep them back.

At this point they approached the British missions which had been established in Meshed under General Malleson, asking for moral support.

SITUATION IN PERSIA.

Now let us look at the position as it affected us. The end of the war had not arrived in sight. The Turks were advancing on Baku on the western shore of the Caspian, where another mission had been established under General Dunsterville but was obviously in great jeopardy. With Baku captured, Transcaspiia Bolshevik right up to the Caspian, we have the realization of German dreams—an open road to Afghanistan and the East, and a very serious situation for India.

Let us look at the local situation. Troops in Meshed: two squadrons cavalry, one battalion infantry less one company; and troops moving up the line: two squadrons cavalry, one company infantry, all practically untrained—anyhow the infantry, owing to three years work as road-construction coolies. Meshed itself in a disturbed state.

MOVE TO TRANSCASPIA.

First one company and one sub-section Vickers guns were sent up to the border at Mohomedabad to supply moral support as requested, but, somehow, *moral* support seemed to have no effect on the Bolshevik advance.

It was therefore decided that all available troops should be sent to give practical support, and the available troops were assessed at the battalion of infantry, less one company, and one section field ambulance.

Accordingly we received orders to march as quickly as possible and endeavour to get astride the railway and do our best. If the Bolsheviks had got past us on the railway when we got there we must try to harry their communications.

We should be nominally under the Russian commander, but could agree to differ if we found it advisable. We should have no line of communication, our sick and wounded must accompany us, the Russians would feed us, and no maps were available—a very pleasant roving commission from which, I fancy, more was hoped than expected.

The route selected for us to take was via Kuchan and the Allahoa Akbar Pass to Mohomedabad on to the border.

OPENING OF OPERATIONS.

On arrival at Mohomedabad we found that the company we expected to be waiting for us there had already gone on ahead, and had joined the Mensheviks at Kaaka, where they expected to be attacked next day, and were not at all sanguine as to the result; the sub-section of the machine-guns had returned to Mohomedabad *hors de combat* from influenza and casualties, as the result of a short campaign they had already had with our allies, and from their description of this we were able to gather some inkling of what was before us.

The march was continued to Artik, the nearest station on the railway, and on the way we were met by the British liaison officer, who painted us a very gloomy picture of the state of affairs.

He reported that an attack on Kaaka was in progress, and our presence urgently required. Accordingly a train-load of fighting troops was immediately made up, and baggage, animals, etc., were left to follow. It was late in the afternoon of August 24 when we reached Kaaka, where we found the Mensheviks full of self-congratulation in having beaten off the attack. All that had really happened was a reconnaissance on the part of the enemy to find out our position; but that would probably have been quite sufficient excuse for continuing the retreat had it not been for the presence of our one company and the knowledge that more were coming.

The weather was very hot, so we elected to bivouac in an orchard next door to the railway station in preference to the railway barracks that were offered us.

COMPOSITION OF FORCES.

We now learnt something of the composition of the forces and the method of warfare adopted, though much of what, for the sake of clearness, I will say now was only learnt by slow degrees and bitter experience.

The Menshevik force with whom we were to ally ourselves consisted roughly of about 1,000 infantry, of whom a very small number, about one hundred, were either old Russian officers or soldiers. The rest were almost entirely Armenians, about whom the less said the better.

The artillery consisted of four modern field-guns, of which one was on the armoured train, manned at first entirely by ex-officers, and extremely good. Later, the Committee said this was *contre-révolutionnaire*, and had the officers dispersed. In addition were four old muzzle-loaders which helped to make a noise, quite an important factor.

TURCOMAN.

Then came the Turcoman, a more or less wild race that was gradually settling down to peaceful pursuits, such as growing cotton, corn, and fruit, living under the tribal system, and most bitterly opposed to Bolshevism, whose houses had been destroyed, crops looted, women and children outraged and murdered. They were mounted on small wiry ponies capable of covering immense distances, were utterly undependable, came and went as they liked, were of no use in attack or defence, but had their value. They would go miles to scupper a small Bolshevik looting party or any stragglers, thus making it hard for them to collect supplies from the outlying villages. They could collect information, usually very belated and very inaccurate, as, during the Bolshevik advance, they spread outwards from the railway, and took to their nomad life in the desert, keeping close to the flanks and stretching far to the rear. They were, in fact, poor friends, but unpleasant enemies.

Now we come to the most important item of all—the armoured train. Ours was armoured by means of bales of compressed cotton and wooden sleepers, carried one 16-pound field-gun and two machine-guns. In addition we had a subsidiary train, armed with one machine-gun, for protecting the line in our rear from our friends. The armament was later improved, and by the end we had two reasonably good trains, but we never got anything in the way of guns to equal those possessed by the enemy as regards range.

The nominal Commander-in-Chief of this formidable army was Oraz Sirdar, a Turcoman chief, son of Tokme Sirdar, who put up such a good fight against the Russians and was finally defeated by them at Geoke Tepe. He was a very charming man, who had had a superficial military education at the Russian Military School, where he had been left by his father when he returned to his country after heading the deputation to lay the homage of the Turcomans at the feet of the Czar. The appointment was more political than anything, as he was the only man who could in any way hold together the Turcoman, and he made little pretence of commanding. His staff, mostly Russians, were hopeless, and had not the most rudimentary knowledge of tactics or organization—this appears only to have been taught to officers specially trained for the staff. There was no pretence of discipline; men chose their own officers and N.C.O.'s, but never dreamt of obeying them, nor were they allowed to wear any distinguishing badges. Men came and went as they liked, generally liking the former on pay-day and the latter on all others. You never knew the size of the force, not that it mattered much, nor whether any picquets that might have been posted were there or not, though you could pretty safely assume that they were not.

ENEMY FORCES.

Against this what was opposed? An army made up truly of a heterogeneous collection, but stiffened by a large number of released Austrian prisoners who had been imprisoned in Tashkent and Samarcand, and told that once they reached the Caspian they could go home. Ruled with an iron discipline, supplied with almost unlimited material which they had obtained from that enormous Russian fortress and arsenal, Kushkb, on the Afghan border, which the Mensheviks had let them take complete without an effort to save it or to destroy or remove the material. In fact, it seemed to change hands, complete with garrison, etc., each time the ebb and flow of the tide passed it.

On their armoured trains they had 4.5-inch guns, also field-guns and machine-guns as many as they could man, and all manned by Austrians.

As regards aeroplanes each side had one at intervals, but they were usually out of order. The Bolshevik pilots were ex-officers and when one went out the remainder were imprisoned, to be killed if he did not return. Our aeroplane only reached us on the fall of Baku, having been flown across the Caspian by its Russian pilot, and we got very little use out of it.

NATURE OF WARFARE.

The method of warfare adopted to date had been as follows:

Each side lived entirely in trains. These moved about in long processions, headed or tailed, as the case might be, by their armoured train or trains. On these trains water was carried in huge butts, field-kitchens on open trucks, men, horses, food, guns, and, in the case of the Bolsheviks, all their loot, a supply of women for use of the troops in accordance with Bolshevik principles, and a printing press to produce the pay of the army. There were also hospital trains with a staff of nurses, and, incidentally, I may here remark that had the Menshevik army had one-quarter of the pluck of the nurses who accompanied it it would have been a fine army. When the retiring force thought it time to make a stand they would get out of their trains and take up a position on either side of the line. The advancing force would see them halted, fire a few rounds from the armoured train, and, if this had no effect, get ready to attack. The procedure for this was to disembark your guns and troops during the night and advance at dawn. When you got close to the enemy, say, 1,000 yards, one of two things happened—either the retiring side bolted for their trains, scrambled on board, leaving behind what couldn't be got on quickly enough, and steamed away; or the attacking side, being met with firm resistance, which meant anything other than a precipitate

bolt, quietly returned to their trains, retired to a convenient distance, and considered what they should do next.

The arrival of the Austrian prisoners on one side, and of ourselves on the other, somewhat modified this procedure, but it remained substantially the same. You will now begin to see the immense advantage to the side with the greatest range from its armoured train. Except in certain circumstances, which I will explain later, it could compel the weaker train and all the others behind it to retire without coming within its range; you could not leave your trains and fight independently of them, as you had no other means of transport for supplies and nowhere else to get your water.

Both sides were expert railway men. They could repair a line quicker than you could destroy it; culverts and small bridges were replaced with incredible rapidity by building up piers either of crossed railway sleepers or even cotton bales. The trains were carefully guarded at night, and a certain length of rail removed in front of them in case you should send down a runaway engine to try what a collision would do. All tricks for laying mines, etc., seemed useless; they were not to be caught. The most successful device I saw was a very slight and gradual widening of the distance between the rails just sufficient to drop the engine between them, by which the Bolsheviks nearly caught our armoured train but just didn't.

DESCRIPTION OF KAAKA.

On the morning of the 25th we had a look round the position. I have here a rough map of Kaaka and its surroundings. The railway station was full of trains but these were now insufficient to accommodate the whole force, so in the event of things going wrong it was obvious we should not have much of a look in. We appropriated enough trucks to carry our kits, spare baggage, and rations, and if the worst came to the worst could probably extricate ourselves and get across the frontier into Persia.

The railway station, together with its associated buildings, comprises a group of solid well-made buildings, and includes a large barrack for the railway employees. Surrounding this is a fair-sized village consisting mainly of mud-built houses, and surrounding the whole are orchards and vineyards enclosed in mud walls. The streets are narrow and tortuous and not remarkable for cleanliness. To the north, about 2,000 yards from the station, is an old mud Turcoman fort, consisting of a wall about twenty feet high in a very fair state of repair. To the east, and dominating the whole position, is a large flat-topped hill rising sharply from the plain at a distance of about two miles from the railway station, and extending for about a mile north and south and perhaps two miles east and west. The railway runs round the southern slopes of this, and south of the railway, about 1,000 yards west of the

large feature, is a long low ridge running north and south. A stream, which the railway crosses on an iron girder bridge, runs below the western slope of this and out into the plain to the north, where it causes a considerable area of broken ground. South of the village is another hill, but this did not come into the picture.

The disposition of the troops was somewhat remarkable and gave us our first hint of the Russian staff's idea of tactics. The ridge south of the railway was packed with all the available Russian troops and heavily entrenched, and one machine-gun section was placed on the extreme right. The company which had gone on in advance was in so-called reserve at the bridge across the stream. The Commander-in-Chief's personal bodyguard, whose equivalent in our Army would perhaps be the Chelsea Pensioners, were in general reserve at the railway station, and the remainder of the Turcomans were in the old fort. The three Russian field-guns were south of the railway behind the ridge and the muzzle-loaders just north of the bridge. Two points were at once obvious. Firstly, an attack was practically certain to come against our left flank, and this was entirely unprotected except for the Turcomans in the fort; secondly, in view of the weakness of the left flank the reserves should be back by the station and not pushed forward as they were. The first point was noted for remedy, but the second was ruled out by the Russian staff, and we had not yet assumed command. The occupation of the large plateau north of the line was altogether too big a business to be undertaken, but I have not time to go into that here, and we had to risk it being used by the enemy as an artillery and observation position.

I now want to emphasize this question of the armoured train, to which I have already briefly referred, as on this the whole operations hinged. It is obvious that if two trains carrying guns of unequal range are matched against one another on a straight line of rail across an open plain the weaker must always be driven back. It is therefore essential, if the weaker is to hold to its position, that it be under cover from view and able to fire over that cover. This can only be attained when the line curves round a hill, such as it does at Kaaka. The procedure then was for the train to lie behind the hill with an observation post on it, or to one side, and fire over it. Further, an engine must breathe—so it did this after the manner of a whale, letting off great puffs of steam at intervals, then retiring or advancing, so as to be out of harm's way while the enemy had shots at the smoke. Should the opposing train be brave enough to poke its nose round the corner it would immediately be within close range and at a great disadvantage, as the other would be sitting ready for it.

BATTLE OF KAAKA.

Late that same afternoon, before steps could be taken to strengthen the left flank, news arrived that the Bolsheviks were disembarking from their trains behind Arman Sagat, the next station up the line. We were asked to proceed to the bridge and join the company there as reserve. On arrival we found that the company had been sent up further to strengthen the right flank, as the attack was expected there. This was rather too much, and we insisted on the Vickers guns and one company being sent to extend the left flank and on keeping two companies in reserve. This change had to be made in complete darkness. I propose to describe the small action that took place next day in some detail, as it gives a clear insight into the difficulties against which we had to contend, both at the moment and throughout the operations, and which had a considerable influence on our future actions.

The attack began to develop at about 7.30 a.m. with considerable gun and rifle fire from the top of the hill. This was carried on throughout the day and several half-hearted attempts were made to advance down the hill but were promptly stopped by artillery and rifle fire and the roar of the muzzle-loaders. It was estimated that twelve guns were in action on the hill, but their fire was very badly directed and they did little damage. Needless to say, no attack was attempted against our right flank.

At about eight o'clock a large turning movement against our left flank began to develop, and was directed on the old fort held, or rather occupied, by the Turcomans. We watched this with considerable interest from our position at the bridge, and saw our worst fears realized as it came on and on, without the slightest sign of a check, past the fort and into the orchards where we were told, with the usual Russian optimism, the bodyguard would doubtless stop it. It was, however, as we learnt afterwards, held up for some considerable and very valuable time by a party formed by our Quartermaster from the details left in our camp. Urgent messages for assistance now reached us, and the reserve company was immediately despatched. This was directed so as to strike diagonally into the orchards with its left flank on the station. We reached the station at the psychological moment, just as the enemy also entered it and began to throw bombs at the trains behind which the bodyguard and all the rest of the mob were seeking shelter. The company charged straight in with fixed bayonets, and the enemy, completely taken aback by this unprecedented form of warfare, immediately started to retire. The line wheeled north, and a running fight ensued through the orchards and over the mud walls, where practically nothing could be seen. Our line was continued to the left by such of the Russians and Turcomans as could be collected by two of the Mission officers, who were attached to the force as

liaison officers, and—this I want to emphasize—such of the enemy as had not got away fast enough also joined this line, since there was nothing to distinguish friend from foe where all were probably friends except the former officers and the Turcoman. On clearing the orchards we saw a party of men standing up in the open; some said they were friends, others enemies. The only available interpreters at the moment were a Punjabi-speaking sepoy, who could speak a little Persian, and a Russian, who also knew a little of that language. This did not get us very far towards the solution of who were our friends and who our enemies, but presently one of the liaison officers arrived, and it transpired that the Bolsheviks wished to inform us that they had no desire to fight against the Indians, and that if we would surrender they would be very kind to us. It was therefore decided that the battle had better continue, and each side made ready by occupying the most convenient positions that were handy. During this friendly discussion the water mules and other first-line transport, and also Russian hospital nurses, had arrived on the scene, and before things were properly straightened out someone let off a rifle and the battle continued. The enemy soon cleared off and vanished into the desert, abandoning four machine-guns. Now all this sounds very comic, but it had also its serious side. Firstly, there was the question of casualties. Out of the one weak company and camp details engaged these amounted to 3 British officers and 24 rank and file killed and wounded. Secondly, there was the question of treachery. The casualties amongst the British officers included both the liaison officers—one of whom died of his wounds—who as you remember advanced with the mob, and there was no room left to doubt that both of these were shot from behind. Thirdly, there was the question of how this would affect further operations, and the one point that stood out clearly was that in any future fighting we would keep ourselves to ourselves. Lastly, it brought out the urgent necessity of a proper supply of interpreters, but this we were never able to obtain as they were not available.

Next morning a welcome reinforcement arrived in the form of a company of the 14th Hampshire Regiment from Krasnavodsk.

After the bad fright they had received the previous day, the staff were only too willing to fall in with our suggestions. Accordingly we reorganized the position as follows: Our troops took over and made themselves responsible for the left flank, and also kept one company to support the Russians as required at the bridge. This served the double purpose of having men on the spot to stiffen and encourage the Russians in case of a frontal attack, and also, if necessary, to stop them from running away before we were ready and taking all the trains.

The left flank was protected by constructing a series of posts, and a barbed-wire fence was erected which eventually reached all round the left flank and front of the position. This part of the work was carried

out by the Russians and was extremely well done. The reserves were kept in our orchard by the railway station. Our posts were, for the most part, situated in vineyards or melon gardens; the grapes were excellent and the melons superb, being treated somewhat after the manner of vintage wines, the choicest being kept for a considerable time in dark cellars to mature. We did not, however, reap much benefit from these excellent fruits as cholera was nearly always present among the Russian troops, owing to their insanitary methods, and our medical officer put fruit on the forbidden list. Tantalus could scarcely have been tried as highly as we were, living, as we did, in the midst of it in that heat and with very little variety of food.

We also established a line of communication to Askabad, where we put all our sick and wounded in Russian hospitals, where they were well looked after.

Two further attacks were launched against the position on September 11 and 28. The general plan was similar in all three but the turning movements grew wider, the last reaching the line in rear of our position, and the number of guns brought against us increased considerably. These attacks were easily dealt with and never reached our position, but an attempted counter-attack came to nothing, owing to the refusal of the Russian troops to advance. For the third attack the enemy arrived in eighteen trains.

Between the two attacks our force was again increased by the arrival of one section of the 44th Battery R.F.A., which, like the company of the 1/4th Hampshire Regiment, had come across from Mesopotamia, and after the last attack by two squadrons of the 28th Light Cavalry from East Persia. This was the most important addition we received, as the lack of cavalry in this open country had absolutely paralyzed us both for reconnaissance and for counter-attack. On the debit side, however, we had to place the toll taken by a severe epidemic of influenza, which, as you probably remember, was at that time sweeping over the world, and deprived us for the time of the services of 10 per cent. of our already somewhat inadequate force.

At this time also the Committee began to add to our troubles, and continued to do so till we got beyond their reach to Merv, reaching their climax while we were actually engaged in the action which led to our obtaining possession of that place. I shall not, however, allude to them again, so must say a few words about them now.

As you know, of course, everything in Bolshevik Russia is nominally run by a Committee or Soviet and, as I have tried to point out, our allies were, to all intents and purposes, Bolsheviks. The president was a butcher, the vice-president an engine-driver. A very small minority were engaged in trying to defeat the enemy, and these were soon removed under one pretext or another. The remainder were occupied in lining their pockets and arranging for the disposal of the ex-officers

at the front and the Turcomans as soon as the campaign had been brought to a successful conclusion through their instrumentality. They openly avowed their intention of doing this, and retained at Askabad both men and rifles, which should have been at the front, for this express purpose.

AGREEMENT TO ADVANCE.

This Committee now became most insistent that we should attack, and related all sorts of terrible things that would happen if we didn't advance. The most convincing of these, and one which had the appearance of truth, was that unless we could get the oasis, at least of Tejend, they could not feed the force through the winter. Lies and half-truths were well mixed up, and finally having, after a very stormy interview with them, obtained their promise to carry out a long list of demands, and a new chief of staff, with some pretence to knowledge of his job, having arrived, and above all the arrival of our cavalry, we agreed.

While carrying out preliminary reconnaissance for the advance, an incident occurred that will show that our enemy could not be despised as entirely incompetent, though he had clearly shown he was not formidable in attack. It also illustrates the advantage of command of the railway. A cavalry patrol had gone to reconnoitre towards Dushak. They were spotted by the armoured train, which was standing near Aman Sagat; the news was telephoned in to Dushak, whence a strong mounted patrol was immediately despatched with their horses by train. These detained near Arman Sagat and rode across to cut off the patrol, who escaped with great difficulty, and the loss of one horse.

PROBLEM OF ATTACK.

Now I want to draw your attention to the problem offered in making a plan for the attack, as it sums up the whole tactical difficulty against which we were competing. Our objective was the enemy's force, not his position, as Dushak could never be held if we took it unless the enemy was first beaten, as it did not possess the essential corner for the armoured train. Anyhow it was useless as we wanted Tejend, and nothing short of that was of any use to us.

The enemy's force was to all intents and purposes as if it were contained in a movable fortress armed with guns which far outranged anything that could be brought against it. If you marched against it in force it moved away. If you posted your guns within range at night it merely moved out of range and shelled you at leisure, as there was absolutely no cover for them. If you marched round into the rear it would move forward, and, as you could get neither water nor supplies, you had to return whence you came, if you could. A night bombing attack or any similar scheme was impossible.

PLAN FOR THE ATTACK.

The plan finally adopted for the attack consisted of a double night march north of the railway for the artillery and infantry, and south of the railway under the cover of the foothills, where they could move by day, for the cavalry; the northern force was to spend the intermediate day concealed in a ruined village north of Arman Sagat. The attack was to be delivered simultaneously at dawn on the second day by the artillery and infantry from the west and the cavalry from the east. Somewhat elaborate arrangements were also made, through the medium of the aeroplane, for the destruction of the line east of Dushak by a party of reinforced Turcoman, in order to prevent the enemy from escaping, or reinforcements from being sent to them from Tejend. These, however, for reasons which you will shortly appreciate, did not work out according to plan, so I will not elaborate them. Taking into consideration the knowledge we had so far acquired of the enemy, this appeared to offer some hope of success, but we were as yet far from plumbing the depths to which our allies could descend.

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS.

All started well, and the northern column was not more than four hours late in getting under way. The ruined village was reached, the troops remained apparently undetected throughout the day, and the cavalry set out on the second stage of their journey. That is all that did go well. When the time arrived for the start of the second night march the Russian troops refused to move on the ground, very possibly true, that they had no food.

Steps had then to be taken to recall the cavalry, which fortunately extricated itself before it had come to any harm; but any possibility that may ever have existed, with so many enemy friends in our own camp, of surprising the enemy had, of course, gone, as also the plans for destroying his line to Askabad. Outposts were put out, food obtained, and it was finally decided to carry on with the original plan three days later.

ACTION AT DUSHAK.

Now, in case you should think that I am not doing justice to our allies, I propose to read you the Russian official account of the action as published in their papers, making a few comments at the end to point out the main omissions and inaccuracies.

"Our detachment received orders to make a large detour round the enemy forces between Arman Sagat and Dushak with the object of destroying the enemy in Dushak. On the night of October 13-14, absolutely unnoticed by the enemy, they attacked Dushak from the south-west at 6.30 a.m., and by 8.30 all Dushak and neighbourhood was

in our hands. The enemy, seeing his hopeless position, blew up his ammunition dumps, stores, etc. At Dushak station seven trains were captured; the eighth, retiring to Tejend, was stopped by our artillery fire, and being surrounded by Turcomans, the enemy in the train, 300 in number, were killed. When Dushak was taken, the Bolsheviks left alive fled to the hills, but by our earlier dispositions they were met by Indian cavalry, and every man was destroyed. In Dushak we captured 152 prisoners, 3 guns, 22 machine-guns, 300 rifles, 200 riding horses with saddlery, and much small-arm ammunition. Thus ended the operation of destroying Dushak and its war material.

"When this operation was finished the troops began to search for food in two of the captured trains loaded with stores. Many were now found to be very busy looting, so that when at 11.30 the enemy attacked from two sides—from the east new forces from Tejend and from the west those who had been cut off towards Arman Sagat—we were forced to take up a defensive position, facing two ways, and were unable to hold it owing to many free citizen warriors being occupied looting the captured booty and loading it on the horses captured from the enemy, and then making off towards Kaaka. Owing to this, from 11.30 to 4.30 p.m. the only troops resisting the enemy were the Indian sepoy, some Russians, and a small number of Turcomans. These troops were under fire from 12 guns and 22 machine-guns of the enemy. The enemy attacked twice in large numbers. We resisted for five hours, when, seeing ourselves beset on three sides, we were forced to retire. The captured guns and some machine-guns were destroyed by us and left. The remaining machine-guns were carried away by our cavalry. We burnt the enemy's trains. Covered by the Indian cavalry the troops returned to their original positions, where they arrived at 6 p.m.

"Our losses were about 170 wounded and 40 killed; the great majority of these were almost entirely the heroic sepoy and Indian cavalry. The enemy lost about 1,000 men.

"Giving their due to the heroic sepoy and Indian cavalry and part of our troops, one must with sorrow remark on the conduct of those who by their disgraceful conduct spoilt such a great chance, and prevented further extension of such a golden opportunity, which might have made it possible to annihilate the enemy."

Well, you may have noticed that, at the beginning of the report, the enemy was annihilated. What really happened, however, was as follows: Delays in the night march resulted in dawn finding the force about a mile from Dushak. It therefore deployed at this point and made an immediate advance in the following order: Russians on the right, two companies of the Punjabis in the centre, with the third in support, and the Turcomans on the left. The ground to be covered was absolutely flat and afforded no cover, except for scattered bushes

about 2 feet high, a few cultivation channels close up to the station, and one or two nullahs which ran in the wrong direction. The attack was supported by the British and Russian guns, firing in the open. The enemy was not taken unawares, but appears to have made his dispositions very hurriedly, with his guns on the higher ground immediately east of the station, a line consisting mainly of machine-guns, of which not less than thirty were in action, occupying a line along the fringe of the trees west of the station, and a line of skirmishers thrown forward in advance.

At about 1,000 yards the attack came under very heavy fire from guns and machine-guns, whereupon the Russians, with the exception of the 100 or so officers and old soldiers whom I mentioned earlier in the lecture, went to ground in the nullahs, the Turcomans vanished, and the Punjabis were left to advance unaided.

The station in the meantime had suffered severely from our guns, and, together with much of the rolling stock in it, was going up in flames, and the Punjabis were soon amongst the guns and machine-guns with their bayonets to the accompaniment of a terrific explosion, caused by a shell detonating some trucks full of explosives. The enemy fled towards the hills, where they fell into the arms of the cavalry, and the rest of the army arrived and proceeded to loot as described in the Russian report. While this had been taking place, a large portion of the enemy force, still in their trains, pulled out of the station to the west under cover of their armoured train, probably because the line to the east had already been blocked by wrecked trains, etc. This movement of the trains could not be prevented by our armoured train for reasons I have already explained, and had been anticipated by us, and we had insisted on the Russians placing a reserve on the right rear of the attack to deal with this very contingency. Needless to say this reserve could not be found when wanted, and it was from these trains and fresh troops brought up from Tejend that the counter-attack came. By this time everyone except the remnants of the original attackers had left the field. The retirement was most admirably covered by the 28th Light Cavalry and the artillery, both Russian and British. All our wounded were got away. The actual figures of the casualties tell their own tale: 28th Light Cavalry, 6 killed and 11 wounded; 19th Punjabis, 47 killed and 189 wounded, which represented 100 per cent. of the British officers and between 40 and 50 per cent. of other ranks of the regiment actually taking part in the attack; Russians, 7 killed and 30 wounded, practically all from among the 100 previously mentioned.

A small force was left at Arman Sagat to watch the enemy, as it was thought he would not be able to remain in Dushak, and the remainder withdrew to Kaaka.

ENEMY RETIREMENT.

Three days later news was received that Dushak had been evacuated, as was indeed almost inevitable considering the state to which it had been reduced. The delay had been caused by the difficulty of clearing a line by which the trains that had moved west of the station could be got away.

Our troops were in no condition to follow up the retirement, but the Russians got into their trains and were quite prepared to advance as long as the enemy retired. By the 23rd Tejed was reported to have been evacuated, and it became evident that the enemy was even more demoralized than we had thought, and the British troops moved up to that place.

The retirement continued slowly, and the Russians were not prepared to do anything to hasten it, nor, indeed, could they do much in the circumstances, owing to the superior range of the enemy armoured train. It hung fire seriously just short of Merv, so a party of our cavalry and Turcomans were sent to make a large detour and threaten their rear. This had the desired effect and Merv was apparently evacuated in a hurry, as no damage was done to the town or the important railway centre. They had, however, delayed the advance long enough to empty Kushkh, but did no damage there either, not even to the powerful wireless station. The retirement continued, and the British troops moved to Bairam Ali, leaving the company of 1/4th Hampshire Regiment to keep order in Merv. Bairam Ali was a model estate made by the Czar to instruct the Turcomans in growing cotton, etc., and was equipped with an up-to-date ginnery. It afforded excellent accommodation for the troops, which was badly needed, as by now the weather was extremely cold. Orders were now received that no further offensive action was to be taken by the British troops beyond Merv.

At this juncture one of those unfortunate accidents occurred which show the utter uselessness of undisciplined troops in an emergency. The Bolsheviks had retired steadily, with no sign of turning, for nearly two hundred miles. They were now half-way between Merv and the Oxus, and showed every appearance of meaning to cross the river and evacuate Turkistan. They had additional troubles in their rear from Bokhara, Ferghana, and Orenberg. Suddenly the gun on our armoured train had a premature burst, which set fire to the truck and did considerable damage. The army turned and fled to a man, and a successful advance was changed in a moment to a rout. A very serious situation now arose. Between Annenkova and Ravnina were the essential corners for the armoured train; behind this there appeared to be no position we could hope to hold short of going back to Kaaka. If Merv, therefore, was to be held, this appeared to be the only place

from which it could be held. Accordingly, a squadron of cavalry was despatched to Annenkova to restore confidence, and a British officer was placed on the armoured train for the same purpose. This had the desired effect, and the armoured train endured two days' constant bombardment most gallantly.

The position gradually stabilized itself by our holding Annenkova, with our trains and escort about six miles in front of it, and the Bolsheviks Ravnina with their trains west of it. The country here is a mass of sand dunes, heaped up anyhow, and very favourable to the attack. Both sides were back at the old game of living in the trains, which stood in a long line on the single railway. Every third day or so the armoured train required refilling, and since this involved the whole row moving behind the station, the night would be spent in shunting trains backwards and forwards. On these nights the army virtually ceased to exist, as it would not be separated from its trains. The weather now was extremely cold, the temperature falling at night to the neighbourhood of zero, the Russian morale was getting lower and lower, and the night picquets would not remain at their posts, with the result that the train crew, the hardest worked unit in the force, got none of their much-needed rest. The only solution, therefore, was to send up some of our infantry for night picquet duty, and this was arranged.

Such was the position at the end of December, and a very unsatisfactory one it was. The Bolsheviks were receiving reinforcements, and could attack us when it suited them, knowing, as they well did, that the British troops were forbidden to take further offensive action, and that the Russians would certainly not do so alone. The advance troops were more or less isolated forty miles from the main force, the severity of the weather making it essential to have the men decently billeted when back from their turn at the front, and there was no suitable intermediate position which could be occupied.

At this point General Beatty arrived at the front with his staff, the forerunner, I believe, of a larger force which it had been proposed to send up, but which was stillborn, and the force was transferred to the control of the War Office, coming under General Milne, commanding the Army of the Black Sea. Shortly before this proper supply arrangements had been made, and we ceased to be dependent on the Russians for our daily bread.

ACTION AT ANNENKOVA.

On January 16 the inevitable occurred. At the front was one company of infantry and half a squadron of cavalry, with the usual motley assembly of our allies, which had now been reinforced by a small detachment of swaggering and blustering Dagastani Cossacks. The morning was bitterly cold and misty. At about 8.30 loud

explosions were heard in rear of the position and also west of Annenkova station. Cavalry patrols were at once sent out along the line and also to the north and south-east. The line was reported to have been destroyed, and a German, captured from the demolition party, stated that a large attack had been organized from the north and east, and should have taken place simultaneously with the demolition of the line. Information was sent to Bairam Ali, and one company was immediately ordered to move up by train and the remainder of the cavalry by road. It was not till noon that the cavalry patrols reported the enemy concentrated in force about three miles to the north. Armenian and Turcoman infantry were sent out to attack them, but were soon reported to be retiring before the enemy, who were outflanking them to the west. At the same time the enemy armoured trains opened fire from out of the mist, and rifle-fire was heard along the railway. Thereupon all the Turcoman cavalry were sent to protect the armoured train, and two platoons of the 19th Punjabis reported to stem the advance from the north. This they succeeded in doing, meeting the enemy in the mist about 700 yards from the line and driving him back some distance in their immediate front, but were still outflanked on their left, and a third platoon sent up to extend this flank suffered a similar experience. The enemy guns with the northern attack were busy all this time, but fortunately, owing to the mist, were firing by guess-work, and guessed wrong, and their shells fell over the position. It was now about 3 p.m., and there appeared to be nothing to prevent the enemy from reaching the railway and rolling up the left flank. At this critical juncture the train bearing the company from Bairam Ali arrived on the scene. The company disembarked under a storm of bullets and went straight for the enemy. It was not, however, till all four platoons had been deployed that the enemy's right flank was eventually found, and even then contact had not been made with the company on the right. By 5 p.m., however, the enemy retirement became general, and was followed up so long as light lasted, but it was only on reaching the camp that the two companies had sight of each other. In the meantime the enemy had been attacking the armoured train and its supporting picquet positions in a most determined manner, and it was not until the latter had been captured and the crew of the former had left their train and charged the enemy in a most gallant manner, worthy of the gallantry with which they had fought throughout the operations, and the last platoon and the last troop of the original escort had gone to their assistance, that they were finally driven off.

Thus ended a most critical day, for the saving of which the honour due to the troops who put up such a stubborn defence must be shared with the God of War who sent down the mist.

Our casualties were comparatively light, amounting to 10 killed

and 36 wounded out of the two companies; while of the enemy, 176 corpses were found next day on the scene of the flank attack alone, and many more were known to have perished from frostbite during the retirement.

It was afterwards discovered from prisoners and deserters that a most elaborate plan had been devised for the complete destruction of the force. Transport had been collected to carry three days' rations, large reinforcements brought up the strength of the enemy to 11,000, and the plan was to destroy the line in the rear of the advanced troops so as to prevent a retirement or the bringing up of reinforcements. The trains and their escort having been overwhelmed, the force was to ignore Bairam Ali and march right round it to Merv, where the inhabitants and the railway men would undoubtedly revert to Bolshevism, and Bairam Ali be completely isolated. Fortunately the scheme miscarried in its first phase, so there is no need to speculate on the fate of the force had it been successful. The result it did have was finally to convince the Bolsheviks that they had better let well alone till the British force had been withdrawn, and we were left in peace till, in March, orders were received to evacuate the country.

Had general policy permitted, there is little doubt that we could have driven the enemy across the Oxus without appreciable loss to ourselves, such was the terror the sowar and sepoy had instilled into them both here and at Dushak, and so suitable was the ground for the offensive. It was not, however, to be, and we withdrew unmolested to Meshed at the end of March, and in a few months all our work was undone and the Bolsheviks were in Krasnovodsk, but too late for the Germans to make any use of their success. And so our task was accomplished.

DISCUSSION.

General DUNSTERVILLE: Sir George MacMunn has asked me to speak, and I do so with pleasure, but as I do not wish to occupy too much of your time I will make my remarks as brief as possible.

It is a great pleasure to me to be here to-night, and to hear, for the first time, something of what was happening in my own immediate neighbourhood seven years ago, when I was busy on the west and south of the Caspian Sea, while Colonel Knollys was carrying out the exploits he has just described to us to the east of the Caspian.

It is interesting to note the points of similarity between my own and Colonel Knollys' force, the principal one being that both were run entirely on mechanical transport.

I was running about in motor-cars, but he went one better and carried out his operations entirely in railway trains. When I speak sometimes of my own experiences while conducting an expedition in motor-cars, people have naturally, but quite wrongly, assumed a

"cushy job." We had very little in the way of roads, and I think I had to push my car a good deal of the way between Baghdad and Enzeli. I hope the lecturer did not have to get out and push his train, but very likely he did.

My own experiences under extraordinary and incredible conditions, with a very small number of troops, often remind me of "Alice in Wonderland," but the fascinating account of the operations which Colonel Knollys has just given us seems more like a page out of "The Hunting of the Snark."

Another point of similarity is the difficulty of dealing with revolutionaries. When all men are equal no one does any work, and soldiering becomes impossible.

On one occasion I complained to the Russian Commander-in-Chief in Baku that a certain battalion of the town troops had not put in its appearance at a certain point where it had been promised. He replied to me: "I am very sorry, but what can I do? I have told him to go there three times, and he won't go."

War becomes impossible under such conditions. Farcical situations such as I have just described make us smile, but we must not forget that it is just these "funny" incidents that cost us the lives of many brave men.

Another serious difficulty from which we both suffered was the impossibility of telling friend from foe; there is nothing to distinguish a Bolshevik from a Menshevik.

Revolutions appear to run on resolutions. Instead of taking action—such as an attack on a position—the apostles of freedom "unanimously resolve to attack," and by the time the resolution has been carried the opportunity for attack has gone.

I thank the lecturer for his lucid account of the battle of Dushak, the details of which I do not think any of us had heard before—a very brilliant episode, bringing out the finest qualities of our best Indian troops and their gallant leaders.

In conclusion, while I repeat how very much I have enjoyed Colonel Knolly's lecture, I am sorry that he does not tell us why he chose to support one side instead of the other. Both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks are tarred with the same brush, and there is hardly a pin to choose between them. The only difference appears to have been that the Bolsheviks had the only long-range gun, which made the artillery duel rather uphill work for Colonel Knollys and his Mensheviks.

Colonel Ton: I am very glad to have the opportunity of making a few remarks, though I was not with Colonel Knollys during the earlier and more interesting stage of the operations.

There is an historical importance in the events that have been narrated from the fact that it was the first time that British troops

have ever been employed in Turkistan. It was well that the British army was represented by such regiments as the 19th Punjabis and the 28th Light Cavalry, for they left a lasting impression of valour and good bearing. It is well known that the events in the main theatres of war overshadowed those of minor operations. Nowhere was this more the case than in this campaign in Transcaspia. If the gallant deeds of Colonel Knollys and his little band of Punjabis had been done in normal times, their fame would have rung from end to end of the Empire.

With regard to the incident of the Camp Quartermaster, who rallied the camp followers to oppose the Bolsheviks' turning movement at Kaaka, and so saved the situation, I believe I am right in saying that the officer's name was Captain Stewart of the Madras Civil Service, who joined up for the war.

Towards the end of the time at Bahram Ali there was an act of gallantry on the part of the 28th Light Cavalry that deserves special mention. The fog that enabled the Bolsheviks to make their surprise attack on January 16 made it possible for them to bring up their troop trains from the rear unobserved by the reconnoitring patrols that used to be sent out from our front. The lack of water and supplies in the desert made it impossible for more than a very limited number of troops to be maintained permanently at the front. Therefore warning of an impending attack could always be obtained, unless there were fog, by patrols reporting the arrival of enemy troop trains behind their front. On one occasion a patrol of about a dozen men of the 28th Light Cavalry under a duffadar was thus reconnoitring, when on topping a sand-dune they found themselves face to face with a party of Bolshevik cavalry about ten times their number. Without hesitation they charged through them, turned and charged again, and then scattering made their way back to our front by ones and twos. All came back within the next few days except two, who were taken prisoners to Tashkent, but eventually escaped and rejoined us at Meshed. The Russians marked their admiration of the feat by conferring the Cross of St. George upon all members of the patrol. (Applause.)

The meeting closed with a very hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer.

INDIA'S DEFENCE AS AN IMPERIAL PROBLEM*

By E. HAWARD

It is not easy to say exactly when the position of India as a factor in Imperial strategy began to be realized. The early doings of the British in India were, of course, mainly concerned with the almost accidental

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, London, W. 1, on Thursday, January 21, 1926, and a paper read by Mr. Edwin Haward entitled "Some Thoughts on India's Defence." Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn presided.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have great pleasure in introducing to-night Mr. Haward of the *Pioneer* who is just going out to India to take up the position of editor of that paper. You who know India know what an important paper in India is the *Pioneer*, and you all know that of all the English papers it is the most read by Indians. He is going to talk on the defence of India, a subject of which he has made a great study; indeed, a pamphlet of his on the subject is used officially at the Indian Staff College; and I need hardly say, from the official point of view, and the British point of view, how very important and satisfactory it is that a man who is the editor of the *Pioneer* should take so much interest, and make the great study that he has made of the very difficult question of the defence of India. You all know what a very great strain this problem has put on the finance of India from time immemorial, and at a time when the Government of India wants every penny it can spare for internal development, for the many things in which India is behindhand in the modern amenities of civilization—which the people of India are beginning to want more and more—the Government of India is still compelled to have a very heavy military budget. When the Great War was over India hoped for an easement; when the Russian Empire crashed we hoped that the very great expense which Russian movement had put India to for many years—we all know how much Lord Kitchener's organization to meet the advance towards India cost—would be unnecessary. We thought peace was coming, but instead of that the situation allowed the Amir of Kabul to march his armies into India when we were in the throes of demobilization: when almost every class of unit was in the process of demobilization it pleased His Highness to launch his unprovoked attack on India. By so doing he upset the work of almost generations, and disturbed the whole of that great mass of frontier tribes, so much so that it will be a generation more, if ever, before the frontier gets into that state of comparative peace and content that it was in before the war began. Because the old frontier raids on the peaceful inhabitants inside the border have changed from the small raids that we knew of for so many years to almost invasions; because the Mahsud is pleased to come down in organized bands leaving behind him an alley-way to go back by with all the points defended by his own riflemen, we are compelled to do what is really a very unmilitary thing. To prevent this Government has been compelled to open up in the middle of Waziristan a large and expensive canton-

purpose of trade; conquest, with the object of pacifying areas in which good trade results could be obtained, came later. Then eventually Great Britain was confronted with her possession of what was practically an oriental Empire; Disraeli, some time after the Mutiny, did the rest. And Disraeli, too, perceived the importance of the Suez Canal in the Imperial Chain. He acted on that perception.* During the Great War India's chief military value to the Empire lay in her release of large numbers of highly trained troops for service overseas, her ability to swell those numbers, and her provision of bases for the campaigns in Mesopotamia, Arabia, and East Africa.† Her strategic position could not be endowed with more importance. The protection of her frontiers, involving, as it did, the employment of large numbers of troops, did not directly influence the main currents of the struggle. It may be doubted whether, in the event of there being another world war, India would be able to occupy so comfortable a detachment.

The pact of Locarno has been signed; it is not world-wide in its direct influence. Ostentatiously hostile to it is the Soviet Government at Moscow. That Government is using all the power of its dictatorship to carry on in Asia a campaign avowedly directed against the British Empire. It is endeavouring to dominate the chaos in China, where it has already annexed Mongolia and obtained control of the Red Government at Canton. It is also extending into Afghanistan the very policy which has enabled it to overrun what once were Turkistan and Bokhara, and which, but for the enlightened patriotism of that remarkable man Shah Reza Khan Pehlevi, might have reduced Persia to the level of a Soviet Republic strung up to Moscow. A glance at the map will make clear the significance of this. India stands as a breakwater against the waves of Red Communism which the Moscow oligarchy seeks to send rolling over the territories to her north-west, north-east, and east. Furthermore, the currents of world politics have, since the war, moved rapidly and restlessly in the direction of the Pacific. An Asiatic Russia in the throes of the Bolshevik upheaval, a China in chaos, Japan troubled by economic and labour difficulties, are all important figures on that stage. It is most improbable that the British Empire

ment, and troops which may be wanted against Afghanistan and a possible soviet menace have to be locked up on the frontier. These are points on which the lecturer proposes to tell you. He has the advantage of having been on the frontier lately as military correspondent, and also when trouble was possible he was himself serving in a defence force unit which held the Punjab in the days of the Punjab rebellion which took place just before the Amir launched his invasion. I will ask the lecturer to begin. (Applause.)

* Indian troops were first employed in 1842 in China, in 1850 in Persia, in 1868 in Abyssinia, and in 1885 in Malta.

† India, in the event of a European war, was expected to provide 3 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade. Actually she supplied 8 divisions, 7 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry divisions, 2 mixed brigades, and other troops.

can ever afford to be indifferent to the developments which may, from time to time, occur in the Far East. And in the Imperial Chain from London through Aden, Singapore, to Hongkong and Australia, India is a most important link. The importance can perhaps best be gauged by imagining what would be the position of the Commonwealth of Australia in the event of trouble in the Far East in which a hostile Power held control in India.

How would East and South Africa fare? The base at Singapore, the defences of Aden, the wonderful harbours of Ceylon.

Ceylon would be of little avail were the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal able to give their spacious hospitality to hostile armaments and forces. The severance of the Mother Country from her Australian, if not her African, Dominions, would be practically complete. Still, the defence of a country is primarily a matter of importance to the country itself. Putting politics aside, the obvious conclusion is that India herself, in her own interests, must regard the creation of a sure policy of defence as essential and vital. Briefly, what is the problem of her defence? Possessed of a land frontier of some five to six thousand miles and a sea frontier of about the same length, she is confronted by difficulties experienced by no other country in the world. Her sea frontier—thanks to the British connection—is protected by the British Navy at an annual cost to her of £100,000, the price of a gunboat. Moreover, the construction of the Singapore base has probably relieved her of further expense in strengthening her harbour defences. But the land frontier is a different matter. To the north and north-east the gigantic Himalaya Range presents a comfortable barrier against the invader. In the East the continued disruption in Yunnan, the friendliness of the relations between the British and French in Tongking, and the neighbourliness of the progressive kingdom of Siam give India little cause for anxiety. The uncertainty of the Chinese situation, however, has made it necessary for more attention to be paid to the conditions on the Sino-Burman frontier, and the latest official report of the Government of India, in noticing the establishment of a Burma Frontier Service in 1923, says, "From time to time the peace of this section of the Frontier is threatened by occasional incursions; for the state of lawlessness in Yunnan has increased during the present unsettled condition of the Chinese Republic, and brigand bands are numerous. Until such time as the course of Chinese politics brings into power a Government strong enough to reassert its authority over the outlying provinces, minor incursions into Burmese territory are always possible. Nor must we forget that, at the present time, there are over a million armed soldiers in China. It is true that these are divided among a number of provinces and under numerous leaders, mostly fighting against each other; but if the time should come when China is again welded into some measure of unity, these large armies may constitute a potential danger." The

report observes that the official relations between the British and Chinese administrators on the borders remain cordial.

The real frontier problem in India to-day is that which has persisted for centuries. It is geographically expressed in a line drawn from the Pamirs south-west to the point on the outer entrance to the Persian Gulf where Persia meets Baluchistan, and therefore British India. This tract is divided into four sections: First from the Pamirs to the Kabul River, a rugged mountainous country comprising Chitral, Gilgit, Swat, and Dir, governed by powerful chieftains who, as they war among themselves, are united in their friendliness towards British administration in India, and therefore give hardly any special consideration as part of the Frontier problem.

South of the Kabul River is the Tirah country, which has a turbulent history, but is for the moment comparatively peaceful, notwithstanding its dangerous potentialities, because the tribesmen in that territory have so many material interests in British India, as distinct from their independent area, that hostile action on their part is plainly impolitic. Their independence and their possession of an ample supply of arms make them, however, a constant source of danger. The southern boundary of the Tirah is roughly the Kurram valley, whence to the Zhob valley stretches Waziristan, which to-day really enshrines the main problem of the Frontier, for, from the Zhob to the Persian border by the sea, British Baluchistan is administered right up to the Durand Line—or Afghan and Persian Frontiers—and quietness and ordered progress reign. Mention of the Durand Line usefully comes here. It is the agreed-upon boundary between Afghanistan and India, but, except for its coincidence as the boundary of Baluchistan, it is not coterminous with the administrative frontier of British India. Between the administrative border and the Afghan border there is a belt of territory inhabited by independent tribesmen owing but a loose allegiance to the British administration, allied by kinship, not only to the inhabitants in the settled districts, but also to tribesmen in Afghan territory, which is theoretically, if not actually, administered by the Kabul Government right up to the Afghan side of the Durand Line along its whole length. In this belt there are 500,000 fighting men, about a quarter of whom are armed with modern rifles and supplied from various sources with adequate quantities of ammunition. In a rugged country the upproductiveness of which persistently fights with the forces of nature against the primitive husbandry of the tribesman, the occupation forced upon its inhabitants by economic conditions is obviously that of raiding the more prosperous and less warlike settled districts in British administered territory. The independent tribesmen breed faster than they can increase the natural productivity of their land, to which they are nevertheless ardently attached.

In 1919 the outbreak of the third Afghan War showed their dangerous potentialities. They swept away the militia posts in the Tochi, and it took the British administration more than two and a half years to restore order and bring them to their senses. The campaign attracted little attention at the end of a great world war, but it was the most costly and arduous in our Frontier history.

This brings us to consideration of the different schools of Frontier policy. On the one hand, there have been those who maintain that the best course is to hold the administrative border, and when serious tribal misdeeds occur carry out swift punitive expeditions and retire. On the other, there are those who, condemning what they call the "burn and scuttle" policy, believe in occupation and administration up to the Durand Line, contending that is logically and psychologically impossible to condemn half a million men to a life of perpetual savagery, and that to acquiesce in the perpetual existence on the Frontier of so serious a menace in the time of invasion by the enemy still further without the gate, is the negation of statesmanship. In Baluchistan the second policy has been long adopted with complete success, but conditions were specially favourable. Now it is generally recognized that an immediate advance to the Durand Line along its whole length would involve very costly military operations beyond the bounds of practical financial policy. Therefore, after restoring order in Waziristan, the Government have adopted the "half-forward" policy. That means that they have established at Rasmak (7,000 feet) a healthy cantonment—still requiring fortification from hostile tribal attention—a garrison including British infantry and artillery, and they have linked it up with Jandola and Dera Ismail Khan by a road running through Plaza Ragsha and Sorrogha. The road is protected by scouts and khassadars, and the garrison at Rasmak is held as a striking force in the event of tribal developments requiring swift and drastic action in order to prevent a more formidable rising. This circular road, as it is called, is supplemented by one from Jandola to Sarwakai, which eventually will stretch to Wana, and in the long run, by extension to Makin, form an outer circle more effectively dominating Mahsud country. The scouts and khassadars are irregulars recruited from among the tribesmen. The scouts are more military in character, officered by British officers, and are a really effective force. The khassadars provide their own arms, obtained in circumstances about which no indiscreet enquiries are made, and command themselves. They are paid allowances, and at the best may be regarded as being an improvement on the old levies, at the worst, successful blackmailers. They are, however, cheap as compared with the regular garrison which would be required in their place in a country which has little to recommend it from the point of view of the serving soldier.

The Royal Air Force must not be forgotten. Situated at con-

venient places in the administrative territory are the headquarters of squadrons of the Royal Air Force, and they have already shown their usefulness in bringing the tribes to heel by day and night bombing, both independently and in co-operation with troops. They have also contributed to the record of heroism which the Frontier has collected in full measure. The dangers of flying across a country intersected by deep gorges and ravines, and averaging in height 4,000 to 6,000 feet above sea-level, will be appreciated. The Royal Air Force does not advertise; if it did, some of the doings of its officers and men on the Frontier might challenge the achievements of our world flyers for attention and admiration. I do not propose to say how far the use of the Air Force on the Frontier might be extended to effect that economy for which Indian critics are pressing. Whether the operation of aeroplanes is more effective independently rather than in close co-operation with ground troops is a matter for settlement by experts, and, as the last despatch of the Commander-in-Chief shows, there is some difference of opinion on that question. It should, however, be emphasized—and the point will be elaborated further on—that the adequacy of the strength of the Royal Air Force in India needs careful examination. From what I have said, it will be noted that India on one part of her Frontier is always in a state of war. Waziristan is now a "peace" area officially. But the hard facts of the situation have compelled the authorities to treat the officers and men of the units engaged there as on active service for certain purposes, among them concessions regarding pay, leave, and rations. Waziristan as the happy hunting-ground of lawless tribesmen is not merely a danger in itself. It also constitutes a factor to be seriously taken into account in considering the problem of defence against aggression from without the borders of India across the Durand Line. The history of India is one of successive invasions, sweeping from the north-western passes on the fertile plains of the Punjab. Three times at Panipat, a little village to the north of Delhi, the fate of India was decided in a single battle. Each time the invaders won, mainly because the faculty of support of a common leadership had been denied to the races which were loosely united to form the dominant power in India at the time. There was no lack of bravery or strategic skill. The centrifugal forces which, to quote the Government of India's apologist, have been the bane of Indian politics were thus early exerting their evil influence. The consolidation of India as a nation is still a dream, but it has been made a dream not beyond the bounds of possibility by the genius of the British who, replenishing their stock from across the sea, have avoided those deteriorating influences of climate and atmosphere which have broken the Empires of the past and merged the conquerors in the feeble and less virile peoples whom they overcame.

In their gradual conquest of India the British relied on their own

soldiers and on the indigenous troops which they had trained. They never used the sons of the soil in their warfare against any particular section of the population. Thus the Mahrattas were conquered by the Bengal Army; the Gurkhas were used against the Sikhs, and the latter, in their turn, to suppress the mutinous Brahmin regiments. Yet when the country came under British control from the Khyber to Cape Comorin, the army in India was in the process of being evolved, and its composition gave representation to nearly all the martial races in the country, with the addition of the Gurkhas, who, coming as they do from the independent kingdom of Nepal, by virtue of our treaties, form battalions in a class by themselves. The army in India is charged with the duty of maintaining internal security—peace between the various races—and preventing aggression from without. The troops have therefore been divided into three categories: (1) The field army or striking force to be moved against a potential invader; (2) the covering troops engaged in defence of the Frontier and charged with the duty of covering the mobilization and concentration of the field army; and (3) the internal security troops which, assisted by irregulars in the shape of local auxiliary force units, are responsible for the composition of civil disturbances which have reached dimensions beyond the capacity of the police forces to tackle. The pressure of financial stringency has reduced the strength of all three categories to a minimum, and the army in India to-day is on a peace footing which, as the late Commander-in-Chief admitted, involved the acceptance of risks only justified by the existence of the paramount need to secure equilibrium in the finances of the Central Government.

Yet it will be seen, if the facts of India's geographical position are clearly understood, that the dangers of war are for India very real. To begin with, an outburst of fanaticism on the Frontier may, notwithstanding the vigilance of the troops and of the devoted officers of the Political Department, be at any moment fanned into a portentous rising. Then the weakness of Afghanistan, already sorely tried by a tribal rebellion which was with difficulty suppressed last year after much fighting, makes of serious moment the alarms and excursions always present where the Soviet methods are active. In fact, the Russian "menace," so familiar to students of recent Indian history, is to-day real and insistent. The reorganization of the formerly semi-independent kingdoms of Bokhara, Khiva, Ferghana, and Turkistan into the Soviet republics of Turkmanistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajik has been carried out on an ethnological basis. The adjacent countries have all of them elements of population allied to the people of the new republics, and thus the idea of peaceful penetration, assisted by a very unpeaceful propaganda, is plain. Turkmanistan on the Russian side lies next to Persian Turkistan, where the Turkomans have been giving Reza Khan some anxiety. Uzbekistan

and Tajik both have their kinsmen in Afghan territory to the south, and the history of the last year has been that of the infiltration of Russian subjects into the northern provinces of Afghanistan—general traders, political adventurers, and men combining the characteristics of both of the other two classes. The desire of Great Britain is to see Afghanistan strongly united under the Amir, who is believed to realize the danger of too close an entente with Russia. But the Amir's difficulties are great; not the least are the conservative prejudices of the Mullahs against his well-meant attempts to improve the administration of his country and to further its commercial development and reaction of the prejudices on the tribesmen, who are no less unruly than their counterparts in our own independent tribal territory.

Fortunately, the Amir realizes that the idea of British penetration of Afghanistan is not regarded with the slightest degree of favour by any responsible statesman, whether at Delhi or London. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any circumstances in which an aggressive policy towards Afghanistan would be framed by any British Government. Whether, however, he will be able to withstand the influences which have been so inimical, the lesser potentates on his borders, is a matter for conjecture. If Shah Reza Khan is spared to complete what he has so well begun in Persia, the friendship of that country may mean much to Kabul, as also will the friendly advice of the British Minister, who has been a conspicuous success in a very difficult post.

The experts, I believe, do not regard the Russian menace at the moment to be serious from the military standpoint. Propaganda and intriguing agents are now the most active of Russian manifestations of ill-will towards the British Empire. But it must not be overlooked that the Russian Air Forces in Turkmanistan have been vastly improved in quality and increased in quantity during the last year. The Afghan Air Force (chiefly machined and manned by Russians) now has thirteen machines, twelve serviceable, and the proposal is to increase it to thirty fighting machines. India has no anti-aircraft guns, no anti-gas measures (the Russians are specializing in gas), and her aeroplanes are not as fast as the best of the Russian machines in Kabul. Competent observers in India consider that there is urgent need of an additional squadron of modern fighting machines. So it is better not to be too complaisant in discussing the actual military potentialities of Moscow's declared policy. So far I have tried to establish the following facts regarding India's defence problem:

1. It is really an Imperial problem.
2. It is unique in that it involves the defence of India against :
 - (a) Formidable armed tribesmen dwelling in India's own borders.
 - (b) Potential invaders from the north-west who may have the backing of a big European power.

3. The factors favourable to India are :
 - (a) The friendliness of Tibet and Nepal.
 - (b) The impassability of much of the north and north-eastern borders,
 - (c) The realization by the Amir of the intrinsic value of neighbourly relations with India.
4. Unfavourable factors are :
 - (a) The difficulties confronting the Amir in advancing the condition of his people.
 - (b) The aggressive policy of the Russian Soviet Government.
 - (c) The difficulty of finding a speedy economic solution for the Waziristan problem. The task of luring the Mahsuds and others to peaceful pursuits has been well begun, but it must be a slow process.

I will now bring this paper to a close with an attempt to set this problem in correlation with Indian politics.

Political India looks upon the Military Budget from two conflicting points of view. First, it has from the days of the old Councils inveighed against the "burden" of military expenditure. As the report already referred to rightly points out, it is no good proving that the figure is governed by actual geographical and political factors beyond control and not by comparative statements extracted from the statistics of other countries. The insurance premium, says the Indian politician, is too heavy a one for India to pay. It is useless, apparently, to tell him that if it were not paid his lot might not be as happy as it is now. Again—this is a later cry—Indian politicians demand defence on a national basis. They want to have an army which, in course of time, will be officered from top to bottom mainly by Indians as Indians and manned as an Indian Army. They profess themselves willing to vote whatever sums are required to create Indian Sandhursts, to bring into being Territorial battalions, Indian Artillery, Engineers and Air Force. They consider that the policy of Indianization ~~has~~ approved is too halting and will take too long to develop. The British Government, having first of all created the Indian intelligentsia and subsequently given it a certain amount of political power, cannot very well treat its opinion as negligible, even if it be wildly indifferent to facts. Add to this demand for a National Army the strong feeling that an Indian Navy should also be created, and you will perceive that on the face of it the decay of militarism in the West finds no echo in the East, even among the classes once regarded as pacifist in the extreme. Yet, obviously, the Government cannot play ducks and drakes with defence. If they decide to experiment in Indianization they must, at the same time, secure the Frontiers of India by maintaining the army in as efficient a condition as possible. The "eight units" scheme initiated by the late

Lord Rawlinson has not yet proved itself. A unanimous report by a mixed (*i.e.*, English and Indian) Committee on the Territorial Forces declared quite recently that until a national spirit were really and truly established in India the rapid extension of the Territorial system was impracticable. The truth is that the political classes which, quite justifiably, look to the creation of a national India—the logical outcome of British policy—desire to establish the existence of a national spirit by the creation of a national army and navy, are not the classes from which naturally the fighting stock of the country comes. That this anomaly may be removed is not necessarily beyond the bounds of possibility, but plainly its removal will not be as rapid as the fervent advocates of Indianization hope. They were told this very clearly by Lord Rawlinson in the last speech made by him in the Legislative Assembly, and they resented the bluntness of the statement, even if they could not deny its accuracy.

It is permissible to suggest that the exposition of Indianization has been lacking in historical perspective. Just as the idea of an Indian nation has been made possible only by reason of the cementing influence of the British element in the population, so the eventual creation of a national Indian defence force will depend, not so much on the gradual elimination of the British, but rather on the judicious blending of India's different races, not forgetting that race which, while not indigenous, maintains its virility and unifying force by constant replenishment from overseas. In other words, Indianization can only be successfully applied to the defence of India if the British element, perhaps in diminished quantity, but never in diminished quality, is retained. In this connection a suggestion made in the *Nineteenth Century Review* by a distinguished ex-Governor, Sir Reginald Craddock, is worth mentioning. Realizing the strength of the cry against military expenditure in India, in so far as that expenditure is incurred on the maintenance of the British garrison, he seeks to reconcile the Indian politician to its incidence by making the British taxpayer responsible for it to the extent of £10,000,000 annually, and in return, to give British goods a preference in the Indian market, the resources of which are still far from being completely explored.

This proposal cannot at the first blush be attractive either to the Indian politician, who is imbued with the idea that India is exploited for the benefit of the British manufacturer, or to the British taxpayer, who has burdens enough and to spare. But both sides might be confidently advised to examine it coolly and judge whether it is altogether impracticable. Two things seem certain: one is that unless India is adequately defended the aspirations to a Dominion of India status must remain idle dreams; the other is that if India is to be held within the Empire as a vital strategic link in Imperial defence against the dangers of the future the responsibility for her defence must in the

main be Imperial, and so involve an amicable adjustment between the Governments at Whitehall and Delhi. India is not averse from a bargain, provided she can be assured that the benefits are not all on one side. She can be convinced that the inviolability of her frontiers is an asset for which payment must be made. She wants also to be convinced that the price she pays does not also cover an asset beneficial to others as well as to herself.

There is much to be said on both sides, and the frank discussion of the problem can surely do no harm. Indeed, it may materially assist in the education of young India in the school of Imperialism.

DISCUSSION.

Admiral RICHMOND: I have listened with very great interest to what the lecturer has said, and I am particularly glad to hear that one who is going out to the *Pioneer*—which exercises such a great deal of influence in India—is going out with ideas concerning defence, and is interesting himself in that important subject. But I should like him to extend his conception of defence beyond the land. What we have heard this afternoon mostly concerns the land. There is also the sea. He has referred to the navy, but I do not think he has laid the emphasis on sea defence that the matter deserves. I have just come home a month ago from India, where I have been two years in command of the squadron, and naturally the question of the defence of India's interests at sea has come my way pretty closely. I think the defence of any country is not merely a defence of its territory against invasion, but is also a defence of its interests in trade; and the defence of the Indian interests in trade appears to me to be a very important matter indeed. Of course, it does not come up normally in the ordinary course of things. The problems the lecturer has been discussing are the events of every day, a trouble going on continually, although there is peace in Europe. But when we come to a large war the defence of the trade of India bulks large. The Indian export and import trade reaches a figure of some £400,000,000 at the present time, and I was always exercised with the thought of what would happen in the event of an enemy being in command of the waters of India, and thereby being able to stop up that trade. When you come to think how extraordinarily vulnerable it is, you realize, I think, what a big part naval defence ought to take in your consideration of the defence of India. In India you have only got five ports if you include Burma—Karachi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, and Rangoon for Burma. Through those five ports you have got to get, practically speaking, the whole of £400,000,000 worth of trade. Compare that with England, which for forty odd million of people has twelve major ports and a vast number of minor ports. For the 315,000,000 people of India you have only five

ports to maintain supplies and export the products of the country. If an enemy is in command of the sea in those waters there is nothing more easy than to shut up the whole of these ports with a ship or two off each of them. That is one thing. The lecturer referred to the price India pays at the present time, £100,000 a year; it is actually a shade over £134,000, but it is not worth while quarrelling about halfpence. I think if more emphasis were laid on this important matter of Indian trade, and the trouble of its defence, we should get more attention paid to it, and a more proportionate expenditure. We should not get the question of defence considered as an absolutely one-sided one. The lecturer referred in the course of his early remarks to the effect of a hostile power occupying India. He said it would be the practical cutting off of Australia and Africa. I cannot agree with that statement at all. In order to do that you must have command of the sea. The mere fact of a hostile power being in India would not cut off communications with Australia; it is a question whether a hostile power can maintain a fleet in India to defeat the British fleet in those waters. It is an extraordinarily difficult thing to maintain a fleet in India, to get the food and fuel required; besides which, any powerful fleet which may have got into the northern harbours of Calcutta and Bombay—Madras would not hold anything at all—would be in the extraordinarily uncomfortable position of being flanked in its line of communications by the British forces. So that a hostile power in India of itself, unless it is able to maintain a very powerful naval force, is not a serious threat to the communications of Australia or Africa. It is a threat, of course, because all the extra harbours supply means by which ships can go out to attack trade. To that extent it would be a worry, but not anything like so bad as the lecturer made out. It is very natural, I think, that people when they talk about the defence of India should concentrate upon the land defence. But if we are talking about big trouble in the East at some future time, we may have naval trouble as well, which we have not had since 1810; and if there should be a bigger naval power fighting, then the defence of India will be, as it was in the past, as much a naval as a military problem. In fact, the fundamental question will be purely a matter of who has command of the sea and who can put the troops in. I do not think so little attention should be paid to the sea as was paid by the lecturer. As to the rest of the lecture, I know too little to express an opinion. (Applause.)

Sir LOUIS DANE: I did not expect to have to speak, because one is always told that when he has left India for two years his information is entirely out of date, and more or less useless; but I am very glad to hear from the lecturer that as regards the defence of India the French adage applies, *Plus il se change plus il reste la même chose*. All that he has said to-night has been extraordinarily interesting, but to those who have spent a good many years in India—since 1876 in my case—

it is not new. I think we have heard all the problems debated, and all the suggested solutions put forward on previous occasions. I should like, first taking the senior service, to notice what the Admiral has just said about the sea defence of India. I do not think it has been entirely neglected in the past; in fact, it has bulked very largely on one or two occasions. I remember very well when there was a proposal, not so very long ago, to allow the Germans and Russians both to come down to the head of the Persian Gulf with railways. That proposal was very strongly urged at home. The Government of India resisted the proposal to the best of its ability, although in a subordinate capacity, and not at that time allowed to express any opinion on a question of policy. The line they took was that, if the Germans and Russians came down to the head of the Gulf, they would undoubtedly have naval squadrons in those waters, and the Government of India would be compelled to keep up in the most unhealthy waters of the world a squadron of counterbalancing strength to the two foreign squadrons. The result would have been that instead of paying £134,000 a year for naval defence,* we should probably have had to spend three or four millions for a great many years before there was any necessity. Fortunately, whatever else the Great War did, for the time being it has relieved us of the possibility of German or Russian squadrons cruising in the Persian Gulf and that immediate neighbourhood. Also, thanks to the happy accident of Lord Curzon's presence at Koweit in the Persian Gulf in 1903, the great Maidan-i-Naftun oilfield of the present Anglo-Persian Oil Company was discovered, and it is not likely that anyone in the near future will propose to abandon our interests there. I quite agree with what the Admiral said, that you have got to look to sea-power for the general defence of India, but there is no doubt that the operations of foreign naval powers in Indian waters with squadrons there can make themselves exceedingly unpleasant, as was shown by the history of the *Emden* at the beginning of the Great War. For about six months the whole of the traffic of India was held up; there was the greatest difficulty in moving troops or anything at all. That was what one cruiser could do. Eventually the nuisance was put down and things put right, but I believe, from what I hear from some of my native friends and others, that the effect produced on the Indian mind of the holding up of Indian trade by one German cruiser on the sea, where Great Britain had hitherto from the Mutiny downwards been supposed to be invulnerable, was rather disastrous.

* From *The Times* of February 10, 1925, it appears that the Royal Indian Marine is again to become a fighting force as the Royal Indian Navy, which is, I think, a sound move, as India will now have to contribute more reasonably to her defence by sea. With greater financial and general autonomy she may even have a policy in such matters as foreign defence, even though it be a subordinate policy.

As regards the defence of India by land, it all comes round again to an eye on China, which we have always kept, and a close watch on Russia and the North-West Frontier. As regards the North-West Frontier, one of the latest developments is the founding of a cantonment at Razmak. But that is not a new idea; it was suggested a great many years ago now, more than twenty-five years ago, and the outer circle road by Datta Khel, Drehtak Narai, and Wano, which is apparently again contemplated—I am very glad to hear it is—was also advocated by the Punjab Government with a view of controlling the movements of the Waziris and their connections with Afghanistan. And it is the same with nearly all these things; the same old problems exist, and they have to be met more or less in the same way as circumstances admit. I think that what has been done in the way of lateral communications on the frontier—speaking as a civilian—has been excellent; it is a policy that was for a long time urged, and it will, I am sure, very greatly conduce to the peace and quietude of the frontier. I quite agree with what the lecturer said, that it is almost impossible throughout the whole length of the frontier to work up to the Durand line. Each section of the frontier must be treated in the manner which is suited to that particular section, and that is why it is an absolutely false analogy to say that what you can do in Baluchistan you can do all along the frontier. The two countries are under totally different conditions. I do not wish to depreciate the great work Sir Robert Sandeman and his successors have done in Baluchistan, nobody has a greater admiration for him than myself; but there you are working with large tribes, controlled by tribal leaders, through whom you can work to a great extent. On the Afghan frontier the whole thing is totally different. Each tribe is more or less a small Soviet, and each man is as good as another, which makes it impossible to deal with them. In Afghanistan, I can claim a rather special interest. I think most of you know I was the happy or unhappy person who concluded the treaty with the late Amir Habibullah on March 21, 1905. Of course it is a matter of great satisfaction to me that through great difficulties and dangers he managed to adhere to his treaty, and I am afraid that his adherence to that treaty cost him his life—at which, I may say, he himself would not have been surprised. It is perhaps worth mentioning that the Amir Habibullah had a great defence policy. It was that he should give us the land and we should make a railway by the Helmand to Afghan Seistan, and a road thence north to the Russo-Afghan frontier, with cantonments in Seistan and at Hashtadun. We were also to give him the worn-out Martinis to arm his men in his northern frontier, and he would give a railhead at Dhakha. His scheme did not fit in with the ideas of Government or of Lord Kitchener and the military authorities at the time, but it is curious that in the Great War we had to do much what he proposed. Our rail-

way was made to the Persian frontier with a metalled road to the north. He said: "If you do what I wish, you will serve as a shield to Afghanistan, and I with my hillmen can guard the hill passes to the north and east. Your Khyber railway is a spear pointed at my heart." Judging from the papers his ideas still hold in Kabul. His son, Amanullah, unfortunately, apparently sought to establish his position in Afghanistan by an unprovoked and sudden attack upon India. His name means "the peace of God," but there was not much peace in this case, though his conduct certainly passed all understanding.

I have seen it stated that we had nearly 800,000 troops involved in repelling that attack. Of course, I am out of date and antediluvian, but I must confess that on the Indian frontier my experience, such as it is, that of a civilian from outside, has led me to deprecate very strongly the use of very large bodies of troops. It seems to me that the conditions of communications and the general conditions prevailing there are such that the moving of these large bodies becomes practically impossible without getting in each other's way, and very little result is obtained. Something of the kind happened in the Tirah expedition, and I dare say if we had had fewer troops on the frontier we might have had a more satisfactory and quicker issue of this last campaign. But there again there may have been reasons which rendered it necessary, of which I am entirely ignorant.

As to the Khyber, perhaps we shall get some day an explanation why Lord Kitchener's carefully thought out and in part executed plan for a railway along the Kabul River, with the Khyber road flanking it on the south, has been rejected for a line through the Pass with an unnecessary rise and fall of 1,800 feet and very poor carrying capacity, not to mention other drawbacks.

However, there is one thing, I was very pleased to hear the lecturer speak up for the volunteers. I was a private in the Punjab Volunteers for a good many years, and then honorary colonel of three regiments, and I was glad to see that in the early part of 1915, when we had only two British divisions intact and remnants of others, and the defence of India fell to a great extent on the 36,000 volunteers then extant, they did not do at all badly. Yet the policy of Government as regards the force was curious. Lord Kitchener in 1909, at the request of the Punjab Government, himself selected on the spot a defensive post at Lahore in the case of a serious riot or rising. Yet the Punjab Government could never induce the Government of India to construct this nor to let the Punjab Government do it. The 1st Punjab Volunteers had raised Rs. 10,000 for machine-guns, but they were not allowed to buy them in the open market, and the military authorities would not supply until the last regular regiment in the south of India had got its complement. There was a want of vision about this which nearly led to a disaster in 1919.

Speaking at my last parade of the Lahore Volunteers in 1913, I gave them the old advice to "trust in God and keep their powder dry," as they never could tell when they might be wanted. It was, as events showed, sound advice, and I can give no better. At any rate, I hope that the force which takes the place of the volunteers will not be depreciated or inadequately supplied, and that it may do as well as they did. (Applause.)

Sir EDMUND BARROW: I did not contemplate speaking on this occasion, but one or two remarks have been made regarding which I must either endorse what has been said or correct it. Sir Louis Dane has just told us there were 300,000 men employed by us in the recent Afghan war. I am surprised to hear it.

Sir LOUIS DANE: I asked how many.

Sir EDMUND BARROW: I should think you might certainly halve that number, if you mean troops only.

Sir LOUIS DANE: I saw the statement made. It was very surprising.

Sir EDMUND BARROW: It was very surprising! and it is unfortunate that such statements are frequently made; it is only for that reason that I venture to correct this figure. On the other hand, when people talk of the vast number of troops we employed during the recent Afghan war, I am in agreement with Sir Louis Dane that if our troops had been efficient, and really mobile troops, on whom we could thoroughly rely, any such number would not have been necessary. I hope I am not hurting anyone's feelings by saying there was serious deterioration, but I have heard on good authority that there was a marked deterioration in the native troops left in India at the end of the Great War, apart from those employed in active warfare in Europe, etc. It was a natural deterioration, for as all know who are connected with India, the fighting races of India are not unlimited, rather the number of fighting men available is few, comparatively to the population. It is absurd to expect that we can draw on India for immense masses of men, and I have always thought and said so. Certain politicians in this country urged that we should have half a million Indian soldiers added to the establishment, as if you could raise unlimited hosts of reliable soldiers in India on an emergency! The idea is absurd. If you did, you would only get a mob together, and that is what actually happened. Therefore the analogy of the recent Afghan war is not really very important. It was quite different from any other occasion on which we have had to defend the frontier. I do not think really there is any other point that I would care to enter upon, more especially as others are waiting to speak.

Sir MICHAEL O'DWYER: Like Sir Edmund Barrow, I had not meant to say anything, but I would like to express the satisfaction we all feel that the future editor of the *Pioneer* has made this subject his special

study. (Hear, hear.) All Governments, including even the Government of India, are the better for informed criticism. I know when I was Lieutenant-Governor in a small way in the Punjab, I was the better for the criticism I occasionally received from Mr. Haward, then the able editor of the *Civil and Military Gazette*. (Laughter.) Two speakers who have already addressed you have spoken of the land front, and Admiral Richmond has referred to the sea front; there is only one point I would like to say a few words about, and that is what we may call the home front. Speaking as a detached outsider I am bold enough to say that, seeing what our military resources are in India and here, and knowing what the strength and efficiency of our navy is all the world over, as long as you have an efficient Government in the Indian Empire and here, capable of prompt decision and quick action, I do not think anything is to be feared from external enemies either by sea or land. (Hear, hear.) To my mind the only serious situation would arise when an invasion by land or sea synchronized, as it probably would, with serious internal disturbances in India. An illustration of that was in 1919, when the Afghans either promoted the disturbances in India, or took advantage of them to make their treacherous aggression. Therefore we must look to the security of our home front. How to secure that is the most vital question, and its importance was brought home to me in April, 1919, when I had to deal with the situation which then arose in the Punjab, from the efforts which were being made by a small, but dangerous, revolutionary party in India, to co-operate with the foreign enemy. That co-operation took the form not of armed force—that we could easily have dealt with—but the more insidious forms of cutting our communications by railway, telegraph, and telephone; making attempts to burn aerodromes and barracks, and to immobilize our forces and prevent the concentration of troops on the North-West Frontier, where they were then so urgently required to hurl back the Afghans. It was very difficult to deal with those attacks on our communications, which were simultaneous with very insidious attempts to sap the loyalty of our Indian army. One thing which set the Sikh troops in the Punjab in a ferment was the malicious rumour sedulously circulated that during the disturbances in Amritsar a bomb had been dropped on the Golden Temple at Amritsar. So alarming was the report that commandants of Indian units had to send down Indian officers to Amritsar, so that they could see with their own eyes that no bomb had been dropped and go back to reassure their comrades. I remember the Maharajah of Patiala wired to me to know whether there was any truth in this rumour, which he said was having a most disturbing effect on the Sikhs in his state. Those are some of the things we have to guard against, and in that connection there are certain considerations to be borne in mind. In the disturbances of 1919 we found that our task was made infinitely more difficult by the

fact that among the subordinate Indian staff of the railways, of the telephones and telegraphs, and of the post office, we had certain disloyal people secretly working with the revolutionary party, and giving them information of what was going on to such an extent that, in Lahore, through which all the telegraphs and telephones to the north passed, we had to clear out the subordinate staff and put in members of the valuable Defence Force, of which the lecturer was a prominent member. We also found that these disaffected members of our railway and telegraph staffs were, in some cases, actually either cutting the lines themselves or inciting others to do so, and were in direct communication with the extremist leaders outside. I mention this for the reason that the railway, postal, and telegraph staffs are very largely drawn from what you call in India the Babu class. They are, as a rule, loyal but often credulous and ignorant, and very easily got at by outside seditious agitators. For this reason we ought to consider whether it is desirable to have all our eggs in one basket, and to leave these very essential security services almost entirely in the hands of one section of the community. In the past we have been able to rely on the fact that we had in our Anglo-Indian community in India men whom we could trust in times of crisis, but owing to the Indianization of the services the unfortunate Anglo-Indian element has been largely crowded out. There is a cry that these departments must be made more and more accessible to Indian control. That change is being hastened as the railways, one after another, have been removed from Company control and brought under State control, and the result is that we have to face the situation that our internal security may be very seriously endangered by this fact. I had proof of that in 1919, when a general strike on the all-important North-Western Railway was only averted by the rumour that martial law had been extended to the railway, as it in fact had been to certain districts. The fact that for long periods in 1920 and 1921—I think the lecturer will bear me out, as I had then left India—a large section of the North-Western Railway, the only line of access to the frontier, was held up by a political strike, shows the importance of the consideration which I venture to place before you: secure your home front and you can face any attack by land or sea with equanimity. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: I think you will agree with me that we have had a very remarkable lecture, dealing in a very interesting way with this very big subject. We are also very grateful to those speakers who elaborated the subject afterwards. If I may, I would like to make one or two points clear. Sir Louis Dane referred to the large number of troops employed on the frontier in Waziristan and the Afghan war, and Sir Edmund Barrow has also spoken of it, and shown quite rightly that there were not so many as imagined. There were, however, a considerable number, and, as Sir Edmund Barrow said, a great many of

the troops were of very poor quality. It is no slur on them. The Government of India in 1918 was asked to raise half a million more troops, but there were not half a million suitable men in India. The best of the regiments were away, and the best of the remaining men in the country were in drafts. There were a great many useful troops raised from, if I may use the expression, the half-martial races. The best of the experienced officers were either killed or away. Those who were left did their best, but there were not enough to make the half-martial races into first-class troops for fighting on the frontier, however eager and good the Indian Army Reserve officer was. The lecturer said he was afraid that, in the matter of war preparation, economy had been forced on the army very naturally and rightly; and rapid mobilization would not be possible. I am sorry to say that is always the state of the army in India. It will always be very difficult to teach certainly the civil Government and finance department and sometimes the commanders themselves what is necessary to get an army in the field and keep it there. There were magnificent assemblages of troops at the Durbars of Lord Curzon and His Majesty: masses of men marched past, with rows of bayonets and lances; but behind all that, the administrative services that kept an army in the field were not organized. The things that don't march past have never interested people. It is, to a certain extent, the same in England, but the resources of the civil population are more handy. Once or twice, when I have had to draw up memoranda on this subject, I have taken the liberty to use the following analogy: The tendency in India has been the tendency of the daughter to whom you give a dress allowance; she spends it on outside clothes, and when the winter comes, there is nothing warm below. (Laughter.) That is what the military authorities, and especially people like the Quarter-master-Generals, are always anxious about. You have had a very full discussion, and I will not trouble you with any more; but I will call upon you to give a very hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer, and also to all those who have contributed to the subject by speaking afterwards. (Applause.)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PERSIA

TEHERAN,

February 15, 1926.

PARLIAMENT has dissolved and left a rather colourless Cabinet to cope with a pressing dilemma. The concession for the valuable sturgeon fisheries of the southern Caspian coast, for which the energetic little Russian Ambassador has been fighting, was tabled apologetically at the last moment by the Prime Minister, Furughi (an ex-schoolmaster of amiable and philosophic disposition), and was deferred, after some apprehensive criticisms, for the consideration of the Sixth Parliament, to meet, after the elections, about June.

The Russians, under a pretext of balancing their foreign trade, have prohibited imports from Persia, with the exception of cotton. They have also stopped the export of Baku petrol to Persia, which will impede the provisioning of Teheran with wheat by motor-lorry from the neighbouring provinces. The Fisheries Concession was to be a partnership affair between Russia and Persia, and the Persian share of the capital was to be lent by Russia at 8 per cent. The Persians objected that there existed equitable rights in the shape of a pre-war concession, and that the stipulation for the employment of some thousands of Russian workers on Persian soil was unacceptable. They consider that Russia will be hit equally with Persia by a trade boycott, and that surrender to Soviet pressure in this case might encourage further interference with their liberties and rights, which already suffer by Russia's refusal to accept the 1920 Customs tariff. It is hoped that a way out may be found by negotiation without prolonged trade hostilities. The caviare is dependent on Russia for its market, and Persia has not a single naval unit on the Caspian.

The Shah is perturbed, as the security of his frontiers depends primarily on a friendly Russia, and he is presumably concerned for the development of his native province, Mazanderan. The merchants of Azerbaijan are invited to console themselves with the prospect of a road between Tabriz and Mosul, for which budgetary provision has been made.

The achievement on which the Fifth Majliss prides itself most is the Sugar and Tea Tax (actually an increase of Customs duty in disguise) imposed by it in May, 1925. The proceeds are strictly earmarked for railway construction, and the receipts for the last nine

months amount to some £600,000. The Railway Bill passed last week provides for the engagement of an American and a German railway engineer and for the costs of survey. It is the Shah's long-cherished desire that even the rails of whatever lines are built be made of Persian steel—a product as yet unknown. The idea of railways was immensely popular with the people a year ago, when it was fondly imagined that a few trunk lines across a mountainous country twice the size of Spain and with a population of under fifteen millions would provide a panacea, establish peace and prosperity, and give magic birth to another fifteen millions in the course of a decade. Enthusiasm is waning of late as the question becomes a practical one, but the undoubted merits of the project remain, and under the guidance of the American advisers much may be achieved.

Some cogent remarks were made by the Administrator-General of the Finances in a lecture on his return from leave last autumn, anent the popular idea that America, being a fabulously rich country, would make poor little Persia a large development loan without asking awkward questions or insisting on more than a trifling *quid pro quo*. Doctor Millsbaugh made it unpalatably clear to his audience that the rich man gets his wealth by strict attention to business, that the American has as keen an eye for security and profits as any other, and that Persian railway construction is not on the charity lists of multi-millionaires.

The work of the American advisers prospers, and their numbers are being steadily increased. Their critics declare that they have done nothing but tax the country without assisting its development, that the expenses of their administration, with an army of well-paid Persian officials, are disproportionate to the revenue, and that the credit of their three years' work is mainly due to the present Shah, who, as Commander-in-Chief of the army, subdued the unruly elements in the population and compelled the tribal chiefs and the powerful landowners to pay their arrears of tax. The cost of the army is about two million sterling annually, which is not excessive in view of the results obtained. To have met this charge out of a budget which actually balances at five and a half million sterling, and to have reduced the national debt to well under two millions, with a substantial sum set aside for development, is an achievement indicative of considerable tact, ability, and hard work on the part of eight or ten individuals, supported, as they are, by the continued good work of the Belgian customs officials.

The crop failure of last year has necessitated the import of wheat, and a few score motor-lorries have been simultaneously imported by the Government for its transport. The use of these heavy lorries is a serviceable reminder to Persians that even their few motor-roads are capable of improvement. An advance towards rapidity of communications has just been made in the granting of a concession to the Junkers

Company for regular services of all-metal aeroplanes between Pehlevi (Enzeli) and Bushire, and between Teheran and the western frontier, to connect with the Baghdad-Khanikin railway. The concession provides for the taking over of the Company's material in case of war.

The excessive road and town tolls which vexed travellers and traders have just been swept away by law, and in their stead various imposts have been placed on merchandise and an annual tax on motor vehicles.

The change of dynasty last December was not marked by any spontaneous enthusiasm. The Persians respect and admire their new Shah as much as they despised the last two of the Qajar line, but there is in his five years of constructive work not enough of the grandiose and spectacular to fire the emotions of his people with the ardent hero-worship of a Napoleonic age. His smile is too fugitive, and his frown too frequent to inspire affection in a soft-mannered race. Yet Reza Pehlevi is of the stuff of which legendary heroes are made. He is very tall and powerfully built—a Saul among men—of great personal courage, magnificently savage in anger, and with the physical alertness of a fighting animal. The most surprising part of his endowment is the ready intelligence and mature judgment displayed in his statesmanship. He has carefully studied the best models, and he surrounds himself with men whose talents are complementary to his own. His capacity for solid hard work is on a par with his other qualities. A week or two ago, when two cases of highway attack were reported, he stalked into the Cabinet Council, banged his fist on the table, and sent the Minister of War trembling (not in his boots, for they were sent after him) post-haste to Kermanshah to wake the garrison there to a sense of its duties. Recently he paid a visit of inspection to the Teheran barracks at five o'clock on a mid-winter morning. Much of the country's future must surely depend on the effect, on such a nature as his, of the pomp and circumstance of monarchy to which he has attained unaided.

THROUGH THE GORGE OF THE TSANGPO*

By CAPTAIN F. KINGDON WARD

MR. CHAIRMAN, Ladies and Gentlemen,—Last year, through the kindness of the Indian and Tibetan Governments, Lord Cawdor and I obtained permission to go to Tibet for a year to botanize. Now Tibet is generally understood to be an extremely lofty plateau with a cold, almost arctic, climate, scourged by very terrifying winds. This idea of Tibet was particularly emphasized by the British expedition to Lhasa in 1904, and again by the several Mount Everest expeditions, so that the general idea of Tibet, you might say, is that of a sub-arctic desert; and it seems possibly the last place in the world to which anybody should go to collect plants. To-night I am going to try and give you a totally different impression of Tibet. This is a country which has always appealed to the imagination of travellers and men of science, and will do so in the future, I think, more and more increasingly; because although we have learned a great deal about it in the last twenty years, since the British mission to Lhasa, there is still a great deal about it that we do not know. It is not so much its remoteness

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, November 26, 1925, and an address delivered by Captain F. Kingdon Ward, entitled "Through the Gorge of the Tsangpo." In the absence of Lord Peel the chair was taken by Sir Francis Younghusband.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—There is no need to introduce Captain Kingdon Ward to you because he has already lectured here, just before going out on this journey about which he will speak to us this evening. The part of the world he will describe is, from the traveller's point of view, I should think, about as interesting a part of the world as you could possibly be in. It is a part where the greatest range of mountains in the world, the Himalayas, as it were, collides with other mountains. There is a great tangle of mountains and rivers. Also, perhaps in consequence, the varied flora and fauna as it were collide, and consequently, just in that little sort of knot of mountains and rivers, flowers and peoples, you get a mixture of the Indian mountains and the Indian peoples and the Indian rivers, plants and animals and birds meeting with the Chinese. Captain Kingdon Ward was well able to appreciate and make the most of his opportunities, because he had already travelled on the Indo-Chinese border for many years, and he it was who was able, with his companion, Lord Cawdor, to put finally at rest what was practically certain already, the problem of the identity of the Tsangpo River with the Brahmaputra River, and how this great river forces its way through the Himalaya mountains. I now ask him to give us his address. (Applause.)

as its inaccessibility, both political and geographical, which has fenced it off from intercourse with Europeans for so long. As a matter of fact, an air line from Calcutta to Lhasa is only about five hundred miles, and the railhead in India ends within a hundred miles of the frontier of Tibet. The country is quite big enough for you to hold this very general opinion of Tibet as a sub-arctic desert, and yet for some areas of it to be totally different; and I am going to try and give you an idea of its size by a process of comparison. To say that Tibet covers a million square miles does not convey very much, but if I say it covers roughly fifteen times the size of Great Britain, lifted to an average height of fifteen thousand feet, without a single mile of railway in it, and on three sides without a railway within five hundred miles of the frontier, you will have a better idea of its inaccessibility. The population of Tibet one can hardly estimate, but it is certainly less than that of greater London. The slide shows you Tibet and adjacent regions. The particular region we are going to visit to-night is that little loop up on the Tsangpo River to the east of Lhasa. What I wish to emphasize is the great contrast between what we may call these two Tibets. There is the Tibet of the plateau, which is the one that has been so much emphasized by all the earlier travellers across Tibet and north to Lhasa, by the Tibet expedition, and by the various Mount Everest expeditions. That plateau covers roughly three-quarters of the whole of Tibet, but it still leaves some two hundred thousand square miles of what we may call the river gorge country, which is anything but plateau. It is a totally different type of country altogether. That two hundred thousand square miles is covered with forests, flowers, and meadows of all kinds. You will notice that the gorge country lies in a comparatively narrow area. As a matter of fact, it is about two hundred miles east to west; all these great rivers are attracted to that one point as though by a magnet. Those rivers rise far up in different parts of Tibet, and eventually flow to different seas; but they all of them have to come rushing through that very narrow gap in the mountains, and that is the area which we are going to visit to-night. To start on a journey like this it is generally necessary to arrange to start two or three days before you want to, or you never get off to time. As soon as you leave railhead everything becomes very casual. Say you have arranged to start at ten o'clock on Monday morning, you generally find that about nine o'clock the head muleteer comes and tells you that all his mules are in pawn, and that he cannot start that day unless you give him an advance of wages. All these troubles being overcome, you generally start a couple of days later than was arranged. The journey is from railhead through the jungles of Sikkim or China as the case may be, with various rivers to cross by more or less primitive methods, generally in ferry boats. We, however, followed the ordinary route from Darjeeling to Lhasa, and up through the

forests of Sikkim, over the Himalaya on to the great plateau of Tibet. To travel on the plateau in the early spring or late winter is particularly unpleasant. The things that one chiefly remembers about the plateau are wind and dust. In the winter snow takes the place of dust—snow frozen and hard, which, of course, rasps the skin very badly wherever it is exposed. It is necessary, however, in order to reach this river gorge country to go over a certain amount of the plateau, and one has a vivid recollection of this fearful howling wind, the dust in the summer and the rasping snow in the winter—so that you very soon lose what the hoardings call that schoolgirl complexion. You will notice that the plateau is quite treeless, and in fact devoid of woody plants. But for two or three months in the summer when the rains come it is covered with flowers. As you get to slightly lower elevations and go down into the valleys, particularly where water is flowing permanently, you begin to get a few trees. The trees are generally, as in this case, of considerable age and are protected by the inhabitants. They show very definitely the prevailing wind, that is to say, they do not rise above a certain height from the ground, and they are all very considerably curved. They are generally rather stunted. This particular tree is a poplar. The photograph was taken in the middle of April, but the trees do not yet show the sign of a leaf on them. Getting down to still lower levels you find the trees become more frequent, and you sometimes meet with very fine trees such as elms. Those who are interested in bird-nesting may like to know that the nests are those of jackdaws and magpies. There are plenty of birds on the plateau; even in the entirely treeless parts you meet birds like choughs, rose finches, and further down babblers and so on. Crossing the plateau, following the ordinary main road is a comparatively simple matter. At the time of the British mission to Lhasa twenty years ago it must have been a very different proposition; but now there are bungalows at every stage, a telegraph-line from Calcutta to Lhasa, and the post goes through into Tibet; so that in some places you might think that the romance of Tibet has passed; but I do not think that is so. These are simply comforts both for Tibetans themselves and travellers, and there is no doubt that a very large part of Tibet will always be devoid of these amenities. A telephone has also been installed from Gyantse to Lhasa, and I believe not so very long ago the political officer at Gyantse rang up Lhasa, asked to speak to the Dalai Lama, and received in excellent English a prosaic reply from a clerk: "His Holiness goes to office at eleven o'clock." That seems to take away the romance from Tibet, but that is a very narrow view. After leaving Gyantse, where a British Trade Agent is stationed, we left the Lhasa road and turned eastwards, and after travelling about eleven days we reached the first big town on the Tsangpo, a town called Tsetang, fifty miles south-east of Lhasa. These are such buildings as are found in most Tibetan cities. There are very few big

towns in Tibet. Tsetang has a population very much less than that of a London borough. It is the principal town in these parts, but although of some importance, is really only what we should call a large village. We now reach the Tsangpo, which was our objective, and we follow that river eastwards through the great gorges. At first the going is fairly easy. We cross the river then, here flowing at an altitude of about eleven thousand feet; we cross it in coracles. The current is perfectly placid, and one may well imagine that the river will go on flowing eastwards in this great trough of the plateau for a good many hundreds of miles. It might even flow to China, and one begins to appreciate the difficulties of the old geographers when they tried to link up this river with some other in India or China. For this reason: the river had been crossed by explorers on their way to Lhasa, but it had not been followed eastwards. No one knew what became of it. When it was followed down, it was found to enter a tremendous gorge, and the following it had to be given up because people could not get through the gorge. There was known in Assam another river, the Brahmaputra, which flowed down from the mountains to the north. It came out through jungles which you could not get into because they were inhabited by hostile tribes, and on paper it seemed reasonable to suppose that the one river was the other—that the river which flowed away to the east in Tibet was the river which appeared in India. The difficulty of accepting that was that there were several other rivers which it might be in India. There were several rivers whose upper courses were quite unknown, and it seemed at first sight just as likely to be one as another. The whole story of the exploration and final proof of identity of the Tsangpo and Brahmaputra is too long a story to go into, but it hangs on this: that all the other unknown rivers were crossed by a native explorer, and when the maps came to be plotted it was found that the Tsangpo could not flow very far to the east, and that the only possible river which it could be was the Brahmaputra of Assam. However, there were about two hundred miles of the gorge to be explored. A certain amount was done by native explorers, and a good deal was done from the Assam side by the Abor expeditions of some years ago. It was proved the rivers were the same, but not demonstrated. The final demonstration was undertaken twelve years ago by two officers of the Indian army. They first followed the Brahmaputra up through Assam, and then struck the Tsangpo higher up and came down through the gorge. They explored all but about forty or fifty miles of it, and set the matter finally at rest. But there was another problem connected with this river; the river flowing on the Tibetan plateau was flowing at an altitude of about eleven thousand feet, and the river in Assam at about one thousand feet. It seemed very natural there would be great falls on the river. One native explorer had reported great falls, but when

the two officers explored the river they found its course could be accounted for without any great fall. They also showed successfully that some mistake had occurred, through which the native explorer had reported a waterfall 150 feet high which was not on the main river, but on a side stream. There was no necessity to postulate a fall, and they did not find one. There was the bare possibility that in the forty or fifty miles which remained unexplored a fall would be found. We followed this river down through the wide trough. The river was flowing perfectly placidly at an altitude of 11,000 feet. There were no big rapids and no great difficulty in crossing the river. This is a typical little village. As we get farther east the country gets less and less barren, and more and more trees appear. This particular village is of some interest, because in it was born, about fifty years ago, the thirteenth Dalai Lama, the present ruler of Tibet, and I suppose the greatest Tibet has ever had. The buildings met with in Tibet are of two types, apart from private houses—monasteries and fortresses. The monasteries are sometimes of a very considerable size, with several thousand inhabitants; but we found no very big ones. There were probably not more than three or four hundred priests in any of them. But in this particular place, when we arrived, there was a certain amount of trouble going on. The monks had been behaving in a rather unmonkish manner, and the lay authorities had descended on the place and ordered the expulsion of about sixty monks. The head lama of the monastery was very much disturbed at this, and came to us by night and asked us to interfere. Of course we could not do anything of the sort; it was nothing to do with us, and it would have been quite unwarranted. But we felt it would have been as well if the monks had not been expelled; they were an unprepossessing lot, and we felt the world would have been safer for democracy if they had been kept shut up. When we arrived at the monastery again later on we found it almost entirely deserted. The fortresses are very fine buildings, often built in strategic situations overlooking the villages at their feet. They have very thick walls and narrow windows. They are a medieval type of building. The fortresses are inhabited by the civil magistrates, and the monasteries, of course, by the ecclesiastical authorities. The people were extremely delightful. The people of Tibet were, always very friendly and hospitable. Whenever we came to a village or monastery, as is usual in Oriental countries, they used to send us presents. These generally took on a severely practical form—a sack of flour, a bag of rice, but particularly eggs. They were very fond of giving us eggs, but we generally found these eggs exploded on contact. Tibet is now maintaining a foreign-drilled army, which will probably render a very good account of itself, but in the back blocks of Tibet you find these more or less amateur soldiers, who are not gener-

ally quite so formidable as they look. Although they have assorted rifles of various bores, and go about with those belts of cartridges, one generally finds that the cartridge will not fit any rifle. (Laughter.) I have said there are no railways in Tibet or anywhere near, and this photograph will give you an idea of the gorge country. For a good deal of the plateau it might be possible to use wheeled traffic, and, in fact, recently the Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army took up to Lhasa from Calcutta a motor-car in pieces on the backs of mules. But in the gorge country such a thing would be utterly impossible, and the only transport is the ordinary Asiatic transport—by yak, pony, mule, donkey. In a great many of the river gorges it is not possible to take any animals at all; one uses only coolies. I shall show you a few photographs to give you rather a different idea of Tibet, a few photographs of plants and flowers, so that you will not imagine that Tibet consists entirely of this very bare, bleak, treeless plateau. The great feature of the south-eastern corner of Tibet is the rhododendrons. These are very fine. Sometimes they are very big trees, at other times bushes or even creeping plants. There are many other trees, of course, besides the rhododendrons, and as you get down still lower into the depths of the gorges you begin to meet with sub-tropical jungle. The reason for botanizing in these places I had better explain. If you look at the gardens and parks of England, and particularly London, you will see a great many interesting and pretty flowers, shrubs, and trees. It is extraordinary what a very small number of them are really English; they are nearly all aliens introduced from different parts of the world. Tibet has given us its quota, particularly of rhododendrons and certain poppies and primulas. Creeping rhododendrons are shown here, forming an entire carpet over the rocks, and covering many square miles. These are of all colours—scarlet, amber yellow, purple, violet, and so on. After the rhododendrons perhaps the most surprising flowers of Tibet are the blue poppies, of which there are a great many. They occur in the harsher country at higher altitudes, from 14,000 to 15,000 feet, where there is very little vegetation of any sort. You get the carpet of dwarf rhododendrons; higher up near the glaciers you get nothing but scattered flowers, but those very often particularly beautiful. These are the blue poppies of this country. The flowers are sky blue with golden centres. Sometimes they are sweetly fragrant. They are perhaps the most surprising thing to find on these bare, treeless scree at 15,000 feet, where there seems to be nothing but the most barren gravel for them to grow on. Sometimes these blue poppies grow in the woods. That was originally discovered, I think, about 1913 by Major Bailey, and has been called after him *Meconopsis Baileyi*. A yellow poppy was found on the rhododendron moorland, growing amongst the dwarf rhododendrons, where they grow like heather in Scotland. After the yellow and blue poppies and the rhododendrons, perhaps the most

beautiful flowers are the primulas. They also grow in very great variety, and cover enormous areas. Sometimes acres and acres are covered by one species of meadow primula. They occur generally in the Alpine meadows which are found lining the streams below the level of the forest. You notice the forest growing on the upper slopes, and down below these flowery meadows are very often full of primroses, as in the next photograph. That is a particularly fine one because it grows about four feet high. It is, perhaps, the biggest primula known. It is something like an English cowslip, but very much larger, with as many as a hundred flowers growing together in a sort of mop head. These flowers grow so thickly in the eastern part of Tibet that they simply clog up the streams. Finally, we have a meadow of giant sorrel—not the woodland sorrel of England, but more like the dock family. These you sometimes find in great colonies, sometimes one here and another there on the hillside. You can see them a mile away; very often they look like cream-coloured Chinese pagodas. I shall now pass to the gorge itself. Our botanical work was done round here. This is the great loop of the Tsangpo. It flows first eastwards, then turns to northwards, then goes to the south as the Dihang of Upper Assam, and finally flows practically back on itself westwards as the Brahmaputra of India. The plant photographs which I showed you were all taken round here where we were botanizing. Our route is shown in red; that is the China to Lhasa road, and this is the country we explored. We did that in summer while we were botanizing, and in the winter we started from this place, Gyala, to follow the river through that great gorge. On the plateau the river was flowing perfectly placidly eastwards. On the plateau the mountains are not particularly high, on every side they go up to 18,000 feet or so; but when you get to about here you see in front of you an enormous range of snow mountains. The river coming up against this obstacle tries to get out of the way by turning more to the north. Instead of flowing straight through this great range it edges away a little to the north-east. It finds itself, however, still more hemmed in by snow mountains on all sides, and takes the line of least resistance. It charges straight at the obstacle, and cuts its way clean through the great range of mountains. There is the river at Tsela Dzong still flowing in a broad valley, quite quietly, with a range of mountains on either side; but after flowing in that direction for another ten or fifteen miles it comes up against this great obstacle. That range of mountains, which is presumably the great Himalayan range, seems to stretch right across its path. and from this point the river begins to edge away to the north-east to try and turn the obstacle. As I say, it finds itself still more involved among the snow mountains and instead of going right away to the north it turns on the range and carves a way clean through. It is here getting under way. You see this great barrier range. These terraces are the remains of glacie

moraines which have been pushed right across the valley by glaciers which have long since retreated. The glaciers come down to within a mile or two of the river, but in ancient times they must have filled the valley. The river has carved a passage through the mountains. It is still trying to get round the flank of the snow mountains, and finds it utterly impossible. It now narrows very considerably, and charges straight at the range. The river in full flood charges the snow mountains. The waves here leap up fifteen or twenty feet. We have photographs taken of one rock—not this particular rock—but we got the rock simply covered with water in July, and when we came through the gorge six months later the rock was standing up about as high as this room above the water. That will give you some idea of the rise and fall during the rains. Of course the Tsangpo is at its lowest about March and April, when the snows have not yet melted, and there has been a considerable period of drought. About June it rises very suddenly, and all through July you get tremendous floods coming down and through the whole of August and September. Then it begins to drop again. We went through it about half-water in November and December.

In order to go through the gorge we had to abandon nearly all our kit and take only porters. We could only get twenty porters, half of whom were women. Most of these porters were carrying rations for the party; the others were carrying bedding and scientific instruments, surveying instruments, and so on. We did not take any tents and could not have put them up if we had done so. We found these women excellent porters; the only drawback was that whenever we got faced with particularly awkward cliffs, they would generally sit down on the top of the cliffs and weep. But that did not disturb them. When they got over it they invariably came on with us. They were extraordinarily plucky and resourceful. The men, of course, were better still, carrying the women's loads in the awkward places and helping them down by hand. The garment these people are wearing is the typical garment of the province, the *gushuk*. In Tibet the most usual garment worn is the *chupa*, a sort of loose dressing-gown. In this part of Tibet they wear another garment composed of a strip of cloth twelve feet long and three feet wide, with a hole in the middle. They simply put their heads through the hole, tie a belt round their waist, pulling it up a bit, and there you are complete with garment. It is a very practical form. When dirty you simply turn it inside out, and when it is cold or when it rains you wear two. It is made either of coarse cloth or untanned skin of goats. In rainy weather they generally wear it with the fur outside, and in fine weather with the leather outside. The leader of our porters was a fellow known to us as Captain Flint; he looks rather a buccaneer, but, as a matter of fact, he was a very stout fellow indeed. He also wears this *gushuk*, and carries a knife. We took one rope with

us. Every man had a sword. We also had a hatchet or two. We had to hack our way through the jungle, and when climbing up and down the cliffs we had to attach the rope repeatedly. When we reached the last village at the mouth of the gorge, about the middle of November, away we started on the sixteenth with our twenty porters, and for the first four days we found a track. After the fourth day we reached a little monastery in the gorge, and spent a day there reorganizing the party for the more difficult part of the journey. This gorge is about a hundred miles long and something like ten thousand feet deep. We found it filled with forest from the water to the snows. As long as we had a path it was fairly easy going, but after leaving this little monastery at Pemakochung there was no trail of any sort. We had to find our way as best we could. We kept the river always in sight; sometimes we were two or three thousand feet above it, sometimes clambering over boulders in the river-bed. The boulders were enormous, as big as cottages and piled on each other, so that it was very difficult to get through. Every three or four days the type of vegetation altered. We found ourselves first in pine forest, subsequently in semi-jungle. The river became more and more riotous and more and more confined between these great cliffs; but we found nothing in the nature of a really big waterfall. That photograph was taken just near this little monastery of Pemakochung and shows a small fall. Kintup, the native explorer, reported a fall of 150 feet high here; but that was a mistake; he really meant a fall of 150 feet on a side stream. He got as far as this place, and spent some time looking for a way down the gorge without success, and so had to return. In 1913, Bailey and Morshead got as far as Pemakochung without any difficulty and went on some ten miles; but it is rather difficult now to recognize the exact spot where Bailey was forced to abandon the gorge and turn back. The sort of obstacles we met with were generally cliffs of this nature. Sometimes we climbed up and down chimneys, sometimes we were right in the bed of the river. The river at this season is fairly low, but it had been a very wet year. We had no particular trouble. It rained sometimes. We slept under trees and cliffs, wherever we could find water. This may sound strange, but when you are two thousand feet above the river it is not always easy to find even a trickle of water where you can form a camp. It was on these places that the women generally gave a good deal of trouble, and the slide shows some of them being helped down. At times we came to comparatively smooth stretches of water, but there was a considerable current all the time. Trees clothed the cliffs practically everywhere, except where these were absolutely vertical. At this time we found a takin trail. These takin migrate up and down the gorge. The takin is a sort of cross between a goat and an ox. There used to be one at the Zoo, but it died. It is a curious animal with a rather big lumping body on short stubby legs,

but extraordinarily agile. We found its track up cliffs almost vertical, with simply a slight scrub growth carpeting on them. It bounds up and down these tremendous cliffs. It goes about in large herds clearing a track through the worst of the jungle. At last we reached a point where we found it was impossible to proceed along the river-bed any more. The river filled its bed from cliff to cliff, and the cliffs were almost vertical. Here there was a waterfall of sorts, about thirty or forty feet high; but we could not get any closer to it than that, and eventually we had to climb up this cliff here. We had to abandon the river, in fact. The river at this point doubles back on itself in a loop, and flows almost due west; it then wriggles round again and resumes its normal course. It is right in the heart of the Himalaya, still forcing its way through the snowy peaks. As we went on through the gorge it often seemed to us we were far from being six or seven thousand feet above sea level, as we were really. It seemed to us we were boring our way into the bowels of the earth and would never come on to a familiar landscape again. One could imagine a strange lunar landscape awaiting us at the bottom: one could hardly imagine seeing cultivation again. Here it happened we had to leave the river and climb the cliffs, and three days later, having crossed the worst of the mountains, we dropped down to the lower foot of the gorge and found a village and cultivation. The porters were so pleased with themselves at seeing human beings again that they gave a great feast and, I am sorry to say, got disgracefully drunk. The result was that we started very late the next day. As far as the upper end of the gorge we had been in Tibet proper, among Tibetans. We now found ourselves at the lower end of the gorge among totally different people. They spoke a certain amount of Tibetan, and had been influenced by Tibetans, but came from different regions, and their own language was not Tibetan. The people are of various tribes, and there is really a sort of jungle no man's land between Assam and Tibet—inhabited by people of Tibetan extraction, no doubt, but not Tibetan any more than Assamese. Some of these people called themselves Mönbas. The Mönbas originally came from Bhutan. We rather came on them out of the blue. They did not expect us, did not know who we were or where we were going. While they were deciding what to do about it we hurried on to the next village. On the whole we found them friendly. They saw we were harmless. The problem was now to see that part of the gorge we had had to abandon. In this case we had to go up the gorge instead of down. We had abandoned it, as far as we could make out, about twenty miles higher up. For a week the people would not help us; they said there was no way up the gorge; nobody ever went there; there was no track. If we got on the top of the mountains we could not see anything. We argued and discussed for a week. We crossed the river by a rope bridge. The rope is made of bamboo and fastened

to rocks on either bank. A slider works on top of the rope, and the ordinary Tibetan ties himself on to this slider and pulls himself across with his hands, kicking with his legs. We refused to work our passage over, and were pulled over in this way with a lifeline. The river is here just leaving the worst part of the gorge; it still has some distance to go before it reaches Assam; but to all intents and purposes the worst of the gorge had been pierced. There were twenty-five miles we had not seen and wanted to see. We reached a little native village, and above us we saw this great snow peak and this forest, and from the position we estimated that if we could get on to this ridge here, we should be able to see and possibly reach the hidden part of the river.

We had followed up the river as far as we could in the river-bed, but that was not very far. The natives told us there was no possible way of getting up there, and that if we got up there, we should not see anything. Then by a curious piece of luck we found a track for ourselves, and quite a good one. We also saw up on this ridge one night as it was getting dark the light of a camp-fire. We returned to the village and told the villagers they had told a fairy story; there was a path, and people over there. They then admitted they had been romancing; we could go and they would take us. It transpired the reason why they said we could not go was because all the country belonged to a neighbouring tribe. It was their preserve. The tribe we were negotiating with were not allowed to go there. They wanted to keep on good terms with the other tribe and not trespass on their property. However, when we started off we found six of them had brought guns. In the final result they shot two of their neighbours' takin, a couple of wild sheep, and some pheasants, all belonging to their neighbours; and then got us to write a letter saying we had done it. Eventually we got on top of the ridge and descended to the gorge again in the narrowest part. Here we found the Tsangpo in places only 50 feet wide, pushing through this extraordinary narrow rent with almost vertical walls thousands of feet high. At one point we managed to get down to the river, where there are a great many hot springs in the river-bed. We found there a waterfall of no great height, 30 or 40 feet, quite vertical. In the distance of a quarter of a mile the river falls 100 feet. There were still four or five miles that we could not see, but we satisfied ourselves that there could not possibly be a waterfall on it, and that the thousands of feet between Tibet and Assam could be accounted for without any very big fall, as Bailey had demonstrated. We now left that gorge. We had passed through the Himalaya and had to get back to India. Our route in the spring was through Sikkim on the main Lhasa road, and then away to the east. Coming back we followed a route further north, and then straight south, through Bhutan; so that, having penetrated into this top right-hand corner, we went up north

on to the plateau, once more rejoined the main body of the caravan, loaded up the mules, and returned along the Lhasa road until we got to this point. From that point we turned absolutely due south and reached India as rapidly as possible. Going up north, this river is not the Tsangpo, but the Po Tsangpo, a great tributary. That river is more or less, in fact, almost completely unexplored; but all we saw was this junction with the Tsangpo and a little bit of the gorge as we went up north. That river also seems to break through a great range of snow mountains. Looking back for the last time upon these great cliffs here on the right, we saw these great barrier ranges that we had just penetrated. The peak on the extreme right is Namcha Barwa, over 25,000 feet high; the peak on the left is Sanglung, over 23,000 feet high. They are the two great peaks of the Assam Himalaya; known for a long time from the Assam side, here they are seen from the Tibetan side. This picture shows the mules loaded up on the return journey, but the photograph after that shows these snowy peaks once more. That was the last view that we got of the Assam Himalaya and the gorge of the Tsangpo, which is just the other side of that ridge. Coming back across the plateau, of course, things were reversed. We came from the jungles of the gorge into the sort of temperate conifer forest of the temperate plateau, and then on to the barren wind-swept plateau. Instead of the dust of summer we had to contend now with frozen snow being blown about. The cold was very considerable; we used to have 40 or 50 degrees of frost at night; but it was not the cold so much as the wind. Those who have travelled in Tibet always remember with disgust the extraordinary savage winds which blow. They spring up very suddenly in the winter about eleven in the morning and finish at nightfall. We used to try to avoid them by starting early in the day. These are glacier lakes of fresh water, and found at a moderate altitude, about 12,000 feet. They are not to be confused with the lakes of the great plateau, which are not glacier lakes, are generally salt, and occupy fold valleys on the plateau. The scenery of this part of Tibet is picturesque. That is another little glacier lake, and you will see vegetation; but in crossing one more range of mountains we got on the plateau proper, and everything was bleak and bare. In three weeks we crossed the plateau and came down through the forests of Bhutan. That was the last tuft of grass before we got back on the plateau proper, where you see it is completely bare and devoid of trees. After recrossing the Tsangpo and turning due south we got into Bhutan unexpectedly. However, we had no trouble there, and at the end of February we crossed the frontier into India, and found ourselves once more prosaically buying railway tickets. (Applause.)

Sir CHARLES BELL: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—There is, I am afraid, nothing of interest that I can add to the extremely interesting and instructive lecture to which we have listened this afternoon. I have been on this river—which Captain Kingdon Ward has so graphically described—only two or three times; once at Shigatse, a great many years ago, where I stayed a week, and again on my journeys to and from Lhasa with Colonel Kennedy some four years ago.

The river is shown on our maps as the Tsangpo, but "Tsangpo" is merely the Tibetan word for any large river, being derived from "Tsang," which means clean or pure, and "po," which is an agentive affix. So Tsangpo means the cleanser or purifier, and therefore any large river. When Colonel Kennedy and I were at Lhasa the river there was always called the Tsangpo, and, as Captain Kingdon Ward has shown us, the large river in the Po country is also called the Tsangpo. The river which is the main subject of our lecture this afternoon has various names in various parts of its course, just as other rivers in Tibet have, and rivers in India so often have. In the vicinity of Lhasa and Shigatse it is known as the Tsang-Chu—*i.e.*, the river from Tsang, the province immediately to the west of that in which Lhasa is situated.

From Lhatse, a town higher up its course than Shigatse, through Shigatse and through the vicinity of Lhasa, on to Tsetang, and, as I was informed, for about a day's journey beyond Tsetang, this great river is navigable for those hide boats which Captain Kingdon Ward showed us in one of his pictures. Thus we have the spectacle of a large river navigable for some four hundred miles of its course at an elevation of 11,000 to 13,000 feet above the level of the sea. I think that must be unique among all the rivers of the world.

We have this afternoon been shown the great difficulties that the river has to encounter before it can break through the Himalayan chain on its way down to India. When Colonel Kennedy and I were in Lhasa we were told by the Lord Chamberlain of the Dalai Lama the legendary explanation current among the Tibetans themselves. He told us that in the old days before Tibet was inhabited the country was all under water, and the reason for it was that this large river flowed into the country, but could not flow out of it, being blocked by the Himalaya. However, Chenresi, the patron deity of Tibet, took his sword and cleft the Himalaya, so that the river was able to flow through.

Captain Kingdon Ward showed us a river called the Po Tsangpo which comes from the country of Po. I do not know whether he traversed the Po country or whether he passed through a corner of it. The inhabitants of Po are a very interesting people, something like the people whose pictures he has shown to us. They are sturdy folk, almost independent of Lhasa. But, as so often happens in Tibet, although

people are practically independent of the civil government of Lhasa, they are very much under the influence of the capital itself. When we were in Lhasa, that dependence of the Po country was shown to us in two ways. Its chief sent a deputation to ask for a girl from the Lhasa nobility to be his bride. He did not succeed in obtaining a girl from one of the very best families, because they are averse to sending their daughters away to a country which is at once so distant and also so lawless. But he did succeed in obtaining a bride from a family which had been recently ennobled. That was one way in which you could see that Lhasa very often influences this out-of-the-way people, who are Tibetan or semi-Tibetan by race; because a lady like that going to the country—and I understood that they usually take their wives from Lhasa—would bring a retinue with her, and no doubt establish a centre of influence. But another, and even more potent, influence which Lhasa exercises on these tribes on the border of Tibet is by that power which in this country is by far the greatest of all, and that is the power of religion. I used sometimes when at Lhasa to visit the great temple there, and especially on the fifteenth of a Tibetan month, because the fifteenth, the day of the full moon, is the holiest day of the month. Visiting it, then, in the late afternoon, when the temple is thronged with worshippers, one could often see people from these outlying parts of Tibet. They worshipped at the same shrines as did the Tibetans of Lhasa, Shigatse, and the interior of Tibet, and they were in no way less devout—perhaps rather more so. In the East religion is a potent factor, and is closely interwoven with politics; in Tibet as much as in any Asiatic state.

I do not know whether it was Captain Kingdon Ward's fate to come to any suspension bridges. He showed us an example of an interesting rope bridge, and you do occasionally also meet with the remains of old iron suspension bridges, the origin of which affords an interesting problem. There are very few of them standing now; I have been over one myself, but very few of them are passable. Some have ascribed them to the Chinese, but the Tibetans put them down to a Tibetan lama who lived a few hundred years ago, and is said to have made 108 of these suspension bridges. One hundred and eight is a sacred number in Tibet. There ought to be 108 beads on a rosary; the Buddhist bible, known as the *Kan-gyur*, ought to be printed in 108 volumes, and the man or woman who is perfectly virtuous is expected to live for 108 years. (Laughter and applause.)

MR. ARCHIBALD ROSE: I believe that Captain Kingdon Ward and Lord Cawdor share the unique honour of having actually visited the country so graphically described, and so wonderfully illustrated, to-night. I can therefore offer no contribution to knowledge. But, as one of the little band of frontier workers and travellers to whom this stretch of the Tsangpo and Brahmaputra has so long been the *Ultima*

Thule of our dreams, I offer a tribute of appreciation and thanks. This unknown stretch of country has been the theme of so many talks by the camp-fire in every part of Central Asia, has been such an inspiration and stimulus, that I find myself half sad to think that the job has actually been finished, yet very proud to think that it has been done in my own generation and by men like Ward and Bailey and Morshead, who have endured so much, and for so many years, in unravelling the secrets of that wild corner of Asia. I was fortunate enough to share with them the thrills of anticipation, and this story of the journey has fulfilled our best expectations. Our Chairman to-night, Sir Francis Younghusband, was the first to stir my own imagination in regard to the unknown stretches of Central Asia, and his travels and books have been a guiding light to us all. I am only glad to think that something still lies ahead for the next generation, and that the Po Tsangpo offers a new field of exploration. May I add just one word about our speaker. He has been so modest, and we have been so comfortably entertained, that we might imagine the journey through these gorges, these peaks and flowers, as one long romantic adventure. Those of us who have seen Captain Ward at work know something of the other side—the physical endurance, the courage and the patience, that have been expended in bringing the long years of effort to a successful conclusion. I see a number of Central Asian travellers here to-night, and I am confident that I speak for all in expressing to Captain Kingdon Ward our gratitude to him for enabling us to live over again, if only for an hour, something of the wonder of our old frontier life.

The CHAIRMAN, in closing, expressed his thanks to the lecturer for his most interesting lecture and beautiful slides, which had recalled so many memories to the minds of some of his hearers.

A VISIT TO THE ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL-FIELDS*

By SQUADRON-LEADER A. R. C. COOPER

BEFORE commencing on the more serious work of this evening, I want to destroy an illusion and disarm criticism. Mr. Webster, in his Dictionary, says "to lecture" means "to instruct"; I am not going to instruct you, but will merely try and describe to you a most interesting visit my chief (Group-Captain Board) and I paid to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's fields last year, and tell you a little of its wonderful organization in the quest of oil. In disarming criticism, I wish to point out that I claim no intimate knowledge of the recovery of oil, nor do I know anything of the financial side of the question.

The fields are situated some 160 miles north-east from the head of the Persian Gulf in a valley in the lower slopes of the Bakhtiari mountains. The headquarters and refinery are at Mohammerah and Abadan respectively, and the line of communication from there to the field is by the Karun river and across the desert. The whole country to the foothills some 100 miles north-east is alluvial desert and part of the great Mesopotamian plain. No made road exists across

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held on Thursday, February 11, 1926, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., and a lecture delivered by Squadron-Leader A. R. C. Cooper (Royal Air Force) entitled "A Visit to the Anglo-Persian Oil-fields." In the absence of Lord Peel the chair was taken by Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—In the absence of our Chairman, Lord Peel, it has fallen to my lot to take the chair this evening. Lord Peel, I see from to-day's *Times*—he is Commissioner of Works in our Cabinet—is appropriately occupied in inspecting the Parliament House in Bermudas; no doubt he will bring back hints for the reconstruction of our Parliament House here. I wish someone with more knowledge of the subject was in the chair; but I see not only the Lecturer but many others here who are able to speak upon it, and I hope they will take part in the discussion. The subject is "A Visit to the Anglo-Persian Oil-fields." The Lecturer is Squadron-Leader A. R. C. Cooper, who served for three years in the Air Force in Mesopotamia. He came home a year ago, and is now serving at home. He has a unique knowledge of the conditions of Mesopotamia and also of the oil-fields, and he proposes to illustrate the lecture with photographs which were entirely taken by himself. The photographs and the slides were prepared by the Royal Air Force Photographic Section at Baghdad.

this plain; a track, merely following the line of least resistance, is used only for passenger traffic and for inspection of the pipe line which it follows.

The Karun river provides an easily navigable route to Ahwaz for paddle-steamers, where the rapids are met; these are circumvented by three miles of light railway, and then smaller paddle-steamers proceed to the river-head at Dar-i-Khazina. From here a 2-foot gauge railway transports light goods through the mountains to the fields, while the road takes the heavier traffic. This road is really a very fine feat of engineering. For the first sixteen miles the route is flat; then you wind through the foothills and begin to climb the range of mountains. Through these the engineers have constructed an excellent road; it is faced with stone the whole way, and is kept in repair by a skilled staff. It requires constant supervision; the surface suffers severely from the heavy lorries, and the melting snow in the spring does a great deal of damage.

Approaching from the plains, the forbidding and inhospitable aspect of the mountain passes might have easily discouraged the early prospectors, who could, without undue pessimism, have quoted Dante's well-known line:

"All hope abandon ye who enter here."

Fortunately for the shareholders they did not.

The area at present upon which drilling operations are being worked is roughly fifteen miles by five, but other prospecting is being carried out much further afield.

The existence of oil had been known for hundreds (possibly thousands) of years, but it was not until 1908 that the first well was sunk and oil produced. The pipe line was laid in 1911. The oil is held in a blue limestone formation; contrary to general thought, it is not found in large underground reservoirs, but is retained in the porous rock itself. It is, of course, under enormous pressure, and this pressure forces the oil to the surface when the rock is tapped. All the drilling is by percussion, and derricks are erected to enable this to be carried out; three types of engine for the drilling are used—steam, electric, and internal combustion. The drills vary in size up to $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons in weight, and the pounding of this heavy weight at the rate of forty beats to the minute is deafening.

The bore-holes range in depth from 1,200 to 4,900 feet owing to the underground contour of the oil-bearing rock. The strata is beaten to powder by the drill working in water to a depth of 3 to 20 feet according to the nature of the ground; the drill is then removed, and a hollow piece of casting with a butterfly valve at the end is inserted. As this descends it fills with water and pulverized rock; on being raised the valve closes, allowing the waste to be lifted out and dumped.

This process is repeated until the bore-hole is clear and drilling is resumed. A careful check of the depth is kept by the driller-in-charge, and when oil is expected the drill is frequently examined for any signs of it. The process between the point when oil under enormous pressure is struck and drilling ceases, the blocking of the bore and the sealing of the well-head fittings, is a highly technical and risky process which I am not competent to describe in detail.

One instance will serve to show what great care is necessary. The geologists periodically require a core from a bore-hole, and for this purpose a tool with short projecting teeth is fitted in place of the drill. This is rotated, and by a mechanical device these teeth are forced inwards until the core breaks off. We were shown one of these which had been rotated too rapidly; the teeth had been completely reversed internally, and the heat generated had welded the head into a solid mass of metal.

As the bore-hole sinks it is lined with casing to prevent it from falling in. These casings are let down piece by piece as the hole deepens, and are cemented in until the final bore-hole forms a solid tube for its whole length.

Contrary to expectation, you never see the oil which is being won in thousands of gallons daily. As soon as the oil is tapped the well is sealed until the well-head fittings have been placed in position. This done, the seals are broken, and the oil, forced up under its own pressure of about 150 pounds to the square inch, flows by gravity into the first storage tank, when part of the gas is run off and burnt; the residue then flows (again by gravity) through several control stations to the main storage tanks at the southern end of the fields. These tanks have a capacity of 2,000,000 gallons each; two are filling, two emptying, and one is in reserve. A very minute check is kept here, and the control station can tell at any moment exactly how much each tank contains. Each producing well is inspected twice daily; some of the wells have been producing for years with no attention other than this. One of the wells is historic; this is F. 7, which alone kept our navy supplied with oil during the whole war without once failing. It is the custom to raise your hat to it in acknowledgment of its service and as a tribute to its loyalty.

From the main storage tanks the oil runs to the first pumping-station, where it is boosted up to a pressure of 500 lbs. to the square inch, and forced across the mountains to the next station 40 miles away; this process is repeated at the other stations until the oil reaches the main storage tanks at Abadan. The average capacity of the pipe-line is one 10-inch and one 12-inch pipe. Each station and intermediate control point is in telephone communication with both Abadan and the fields, and an hourly report is made giving the amount of oil passed through. Ample precautions are taken to guard against

a breakdown, and reserve storage tanks are at each pumping-station, to be brought into use in the event of a part of the pipe-line having to be closed down for repairs. The accepted axiom is that a regular supply to the refinery must be maintained at any cost.

We were given interesting comparative figures for the years 1912-13 and 1922-23. In the former a little under 83,000 tons of crude oil was won, while in the latter period the figure had increased to nearly 3,000,000.

The oil is held in the rock under great pressure, and in its discharge is heavily laden with gas. In the early days this was allowed to escape naturally, with resultant danger to the workmen; so much so that men who could not return to their huts by sundown had to remain where they were for the night, as the gas, being heavier than air, hung in the low-lying ground and formed an impassable barrier; several lives were lost in this way.

The burning off of part of the waste gas is a wonderful sight at night. I counted eleven flares burning at once within a radius of a few miles. Some of the flares were out of sight, and all you saw was the reflection on the rocks; others looked like tongues of flame belching from the ground, and those on the distant mountain-tops gave the impression of beacons for lost souls. They lit up the whole area, and showed up the rocky country in contrast and relief, and the scene would have given Gustave Doré a wonderful inspiration for an illustration to the "Inferno." It was an awe-inspiring sight.

The fields are on the route of the migrating birds escaping from the hot deserts further south, and the field manager told us that in the migrating season geese and duck could often be heard all night circling round this spot, attracted by the wide-spread area of light from these flares, and he had actually picked up in his own garden two geese so exhausted that they could fly no further.

During drilling operations all possible precautions are taken against danger from escaping gas, "No smoking" and "Danger—drilling in progress" notices meet you at every turn; all dangerous areas are enclosed with expanded metal 15 feet high; matches are taken from you by a Persian guard; all the bungalows are provided with gas-masks and safety-lamps. The smell of gas is a permanency in the fields; in some places it is worse than others, but you are never quite free from it; it brought back many unpleasant war memories, and at night it was difficult to refrain from instinctively reaching out to make sure your gas-mask was round your neck.

There is neither wood nor coal in the fields, so part of the waste gas is used for domestic purposes; it is laid on to all bungalows, and is used indiscriminately, without the necessity for a penny-in-the-slot machine.

Four pumping-stations convey the oil from field to refinery: the

first at Tembe, at the southern end of the fields, and three others, roughly forty miles apart, at Mullasani, Kut Abdulla, and Dar-i-Quain. Each has its own engineer and staff, and the pumps are at work night and day. With so much oil and gas about the danger from fire is very great; as a precaution, jets, sprinklers, steam nozzles, and enormous chemical extinguishers are installed at each station, any one of which, or all three, can be turned on at a moment's notice. Practically everything is duplicated to avoid any possibility of a check in the supply. Each department is isolated within a fenced enclosure, and smoking is prohibited.

Well-built and most thoroughly equipped hospitals have been established at the refinery at Abadan and in the fields; twenty doctors and fifteen nurses are employed, and a highly skilled surgeon is constantly operating. The hospital we were shown in the fields had a complete dental surgery and a most elaborate operating theatre. All treatment is given free, and we saw a dental plate being made for a Persian who had been without any teeth for many years; the surgeon laconically remarked that he had the greatest difficulty in making his patient understand that he was not to remove it when he wanted to eat. Segregation wards are maintained for the many unpleasant diseases the Oriental suffers from, and in these the several classes of natives are kept apart. It was a curious sight to see a black native, who is generally content to spend most of his days and nights in his only suit, lying in bed in a white nightshirt, with white sheets, tended by a white nurse. I was tempted to quote for him the anonymous poet: "Oh! mother, couldst thou but see me now!"

One of the facts that struck me most was the excellent sanitation. When it is realized that some 10,000 natives are employed in the fields alone, and that not one of these has even an elementary knowledge of the principles of sanitation, the danger from infectious and contagious diseases is very great. Owing to the strictest sanitary discipline and constant supervision and inspection by trained sanitary squads, both European and Persian, the incidence of disease has been small. One of the reasons for this is the abundance of incinerators for destroying garbage and refuse. Scattered all over the fields one finds lengths of 17-inch pipe casing, into one end of which the refuse is tipped, and at the other a very large jet of gas—another use for much of this commodity which is going to waste. Squads are employed in nothing else but this, and the incinerators are constantly at work, complete destruction of the rubbish taking about fifteen minutes. Again, there are frequent inspections by the medical people, and the sick parade each day is no light task.

The Company has a fleet of something like 600 vehicles working in the fields; nearly 115 miles of roads have been made, surfaced with stone in most cases and the arteries macadamized; and a transport

section, with its workshops and inspectors, is most efficient. Ford cars are generally used for the journey through the mountains and desert to Abadan, owing to their power and lightness. We were told that the future policy is to replace all foreign makes with cars manufactured in England. I believe that to a very large extent this has now been done.

No commodity of any kind is produced in the fields; all food stuffs, wines, clothing, and other necessities of modern life have to be imported from Home or India, and brought up from the base by river, road, or rail. The stores in the fields would not disgrace any of our large wholesale stores in town. Something approaching 15,000 people have to be fed and clothed from these stores, so it may be imagined what quantity of stock has to be held. The prices were most reasonable in this out-of-the-way spot, and my chief caused no little heart-burning to our suppliers in Iraq by securing a price list from the Company's stores and comparing it with those charged to us in Baghdad. Fresh meat and vegetables are very rarely obtainable, but one heard little complaint of the monotony of subsisting on tinned foodstuffs. Anything within reason can be purchased, and the Company takes great trouble in this most important department.

All repairs to machinery are carried out in the Company's own workshops. These have been built on a very elaborate scale, and the most up-to-date machinery has been installed. Each ton of this, like everything else in the fields, has been imported from home, and carried from the base 160 miles away. In the carpenters' shop, where much of the furniture is made, we saw an interesting comparison between the methods of West and East: alongside a modern machine turning out table-legs by the dozen was an aged Persian carpenter using the identical paring tool we read of in the Bible. He told us that what was good enough for his father was good enough for him.

The 2-foot gauge railway plays an important part in the organization of the fields. On an average seven trains daily are run, carrying up 150 tons from the river-head at Dar-i-Khazina. It follows generally the bed of the Tembe river, and much care has to be taken to prevent washaways in the flood season. The Tembe river, and its tributary running through the fields, is of no advantage to the Company, as the water is too brackish; experiments have failed to purify it, so that all water has to be pumped forty miles. A new pumping-station was being erected at the northern end of the fields, and here we were shown an interesting example of practical economy. In order to carry the machinery for this station over a rocky and very steep range, it was proposed to construct a road costing many thousands of pounds, but the field manager, realizing that once the machinery was *in situ* there would be little necessity for the road, had designed and constructed a slide 2,200 feet in length, and at an angle of over 45 degrees, down the steepest

part of the range into the valley below. This cost £900, and the Company saved some £7,000.

The Company owns its own fleet of sixty-two tankers, and has constructed modern wharves on the Shatt-el-Arab which would do credit to any port.

The average daily export from Abadan is approximately 3,000,000 gallons of crude oil, kerosene, and petrol.

In the subsidiary but very important services, the Company employs a highly skilled staff of chemists and geologists with their laboratories, and a very efficient body of police for internal control. A private wireless set has been set up on which the owner has heard Big Ben strike; this is but a beginning of the great benefits which will accrue to this isolated community from modern broadcasting. Recent scientific improvements in wireless have indeed proved a boon and blessing to men working some 160 miles from any form of civilization, and one can imagine the feelings of hundreds of young men from home, many from our Universities and Public Schools, listening to the Savoy band playing the latest dance music.

The main impressions left on us were expansion; wonderful organization; capacity for hard work under trying conditions; and an overpowering smell of oil and gas.

The romance of the fields has yet to be written. The discovery of the oil, the ramifications of its winning, and the colossal industry of some 30,000 people of all races in the inaccessible wastes of Southern Persia, would fill a most interesting volume. The heat of the eight-months summer ranges between 100 and 125 degrees in the shade; the loneliness of the life, the almost total lack of social intercourse, and the absence of most of the ordinary amenities of life make work a necessity as a relief from utter boredom. They do work.

Sir LOUIS DANE: Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Ladies and Gentlemen,—You have heard a most interesting account of the Anglo-Persian oil-fields, and you have also heard a very interesting story of how the field was discovered, from the Lecturer. I think I can perhaps carry the story a little further back than 1905. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company—I dare say a good many of you have seen it at Wembley—wrote a most interesting booklet on the same subject, and it is an astonishing thing to think that on the very verge of success, in 1908, orders had actually gone out from England to stop all the boring and to remove the plant, when the first big gusher came into flow—I think it was in May or June, 1908. That was an extraordinary piece of luck for us. The discovery of the Maidan-i-Naftun was also a bit of good fortune for the British nation. Lord Curzon, in the beginning of the century, was devoting all his great ability and wonderful industry to devising some method of maintaining our interests at the head of the Gulf; I happened

to be at that time employed under him in the Foreign Department of the Government of India, and I had to saturate myself with all details connected with the Persian Gulf. In fact, we were actually compiling, from very inadequate materials, a gazetteer of the Gulf and surrounding countries which I believe, poor as it was, was of considerable use during the war. Well, in the course of working up these details, I came across in the accounts of old travellers, and also in the accounts of one or two more recent travellers, who had been sent to look about the country, references to the Maidan-i-Naftun, and the accounts that were given there struck me as being remarkably like the accounts of Baku. At the end of November, 1903, Lord Curzon, accompanied by the East Indian Squadron, made a tour to inspect our consular posts, political agencies, and stations in the Gulf. In the course of that tour we came to a place called Koweit, just at the head of the Gulf, on the western side, which was at one time considered a suitable harbour for the Baghdad railway. There was a wonderful Arab fantasia there, and we all had a very hard day, and in the evening my messenger came in to say there was a European wished to see me. It was rather an extraordinary thing to find a European there, because there were no Europeans anywhere near it. However, I naturally said, "Show him in." He brought in a Mr. Reynolds. I dare say a great many of you have heard of Mr. Reynolds, who was a great oil engineer and explorer: I am sorry to hear that he died last year in Spain. He is dead, Lord Curzon is dead; and I at the present moment am perhaps the only person who knows exactly what happened at Koweit in November, 1903. Mr. Reynolds said to me that he had been marooned at Koweit for some time, and he wanted to know if Lord Curzon would allow him to have a passage in one of the ships accompanying him across to Bushire, to catch the mail steamer for England. I said: "Why are you leaving?" He said, "Well, Mr. D'Arcy has spent a great deal of money, he is not prepared to spend any more; we have not found oil in payable quantities, and I must get home by this mail steamer." I said, "Have you ever heard of the Maidan-i-Naftun, the plain of naphtha?" He said no, he had never heard of such a place. I showed him where it was on the map, and said, "Why not go and have a look at it? You have three months' cold weather before you. It seems a thousand pities to turn up what may be an immense national benefit." At first he said, "I cannot go. I have no money; I have no caravan; I have no tools." I said, "If the Viceroy will engage to fit you out, will you go?" He said he would. I saw Lord Curzon, and Lord Curzon said he was afraid Mr. D'Arcy had lost his money, but it was worth while helping him. We made Mr. Reynolds over to the Resident in the Gulf, who gave him such assistance as he required. He went up to the Maidan-i-Naftun neighbourhood. The report he brought home in February, 1904, very much interested the

Admiralty, and much interested the Government at home through the Admiralty; and eventually I believe it led to the formation of the syndicate with Lord Strathcona and the Burma Oil Company: and that was the beginning of the exploitation that led to the finding of the first well, as I have told you, in June, 1908. It was a curious case and shows, as often happens with the British nation, that our luck helped us, in the matter of the finding of this oil, throughout. If Mr. Reynolds had left Persia at that time, and operations had been stopped, I have reason to believe that the whole of the concessions to Mr. D'Arcy over southern Persia would have lapsed, and we should never have got them back again, because shortly after that period the Persian Government were not so favourably disposed towards us.

Another point of luck occurred in 1906-7. The relations of the Company with the tribesmen have been wonderfully good, but at this period there was trouble with the Bakhtiariis. A telegram from Mr. Reynolds reached India to the effect that this tribe had come down and wounded a driller, and that, unless protection was afforded, the men were about to leave, and this was a pity as prospects were good. On the same day we heard that a fresh consular guard of twenty-five sowars had reached our new consular post at Ahwaz, and Lord Minto agreed that the old guard should be sent up to the oil-fields instead of coming to India at once. They got there within a couple of days of the attack, and the effect was magical, so that all quieted down.

The British Government were very fortunate in getting a strong British Company like the Burma Company to take up the matter. The Burma Oil Company were exceedingly fortunate in being able to depute on their behalf, as manager, Sir Charles Greenway; for there is no doubt whatever that Sir Charles Greenway's energy and perseverance have had a good deal to do with the success that has been attained in the Anglo-Persian oil-field. I am afraid I have bored you, but one never knows how long one may live, and I thought it just as well, before you left the room, that you should hear what was, I believe, the actual origin of the finding of the Maidan-i-Naftun. (Applause.)

Captain ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.: Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I think it a great privilege to have been invited to listen to a lecture which, in common I am sure with every other person, in the room, I found both interesting and instructive. We owe very grateful thanks for such a vivid and realistic account. It has served for those of us who have been to the fields as a stimulus to our memories, while for those who have not been it has created a picture which I am sure they will long remember. The Lecturer, very wisely I think, laid some stress upon the work which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company has done by means of its hospitals for the people of South-Western Persia. It is one of the Company's most remarkable achievements, and has contributed to the excellent relations that have been established and

maintained between the Company and the inhabitants of that region. It is not too much to say that the Company is not only a great business enterprise, but a great humanitarian agency in South-Western Persia (Hear, hear), and I do not think there is any Britisher who can go and see those fields who will not come back with a sense of pride that it is people of our race who have had the courage, the initiative, the energy, and the staying power to build up what is perhaps one of the greatest monuments of British industry on the whole face of the world. We are being told in these days by the voice of authority and by the voice of the postmarks on our letters every morning to buy British goods. Well, if that is the standard of achievement, we owe a great debt to those who have made it possible not only for us to buy British petrol, but for a very large measure of employment to be given directly and indirectly, through manufacture of appliances and stores of every kind, to many tens of thousands of British workmen. I hope this Company will long continue, as in the past, to prove not only a great commercial link with the Middle East, but also a link of friendship between this country and Persia. (Applause.)

Sir HARRY BRITTAN, M.P.: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, —I should like to associate myself with other speakers, more particularly with my colleague, Captain Eden, in thanking the Lecturer very sincerely for a most interesting address. I had the privilege of visiting the fields Muhammerah and Abadan a few weeks ago, and I also had the privilege of coming home with my next-door neighbour, Group Captain Board, who accompanied the Lecturer on this very tour. I should like to repeat what I have said on more than one occasion since my return from a tour of 35,000 miles round the British Empire, that this is not only the finest oil-field that I have seen, but that it is absolutely beyond all praise from the point of view of organization. You ladies and gentlemen have seen on the screen something of the God-forsaken land in which these men work, and if you hear anyone talking, as some people do, about the decadence of the British Empire, suggest that if they want a tonic they should get out to Southern Persia, and see what Englishmen and Scots in co-operation can do together. Just one little point as far as the Lecturer is concerned, if I may cavil at a statement made in the very last sentence. I admit that all those I met in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company—and more hospitable hosts one could not wish to meet—work, and work hard. But I do not think it is right to say they have nothing else to do and no relaxation. When I arrived on Christmas Day there was a very first-class race meeting taking place. I happened incidentally to spot a winner, but I was filled with admiration that people in this appalling-looking region had the pluck and energy to get up what was really a first-class show. I found in my tour round this district everything in the way of tennis, polo, athletics, even to a regatta on the miserable little pond you saw

by the first pumping-station, carried out by those who are responsible for the health of their people. I must also wholeheartedly agree with what has been said as to the progress of this great concern, in which the British Government has got one of the finest investments it ever made. There has been more than one attempt made by others to try and get this great concern out of British hands, and it was owing to the John Bull tenacity of the chairman—and his appearance will show you that he is of the John Bull type—that it is still under the Union Jack. (Applause.)

Sir CHARLES GREENWAY: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I did not come here prepared to make a speech, or even knowing what the subject of the lecture was to be. It has been extremely interesting to me to hear the lecture that has just been delivered because it brings back to my mind very forcibly the experiences I went through in 1910 and 1911, when the conditions of life were ten times less civilized than they are to-day. I would also like to express the very great pleasure I have in hearing the remarks made by Sir Louis Dane, and I can confirm to a very great extent his statement of what happened. From what the lecturer told you, you will have gathered that the Anglo-Persian Company is a wonderful institution. I do not, however, think I am entitled to claim the credit that has been attached to me in regard to it, but at the same time I am very proud indeed to have taken the part that I have done in the development of such a very important asset of the British nation. (Applause.)

Admiral RICHMOND: I think everything I had to say has been said by the people who have spoken already. But there is one point I should like to mention: it is that this great concern, the Anglo-Persian, must not be looked upon as a purely business proposition. It is of the greatest national importance. I would particularly ask people to look at it from the national point of view—not only as giving work at home, but from the point of view of imperial defence it is a matter upon which too much importance cannot be laid. The only other thing I should like to add is that when I was in Abadan last, nothing struck me more than the very great care that was taken by the Company to look after all their employees; I think it is a very satisfactory thing, for anyone who has friends or relations out there, to feel that every effort is made by the Company to make their people comfortable in every way. It is a beastly place in itself. But everything done is truly on a lavish scale, showing that the Company have the interests of their employees at heart, and are not afraid to spend money on making them comfortable. (Applause.)

Wing-Commander W. T. WYNN: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I think all we have heard to-night will leave no doubt in our minds as to the importance of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It constitutes the nucleus of our responsibilities in that part of the world

including Iraq. We have been hearing a good deal about Iraq lately, not exactly to its advantage, but we should think of Iraq as a missing link that had been missing for a good many hundred years between Europe and that part of the Middle East. I believe I am right in saying that one of the motives underlying the First Crusade was to try and reopen communications between Europe and the East, that had been closed as the result of the Turkish invasion. Well, that communication had been closed until the end of the last war and, as I said before, Iraq is a missing link between Europe and India, and if we think of the Anglo-Persian oil-fields, and all they mean to the British Empire, we ought to interest ourselves in keeping that link of communication open. (Applause.)

Mr. J. M. WILSON: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am deeply indebted to Squadron-Leader Cooper for his lecture this evening. It has revived very pleasant memories.

About three months ago, just prior to my final departure from Iraq, I paid a visit to the oil-fields. In spite of the fact that I had been almost ten years in Iraq, it was my first visit. I was immensely impressed by the engineering organization of the Company. I realize quite fully, I think, the difficulties which an engineer has to face in that part of the world, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company has undoubtedly accomplished an engineering triumph.

I went as a tourist and I was personally conducted round the fields by Mr. Wright, the Fields' Manager, who took a keen delight in showing me all the details of the work.

The very wasteful consumption of the natural gas, which has been mentioned this evening, is, so I was informed, very shortly to be avoided. It is to be reduced into some medium and transported to the refineries. This will prove a very great saving. I noticed a peculiar thing in connection with this gas: it is used for firing furnaces at a pressure of about 350 lbs. per square inch to generate steam at 120 lbs. This is a very technical point, and of course steam is being rapidly supplanted by electricity.

I may say that the whole engineering organization so impressed me that on my return to Muhammerah I wrote to my old Ministry, the Ministry of Communications and Works, and suggested that no Iraqi should be considered qualified to hold the post of Minister, particularly Minister of Communications and Works, until he has seen, and to a certain extent studied, the Anglo-Persian oil-fields.

A MEMBER: May I ask two quite short questions of the Lecturer in connection with the weather—Have you found any tendency to an increase of rainfall in that part of the world?

THE LECTURER: I am afraid I cannot answer that question; I was only in the fields about ten days in February.

THE MEMBER: It is not just idle curiosity; I have been for some

time working out a theory which I put to Sir Aurel Stein some years ago that there is a tendency now to increase of rainfall right across the desert area. If that should come it means a tremendous thing to the whole of that part of the world. We saw that they had been flooded out on the Syrian desert quite a short time ago, and a recent lecturer on Morocco suggested there was an increase of water in the Sahara. I do not know whether you could give any information on that point.

The LECTURER: I am afraid I cannot.

Sir JOHN CADMAN: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—May I add my tribute to the Lecturer for a very interesting account of a very difficult subject, and to have done it after a visit of ten days shows no mean talent for the collection of material. I should like to refer to two points of more or less technical character. Although it has been said that a certain amount of luck attended the early development of this field, I am perfectly sure that no one will go away from this room to-night thinking that the development which we have heard of is merely a matter of luck. Imagine for one moment the engineering feat that has been accomplished in harnessing the forces which have been found in this great Maidan-i-Naftun plain. Imagine a boiler some fifteen miles long, as the Lecturer said, and five miles across, containing pressure at one stage 800 lbs. to the square inch, into which a number of these snaky-looking holes are punctured—and if the Lecturer were back in Persia to-day he would see no oil and smell no gas. Imagine, too, the quantity of oil which is moving out of that field, something like 13,000 to 15,000 tons a day. To have harnessed an oil-field in that manner is no small engineering feat. Anyone who has visited oil-fields in different parts of the world, mostly controlled and carried on by foreigners, will have been struck by the dirty, slovenly appearance of the spot from which the oil is obtained. You do not see that in the Persian field. You see no oil and, as I say, you smell no gas. All you see or hear is a busy hive of industry, and this great volume of oil is belching forth down to the refineries at Abadan. There is a tremendous amount of work going on which cannot possibly come to light. I will give two instances. It has been a very difficult problem to keep a pipe from corrosion on a desert. The salts of the desert are continually attacking the metal of the pipe, and all kinds of material have been tried to coat the pipe and to prevent this corrosion. But by the application of proper scientific thought a very simple method was arranged. It was found that by cutting out a trench in which the pipe was buried, and having it open during the rainy part of the year—and for this particular purpose I hope the rainfall may increase (laughter)—the rain washed the ground during that period and removed the salt from the soil. This done, the soil is put back on the top of the pipe. Not only is corrosion prevented, but along the pipe line there grows a quite reasonable vegetation. One other phase of the

oil-field I wish to speak of, and that is the human side. It is the conversion of a fairly crude material in the form of the Persian labourer into the skilled artisan. The schools which the Company have set up have introduced a method which would be difficult to introduce into this country, I will admit; but the pay of a workman is dependent upon his capacity to pass a test, and the schools are so developed that a man passes into the school and back to the works, and by that means he can only get his increase of pay by increase of efficiency. The operations, such as boiler work, done by what appear to be quite crude natives would astonish a Scotch dockyard skilled workman. It is remarkable how these people can be got to work by proper training. It is all done by carefully thought out plan. There is no luck in producing these things. It is a carefully studied piece of work, and I was very glad to hear the reference made to Sir Charles, because his capacity for stimulating activity amongst those who work with him is stupendous.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am sure you will all wish me to thank the Lecturer again on your behalf for the very technical lecture he has given us, and the very excellent photographs and slides which have illustrated it. After what we have heard from him and from those gentlemen who have joined in the discussion I have no doubt many of us will want to go on a joy ride to this delightful spot of Maidan-i-Naftun. (Laughter.) We have seen that several Members of Parliament, who have all the world to choose from, select this spot for their cold-weather pilgrimage; also gentlemen from Baghdad, when they want a week-end holiday, go to Maidan-i-Naftun. When they go there they find excellent shows going on, races where they can back a winner—a thing we have found difficult in our own country—and in fact the amenities of civilization in such abundance that in a year or two Maidan-i-Naftun will draw people like Algiers or Egypt. We are all proud of this great outpost of civilization in the East; nothing greater has been done; it has all been done by private enterprise. As the Admiralty has told us, it is a factor, and a most important factor, in our scheme of imperial defence. We also realize that it is a great factor in the future of our trade with the East, and, not least of all, it is a great factor in the spread of British civilization and British ideas in the Middle East. On all these grounds I think we have several reasons to be proud of the work that has been done in the Anglo-Persian oil-fields, and we are deeply grateful to the Lecturer this evening for having given us such an admirable description of that great work. (Applause.)

MOSUL

By F. W. CHARDIN.

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution on January 14, when Mr. Chardin gave an illustrated lecture on the town and *vilayet* of Mosul, Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn in the Chair.

Mr. Chardin pointed out that the name "Mosul" was derived from the Arabic "Al-Mausil," and signified a junction, for this place was the natural junction of two important trade routes of the Middle East. The town itself, adjoining the Nineveh of the Assyrian Empire, in those days a great and flourishing city, is still a place of considerable importance, as it is the emporium for a wide area. The *vilayet* of Mosul is divided into two parts by the River Tigris; on the west side are rolling plains and an Arab population, to the east the foothills and mountain ranges of Kurdistan. In Mosul all the races of Mesopotamia meet together—Arabs, of whom there are roughly 166,940, Kurds (494,000), Turcomans (38,000), Christians (61,330), Jews (11,890), Yezidis (26,000). These figures do not include the Christian refugees, numbering about 11,000, who have recently fled into the town and *vilayet*. There are other small elements in the population on the plains to the east of the Tigris—Shebbakis, Badjwan, and Sarlis. For the most part the various nationalities keep their own habits and characteristics, though the Turcomans, who are probably of Seljuk descent, have adopted the Arab dress. The Christians, who are of the ancient Eastern sects, Nestorian, Jacobite, Chaldean and Syrian Uniats, are, on the whole, able, industrious, and enterprising, and a great part of the industries are in their hands. The climate of the region varies between extreme heat in summer and a considerable degree of cold in winter, but the autumn and spring are very pleasant. The fertile soil gives good crops—rice and vegetables near the river, tobacco, cotton, and fruit in the hill country, and wheat and barley on the plains. The minerals are good, and there is probably oil to be found. There is also plenty of good shooting to be had.

The lecturer then gave slides showing the town of Mosul, and sketched briefly the problems of the present and the future, the need of public security, the difficulty of finding sufficient labour for development—for the population is scanty—the need of good communications and of a railway, and he spoke of what might be expected from general favourable conditions. Finally, he ended his lecture by giving reasons

why England should hold to her obligations, and why Mosul should remain part of the Iraq kingdom.

Sir ARNOLD WILSON, who followed, said: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—With the last sentence of our lecturer's remarks, that our honour requires that we should remain in Mosul, I fancy there are few who will disagree. I notice that Lord Lamington has unfortunately left us, or perhaps we might have expected something on the opposite side from him. I hope I shall not be regarded as taking up too much of your time if I offer a few observations on that point myself. Our lecturer mentioned the Christian Churches of Mosul; he did not mention the tablet that has been erected there to the memory of twenty British officials of the Political Department who were killed on that frontier during four years. There might have been another monument, and I hope there will be some day, to the thousand or more British and Indian soldiers who lost their lives in the capture and occupation of Mosul and its *vilayet*. We ought not to forget them. All we have left now in the Mosul *vilayet* are our honour and the international obligations we have assumed. We are not there for what we can get out of it. It is very difficult to foresee what the present Turkish Ministry will do at any given moment; but of one thing I am perfectly certain, that but for the tactics of the Beaverbrook press in this country the Turks would long ago have accepted the inevitable, and would have realized that the British Government meant what it said. (Applause.) The longer I live the more I am convinced that our avowed enemies do us very little harm. It is we who cause our own damnation and seek our own downfall by a lack of unity and by a passion for self-depreciation and self-examination which, whilst very suitable for a private individual in the conduct of his domestic business, is less satisfactory when applied to international politics. (Applause.) We are not in Mosul for oil, and I do not think it is unfair to say we never have been. One only has to look at the map to realize that oil is not, and never was, the prime factor in our view of Mesopotamia. I do not say that other countries have never cast envious eyes on the oil-fields of Mosul, but the British Government knows more about these things than most, and has at no time held these views. Wretched as the Government is, according to some newspapers, it is still the best in the world, and better qualified than any other Government I know of to express a reasoned and sound opinion on a matter of this sort, more particularly with regard to its strategical aspects. If there is oil in Mesopotamia it will inure to the benefit of the Iraq Government and we hope that Government will derive a revenue from it. But I am convinced that the principal riches of Iraq will be always agricultural, derived from the industry of its own people and the wealth of its own lands and rivers. There is no question whatever, to my mind, that we should remain in Mosul.

I was convinced of that some months before the occupation, and have never changed my views. We have to regard our position there as that of trustees, not merely for the Arab nation who live there, but for Europe, and, indeed, for all those nations of Europe and Asia who accept our ideas of civilization and do not agree with those of Russia. The real problem to-day is the division of the world into two great camps: those who come under the influence of Russia, and those who remain outside the influence of Russia. The Russians may or may not succeed in converting willingly other nations to their point of view. I think myself it is doubtful whether they will effect any further conversions. Of one thing I am quite sure, that the European nations, and those great nations of the East, Japan, China, Persia, India and Arabia, are far too firmly attached to the individualistic ideal, to the rights of property and the right of an individual to his own religion and his own way of life, to accept Bolshevism or the system of the Soviet republics willingly. But unless we remain in Mesopotamia we shall have no means of preventing the extension southwards of the Soviet Socialist system of republics. The U.S.S.R. are not without influence in Turkey. They are strategically in a strong position in Persia, although the Persian Government is most decidedly not under their influence. The Arabs have had a civilization always highly individualistic. They have never been able to form an empire yet for any length of time, because they have always split up into small groups. Iraq is by far the most successful of all the Arab empires of the present day; there is more unity in Iraq than I have seen in any other part of Arabia. I visited it a few weeks ago, and was astonished at the degree of unity which the country had attained. The old divisions between Sunni and Shia, Kurd and Arab, Arab and Persian, are beginning to fade. The Iraqi is beginning to regard himself as a member of a nation, rather than of a town or a tribe. King Faisal has done extraordinarily well; he has helped greatly to unite the Iraqis and make them sink petty differences and religious differences. He is well qualified to do so, and it is our bounden duty to see the work through to which we set our hand, not in 1920 or 1918, but in 1917, when we captured Baghdad. General Maude's proclamation has not been forgotten. The Iraqis will regard us in twenty-five years' time more favourably than they regard us now, just as they regard us far more favourably now than six years ago. Our honour and interests alike demand that we should remain in Iraq, and the League of Nations, to whom we have committed ourselves, would receive the severest blow that I can possibly imagine if we failed to-day to give effect to the undertakings which we have formally made *vis-à-vis* that body. (Applause.)

In conclusion Major Bovill showed slides of the Mosul frontier which had been kindly lent by the Air Ministry, and the meeting closed with a vote of thanks to the lecturer.

COLONEL LAWRENCE'S MANUSCRIPT

COLONEL LAWRENCE's book is an unknown quantity, and he apparently desires that it should remain so. By the courtesy of Dr. Cowley, Bodley's Librarian, I have been enabled to read this extraordinarily interesting work. The book is in manuscript, containing about 420 pages, which are divided into ten books comprising 139 chapters. The first nine chapters form the introduction, and there is an epilogue to finish up with. It would appear that Colonel Lawrence wrote his book first of all for publication but afterwards changed his mind, and throughout the manuscript changed the present into the past tense as though to write for the future. He made, when handing over the book to Dr. Cowley, the stipulation that no extracts were to be made from it, and that none of it was to be published; but that it might be read. It was to remain locked up, and in the Librarian's personal charge. In commenting, therefore, upon the book, a proper interpretation of these conditions operates at present against any proper account of it being written, and only a general description can of necessity be embarked upon. In course of time the conditions may lapse, but by then, perhaps, interest in the book may have passed away.

In the December number of *Blackwood*, Edmund Candler wrote a laudatory and most interesting article about the book. From his description it might be inferred that he read it at the Bodleian. But I am confidently informed that this was not the case. Apparently, therefore, he read another copy, which I gather is in the hands of a famous "Arabian" who was associated with Colonel Lawrence in the Arab campaign of 1917-1918. As the writer in *Blackwood* quoted extensively from the text, it appears that he was not bound by the conditions placed upon reading the Bodleian copy.

In the early part of the book, Arab history, conditions, and aspirations are discussed by a master, whose knowledge of everything pertaining to the Arabs is profound. He writes with all the sensitiveness and understanding of an enthusiastic sympathizer against Turkish misrule, and his championship of those whom he learnt to love explains the affection and respect in which they held him, and the power which he undoubtedly exercised over them. His knowledge of their language, customs, and religion, and his sympathy, were the twin rocks upon which he stood. Lawrence shows himself to have been unused to and to dislike forms and ceremony, and in this he is completely at one with the democratic Arab. He shows himself, perhaps, rather too impatient

with regard to those with whom he worked, who had, of course, generally to observe these restrictions upon freedom of action. Warfare against the Turks could not possibly be waged by an army of freebooters alone. But he speaks with gratitude and with understanding of many who laboured with him to make the Arab movement in the Hejaz a most valuable asset for the Allied cause during the Great War. It is common knowledge that he seldom saw eye to eye with those responsible for the campaign in Palestine, and in his book Lawrence does not hesitate to enlarge upon this. It may, indeed, explain his desire that the book be not published. It is so interestingly and excellently written, and in such epic terms, that it could not but create a considerable sensation if published; but before publication it would need to be pruned, and in this process much that is interesting and enlightening would have to go.

After the somewhat lengthy introduction, the remainder of the book deals with Lawrence's and the Arabs' part in the Palestine and Hejaz campaign.

Whether he was right in his ideas as regards the elasticity of the methods of conducting the campaign so far as the Arabs were concerned, it is difficult to say. He suggests that, if the Arabs in Mesopotamia had been handled properly, they would have been actively friendly for us against the Turks and would have duplicated those activities in Palestine and Syria which contributed so greatly to the general overthrow of Turkish rule. But the Arab of the Marshes in Mesopotamia is an entirely different person from the Arab of the Hejaz, Transjordan, and Yemen. And it must be remembered that the greatest cruelties inflicted upon the capitulated garrison of Kut were done by Arab troops. The Turks were themselves guilty of negligence and unconcern rather than of active cruelty. For the rest, the Mesopotamian Arab was a vulture who plundered and practised his native cruelty upon British, Indian, and Turk indifferently.

Much of the book is given up to descriptions of the captures of various Hejaz towns and garrisons, destructions of railways and trains, and all the other methods by which Turkish rule in the Hejaz was early made impossible. It can be contested that it is easy enough to blow up a train and beleaguer a small garrison. This may be so. But the descriptions of these deeds as written by Lawrence make them most interesting reading and portray a picture of movement and action which it is impossible not to read with avidity. The way in which many stirring incidents are described is vivid in the extreme. There is no doubt that the cumulative effect of these pinpricks was considerable, and that they helped materially to weaken Turkish morale and resistance. Now and again the author is too prolix, and he enters too much into unnecessary detail. He is introspective, sometimes almost to the point of weariness, but his book is a human document, of interest both

as a psychological study and as a historical record. There is unfortunately throughout the work a general absence of dates, which is sometimes a disadvantage.

Colonel Lawrence, although a student rather than a soldier, evidently possesses a very thorough knowledge of military history. He disclaims being considered a soldier, and yet his military descriptions are in themselves professional. Besides showing himself to have been an irregular leader of the highest order, Lawrence in his book proves himself to have been no mean diplomat. It is well known that our allies did not wholly approve of our methods with regard to the Arabs. The political aspect with them often predominated over military necessity, and their alarm at and distrust of our intentions often tended to add to Lawrence's difficulties. As he himself might have said, if each man wrote his own despatches, rewards would be extremely numerous. But he describes unaffectedly the way in which he met intrigue. It was simple and convincing. There was intrigue also on the Arab side, and the manner in which Lawrence led his irregular but united army into Damascus is sufficient evidence, for those who know the Arab, of diplomatic ability beyond the average.

It is not generally known that for some time Lawrence was in effect a prisoner at Deraa, whither he went himself to spy out the land. His identity was unknown, but he suffered a brutal flogging at the orders of a Turkish Bey for reasons which it is unnecessary to enlarge upon. From his treatment on this occasion he took long to recover. One of the most amazing things about Lawrence's conduct of his campaign was that his enthusiasm remained undimmed by hardship and ill-health and that his sufferings must at times have been intense. To appreciate fully what he did, this fact also must be appreciated: After he was instrumental in blowing up Jemal Pasha's train a price of £20,000 was offered by the Turks for him as a live captive, and £10,000 as a dead one. As the usual price for a British officer paid by the Turks was £100, one can gauge what an instrument they considered that he was against them.

Of the strategy in the Arab campaign there may be two opinions. Lawrence was in favour of allowing the Turks to retain their posts, scattered and difficult to provision as they were, for as long as they could. He favoured a national rebellion rather than isolated military action. Military ideas were, perhaps naturally, against this, but it is questionable whether the speedy capture of all the Turkish forces in the Hejaz would not probably have rendered Arab enthusiasm a little weaker before the final advance to Damascus took place. There is no value in flogging a dead horse, and to discuss such controversies is useful only for students of strategy in war. But this at least may be said, that the Arab is not in our sense of the word a soldier. Defeat depresses him, and one definite military victory against him might

have rendered him sullenly defiant instead of actively hostile to the Turks.

Lawrence was among the first to enter Damascus in 1918. He found the town in a state of indescribable confusion. The Turks left no rule or order behind them, and a temporary system of government for the place had to be improvised. The number of Turkish wounded and sick made part of the town a shambles, and the author describes in detail the steps taken to avert the danger of pestilence. Doubtless much more was done than he describes, but he undoubtedly took the first steps to reduce municipal order out of chaos while the military command were directing their energies towards reorganization and further advance of the army.

Lawrence must for all time, despite his critics, go down to history as a very considerable factor in the defeat of the Turks in Palestine and Syria during the Great War. His book as a record of his achievements will also go down to history, and it is much to be regretted that he has decided not to publish it, and has placed such restrictions as he has done upon the use of it.

A perusal of this book makes the reader feel that Mr. Lowell Thomas's eulogy was not overdrawn.

REVIEWS

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE CHINESE REPUBLIC. By H. G. Woodhead. London : Hurst and Blackett. 15s.

Mr. Woodhead has written a useful book. At a time when Senator Borah and other American politicians and many American missionaries are encouraging hot-headed youths in China to think that all their troubles are due to unequal treaties and foreign interference, it is important that the other side of the case should be presented; and Mr. Woodhead, as an experienced journalist with long knowledge of China, presents it very effectively. His descriptions of the present condition of the railways, and of the country generally, appear to be in no way exaggerated.

The chapter about extraterritoriality is particularly valuable. In the conditions now existing in China, some transitional arrangement of the nature suggested by Mr. Woodhead will have to be introduced before British subjects can be left to the mercies of Chinese courts in criminal cases; though, personally, I think that every foreigner residing in China may fairly be asked to make some reasonable contribution to the revenue of the country.

The case against any sudden abolition of extraterritoriality is even stronger than Mr. Woodhead has made it. He says that, in Chinese law, the punishment for manslaughter is strangulation. It should have been added that manslaughter in Chinese eyes includes what we should call justifiable homicide. The Chinese Criminal Code—the Ta Ching Lu Li—is, in some respects, a very remarkable work; but the law of homicide was flagrantly unjust, and the full measure of its injustice has been overlooked by some foreign writers. In an Imperial Edict, which was communicated in 1822 to the servants of the East India Company, it was said to be "the fixed law of the Celestial Empire that, in fighting with each other, whoever kills a man shall be sentenced to forfeit his life, without at all regarding whether he moved his hand first or last." This edict appears to describe quite correctly Chinese law, as set forth in the Ta Ching Lu Li. The right of self-defence was, in fact, not recognized.

I do not know how the matter has been dealt with in the Code which has been recently drafted in Peking, but the law above stated is deeply ingrained in the Chinese mind, and it is the law that we must expect will be administered by Chinese courts in the interior of the country. Causing death by accident was, by Chinese law, punishable with a fine; but from cases that occurred at Canton, before extraterritoriality was conceded, it is clear that a plea of accident would be very sparingly admitted. In a country full of badly-paid and badly-disciplined soldiers, affrays are precisely the cases in which foreigners are liable to be involved, however well conducted they may be.

It is also important to note that extraterritoriality, except in homicide cases, was voluntarily conceded by the Chinese themselves. In an Imperial Edict, issued in 1808, this was stated very clearly. "In all cases," it was said, "of offences by contrivance, design, or in affrays happening between foreigners and natives, whereby such foreigners are liable, according to law, to suffer death by being strangled," the magistrate of the district was to enquire into the case, and report his finding to the Governor or Deputy-Governor for confirmation; and if

the finding was confirmed, he was to take the offender to execution in conjunction with the chief of the nation concerned. "In all other instances," it was said, "of offences committed under what the law declares to be palliating circumstances, the offender shall be sent away to be punished by his countrymen in his own country."

I think, however, that the title of the book claims too much, and that Mr. Woodhead has not told the whole truth about China under the Republic. The picture painted is too black. I am unable to say how far the account of the progress of education in the past decade, which was given by a special correspondent of the *Observer* of January 3, is strictly accurate; but I think it may be accepted that considerable progress has been made, and Mr. Woodhead makes no reference to this. In at least two matters also, which are within my knowledge, the Chinese, since 1911, have displayed considerable administrative capacity. Mr. Woodhead says that the Salt Revenue in China was placed under foreign supervision after the conclusion of the Reorganization Loan of 1913. This statement is only partially correct. It was provided in the Loan Agreement that the taxes on salt were to be collected by District Inspectorates, established in the producing districts, and that the revenue collected was to be lodged in the foreign banks which provided the loan or in depositories approved by those banks. The District Inspectorates were in charge of a Chinese District Inspector and a Foreign District Inspector, and were subordinate to a Chief Inspectorate, which was to be established in the Chinese Salt Administration at Peking. This also was to be in charge of a Chinese Chief Inspector and a Foreign Chief Inspector: but the Loan Agreement left it open to the Chinese Government to adopt any system of Salt Revenue administration it might think proper. The bulk of the Chinese Salt Revenue in 1913 was derived from taxes, levied at the time of sale in the districts of consumption, on salt transported by direct Government agency or by privileged monopolists, and it was the declared policy of the Chinese to extend this system. This policy was so far recognized in the Loan Agreement that 7,000,000 dollars were provided as capital for the purchase and transportation of salt, and 5,000,000 dollars for advances to salt merchants. The District Inspectors in the producing districts could not collect revenue in the consuming districts, and the provisions of the Loan Agreement, drastic though they were in some respects, did not fit the facts. The result was a deadlock, and for some months nothing was done. The Chinese were pressed by the Bankers and by the Ministers of the Powers concerned to give effect to the Agreement; and I succeeded in persuading them to discard the system of Government transportation, which was unsuited to China, and to collect the greater part of their Salt Revenue through the District Inspectorates by a single direct duty on salt when removed from the salt works or from depots, established at suitable places for the convenience of traders. In the District Inspectorates, which at no time exceeded thirteen in number, the Foreign District Inspector was the only foreigner employed, though foreigners rendered very valuable assistance in connection with the weight and issue of salt; and some foreigners were necessarily employed in the Chief Inspectorate, where the volume of correspondence and accounts was enormous. The Chinese Chief Inspector was also the Head of the Central Salt Administration, and the Foreign Chief Inspector acted as Adviser of the Administration. All administrative measures, agreed upon by my Chinese colleagues and myself, which did not fall within the scope of the duties of the District Inspectorates, were carried through by the Central Salt Administration, which conducted all correspondence with the Salt Commissioners and with the Provincial Governments which had formerly controlled salt administration.

It was strenuous work, but in two years an efficient administration, on the new lines, was substituted for the administration formerly conducted by the Provincial Governments in every province of China, except Kwangsi, and a net revenue of 69,000,000 dollars was paid into the foreign banks in 1915. The administration was imperialized as well as reorganized. The total number of foreigners employed in connection with the reorganization was about forty. Nearly all of them did excellent work, but to ascribe to the foreigners the whole credit for what was done is most unfair to the Chinese, and also to the foreigners employed, as it makes them responsible for abuses they were powerless to prevent. Wealthy and influential holders of monopolies for the sale of salt were allowed to make large and unnecessary increases to the sale prices, which more than recompensed them for the increase of taxation imposed by the Government, and the poor consumers of salt suffered. If these monopolies could have been abolished, the Government would have got more revenue, and the people would have got better and cheaper salt; but this reform was found to be impracticable.

The system of collection was good, and cases of defalcation and embezzlement were very rare. In a few cases Chinese members of the staff were involved in cases in the courts; and what I saw of the working of these courts certainly did not impress me favourably.

Owing to the loss of authority of the Central Government, the fabric is collapsing, and the provincial and military authorities are appropriating the revenue; but even in 1925 the Central Government received from salt the substantial revenue of 82,000,000 dollars.

In India it was decided by the Government, after full enquiry, that the salt administration of the whole country could not be conducted by one office. The reorganization, notwithstanding its defects, was, therefore, a remarkable administrative achievement.

The suppression of poppy cultivation throughout China, except in outlying localities, occupied by Lolos and other tribesmen, was also a noteworthy administrative achievement. Personally, I think the driving-power behind the campaign of prohibition was the desire to get rid of foreign opium. But, whatever may have been the motive, the results were amazing. Recalcitrant farmers who tried to prevent the destruction of their crops were freely shot, and, for a time, poppy cultivation practically ceased to exist. When, early in 1915, I passed through Yunnan, (where opium was produced in large quantities before opium from Bengal reached Canton), and Szechuan, where opium was produced in enormous quantities, I saw no poppy. Many Chinese are genuinely opposed to opium; but in 1906-15, as in 1889, it was the connection of the foreigner with the drug that made it so particularly obnoxious. Now that it is a domestic matter, it is doubtful if prevention will ever be again prosecuted with the same pertinacity.

Sufficient credit, also, has not been allowed to the Chinese Government, by Mr. Woodhead, for the attempts made to reform the currency in 1913-15. When I arrived in China in June, 1913, the Chinese Government was trying to establish a dollar currency. The foreign banks were not taking much notice of their efforts, but I found, in the course of my travels, that in places (notably Canton) a dollar currency was effectively established, and that in the interior in many places, whatever preliminary juggling might be gone through with taels of various denominations, when money actually changed hands it did so in dollars and dollar or tael notes. In all my wanderings in China only in the extreme north-west did I actually have to use weighed silver as coinage.

From the outset the salt tax was assessed in dollars and collected in dollars, any loss sustained, owing to a local dollar being of somewhat less value than a

national dollar, being simply ignored. In 1915 I believe that, with adequate foreign support, taels might have been superseded. But the Maritime Customs Department was entrenched behind the Haikwan tael, and the foreign banks were not willing to sacrifice the profits they were making on the interport exchanges, and nothing was done.

I agree with Mr. Woodhead that the present outbreak of anti-foreign, and especially of anti-British, feeling is mainly due to Soviet propaganda, but this propaganda would not have been so successful if the propagandists had not had material to work on. As Mr. Woodhead says, the support given by Great Britain and the other Allies to Japanese schemes of aggression, both during the war and at the Peace Conference in Paris, caused great indignation among the Chinese. The British, also, were in no hurry to forgo the Tariff advantages they had secured as the result of the wars between Great Britain and China.

In the post-war conditions of the world, when Indians have been permitted to impose 33 per cent. *ad valorem* duties on British goods, some increase of the 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duties, especially upon articles such as wines and tobacco, might well have been conceded to China, without making the enhancement dependent upon the abolition of *likin*.

In other matters, also, Britons have hardly been as careful as they might have been to treat China with the "regard due to a great country." The International Settlement of Shanghai has been developed mainly by British money and British brains, and it is still so predominantly British that the Chinese, not unnaturally, hold the British responsible for any grievances that they may have in regard to the municipal administration. For the reasons given by Mr. Woodhead, I think the reservation, for the exclusive use of foreigners, of the limited area included in the public parts is justifiable. But the assumption by the Foreign Consuls and the Municipal Council of jurisdiction, even in cases occurring among themselves, over Chinese residing in the Settlement, which is what the retention of the Mixed Court against Chinese wishes amounts to, was an affront to Chinese sentiment, and does not appear to have been necessary for the protection of foreign interests. The construction, without permission, of roads outside the limits of the Settlement, and the refusal to grant even a limited representation on the Municipal Council to leading Chinese citizens, were also resented.

The Maritime Customs Department is a fine service, and has maintained the financial credit of China throughout all her difficulties; but it seems a pity that more was not done, when the matter was entirely in British hands, to conciliate Chinese sentiment by the promotion of Chinese of capacity and honesty to the higher administrative grades. Such men were to be found in China in 1918. In many of the Salt District Inspectorates the Chinese District Inspector was the man who did most of the work: and it must have been very galling to the Chinese to see that a foreigner of almost any nationality was good enough to be a Deputy-Commissioner and Commissioner of Customs, and that Chinese only were barred.

These grievances are, of course, in no way responsible for the present deplorable state of affairs in China, though they may have helped to accentuate the bitterness caused by the unfortunate shooting incident at Shanghai on May 30. The Chinese themselves have created the misrule and the disorder from which they are suffering, and they alone can put things right. It certainly is doubtful if the Republican form of government is suitable for China or for any other Oriental country, but it must not be forgotten that China has always been subject to periodic violent upheavals. When such a large proportion of the popu-

lation is at starvation's edge, these upheavals are not surprising. The present disturbances are child's play compared with the appalling massacres that occurred during the Taiping rebellion in the middle of the past century. Fierce rebellions, ruthlessly suppressed, also occurred under the Manchus in Yunnan, Kansu, and Shensi, and the conquest of China by the Manchus was facilitated by a rebellion against the Chinese dynasty which preceded them. Firm action at Canton for the protection of British interests would appear to be justified, but for the rest of China a policy of benevolent neutrality appears to be the only policy which Great Britain can pursue.

PEKING TO LHASA: THE NARRATIVE OF JOURNEYS IN THE CHINESE EMPIRE MADE BY THE LATE BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE PEREIRA. Compiled by SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND. Constable. 18s. net.

It may safely be claimed for the late Brigadier-General Pereira that he had a more extensive knowledge of the physical characteristics of the Chinese Empire than any other living man. Possessed of an inborn passion for travel, he conceived the idea, when he was appointed Military Attaché at Peking in 1905, of visiting every one of the 175 departmental capitals (*i.e.*, *Fu* cities) of China, and to the methodical accomplishment of this tremendous task he devoted all his spare time and energy during the next seven or eight years. He had previously acquired a useful knowledge of the Chinese language, and, what is almost equally important, of native etiquette, whilst serving with the Chinese regiment at Wei-hai-wei in 1900, and these accomplishments, combined with his tact and charm of manner, secured him the friendly assistance of the officials and immunity from serious trouble during his subsequent wanderings. The Great War recalled him to Europe; but he returned to China in 1920 dominated by a desire to follow in the footsteps of the intrepid Abbé Hue, who, with his companion Gabet, penetrated Tibet and entered Lhasa from the east in 1846. Since that date many travellers of various nationalities had tried without success to reach "The Seat of Divine Intelligence" from the same direction. Pereira hoped for better luck!

We see him, then, at the beginning of the present narrative, setting out from Peking in February, 1921, across the dreary, famine-stricken plains of Chihli on his long trek westward, never failing, however tiring the day's march, to write up his diary; and, as these entries include not only the record of his own experiences but unusual bits of information gleaned from all and sundry, they form most fascinating reading. Of conditions in the interior of China he draws a sad picture. Time and again he refers to the terrorization of the people by the soldiery, who, underpaid or not paid at all, loot to live; whilst on not a few occasions he was asked by the officials to make considerable detours, because the route he would have chosen lay through brigand-infested areas. From Chengtu, where he arrived at the end of May, he made two expeditions not included in his original plan—one to Mount Omei, the other into the wild, hilly region of Western Szechuan. His object in the latter case was to bag a "great panda," a rare species of bear; but, though he reached a height of over 12,000 feet by very rough, uneven trails, and came across traces of pandar, takin and serow, he failed in his particular quest.

Reaching Tachienlu on December 26, Pereira changed his direction and made a detour of several hundred miles north to Lanchow, and thence to Tangar, where he received the dispiriting news from Peking that the Government of India had refused to obtain a pass for him from the Tibetan authorities. His hopes were further shaken by his meeting with the Danish traveller Sorensen,

who had tried to reach Lhasa but had been turned back. Nevertheless, "hoping for the best yet almost expecting the worst," he completed his preparations for the final plunge into Tibet, and on May 11 continued his journey. A fortnight later, from a plain below the Chida Pass, he saw the great mountain Amné Machin, which rumour says is higher than Mount Everest. He describes it as towering above everything else in its snow-clad grandeur, and well over 25,000 feet. This giant peak, or the range to which it belongs, is mentioned by Filchner and Tafel amongst other modern travellers. They saw it from the south, but it is doubtful if they got any nearer to it than Pereira, and the whole of that region would appear to offer rich possibilities for further exploration.

On July 28 Pereira reached Chamdo, the crucial point of his journey, for its continuation thence depended on the goodwill of the Tibetan authorities. This he was fortunate enough to secure in very tangible form—a letter from the Kalon at Lhasa inviting him thither—and on September 6 he started in high spirits on his last lap of 670 miles. Of the four great passes that lay before him, the Shiar-güing La, 16,528 feet, bears the worst reputation amongst the Chinese and Tibetans, and Huc, who crossed it in winter, testifies graphically to its terrors. Pereira, however, found the Nur-güing La much the more difficult of the two. The descent, in particular, over "a veritable sea of boulders, rocks and stones," he describes as appalling, and it is plain that he was beginning to feel the strain of his long journey. On October 2 the climb to the top of the Banda Pass "made him gasp, and when he rode he shivered badly." Yet he had spirit enough to note humorously in his diary that his boy had brought two cocks from Chamdo, "not for eating, but to call him in the morning as he had no watch!"

Pereira reached his goal on October 17, 1922, "the only white man living," as his diary records, "who has been from Peking to Lhasa direct." He was received by the Dalai Lama, and invited by the Tsarong Shapé, the Commander-in-Chief, to inspect the troops. He notes that the rifles, khaki and equipment were all of British pattern, and the words of command in English.

From Lhasa, Pereira crossed the Himalayas to India. But he had overtaxed his strength, and at Calcutta had to enter a nursing-home to rest his leg. Yet, no sooner was he all right again than he forgot all the discomforts he had suffered, and set off once more for China, this time by way of Rangoon and Bhamo. Crossing Yunnan by the ordinary trade route through Yunnanfu as far as Chaotung, he made separate excursions from that city into the Miao and Nosu (Lolo) countries, after which he continued to the Yangtse, taking boat at Mayissu for Suifu, and so down to Hankow and Shanghai, reaching the latter place on May 13, 1923.

His thirst for travel unassuaged, Pereira allowed himself no rest, but started again for that snow-covered, wind-swept land which only a few short months before he had declared he never wished to see again. This time his objective was Lanchow, which he hoped to reach from the south, through Batang and Kantze. Leaving Hongkong on June 9, he proceeded to Haiphong, and thence by rail through Tonkin to Yunnanfu, where he was joined by Dr. H. Gordon Thompson. No one travels in Yunnan during the summer if it can be avoided, and it is scarcely surprising that the party experienced difficulty in obtaining transport. From June to September the monsoon rains rarely cease, and the roads—never good—deteriorate into quagmires. Pereira remarks on the swollen state of the Yangtse, when he crossed it by a suspension bridge near Tzuliu on August 7. It was "a wild tumult of rushing rapids . . . not even the Ngom Chu and other rivers in Tibet when in abnormal flood could equal it." He had never seen such a mighty torrent.

Arriving at Batang on September 21, Pereira, with the most strenuous part of the journey before him, found the whole countryside in a state of disorder, and the officials unwilling that he should proceed. This difficulty, however, he overcame, and, having procured two small tents to shelter his party at night, left Batang on October 5, making for the Ta So Shan divide, 15,610 feet. Bitterly cold and snowy weather was experienced, and Pereira, who had been ailing for weeks, felt seedy and wretched. On October 19 he suddenly collapsed, and was brought with difficulty into Kantze, where, early next morning, his frail body exhausted by the fatigue of continuous travel, he passed peacefully away.

Sir Francis Younghusband has performed the task entrusted to him with sympathy and restraint. He has allowed Pereira's own words to tell this tale, and the result is a book of singular charm—a book to settle down with before a blazing fire on a cold night, even as Pereira himself had visions of doing with his memories of dangers and difficulties faced and overcome. This for him was not to be. But who shall say that Providence (to Whom his diary more than once records his gratitude) did not continue to deal kindly with George Pereira in ordaining that he should never know the tediousness and infirmities of old age, but should pass on straight from his beloved strange places, leaving behind the memory of an unassuming, gallant traveller and very perfect gentleman.

F. W. O.

IN THE HEART OF ASIA. By Lieut.-Colonel P. T. Etherton. London: Constable and Co. 9 x 6 $\frac{1}{2}$. 805 pp. 16s.

Colonel Etherton has every qualification wherewith to give us a first-class book on the affairs of Chinese Turkistan, otherwise known as Sin-Kiang. In fact, as regards matters which occurred there between 1918 and 1923, no one should be better able to enlighten us. The book opens with a pleasantly written description, full of information, of a journey through Kanjut, Sarikol, and the Gez valley to Kashgar. This was done as a member of our mission to Turkistan, which was despatched to counter the German threats against India in the spring of 1918. The author then has a great deal to tell us about the people and customs of Kashgaria itself. He includes an amusing description of the régime under Ma-Ti-Tai, the brigand-General who tyrannized over the country for a number of years until his deposition and decapitation in 1925. Colonel Etherton naturally has much to say about the infiltration of the Bolsheviks into Chinese Turkistan, regarded as a stepping-stone to India. This is especially interesting at present, as it illustrates how, in foreign politics in Asia, Moscow's activities are merely a more rigorous continuation of those of imperial Russia, executed, however, with unclean and insidious means such as imperial officials (even Consul Petrovsk) would not have deigned to use. Picturesque vignettes flit through the pages; incidents of doings in Ma-Ti-Tai's harem alternating with a page about the Swedish Mission or another about ancient conquests.

Political activity and the repercussions of wild struggles did not cease with the Armistice. Kashgar heard of the massacre of the Romanoffs, and was reached by ripples from the Afghan war and by the rise and fall of opium smuggling, in which the Bolsheviks took a hand. The downfall of Bokhara is authoritatively described, together with the origins and progress of the Basmachi insurrection.

Colonel Etherton gives it as his opinion that in the spring of 1919 Russian Turkistan was ours for the taking, being at the mercy of the three companies of the 19th Punjab and two squadrons of the 28th Light Cavalry, who had pushed the Red armies back nearly to the Oxus. Few who know the facts will be bold

enough to disagree with this, and the next few years will show us what our withdrawal and our abandonment of the loyal Turkoman has cost us. The author very truly tells us that though Moscow values Turkistan as a granary, it sets still more store by the country, viewed as a stepping-stone for subversive movements against British power in Asia. Besides this, he gives us a useful sketch of the history of Chinese Turkistan during the last century, and one from which there is a good deal to learn of present interest. His sidelights on the diplomatic and administrative methods by which China has so far maintained her very precarious hold on the New Dominion should not be missed by those who are seeking a solution of the Chinese riddle. The author's little sketches, sometimes humorous but more often tragic, of Chinese methods of procedure are not uninteresting, especially when one remembers that in Sin-Kiang the Chinese were ruling an alien race before the time of King Egbert. One cannot help regretting that Colonel Etherton does not put forward some definite practical plan for staying the Bolshevik tide in Asia, but perhaps this might be considered to be outside the scope of such a work. Briefly, it is a book which, when read with discrimination, will be of the greatest service to every student of Mid-Asiatic politics and of Russia's ceaseless and relentless advance against our Asiatic frontiers.

L. S. V. B.

THRO' THE GATES OF MEMORY: FROM THE BOSPHORUS TO BAGHDAD. By Betty Cunliffe Owen. Messrs. Hutchinson and Co. 21s.

This is a book of travel of the lighter order. It makes no pretence to being a work of either a scientific or geographical nature, but has a slight historical interest in that Mrs. Cunliffe Owen is able to give us thumbnail sketches of life in pre-war Constantinople and later on in Iraq.

Part I. deals with Turkey just before the war. We see Constantinople struggling to recover from the Balkan Wars of 1913, the ascendancy of the Germans becoming more and more marked, then the murder of the Archduke, the outbreak of war between the Great Powers, and finally Turkey's entrance into the war on the side of Germany. It is just a series of sketches of everyday life.

Part II. deals with post-war Iraq and gives a good picture of that country during the unsettled period which followed the war. Mrs. Cunliffe Owen gives a graphic account of the camp at Baqubah, where her husband was in command of the camp for refugee Assyrians and Armenians. It is a piece of work done by the British which is too little known, except by those who were directly or indirectly connected with it, and it is as well that it should have been brought before a wider public. If anything the difficulties and discomforts are underestimated. We see under what trying conditions the work of assisting less fortunate people is carried out, how uncomplainingly and cheerfully, and with no attempt at obtaining personal kudos. The life at the Persian hill station is well depicted, and the unassuming bravery of English women comes plainly to the fore. We have also an exceedingly vivid description of the attempted repatriation of the hill portion of the Assyrians from Mosul, and of life there in disturbed times. All that pertains to the life of the people is always of value.

But the whole book would have gained enormously had it been written in a less exclamatory and colloquial style; the style is not equal to the interest of the story Mrs. Cunliffe Owen has to tell, and whilst we can well believe that it was a great gain to the little group of British officers in Mosul to have so charming and sympathetic a lady in their midst, we can hardly believe that they

would care about her having "even for a fugitive moment ironed a crease or two out of puckered foreheads."

The poetry, too, is hardly up to the standard which one expects to find in a book of this nature. The illustrations are quite excellent and give a good idea of the country and places.

C. J. S.

FOUR CENTURIES OF MODERN IRAQ. By Stephen Helmsley Longrigg. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 21s.

The history of Baghdad in modern times has been strangely neglected. Whilst archaeologists have been delving in the soil for the relics of a remote antiquity, and Arabists have devoted themselves with considerable zeal to the study of mediæval Baghdad, the period which lies between A.D. 1500 and 1900 has not attracted any serious historical study. The difficulty of the task, and the dull, hard labour it entails, might well alarm and discourage any writer, for the sources entail reference to Arabic, Turkish, and Persian manuscripts and printed books, and to scattered references in books of travel which have appeared in half a dozen European languages. Yet British soldiers and administrators engaged in Iraq were bound some time to make good this deficiency in our historical knowledge. That Mr. Longrigg has been at exceptional pains to master the sources is proved by the important Appendix I. to his book, which cannot be too highly praised; and the result of his labour has been a history which will always remain a standard work. Very few pioneers—and Mr. Longrigg is a notable pioneer not only in his subject but in his strictly scientific method—can claim so much.

The story, which is told in good English, strict in its accuracy and undefiled by meaningless figures, is, it must be confessed, a dull one. It is concerned with the exploits of a few ambitious, sometimes stupid, rascals to control in their own interest, with or without the consent of the nominal overlord, a few cities long corrupted by intrigue and quite incapable of fidelity, and to preserve some semblance of order amongst the peasants, continually stirred to revolt and internecine strife by the sheikhly families. In all these four centuries there appears only one man who claims unstinted praise from Mr. Longrigg's pen, Uthman Pasha the Lame, the conqueror and victim of Nadir Quli; others, Salim, Sulaiman, Daud, who occupy some space in the narrative, receive the censure their defects of character warrant. But if the enthusiasm evoked by personal admiration is lacking, there is a note, which runs throughout the book, lending it a unity and serving to hold together the various narratives which have to be told under separate headings, since the territory here included as Iraq ranges from Mardin to Basrah. That note is the unity in disunion, the essential coherence of the whole territory in modern times. If the history of these centuries be regarded as a forecast of the future, then Basrah, Baghdad, Mosul, and even the district northwards, must infallibly be for the most part under one administration; any deviation from that rule is a temporary aberration and generally a disaster.

Now that this work, the historical firstfruits, as it were, of the British administration, has laid down well and truly the main lines of recent history, is it too much to hope that we may soon see more detailed studies of this period? In the archives of Iraq there must lie masses of information about the tenure and rights of land* which would be of much interest to the historian, but of

* Mr. E. B. Howell, C.S.I., I.C.S., the first British official head of the Revenue Department of Iraq, gave the Central Asian Society an account of the Turkish land and land revenue system as it was found in Iraq (see JOURNAL OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, Vol. IX., Part I, p. 21).

prime importance to the budding administrator. In private correspondence and papers doubtless still existing there must be evidence that Rich, Rawlinson, and other British residents at Baghdad occupied a far more influential position than is to be guessed from Mr. Longrigg's reference to them in a footnote. Amongst the tribes it would doubtless prove possible to trace the growth of some quite recent sept of the great tribes, more especially of the Muntefik; and an examination of the proportion of true Beduin to the so-called "marsh Arab" would be invaluable. In short, Mr. Longrigg's book impels us to clamour for more, the most sincere tribute it could possibly have. May he yet further delight us by producing from the vast store he has so conscientiously assembled more distilled information that shall aid those who have to administrate Iraq, and those who would study the latest developments in that distressful land.

A few misprints—*e.g.*, *sciem* on p. 199, *Yag'ab* on p. 195 (surely for Ya'qub), are of little account. The volume is excellently printed, and the map of the administrative areas invaluable. S. S.

ADVENTURES IN TURKEY AND RUSSIA. By E. H. Keeling. John Murray, 1924. 10s. 6d.

Under this plain and unassuming title is told a story so packed with dangers, escapes, hardships surmounted, and unexpected somersaults of fortune that one is at a loss to recall its equal except among works of professed fiction. Yet this is a sober narrative of facts, the author's personal experiences in Turkey and Russia between April, 1916, and December, 1918. Many were taking their part in similar events during those years of war and great adventures, but few can have had the good fortune of Captain Keeling. For two years and nine months he passed unscathed from one danger to another in wild places and came through it all with his life when the odds against his doing so had become almost fantastic.

In a special sense his book is that of a survivor. Others may have seen as much in as short a time—though they cannot be many—but others have not survived. Of his English comrades in a brief stage of his adventures he alone remains. Of the Turks, Circassians and Armenian outlaws, who, for their own interests took part with him in the same episodes, they too, have gone, save perhaps one.

The story begins with the surrender of Kut el Amara of April 29, 1916. The author, himself an officer of the garrison, then describes the desert march of some 500 miles from Baghdad to railroad at Ras el Ain, done on foot, in the heat of the Mesopotamian summer, by debilitated men always short of food and water, always driven to the limits of physical endurance by their captors. The 225 miles from Mosul to Ras el Ain they marched in 8½ days under these conditions.

No story of the war is more heartrending than that of the garrison of Kut el Amara after the fall of the town. Twelve thousand unwounded men, British and Indian, there laid down their arms and became prisoners of war to the Turks, whose General in command informed General Townshend that they would be regarded as "Turkey's sincere and precious guests"; how the promise was kept Captain Keeling's book shows without waste of words. Of the Kut prisoners nearly half had perished when the Armistice came in October, 1918, and 3,000 had disappeared beyond the possibility of ascertaining when, where, or how they died. The ultimate responsibility for such mortality, due to hideous ill-treatment and neglect, the author rightly lays upon Enver Pasha. He passed

along the line of route in his car when the rank and file of the garrison—whose privations were always greater than those of their officers, who had been separated from them—were dying in heaps by the roadside. He was then Chief of the Turkish General Staff and virtually Dictator; his word would have stopped the march or changed its conditions; but he did nothing. He was too confident at this time of final success in the war to care what happened to British prisoners. Yet after the Armistice the British Government abandoned their purpose of bringing to justice those who had caused the needless death of more than 5,000 British prisoners of war in Turkey.

Beyond Ras el Ain the journey was more tolerable for the author and his fellow-officers. They were taken by rail and motor-car to Angora and thence by carts to their place of internment at Kastamuni in the uplands of Paphlagonia. Life there was monotonous, but healthy and by no means unendurable, and the prisoners found their Turkish guardians more humane in their actions than had been promised by earlier experience. One curious fact that the author mentions sheds a strong light upon the British reputation in Turkey, even during the war. The prisoners were moneyless or nearly so; remittances often did not reach them or were reduced by the rate of exchange to one-fifth of their value; and the sums they received from the Turks as pay due to prisoners of war were entirely inadequate for their needs. Their difficulties were removed, however, by the tradesmen of Kastamuni, Moslem and Christian alike, who accepted cheques from the prisoners, written on scraps of paper, in the conviction that the cheques would be met. Almost unlimited advances were made in this way to strangers who were also enemies. Nor were the cheques presented during the war through a neutral country, as they might have been. After the Armistice, however, a Kastamuni Greek arrived in London "with a sackful of them on his back for collection." Many of the drawers were dead by this time, but it is to the credit of the War Office that in the end every cheque was paid, and the tradesmen of Kastamuni were justified in their faith.

It was at Kastamuni that the more exciting adventures which overtook Captain Keeling began. With three British companions he succeeded in escaping and reached the coast of the Black Sea near Sinope. But it would be unfair to the author to retell his story or even to outline it, for his adventures in the Paphlagonian mountains and on this classic coast are the most exciting and romantic in the book. The reader must make his acquaintance with the outlaws Raghîb, Keork, Musa, and Kiamil through Captain Keeling himself, and so doing find himself among the band who hid among rocks and forests, outwitted Turkish watchfulness, bound Greek boatmen to trees at the boatmen's request, committed piracy on the Black Sea, and eventually arrived safely at Alupka thirty miles from Sevastopol forty-nine days after leaving Kastamuni.

In Sevastopol, Captain Keeling encountered the Russian Revolution, which thwarted the plans he had made for rescuing a number of his comrades left in Kastamuni. Thereupon he went to Caucasia, and returned thence through Russia to England. In August, 1918, he left England again for Mesopotamia, and was in Baghdad when the Armistice of Mudros ended hostilities with the Turks. Thenceforward to the end of the year he was charged with the duty of collecting and evacuating British and Allied prisoners of war from the regions in which they had suffered most—from Turkish camps and construction works between Mesopotamia and the Taurus Mountains. Even now, however, his adventures had not yet ended, for more than once he found himself in an awkward situation.

But enough has been said to show the unusual nature and interest of the book

and the experiences which befel its fortunate author. The book itself is short—altogether too short for the material with which it deals—and is written in a style of military brevity which sometimes dismisses a critical situation with a few curt words. Of this, however, there can be little doubt, that a hundred years hence anyone seeking information upon certain Turkish aspects of the Great War and side lights on the Russian Revolution will look upon this small volume with gratitude, as containing the convincing evidence of an eyewitness.

W. J. C.

FREIE WEGE VERGLEICHENDER ERDKUNDEN. Von R. Oldenbourg, Munich and Berlin.

This is a magazine of articles on geology and political geography. It is compiled in honour of the sixtieth birthday of Erich von Drygalski, who has been for twenty years professor of those subjects at the University of Munich. All the contributions are written by his former pupils, several of whom are well-known men, as an expression of gratitude for the labours of their instructor and as an appreciation of the great benefits that the German Empire has received through his stimulating efforts. It is rightly insisted that an intimate knowledge of geography and the political conditions of foreign countries is of vital importance to the people of an Empire with interests abroad and a necessity for colonial expansion. Of the twenty-three articles on subjects of world-wide interest four are devoted to countries in which members of the Central Asian Society are particularly interested.

Dr. Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer, who accompanied von Hentig to Kabul in 1915 on the mission sent to win over the Amir to the Turkish-German cause, is the writer of a long article on the Middle East. As might be anticipated, the article is marked by an almost fanatical anti-British bias. It opens with the extraordinary postulate that the long rivalry of England and Russia in Asia was the chief cause of recent wars in most quarters of the globe, even including the Great War. This statement is no less astounding than the assertion that Constantinople was offered as a bribe to Russia before she entered the Great War or the remark that the final collapse of Russia was mainly due to the intrigues of the English, who were plotting to foment discord in Russia's Asiatic possessions. There are other inaccuracies of a similar description in the article, but, when facts of common knowledge such as these are so grossly distorted, further refutation seems unnecessary.

Von Niedermayer is more fortunate, however, in his diagnosis of the great changes that the war has wrought in the minds and characters of the people of the Middle East. He rightly asserts that their longing for independence has become even more pronounced. They have also learnt that in order to maintain their independence under modern conditions they must adopt modern methods. With this object they are striving to acquire a greater mastery of the machinery of Western civilization, which can be used for the development of the treasures of the earth. The rapid growth of these ambitious ideas has enormously increased the difficulties of England, who has never had harder problems to solve than those of the present day. It has also augmented the trials of Russia, who has never been so inadequately equipped for the control of her Asiatic possessions. As a result of this sudden craving for progress in the Middle East there are great possibilities for development and expansion in every direction, but capital is urgently required. The only disinterested country (presumably Germany) is now no longer able to assist as she has been knocked out and impoverished in the late war.

The article concludes with the statement that Germany, powerful and valuable though her influence was in the Middle East before the war, must now realize that in the immediate future no useful field for political action lies open to her enterprise in that direction. She must confine her energies to the development of her trade in those countries. On the other hand, her political energies should rather be devoted to continental enterprises where her help can be of use and where she may find means of building up her strength with a view to the eventual rehabilitation of the German Empire. Von Niedermayer was apparently not thinking of the advantages to be gained from the signing of the Pact of Locarno.

Dr. Josef März and Dr. Hesse follow with articles on the problems of the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. Both are academic studies giving a temperate and accurate synopsis of the subjects reviewed. Dr. März gives an historical retrospect of events in the Persian Gulf. He points out that the British have been virtual masters of this inland sea ever since they assisted the Persians in 1622 to oust the Portuguese from the trading stations which they had established on the islands of Kishm and Ormuz. At the same time, he rightly observes that the British, while they have always been prompt to resent the interference of any other Power in gulf questions, have always been satisfied with a nominal control, unsupported by strong local forces. He calls the British Resident at Bushire the uncrowned ruler of the Gulf, but adds that his authority, like that of the other British residents in the Gulf, does not extend beyond the limits of the place where he is stationed. He agrees that the Gulf must be an indivisible unity in the control of one Power. Its possession is not indispensable to any of the countries bordering its coasts. The nation, however, which controls one shore has always been compelled to bridge the Gulf and acquire command of the other shore.

Dr. Hesse's article on Mesopotamia is chiefly concerned with the geographical and climatic difficulties of the country which impose a nomadic existence on a large portion of the population. This necessity for annual migration remains a constant bar to civilization and regular progress. Nothing but the harnessing of the waters and an adequate system of canals under a settled government can re-introduce a more satisfactory state of affairs.

The fourth article by Dr. Ullrich Bey on Armenia furnishes a melancholy picture of the past trials and present hopeless condition of the cultured and Christian Armenian race. He recognizes that the greater part of the blame for the wholesale extermination of the Armenians by the Turks will be attributed to Germans. At the end of the war the League of Nations took the Armenians under their protection with a flourish of trumpets, but so far all their efforts have only served to render their situation more desperate and more hopeless. Their future welfare lies now absolutely at the mercy of the Turks.

A. M. S. E.

APPENDIX

"THROUGH THE INNER DESERTS TO MEDINA."

HENDAYE-PLAGE,

HOTEL CONTINENTAL,

BASSES PYRENEES, FRANCE.

February 26, 1926.

DEAR SIR,

My attention has been drawn to the review about my book by Mr. Philby, in your *Journal*, Vol. XIII., Part I., and I wish to make some statements regarding it.

I arrived at Damascus in May, 1914, and though I had letters of introduction to the Turkish authorities there, I did not use them, as Captain Wavell the Arabian traveller had warned me not to do so. All the same I had been signalled to the Vali at Damascus as suspect, and before accomplishing my journey, I was taken prisoner by the Turks, who confiscated all my photos, notes and sketches. Those circumstances alone limited the record of my adventures, and made it impossible for me to give a more perfect account. The book published contains, alas! but the tenth part of what I had originally written during the journey!

Mr. Philby seems surprised that I met Chinamen and Javanese (not Japanese) at Medina, and I regret more than ever the photographs lost, on which he would have seen many of the latter amongst the crowd.

That some names are misprinted is regrettable, but does not seem to me of such importance, once Mr. Philby found it easy enough to recognize them!

"The guide, philosopher and friend selected by the Countess to share her adventures was no other than that delightful individual Muhammad al Bassam (she invariably refers to him as 'Mahmoud')". I never refer to him only as "Mahmoud," but called him as *everybody* there called him, Mahmoud Bassam! I have written to Mahmoud Bassam asking him to send me a written statement of our journey together, which I will send you at once when I receive it, and which I hope will satisfy the public that I am not the "De Rougemont" Mr. Philby makes me out to be, but that my book is true.

Now Mr. Philby seems to give great importance to the date of Ramadan. I must confess that I did not remember exactly the dates when writing the book, but to prove to him that I *did see* the life of Ramadan and was not dreaming it, I enclose a letter of Consul Richardson, at that time British Consul at Hodeidah, sent to me during my stay at Damascus, in July, 1914, during the Ramadan.

"That is all she has to say about Palmyra," he continues. About Palmyra, Baalbeck, any town with ruins of historic interest, so much has been written that I did not think it worth the while to repeat things known to so many!

"In due course the procession heads for Wadi al Mustarri (shown as Wadi al Mustawi)." My Arabs called it "Wadi al Mustawi," and under this name it is also marked on the map of Arabia by Captain Hunter (Survey of India, 1908).

Further, "The Countess here presents us with an initialed sketch of the mosque of Zilfi, which, to say the least, is a pure fiction of her imagination."

But who says the picture of the mosque on p. 134 is that of Zilfi! It only says beneath: "and the Muezzin's cry was heard from the tower of the Minaret." As a matter of fact, this sketch had been joined with others to be used as tail-piece at the end of each chapter, but the publisher had it enlarged and put where he thought it would fit in. But there is no pretence that the picture presents the Mosque of Zilfi. It was just put there to fill out the empty spaces marked through the loss of the photos, and I am indeed very thankful to my publisher that he managed to make a presentable book out of the poor skeleton he had to deal with, and I think he has done wonders in this direction.

This journey of mine was only to be an essay, a light study, after which I intended to make another one, using my experience and taking my brother along, a known geologist. It was also to be a proof that, with courage, a great deal of optimism and casualness, one could take obstacles lightly, which more serious and pedantic men would find impossible to do, just because they would see them too clearly.

If the war had not broken out, and the Turks had not made me a prisoner, *nothing* would have hindered me to enter the Ruba el Kali desert, because it was on account of the Turks that I was taken prisoner at Zilfi! But I have been asked not to publish the part of my book relating to the Turks.

I am not a scientific traveller, but that Mr. Philby should say that I imagined all my adventures and drew on winged fancy alone could nearly flatter me for the compliment paid to my imagination. But as such known Arab travellers as Palgrave and Mr. D. Hogarth had also to undergo the critical doubt of Mr. Philby, I shall not mind being added to victims so highly esteemed and distinguished!

At the same time I am very distressed not to be "persona grata" in the eyes of Mr. Philby, as I thought of asking him for a letter of introduction to Ibn Saud. I intend to make another start for the Ruba el Kali this year, which, after having read Mr. Philby's "Heart of Arabia," seems to be ever so much easier than before. As also Mr. Philby's ideal is to cross the Ruba el Kali, it would not be at all impossible that we should meet in the desert. I shall hope for it; what better witness could I wish for?

Begging you to forgive my poor English,

I am sincerely yours,

DONSHKA, COUNTESS MALMIGNATI.*

* Mr. Philby's answer has been delayed owing to his absence abroad.

OBITUARY

HUGH SPENCER

ALL who served in the United Provinces some years back will be sorry to hear of the death of Hugh Spencer, which occurred on January 14 after a painful illness of five months, which he bore bravely. Spencer joined the I.C.S. in 1888, being posted to Aligarh. This was not his first acquaintance with the country, for he was born there, his father being Mr. Charles Innes Spencer, M.I.C.E. He took kindly to the country and his work, and till he retired, in 1915, served in various executive posts. He was a "hot weather bird," finding pig sticking and tiger shooting more to his taste than the quest of pleasure and promotion in cooler regions, and during all his service he paid no visit to the hills. The good work he did in the famine of 1908 was recognized by the grant of a C.I.E., but the cadre of the United Provinces must have been well filled with efficient men if the province did not suffer by letting Spencer retire as a District Officer. From his retirement till 1919 he held the post of Hindustani and Hindi censor at Cairo, a post for which he was well fitted. During the last years of his life he was a member of the Board of Studies in Law, London University.

In 1911 Mr. Spencer was married to the daughter of the late William Smith, J.P., of Bristol, who survives him.

NOTICES

THE Council wish to express their grateful thanks to Mr. J. F. Baddeley for a copy of "Russia, Mongolia, China: being some record of the relations between them from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the death of the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, A.D. 1602-1676."

The following books have been received for review :

- "Thro' the Gates of Memory," by Betty Cunliffe Owen. 9" x 6". Pp. 266. Sketch-map and illustrations. (London: Hutchinson and Co. 1926. 21s.)
- "In the Heart of Asia," by Lieut-Colonel P. T. Etherton. 9" x 6". Pp. 302. (London: Messrs. Constable and Co. 1925. 16s.)
- "Four Centuries of Modern Iraq," by S. H. Longrigg. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 21s.)
- "Peking to Lhasa," by George Pereira. Edited by Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 6". Pp. 287. Map and illustrations. (London: Messrs. Constable and Co. 1925. 18s.)
- "Syria," by Leonard Stein. 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 5". Pp. 94. (London: Messrs. Ernest Benn, Ltd. 1926. 3s. 6d.)
- "The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, 1635-1834," by H. B. Morse, LL.D. Four volumes. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 6". (Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 70s.)

MEMBERS ELECTED ON MARCH 25.

- Chaplin, Colonel Commandant J. G., C.B.E., D.S.O., Headquarters, Military Forces in Iraq, Baghdad.
- Dobbin, Lieut.-Colonel H. T., D.S.O., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, c/o Messrs. Lloyds Bank, 6, Pall Mall, S.W.
- Elphinstone, Major W. G., M.C., Poona Horse, Ministry of Defence, Baghdad.
- Holmes, Colonel, 8, Gloucester Walk, W. 8.
- Ja'far Pasha el Askari, 51, Queen's Gate Gardens, S.W. 7.
- Lygon, Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Robert, M.V.O., M.C., Iraq Army, Mosul.
- Martin, Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel H. G., R.A., c/o Messrs. Lloyds Bank, 6, Pall Mall, S.W.
- Mond, The Right Hon. Sir Alfred, Bt., 37, Lowndes Square, S.W.
- Pratt, J. T., c/o Foreign Office, S.W.
- Ritchie, Sir Adam B., Caledonian Club, S.W.
- Weston, Brig.-Gen. Spencer V. P., Otlands, Weybridge.

Members only are responsible for their statements in the *Journal*.

JOURNAL
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VOL. XIII - 1926

PART. III

CONTENTS.

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1926-1927.

THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN.

THE BAKHTIARIS. BY LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR ARNOLD T. WILSON,
K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.

ADEN. BY MAJOR H. WILBERFORCE-BELL.

ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

THE KHAIBAR PASS AS THE INVADERS' ROAD FOR INDIA.
BY A. S. BEVERIDGE.

SIR AUREL STEIN'S IDENTIFICATION OF AORNOS.
BY COLONEL D. L. R. LORIMER.

REVIEWS:

THE ITALIAN EXPEDITION TO THE HIMALAYAS. INDIA. MESOPOTAMIA
CAMPAIGN, 1914-1918. THE RISE OF THE IMAMS OF SANAA. THE ARAB
AT HOME. IRAQ. RELIGIONS OF THE EMPIRE. THE RIGHT HONOURABLE.
SIR MORTIMER DURAND, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.


APPENDIX.

OBITUARY.

ACCOUNTS.

NOTICES.

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Part III

THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN *

MUCH has been written on the subject of Russian intrigues in Central Asia, and the object of the present article is not so much to expose the machinations of the Third International in that part of the world, as to draw attention to the importance of the present Russian activities in Afghanistan, and their probable effect upon the general situation, more particularly as affecting British interests in those areas.

Forty-five years ago public interest was focussed on the Russian advance in Central Asia. The general apprehension in this country as a result of that advance only died down when, in 1886, the Russians seemed to have reached the limit of their progress towards India, and a permanent frontier was established between themselves and Afghanistan.† The frontier was a sound one geographically, and the Russian 'bogey' gradually ceased to haunt the minds of those responsible for the safeguarding of British India.

Subsequently, with the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 the last bone of contention between this country and Russia seemed to have been removed.

Then came the Russian Revolution, and with the advent to power of the Soviet Government, with its far-reaching disruptive activities, the equilibrium of the greater portion of Asia was completely destroyed. The new Government in Moscow not only refused to recognize any of the previous agreements made between Imperial Russia and Britain, but definitely declared with a frankness unknown in previous diplomacy that the Soviets regarded us as their most dangerous enemy, and whether or not they succeeded in upsetting us in Europe, they would certainly try and destroy our prestige and power in Asia. And they have set themselves to the task with untiring energy.

* A meeting was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, W., on March 11, 1926, when a paper was read on "The Problem of Afghanistan," General Sir Edmund Barrow presiding.

† Though the Afghan Boundary Commission of 1886 settled the western section of the Russo-Afghan Boundary, the eastern section remained unsettled until Sir Mortimer Durand's Mission of 1893.

From 1919 onwards, despite the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, and with utter disregard of whatever official or private trade negotiations may have been in progress between London and Moscow, some of Soviet Russia's cleverest brains have been at work formulating a definite scheme of Asiatic policy in general, and Central Asian policy in particular.

From the very first they found the task a most difficult one. For while the first problem was the consolidation of Soviet power in Turkistan, such consolidation could only be effected by the use of force, which in itself antagonized the bulk of the native population. The first phases of Soviet rule in Turkistan were indeed so tyrannous that with the slightest encouragement from outside the natives would have fought to the bitter end. After the British withdrawal from Trans-Caspia, however, all hope of outside assistance died, and save for the continued activities of the *Basmach*, or guerilla bands, operating in the inaccessible mountain regions, the bulk of the natives resigned itself to Soviet rule.

But though the Soviets had triumphed, they were by no means free from anxiety. They lived in constant fear of some fresh outbreak, and suspected every stranger of being a British emissary in disguise.

It was felt in Turkistan that some conciliation to native sentiment was necessary, and various local privileges and concessions were granted. These were only palliatives, however, and the call for a definite general policy soon became imperative.


The next move by the Moscow Government was the bold one of posing as the champion of Eastern progress. By espousing the cause of the discontented elements in Asia, Soviet Russia calculated on achieving the twofold object of diverting native discontent and antagonism from herself by depicting Britain in Asia as the real tyrant, and of winning over to her side those new movements in India and elsewhere which, if properly controlled, might be turned into powerful weapons against British influence in Asia.

This new policy was inaugurated by the much-advertised Congress of Eastern Peoples, which was held in Baku in the summer of 1920. The main object of the Congress had been the bringing together of the various Asiatic malcontents with a view to fusing them into one definite movement. The Congress failed conspicuously in its main object, but proved of considerable instructive value in other directions.

Apart from serving as a starting-off point for an extensive campaign of anti-British propaganda in Asia, it showed the Soviets how little they knew about the Eastern peoples living beyond their own frontiers, and, more important still, it demonstrated clearly the impossibility of creating any combined Eastern movement. Indeed, on the contrary, it showed how very easy it would be to create and foster discord among the different Oriental elements.

The Soviet authorities took their lesson to heart, and while they set to work to study *ab initio* the different revolutionary movements and causes of Asiatic discontent, they also decided on a radical change of general policy. They discarded their plans for creating a combined movement; talked less of starting an Asiatic conflagration, and embarked on a policy of political and racial disintegration on the principle of *dividere et imperare*.

In pursuance of this new policy they proceeded to split up the whole of Turkistan into small republics on an ethnological basis. Hence the appearance on the map of such newly-coined words as Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and many others.



The policy is certainly a most ingenious one, and although it is yet early to judge of its efficacy in practice, it may, if carried out in a liberal and broad-minded spirit, prove a practical solution as far as Soviet Russia's own Central Asian problems are concerned. How far it meets with native approval is, of course, a different question, nor can one suppose that it will necessarily prove a permanent solution; but as we are primarily concerned with actualities, the fact has to be accepted that the Soviet Government have satisfactorily consolidated their position within their own frontiers, and are now able to pay attention to the neighbouring regions just beyond those frontiers.

Of these neighbouring regions recent events have shown that the Russians are paying particular attention to Afghanistan. They intend

following a progressive policy in that country on the basis of gradual penetration. This penetration is being carried out along simultaneous and parallel lines. That is to say, the Soviets are endeavouring to obtain a footing in the country both politically and economically, though the two questions are being kept carefully distinct.

Politically the idea is to continue the policy of disintegration into ethnological units—in other words, by means of agitation and propaganda among the different racial elements in Northern Afghanistan, foster a number of local movements aiming at autonomy and secession from Afghan rule.

The Soviet Government of Russia is careful to conceal its connection with this campaign of agitation, which for convenience is being organized by the Third International. And to cover the connection still further, the agents and agitators actually employed in Afghan territory purport to be working on behalf of one or other of the neighbouring Soviet Republics.

The lines of their propaganda are as simple as they are attractive. The local Turcomen inhabiting the district around Herat are reminded of their close kinship with the Panjdeh and Merv Turcomen, who are now enjoying complete independence, coupled with all the advantages which the protection and progressive culture of Soviet Russia can give them. The Afghan Turcomen, it is emphasized, are at present being ruled by an alien and backward race, with whom they have no common ties or interests. Not only racially, it is argued, but also geographically, the Herat district is much nearer to Turcomenia than to the capital at Kabul. The local inhabitants have only to rise and proclaim their autonomy, and they could count on immediate assistance from Soviet Turcomenia. These and similar arguments are being brought to bear not only upon the Turcomen of Herat, but also upon their eastern neighbours the Uzbeks and the Tajiks of Badakhshan.

None of these people have anything either racially, tribally, or individually in common with the Durrani tribe who now sit on the throne in Kabul. And while they likewise have no sympathy for the Russ, they cannot help being much affected by the propaganda of their kinsmen on the other side of the frontier.

Now if Soviet Russia confined her activities to mere propaganda, the matter would not be such a serious one. They are doing much more, however. The Russians understand their Orientals well enough by this time to know that nothing impresses the materialistic Afghan so much as concrete facts. It is the same with the Pathan and with the Indian of the north. So long as the talk is one of theoretical advantages, they will agree out of mere politeness, or because to agree is the line of least resistance; but it requires some visible sign of practical profit to really convince them. Hence it is that the Russians are paying such great attention to commercial and economic penetra-

tion into Afghanistan at the present moment, and they are making a bid for the goodwill of the native population by encouraging and facilitating local trade relations. In this, as in their propaganda, their aim is naturally to advertise the progressive and beneficial character of the *Pax Sovietica*.

Thus Herat has now been linked up with the Russian telegraph system, and every effort is being made to promote the caravan trade between that city and Merv and Panjdeh. Further east the Russians are reconstructing the railway connecting up Bokhara with Termez. The latter is the most important point on this part of the Amu Darya, and lies on the main caravan route through Afghanistan, which also happens to be the most direct route from Russia to India.

With the railhead at Termez, European merchandise can be delivered at the Afghan frontier within little over a week after leaving the factory. With the recovery of Russian industry and the arrangement for transit facilities for the manufactured goods of Central Europe, Northern Afghanistan can become just as independent of Kabul and India as the north of Persia was independent of the Persian Gulf. The ruins of ancient cities along the bed of the Amu Darya tell of the greatness of this area before the hordes of barbarians swept over it. The Russians have it in their hands to restore wealth and prosperity to the Oxus valley. The construction of the Termez railway is the first step, and with the development of trade, and, above all, with the improvement of transport, which must come before anything else, the centre of activity in Turkistan will quite probably shift down to the Amu Darya, and Termez will once again become a flourishing city.

The people of Afghanistan, on the other hand, will come to look more and more towards the north for their trade, and the success of the Soviet policy will depend entirely on the ability of the Russians to show them practical economic advantages and commercial progress.

Should nothing occur to frustrate the Soviets' present scheme of activities, one may expect to hear any day that Herat has proclaimed itself an autonomous Soviet republic, and that the neighbouring provinces to the east have followed its example. Help in some form or other would almost certainly be forthcoming from across the border and the Afghan Government in Kabul may quite well awake on morning to find their northern provinces gone, and the Soviet frontier a hundred miles nearer to the south.

One wonders what the feelings of the Amir would be if he suddenly had to face a revolt in his northern provinces. The situation would be an extremely difficult one, and although it might turn the political scales at Kabul definitely in favour of Great Britain, Kabul by the time might only be representing the half of Afghanistan. Many new factors would come into force, and it is impossible at this stage to draw any clear picture of what would happen.

Nor is it necessary to draw pictures of the future when we are already face to face with serious actualities. The Russians have definitely embarked on a determined progressive policy, and in making a bid for economic and commercial supremacy in Afghanistan, they make no secret of their intention of ultimately contesting British commercial, and with it, of course, political, supremacy in India.

Counter-measures must obviously begin somewhere. It may be impossible to compete commercially with Russia in the areas adjoining her territory, but there is every reason why a policy no less active and penetrating than that of the Soviets should be applied to the areas which lie nearer India, and whose commercial interests are naturally bound up with India rather than with the north. Thus the country between Kabul and the Khyber and districts of Ghazni and Kandahar boasts a considerable trade with India. With the opening of the Khyber railway, the main Indian railway system has been brought into direct communication with the Kabul trade route. True, the Khyber railway as it is at present does not facilitate to any great extent the main caravan traffic, since the distance from railhead to Peshawur is too short to make it worth while for the caravans to abandon their camels and proceed by train. One naturally hopes, however, that the present line is only the beginning of greater things. Meanwhile, pending the continuation of the line, it will be a simple matter to organize an efficient system of motor transport running between railhead and Kabul. Similarly at Kandahar, where a very short distance separates one of the main trade centres of Afghanistan from railhead on our own frontier, efficient motor transport would play a very important rôle. Further west again, we have the continuation of the Nushki railway as far as the Persian frontier. This line, which was constructed for military reasons during the War, is important in that it facilitates communications between India and the fertile province of Sistan. Though Sistan is mainly Persian territory, it is impossible to exclude it as an important factor in the development of Afghanistan.

With Russian influence predominant in Herat, a city which, from the time of Alexander the Great, has always been regarded as the strategic and economic key to India, the consideration of Sistan in relation to British-Indian interests becomes essential.

A glance at the map will show the obvious importance of Sistan. Itself a plain, it comprises the drainage area of the Helmand, which is the largest river in Afghanistan, and a number of other rivers. Water for irrigation purposes is therefore abundant, and the soil, which is rich in silt, is extremely fertile. There are large areas suitable for cultivation which are lying untouched. With very little development, the country could easily become the most productive area in Persia, and the main distributing area for South-west Afghanistan.

With a potentially rich area such as Sistan, and at least two of the main Afghan trade routes within easy reach of our Indian frontier, not to mention the existing railway connections with that frontier, there is no lack of scope for British or British-Indian enterprise. Only by getting a sound commercial footing in the country—and this refers not only to Afghanistan, but also to Eastern Persia—can Britain hope to contest Russian progress towards India.

The whole question can be finally summarized in the fact that the time is rapidly approaching when the primitive Afghan will learn to discard his camels for mechanical transport. If we do not teach him to do so, the Russians will, and, petty as it may seem, our reputation as the most cultured power in Asia will suffer if we are not the teachers.

DISCUSSION.

Colonel LEWIS: Ladies and Gentlemen—The reasons I am now here talking are, firstly, because I have been asked to do so by General Thomson, secondly, because I spent about six months in Kabul as military attaché, and, thirdly, because my ordinary line of business has made me study the question very carefully at different times. First, I should like to say, as regards the mention of Russian propaganda, I am entirely in agreement; I believe that there is a very considerable danger which might in future threaten British India from the Russians advancing from the north. I do not agree with the author as regards the remarks he made about Herat, however: I think the real danger does not lie in Herat. Herat is occupied by a population of which, roughly, one-third are Afghan subjects; the remaining two-thirds are Baluchis, Arabs, or, still more preponderating, Persian subjects. Therefore the population in the Herat valley is not so likely to be affected as people in Afghan Turkistan, Katagban, and Badakhshan. Secondly, I do not see how any amount of commercial activity on our part will stop the Russians taking their next step, whenever that may be. Something more, I think, is required. I should like to say now that I am not a bit of an alarmist—I think the idea of the Russians coming down with great armies is absurd; but one cannot help fearing the Russian propaganda, because it has proved its worth so many times in that part of the world. However, I consider that the menace is so real that I want to talk—in fact, to give my opinion—of what might happen in Northern Afghanistan. In 1885, as you have just heard, the Russians came to a halt in the north. They stopped because they ran up against Afghanistan, backed by Great Britain, and when they stopped, I do not agree that their frontier was a good strategic one; for they stopped at a river and a desert, and a river and a desert are not a good strategic frontier. The proper strategical boundary was the line of the Hindu Kush. As regards an ethnological boundary, it was a very bad one.

They stopped in the middle of a racial area—that is to say, Turcomans, Uzbeks, and Tajiks live on both banks of the Oxus river. They might have stayed there but for the revolution, because before 1919 we guaranteed the borders of Afghanistan. After the war with Afghanistan in 1919 we lost that control, and are not now responsible for the borders. The Russian Revolution came along, and Russia from the beginning recognized in Great Britain, as a great capitalist nation, the chief enemy; and she determined, if she could, to strike a blow at us in India. Russia realized the supreme importance of India as a portion of the British Empire, and the means were at hand. She formed these independent republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. At first sight one might think she did it to stabilize conditions in her own borders, but we know otherwise, because there is very definite evidence of the secret propaganda which she carried out amongst the Turcomans, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, south of the Oxus—that is to say, in Afghan territory. So that, having established those republics, and having worked on those people by propaganda, it is quite true that one day the Amir in Kabul may wake up and find that he has lost the northern part of his kingdom, and that these people—Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turcomans living in his territory—have decided to throw in their lot with their brothers north of the Oxus, and become amalgamated with the independent republics. That sort of thing has happened before, and when things reach that stage, then the Soviet Government of Russia steps in and takes the republics under her wing. That would suit Russia well, because from her present border she is too far away from India. She can and does send agents into India itself, and can establish advanced centres such as she has at Kabul and Chamarkand, but she is too far off for the final stage—that is, the provision of arms for the people she has excited by propaganda. It suits her book if she can come a step nearer. I want you to picture a minute what it would really mean if she came nearer: it would mean to all intents and purposes an Afghan-Russian frontier on the line of the Hindu Kush, which runs out almost to Herat. Supposing she does step in and occupy the northern part of Afghanistan, who is going to stop her? We are not, certainly: it is far too far to send any military expedition. The Amir, can he stop them? I do not think he can. If you remember the extraordinary difficulty he had in quelling the little revolt that took place last year in Khost, and if you think the Soviet brains behind it all would probably so time the risings in Northern Afghanistan that they synchronized with one of those ever-recurring revolts in Southern Afghanistan, I do not believe the Amir would be able to prevent those provinces shaking off his rule. The next step would be the gradual building of roads and railways throughout the northern area, and there is nothing at all impossible as regards engineering for this railway from Termez to be brought up to the

Andarab valley, which is about fifty miles from Kabul. That fifty miles includes thirty very easy miles north of Kabul, through the Koh-i-daman, through which there is a very good motor road. There remain twenty miles of very bad country, and even now Russian survey parties are working, with the permission of the Amir, to site a road over the Hindu Kush, and portions of that road have already been completed for motor traffic. That means, if that should happen, that the next time we are tied up in some other part of the world, Russia will have Kabul more or less at her mercy. She will be fifty miles from Kabul as against our railhead of about 180 miles, unless we do something about it; and the question is, what are we to do? It is a very difficult problem. These are entirely my own opinions. I think our possible actions can be summed up under two headings: the first is "communications," and the second is "putting our own house in order." I will show you what I mean in more detail. First, as regards communications. Remember, sitting on the throne of Afghanistan is a young Amir, frankly ambitious but untravelled—until the other day he had never been to Kandahar; the furthest he had ever been was Jalalabad—but nevertheless pushful and go-ahead. Conditions in Kabul have changed enormously. You now find electricity, public gardens, and a band which, to the Western ear, discourses perfectly abominable Afghan music. (Laughter.) They are starting a new era with a number of Europeans. You can move about with quite as much safety there as in the city and plains round Peshawar itself. There are schools, European legations, and good motor roads. In the forefront of all his programme of progress, I think the Amir puts education and communications. As to communications, he is very keen on developing roads throughout his country. This is where we can help him. Whenever the question of communications arises in the south and east of Afghanistan, we should help him as much as we can, whether with money, technical advice, stores, or material. The chief obstacles which the Amir meets are the Mullahs and the wild and warlike tribes who live on our north-west frontier. If—and he has tried more than once—he could calm them down and disarm them, he would have no difficulty at all in pushing on communications, which is what we want. We, on our side, are faced with the same difficulties.

That brings me to the second way in which I think we could prepare to protect Afghanistan if the Russians advanced up to the Hindu Kush—that is, by setting our own house in order. Take a concrete case. I happened to be in Kabul about the time when negotiations were going on about the murder of Mrs. Ellis and the kidnapping of Miss Ellis by Ajab Khan and his associates, so I can give you this picture from the Afghan point of view. Do you remember? Ajab came to Kohat and kidnapped Miss Ellis, after killing her mother, and took her away to Tirah. Our relations with Tirah—that being the

country where the Afridis live—are governed by treaties, and the Afridi agrees not to harbour within his territory refugees from British justice; so that when Ajab went off with Miss Ellis and took her up into the Tirah, the authorities on the North-West Frontier of India said to the Afridis, "Fulfil your agreement and expel these murderers." The Afridis said, "Right-o," and expelled them, but not into another portion of British territory or any other tribal territory. Other tribesmen did not want to be involved in another's quarrel, and if they had put them into British territory it would have been tantamount to handing them over to us, a thing they will not do. They turned them into Afghanistan. The Government turned to Afghanistan and said: "You are a civilized country and cannot harbour murderers." From the Afghan point of view—although, of course, the Amir did not use these words—the reply to this was, "Why don't you do your own dirty work? I cannot catch these fellows on the frontier; I am mixed up with tribal difficulties the same as you." We insisted. Nothing happened. We began to take off our coats. This consisted of certain military preparations in Peshawar, and what impressed the Amir more than anything else was the evacuation of our ladies from Kabul. The Amir said, "Now they mean business." Very loth, he collected an army, and sat down on the other side of the Afridi border. A deadlock followed. The Afridis, still carrying out their obligations, sat on one side of the frontier, and would not allow the criminals to re-enter Tirah, and the Amir with his army sat on the other side, and there they either could not, or really dared not, arrest the criminals for fear of letting loose a wasps' nest about their ears. We insisted, and at last, luckily, a solution was found by which the Amir, by means of negotiations, persuaded Ajab and most of his gang to accept transportation into Turkistan, where they are still living quite happily. Two of the gang refused to go, and are still in Tirah. The point is, What is going to happen next time a similar murder takes place? Are we again going to risk a war with the Amir, with whom it is of the utmost importance from the point of view of the Russian menace that we should remain at peace? Personally, as matters stand now, I do not see that we can do anything else; and it seems to me, if for no other reason, that we must get control over our own people. I do not mean for a moment to say that we should declare war on the Afridis, and march in and take their country; we cannot afford to do it; but I say, that just as in Waziristan we are gradually penetrating by making roads, we should take every possible opportunity which may occur in Tirah of doing the same, and in other portions, too, of independent territory. If we do that, we may, in co-operation with the Amir, on his side of the border, settle and disarm the people. Until they are disarmed you will never have peace. Once you have got peace, communications will spring up easily; there will be good motor roads and

railways to Kabul. Peace will release the enormous force now employed as covering troops all along the border. With the covering troops available, and the roads built, we should have no difficulty, when occasion arose, of going up to Kabul and assisting the Amir to prevent the Russians coming down any further and occupying Kabul. (Applause)

Sir RALEIGH EGERTON: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—My own close touch with Afghan affairs finished about fifteen years ago, but I have kept up a close study of them, and also have friends who occasionally send me notes on the subject. The position of Afghanistan *vis-à-vis* India and elsewhere has changed very much since I knew more about it, in so far as Afghanistan is now independent of Indian interference so far as foreign affairs go, has diplomatic representatives all over the world, and accepts them from all over the world. In those days the Amir could do nothing except through the Government of India. The Bolshevik propaganda, as we know and have heard to-day, is going on on racial lines on the northern frontier of Afghanistan, but I am not sure that it is making politically very great progress, because I believe all those people—Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Afghan Turcomans—are very proud of calling themselves Afghans. I do not think they boast much of their Tajik or other nationality. The Afghan name carries great force among all the people in that part of the world, and they are very proud of it; so I am not sure the Bolshevik Soviet propaganda will have very much influence in calling them to desert from their allegiance to the Amir. They are very fond of their country, too, and have always hated Russia; they hated imperialist Russia, anyhow, and I do not suppose the Bolshevik Russia looks very different to them. Another thing is that when the Bolsheviks really went into Turkistan they committed a very grave error in the roughness of their methods, and among other things alienated both local Afghan and Indian traders by confiscating all their goods. That produced a very strong feeling against them, which they must find it hard to allay. After a few years they did, under pressure, to some extent compensate the Afghan traders; but because of their hostility to us, and I suppose their desire to show our impotence, or something or other, I believe they gave no compensation to the Indian tradesmen, and there is a very strong community of Indian traders up in Bokhara and Turkistan east and west. When the Russians rather treacherously seized Bokhara, the Afghans saw their co-religionists who had to flee the country, and they brought tales into Afghanistan of great hardship and terrorism on the part of the Bolsheviks. Another thing, the Amir is no fool. As we have heard, he is an intelligent young man, and I think it very probable he puts very strong governors into those northern provinces where Uzbeks and others are living. I should not think he would send weak men there, and we know an Afghan governor

can keep order with a very strong hand if necessity arises. Uzbeks and Tajiks are not very warlike; they are peace-loving people, and I think that political propaganda, as against commercial penetration, might not produce a very great effect. You see, in that part of the world the Amir has not for a very long time had any rebellion; it is only in the southern and more mountainous parts of Afghanistan that rebellions break out. No doubt the Russians have paid great attention to commercial penetration. There is no harm in that; we penetrate commercially all over the world. At the same time we know that the Russian Government, under cover of commercial penetration, covers a good deal of other designs. Of course, they have their two organizations in Soviet Russia: there is the Soviet Government of the Soviet Federal Union, and then they have also got their Third International, which is really another form of government, which is administered by Russia. Certain individuals are members both of the Government and the Third International. The Third International is out first of all to destroy Russia and break down all capitalist enterprise all over the world and establish the government of the proletariat. In its efforts to do that it has indeed completely wrecked Russia. The Russian Union of Soviet Republics wants to re-establish Russia to a certain extent, and attract foreign capital to re-establish the country. The Third International cannot stand seeing Russia really re-established, by capitalism as they think, because that would upset their principles, so that these two are rather at loggerheads. That has been seen in several instances. Once in Germany, when the Soviet Government had practically established good trade relations in that country and was in a fair way to attract German capital, the Germans discovered some Third International emissaries hidden away in the Russian Trade Embassy, plotting against the German State. Of course, the Russian Government repudiate such emissaries, but there is no doubt they are closely mixed up together. Though their aims are the same, their methods are different. Another point is, as Colonel Lewis said, that the Russians do "propagand" against us as a capitalist state. They do that in other parts of the world, but I think they found that definitely they must modify that attitude when they formulated their designs against India, because we cannot be regarded as a capitalist oppressor in India. We are an Imperialist, and it was as an Imperialist ruler that they decry us in India—an Imperialist oppressor. If they had gone for the capitalist in India they would have had to go for the Indians, the big cotton merchants of Bombay and other big Indian industrial centres. They are the capitalists; we are not really the capitalists in India. It is as an Imperial oppressor that they attack us there. They do the same against us, I think, in practically every part of the world, but especially in the East. When they get a bit further east, they find themselves up against the

difficulty that they cannot talk about the Japanese as capitalist oppressors. The fact is that the Bolshevik methods are rather protean; they alter methods to suit local circumstances. As the Lecturer and Colonel Lewis pointed out, they have gone in for establishing small nationalities, and basing the benefits they offer to these people on establishing these nationalities, and I am afraid we have got to go back to someone now deceased, who talked about "self-determination of the smaller nations." That catchword has become the curse of the world. That expression, when put into practice, has lost us a good deal and the Russians are playing that catchword against us as hard as they can in Asia, and against other countries on their western frontier in Europe.

In the paper which has been read to-day the author advocates the extension and improvement of communications and trade and the development of Afghan Seistan as the best methods by which we can counteract Bolshevik intrigue in Afghanistan, which is really directed against our command of the situation by holding India, to which country they hope to extend their subversive operations eventually. These proposed methods have their merits, I admit, but in my opinion they are inadequate, and although in following them we might claim to be acting disinterestedly, in practice they would appear to be the exact counterpart of those of our antagonists.

I believe that the King of Afghanistan, like the Shah of Persia, is really quite inclined to accept or retain the friendship of England. But in both cases the difficulty of doing so openly is the same. Through both countries Bolshevik Russia is working, mostly underground, with the view to destroying our supremacy in India and over the sea route connecting that country with Europe. Towards this end they have no hesitation in stirring up rebellion among the subjects of the two rulers I have mentioned, and in both cases I feel pretty sure that the two astute personages have realized that any marked display of friendship towards us and acceptance of our guidance would only intensify the activity of the Bolshevik organization, which would foment disturbances among the people against any reforms or improvements which the ruler might establish at our instigation. It is therefore necessary that we should work unostentatiously. In Afghanistan in particular—and I must restrict my remarks to that country—it is necessary that we should, as Englishmen, win the respect and perhaps the affection of the people as well as those of their ruler. In his efforts at reform he has to overcome the narrow-minded opposition of the mullahs, so whatever course we follow it is absolutely essential that we should avoid any semblance of religious subversion. It is my firm belief that in order to attain the objects I have mentioned, the most powerful instrument we could take in our hand is that of hospital work—not medical missions. At our Legation in Kabul we should have a considerable

medical staff, well equipped for both medical and surgical practice I have no doubt that the King would provide or facilitate the provision of accommodation for this. The personnel would have to be carefully selected, and a knowledge of modern colloquial Persian should be an essential qualification, for that is the language of the country—not Pushtu, as usually supposed. In addition to the requirements for a stationary hospital, there should be provided equipment for travelling dispensaries, which could be carried on mules, and sent periodically to visit the villages up to forty or fifty miles from the capital; I feel sure that the safety of such parties would be guaranteed by the King. By these means the good name of our race would gradually permeate the minds of the people, and in a few years' time hospitals with similar equipment might be established at Kandahar, Herat, and perhaps also in the very teeth of the Bolsheviks at Balkh or Mazar-i-Sherif, and extend our reputation even further afield. The cost of such organization would be insignificant when weighed against the advantages both to the Afghans and ourselves that we may reasonably expect from them. The personnel should be purely English in the higher grades, and Anglo-Indian in the subordinate ranks. The menials could be obtained locally in Afghanistan.

Major ROUTE: There are three small points. I was in Kabul in November. One of the points is the large amount of Soviet money which is being spent in Afghanistan in the spread of disaffection. It does not mean much at present, but it is raising up a force which may be a great danger in upsetting the present arrangement later on. Another point which has not been touched upon is the extraordinary high prestige of the British in Kabul at present. That is due partly to the policy of the British Government, but a good deal to the British Minister, Sir Francis Humphrys. (Applause.) It is very notable as compared with the other nations, the Germans, and particularly the Italians, and to some extent the Russians. There is one other point which was mentioned—that is, the communications with India. There is reason to believe that this matter is not being forgotten. I am not in a position to say what arrangements have been made, but I think both the Amir and the British Government do realize the importance of communications between the North-West Frontier and Kabul, and we may expect to see something in the not very distant future. (Applause.)

Colonel STOKES: Sir Edmund Barrow, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I do not know who wrote this paper, but from my own knowledge of the correctness of his account of the earlier effort made by the Bolsheviks, I am inclined to think that the second part is probably equally true. The Bolsheviks started out at the beginning with the intention of Bolshevizing the Mohammedans of Asia. That was due to their ignorance of the Mohammedans of Asia; because anybody who knew

them at all, knew that Bolshevism would not appeal to them, and was bound to fail. They have seen it fail, and have started a far cleverer and much more promising game. They are trying to disintegrate those Mohammedan nations by the application of the Wilsonian policy of self-determination. It is a grave danger to us, and a much more difficult thing to meet. The writer of the paper seems to me to suggest that we should adopt the methods on our side which the Bolsheviks are adopting on theirs, but that seems to me to be merely playing their game. We have got a wall between Russia and ourselves, and Russia is a perfectly open and candid enemy. Nothing could be more open than the enmity of the Bolsheviks towards us, and if the Bolshevik has taken a pickaxe to knock the wall down from his side, it seems absurd to take another pickaxe and knock it down from ours. That leaves the problem unsolved. The question is, what can be done to stop it? I do not believe any amount of roadmaking or commercial penetration is going to help us. I think if you are going in for road-making in order to help the Amir, you are assuming in the first place that the Amir wants your help, and you are taking the problem a stage further than it has yet gone. I do not think the problem is so desperate as that. But the question of Afghanistan is only one portion of a much bigger general problem which is threatening us, and which, so far as I can see, no attempt is made to deal with. We have got between Russia and ourselves Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. In the old days it was considered that our policy was to keep those three buffer states going, and if anybody knows a better policy they have not yet produced it. Unfortunately, for the last twenty-five years not so actively, but for the last ten or fifteen years very actively, we have been out apparently to destroy Turkey. At least we have convinced the Mohammedan world that such is our intention, and that is to-day the root of the problem in Turkey. You would have no Mosul question if the Turk was not profoundly convinced that Mr. Lloyd George's policy and the policy of the British Government as carried on to-day is the destruction of Turkey. If you can remove that, you can have everything you want, and no Mosul question. Why does Turkey want Mosul? We have done exactly what Colonel Lewis described the Russians as doing in 1885, when they sat down in the middle of a racial area. We have got half the Kurds in Iraq and half in Turkey, and the Turk says, "That is the lever they want to hold in their hands; they want to make trouble for us whenever they like," and obviously if we have half the Kurds in our hands we can always make trouble for Turkey. I submit to you this problem is not to be treated piecemeal. It is a perfectly connected problem. Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan are the barrier between us and Russia. Imperialist Russia was aggressive, we made agreements which were not kept very well; but we kept the thing going. Bolshevik Russia is openly hostile

and out to destroy the Indian Empire, which it believes to be our Achilles heel. Meanwhile, what are we doing? Nothing at all. The British Ambassador to Turkey lives in Constantinople. Do we treat any other state like that? The British Ambassador to France does not live in Calais but Paris. The amenities of Kabul are probably not much greater than those of Angora, but the policy of the British Foreign Office appears to be to hold Turkey at arm's length, not to be friends with her, but wait and see. The situation, as described in this paper we have heard read to us, is, to my mind, serious and not to be neglected. To counteract—I do not think you can really counteract the trouble by making roads and commercial penetration—that puts you in a position to help Afghanistan if the next stage comes. But surely we ought to prevent the next stage coming at all, and the question is, how are we to do that? What we want is a constructive policy of friendship with these three Mohammedan countries. We do not want one inch of their territory; we have got no conflict of interests. I shall be told there is Mosul, but the Mosul question need not exist if you hold out the hand of friendship to these Mohammedan peoples. But I doubt very much whether this problem has ever been regraded as a whole in the Foreign Office. Although we have Sir Austen Chamberlain saying we have every desire to live in peace and amity with Turkey, our actions do not keep with our words. This is a very big and serious problem that faces us, if we are now to keep the British Empire going and keep India. (Applause.)

General Sir GEORGE MACMUNN: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have had some very interesting and informative remarks made on the lecture. One thing I would like to point out, and that is if the worst comes to the worst, and in the course of the next ten or twenty years Soviet Russia insists on crossing the Kabul frontier with the desire of adding to the factitious republics some of the Afghan territory, it will no doubt be necessary for us to assist the King of Kabul against them. As has been mentioned, up to the time when the present Amir insisted on invading India—entirely unprovoked, just after the Great War was over—we had guaranteed his frontiers against Russia, and up to the day of the Great War the whole energy of the military authorities in India was devoted to preparing to carry out that obligation if necessary; and we were quite prepared, if need be, to send troops to Afghanistan, and generally to back up the Afghan forces against Russia. We are far better able to do it now than we were then, if we are compelled to do so. As Colonel Stokes has told you, it must be our policy to support these Mohammedan kingdoms, so long as they are worthy of it, that lie between us and Russia, whether Imperial or Soviet. We shall have to support Afghanistan, and are now in a far better position to do so than formerly. When we guaranteed the protection of Afghanistan by force of arms against Russia there was not a motor-car prac-

tically, certainly not a motor-lorry, in the whole of India, and no motor road in Afghanistan or on the frontier. Now not only is there a considerable force of motor transport of the Indian Government, but industrial India has motor transport, and Great Britain has plenty to send. In addition to that we have motor works and repair shops in India, and these must increase; we have doubled the railway from Peshawar to the frontier, and have very much improved the railway line to the Quetta frontier, and very much improved the whole of our railway reserves. Therefore, if the worst comes to the worst, we are in a very much better position to support Afghanistan against her neighbours than formerly. No one wants more war, and certainly neither this country nor India; but we cannot allow a scoop of Afghanistan by Soviet Russia as part of their design to destroy India by Soviet penetration. But at the present period, just as the essential demand is for economy here, so in India is the demand the same, and I see no hope of the Indian Government being willing or able to adopt any methods of pacification of the frontier such as Colonel Lewis would wish to take. However urgent it may be to take over the tribal country, you may be certain we shall not do it. It is too costly, and Government must adopt the policy of sitting tight and hoping for the best. Such preparations for trouble as are possible will no doubt be made, and our own Foreign Office and the Indian Government are watching closely what the Soviet people are doing. There is only one way to meet propaganda—that is, by counter-propaganda; you must spread as good a story as the other fellow if you would prevail. I think the Indian Government understand that, and there is no better propaganda, as Colonel Stokes has said, than the extraordinary influence which the British Minister in Kabul is obtaining, and the general good opinion of the English that is prevailing in public opinion there compared with the attitude of other Europeans with whom the Afghans are in touch. It is a great source of strength to imperial Britain that even if people do not like us, which I doubt, they trust us. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: As no one else will step in, I must sum up. I am sorry, because I did not come prepared to speak on this occasion, but have at the last moment been compelled to take the chair. The paper was, as I said, needlessly short; we could have listened to a much longer and fuller paper with advantage; but, on the other hand, it has left us more time for discussion, and we have had the advantage of hearing speakers well acquainted with the subject, two of whom have recently come from Kabul. The only point I might say something about is Colonel Stokes's remark that he relied on a combination of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan to oppose the Soviet menace.

Colonel STOKES: Not exactly that. You have got to keep those three countries independent. I do not say they would combine to resist Russia; you have got to keep them going between you and Russia.

The CHAIRMAN: That modifies the remarks I was going to make. It is true they could form a barrier which might be valuable, but at the same time I am not hopeful about such a barrier. I have been all my life a Turkophile and Russophobe, but at the present moment I feel that the conditions under which I was a Turkophile have completely changed, and what we may now have to meet is a Russian and Turkish combination. Personally, I no longer believe in the Russian menace. The whole situation is so changed. Modern political progress—railways, steam communication, and such-like modifications—have put it out of the power of Russia to invade India in the easy way that they so jauntily contemplated twenty, thirty, or forty years ago. They seemed to think in the old days that the invasion of India was a simple problem; that they had only to enter Afghanistan, march through it, rouse the border, and drive us away from the frontier. But I think that the Soviets, in spite of their general military ignorance, recognize that it is not a feasible proposition under present circumstances, and that Afghanistan may be a barrier to themselves. If, as Colonel Stokes said, we can get Afghan support, there need be no fear of Russia. Those who have little acquaintance with the countries mentioned may suppose, from the position they occupy on the map, that invasion by them is quite a possible proposition. Afghanistan is, however, one of the most difficult countries in the world. It is seamed with mountains in every direction, and its tribes, though not autonomous, would all be united against *any* invader. There are no people in the world who would more readily rise to fight if their country were invaded. I believe that as long as we can keep Afghanistan on our side there is no fear of invasion by Russia. The distances, the local difficulties, and also the low organizing power of the Russians, will be, I might say, always on our side. They are sure to commit ghastly mistakes, and I hope we shall profit by them. I do not think I need detain you any longer. I entirely agree with much of what has been said by the last speaker, General MacMunn. I believe we are now in a very much better position to resist Russia, and that the Russian difficulties are probably far greater than they were even in Tsarist times.

I am sure you will all support me in giving a hearty vote of thanks to the speakers who have come here to-day, as well as to General Sir WILLIAM THOMSON, who kindly read the paper which gave us the substance on which to open a discussion. (Applause).

THE BAKHTIARIS*

By SIR ARNOLD T. WILSON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.

No apology is needed for the following attempt to explain and elucidate the early origin of the Bakhtiari tribes and to give some account of their way of life, for this branch of the great Lur family has played an important part in recent history. It was their action in 1909 which made the establishment of the present constitutional régime in Persia possible, but they have a greater title to our gratitude and to fame than this. The greatest oil-field in the world—that of Masjid-i-Sulaiman—is situated in their territory, and has been worked under the protection of guards supplied by their chiefs and by labour drawn to a great extent from their tribes for the best part of twenty years in a spirit of entire amity and goodwill. The Bakhtiari tribes occupy the large tract of mountainous country in Southern Persia lying roughly between longitude 48° 40' and 51° E., bounded on the south by the great plain of Khuzistan and on the north by the high-lying submontane districts of Chahar Mahal, Faraidun, and Khunsar.

RACIAL ORIGIN.—"Who the Lurs are," says Curzon, writing in 1890, "and whence they came is one of the unsolved and insoluble riddles of history." He quotes Rich, who declared the Bakhtiaris to be Kurds, and mentions the further speculation that the Bakhtiaris are the relics of one of the Greek colonies left by Alexander in Asia, a hypothesis for which the further support is claimed of the similarity of the Greek and Bakhtiari national dances. It has also been suggested that they are Turks, Semites, and Kurds, and it has even been suggested that they originate in Bactria owing to the similarity to European, but not to Persian, ears of the words "Bactria" and "Bakhtiari." Recent research into Bakhtiari tradition suggests that none of these assertions is entirely correct, but that there is an element of truth in all of them.

The legend that tribesmen tell to explain their origin is connected with the son of Mardas, Zuhag, who, at the invitation of the people of Persia, invaded that country, overthrew Jamshid, the fourth of the mythical kings of Persia, and reigned in his stead. Zuhag, so the legend runs, was at first wise and virtuous like his father, but later he was tempted by the devil to slay his father and seize the throne. A victim to ambition, "by which sin the angels fell," he did so, and became the slave of the devil, who begged to be allowed to kiss his

* Lecture given at the Royal Society of Arts on March 4, 1926, to the Royal Asiatic Society, the Central Asian Society, and the Persia Society, illustrated by a film "Grass," kindly lent by the Famous Players Film Co., Ltd.

shoulders and to touch them with his eyes. Flattered, Zuhag agreed, and from each shoulder sprouted a black serpent. Many remedies were tried, but without avail; when cut off the reptiles grew again. Again the devil appeared, disguised as a physician, and prescribed as a remedy that the serpents should be fed daily on the brains of men, a diet that would ultimately prove fatal to them.

Daily two young men were slain to provide the serpents with their appointed food; after a time, however, the servants of Zuhag substituted sheeps' brains, permitting the human victims who were brought for execution to the palace to escape to the mountains on condition that they never left their fastnesses, lest the trick be discovered. Followed by their wives and families these young men fled to the hills, where they lived, calling themselves Bakht Yari—the lucky ones.

According to another legend they are the descendants of a Moghul named Bakhtyar, who came with the Turks of Tūrān when Afrasiab invaded Persia in the reign of Gushasp. The descendants of this man took to the mountains and defied all comers—even the redoubtable Parthians, till Ardeshir (Artaxerxes) the Sassanian subdued them and put over them rulers who lived in this mountain and carved the monuments which may be seen to this day at Malamir and elsewhere.

A third legend claims that the Bakhtiari were town dwellers till the time of Darius III. (Codomarius), "Darya Valm," who was placed on the throne of Persia about 336 B.C. by the eunuch Bagoas; at this time oppression caused many to abandon their towns and fly to the hills, where they became the progenitors of the Bakhtiari.

The Haft Lang branch of the Bakhtiari include under their ægis tribes of widely different origin and characteristics. In the warm depths of the Karun valley are to be found several communities of Arab origin, speaking a dialect which includes many Arabic words. These are the Arab Gao Mish, who, as their name implies, make their livelihood by keeping herds of buffaloes. The buffalo has no place among the stock of the true Bakhtiari nomad.

There are also several tribes of "Turks" who are in tributary relation to the Haft Lang chiefs, and are probably of Qashgai origin. These speak a dialect of Turkish identical with that of their Qashgai forbears.

Mention must also be made of the Zangina, a tribal subdivision who claim to have come from Kurdistan some ten generations back: there are also numerous other fragments of non-Bakhtiari origin, such as the Shalu-i-Haidar Khani who live in Dizward, a district between Dehdiz and Qal'ah Madrasah on the Sfehan road. This group are Jagatānis who migrated from Shiraz 500 years ago, and their chiefs trace their descent from Changiz Khan. Again, the Suhid, a subdivision of the Dīnārūnī, who are classed as Dīraki, are really of Kūhgalū extraction, having come from Tāshūn in the Bahmai country some ten

generations ago. To this day they retain their predatory instincts and have an unenviable reputation.

One of their chiefs traces his descent from Kaikubâd.

Another section of the Duraki, the 'Arab-i-Ali Beg, trace their descent from the Mahâwi, a tribe of Arabs who in former times lived in Bulaiti near Shûshtar, and are of Beni Turuf origin. Owing to internal dissensions a portion of them fled to the Bakhtiari country in the days of J'afar Quli Khân. They have prospered and own large flocks of buffaloes.

The Bâbâdi from time immemorial have been wild and lawless, and by successive governments have been driven out from various habitats for this reason, till at last they have come to rest among the rugged mountains of the Zardeh Kuh. Originally they were Arzâqeh Arabs living in Mesopotamia, migrating in the time of the 'Abbâsid Caliphate to Basrah, where they remained six years. They moved thence to Ahwaz, but their lawless habits secured their expulsion to Andakib, whence they were again displaced, till they came to rest in their present habitat. They defied Nâdir Shah, who inflicted some punishment on them; the first Ilkhani to bring them under control was Husain Quli—he was also the last—and they have an unenviable, or perhaps we should say enviable, reputation for lawlessness.

Tribal legend and tribal tradition thus both indicate that the group of hill tribes now collectively known as the Bakhtiari are, in point of fact, refugees drawn from half a dozen different races, who have been absorbed into the original Iranian stock.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.—The ordinary tribesmen are destitute of any bookish education or knowledge of the outer world, though they may visit the neighbouring towns as foreigners for commerce or barter, but the exigencies of their active, roving life, ever confronting them with the unmitigated dangers of rugged mountains and swift rivers, and exposing them to the vicissitudes of climate and weather, keep their wits in a state of intelligent activity.

Pastoral people are not usually fools, and the ideal nomad grazier should be a combination of Rob Roy and the Lowland Scottish shepherd. The Bakhtiari has more of Rob Roy perhaps than of the shepherd in him, and his natural pastimes, when left to pursue his own courses, are rather raiding and robbery than poetic reflection or philosophic meditation.

Considering his surroundings and his neighbours, it is not altogether surprising if the Bakhtiari is a man of violence and not unacquainted with sin. If under the discipline of relatively powerful chiefs his quick temper may find satisfaction in belabouring a quarrelsome or sulky wife, or hurling himself on an annoying brother Bakhtiari, rather than in the excitement and danger of an attack on a neighbouring tribe, and if petty thieving and pilfering often take the place of robbery

under arms and other high enterprise, it is by no means always so. At least the manliness of the race has not as yet been assailed by the debasing influences of law courts with their chicane and false swearing to another's hurt. It is perhaps unnecessary for me to add that the average Bakhtiari tribesman is physically as fine a man as is to be found in any country, capable of extraordinary feats of endurance, wayward as a child and as lovable withal, a loyal friend and a good workman.

TRIBAL DIVISIONS.—The Bakhtiari tribe is divided into two parts, the Haft Lang and the Chahar Lang. Two reasons are given by tribesmen for the division. According to one account, Bakhtyar the Mughul had two wives from whom he had four and seven sons respectively; from these eponymous heroes sprang the Chahar and the Haft Lang.

Another tradition is that the tribe was originally undivided. One day, however, they divided for the purposes of a raid into two parties, and in the fighting that ensued four from one party and seven from the other were killed, taken captive, or left behind, from which circumstance the divisional names arose.

DESCRIPTION OF THE HAFT LANG.—The large majority of the Haft Lang are nomadic, and in the course of their seasonal migrations cover all the central part of the tribal territory.

In the winter they are found scattered among the low hills and undulating valleys fringing the Arabistan plains; but with the arrival of the vernal equinox they begin to turn their faces northwards, and then gradually make their way to the lofty central ranges and the high-lying and hill-girt plains beyond, which border on and shelve down to the central Iranian plateau. Autumn again sees them retracing their arduous steps along unmade tracks over the intervening ranges to their winter haunts.

Though nomads whose principal interests centre in their flocks and herds, they are not, like many of their cousins of Luristan, a pastoral people of the straitest sect, for they also practise agriculture. Indeed, many tribes cultivate two sets of crops, sowing wheat, barley, and other cereals in the uplands (yailaq) in autumn, which they reap on their return in the following summer, and again sowing wheat and barley in the garmsir (lowlands) in winter, to reap and harvest which some of their number remain behind when the general exodus takes place in spring.

The Haft Lang have absorbed, from time to time, many non-Iranian elements: the Behdarwand and the Babadi, for example, both claim to be of Arab descent, and Ranking* states that only the Duraki are of purely Lur descent (and even the Duraki includes many non-Iranian sections).

As a result of this varied composition, the component clans of the

Haft Lang show much more independence than those of the Chahar Lang.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAHAR LANG.—The Chahar Lang are now numerically inferior and confined principally to the south-east portion of the country, where they live a more or less sedentary life, and to its north and west frontiers, where they are nomadic. They are now (1926) independent of the Haft Lang khans, and pay taxation and receive orders from the Persian Government direct or through the local representatives of the Central Government.

Like the Haft Lang, though predominantly Iranian, they are of mixed race: the Makwandi, for example, who live round Jaru, came from Mecca, perhaps in the fourth century, when the Persian king Anushirwan conquered all Arabia.

Up till the middle of the last century the hegemony of the Bakhtiari tribe rested with the Chahar Lang, but with the fall of the family of Muhammad Taqi Khan Kiunarsi his rival Jafar Quli Khan, grandfather of the present ruling khans, took his place, and established the general ascendancy of the Haft Lang, which was maintained until 1924, when the Persian Government as a matter of policy decided to detach the Chahar Lang from the control of the Ilkhani and Ilbegi and to deal with them direct, as they are now doing.

The experiment has on the whole been successful and is undoubtedly popular with the Chahar Lang and with their chiefs, though the difficulties of the latter are augmented by the presence at certain times of the year of large numbers of nomadic Haft Lang tribesmen with their flocks.

The Chahar Lang may be divided geographically into two parts—namely, (1) the division living in the Junaqan Garmsir, known as the Junaqan or sometimes by the family name of their chiefs, Chahar Lang-i-Kiunarsi, or, as they more correctly should be called, the Chahar Lang-i-Kiunars; and (2) the division which has its habitat in Faridun, known as the Mahmud Salihi.

CHAHAR LANG-I-KIUNARSI.—(1) The chiefs of the Junaqan or Chahar Lang-i-Kiunarsi are:

- (a) The sons of Khuda Karam Khan,
- (b) Mahmud Khan of Dalun,
- (c) Muhammad Husain Khan of Munganun,

who are cousins.

Khuda Karam Khan was the grandson of Muhammad Taki Khan, who is best known on account of his friendship with Sir H. Layard, G.C.B., who spent several years of his life (*circa* 1841) among the Bakhtiari. The foundation of British friendship with the Bakhtiari, which has since become traditional, were laid by him.

The genealogy of the Khuda Karam Khan branch is as follows: Khuda Karam Khan, son of Ali Riza Khan, son of Muhammad

Taki Khan, son of Hassan Khan, son of Fath Ali Khan, son of Hassan Khan, son of Zaman Khan, who had his habitat at a place called Kiars, situated in the present Chehar Mahal.

The name Kiars may be traced in the name "Kiar," which is the name of one of the four divisions which go to make up the Chehar Mahal, the four divisions of which are : Chehar Mahal, Mizdaj, Lar, and Kiar.

Family tradition makes Zaman Khan descendant of the great Djemsheed (Jamshid) who lost his kingdom of Persia to Zuhag, the son of Mardas, and who, as I have mentioned elsewhere, figures largely in Bakhtiari legends and traditions.

The legends regarding the great Jamshid are too numerous, too fantastic, and too varied for inclusion here ; suffice it to say that he is credited with supernatural powers. Through Jamshid and his father, Hushang, the son of Siamak, "who fought with the barbarians called Deeves, assisted by lions and tigers," Zaman Khan's descent is traced to Kiunars, to whom is attributed the title of "Gil Shah," or "King of the World," who had his capital at Balkh and whose sovereign sway was even acknowledged by the wild beasts of the forest.

In bygone days the Kiunarsi used to live in Faridun, with the sister branch of the Chahar Lang, and having quarrelled and become "Yaghi" (rebellious) they migrated to Malamir, where they settled independent of the Haft Lang Bakhtiari. In the end of November, 1841, the Mutamid-ud-Dauleh, at that time Governor of Isfahan, Luristan, and Persian Arabia, demanded a sum of 10,000 tumans from Muhammad Taki Khan, a part of which, 3,000 tumans, was revenue to the Royal Treasury. Muhammad Taki Khan not having the necessary sum, and being unwilling to extort it from the tribesmen under his rule for fear of alienating their sympathies, had to procrastinate, till at last the Mutamid-ud-Dauleh in desperation complained to Muhammad Shah and accused Muhammad Taki Khan of intriguing with exiled princes in Bagdad, of dishonouring Royal drafts on him, and of refusing to pay tribute. The result of which was that the Mutamid-ud-Dauleh was ordered to coerce this recalcitrant Chahar Lang chief in the following spring. The Mutamid-ud-Dauleh came, and with a large following was the guest of Muhammad Taki Khan, after which he went to Shushtar, but returned again to attack his former host in his fort at Kaleh Tul. Muhammad Taki Khan fled and took refuge with Shaikh Thamir of the Ka'b in the Fallahieh marches, was treacherously taken prisoner by the Mutamid-ud-Dauleh, and sent to Tehran, where he died in 1851.

On his death the chieftainship of the Chahar Lang passed to four men—namely, Ali Riza Khan, Ali Muhammad Khan, Ali Murad Khan, and Ali Quli Khan, the first of whom, however, appears to have been the only one of any account among them, and on his death, in 1879, the chieftainship passed to his son, Mirza Agha Jan.

The Chahar Lang were at the zenith of their power in the time of Muhammad Taki Khan, and after his death appear to have lost cohesion and to have gradually fallen a prey to the ambition of the Haft Lang chiefs, who, since that time, have been the ruling branch of the Bakhtiaris, and possessed themselves of the territories occupied by the Chahar Lang—namely, Junaki and Malamir.

THE RULING CHIEFS.—The present ruling chiefs trace their descent from one Haidar-i-Kur, the blind or, rather, one-eyed chief of the tribe of Papi, who inhabit the rocky fastnesses north of Dizful, west of the Diz. This chief Haidar having quarrelled with his own tribe in the reign of Fath Ali Shah, took refuge with the Khidhiri, now known as the Khidhir Surkh subdivision of the Zaraswand. This subdivision was at that time ruled over by one Khidhir, whose shepherd and servant Haidar became. Tradition has it that after Haidar had served Khidhir for some time the other chiefs, relatives and some say brothers of Haidar, came in search of him from Luristan, and after much wandering came to Khidhir, who from them learnt of the noble birth of his shepherd. Being ashamed of his churlish treatment of a man of high birth, Khidhir sent out robes to the shepherd and a party to bring him in from the mountains, where he was tending his master's flocks. On his return, his brothers tried to persuade the quondam shepherd to return with them and again take up the chieftainship of his tribe, but without success, and returned to their homes. Haidar was now received into the family of Khidhir, who gave him his daughter in marriage, by whom Haidar had one son, Ghalib, whom he taught to read and write. This man, when he grew up, became the confidant and scribe of the chief of the Khidhiri, and so gradually increased in power, and his sons after him, till their descendants gradually ousted the rightful chiefs of the Zaraswand, and eventually made themselves masters of the tribe. One of these, by name Ali Salih Khan, accompanied Nadir Shah, at the head of Bakhtiari sowars, on his expedition to India. Omitting a few generations, we come to Jafar Quli Khan, son of Asad Khan, in whom the present ruling chiefs have a common ancestor. Jafar Quli's competent sons, Hussain Quli Ilkani and Imam Quli Haji Ilkani, each held the Ilkhan-ship on their father's death for varying periods, and each dying, left behind him a large family. They were succeeded by Isfandiari Khan and Mohammad Hussain Khan, who worked together as Ilkhani and Ilbegi with wisdom and unanimity. They, like their respective fathers, were recognized by the Persian Government as hereditary leaders of the tribes and as governors of the province, for the revenue and security of which they were held directly responsible in virtue of patents of governorship, which conferred on them the titles of Ilkhani and Ilbegi respectively, appointments much coveted for the authority they conferred.

Isfandiari died in 1903, after thirteen years' unbroken tenure of office, and Mohammad Hussain Khan in 1905. The subsequent history of the ruling family is one of dissension and disunion, with the inevitable result.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL REMAINS.—Evidences of antiquity in the form of ancient roads and the remains of ancient bridges and buildings are to be found in almost every large valley, along every existing main road, and in most of the larger cultivated plains, and it is quite clear that at a very early date in Persian history—probably during the Achæmenian Period—it was part of a settled policy of the rulers of Persia to maintain good communications between north and south through the Zagros Range. Some of the main trunk roads can be traced to-day: one of them started from Shushtar, crossed the Diz, the Karkhah, and the Kashgan, or was joined by subsidiary tracks crossing these rivers, and went north through Khurramabad to Burujird, with a branch to Kermanshah through Tehran.

The Kashgan River is crossed three times between Khurramabad and its junction with the Karkhah by bridges of very great strength and beauty, which are only partially ruined even now. Of these bridges, two probably date from the Arab conquest; they are of similar construction to the great bridge at Arrejan and Behbahan. They consist of a series of eighteen or twenty piers of solid masonry, each pier (I speak from memory) being some 15 by 12 feet in size, with oval ends faced with cut limestone, the centre consisting of rough blocks of limestone set in a very fine quality of lime, the strength of which is such that, where the piers have been undermined by the gradual cutting back of the river and have fallen into the stream, instead of being disintegrated by the water they have been slightly worn away, cut into pot-holes, scoured and polished by gravel, as if they were a single boulder and not an artificial conglomerate.

The third bridge, which is between the first two, is known as Pul-i-Kalhur and is probably of Sassanian or possibly earlier date.

We have no certain knowledge of any arched bridges in Persia previous to the Sassanian Period, and only of one in Iraq—viz., at Babylon. It is a curious fact that the word "bridge" occurs nowhere in the Old or the New Testament. The idea of arched bridges is certainly much older than the Romans, and it is reasonable to suppose that it originated in Persia, unless, as in so many other things, China can claim priority.

The earlier roads of the Achæmenian Dynasty were probably provided with rough timber bridges thrown across the rivers wherever possible. The geological formation of the Zagros makes this comparatively easy. The Karkhah, which is about the same size as the Karun, flows at the Pul-i-Tang through a narrow rift not more than 15 feet across at the top, and I have seen a Lur jump from

one side to the other without difficulty; though had he missed his footing, he would have fallen some 50 feet into the gorge. The Kashgan flows through a similar gorge at Pul-i-Kalhur, and there are similar narrow rifts on the Diz, the Zúrá, and several other rivers.

Every town of importance to-day seems to have been connected two thousand years ago by a good paved road with every other place of any size. Paved roads led from Persepolis to Shushan the palace, near Dizful, through Behbahan; another road led from Bandar Rig and Ganawah to Ram Hormuz. Behbahan-Isfahan, Malamir-Isfahan Malamir-Shushtar, were all connected, and a great caravan track led from Shushtar, through Haft Shahidan, over the Karun by a bridge the pillars of which can still be seen in the Landar gorge, northwards through Shimbar, where it forks, one branch going to Kaleh Bazuft and Ardal, another going probably over the Charri pass. There was, of course, a bridge across the Bard-i-Qamchi, and I have traced a well-defined caravan track from Gotwand through the Karun gorge on to the Lali plain and thence to Andakáh. Wherever the traveller goes in Persia—and more particularly in this district—if he keeps his eyes open he can see the remains of these roads, and often, running right across the existing track to-day, the foundations of early buildings consisting uniformly of large boulders laid on a rectangular plan; all that it is necessary to do, in order to get some idea of the antiquity of these ancient foundations and of the ancient rough walls of stone thrown across the passes and gorges all over the country, is to turn over one of the large stones and observe, as I have often done, that the surfaces which are buried are unweathered and are as fresh as when they were originally placed in position, whilst the exposed surfaces are heavily pitted and worn by centuries of exposure to the elements.

In the Faraun valley, north-east of the Malamir plain, there are some fine sculptures of Sassanian date, which are fully described by Layard:

"In a small defile or gorge, called Hong, I discovered five figures, somewhat under life size, carved on a detached rock. They appeared to represent, from their costumes, the meeting of a king of the Sassanian dynasty, followed by three attendants, with another king, perhaps a Roman emperor, on horseback. There was no inscription near them.

"I discovered another bas-relief near a ruined Imam-Zadeh known as Shah-Sawar.* The fall of part of a cliff on a hill-side had left the surface of the rock as if artificially scarped. Upon it was carved a tablet containing six figures, which appeared to me to belong to a much earlier period than the sculptures at Hong. They represented a king, probably of ancient Susiana or Elam, seated on a throne, receiving five captives with their arms bound behind their backs. These figures were

* "The king on horse-back."

scarcely two feet in height. An inscription, probably in the cuneiform character, which had once existed beneath them, had perished from the effects of time and weather.

"But the most remarkable remains that I discovered in Mal-Emir were those in a ravine called Kul-Fara, or Faraoun. I counted no less than three hundred and forty-one small figures sculptured in the rock. They occupied five different tablets, and were accompanied by a long and perfectly preserved inscription of twenty-four lines in the Susianian cuneiform character. There were, moreover, short inscriptions carved across some of the figures.*

"The largest tablet, which was high up on the face of the rock, but easily accessible, contained ten figures, and appeared to represent a sacrifice. Men were seen in it bearing animals, and playing on instruments of music before an altar, near which stood a priest. The heads of most of the figures had been purposely defaced, probably by the early Musulman occupants of the country.

"The three faces of a large triangular detached rock were covered with similar figures, also represented as engaged in sacrifice or in some religious ceremony. The same subject was repeated on a second detached rock, and in a third tablet, with one hundred and thirteen small figures, in a kind of recess in the hill-side. In another recess was a bas-relief representing a king seated on his throne, with attendants, priests, and others worshipping before him. On a fallen rock at the entrance to the gorge I found the figure of a man about seven feet high—apparently a priest, as his hands were raised as if in prayer. On one side of him were nine smaller figures, and four beneath him.†

In a cleft on the south-west side of the plain is the Shikaft-i-Salman, which contains another remarkable piece of sculpture of the same period.

These inscriptions, which have been published for the trustees of the British Museum, relate to the restoration of certain temples and the carving of the sculptures and inscriptions in this gorge by the king of the period, approximately the eighth century B.C. There is no question that the fertile plain of Malamir, near which these inscriptions stand, must at one time have been thickly inhabited. It was known, as late as the seventh century, as Idaj, and not one but half a dozen ancient paved causeways of the Sassanian period converge on the plain, one from the ancient bridge across the Karun at Bard-i-Qamchi, one from the ford at Susan and over the Kuh-i-Gugird to the north-west, one north-east, which is traversed by the present Ahwaz-Istahan road and

* These inscriptions are included in the first volume of the collection of cuneiform inscriptions published under Sir H. Layard's superintendence for the trustees of the British Museum.

† All these figures are fully described in Sir H. Layard's memoir published in the *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* for 1846.

is in almost as good a condition now as it was fifteen or twenty centuries ago. A fourth runs round a spur of the Mungasht, probably to Bars. The whole Bakhtiari country is seamed with these relics of a road system which for completeness has no parallel to-day.

There is also said to exist a sculptured tablet in the Shimbar gorge. Sawyer is responsible for the statement that on the summit of one of the Sabz-Kuh peaks is said to be the names inscribed in the rock by "a mighty hunter king that came from the north"; he climbed the summit (11,110 feet) over snow and crystalline rock, but heavy snow (in May) prevented him from seeing the inscription, if indeed it exists. He also describes in some detail a pedestal and column—the whole some six feet high, in a cave, the appearance of the whole suggesting to his mind the remains of a cross in a ready-made catacomb, 10,000 feet above the sea, the chosen meeting place for rude but faithful shepherds (and, after all, it was to shepherds that the angels first chose to appear). Though persecuted through many centuries, Christian (Armenian) communities still exist, and many are the stone-built villages which are attributed to former prosperous Christian communities that have been wiped out by past fanaticism.

Finally, the following tradition quoted by Sawyer concerning three lime-cemented buildings on low mounds commanding the approaches of the Gurab valley near Kaleh-Bazuft is worth quoting:

"Long before the days of the Khosroes, when bows and arrows were the only weapons and iron unknown, there lived in this neighbourhood a king, Farukh Padshah (Pharoe ?), who had three sons—Salmon, Tur, and Iraq. On the father's death the three sons, as in duty bound, quarrelled, and each built himself an impregnable eyrie, the remains of which still exist, and, bearing their names, vouch for the accuracy of the tradition. In due course they separated, and each formed an empire—the eldest, Salmon, went westwards to Rum; the second, Tur, to Turkestan; and the youngest, Iraq, became the founder of the Iranian Empire."

RECENT HISTORY.—In the reign of Shah Abbas (1586-1628) the Bakhtiaris helped to cut through the hills of Sohrab, which divide the headwaters of the Karun and the Zaindeh Rud, so that the waters of the former would supplement in summer the all too scanty supply afforded to the fields of the Isfahan plain by the latter: to this cutting, which was never finished, was given the name "Karkanun," an abbreviation of "Kar Kardanun" (the place where they have worked). At this time Jehangir Khan was chief of the Chahar Lang and lived at the mouth of the Tang-i-Baba Ahmad.

When Nadir Shah captured Delhi in March, 1739, he had with him 1000 Bakhtiari sowars under one Ali Salih Khan. On the assassination of Nadir Shah, in 1747, the Chahar Lang were under the powerful rule of Ali Mardan Khan, who had welded them into a homogeneous

whole and whose ambitions led him to seize Isfahan, declaring himself Shah and exercising royal prerogatives. He actually struck a coinage bearing his name; he was attacked not long afterwards, defeated, and later killed by another adventurer of not inferior calibre, Karim Khan Zend, himself a Lur, or rather a Lek, by descent.

As so often happens on the fall or death of a powerful chief, tribal dissensions followed; the Chahar Lang lost cohesion, the Kiunarsi section went to Junagan, with their headquarters at Malamir, whilst the sister branch, the Mahmud Salihi, remained in Faridun, where in 1794 they came under the yoke of the Haft Lang, who were ruled by Habibullah Khan; in the same reign (that of Muhammad Shah Khwajeh) Qalb Ali Khan made himself master of the Behdarwand: the Kiunarsi later were brought under control by Husain Quli Khan of the Haft Lang. The decline of the Chahar Lang dates from this event.

SPORT AND ANIMAL LIFE.—To sportsmen these regions are highly unsatisfactory. The lion, so common fifty years ago, is now extinct. The leopard and bear survive, but are now rare. The mountain goat (ibex) and mountain sheep are commoner, but are restricted for the most part to the most waterless and least attracted areas. The francolin is met with in fair quantities, but it affords but little sport, as it refuses to rise. The inhabitants, hardy mountaineers and idle at all times, are for ever scouring the hills in search of anything that will give an excuse for a shot in season and out of season. Males, females, and young, whatever has life is hunted down and shot. Stalked from every side, and not recognizing the demarcation laid down by man, a wounded bird is frequently the cause of a hunter's quarrel, the commencement perhaps of a tribal feud.

The comparative paucity of bird life is a surprise to the traveller, and his surprise is increased when he learns from the researches of the Russian Zarudny, and more recently of Woonnam and Cheesman, that the number of species observed by these experts in the course of a few months in the area runs into many hundreds.

ARTS AND CRAFTS.—As is the case with other nomadic tribes, the handiwork of the Bakhtiaris is restricted to their own requirements.

The women of the tribe weave coarse woollen carpets from the wool produced by their own flocks, the warp of which is usually of five-strand cotton, obtained from either Isfahan while in the high country, or Ramuz, Shushtar, or Dizful while in the low country. The five-strand cotton is imported from India, and is much preferred, though country-woven two-strand or three-strand is also used. The wool also is of similar material. The wool is dyed at home by the women with natural dyes, which are all, with the exception of the indigo-blue, crimson, and violet, obtained by them locally from the various plants and coloured earths. The peculiar orange which is such a striking

feature of Bakhtiari woven carpets is obtained by treating the ashes of a certain plant found in the mountains with the urine of oxen. The colours with the exceptions mentioned above are obtained from the same centres as the cotton, and happily for the industry the use of aniline dyes, either alone or as an admixture with fast dyes, is practically unknown among the Bakhtiari.

Besides carpets, the women weave a coarse woollen fabric, on the outer side of which a nap of about $\frac{1}{2}$ inch long is left, which is used chiefly for sewing up into sacks for the transport of grain, etc. This fabric is usually woven in lengths of about 9 feet 6 inches by 3 feet broad, which, in the finished form, are known as a "khur." The black goats'-hair cloth, used exclusively in the construction of their tents, is also woven by the women of the tribe, usually in lengths of about 20 by 3 feet. This is the "sack-cloth" of the Old Testament.

Crafts found among the tribes are few and of the most primitive nature, the most common being blacksmiths and carpenters, with here and there an armourer.

The national form of foot-gear, the "giveh," is also made by the tribesmen in its coarsest form, the soles by men called "giveh-kash," the uppers by those called "giveh-duz."

Each subdivision has its own "medicine-man"—it is impossible to concede to them the title of "doctor," for their attainments in the art of healing are as primitive as they themselves in appearance are uncouth—who relies solely on simples and incantations, which are looked upon as hereditary possessions. Such recoveries as are effected are due, not to the skill of the "medical men," but to the robust constitution with which the tribesmen and women are endowed. All the above arts and crafts are found among the sedentary population subject to Bakhtiari rule also, but, as is only to be expected in a higher degree of development, with the additions of masons and "gilim" weavers. The "gilim" is also woven, to some small extent, by the tribes, and is a woollen floor covering, usually about 9 by 4 feet, with a coloured pattern woven into it both sides alike, and has no pile. Another woollen fabric is produced, called "farsani," which takes its name from the village Farsan, in Mizdej, which is a variation of the "gilim." The "farsani" has a pattern in colours much resembling the pattern for which the "Panj Deh" Turkoman carpets are famous, is one-sided, and measures about 10 by 4 feet. It is used for a variety of purposes—floor and bed coverings, wrappings for other fabrics, etc.

The actual method of weaving in vogue among the nomads is very much the same as is met with in any other part of Persia, the setting up of the loom, the knotting, tying, and finishing, all being the same, the only difference being that the looms, which are hand-looms, are invariably horizontal among the Bakhtiari, as opposed to the vertical

looms met with in the Kashan, Sultanabad, and other districts. To describe it briefly the *modus operandi* is as follows:

The loom, raised about 18 inches off the ground, is set up horizontally in one of the black goats'-hair tents, and on it is strung the warp (Luri "farishdak"), which is sometimes of wool, more often of cotton, for which the five-strand cotton, imported from India, is preferred, though two- and three-strand country-woven is also used. Any number of women and girls, from two to fifteen according to the size of the carpet to be woven, sit on boards and set to work, each weaving about a width of 2 feet. They have no small boys, as in India, or young girls, as in other parts of Persia, to read out the number of stitches of each colour in the pattern, but trust to memory and a miniature design or a carpet which they may be copying.

Each stitch (Luri "gireh") is made by tying the front and back thread of the warp together with a piece of coloured wool in such a manner that the ends are brought out together between the threads tied together, with the "wrap round" below the ends of the wool, which are then cut off with a knife (Luri "kard"), leaving about $\frac{1}{2}$ inch of wool hanging from the knot.

This forms one stitch and the double ends constitute pile.

The process is repeated all along the line (Luri "chin") with the proper colours according to the pattern, and when a whole line is finished the shuttle (Luri "tap") is run through by hand with a cotton or woollen thread, according as the warp is of cotton or wool, to form the woof (Luri "miun tap") of the groundwork. Then the whole line is beaten down with an instrument resembling a heavy fork (Luri "karked" or "tapkub"), with blunt steel prongs fixed close together so as to insert themselves between the threads of the warp. Then the hanging ends, thus beaten close to the line below, are sheared off with a big scissors (Luri "qaichi") to an even length, so that the pile (Luri "khawb") may be even and compact, its length varying in direct ratio to the fineness of the carpet, the finer the shorter. If the lines of stitches are well and evenly beaten down the warp and woof should contain exactly the same number of stitches, but this exactitude is rarely met with, with a resulting slight elongation or contortion of the pattern. After the shearing the beams (Luri "pez") are reversed, the upper becoming the lower, and the warp-threads thus also reversed, the front becoming the back.

The carpet is commenced and finished by either knotting or plaiting the warp thread and weaving in a couple of strands of coloured cotton or wool, according to the material of the woof, between the so knotted or plaited threads and the first or last row of stitches. The edge-binding is done in the process of weaving as each line of stitches is finished, after each beating by the first and last girls of the workers, who wrap some strands of coloured wool round the edge-strings; as the

carpet increases in size, it is rolled round the beam nearest the workers, or in other cases the boards are shifted forward under the carpet, upon the finished portion of which the workers sit.

The rate of work varies with the expertness of the workers and the fineness of the carpet, but the average rate of work among the Bakhtiari per girl working on a width of 2 feet is 3 inches length in 10 hours.

The size of Bakhtiari carpets varies from about 7 feet by 4 feet 6 inches (over-all measurement) to 14 feet 3 inches by 7 feet 6 inches, the latter being the more common size among the nomads, while the larger sizes are made on the chiefs' own looms for their private use.

The quality also varies from 8 stitches (Luri "giroh") and 8 lines (Luri "chin") per inch (*i.e.*, 64 stitches per square inch) to 16 stitches and 14 lines per inch (*i.e.*, 224 stitches per square inch).

This may be contrasted with a good Ferahani silk carpet, containing 19 stitches and 20 lines per inch (*i.e.*, 380 stitches per square inch), or a good Kashani, containing 17 stitches and 16 lines per inch (*i.e.*, 272 stitches per square inch), or a good Kirmani, containing 16 stitches and 15 lines per inch (*i.e.*, 240 stitches per square inch).

The value of Bakhtiari carpets varies according to quality, size, etc., but to quote an example we may say that a well-woven carpet of the smaller size mentioned values about 15 tumans, while the larger size quoted values about 60 tumans. The women employed on the chiefs' looms are paid 2 krans and their food per diem plus 1 maund shah of wheat per month, all materials being found; the women and girls so employed are usually the relatives of the chiefs' own retainers or "amlajat."

Among the nomads the designs are indigenous and are usually broad, flowing floral designs in which animals sometimes appear, with broad borders, while the same holds good for the carpets woven on the chiefs' own looms, on which also designs of carpets from other districts are copied.

The point from which Bakhtiari carpets gain their individuality is their colouring, and it may not be without interest briefly to describe the methods employed by the nomads for producing those colours, and their method of production:

1. Royal blue (indigo-blue; Luri "abi").
2. Crimson (Luri "surkh-i-sir").
3. Violet (Luri "bunafsh").

The above are bought in the various trade marts, Isfahan, Ramuz, Shushtar, or Dizful.

4. Dark blue (Luri "surmai") is produced by an admixture of a greater percentage of indigo to water and less washing.

5. Black (Luri "mishki") is produced by boiling for a few hours a mixture of pounded pomegranate skins and blue vitriol ("zaq-i-siah")

and water, to which indigo is later added. This mixture is reboiled and the dye produced.

6. Light green (Luri "sauz-i-pistai"). The leaves of the apple tree, or for an olive green ("sauz") the leaves of the willow tree, are pounded up with alum and boiled up for a few hours with water, into which mixture wool which has already been dyed yellow is dipped.

7. Dark green (Luri "sauz-i-sir"). The leaves of a plant called "jaz," or of another plant "isfarak," are pounded up with alum and boiled with water. The wool to be dyed is steeped in the dye so produced for twenty-four hours, washed in running water for twenty-four hours, resteepled, rewashed, and put in the sun to dry.

8. Coffee colour (Luri "bukhur"). "Kela," which is the ashes of *Quercus ilex*, is mixed with the urine of oxen, to which a small percentage of water is added and the whole boiled. Into this is dipped wool which has already been dyed violet, and the depth of colour is regulated by the number of dippings and washings.

Another method of producing a very dark coffee colour is to steep the violet wool for three days, or longer if necessary, in stagnant water.

9. Buff. Camel's hair ("pashm" or "kirk-i-shutur") is used in its natural state.

10. Yellow (Luri "zard-i-limui"). The leaves of a plant called "gandal" are pounded and heated to the boil with alum and water.

11. Bakhtiari orange or golden yellow (Luri "zard-i-tilai"). The leaves of a plant called "gandal," madder ("runyas"), or, failing this, turmeric ("zarchuba"), and pomegranate skins are pounded up with alum and well boiled with water, to which a large percentage of the urine of oxen has been added. The wool to be dyed is dipped in this dye and then steeped in running water, and the longer the steepings the deeper the colour.

12. Scarlet (Luri "surkh"), "kala" (wood ash), madder, alum and the juice of unripe grapes ("ab-i-ghura") are well mixed together and then boiled in a mixture of water and urine of oxen. The various shades of this colour are obtained by increasing or decreasing the amount of grape juice. Shades of the colours are produced by increasing or decreasing the length of time allotted to steeping.

The usual process of dyeing is to steep the wool in the dye for twenty-four hours, wash in running water for twenty-four hours, resteeple and rewash for a similar length of time, and dry in the sun. A small quantity of bovine urine is added to the dye for the second dipping to ensure fastness of colouring.

This addition is regarded by the Lurs as a fixing agent, without which the colour would be evanescent.

DIALECT.—The Bakhtiari dialect has been studied by several European scholars, notably by Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) D. L. R. Lorimer, C.I.E., whose valuable monograph on the subject has been

published by the Royal Asiatic Society. He shows the Bakhtiari dialect to be in the main distinctly Iranian, with many old Pehlevi words omitted and with a few accretions from Arab, Turkish, and Kurdish tribal sources.

The Bakhtiari is an out-door animal and a mountain dweller, and is accustomed to exercising his lungs, if occasion require, across a valley or down a hillside. The less sophisticated tribesman is, therefore, apt to be a noisy companion in a drawing-room; on the other hand, he has, as a rule, the merit of articulating clearly, and the Bakhtiari dialect is in consequence not displeasing to the ear, and has a real fascination for students of languages by the reason of its vividness and the wealth of homely imagery which is employed in every-day speech.

We have seen that the typical Bakhtiari is a shepherd, cattle-owner, and nomad; we have seen that he is also an agriculturist, that the country he inhabits is wild and savage, and that he is constantly exposed to the severities of nature, to heat and cold, to rain and snow and parching dryness. All these conditions postulate a vocabulary sufficiently variegated to deal with them, for they constitute the crude material of necessary conversation.

BAKHTIARI CUSTOMS.—It is much to be regretted that this most interesting subject has not been more fully studied by those whom good luck has enabled to spend some time amongst the tribes. The Stick Dance is considered by some to be closely akin to ancient Greek dances, though it is more than doubtful whether any deductions can be made from fancied resemblances of this sort. I myself witnessed a mourning ceremony for a warrior who had fallen some two years previously. The men and women in their best clothes formed each two groups. Two large black tabernacles stood side by side in line, one for the women and one for the men, and at each outer flank stood a group of women and men respectively swinging their arms and bodies to the rhythm of a melodious but sad dirge. The other groups were some 200 yards off, and soon began a slow march towards the tents, the women making straight for the women standing near their tent, and the men for the men's group near theirs. As they came near each other, all the actors gave out signs of grief and woe, not discordantly, and beat their breasts with both hands fisted. On the groups closing, they disappeared into their respective tents, and began again their doleful songs. The whole ceremony was quickly and systematically performed without confusion. The proceedings, though perhaps more ceremonious than real, were realistic, and the women, in their dark, nearly black, clothes, unveiled as are all Bakhtiari women, standing and marching shoulder to shoulder in an orderly group, bore a grave and impressive appearance.

Other customs are referred to in some detail in that most interesting book entitled "Grass." Many of these observances are probably

connected with pre-Muhammadan religious observances, for Islam penetrated into these hills at a comparatively late date. I myself have seen the eternal fire burning in the hills of Luristan. I have seen the women making their bows and saying their prayers to the high places, lofty peaks such as those that were sacred when Baal was all-powerful. I have seen great rocks in distant valleys red with the blood of recent sacrifice, and it is probable that the beliefs underlying these practices still linger on.

Of folk-lore there is much that might be written. Like all hill-men, they are fond of stories of animals, some of them with a religious tinge, but nearly all of them with a humorous touch. They have numerous stories about bears, whom they believe to be endowed with an intelligence far superior to that of other animals, and to have almost human feelings and habits. They claim that a bear will sometimes kill a man to possess himself of fire-arms, which, however, the bear is unable to use when he gets them. This is because bears were once human beings, being, in fact, the progeny of a miserly, inhospitable man, who, seeing a stranger coming and thinking to shirk the duties of hospitality, hid himself under a heap of wool, for it was the time of sheep-shearing, and desired his wife to tell the traveller that her husband had gone to the mountains and that, being a woman and alone, she could not receive him as her guest. She did as she was bidden, but the stranger, who was none other than Hazrat Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, knew that her man had hidden himself. Addressing him, "Arise, O Bear," he exclaimed, "and dwell henceforth in the woods," the wool adhered to the inhospitable Lur, he lost his speech, fled to the mountains, and became the first bear, being joined, we may suppose, by his wife at some subsequent date.

Of the leopard they tell another story—that it will always scratch a man's face, but will never touch a woman, and the reason is this. A woman once went to the Prophet Ali saying, "Sir, I have no husband. Find me a husband." "Certainly," said Ali, who found her one. A month later she came back. "O Ali," she said, "I cannot live with such a man; he is too cruel, too hard, too unkind, too brutal. Find me another husband." The Prophet complied. A month later she was at his door-step again. "O Ali, I cannot live with such a man. He is no man at all. Whatever I ask for he gives me; whatever I say, however unreasonable, he accepts. He has nothing for me but embraces and affection. He is not the sort of man that I can admire or live with." "Woman," said Ali, "you are hard to please, but I will give you one more husband," and a third was found. A month later she reappeared. "O Ali," she said, "I cannot live with this man. He is so calm and just, and reasonable, and proper, and dull, that I would sooner have my first husband back. He was indeed a man." "Woman," said Ali, "you are incorrigible. Become a leopard," and ever since

then, whenever a leopard sees a woman, it passes her by, and when it sees a man it scratches his face.

Of the cock and the hen, who cannot fly, they tell the story that there was once a time when the Almighty was giving wings to all the animals. It was late in the day when the turn of the cock and hen came, and of certain others too late to try their wings. Most of the birds said, "Very well; God willing (*Insha Allah*), we will fly to-morrow." The cock and the hen did not say "God willing." They just said, "We will fly to-morrow," and in revenge for their presumption the Almighty deprived them of the power of flight, and that is why every Persian prefaces an expression of intention with the magic words "*Insha Allah*."

And they have stories, too, of frogs, to whom the Prophet gave orders that they should sing the praises of the Almighty at night when all other animals were silent; of the camels, who were a race of Shaikhs so proud that, instead of saying, "There is no God but God," they said "There is no God." In spite of warnings they persisted, and were turned into camels and became beasts of burden. That is why they grumble when they are loaded and look so proud and supercilious as they pass down the street, and that is why there is and never has been any such thing as a wild camel, although all other domestic beasts have their equivalent in the wild state.

The crane they call "*Haji Laklak*," for he flies to and from Mecca every year, and has on his head a white turban as a sign of his wisdom, like the priests.

The swallow, too, is a sacred bird who may by no means be killed or molested, however inconveniently he may build his nest in the drawing-room or bedroom. On his head is the blue turban of a descendant of the Prophets, and it was a host of these birds that destroyed the army of Abyssinia that was about to attack Mecca. And I will conclude with the proverb typical of many current in men's mouths: "Three things there be that no man hath seen—the eye of an ant, the foot of a snake, and the way that a mulla gets his living."

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ADEN*

By MAJOR H. WILBERFORCE-BELL

(Indian Political Service.)

I SELDOM think of Aden without remembering a certain servant whom I engaged once in India in succession to another who had proved unsatisfactory. The day I engaged him I noticed a little heap of dust on the stairs. Two days passed and it still remained, so I thought it time to point the heap out to my new acquisition. His answer left me speechless. "Oh yes," he said, "I have seen it; but it is not my dust, it was there when I came!"

So was the Aden dust-heap there when we came on the scene in 1839. But it is a permanent heap by the side of the great highway of the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, which forms the backbone of our Imperial communications. Aden is the eastern counterpart of Gibraltar.

It is a small place in itself. If you look at the map you will realize better its confined dimensions. Including the sandy isthmus connecting it with the mainland, it comprises only twenty-one square miles of country, most of which is mountainous and uninhabitable. Sheikh Othman, an adjunct village situated at the neck of the isthmus, has an area of thirty-nine square miles, nearly all of which is desert. Further along the coast and at the opposite side of the harbour is Little Aden, a volcanic peninsula similar to Aden, and which has an area of fifteen square miles and a population of about 300 souls, all fishermen and their families. Little Aden was acquired by purchase in 1869, and possession of Sheikh Othman was similarly obtained in 1882, both as defensive measures. Thus the total area is about seventy-five square miles, most of which is uninhabited or uninhabitable. Sheikh Othman has a population of about 8,000, so the great bulk of the total population of about 56,000 lives in Aden.

When British troops entered Aden on January 19, 1839, the place was little more than a fishing village, where a few hundred souls made a livelihood from what the sea had to yield. Gone were the days when Portuguese and Turk had striven for the mastery of a place which was itself of first-class strategic and commercial importance in the affairs

* Anniversary lecture given at the hall of the Royal United Service Institution on June 10, 1926, the Right Hon. Sir Maurice de Bunsen in the chair.

of the world. Ruined were the formidable fortifications—sited both against attack from the mainland as well as from the sea—which, for centuries previously, had been the last thing in defensive works. It was over the almost flattened ruins of these works that the storming parties of the Bombay European Regiment (which, after the Mutiny, was brought on to the British establishment and was disbanded in 1922 as the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers) and the 24th Bombay Infantry (later the 124th Baluchistan Infantry and now the 1st Battalion 10th Baluch. Regiment) advanced. Dead was the harbour—due chiefly to silt, and very largely also to an extravagant customs tariff designed to satisfy the greed of a thoughtless Arab chief and his satellites—which for many centuries had been the very centre of commerce between the Eastern and Western worlds.

Ruin and desolation had succeeded prosperity and power, and after providing for security from attack without and from treachery within, the first important task of Aden's new masters was to make law and order where none existed. Such in a few words was the condition of Aden at the time of the British occupation, and I make no excuse for referring to the written words, relative to things as he found them, of Commander Haines of the Indian Navy, to whom was entrusted the business of building anew after a successful entry. He writes:

"The little village (formerly the great city) of Aden is now reduced to the most exigent condition of poverty and neglect. In the reign of Constantine, this town possessed unrivalled celebrity for its impenetrable fortifications, its flourishing commerce, and the glorious haven it offered to vessels from all quarters of the globe. But how lamentable is the present condition! With scarce a vestige of its former proud superiority, the traveller sees and values it only for its capabilities, and regrets the barbarous cupidity of the Government under whose injudicious management it has fallen so low."

I much regret that I am unable to show you a picture of Commander Haines, although I believe that there is one in existence. Subsequent to the capture of Aden he was its first ruler, and his fate recalls that of Warren Hastings. After some years' administration of his charge, he was accused of peculation and imprisoned in Bombay. There he was kept, even after a judicial trial had resulted in his acquittal, until his health completely gave way, and he was released from prison only to die. He was buried in the Back Bay Cemetery at Bombay, and his name was never officially cleared of the slur upon it. His guilt was as doubtful as was that of his greater predecessor, and the injustice of his treatment was no less infamous.

Let us now turn for a few moments to earlier history. The Arabs say that Cain was buried at Aden, in a tomb which was elevated to an inaccessible height by volcanic action. The picture shows the traditional spot, now high above the main pass connecting the old Aden

with the new. The first authentic mention of Aden is in the twenty-third verse of the twenty-seventh chapter of Ezekiel, where it is described on equal terms with Sheba in its commercial relations with Hiram, King of Tyre. Then there is a blank, and later the Amalekites journeying southwards mixed with the Sabæans and formed the Himyarites. There were Himyaritic rulers of Aden for several hundred years before the birth of Christ, but the Himyaritic power disappeared when, in about A.D. 110, the Emperor Augustus sent a Roman expedition to the Yemen under Ælius Gallus. Before this Roman invasion, however, we are told by the author of the "Periplus" that Aden had fairly recently been destroyed.

Then comes another blank until A.D. 342, when it is known that the Emperor Constantine sent an unfruitful Christian embassy to Aden. But Christianity in the Yemen proper lasted longer than it did at Aden, until, at the beginning of the sixth century, the Jews of the Yemen massacred all the Christians except a few who fled to Abyssinia. These survivors induced the Abyssinians to despatch an army to the Yemen under one Aryat, who landed at Aden, and proceeding inland established an Abyssinian dominion. This invasion took place in A.D. 525, and altogether four Abyssinian kings ruled. The last of them, Masruk, was called upon to defend himself against Persian aggression, for Seiph, a descendant of the Himyaritic kings, applied to Kosroes, King of Persia, for aid in driving out the Abyssinians, which aid was granted. Masruk was killed, and in about the year A.D. 575 a Persian rule was established in Yemen and Aden with Seiph as Viceroy. I think I am right in saying that from that time until 1922, when Ras Tafari, heir-apparent of Abyssinia, visited Aden, no further member of the Abyssinian ruling family had set foot in Yemen. The last Persian viceroy died in A.D. 632, and the House of Umayyah then ruled until A.D. 749, when Aden passed with the Yemen beneath the yoke of the Abbasside Caliphs.

In 932, however, Aden became independent under its own Imam, but 106 years later Ibn Omar of Lahej established his rule in Aden, and this continued for 400 years, when the place was recaptured by the Imam of Yemen. The map now shown on the screen is that of the Yemen, of which Aden was anciently a part. The "Arabia Felix" of the Romans is still a smiling and fertile land, rich in soil and in agricultural and mineral possibilities. But, generally speaking, it is *terra incognita* to us. Few Europeans have penetrated to Sanaa, its capital, and the most recent Englishmen to have gone there are Colonel Jacob and Sir Gilbert Clayton. Some years before the war George Wyman Bury, a comparatively unknown wanderer, lived an adventurous life in the Yemen as chief of an Arab tribe, and his knowledge of the country was peculiar and unique. He died a few years ago, but he left behind him no record worthy of his doings, though his

two books "The Land of Uz" and "Arabia Infelix" are full of interesting information.

Between Sanaa and Aden is an expanse of country which is in part fertile and in part a sandy waste. This country is occupied by a number of petty tribes, and it is not possible to consider Aden without also considering them and the country to which it is contiguous. Our sphere of protective influence in the Hinterland was settled in 1905, but I will refer later on to this. Beyond our sphere lies that of the Imam of Sanaa, the hereditary ruler of the Yemen, who still considers that Aden is part of his inheritance. The petty tribes owe an allegiance, which is nominal rather than actual, to either ourselves or to the Imam, according to which side of the line of demarcation they belong.

In 1454, two brothers seized Aden, one of whom became its Imam, and his line continued to hold the place until the Portuguese attacked it on Easter Eve, 1512-13. D'Albuquerque, with instructions from the King of Portugal, took an expedition from India, consisting of twenty ships manned by 1,700 Portuguese and 800 Indian soldiers. On arrival they proceeded to make a frontal attack. They carried by storm the island of Seera, a commanding position of defence, and here they took thirty-nine guns and killed most of the defenders. Then for four days they attacked the great wall which ran along the front of the harbour, being beaten off with heavy loss; and they retired after burning all the shipping they could get hold of. There was a Portuguese artist with the fleet and he painted a picture of the action, and the picture now on the screen is from that painting. I regret that I have been unable to trace where the original now is. Seera Island is no longer, strictly speaking, an island, for it is connected now with the mainland. But when the Portuguese attacked it, it was not so connected. It was a very strong and well-defended out-work, and its capture by the Portuguese was no mean feat. The island is of solid rock and lava, with scarce an atom of vegetation upon it. In very ancient times the Arabs said that if one were of pure mind and heart and ascended the place exactly at midnight on the night of the full moon one would be rewarded by the sight of a magic city far away in the desert. Legend says that this magic city has never yet been seen by eyes of man. The island simply radiates heat, and in the hot weather it is like a furnace. To the Arabs of our day it is shorn of all its magical properties and is known purely and simply as "Jehannum."

All that is left of the great wall which the Portuguese attacked so disastrously now forms part of the foundation of the British infantry barracks, and the remains are actually those of the Sally-port. This photograph of Aden, taken from Seera Island, shows the changes wrought in appearance and in fact since 1512.

It is now that the Turks enter into the picture. About this time the Turks were dominant in Eastern Europe. They held the Mediter-

anean in thrall, and under Suliman the Magnificent had taken Egypt. Their principal antagonists in Europe were the Portuguese, who alone could meet them on equal terms at sea. When, therefore, the Turks learned of the establishment of Portuguese power in the East and of their activities in the Red Sea, they feared being attacked in the flank. A Turkish expedition was therefore sent to Aden, and in A.D. 1538 it arrived in Aden Harbour. Warned by the unsuccess of the Portuguese attack, the Turks obtained an entry into the town by stratagem, and leaving a garrison in Aden the fleet proceeded to India to attack the Portuguese off Diu. This attack was unsuccessful, and on their return journey a few months later they landed 100 pieces of artillery and a further garrison of 500 men before returning to Egypt. One of the guns which they left is now to be seen in the Tower of London. A few years later the inhabitants rose against the Turks and handed the place over to the Portuguese, but a Turkish fleet and army regained possession of the fortress. So matters continued until 1680, when Kassim, a descendant of the Prophet, proclaimed himself Imam of Sanaa in the revolt against Turkish rule. The last Turks were driven out of the Yemen twelve years later, and then early in the eighteenth century the Governor of Lahej revolted and seized Aden. The first English ship to visit Aden was the *Ascension* in the seventeenth century, and those who may be interested sufficiently will find an account of this visit in the "Journal of John Jourdain," which was published by the Hakluyt Society some years ago. It gives us an interesting idea of conditions at Aden at that time. In 1839 we took Aden for a variety of reasons. One of these was as a punishment for an attack on a British vessel. Another, and probably more important reason, was the necessity for establishing a coaling station for steamers somewhere between Suez and Bombay on the adoption of the overland route in 1837. Negotiations were made to obtain Aden by purchase, and the Sultan of Lahej had agreed to cede the peninsula for an annual sum of 8,700 dollars. He went back on this agreement, however, and so Aden was not obtained by purchase.

The Turks returned to the Yemen, but not to Aden, in 1871, and between then and 1901, when a boundary line was more or less delineated, they once or twice attempted to question our right to hold Aden separately. So matters remained until 1915, when they attacked Aden. They were held, however, although they were not definitely defeated until three years later, when they surrendered after the Armistice.

We were not allowed to remain in entirely peaceful possession of Aden after we had occupied it. Several attacks of a minor nature were made by the Arabs from the interior, who very much resented the British occupation. Islam has always had a strong and fanatical hold on the Yemen, and apprehension mixed with religious zeal was deeply

instilled into them, hence a series of Arab attacks were made upon the fortress, one of them in 1844 by a horde of unarmed fanatics who were told that the bullets of the infidels would not hurt them. All these attacks were beaten off without much difficulty, and although vigilance was necessary for some years to come, we were never till 1915 in any danger of being seriously embarrassed. A few individual attacks were made on officers, but these ceased after 1851, when an Arab who had murdered an officer of the Cameron Highlanders was hung in chains outside the barrier gate and his body left there *pour encourager les autres*. When it had been up sufficiently long to serve its purpose, it was taken down and walled up in a recess in the rocks, which can be seen to this day.

As years went on the fortifications of Aden were entirely remodelled and strongly rebuilt. Modern armaments—quickly out of date, by the way—were mounted at what were considered vital spots, and the place was made practically impregnable from attack on the landward side. But the greatest change of all was the giving up of the old harbour of Aden for the present one at Steamer Point. This was necessary because convenient anchorage was desired for coaling purposes as one of the first results of substitution of steam for sails. Then, again, the old harbour became silted up, and in the middle of the last century, where there had been formerly 12 fathoms of water, ships of very small draught only could ride. So the old harbour, which had been a harbour for at least 2,000 years, became deserted, and it is now used only by a few fishermen. Thus it is that Steamer Point—or Tawahi, as it is more correctly named—began to supersede the ancient Crater at Aden. In 1839 Tawahi was a small fishing village, and so it remained for twenty or thirty years. The principal Government offices and commercial houses were in the Crater, and at Steamer Point were only a few houses erected, to which those who could do so went to obtain some respite from the long Crater hot weather. Steamer Point is considerably cooler than the Crater, which is, as its name implies, the inside of an extinct volcano. It is also healthier, and is not built, like the town of Aden, upon the ruins and desolation of its predecessors. The migration was therefore beneficial from almost every point of view. But the Arab inhabitants did not abandon the Crater, which is still the centre of trade. Hence the Treasury and Court were not affected by the move, and the greater part of the British garrison are still located where the bulk of the population is situated. For some years the garrison had its barracks in what was known as the Isthmus position. This was to the north of the Crater, but between the hills and the high defensive walls. But the place had subsequently to be abandoned, both on account of the heat and of the prevalence of malaria. Generally speaking, the climate of Aden is quite healthy for a short stay. It is hot, but between November and April not unpleasant. After a time in

Aden, however, the climate is very deleterious. Steamer Point is far more bearable than is the Crater.

I do not suppose that there is a single visitor to Aden who has not heard of the Tanks. They are, indeed, world famed, being hewn out of the solid rock. None knows now when or by whom they were constructed, but it would appear that they date probably from the time of the Persian occupation in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. Some authorities—notably Bury—have ascribed to them a much earlier date, but it is doubtful whether there is sufficient justification for this. Like the Pyramids, they have been fashioned with infinite labour, and are so constructed that when the uppermost is full it overflows, and so on until all are filled. The water pours into them through a rocky cleft from the desolate tableland immediately above the Crater. The deep-cut watercourse strongly resembles Dante's *Inferno*, as pictured by mediæval artists. The capacity of the Tanks is 8,000,000 gallons, but the water in them is never really fit to drink and is sold chiefly for washing purposes. In 1839 they were completely choked with sand and rubbish, and even their site was not known. But seventeen years later their re-excavation was undertaken, and they were restored in time to be filled by a heavy fall of rain on October 23, 1857. Besides these Tanks are seven or eight isolated ones dotted about the Crater hills. But they are unimportant and are now not even watertight.

The rainfall at Aden is extremely small, and most of the drinking water is obtained by condensation. It is only occasionally that a down-pour occurs, and then only for a short time, and it is a rare thing for all the Tanks to be properly filled. The mode of water supply in what I might term the middle times is something of a mystery. Perhaps the amount of rainfall has gradually lessened. The construction of the Tanks would be scarcely worth while to retain a fall which occurs only about once a year, for such collected water could not supply a population of 30,000 for more than a few months at most. In the sixteenth century an aqueduct was constructed which led a certain amount of brackish water into Aden from the desert. Then again, there are still wells in Aden itself, which are said to have contained sweet water until comparatively recent times. All these wells now contain brackish water, and probably the brine of the sea has only lately completed its percolation below the Aden peninsula. The four pictures of the Tanks upon the screen give, I fear, but a poor idea of what they are or of the labour expended upon them.

One of the primary results of stabilized British rule has been that Aden has become an important commercial centre. Such commerce is, in fact, largely between the countries exporting hides and coffee and those importing these articles, and Aden comes into the picture chiefly as a port of transshipment. Nevertheless its importance as such is by no means small. It is the most important distributing centre both for

European, American, and Indian ports as well as for those smaller ports on the Red Sea and on the African coast which are served principally by means of dhows. With this increase of trade there is also an increase of traders, for whereas Indian and Arabian merchants are concerned chiefly with the Red Sea ports, it is English, American, French, Greek, and other European traders whose interests lie further afield. Hence, as a port of call, the tonnage passing annually through Aden reaches very formidable figures, even when vessels entering to coal or replenish their oil tanks are excluded from the list. For example, in October, 1923, the number of vessels of over 200 tons burthen which used the port was eighty-three, the total tonnage of which was about 340,000. The total value of imports and exports for the month was considerably over one crore of rupees. This included both coal and oil fuel. But Aden is not a commercial outlet of the Yemen. That fertile country is, to all intents and purposes, a sealed book to us, and its commercial and mineral possibilities have so far remained practically untapped. The little commerce between Aden and the interior which exists is local in character, for excepting for hides and skins the exploitation of the products of the country, for which Aden is the natural outlet, remains one of the problems of the future.

The affairs of Yemen have always been closely connected with those of Aden, although in recent years the political relationships have been divorced. In 1642 a resuscitated Imam of Sanaa drove the Turks out of the Yemen, where his line remained supreme until 1871, when a Turkish army regained a control of the province, which was in many respects only nominal. But in 1728 the Governor of Lahaj—which is the largest Arab town in the vicinity of Aden and is situated in a smiling oasis in the midst of apparently limitless sand and scrub—revolted and set up a state independent of the Imams. Other tribes also, in what is now called our Protectorate, gained a semblance, at least, of independence, and the ruler of Lahaj (which then included Aden) allied himself with the Yaffai, Fadli, Haushabi, Amiri, Akrabi, Alawi, Subeihi, and Aulaki tribes, as a measure of mutual defence in case the Imams should endeavour to reassert an overlordship. Thus it came about that when the Turks returned to Yemen in 1871 they found a Yemen much smaller in extent than that over which they had formerly ruled, for our treaty with Lahaj after 1839 embraced also the tribes in alliance with him. In typically Turkish fashion the Turks endeavoured to disregard things as they found them, and they proceeded to overrun the Amiri and Haushabi territory, and to threaten Lahaj itself. Diplomatic remonstrance led to the withdrawal of the Turks, and they desisted from these methods until 1900, when a Turk constructed a fort at Ad Dareja in Haushabi territory. It was not until troops were sent from Aden that the intruders were expelled, and after a certain amount of parleying the Turks agreed to a boundary line being drawn which

would mark the limits of the respective spheres of influence of the two Governments. Supplemented by troops, the Boundary Commission got to work, and eventually, in 1905, the dispute was settled by the erection of a line of boundary pillars, which extend from a point on the mainland near Perim for about 200 miles to Kataba on the Bana River. Beyond Lak Mat-es-Shub the line was not definitely marked, but its north-easterly direction only was agreed upon.

In 1911 the Imam of Sanaa made a treaty with the Turks, to which he adhered during the war, and the Armistice left him the inheritor of Turkish power in Yemen, since when he has declared that he does not recognize the boundary fixed by the Commission in 1905 because he was not a party to the agreement. He considers that the Yemen and Aden are one and indivisible, and does not recognize the changes that time has wrought. He affects to regard the Sultanate of Lahej as a revolted governorship, but nevertheless the Commission's boundary line still exists generally, and the tribes on each side of it acknowledge allegiance accordingly—either vaguely or otherwise, as may suit themselves.

But the Imam is a reactionary. He represents "fanatical Islam," and does not desire that his territory be exploited. It is said to be rich in agricultural and mineral possibilities, and if ever it is opened up Aden will be the country's most convenient outlet, particularly if the railway, which now runs from Aden to Lahej, is continued up into the interior. But there is at present little hope of the realization of such a project, and Sanaa and its fertile surroundings are likely to remain more or less inaccessible. Even were the Imam ready to welcome the railway, the commercial difficulty would not be settled. Trade will not flourish where it is insecure, and the education of the tribesmen in the arts of peace would be no light undertaking.

When the Turks were dominant in the Yemen, it is said that they dared not move troops from Hodeida to Sanaa excepting in substantial numbers; also, but with what truth I do not know, that they were practically confined to the vicinities of their barracks. If this is so, the Turkish control of Yemen was a threat rather than an actuality.

No lecture on Aden would be complete without mention of her peoples. They are a mixed collection consisting of Arabs, Jews, Somalis, Sidis, Indians, and half-breeds, besides the British garrison. Of all these peoples the Arab naturally comes first in importance. These Arabs are very bigoted, and have retained many old traits which have died out, or are dying out, in other Moslem countries. Their very language is somewhat archaic, and the Arab camel-men and petty traders who come into Aden are dressed in a loin cloth of indigo blue, just as were their ancestors in biblical days. The educated Arabs are not a progressive people, but one or two of them have attained local importance and some of them have become substantial traders. The Arab of the interior differs

a great deal from the Aden Arab. He is independent and at one and the same time very democratic and very autocratic. The Arab chieftain rules by the will of his people and only so long as that will is favourable to himself. He has very definite ideas regarding his position as an autocrat, and as an illustration of this I know of no better than that afforded me by an Arab chief who came into Aden with his son. The son died while in Aden, and it became my duty to write to the father a letter sympathizing with him in his loss. His reply was: "I hope that God has given my son a seat in Paradise, but I hope that He will give me a better seat!" They have also a distinct though quaint sense of humour. A year or two ago it became necessary for an aeroplane to drop a few bombs on a neighbouring chieftain who was creating breaches of the peace. This pleased immensely one of his enemies, who wished that another chieftain could be similarly entertained. The aeroplane went, but did not bomb this gentleman, upon which the first Arab came into Aden and said that he had no respect for aeroplanes any longer, that they were like any other bird which did not lay eggs—they were no good!

Next and most interesting of the Arab people are the Jews. These Jews are a marked feature of Aden life, and they look as though they had stepped clean out of the Bible. They still retain all the reverence for the letter of the law which their forefathers had, and for many hundreds of years they have been in the Yemen a persecuted people. In 1910 a French Syrian named Yomtob Semach went on a mission of the "Alliance Israélite" to the Yemen. At the end of his mission he wrote a very interesting book of his experiences, from which I shall here quote. He said that the Jewish population at the time in Yemen numbered about 14,000, and he gave the following account of their origin:

"In my conversation with the rabbis the same phrase always recurs: 'Have we ever had the leisure to think of that which is past? The present is so hard, why dig into the past? We try even to forget our dead, only rarely do we celebrate the anniversary of a dead person. We know by tradition that we came here at the time of Solomon. We were for a time masters of the country, but afterwards what sufferings have we not experienced, and what persecutions! And that is all!'

"They know nothing else. It is I who recounted to them that Ezra, the Scribe, having invited their ancestors to return with him to Jerusalem they refused. The great Patriarch cursed them, since which time no Jew of the Yemen has borne the name of Ezra." So much for their history. Some of their present-day restrictions he mentions as follows: No Jew may—

1. Speak loudly before a Moslem.
2. Build houses higher than the houses of the Moslems.
3. Stare at a Moslem when passing him in the street.
4. Engage in the same commerce as the Arabs.

5. Say that the law of Islam can have any fault.
6. Insult the Prophets.
7. Discuss religion with a Moslem.
8. Ride astride.
9. Shut his eyes when he sees a nude Moslem.
10. Have anything to do with Jewish law outside the temples.
11. Raise his voice during prayers.
12. Let out money at interest.

Then among the things they must do is, they must always rise before Moslems and honour them in every circumstance. Their distinctive dress and ringlet curls mark their identity. It is persecution which has made the Jews in Aden, as elsewhere, the unalterable people that they are.

A Parsee friend of mine in Aden told me that one Sabbath day (Saturday) he happened to be near a house out of the window of which fell a Jewish child. It was badly hurt, and the father who appeared at the balcony refused to do anything for the child because it was the Sabbath day. It was the Parsee who picked it up and took it to hospital. Several of the Jews of Aden are very rich, and one of them, Judah Messa, owns the whole of the front at Port Said, but refuses, however, to put his money in a bank and keeps it in cellars beneath his house stored in boxes. The story goes that when the Turks were on the point of capturing Aden in 1915 his house was picketed by Arabs sharpening their knives, and if the Turks had got in, there is little doubt that the wealth of the Messa family would have disappeared for ever.

The Somalis in Aden are turbulent and vain specimens of humanity from North Africa. Their customs are those of a brave and barbaric people, and as they are always looking for trouble they have to be carefully watched. They wear a long white garment which resembles a Roman "toga," and they usually cover their heads with lime so as to bleach their hair. They are not permitted to carry the spears and other weapons which they would prefer to do, but they like to be seen with a useful-looking stick or with a short hide whip which is known as a "wife beater." They seek employment at all sorts of odd jobs where hard work is not insisted upon, and they particularly like to own a harbour boat, where the work is lucrative and not too severe. Years ago Somali boys used to disregard sharks and dive for coins. But that occupation is now forbidden. People who know Somaliland say that all Somalis are not like the Aden specimen, but that only the worst cross over from Africa.

Finally, a number of Indians who have served the administration or come as traders since 1839 have intermarried with the Aden Arabs and have formed a community of half-Indian and half-Arab parentage. These people are clever, and a number of them during the war served as firemen in British ships, but the mixture on the whole is not a very good one.

Social Aden flourishes and apparently always has done so. The English community, consisting of the Eastern Telegraph Company—who form almost a community in themselves—and a number of merchants and traders in addition to the troops, busies itself with all sorts of games and other relaxation to drive away *ennui* and make for fitness. Golf, tennis, football, hockey and cricket, bathing and fishing, furnish sufficient variety for the most exacting devotees of exercise, and there is also a very flourishing polo club, for whose annual tournament His Majesty the King presented, in 1912, a very fine challenge cup. The Union Club is almost as well known as are the Tanks, and some years ago an Historical Society was formed which unfortunately suffers somewhat from lack of permanent support, consequent upon the frequent changes of troops and individuals. Aden has now no newspaper. Some years ago the *Aden Focus* was published with unfailing regularity; but it suffered a decline owing to its principal feature becoming classed under the heading "Things we want to know." As you may imagine, people wanted to know too much, with the result that the *Aden Focus* was obliged to cease publication.

The Aden of the present day is a very different Aden from that of the past. The advent of the motor-car and the railway has given it almost a "rush" appearance, while the introduction of electric light makes the place almost modern. The future, who can foretell? The strategic points of the Empire have been materially affected by the Great War and by the Washington Conference, and Aden, being situated as it is, cannot be ignored either strategically or commercially.

I will now close my lecture with a few pictures on the screen. This picture and that which follows it depict the ancient road into Aden. It is, in fact, one of the most ancient highways in the world, for it was used when Ezekiel lived. Certainly no road in Europe has had so long a continued history. The gate at the top of the hill is on the site of the "Gate of the Water-carriers," mentioned by Abulfeda, the Arab historian, who flourished in the fourteenth century and fought under Saladin against the Crusaders.

The next picture shows the oldest building still extant in Aden. It is one of the minarets of a mosque, the ruins of which are apparently buried beneath it. It is usually ascribed to the Turks, but this is a mistake, since the Portuguese artist, Correia, showed it on his picture of 1512, which was before the Turks took Aden. It is also depicted in this view of Aden of the fifteenth century, which is, I understand—but for which I cannot vouch—from an ancient woodcut found in Vienna some years ago. The Latin inscription in the corner is to the following effect: "Aden, the emporium of renown of Arabia Felix, to which come traders from India, Æthiopia, and Persia. The city is magnificent, well fortified by nature and by art, celebrated for the number and crowding of its buildings, for its wall, and for the high mountains

above the town, on the summits of which burning beacons indicate the port to navigators. It formerly had the shape of a peninsula, but now, by the industry of man, is surrounded on all sides by water." This last assertion is a glaring mistake. The sandy isthmus connecting Aden with the mainland is about half a mile across, and though this may be a considerably greater distance than formerly, yet the "industry of man" very clearly never attempted physically to cut off Aden from the Yemen.

The next three pictures show Aden Crater from different aspects. Then we have the British infantry barracks, the road to the Crater, and two views of the Main Pass hewn by us in the rocks to connect the Crater with Steamer Point. Maala Wharf, near the Main Pass, has for years been the haunt of the boat-builders. The frail craft they build have the high poop and shallow draught of fifteenth-century ships, and they still sail as intrepidly as sailed the ships of Columbus—of not much greater burthen—across the Atlantic. These picturesque survivals are doomed, alas! to disappear. The coasting steamer is driving them into a position of uneconomic production, and the boat-builder by ancient descent is seeking other means of livelihood.

The next three pictures are of Steamer Point, and then we have the "Gateway of Aden," which is also a war memorial. On one of its sides is a list of all units which defended Aden between 1914 and 1918. Finally, this is a very familiar Aden scene. (Applause.)

DISCUSSION.

Mr. H. St. J. PHILBY: I am afraid the time is rather short, ladies and gentlemen, but if you will bear with a few words, I should rather like to say them. I had hoped to hear rather more from Major Wilberforce Bell about the modern state of affairs in and about Aden—the present political situation and so forth. As you will have realized from him, a great deal is known to us from various sources about Aden itself. He was, perhaps, inclined to talk about Aden and the Yemen as if they were a single entity, and as if anyone who knew the one necessarily knew the other. But that is not the case. Aden stands next door and is easily accessible to the Yemen, which, as Major Wilberforce Bell said, is practically a closed book. That is true to-day, in spite of the fact that for nearly a century Aden has been in British hands. Great Britain has never been lacking in people with the capacity to explore, people who do not mind roughing it a certain amount or even risking it. But Aden is extraordinary in respect of the authorities who have been there since the beginning of our connection with it. Perhaps they have always been frightened by the case of Commander Haines, to whom reference has been made. He was cashiered by the British Government and accused of embezzlement. He had

probably been guilty of rather too great keenness in the prosecution of his job, and had gone further than he ought to have done according to the orders of the Government, and they chose that method of getting rid of him. I think that must have had an influence on the subsequent rulers of Aden: not only do they never go inside the Protectorate themselves, but they never allow anyone else to go. For that reason I cannot claim any competence to talk about the Yemen. The last time I went to Aden I did so with the express purpose of attempting the exploration of the little known country of Hadramaut, next door to the Yemen and a little further to the east. But I did not lose much time in discovering that the British Government's sole interest in that part of the world was to remain ignorant of it. I did not ask them to send me, I wanted to go myself; but they would not allow me to. I was then still in the service of the Government, and had to defer my project to a future time. If that future time does come I shall not go in by Aden, but by some back door and only finish at Aden. My experience was after all only the same as that of others who have made the same attempt. I was surprised at Major Wilberforce Bell's modest estimate of the work of Mr. Wyman Bury. I have always regarded him as one of the brighter lights of the British régime in the Aden region, and I think my opinion is probably shared by the great majority of people who are numbered among those who know something about Arabia. I think Mr. Wyman Bury stands in the very front rank of the people who have dealt with Arabia, and contributed their quota to the common stock of human knowledge of the country; and it is a great pleasure to me to be able to do him justice to that extent. I see here Admiral Richmond, and I should like to point out that it was really the Admiralty who ultimately before he died vindicated his reputation and his work. He died a young man; that is, perhaps, why he did not leave the records that would have been worthy of his intimate study of the country. He died of consumption, and most of his work was done under the grave disability of a raging consumption. I think that point should be brought out. It was the Admiralty, the department which is concerned with the sea, which really discovered and vindicated Mr. Wyman Bury's work on land. I believe the Admiralty attitude during the war was that if there was anything far enough away from the sea to be invisible therefrom, that thing was *ipso facto* of interest to it. It was extraordinary the amount of work they did in areas with which it might be thought they had nothing to do. They found out that Mr. Wyman Bury was an expert on Arabia. He had served in and around Aden and done magnificent work. His reward was to be told that he must on no account return to Aden, and that, if he did so, he would not be allowed to land. It must have been rather gratifying to him and very embarrassing to the Aden authorities when he did return and landed as a political officer from one of His Majesty's ships.

That was sufficient vindication of him within a few years of his unfortunate death. To quote another case: some of you may know that during the war a regiment was raised called the Yemen Infantry. It was raised and trained by British officers for service in the Protectorate, and did very good work. Those officers—every one of them, or the great majority of them—were not only amply qualified but deadly keen to risk themselves, to go into the country and find out something about it. They were stationed at Shaikh Othman, and could come into the Aden club as often as they liked; but anyone who suggested going out in the other direction was discouraged. He was not allowed to go. If he had gone it would have been as much as his job was worth. As a result none of the officers went. When the Yemen Infantry was disbanded, all those officers who had some experience of Arabs and knowledge of Arabia—officers whom the British Government, one would have thought, would use in some country within reasonable reach of Arabia—were scattered to all parts of the earth, to China and elsewhere; and I suppose the reason was that it was feared they might contribute something to our knowledge of Arabia. It is true Colonel Lake, the Commanding Officer, was allowed to go into the Yemen with General Clayton's mission, which went there last winter. Now there was a man who knew the country inside out from the outside—he had never been allowed in—but he was allowed as a concession to accompany the mission, to which he proved of very great service, I believe I am right in saying at his own expense. The circumstances in which that mission was sent and returned stultified were sufficient to show how extraordinarily ignorant the British Government was of the country and of the condition. As a matter of fact, when I heard it had been sent, I wrote a little article to a newspaper pointing out how very silly it was. I did not think my view would be vindicated so completely by the failure of the mission, because I thought the Imam wanted a treaty, and we were going to give him one. But I have never understood why the Imam of the Yemen should have hankered for so many years since the war for a treaty with Great Britain. I have never understood what he hoped to get from it, and he must realize by now that the price he would have to pay for the treaty is the relinquishment of certain territory which he occupies absolutely wrongly and unlawfully. Of course he has no right to be there. The boundary between Yemen and our Protectorate was laid down by a diplomatic arrangement between Turkey and Great Britain. Neither of those countries had the slightest right to dispose of one inch of that territory, and that is why the Imam does not recognize that boundary line. Major Wilberforce Bell has pointed out that Turkey had a very shadowy and nebulous authority on one side and we none on the other side. That is why the Imam refuses to recognize it, and is sitting on our side of the line to show his right to it. Do we want him to

leave that territory? If so, it can only be to save our face, because it is discreditable that he should be sitting on our boundary line and we unable to turn him out. Is it good to think we have to beg him to go out, and promise that, if he will go out, we will give him a treaty in return—a treaty which would be worth nothing to him, because we do nothing for the tribes on our side? Has the British lion fallen so low that he cannot turn the fox out of his own den? The whole truth is that it is not worth while to turn the fox out. Leave him there to look after the vermin—those truculent chieftains who subsist on the doles received from the British Government. Why waste money on them? Let the Imam look after them if he wants to. We derive no benefit from them. So why all this talk of a treaty? Let us realize that the mainland of Arabia has no interest for us. Let us go in there as explorers and merchants, but there is no need of British political intrusion in the country. It does no good, and it sets these Arab chiefs against each other and against us. As regards the Imam, he must realize some day that if he does not give up this hankering for a treaty with Great Britain, and turn his attention to securing a treaty with his powerful neighbour on the north, the new Wahabi king, he will find that the whole sentiment of Arabia will be in favour of that monarch, who has made good without any treaty with Great Britain or British influence behind him. While the Imam hankers for our treaty, he is challenging Ibn Saud by trying to nibble away at the southern part of the province of Asir and add it to his dominions. If the Imam goes on in that way he will collapse before the ever-growing might of the Wahabi, and while snatching at the shadow he will lose the substance. He will lose his own territory and never get a bit of British sympathy or support. We cannot sympathize with or support him. Only in to-day's paper I saw the report that the Imam has not seen fit to send a representative to the Moslem Conference, at the present moment being held at Mecca under the auspices of the new Wahabi king. That is a very serious omission from the point of view of the Imam, and may land him in serious trouble. I should not be surprised at all—it may seem strange to say so, but I feel encouraged to say it—for Ibn Saud has risen from very small things to very great things, and is now practically the only power that counts in the Arabian world; and I should not be surprised if in a very few weeks he emerges out of the Moslem Conference, and the pilgrimage which will succeed it, as the Khalif of Islam. That may seem rather a surprising deduction from present events, but I think everything is shaping in that direction; and if that development takes place, I think the Imam will find that he has made a very great mistake in not sending a representative to take part in the election of the Khalif.

It is just such facts as these that make it essential that we should think out and decide on a definite policy. I have indicated what I

believe to be a right policy—namely, to have nothing to do with the main land of Arabia. We have Aden, and nobody suggests we should give it up. Aden and Perim are sufficient: the mainland we do not want anything to do with. Let us give up the attempt to subsidize petty sheikhs and petty chiefs one against the other, or we shall find ourselves involved in a quarrel where the only result will be that we shall have to admit that we cannot help our protégés. We shall have to retire and take all the discredit for the failure of our policy. Some of us believe in the policy of dividing and ruling; but that does not apply to Arabia: it would be better to leave it under a single unified control, as it will be in a short time. Ibn Saud is destined to rule the whole of Arabia. Let him rule the whole of it, and let us cease to divide these tribes one against another in our imaginary political interests. But the essential thing is that we should not divide ourselves in dealing with places like Aden and the Yemen. Let us give up the division of counsels which results from the present state of affairs. Aden is administered by the India Office, but political questions affecting the area are dealt with by the Colonial Office and military questions by the War Office. How can you get a connected policy arising out of the divided ambitions and counsels of those three Departments? I should say: Let the Admiralty take over Aden and have done with it, and leave the politics of Arabia to look after themselves. (Applause.)

Admiral RICHMOND: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—Aden is of very great importance to us from the sea point of view. You have a great deal of the trade of Australia and New Zealand, not calling at, but passing by, Aden when going through those Straits. You have the whole trade of India, Burmah, Malaya, and Hong Kong, and the developing trade of East Africa coming that way as well. To have a secure harbour where your ships can work at that focal point of trade route, which is the very point at which the enemy would, if he could, attack, is of the very greatest importance. The holding of Aden gives the sea base we require. We should be in a parlous way if an enemy maritime power had possession of Aden; who could, if he continued to hold it, worry all that vast and important trade which passes in and out of the Mediterranean by the Red Sea. So far as concerns the Hinterland I know nothing about that at all. All that matters to us at sea is to be able to hold the fortress. If anything to do with the tribes of the interior affects the holding of the fortress, I am glad we should work with them as we are working. If it has no effect on holding the fortress—on which I express no opinion—I agree with Mr. Philby that we have no interest there so far as the sea is concerned.

The LECTURER: Mr. Philby has, I am afraid, rather misunderstood what I intended to say about Mr. Wyman Bury. I am sorry if I gave the impression that I did not appreciate what he had done. I think it

is almost cheek of me even to suggest that I should appreciate what he did, because he did magnificent work. But what I do say, and what I maintain, is that he has left nothing that is at all worthy of his doings. His books are almost gazetteers, and he knew the Yemen so well, and had taken such an interesting part in its affairs for so many years, that I still maintain it is the greatest pity that he was not able, before he died, to give us something really valuable about his experiences in that country. As regards the political question of our position in Aden and the Yemen, I am afraid that, being a serving officer, I am also debarred from giving my opinion, and, anyhow, it really would not be worth very much. But I can say this, that the present policy of doing nothing seems to me to be about the very worst possible thing we could do. A policy of inertia has never paid, and yet we have adopted it in this extraordinarily interesting and valuable possession of ours for very nearly a hundred years. I think we are extremely lucky to have been left there. The circumstances have been, no doubt, that no other European foreign power has considered it worth while challenging us in that part of the world. But that point of view is entirely disappearing. Other nations are challenging us in that part of the world, and for that reason alone I think it is high time that we took into consideration the further political status of Aden, with the idea of improving the situation there. Aden's position, from the maritime point of view, is one on which I am not competent to give an opinion. Admiral Richmond says how very valuable a position it is to us, and that, I have no doubt, is the truth; but there is this which you must always take into consideration in considering Aden, and that is that the main harbour is not available for ships of very great draught. It is kept free for ordinary marine merchant ships with great difficulty, and when the *Renown* took the King to India in 1911 she could not go into the harbour but had to wait outside. I do not know whether the *Renown* is now to be classed among our very big ships; perhaps Admiral Richmond could tell us whether any substantially big ships of modern times could enter into Aden Harbour. That point of view must always be considered. There is not a great depth of water in the harbour. I do not think there is anything more that I can usefully say about this lecture, except to thank you very much for your patience in listening to it. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is entirely beyond my powers to add anything at all useful to what has been said. I have listened to the lecture and the speeches subsequently made with the greatest interest. We have all learned a great deal about Aden from what Major Wilberforce Bell has told us and from his admirable slides, which have really given us a view of the whole place; and we have been given a sketch of the history of the country, taking us through the ages of Turks and Abyssinians, up to the time when Aden became a British possession in 1839, and on. I think we must all wish that our knowledge

of the Hinterland should be increased ; Mr. Philby, I have no doubt, will some day get in by that back door and write a very interesting book, which will tell us really what is the state of the country. I feel that the power and greatness of our country is displayed more by these great links that connect us with the rest of the world than in any other way. I remember once a foreign diplomatist saying to me that he had never realized the power and influence and immense authority of the British Empire until he had travelled out to the Far East and observed at so many points of call the British flag. It had deeply impressed him ; and, although it may not be a very pleasant place to live in, and although, perhaps, we may not feel it necessary to extend our influence beyond the immediate Hinterland of Aden, it is important that this link should be preserved to us. I only ask you now to join me in a most hearty vote of thanks to Major Wilberforce Bell for his admirable lecture. (Applause.)

ANNIVERSARY MEETING

THE Anniversary Meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W., on Thursday, June 10, 1926, the Right Hon. Sir Maurice de Bunsen presiding.

The CHAIRMAN opened the proceedings, largely of a formal nature, by asking the Honorary Secretary, Lieut.-General Sir Raleigh Egerton, for his report on the year's work.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-General Sir Raleigh Egerton): Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—In February last occurred the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first efforts taken to found this Society. They were taken by the late Mr. A. Cotterell Tupp, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, and Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband, then a Captain. They met and formulated the idea of this Society, and in December of that year, 1901, the formal meeting was held which established this Society as a working force. I hope, in an early number of our *Journal*, we may be able to get somebody who has been a long time in the Society to write a comprehensive account of its progress and activities. You may be interested to know that of those who joined at the meeting in December, 1901, and during the following year, 1902, so far as I can see from our Rules, there are still as many as nineteen surviving and supporting the Society. In January, 1902, there were only 30 members, and the rate of increase appears to have been some what slow for a considerable number of years. In 1918, when Sir Edward Penton made over the Hon. Secretaryship, which he had held for sixteen years, taking it over shortly after the formation of the Society from Sir Francis Younghusband, who was the first Honorary Secretary but gave it up on returning to India, the war had left the Society with only 130 members. Colonel Yate held office from then until 1923 with Mr. Stephenson as his colleague, and during that time the membership increased to well over 600. During the past year we have lost 5 members by death, and 24 have resigned. Against those 29 casualties we have 81 members who have been elected, which gives us a net gain of 52 members on the year. (Applause.) Our present strength is 892 members; we cannot reach that mystic 900. When we get to that we shall want to get to the 1,000. During the past session there have been eight lectures delivered; the ninth lecture is to be delivered to-day; and the tenth lecture, which was postponed owing to the strike, will be given on July 8 next. The last number of the *Journal* for this season will appear on the first of next month, and then we shall complete the full series for the year. There are certain changes occurring in the Council

and officers of the Society which, with your Chairman's permission, I will read out, he will then put them to the meeting for confirmation. Owing to the death of Lord Curzon the office of President became vacant, and Lord Peel, who has been our Chairman up to now, has kindly accepted nomination for it. In his place as Chairman of the Council, an invitation was sent to Lord Willingdon, who, as you know, is absent in China. The invitation was sent some considerable time ago, and no answer has been received. Since sending the invitation we have heard rumours of his appointment as Governor-General of Canada, and these have only to-day been confirmed in the paper; so the Council know now that the invitation to Lord Willingdon is not likely to be accepted, and they have to consider to whom they shall offer the post of Chairman of Council. There is another change, for, I am sorry to say other work claims so much of my time that I am not able to devote sufficient time to the affairs of the Society, so I must regretfully ask the Society to accept my resignation. In my place Major-General Sir William Thomson has been invited, and has kindly accepted the office of Honorary Secretary. You are going to be asked to re-elect Sir Edward Penton as our Honorary Treasurer; Mrs. Frazer continues as Honorary Librarian. Two Vice-Presidents have resigned under the Rules: Lord Ronaldshay and Lord Carnock. In their place you will be asked to elect Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm, and Major-General Sir Webb Gillman. As to Sir Neill Malcolm, his appointment as Vice-President will make a vacancy among the Members of the Council, as will the appointment of Sir Webb Gillman also. Sir John Maffey and Lieut.-Colonel Yate also disappear from the Members of the Council under the Rules, and in the place of these four you will be asked to elect the following—Lieut.-General Sir Wolseley Haig, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Cecil Kaye, and myself, leaving one vacancy.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we may as well put to the meeting now the changes which have taken place and have been indicated by Sir Raleigh Egerton. As regards the new President, Lord Peel, I am sure we are looking forward to his being a most admirable President; he has had great experience, and at a comparatively young age reached high Cabinet rank. I think we are fortunate in having obtained his consent to succeed the late Lord Curzon and be our President. The various other names Sir Raleigh has mentioned I would also put to the vote, and ask if the meeting agrees to these appointments and changes. Those who are in favour kindly signify their assent.

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

The SECRETARY: There is a new Rule proposed, and a few small alterations in existing Rules, which I will now read to you: "The following new Rule is proposed, and, if passed, will be numbered 16: 'The Council may elect at their discretion three Honorary Vice-Presidents of the Society from among ex-members of the Council whose

services to the Society are considered worthy of such recognition." There are several members who have done notable work for the Society over a considerable period of years, and some recognition should be made of the work they have done. They are no longer available for active work on the Council, and it is felt that it would be the wish of the Society to offer them the post of Honorary Vice-President. They have been active members of the Council, and we have asked them whether they would accept the honour, and they have expressed their gratification at the suggestion. I will read out the names, and perhaps the Chairman will put them. The Right Hon. Lord Carnock, G.C.B., G.C.M.G. (Chairman of Council 1919 to 1923), the Right Hon. the Earl of Ronaldshay, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. (Chairman of Council 1908 to 1914), and Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate, C.S.I. (Hon. Secretary 1918 to 1923). First of all, I think we must ask if the new Rule be accepted authorizing these appointments.

The CHAIRMAN: Is the meeting in agreement with that new Rule and the appointments made under it? May I ask you to signify in the usual way?

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

The SECRETARY: There is one minor alteration in Rule 13, which instead of "four years" is to read "not more than four years." The Rule reads as far as I remember that a member may serve on the Council for four years, and then it goes on to say that every year two senior members will retire. They may have been on the Council only one year, and it reads rather curiously to say they shall serve on the Council for four years, and in the next line to say they may resign after a year or so. Instead of "four years" we think it will be better to say "not more than four years." Then the existing Rules Nos. 20 and 21, which referred to the formation and constitution of the Council, are very far down in the Rules; and it is proposed to put them further up as the Council is so frequently alluded to, and instead of being Nos. 20 and 21 they shall become Rules Nos. 12 and 13; and the first sentence of the existing Rule No. 13, which regards the appointment of the President, shall be a rule by itself, and numbered 14; and the present Rule 14, together with the present Rule 13, excepting the first sentence which I have just mentioned, will become one Rule, No. 15. Rule 16 will be the new Rule regarding the Honorary Vice-Presidents, and the subsequent Rules will be all renumbered consecutively in accordance with these changes. Rules Nos. 13a to 19 will be Rules 17 to 24, and Rules 17 to 24 will be Rules 25 to 37. Those changes are necessary, but we have to get your sanction.

The CHAIRMAN: I may say that all these changes have had the careful consideration of the Council. They are purely formal, but it was thought advisable to make them and to explain them. I take it that meets the approval of the meeting?

The Resolution was unanimously agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have really very little to add, because I am not the proper occupant of the Chair. I am taking it in the absence of Lord Peel, who has been Chairman until to-day; and also in the absence of the new Chairman we are to have, but whose name we do not yet know, because of Lord Willingdon's appointment to Canada, which makes it impossible for us to look forward to having him as our Chairman, which I feel sure would have been very welcome to the Society. But he is called to very high Imperial office, and therefore it is no use reckoning on him any more. We shall have to elect a Chairman. I feel therefore I am not in my proper place, and not very competent to review the work of the Society. But I have got to do one or two things. One is to inform you about the accounts for 1925. I may say with regard to the accounts they seem to be satisfactory. They have been audited by Sir William Thomson and Major Rynd, and they show a balance of £55 on current account, and £25 on deposit account, and we have now got an investment of £250 in war stock and war savings certificates, which shows the advance the Society has made to be able to have such an investment. Although it is a small one it is slowly growing. That is the condition of our accounts, and at all events it is a balance on the right side, which is not always the case in accounts of this kind. I think Sir Raleigh Egerton has already mentioned that the membership has got up to 892. That, of course, is a quite satisfactory number, although we hope to get up to a still higher membership. I hope that any members who have an opportunity of inviting others to join the Society, who would be competent and interested members, will do so in order that our membership may be still further increased. The year has been a satisfactory one. The *Journal* has long since taken a recognized place among publications of its kind. I think many of you have found on looking into its pages that it contains useful information not to be found elsewhere, so that we may feel the Society is doing useful work in producing it. Our new President, Lord Peel, takes the place of Lord Curzon, whose death and whose great loss to the Society have already been alluded to. His was, of course, a great name to have as President, and he took a real interest in the Society. I remember very well having to write him and ask him if he would be the principal speaker at our dinner the year before last. He wrote a charming letter in reply, in which he said he felt very much the honour of being President of the Central Asian Society, and certainly would not think of refusing the invitation to address the meeting once more. He had his heart in the Society, and I believe we shall find the same with our new President, a member of the Cabinet, who has been Secretary of State for India, and filled many other offices, and whom you already know as a very competent speaker; and I think we are fortunate in being able to look

forward to having him as our President. (Applause.) I do not like to sit down without referring to the great loss the Society is incurring in the resignation of the post of Honorary Secretary by Sir Raleigh Egerton. Few members know better than I—though other members of Council know equally well—how useful his services have been. He has filled a place which perhaps was not easily to be filled, because Colonel Yate had for a very long time conducted the work of Secretary most admirably, and had been exceedingly helpful in promoting the interests of the Society; in fact, I think we all know the name of Colonel Yate is intimately connected with our Society from the very early days. But since Sir Raleigh has filled the post he has shown a very great interest in all its work, and has been unremitting in his attention to it; and I think his loss will be a very great one. I am sure you will all join with me in offering the thanks of the Society to him for the services he has rendered, and which we hope he will go on rendering although not in the position of Secretary. (Applause.)

Mr. E. R. P. Moon: May I be allowed to dot one "i" in your valuable address, and that is in reference to the *Journal*. I should like to mention to those who, perhaps, have not been at our dinners, how our late President, Lord Curzon, always expressed his great appreciation and admiration for the *Journal*. Testimony from a man like that to the value of the *Journal* will, I am sure, make it more valued by others. (Applause.)

THE KHAIBAR PASS AS THE INVADERS' ROAD FOR INDIA.

ON various occasions provided by the affairs of the Khaibar, Western writers have repeated the opinion, which seems to have originated well back in the nineteenth century, that the seven "Great Invaders of India"—from Alexander in 327-26 B.C. to Nadir Shah in 1738-39—made their march eastward through that "narrow sword-cut in the hills," and crossed the Indus at "Attock."* The implications of a single available route to a sole river-crossing, conveyed by the block of coincident movements, being singular, now easily discredited, and needing credentials of having ever been accepted, I quote the two following examples :—

"Beyond Jam-rud lies the mouth of the Khyber, that flood-gate through which the overflow of swarming horde or military monarchy has again and again poured down into Hindustan."

"It is certain that Atak has seen the passage of every conqueror who has invaded India from Alexander the Great downwards."†

The belief dies hard, not unnaturally, since it had a respected literary origin from which it has been handed down in successive English writings, that origin being, I suggest, a tangle of matters concerning the Kabul River from which was drawn belief in a Greek traverse of Khaibar.‡ However this may be, belief in the multiple and exclusive invasion-uses of the Khaibar is noticeably *mal à propos* in the N.-W.F. Province, through which runs the ancient highway to India down the Kurram Valley to the Indus-crossing for Dhankot.§

One cannot but smile to think that the four invaders whose route this was—Mahmud of Ghazni, Muhammad of Ghor, Chingiz Khan, and Timur Beg—could now entrain at Thal.||

The Western belief would have died out long ago, no doubt, if a table of particulars of the names and routes of the Seven Invaders had been accessible for ready reference by those unfamiliar with Indian

* *i.e.*, Atak Benares, the ferry-station Akbar Padshah established, fortified, and named in 1581-83, at the N.W. limit (*atak*) of his empire.

† *The Times*, February 24, 1924, and Murray's Handbook of the Panjab, 1883, p. 269.

‡ See *post*, the Alexander section.

§ Uncertainty as to the position of Dhankot (*var.*) is resolved by G.I. District Map, Sheet 15, 1866, which enters it on the river at the foot of Dunkote-Sir. The town was destroyed by the flood of 1841.

|| A useful reference book, guiding to others, is Elliot and Dowson's "History of India as told by its own Historians."

history. But to prepare such a useful table *ab initio* must be laborious. The period is 2,000 years; the information is scattered through many books; its road of research is beset with pitfalls; no one seems to have demanded to be told the routes until the activities of the N.-W.F. Province urged it. It is with pleasure that I proffer with these notes a concise statement of dates and routes which has entailed the less labour to me that my own book-work has enforced a delightful acquaintance with the literature and survey maps of Babur Padshah's territories, the north-western portion of which included the Kabul Valley and a wide circle of adjacent lands.

THE SEVEN GREAT INVADERS OF INDIA.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Routes to the Indus.</i>	<i>Transits of Khaibar.</i>	<i>Indus Crossing.</i>
I. Alexander of Macedonia; b. 356 B.C., d. 323.	327 B.C.: Charikar to Charsadda, moving between the eastern Hindu-koh and the Kabul River.	None.	At or near Und, 15 miles above site of "Attock" (1583).
II. Sl. Mahmud of Ghazni, <i>Turk</i> ; b. 967, d. 1030.	Ghazni, Paiwar, Kurram Valley to boat-station for Dhankot.	None.	To and from Dhankot.
III. Muhammad of Ghor, <i>Afghan</i> ; murdered 1206.	Ghazni, Paiwar, Kurram Valley to boat-station for Dhankot.	None.	To and from Dhankot.
IV. Timucin, Chingiz Khan, <i>Turk by family</i> ; b. 1154, d. 1405.	1222: Balkh, Bamian, Burwan, Kurram Valley, Indus, Kohat, Peshawar Plain, Bajaur; returned by same route.	None.	Never crossed.
V. Timur Beg, <i>Barlas Turk</i> ; b. 1336, d. 1227.	1403: Samarkand, Andar-ab, Badakshan, Pang-sheer Pass, Kabul, Paiwar, Kurram Valley, Indus.	None.	To and from Dhankot.
VI. Babur Padshah,* <i>Timurid Turk</i> ; b. 1483, d. 1530.	1519: Bajaur to Charsadda. 1525: Kabul, Khaibar Pass, Indus 15 miles below "Attock."	Several. The Pass was a road in his own territory.	Four times by the ford in Charsadda; once to Nil-ab, 15 miles below the site of Atak.
VII. Nadir Shah, <i>Afshar Turk</i> ; b. 1687, d. 1747.	1738-39: Kabul, Khaibar, Indus; returned by same route.	Once, and on return route.	To and from "Attock" (Atak).

* No surmise is entered as to routes followed in years of which record has not survived.

I. ALEXANDER'S KABUL CAMPAIGN.

327-26 B.C.

"Marking a searcher's track, his dead opinions lie."

Amongst the curiosities of literature few can be more singular or more entangled than the episode of the addition of the Khaibar Pass and the Atak Ferry—made in the thirties of the nineteenth century—to a route-order issued by Alexander some 2,000 years earlier. That order was that Hephæstion and Perdikkas, commanders of the main army (90,000), should go (*from the Koh-daman*) into "Peukelaotis" (*the modern Charsadda subdivision of the Peshawar District, lying along the Landai between the Indus and the Swat*), and there make preparation for crossing the Indus. Its brevity pre-supposed acquaintance with the road, but, in any case, whatever the Greeks had learned was supplemented by the expert guidance of Hindu allies who accompanied the entire march eastwards. "Peukelaotis" had marked advantages; it included the Hind Ferry (*Und, Ohind, var.*), to which goes the ancient Balkh-Lahor trade road, precisely suiting Alexander's advance for India, and it may have included the ford used by Babur Padshah, below Topi (*now the Pihur-Dalmohat-ferry*?).

What I shall say of the Greek routes to the Indus has been shown to me by Babur-nama work that has enforced close attention to maps and books concerning the Kabul Valley and its border-lands. Earlier commentators on Arrian's *Anabasis* are likely to have seen and said what these notes contain, but before writing of the routes I shall give a few examples of the intricacy inherent in the whole matter or imported by the Khaibar-Attock theory, examples which, it may be said at once, oppose its acceptance.

Obvious objections to accepting the modern additions are these:—They seem to have no textual warrant. If the feat of getting 90,000 men, with the *impedimenta* of 120,000, through the Khaibar and thence across the Kabul River in May (*i.e., near Jalalabad, from Peshawar into Charsadda, and thence back for Atak*) had been achieved, it would have been chronicled; we hear even of the stony bed of Panjkora and of difficulty in crossing the river (*kho*) of Alangar. The new route is the longer from its *détour*. It withdraws a force of 90,000 behind a difficult river and into a pass-gully, and thus precludes co-operation with a hard-fighting force of 30,000. This cannot have been. Alexander had ordered the main army to obtain submission from all towns on its road; immured for thirty-three miles in Khaibar, how obey? I pass on to less obvious matters.

1. The earliest mention I have seen of "Attock," as Alexander's crossing-place of Indus, is made by H. H. Wilson in the *Ariana Antiqua* (Lond., 1841, pp. 137, 192). As being his, it would be accepted unhesitatingly. Discussing the navigation values of the Indus and

the Kabul River, he says of the former, "Its upper part was descended by Alexander to Attock in boats, and, in fact, it is navigable for 40 m. above that fortress" (*Fort Atak Benares*) "to the vicinity of its débouche from the mountains." (*N.B.—Amb is forty miles above Atak.*) Wilson will not have written this without warrant. The limit of upward navigation on the Indus has been for many years fixed in gazetteers at a little above Atak, higher than which are the rocks and rapids of the tumultuous meeting of Indus and Landai. But may not Wilson have been right? Though his book was published in 1841, the statement quoted above seems to have been written earlier (? 1833); hence I suggest what may support Wilson's statement. The Hazara Settlement Report (1876, Cap. E. G. Wace) says, perhaps commenting on Wilson: "The Indus was not navigable above Dal Mohat Ferry in 1876, and boats did not ordinarily ply above Attock." But between 1833 and 1876 there occurred what may have left both the opposed statements correct—namely, the Indus flood of June, 1841, in which the river, flinging itself through its defile like a high wall of rocks, débris, and mud, held up the Kabul River (Landai) for twenty miles to Nisatta during twelve hours. Is it not conjecturable that, as its momentum lessened in its widened bed, the resolution of the forces of its forward fling and of the side-thrust of the imprisoned Landai let fall the Indus-burden of rocks near the confluence of the two rivers where now stretches the bar to the upward navigation of the Indus? May not Wilson have been right even in 1841?*


2. My second example is provided by Grote (*H. of G.*, 1888, x. 168) when he says: "It is presumed, probably enough, that Alexander crossed the Indus at Attock, the passage now frequented." It is true that the ferry was so in 1888, and was established in 1583, but Babur's ferry was at Nil-ab, fifteen miles lower, in the Indus-Haro *duab*, and once alone crossed (December 16, 1525).† What I have said does not exhaust the opportunities for mistake about conditions existent 2,000 years earlier, since study of the Indus has taught us that it has for ages pushed its course westwards across the Panjab; it was near Fort Atak in 1583—where was it some 2,000 years earlier?

3. This entry is important, since it shows that the additions once appeared justified, and at a later date were rejected; they were admitted (one or both) to the Imperial Gazetteer of India in 1883, and to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* in 1902. Neither appears in the most recent editions of these great works, respectively, in 1907 and 1910, where Ohind (the Hind Ferry of Charsadda) replaces Atak.

One would wish to learn the specific ground on which "Khaibar

* For a graphic account of the ascent by boat of the Indus from Khairabad to Marer see the Report of the Isazai Campaign, 1892 (Cap. A. N. Mason).

† Changes in the river are indicated by there having been an "Old Nil-ab" (*B. in E., s.n.*).



THE KHAIR PASS AS THE INVADERS' ROAD TO INDIA.

and Atak" were accepted as correct additions to an order which needed none. Not to dwell, however, on matters so obvious as that the early acceptors were pioneer observers of the Kabul Valley, or on the prominence of both the additions on the Panjab-Kabul road, I suggest a simple and covering explanation, having the double use of disclosing both the origin of the unwanted additions, and the creation since 327 B.C. of a modern Kabul River.

This explanation is one of mistake and confusion due to disparate knowledge of the river of the Kabul Valley,* possessed, on the one hand, by Alexander, his "literary Greeks" (*Grote*), the geographers Strabo and Ptolemy, with other well-informed Greeks (mentioned in McCrindle's volumes), and, on the other hand, by the group of Western entrants into the valley in the nineteenth century (and later). The disparity is shown by the words and opinions of each group to be the result of the circumstances that whereas the Greeks, entering the valley into the Kohistan, knew the Kabul River whole, as Orientals know it, from its source in the uttermost parts of Paropamisus (*under the Khawak Pass* [11,640 feet] of *Hindu-koh* [*kush*]),† to its outfall in the Indus (2,079 feet), the Western group, entrants for the most part from the Panjab, appear to have known its lower course alone, from the Indus to near Jalalabad, and this mistakenly.‡

Here and there question stirs about the composition of the new river (*cf. Prov. Gaz. of Kabul, s.n. Kabul River*), and even brief observation finds it misfitting that the "rivulet" which brings from the Unai Pass all that the cultivators on its head waters do not use—it is fordable near Kabul after a forty-mile run—should be said to receive the great and swift Logar as its tributary; moreover, the "hair pin" curve the Logar is supposed to make into "Panjsher" is a surprise.

Survey maps, ours not alone, delineating rivers whole, agree here with Greek and Oriental opinion, and I have chanced on two cases of repudiation of the new Kabul River, as being the river of the valley.§

The working-out of imperfect modern acquaintance with the Kophen seems to have been that the Western group, unaware that the Kophen Arrian says the Greek army crossed, is the upper course of the Kabul River and skirts Koh-daman,|| transferred the Greek main army some

* Not of Kabul town. It has been known as the Kubha of a Vedic hymn (Mc.C., 1885, p. 88), Persian *Ao-i-Kabul* (Greek, *Kophen*), Timur and Babur's Baran, the English Kabul River.

† For a limitation in the use of *kush* see *B. in E.*, p. 485.

‡ Its main upper course has been supposed tributary and named Panjsher; to its thus truncated Landai-Ningnahr reaches a new upper course has been given—viz., Logar-cum-affluents, and to the whole river a new source, some 150 miles south-west of its own near Khawak (*and under the Unai Pass* [8,000 feet] of *Koh-baba*).

§ One Wilson mentions; the other is that of Sayyid Ghulam Muhammad, twice Warren Hastings' envoy to the Court in Kabul.

|| One writer, indeed, transferred Alexander and his 80,000 also, who attacked the Aspii on Safed Koh and conquered the whole range.

sixty miles to the south-west of Charikar, to the only "Kopphen" of which they had information, and there crossed the 90,000 men and their belongings into Ningnabar, one writer fixing the crossing-place at the ford of our Hussars' disaster in 1879.

Contemporary writings reveal that anxious thought and ingenuity were spent in trying to adjust Arrian's statement to imperfect modern information about the Kabul River. It would have been a labour worthy of even Alexander to get those 90,000 men and their belongings across into Ningnabar with the river in May flood. One is certain the escorting Hindu chiefs did not counsel the attempt. But if the *tour de plume* were carried out and the crossing overcome, there would be no choice—return being unthinkable—the Indus had to be reached, and how except through the Khaibar, and how from Jamrud, but by what was the ordinary ferry of the nineteenth century? Thus I suggest the origin of the modern route as that also of the modern river.

There may be another explanation. We are not assured that 2,000 years ago there flowed a river to be crossed at the later Fort Atak; are we better assured that there existed a Khaibar gully through which a great army could toil?*

THE GREEK ROUTES TO THE INDUS.

Arrian's well-authenticated narrative† of Alexander's Indian expedition, taken with its supplement of details from other Greek writers, allows the following summary:

1. The entire campaign was waged within an irregular quadrilateral, bounded north by the foot-hills of Hindu-koh and its extensions towards the Indus; south by the Ning-nabar and Landai reaches of the Kabul River; east by the Indus; and west by the Kopphen (*here Upper Kabul River, mod. Panjsher*).

2. This quadrilateral was entered by the Greek army (120,000) in two divisions, one under Alexander's own command, and consisting of 30,000 picked, light-armed troops led by Craterus, the other of the main army, some 90,000, under Hephæstion and Perdiceas. It crossed the Kopphen eastwards, from its camp on the west bank of the river to the road running along its eastern bank from the Panjsher Valley southwards. This road Alexander seems to have left at once to attack the Aspii, but Hephæstion's force to have followed to near Mandrawar, and thence, I suggest, to have taken the Kunar road, and (as it is known that the main army was first in Peukelaotis) to have turned off at Kunar (town) or Pashat, from either of which places Charsadda is easily reached.

* I have not noticed reference in writings concerning the Khaibar road of 2,000 years back, to the Ab-Khana, the Mulla-gori, or the Karapa roads (Masson I., 147, 223).

† For a list of Arrian's sources see McCrindle's "Ancient History of India," 1898, and new edition, 1896.

As in considering the routes of the campaign it is useful to form an opinion as to the position of the Greek camp, I enumerate various matters which locate it as in the Koh-daman and near headquarters (Alexandria):—(1) The convenience of all concerned, for arrivals and departures across the passes or to the Indus; also for ease of access to the Kohistan grazing-grounds, to the hunting, fishing, fowling, and fertile villages none have described better than Babur; (2) nearness to the Trivium of trade roads near Charikar (*forty miles north of Kabul*); (3) Alexander's rule to cross rivers high on their course; (4)* that he seems to have gone at once, after reaching the eastern bank of the Kophen, into the high mountain tract in which rises the Kho-es, which I take to be the Kho(-aspes)—*i.e.*, river of the Aspii (*Babur's Kau, Masson's Kow*) he first attacked; (5) on a differing ground, as locating four places to the east of Charikar—(a) Alexandria, from which, as headquarters, Alexander will have started to join his contingent, (b) Nikæa, to which having come he sacrificed to Pallas Athene, (c and d) the camp and the Kophen, to which latter he is said to have proceeded.*

The campaign opened with the well-known division of the army:—(1) Alexander's contingent which attacked successive tribes of the foot-hills from Alangar Valley to beyond Bajaur, whence he descended (by Malakand?) into "Peukelaotis" (*Charsadda*); and (2) Hephæstion's great force, with which went Taxiles and other Hindu chiefs, under orders to go into "Peukelaotis," and there to prepare for crossing the Indus. In the end his orders were carried out; the whole army reassembled (after much fighting by both divisions) in Peukelaotis, and all crossed, from a riverside town of the State (*Strabo*), by the Hind Ferry (*Ohind, fifteen miles above Akbar's Fort Atak*), the Indus terminus of the through trade-route from Balkh to Lahore. This route precisely suited an eastward march from near Charikar to Charsadda, since by it, from time immemorial, horse-dealers have brought Balkhi horses into the Kohistan to get into condition for the Indian market; and on those same lands will the horses of the Greek army have recuperated or their numbers have been brought up to due strength.

We know Alexander's own route from his successive encounters with the tribesmen of the foot-hills, for making which the road served as a base-line for advance on position after position. This is the ancient military road of invasion; it is, indeed, the frequented road from the Hindu-Kush passes to the Indus.

That the Hindu allies would guide the Greek main army by this road seems obvious; Taxiles (ruler also of Amb) will have used it to reach the Greek camp on the Kophen, where he and his fellow-chiefs

* Arrian, Lib. IV. cap. xx. and Raphellius, Gr.-Lat. p. 314; Rooke, I. 202, 266; McCrindle, new edition, 1896; Phillips' and other atlases: Masson, III. cap. vii. for valuable matter about Bigram.

waited on Alexander. The brief royal order was sufficient for those who knew the country. It was Babur's road to Bajaur, thence to the then desolate Charsadda, and thence to the ford in the same state he used frequently.*

I now venture to suggest that for the main army to advance by the same military road would have the advantage of explaining why Alexander should have attacked the tribesmen, a matter I have not chanced to find acceptably explained. He is sometimes said to have done it and have placed garrisons in order to secure a road of retreat, but he had no thought of return through Kabul; had he been compelled to retreat from Trans-Indus India, there were better ways out into lands held by his own troops on the south, than the difficult Kabul Valley. Moreover, his garrisons could hardly have held their own, when his army had left them isolated. Nor does it seem reasonable that—as might be surmised—the attacks on the tribes were made with commissariat intentions; Alexander had as close companions men of high rank; for him and them to raid personally for cattle and corn seems misfitting. I have once seen it suggested that the main army took the Kunar road in order to protect the royal contingent. If one considers the narrow horse and camel roads, and into what thin line the 90,000 of Hephæstion's force would file on and on along the road, it seems not unsuitable to explain the action of the two divisions as co-operative, Alexander protecting Hephæstion's force as it moved eastward, by holding up the valiant, looting tribesmen, who, familiar with every point of vantage, could have destroyed even a great army in detail. The garrisons were temporary, one surmises, rejoining when the advance of the whole force permitted. These suggestions of a lay person about military matters are entirely diffident. What prompts them in part is that the Hindu and Buddhist peoples of the Valley must have desired to speed the Greek army across the Indus as greatly as the Greeks must have done to leave Kabul for Hindustan. The tribesmen were the common and perennial enemy from whom attack would be expected. Alexander had crossed country and had held up the Aspii from a long stretch of Hephæstion's road; the process could be repeated and repeated. Hence, concerted protective action on either side against the brave and stubborn tribesmen.

In concluding these brief notes, I wish to express my regret that in them episodes of the greatest interest could not be touched, amongst them being those of Massaga, Nysa, and Aornos. These, however, are all aside from the matter of routes.

ANNETTE S. BEVERIDGE.

(*To be continued.*)

† The routes between Charikar and the Hind Ferry are well shown on the G. of I. survey maps Nos. 38 and 43 (Kabul and Kashmir), reprinted 1923, on which mainly the map accompanying these notes is based.

SIR AUREL STEIN'S IDENTIFICATION OF AORNOS.

THE sudden appearance of the name Aornos in the headings of the daily Press must have discouraged some readers, intrigued others, and awakened in a select minority the delicate and soothing sensation of superior knowledge. To the latter the name Aornos would possess all the unction of that "blessed word Mesopotamia." Still even for those whose immediate mental reaction yielded, "A mountain stronghold in the north-west of India captured with difficulty by Alexander," it is, perhaps, not without interest to refresh their knowledge.

The capture of Aornos was the last condition necessary to make possible, or at least to justify, the invasion of India east of the Indus.

In 329 B.C. Alexander had established himself on the frontiers of India at Kandahar, where he founded the city of Alexandria-among-the-Arachosians. In the winter of 329-328 B.C. he pushed north and possessed himself of the upper Kabul Valley, where again, according to his custom, he consolidated his position by establishing cities, Alexandria-under-the-Caucasus and Nikala. But before addressing himself to India he thought it necessary to dispose of the last remains of the Persian Empire lingering in Central Asia. An expedition to the Jaxartes (Syr Daria) occupied him and his forces till May 327, when he arrived back at the latest Alexandria. He now called on the chiefs of the lower Kabul Valley and the Raja of Taxila to come in to him. They did so without demur and notified their submission, and the direct route to India now lay open to him.

There remained, however, the independent tribes occupying the hill country lying to the north of the Kabul River, the inhabitants of the Kunar, Panjkora and Swāt Valleys, who showed no signs of submission, and unless disposed of would constitute a serious danger in his rear and to his line of communications with Alexandria-under-the-Caucasus. He accordingly decided to deal with them in detail. He divided his force into two divisions. One division he despatched under Hēphaistiōn and Perdikkas by the direct route to the Indus, where they might make arrangements for the crossing of the river, while he himself with the remainder of the troops took a more northerly route through the hill country.

Scholars' estimates from the available data of the strength of his total forces at this period vary from 85,000 to a minimum of 25,000 or 30,000 men. The strength of the force lay in its European elements,

first and foremost the Macedonian regiments and then Greek and other mercenaries, but these were re-enforced by native contingents who had joined him at the various stages of his march from Persia onwards. Alexander dealt successfully with a series of tribes and of towns or "cities," which appear to have been numerous in a region where there are now none. The sites of most of these "cities" cannot be identified with any certainty, and the population, which was "Indian," cannot be regarded as the ancestors of the Afghan and Pathan tribes now occupying this region. The existence of cities, or even towns, seems to indicate a higher state of material and social organization, which must have persisted into the days of Buddhism, till the state of things described by the Chinese Pilgrims, the last and chief of whom was Hiouen Tsang (A.D. 629-645), was reached.

Advancing apparently up the Kunar Valley and thence through Bajaur, Alexander disposed of the Aspasians. Then crossing the Gouraios, (Panjkora) he attacked the Assakēnians and captured their principal city, Massaga, after a strenuous siege, in the course of which the Assakēnian chief was killed. Massaga appears to have been in Swāt. After this he invested and reduced two unidentified "cities," Bazira and Ora.

These successful operations led up to the final episode of Aornos, for, as Arrian says: "When the inhabitants of Bazira heard that Ora had fallen, they regarded their case as desperate, and at the dead of night fled from their city to the Rock, as all the other Barbarians were doing, for having left their cities they were fleeing to the rock in that land called Aornos." In the first place, however, he took up the thread of things in the lower Kabul Valley, down which Hēphaistion and Perdikkas had advanced to the Indus, establishing on their way a post at Orobatis, probably near the modern Nowshera. Alexander received the submission of Peukelaōtis, identified with Pushkalāvati as the modern Chārsadda, and "then occupied himself in reducing other towns—some small ones—near the Indus." He is then reported as "reaching Embolina, a city close adjoining the rock of Aornos." The quotations are from Arrian, whose account of Alexander is "the most complete and trustworthy that we possess."

Flavius Arrianus, of Nicomedia, in Bithynia, was born about A.D. 96. He was appointed Governor of Cappadocia by Hadrian, who held him in high esteem. He was a historian and philosopher of repute and a military commander and a military writer of ability. His chief work is the "Anabasis of Alexander," for which he claims as his principal authorities Ptolemy, son of Lagos, of Aornos fame and afterwards king of Egypt, and Aristoboulos of Cassandreia who also accompanied Alexander.

We may follow Arrian through his account of Aornos and its capture. After recording the flight of the Barbarians to this place

of refuge, he remarks that there was a report concerning it that it had been found impregnable by Heraklēs. Sharing an old difficulty with Herodotus (II. 43), he does not know *which* Heraklēs was meant, the Theban, the Tyrian, or the Egyptian. But he personally discredits the whole story. He continues :

"The rock is said to have a circuit of about 200 stadia, and at its lowest elevation a height of 11 stadia." (These figures represent about 23 miles and 6,700 feet respectively. Diodorus gives the measurements as 100 stadia and 16 stadia). "It was ascended by a single path cut by the hand of man, yet difficult. On the summit of the rock there was, it is also said, plenty of pure water which gushed out from a copious spring. There was timber besides, and as much good arable land as required for its cultivation the labour of a thousand men.

"Alexander on learning these particulars was seized with an ardent desire to capture this mountain also, the story current about Heraklēs not being the least of the incentives. With this in view he made Ora and Massaga strongholds for bridling the districts around them, and at the same time strengthened the defences of Bazira."

After this follows the expedition to the Lower Kabul Valley mentioned above. Then :

"On reaching Embolima, a city close adjoining the rock of Aornos, he there left Krateros with a part of the army to gather into the city as much corn as possible and all other requisites for a long stay, that the Macedonians having this place as the basis of their operations might, during a protracted siege, wear out the defenders of the rock by famine, should it fail to be captured at the first assault. He himself then advanced to the rock, taking with him the archers, the Agrianians, the brigade of Koinos, the lightest and best-armed men selected from the remainder of the phalanx, 200 of the companion cavalry, and 100 horse-archers. At the end of the day's march he encamped on what he took to be a convenient site. The next day he advanced a little nearer to the rock, and again encamped.

"Some men thereupon who belonged to the neighbourhood came to him, and after offering their submission undertook to guide him to the most assailable part of the rock, that from which it would not be difficult to capture the place. With these men he sent Ptolemy, the son of Lagos, a member of the bodyguard, leading the Agrianians and the other light-armed troops and the selected hypaspists, and directed him, on securing the position, to hold it with a strong guard and to signal to him when he had occupied it. Ptolemy, who followed a route which proved rough and otherwise difficult to traverse, succeeded in occupying the position without being perceived by the barbarians. The whole circuit of this he fortified with a palisade and a trench, and then raised a beacon on the mountain from which the flame was likely to be seen by Alexander. Alexander did see it, and next day moved forward

with his army, but as the barbarians obstructed his progress he could do nothing more on account of the difficult nature of the ground. When the barbarians perceived that Alexander had found an attack to be impracticable, they turned round, and in full force fell upon Ptolemy's men. Between these and the Macedonians hard fighting ensued, the Indians making strenuous efforts to destroy the palisade by tearing up the stakes, and Ptolemy to guard and maintain his position. The barbarians were worsted in the skirmish and when night began to fall withdrew.

"From the Indian deserters Alexander selected one who knew the country and could otherwise be trusted, and sent him by night to Ptolemy with a letter importing that when he himself assailed the rock, Ptolemy should no longer content himself with defending his position but should fall upon the barbarians on the mountain, so that the Indians, being attacked in front and rear, might be perplexed how to act. Alexander, starting at daybreak from his camp, led his army by the route followed by Ptolemy when he went up unobserved, being convinced that if he forced a passage that way, and effected a junction with Ptolemy's men, the work still before him would not then be difficult; and so it turned out, for up to mid-day there continued to be hard fighting between the Indians and the Macedonians—the latter forcing their way up the ascent, while the former plied them with missiles as they ascended. But as the Macedonians did not slacken their efforts, ascending the one after the other, while those in advance paused to rest, they gained with much pain and toil the summit of the pass early in the afternoon, and joined Ptolemy's men. His troops being now all united, Alexander put them again in motion and led them against the rock itself; but to get close up to it was not yet practicable. So came this day to its end.

"Next day at dawn he ordered the soldiers to cut a hundred stakes per man. When the stakes had been cut he began piling them up towards the rock (beginning from the crown of the hill on which the camp had been pitched) to form a great mound, whence he thought it would be possible for arrows and missiles shot from engines to reach the defenders. Everyone took part in the work, helping to advance the mound. Alexander himself was present to superintend, commending those that were intent on getting the work done, and chastising any one that at the moment was idling.

"The army by the first day's work extended the mound the length of a stadium [*circa* 200 yards], and on the following day the slingers by slinging stones at the Indians from the mound just constructed, and the bolts shot at them from the engines, drove them back whenever they sallied out to attack the men engaged upon the mound. The work of piling it up thus went on for three days, without intermission, when on the fourth day a few Macedonians forced their way to a small hill

which was on a level with the rock, and occupied its crest. Alexander without ever resting drove the mound towards the hill which the handful of men had occupied, his object being to join the two together.

"But the Indians, terror-struck, both by the unheard-of audacity of the Macedonians in forcing their way to the hill, and also by seeing that this position was now connected with the mound, abstained from further resistance, and, sending their herald to Alexander, professed they were willing to surrender the rock if he granted them terms of capitulation. But the purpose they had in view was to consume the day in spinning out negotiations, and to disperse by night to their various homes. When Alexander saw this he allowed them to start off as well as to withdraw the sentinels from the whole circle of outposts. He did not himself stir until they began their retreat, but when they did so, he took with him 700 of the bodyguards and the hypaspists and scaled the rock at the point abandoned by the enemy. He was himself the first to reach the top, the Macedonians ascending after him pulling one another up, some at one place and some at another. Then at a preconcerted signal they turned upon the retreating barbarians and slew many of them in the flight, besides so terrifying some others that in retreating they flung themselves down the precipices, and were in consequence dashed to death. Alexander thus became master of the rock which had baffled Herakles himself. He sacrificed upon it and built a fort, giving the command of its garrison to Sisikottos, who long before had in Baktra deserted from the Indians to Bessos, but after Alexander had conquered the Baktrian land served in his army, and showed himself a man worthy of all confidence."

After the capture of Aornos and a few minor operations probably to the north of it, Alexander returned to the Indus and then proceeded by a difficult route to join Hephaistion and Perdikkas, who had now constructed a bridge over the Indus, probably at Ohind, sixteen miles north of Attock. According to Curtius the march from Embolima, near Aornos, to the bridge occupied sixteen days. Progress was no doubt slow owing to the nature of the country.

This is the story of Aornos, as we have received it, according to the best authority, and it contains the principal data available to us for the identification of Aornos on the ground. The story and the data are given with some variation by our other informants, Quintus Curtius Rufus and Diöдорus Siculus. One important feature of the site, which is not mentioned by Arrian, is recorded by both these authorities. They say that the base of the Rock (according to Diöдорus on its southern side) was washed by the River Indus. This is further supported by Strabo XV., 687 (cited by McCrindle).

The question of the identification of Aornos has occupied European minds for the last ninety years. In 1836 General P. Court expressed the opinion that "it is probably the castle which was opposite Attak,

and the vestiges of which we see upon the summit of the mountain. Its foundation is attributed to Raja Hodi." In 1848 General A. Cunningham advanced a claim for Rāni-gat, sixteen miles north by west of Ohind. This among other difficulties entailed reducing Aornos to a height of 1,000 feet, "which is, however," General Cunningham remarks, "a very great height for so large a fortress."

In 1854 General Abbott discussed the question at length, and concluded that Mahāban Hill is the most probable site of Aornos. This idea was combated in 1863 by Mr. Loewenthal, "a learned missionary," who pressed the case originated by General Court for Raja Hodi's fort at Attak. Abbott replied, reiterating his conviction that "the Mahāban is the Aornos of history," though he thinks that the question is "still open to discussion." In giving the above summary of claims and counter-claims in his "Ancient Geography of India," published in 1871, Cunningham still pushes his own favourite, Rāni-gat.

On the whole, however, Abbott's Mahāban held the field till 1904, when Sir Aurel Stein was able to visit the mountain, and found it quite unlike the classic descriptions of Aornos and quite unlike Abbott's description of itself. In his "Report of Archaeological Survey Work in the North-West Frontier Province, etc.," for 1904-05, Stein excuses Abbott by remarking that he had only seen Mahāban from a considerable distance and from the side of Hazāra. It appears to have been a case of distance lending more than enchantment to the view as seen by the eye of preconception and faith. Stein's report, in fact, killed the Mahāban theory. It was apparently only in ignorance of it that Mr. E. R. Bevan, in the "Encyclopædia Britannica (1910-11), i. 548, wrote that "the best opinion now confirms Abbott's identification of Aornos with Mahāban." Later, in the "Cambridge History of India" (1922), i. 356, he says: "Unfortunately, it has so far been impossible to fit the Greek description of Aornos to any rocky height noted in the country to-day," and refers to Vincent Smith's "Early History of India," 1914 edition. Vincent Smith had rejected Mahāban on Stein's showing and also on other grounds, and said: "I agree with Sir Bindon Blood that Aornos must be looked for on the Indus higher up than Mahāban, and perhaps near Baio, which is above the sharp bend above Kotkai." That would appear to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of Sir Aurel Stein's present discovery.

Sir Aurel himself, in rejecting in 1905 the attempted identification of Mahāban with Aornos, had said, prophetically as it would now appear: "Considering how vague the geographical data are which our available sources furnish, and how little we know as yet about the detailed topography of the mountain tracts which lie along the Indus towards Buner and Swat, there still remains a possibility of our having to look for Aornos higher up the great river." But he was prepared for possible disappointment, and was ready in that case to fall back on a

possible alternative discovery—that the record of the Aornos episode was not of a “truly historical character.”

Now, twenty-one years later, he claims to have succeeded in the realization of the first alternative. According to the Simla correspondent of *The Times*, Sir Aurel Stein, travelling “in the mountain tracts of the Ghorband, Kana, and Chakesar between the Indus and the Swat watershed,” found that “the range trending eastwards from the Swat-Indus watershed ends between the valleys of the Ghorband and Chakesar in a high-detached spur. This overlooks a big bend of the Indus, with a high peak above. The range is almost level for two miles, and is now used as a summer grazing ground, with a space for cultivation, known locally as Pirsar—that is, ‘Holy Man’s Height.’ Sir Aurel Stein is convinced that all the topographical features of this plateau agree very closely with Greek accounts of Aornos, and that the site has been found at last. No genuine local tradition survives of Alexander’s conquest. The rugged peak immediately above still bears the name Una.”

This reference to the name Una seems to imply that Sir Aurel Stein regards it as representing the original name of which Aornos was the Greek rendering. That is a question for the philologists. Arrian also gives Aornos as the name of a place in Bactria.

Scholars, with knowledge on which to base independent opinions and reputations to lose, must perforce sit on the fence until full details of his discovery are received from the explorer; but such authorities as Dr. F. W. Thomas, Sir Denison Ross, Professor L. D. Barnett, and the President of the Royal Geographical Society, Sir Francis Young-husband, knowing Sir Aurel’s qualifications as a scholar and his record as an archaeological investigator, have given his claim what amounts to their conditional blessing. However cautious, and rightly cautious, they are in expressing any positive opinion, they have raised no point against it. Meanwhile the public, with no reputations at stake, may safely enjoy the luxury of uncritically accepting Sir Aurel Stein’s discovery and regarding the Aornos controversy as settled, with little fear of being subsequently called on to recant their faith and revise their beliefs. And the writer at least will tender his congratulations to Sir Aurel on the latest addition to the remarkable record of his discoveries.

D. L. R. LORIMER.

REVIEWS

THE ITALIAN EXPEDITION TO THE HIMALAYAS. Spedizione Italiana De Filippi Nell' Himalaia Caracorum, e Turchestan Cinese (1913-1914). Serie II.: Sotto la Direzione Di Giotto Dainelli; Vol. IX., I tipi umani: R. Biasutti e G. Dainelli. (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli.)

The Italian Expedition of 1913-1914 to the Kara-koram Himalayas and Central Asia under the leadership of Cavaliere Filippo De Filippi can be described as one of the greatest achievements in mountain exploration of recent times, and it has added considerably to our knowledge of the Himalayas. Probably no expedition to any part of the world has ever left its base so well staffed and equipped with scientific instruments, and it appears to the reviewer to enter on a new phase in the history of Himalayan exploration. It had the support of H.M. the King of Italy and the Royal Geographical Society besides other scientific institutions both in this country and Italy. De Filippi's programme included not only the exploration of some of the unknown glaciers of the Kara-koram Himalayas from a geographical standpoint, but investigations in all branches of science. Specialists with the most elaborate equipment took observations concerning meteorology, terrestrial magnetism, gravity, solar radiation, anthropology, and geology—in fact, all branches of physical geography were investigated with equal thoroughness. In addition, a small detachment from the Survey of India accompanied the Expedition, and their work has been described by Major Wood, R.E., in his most comprehensive report to the Survey of India.*

Owing to the outbreak of the Great War the work of the Expedition had to be curtailed to a certain extent. The publications of the results have also been delayed, but the volumes of this large encyclopædic work are now being brought out rapidly. The second Series is under the supervision of Dainelli, and comprises ten volumes, dealing with the geological and geographical results in their widest sense. The book under notice is the ninth volume of this Series, and deals exclusively with the inhabitants of Ladakh and Baltistan. It makes glad the heart of the reviewer, and we have nothing but praise for both the contents and the manner in which it has been produced. It is divided into two main parts. The first half, written by Dainelli, will interest the general reader, though only the specialist will be able to appreciate the immense amount of labour and research entailed in the writing and compilation of such an exhaustive treatise on the various races, religions, etc. The second half has been written by Biasutti, and is devoted to a detailed and invaluable report on the anthropological work done, which will delight the expert. There is an excellent bibliography, which speaks for itself, a number of maps, and a good collection of photographs, which will be referred to later.

Dainelli starts by giving us a clear and precise general résumé of the various

* "Explorations in the Eastern Kara-koram and the Upper Yarkand Valley." Narrative Report to the Survey of India Detachment with the De Filippi Expedition, 1914. "Dehra Dun": Printed at the office of the Trigonometrical Survey of India, 1922.

raees inhabiting the Kara-koram region of the Himalayas; this is followed by a short description of the languages and dialects spoken, which should be read in conjunction with the language map at the end of the book. Each race and tribe is next described minutely, in particular the Brokpas, the Baltis, the Ladakhis, and the inhabitants of Purig. Kargil is the capital of the Purig district, which is chiefly inhabited by Ladakhis, who have become Mahomedans; owing to its topographical position it forms a kind of buffer state between Baltistan and Ladakh. It was governed by a line of chiefs, now extinct, which, however, lasted down to the time of the Dogra war in the nineteenth century. The origin of the people of Purig is carefully worked out, and Dainelli appears to consider them as forming an ethnological group of their own, entirely distinct and separate from both the Ladakhis and Baltis. The differences and the similarities of the various races in so far as their characters are concerned are dealt with fully, likewise their distribution.

The earliest known religion in Baltistan and Ladakh is outlined, and its history traced until the introduction of Buddhism; we are then shown the subsequent expansion of the latter religion. We have most interesting information concerning the religion of the Dards, who in some districts are neither Mohammedan nor Buddhist in the pure sense of the word. It is not uncommon for one generation of a Dard family to be Buddhist and the next to be Mohammedan. The Dards to this day have many peculiar customs still surviving. The milk of cows is not used, nor do they make butter, and the cow is held in abhorrence in much the same way as a Mohammedan holds a pig. Sometime, about the thirteenth century, we have a wave of Mohammedanism spreading chiefly over Baltistan, to be followed later by inroads into Ladakh, all of which are clearly shown to us.

There are four types of architecture to be seen in the Western Himalayas, three of which would appear to have threaded their way in from the neighbouring countries. We have architecture of Indian Buddhist, Tibetan Buddhist, and Mohammedan origin, and, lastly, the original demon architecture. The first of these seems to have been introduced to some extent by the emigration of monks from Kashmir; their monasteries are easily distinguished from others owing to their typical Kashmir style. The Mohammedan architecture in this part of the world would seem to present no distinctive features; the mosques in Baltistan are frequently poorly built, being low in structure, with the usual mud-built walls. The last is particularly interesting, and Dainelli has been at great pains to collect as much information as possible. To the reviewer this appears to be the first real exhaustive attempt to grapple with the subject as a whole.

Lastly, Dainelli ends with several miscellaneous subjects. The castes are briefly dealt with, and there are excellent descriptions of the Mons and Argoons. In most villages in Ladakh we find Mons, and they are treated by the remainder of the inhabitants as of an inferior class; they are often musicians, and follow the trade of either blacksmith or carpenter. The Argoons are the result of a cross between a Turkistan father and a Ladakhi mother; this is, perhaps, the only case we have of two of the chief Asiatic religions intermarrying—that is, the Mohammedan and the Buddhist. The Argoons possess a kind of monopoly in the transport of goods between Leh and Yarkand. Dainelli goes into the question of polyandry with great thoroughness, and shows the general effect of it on the population. The historian will not go unsatisfied, for there is an admirable account of the local legends and the history of the people. It is, however, Dainelli's part of the book that will interest the general reader, and one can safely say that no stone has been left unturned to collect information and facts, though at the same time one is struck with the remarkably few words that have been used, and the precise manner in which it has been written.

The anthropological report, the second half of the book, has been compiled by Biasutti, and is based on measurements of 408 males taken by Dainelli during the expedition, mostly whilst in the Skardu basin. These measurements follow the method laid down by the Anthropological Institute of Florence, and are of all the types found in Baltistan and Ladakh, over a hundred, however, being Baltis. The origin of the Baltis has for many years past given rise to different theories, but the general opinion among English writers is in favour of a Mongol origin. Vigne, one of the earliest writers, described them as a mixture of Mongol and either Persian or Indian. Cunningham clearly stated that they are a branch of the Mongol race, though somewhat modified by climatic conditions and intermarriage with the Aryan races of India. We then have Biddulph, who acknowledged a strong strain of Aryan blood, owing to mixture with the Dards. Dr. Neve is of opinion that the Baltis are of Tibetan descent. In the early eighties of last century the Hungarian anthropologist Ujfalvy took anthropometric measurements, which appeared to support his theory that the Baltis are of Aryan stock, thus differing from the writers mentioned. Biasutti would now seem to settle finally the much-discussed question by agreeing with Ujfalvy, Biasutti's opinion being amply supported and confirmed by strict anthropometrical measurements. There is also an interesting examination of a Balti cranium by Nello Puccioni following the table of measurements.

Travel books are occasionally open to criticism on account of their maps, but Dianelli disarms us, there being no less than six, all of which are good. One shows the distribution of the languages and dialects of the country, the Tibetan language being shown divided up into two main dialects—the Ladakhi and Balti. Dainelli does not stop here, but gives the minor dialects, and has coloured each area where these dialects are spoken. Then we have a map giving us the distribution of the costumes, defining the limits for the wearing of the Tibetan leather boots, and also the *pirak* or the Tibetan woman's head-dress. Besides these, there are others dealing with the distribution of religions, population, races, and, lastly, an anthropological map. The fine collection of photographs is placed at the end of the book, and nothing seems to have escaped the camera, for we have pictures illustrating practically everything mentioned in the text. The Expedition wintered in Baltistan and Ladakh, and, consequently, we find particularly interesting plates showing winter conditions in these countries; previous photographs would appear mostly to have been taken in the summer months. One excellent full-plate shows Buddhist remains outside Dras, probably early relics of the first Buddhist missionaries to Yarkand. Coming to types, we have a remarkable collection of photographs of individuals and a group of each race. In addition to full faces, Dainelli gives us side or profile views—yet another example of the thoroughness of his work. These fine photographs, apart from their interesting subjects, are admirably reproduced.

It is to be hoped that an English translation of this volume will be forthcoming, so as to appeal to a wider circle as a book of reference. One might even hope that, should it be necessary, some of the larger societies, such as the Royal Geographical Society and others, would combine and undertake this work. Finally, both Dainelli, under whose supervision this volume was written, and Biasutti, for his excellent detailed anthropological report, deserve our hearty congratulations. The issue of the remaining volumes of this series will be looked forward to with interest if the same standard of excellence be maintained.

B. K. F.

INDIA. By Sir Valentine Chirol. Ernest Benn, 1926. 15s.

There are two classes of writers on India—those who have lived and worked among its various peoples, and attempt to describe Indian life and problems from within, and those who have set themselves to acquire a knowledge of India by study and travel, and write from the detached standpoint of outside critics. The former are apt to lack perspective, the latter that intimate and inner knowledge essential to wise judgment. Of this latter class there is no more competent authority than Sir Valentine Chirol. His present book is the last of a trilogy which began with the masterly exposition of "Indian Unrest," published in 1910. That was followed by the very vivid, if somewhat hasty, presentation of "India, Old and New," which appeared in 1921. At that time many well-wishers of India, who had not got down to the roots of its problems were carried away by the premature enthusiasm evoked by a well-meaning but ill-constructed scheme of reform which, evolved by idealists and theorists ignored the permanent, vital, indigenous forces that sway the minds of India's various races, castes, and creeds. Five years' experience of the reforms has brought sad disillusionment, even to such an acute observer as Sir Valentine Chirol.

A comparison of his forecast, in 1921, of India's political future under the reforms, with his vivid résumé of the last five years, furnishes much ground for reflection and much cause for anxiety as long as the cumbersome and un-Indian experiment of 1919 is continued on its present lines. Fortunately for India, that experiment is to come in 1929 under the review of the British Parliament, which, after local administration in India, will have to decide how far to "modify, extend, or restrict" it. For those who have to make that momentous decision, the present book will furnish valuable material. The book is described in an Introduction by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher as a "masterly survey of all the factors essential to the comprehension of modern India." The description may be accepted without tying the reader to a general acceptance of the author's conclusions. In many places the limitations inevitable even to the most acute observer, who is cut off from communication with the 99 per cent. of the population that have no knowledge of English, are apparent. From the undue prominence given to politics, and to the views of the Westernized and "politically minded" Indians, one realizes that the author's intercourse with the people was necessarily restricted to these classes. Anyone who has lived long in India knows how difficult it is to get at the back of a man's mind when he is talking to you in a—for him—foreign medium, or through an interpreter.

The book, therefore, often displays a marked, though unconscious, bias against the British administration and the British official, who are the favourite targets for the criticism of the Indian intelligentsia, and not less so because, in the past at least, they were striving rather for the benefit of the masses than to satisfy the aspirations of the educated classes. There is throughout a suggestion that for the last forty years, or since the National Congress has started, the British authorities have been culpably lacking in political acumen, and have failed to see or to estimate the significance of the Congress agitation, the victory of Japan over Russia, of Tilak's revolutionary movement, etc.

There is perhaps some foundation for these suggestions: but anyone who was in touch with the administration of India from 1886 onwards knows with what interest each of these new developments was followed by all ranks of the administration. The writer of this review has a vivid recollection of frequent discussions of the bearing on India of Russia's defeat in 1903, not only in high administrative circles but in every frontier mess from Abbottabad to Dera Ismail Khan. The Indian Central and Provincial Governments in pre-Reform days,

though mainly preoccupied with the urgent problems of everyday administration, were by no means the dullards living in a fool's paradise of easy self-complacency that the author suggests. They certainly succeeded in the primary duties of maintaining internal peace and promoting progress, and even contentment, to an extent which must be the envy of the reformed and pseudo-democratic administrations that now hold the field but have lost their grip on a people accustomed to look to those in power—whether British or Indian—for a definite policy and prompt decision. But though much of the book must excite controversy—as is inevitable in a work covering such wide issues—the narrative as a whole is one of exceptional value and interest.

The chapter headed "The Tangle of Western Education" is a very masterly and convincing exposition of a complex problem. Of the vernacular press in Bengal in 1907-9 the author writes: "The revolutionary press treated murder as a culture to be scientifically developed in a religious medium." Of the educational institutions he says: "There were High Schools and Colleges which had become forcing houses of conspiracy, where some of the teachers systematically trained up their pupils to believe in murder as a patriotic duty." Many of us know these facts; but have they ever been so well expressed? The author has also done a real public service in bringing out how the various attempts to spread primary education among the masses failed from the days of Sir Charles Wood and Lord Dalhousie down to recent years, owing to the short-sighted policy of a Government that feared to face the heavy financial cost, and the apathy or hostility of the Indian intelligentsia—composed mainly of the hereditary literate classes—who were indifferent to the needs of the masses as long as they could secure such funds as were available for the higher education of their own class.

The chapter on the partition of Bengal and its revocation indicates that the author is in closer touch and sympathy with Hindu thought and feeling than with Muhammedan. He writes as if the only public opinion in Bengal and, indeed, in India was Hindu opinion, and as if the Muhammedans in Bengal before the partition were a negligible minority. Lord Curzon's separation of Eastern Bengal was a genuine and generous attempt to meet the aspirations of the backward Muhammedan majority in that province—over twenty millions—who till then had notoriously been the helots of the more advanced Hindus who dominated not only Western but Eastern Bengal through their monopoly of public office, of the Bar, the Press, and educational institutions. It was this Hindu dominance, backed by the murder gangs and revolutionary organizations of the schools and colleges, that led to the revocation of the partition a few years later. It was long a moot question which course would have been the more expedient in the long run—to face Hindu opposition in a good cause, or to undo an act which was undoubtedly beneficial to, and popular with, the Muhammedans in the hope of conciliating Hindu feeling. The result proves that the former course would have been the wiser. By their success in revoking the partition, the Hindu revolutionary movement was encouraged, while Muhammedan sentiment, not only in Bengal but all over India, was inflamed against a Government that, as they put it, had betrayed them. To that policy we undoubtedly owe much of the subsequent troubles with a section of the Indian Muhammedans culminating in the Hijrat Movement of 1921, the Moplah rebellion of 1921-22, and the violent anti-British Khilafat agitation which fed both. The irony of the situation is that the problem which Lord Curzon tried to solve by partition still remains, and is, in fact, now more acute than before. Mr. C. R. Das years ago tried to solve it by the famous Bengal Pact, offering the Muhammedans, as the price of their political support to his "anti-British policy, a share in the loaves

and fishes of Bengal proportionate to their numbers. But, as the author points out, Hindu opposition was so violent that the project was still-born.

The rival religions, "hating one another for the love of God," have now—in April last—tried to solve the problem in their own way by wholesale murder, arson, desecration of mosques and temples; and only the calling in of British troops, after scores of people had been killed and hundreds wounded, arrested a general massacre. Is it unreasonable to believe that if the Muhammedan sphere in Bengal had remained separate, as defined under the partition, these recurring and sanguinary outbursts would have been avoided?

The chapters dealing with the Reforms and their working are both accurate and illuminating. Here the author, with his wide experience and his knowledge of politics and politicians, is at his best. His matured view of the Indian Legislature that "their record, for the first legislation period at any rate, was not altogether discouraging" is equivalent to damning with faint praise. The author puts his finger on the main reason for the failure of the All-India Assembly to realize its inexperience—namely, the desire of the Government of India to flatter its vanity by weakly yielding to its immature pretensions when wise and firm guidance was called for. The Government, he rightly says, "took the first step down a very slippery plane when in spite of the definite promises of the (Reform) Act of 1919 it acquiesced (after one session) in an amendment declaring that India has already made sufficient progress in the path of self-government to claim an early revision of the Constitution without waiting for 1929, the date fixed in the Statute." Could official ineptitude go further? The acceptance of that amendment marked the *Nadir* of British administration in India. Fortunately its action was promptly repudiated by the Home Government.

The reference to recent administrative matters are not always marked by precision of thought and accuracy in details. The statement on p. 156 that the Morley Reforms gave the new Councils no powers of control and carefully maintained an official majority is not correct. Those Councils enjoyed control over new legislation, and, *all* the Provincial Councils, had a majority of non-officials, a majority of Indians, and, in some cases, a majority of elected members. Lord Morley's reason for retaining an official majority in the All-India Council is quoted on p. 155 thus, "that in no circumstances could he envisage a parliamentary system for India." Was he far wrong?

Again, on p. 254 the author justifies the action of the All-India Assembly in rejecting the 1928 Budget on the ground that the enormous military expenditure absorbed half the revenue of the state. This fallacy, which can only be supported by separating provincial from central finance, has been exposed over and over again. As a matter of fact, the total expenditure on defence in India is less than one-third of the revenues of the most lightly taxed country in the world, and amounts to less than half a crown per head of the population as compared with £3 per head in Great Britain. No great Empire was ever so cheaply protected as India to-day.

On p. 269 it is said that Gopi Nath Sahai (whose murder of a British merchant in Calcutta in 1924 was extolled by the late C. R. Das as a patriotic act) intended to murder an Inspector of Police. The assassin was after bigger game—no less than the fearless Commissioner of Police, Sir Charles Tegart, who has done so much to stamp out the revolutionary conspiracies in Bengal.

The account of the Akali Sikh movement in the Punjab (pp. 297-300) is inaccurate in many material respects, but there is only space to notice one. The author talks of "the short-lived trouble which broke out in the second year of the war, with the return of a few hundred Sikhs driven away from Canada and

bitterly estranged by the anti-Asiatic immigration laws." Here he is confounding the return in September, 1914, of 300 Sikhs in the s.s. *Komugatu Maru*, who were not allowed to land by the Canadian authorities, with the return between October 1914 and 1916 of some 10,000 Sikhs settled along the Pacific coast, but chiefly in the U.S.A., who had been infected with anti British and revolutionary propaganda by Har Diyal and others, acting under German influence. Most of these men came back to India at the end of 1914 and the first half of 1915, with the declared intention of fomenting rebellion in the Punjab. Some hundreds of the most dangerous were promptly interned, and others were restricted. But those who were left at large succeeded for a space of nine months in spreading a campaign of murder and rebellion—combined with attacks on troops and police and serious, and not unsuccessful, efforts to spread sedition in the Indian Army—through the Central Punjab, which was only put down by special legislation and stern executive measures. Fifty-eight of the ringleaders were sentenced to death and over a hundred to transportation. The history of this dangerous conspiracy is fully described in the Rowlat Report of 1918. To write of it as a "short-lived trouble" caused by a few hundred returned Sikhs shows a very inadequate appreciation of the real facts.

But it is in dealing with the disturbances in Amritsar and elsewhere in March-April, 1919, that the author shows a more serious ignorance of facts brought out in official publications or established judicially in public proceedings before a British judge and jury. It would appear as if the author, who visited India (including Amritsar) in 1920-21 and then met Gandhi and the leading Indian politicians, had fallen under their spell in echoing their parrot cry of the "Punjab Massacres," and had never revised his first impressions in the light of facts subsequently established. Thus he writes (pp. 206-7) that Gandhi proclaimed April 6, 1919, as the date for a complete Hartal, and that on that same date occurred the first collision at Delhi between Gandhi's followers and the police. In fact, Gandhi first fixed the Hartal for March 30, and it was on March 30 that the Hartal at Delhi led to an attack by the mob on the railway station, which alone links the Punjab and North-West Frontier with the rest of India, to repulse which not only all the available police but the troops had to be called out. They had to charge the mob several times and open fire more than once to force them back into the city. Eight of the rioters were killed and some forty or fifty were wounded, as well as several of the police. Surely the author treats this very lightly in saying "there were only a few casualties at Delhi."

The point to note is that Gandhi, though, after the events of March 30 at Delhi and elsewhere, he realized that the Hartal must inevitably lead to bloodshed, decreed a second general Hartal throughout India for April 6. It was this distinct challenge to Government, enforced by wholesale violence and intimidation, that created the electric atmosphere charged with rebellion which precipitated the serious and simultaneous outbreaks at Amritsar in the Punjab and Ahmedabad in Bombay (1,000 miles apart) on April 10. On April 14 Gandhi at Ahmedabad, trying—as usual—to quell the storm he had aroused, described the outbreaks as "having been done in an organized manner." He was primarily responsible for them; but the author, like so many others who look to Gandhi's lofty professions rather than to his criminal actions, deals lightly with a man whose ascetic pose has covered a multitude of sins.

But the author has no language too strong for the unhappy officers of Government who had the ungrateful task of repressing the rebellion promoted by Gandhi's agitation, and here again many of his assertions are incorrect.

Thus on p. 209 he says: "*Throughout the Punjab* martial law was enforced with the utmost rigour," etc. There are twenty-nine districts in the Punjab,

and only in *five* of them was martial law proclaimed, and even in them it was enforced only in the towns where serious outbreaks had taken place, and to safeguard the railway communications with the N.W. Frontier. The above statement would suggest that the (whole) Punjab was aflame, as indeed is asserted on p. 207. That is a libel on a province which, except for the town mobs in eight or ten places, remained conspicuously loyal throughout the crisis and gallantly repelled the Afghan aggression. The author might have noted that martial law was withdrawn in the Punjab after two months, while in Egypt, where there was a simultaneous similar outbreak, it remained in force for over two years, and in the case of the Moplah rebellion of 1921-22 for over six months.

The same inaccuracy characterizes the account of General Dyer's action at Amritsar (pp. 207-210). Take the statements:

1. "Order had been restored *before* General Dyer reached Amritsar."
2. "General Dyer with a *party of fifty Gurkhas* reached the Bagh and saw a dense crowd; most of them engaged in listening to speeches. . . . He assumed rightly enough that this was a public meeting in contravention of his orders and a seditious one."
3. "*Without a word of warning* he opened and kept up on them a fusillade," etc.

The report of the Hunter Committee, the Despatches of the Government of India, and of the Secretary of State, and, above all, the summing up of Mr. Justice McCardie in a well-known libel suit in which Dyer's action at Amritsar was the chief issue, show that none of the statements above quoted can be accepted without grave qualifications. To take them in order.

(1) It was because the Amritsar rebels held undisputed possession of the city after the general massacre of Europeans on April 10 that General Dyer was sent there with a considerable force on the night of the 11th to restore order. On the 12th, and morning of the 13th, the rebels were able to derail trains along the main line adjoining Amritsar, thereby cutting his communications, and to send out emissaries to foment the outbursts in Kasur on the 12th—when two British soldiers were clubbed to death, and several British officers and men and an English lady with her children narrowly escaped the same fate—to attack Treasuries and wreck most of the railway stations between Amritsar and Kasur.

On April 13 the situation in and around Amritsar was so alarming that the Government of India declared a state of "open rebellion" and imposed martial law, at the same time calling on all officers of Government to use the "most drastic action" in preventing the spread of the disorders and assuring them of full support.

(2) and (3). The author seems to have studied neither the Hunter Report nor General Dyer's own report of April 14. Had he done so, he would have seen that Dyer with a strong force had spent four hours on the morning of the 13th going round Amritsar City with the District Magistrate and issuing proclamations, orally and in writing at nineteen different places, warning the people that gatherings were prohibited and would be dispersed by him with armed force. His warnings were received with defiance and a hostile gathering at the Bagh was announced by the extremists as a defiance. It met a few hours later. While that gathering of 15,000 was being addressed by the men who had taken a leading part in the murders and rebellion of the 10th, Dyer came on the scene and dispersed it by force as he had given previous warning that he would. Had he failed to do so, his small force would have been annihilated by sheer weight of numbers, and one shudders to think of the consequences in the Central Punjab, for the cities of Lahore, Gujranwala, and Lyallpur and many towns along the railway were in a state of "open rebellion," but the news of the crushing of the rebellion at its source in Amritsar promptly restored order.

His small force was not "50 Gurkhas," but, as his report shows, "25 Rifles 9th Gurkhas, 25 Rifles from 54th Sikhs F.F. and 59th Rifles F.F., making a total of 50 Rifles, and about 40 Gurkhas armed with kukris."

The author suggests that the meeting, though assembled in defiance of military orders, was rather a harmless affair engaged either in listening to speeches, or, as stated in the House of Lords by the Under Secretary of State in 1921, a prayer meeting. Dyer's view was that he had the rebel army in front of him. The nature of the meeting was under investigation by a British judge and jury for days. This is how the judge puts the matter in his published summing up:

"What was the meeting of *men* for?" (There were no women and children among the 15,000.)

"The question is, who were the speakers? One of them turned King's evidence, one was prosecuted for inciting the crowd to murder Mr. Scott and Mr. Stewart at the bank on April 10. Another speaker had been a clerk in that bank; he had led the murdering crowd to the room of Mr. Scott. A third speaker was one of the murderers of Mr. Scott, who was beaten to a pulp; a fourth speaker was also implicated in the bank murders; a fifth speaker had absconded to Kashmir.

"Another speaker was convicted of sedition and waging war, and the bank clerk had published a poem directly inciting to murder. This poem was being recited to the crowd just before General Dyer arrived. . . .

"What were these people speaking of?" The man who had led them to the bank murders was there. General Dyer fired," etc.

Which account carries more conviction? Sir Valentine Chirol's, or Mr. Justice McCardie's? Sir Valentine had the advantage of seeing the place, but obviously received a garbled and one-sided account of what took place. The judge and jury gave the best part of five weeks to a consideration of the sworn evidence of over forty witnesses on both sides, who were most competent to speak and were able to depose to many facts which the Hunter Committee had declined to hear.

There is an equal discrepancy between the author and the judge as to the final judgment. The judge in summing up said:

"I express my view that General Dyer in the grave and exceptional circumstances acted rightly, and in my opinion, upon the evidence, he was wrongly punished by the Secretary of State for India. That is my view, and I need scarcely say that I have weighed every circumstance and every new detail that was not before the Hunter Committee."

The jury by a majority verdict of eleven to one readily accepted the Judge's view. After referring to the above passage, the author complacently adds on p. 210:

"But the Labour Government then in office at home held that the learned judge was not in full possession of the facts, and maintained and reiterated their predecessors' censure."

There the question rests and may be left to rest.

Whoever is in possession of the facts, the author clearly is not. However it may suit politicians to ignore the judicial decision on a main line direct issue, one does not expect to find a writer of Sir Valentine's authority in that *galère*, making an unjustified attack on an officer who, as the result of being "wrongly punished," is unable to defend himself. What ground has he for traversing a judicial finding, and which was not appealed against and is therefore final? No doubt it is not easy to shed opinions prematurely formed on a one-sided presentation of the case. The broader issue raised by the Labour Prime Minister's statement, behind which the author takes refuge, has been discussed in Sir Lynden Macassey's brilliant article "Executive v. Judiciary," in the April number of the *National Review*. It is clear that the question will not be left to rest; if not

taken up by Parliament, it will certainly not be overlooked by those who value historical truth and British justice. To call General Dyer's action, as he does, "preventive massacre" conflicts with both. It is a pity that a book, in many respects so valuable, should be seriously inaccurate in several matters which have been the subject of recent controversy.

There are many other assertions beside those noted which need correction, but this review has already run to excessive length. Doubtless the author will make the necessary corrections in any further issue, and thereby further enhance the value of his work.

M. F. O'D.

MESOPOTAMIA CAMPAIGN, 1914-1918. Vol. III. of Official History. By Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O. H.M. Stationery Office. 15s.

The first two volumes of the official history of this campaign having established for the author a high repute, the third might well leave a taste of disappointment. But it is not so; the early record of easy, perhaps too easy, success in 1914-1915 was followed by the tale of unrelieved gloom and disaster which led up to the fall of Kut in April, 1916. The present volume deals with the triumphant vindication of our arms under the late General Maude—the busy five months from December, 1916, which witnessed the wearing down of the Turkish XVIIIth Corps near Kut, the capture of Baghdad, and the dispersal of the Turkish XIIIth Corps hurrying too late back from Persia.

Although the destruction of the Sixth Turkish Army thus forms the theme of General Moberly's volume, the record is not one of smooth successes. There were many failures, and although an official historian is precluded from critical comment, the facts are so clearly set out and the relative values of events so well maintained that this book is of far wider interest than just among those who voluntarily, or for examination purposes, are students of military history.

Indeed, it is safe to say, even at this close distance of time, that this volume covers the zenith of the modern Turkish state; subsequent events have only followed from decisions taken at that time. For in 1916 Turkey, for the first time in her own sphere, held the initiative. It is true that at the beginning of the war she had invaded Egypt as far as the Canal, but that was German not Turkish strategy; she had achieved the easy success in the Caucasus which forced upon us the Dardanelles Expedition, that again was fortuitous, and directly due to the weakness of her chief opponent, Russia, rather than a deliberate plan. So, even though Erzeroum had fallen in February, 1916, the Russians could surge no further forward than Erzingan without delaying many months to build a railway; the British were at a standstill before Gaza in Palestine, and in Mesopotamia, if they still wanted Kut, there were plenty of troops and to spare to defend it. Turkey could strike, and at once the Pan-Turan idea bubbled to the surface. Baratoff's army in Persia was the excuse to invade a neutral country, and the fact that those particular Russian troops were peculiarly averse to fighting was an added incentive. An easy invasion as far as Hamadan followed, but it is clear from General Moberly's narrative that the criticism of the Turkish historian, Muhammad Amin, which he quotes, to the effect that Kut and Baghdad were lost by the Persian escapade, is well founded.

The day we entered Baghdad, March 11, 1917, was also the date of the first stroke of the paralysis of the Russian revolution. Again Turkey had the initiative, again the lure of Pan-Turan led her armies away, this time into the Caucasus, where the only resistance was to come from their allies the Germans, already in occupation at Tiflis by special request of the Georgians, and the

handful of British under General Dunsterville, who made such a fine resistance at Baku. But again these easy political invasions were brought to naught; Turkey suddenly found that Allenby had destroyed her main army, our Salonica army, on the collapse of Bulgaria, was free and on the point of moving on the capital, which they could reach long before the scattered conquerors of the Caucasus could return to defend it. So an armistice, which was virtually a capitulation, became the inevitable outcome of the Pan-Turanian policy when put into practice.

Later, when fortune and the Greeks gave Turkey another chance, and she had a virtually clean slate presented to her with the Treaty of Lausanne, again the political fever supervened, this time in the more acute form of a fierce nationalism, the spread-eagle imperialism of Pan-Islam and Pan-Turan developing into a virulent and narrow tribalism. When the wiser dictator, Mussolini, fosters both the monarchy and the Papacy, who in return give him powerful support, the more elementary Mustapha Kemal must needs destroy the machinery of Church and State, arrogating to himself the ridiculous triple position of Head of the State, President of Parliament, and leader of a political party. In the religious sphere Young Turkey has deposed and deported the Caliph, dissolved the monasteries, and disestablished Islam. The present state of affairs is well described in an article of especial interest in the April number of the *Army Review*, "A Republic in the Making," by Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Thackeray, in which he says:

"For nationalism runs riot at Angora. 'We were but Mussalmans, now we are Turks.' 'Turkey for the Turks.' The war cry of the Turkish National Pact was 'L'Empire Ottoman est mort. Vive la Turquie.' Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism have merely a moral value as stimulants. . . . With the Mussalman States of Central Asia her relations are sentimental and religious rather than political and economic."

Twenty years ago Lord Cromer in his great book "Modern Egypt" wrote: "Islam reformed is Islam no longer. It has yet to be proved that Islam can assimilate civilization without succumbing in the process." Modern Turkey has yet to learn that the assimilation of alcohol and the wearing of "billycocks" are not progress. Recently Mustapha Kemal sanctioned the execution of several Turks for refusing to obey the "hats" order. An absurd incident, but it symbolizes war on Islam as an established faith; Angora seems to take the view that the blight on her progress has been the Koran.

Pan-Islam and Pan-Turan have led to a morass, and just as Julian's doubtful victory at Ctesiphon marked the beginning of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, so can we see the beginning of the end of modern Turkey in the brief period so faithfully recorded in General Moberly's Vol. III. of the Mesopotamia Campaign.

Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt are under the control of Western Powers; Mecca is in the hands of the Wahabis, the most full-blooded of all the followers of the Prophet. Can Turkey without Islam survive? We have always, and necessarily so, been sensitive to Moslem opinion in the East, and particularly attentive to Turkey as the suzerain of Islam. We can wonder whether we shall go far out of our way to help the new non-Moslem Turkey when Mussolini elects to recreate the Roman Empire in Asia Minor. When Russia next besieges Kars, the key of the Southern Caucasus, for the moment in Turkish keeping, will there be another Williams and a British staff to organize and inspire the defence as in 1855? Clearly Turkey cannot expect British friendship if she continues to practise the time-honoured pastime of "twisting the Lion's tail." On our side it is to fly in face of facts to contend that our policy since the Armistice has been

a source of national pride. The present attitude of both countries, as indicated by the Mosul settlement, gives great hope for a better understanding in the immediate future.

This is not the place for a military review, but it must be said that General Moberly's narrative from that point of view is accurate and clear, and survives all tests that memory and limited personal records can apply. The maps are good, constant references to them, if annoying, cannot be avoided; but the profusion of footnotes is very distracting, and it would seem that in many cases they could be woven into the text with great advantage. The nomenclature of regiments is sometimes given in strange forms; perhaps it seemed to the author too slangy to talk, as soldiers do, of the "East Lances" and "North Staffs," but the half-measure of leaving out the word Regiment, and saying "The East Lancashire had advanced," reads very awkwardly.

This volume is, as has been said, full of interest, and it is good news to know that the last phases of the campaign, including the doings of the Eastern Persian Cordon and of the mysterious Dunsterforce, are to be told in a fourth and final volume, now nearing completion.

W. M. T.

THE RISE OF THE IMAMS OF SANAA. Translation, with comments, by A. S. Tritton of the Aligarh Muslim University. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 7s. 6d.

This in the main is a work compiled in the tenth century A.H. The latest Imam under reference is Ismail al Mutawakkil (1055-1067 A.H.). The book describes the "steam-roller" warfare between Turks and Imams which ended only in 1911-1912 A.D., when the Imam of to-day, Yahya al Mutawakkil, buried the hatchet to throw in his lot with Islam against the Italians in the Italo-Turkish campaign.

Mr. Tritton in his comments relates the prophecy that "in the latter days one of the Prophet's family should possess Shahara and destroy the power of the Turks." Their power has been destroyed by Britain, and the present ruler lived mostly at Shahara during the Great War, and also before 1911, when the Turkish and Imamic forces alternately took, and were dispossessed of, San'a. Against this place and the garden-city of Al Rauda—five miles to its north—the Turkish attacks were chiefly directed, and Al Rauda to-day presents a very battered appearance. Mr. Tritton discusses "the selfish interest and delight in strife, rather than the love of religion, which made the Arabs under Turkish rule hesitate to join the Imam." It is true that the Zaidi creed is less bigoted than the Shafa'i in the Yemen; but many Arabs in the latter-day warfare were well aware "on which side their bread was buttered," and not of them could it be said, as of Cato:

"Victrix causa Deis placuit, sed victa Catoni."

It was not "hypocritical," as Mr. Tritton rightly believes, that while the Arabs refused Turkish rule "because the foreigners were evil-doers," yet in writing to Turkish Pashas the Imam praised God for Turkish victories which the Sultan-Caliph upheld, and glorified Islam. The Yemeni Arab has never loved his Turkish overlord, but, being a Muslim, he would naturally exult over Islam's defeat of the infidel. This spirit continues to this day; and yet the Arab loves strife for strife's sake, as one of their poets has said:

"To us men is prescribed the fight; to you women the trailing of the skirt."

It is a pity the translator writes "Yemen" instead of "The Yemen." "The transliteration of foreign names can hardly be called systematic," he says; but his system is mostly satisfactory. Yet I dislike "Sanaa" and "Saada" even in the *text*, for the double *a*'s suggest to the European eye and ear no fitting pronunciation. The index, of course, gives the correct transliteration, and yet here I notice the slip of "Arhab" for "Arḥab" (cf. Rechabites). So, too, "Lahj" (monosyllable) is the correct form. "Bir" is also a slip, and "Mokha" is better than "Mocha"; and I note that Mr. Tritton uses elsewhere the *kh* to represent this sound. Has not the commercial commodity stereotyped the *ch*? The use of *r* for the letter "ghain" is confusing. This is the French device, and with them is good, for their "*r*"-*grasséyé* closely represents the "ghain." To English ears this sign can suggest *r* only. Many Englishmen cannot pronounce *ġ* ("ghain") without combining the sound of *r*, and this inability may be laid at the door of a faulty transliteration.

It is refreshing to note that Mr. Tritton does not support the almost universal error of the double *s* in the word "Husain." "Dhimar" should be "Dhamar," and "Yafrus" is correct—not "Yafris." All this is, perhaps, captious criticism, and yet the book is an appeal to "scholars," chiefly.

The Arabs assert that Bait al Faqih al Zaidiyya, which lies on the outskirts of the B. Sulail, on a level with the island of Kamaran, was the *original* town of that name, and that thereafter was founded the town further south, B. al Faqih, on the road between Hodeida and Zabid—and Allah best knows!

The tobacco plant, it is said, was tabooed by the Imam; and to day the Imam neither smokes nor drinks coffee, though he eats moderately of the galeaf (*Catha edulis*), which his people, unfortunately, "ingorge without restraint.

The "collective ownership of the clan" ("al qabyala") is stated; but a clan will, for filthy lucre, split up into two mutually hostile parts, for, as the Prophet said, "Everyone has his own pet calf, and the calf of my People is the dirham." Properly speaking, the ideal Arab unit is the *family*. Hence it was possible for the Turks to keep the tribes in subjection by the principle of *divide and rule*. Tacitus, in his *Germania*, wrote: "Long may it last, I pray, and persist among the nations, this—if not love for us—at least hatred for each other. . . . Fortune can guarantee us nothing better than discord among our foes!"

It is interesting to learn that "the Jews, armed with slings, fought for the Imam." Nowadays the Jew goes compulsorily unarmed. In our Aden Protectorate I know of just two wholly Jewish villages where the inhabitants have peculiar prerogatives.

The punishment of harlotry is still exacted. I recall once in Dala headquarters a body of sheikhs coming to my camp to ask if certain women were countenanced by me in a village near the soldiers' tents. When I protested, then, "May we oust them?" they asked. I consented, and the village was speedily cleared, and the unfortunates put down across the Turkish border.

Mr. Tritton is not correct when he says that the name Zaidi is never given to the Imam. His followers, too, glory in the term "Ziyūd"; and to-day the Imam leans chiefly to his Zaidis for support, and to the B. Muṭar of the Bakil in particular. When in San'a in 1924 I always asked for an escort from this clan, and this pleased Imam Yahya.

I must differ from him, too, when he says that, roughly speaking, the appellation of Sharif is used "outside the Yemen." As a matter of fact, the fine distinction between Sharif and Saiyid, as descendants respectively of Al Hasan and Al Husain, is adhered to. Imam Yahya is descended from the former, while many of the Imams have traced their descent from the younger son of Ali. I admit, however, that the present ruler is usually styled Saiyid.

Again, it is not correct to say that "in Zaidi belief any descendant of the Prophet who was a just man might become Imam." There are some twenty-one qualifications for the Imamate, and many of these are physical.

The word "dawil" is not surely referable to a "daula"? "Dawil" in the Yemen means *old*—cf. Al Sheikh al Dawil, the *old* village of Sheikh Othman, by Aden.

The translator treats of "the casuistical treatment of an oath imposed by force." This is true. Sitting in the Aden courts as a magistrate, I remember a Bedouin witness who, when about to be put on solemn affirmation, said to me: "Think you I shall lie if *not* put on oath?" After this I never put his kind on oath. Others have thought that an oath imposed by an unbeliever may be broken with impunity. It is true that an oath given in the name of the local saint of Yafus (near Ta'izz), one Ibn 'Alwān, is held to be most binding. In the Yemen, Ibn 'Alwān is held in almost as high esteem as the Prophet. The Zaidis, however, do not make pilgrimages to the saints' tombs as the Shāf'is do.

The Yemenis to-day are not quite smooth-faced. Everyone keeps some hair on the face to swear by—usually on the chin.

This work of Ahmed, "controlled by certain specified books now in the British Museum," should be welcomed by the scholar, and it is hoped that Mr. Tritton may see his way to continuing the series. The work abounds in place-names. The Yemen is thickly populated. Whitaker's estimate of 700,000 is a stereotyped error. The figure is nearer 5,500,000. A map would have fitly crowned the volume, which most surely was a labour of love.

H. F. J.

THE ARAB AT HOME. Paul W. Harrison. London: Hutchinson and Co. (1925). Sketch map and illustrations. 15s. net.

Some five hundred books more or less directly connected with the Persian Gulf have been written in English during the past hundred years, and probably about five times as many concerning the countries of the Middle East. Not more than one-tenth of this number have that peculiar literary charm which is the hall-mark of sympathetic observers who, by long residence and habit of mind, have not only much to tell, but much to teach their readers, because they have learnt much.

Amongst such books Dr. Harrison's work will long hold a high place; indeed, we may well regard it as the most informing and most thoughtful work that has appeared on the Persian Gulf region during the past thirty years. The author is describing things he has seen, not once only as a chance traveller, but on many occasions during long years of work as a medical missionary; not only in a consulting-room, but as a traveller in regions where Europeans have seldom, and European doctors scarcely ever, penetrated. Arabia, and particularly Nejd, is a crucible in which mankind has been scorched and buffeted by sun and wind and, though the process is not yet complete, Dr. Harrison's discerning eye has found gold, though he does not hesitate faithfully to describe the dross from which the precious metal has emerged, and is emerging.

Perhaps the most important parts of his book are the chapters in which he describes the life and bondage of the oasis-dwellers of Hasa and the pearl-divers of Bahrain and the neighbouring coast. The former lie beyond the reach, as yet, of European ideas, but the latter have for the past fifty years lived, if not under the British flag, in a principality whose chief is very directly under the

political influence of Great Britain. That such bondage should exist and should have been intensified during the last twenty years is, as Dr. Harrison perceives and is not afraid to record, not entirely creditable to this country. Dr. Harrison's estimate of the attitude of the average Arab towards British merchants and officials is not wholly flattering, but is probably as accurate as is possible amongst a population whose views of the suzerain power are apt to vary according to the character and reputation of the local representative of Government for the time being.

As a disinterested physician and surgeon, without political affinities, the author had opportunities of meeting and conversing freely and frankly with all classes, not excluding women, and this circumstance invests his book with quite exceptional value for those whose business brings them in contact with Arabs, whether in Mesopotamia or the Persian Gulf. Like Doughty, he admires the simplicity of their life and aims, their passionate belief in the one God and, through it, in the unity of the universe, in which they perceive more clearly, perhaps, than Westerners, how small a part is played by puny man. He does not attempt, however, to idealize the subject of his work nor his environment. Heat and cold, hunger and thirst, vermin, sickness, and death are to his Arab friends, as they were to us all in Europe not so very long ago and to very many during the Great War, a necessary part of life, not things to fear or to avoid contact with, but things to face stoically and even lightheartedly as the common lot of men. It is a book that should be often in the hand, and permanently on the shelves, of all those who live between Suez and Karachi and of many others who may see here, as in a glass, what our own early ancestors endured and what they held dear. Those who have ears to hear will understand from this book why it is that it is in the East that great religions have been born, and why it was in Central Arabia that the Wahabis, the most militant sect of modern times, were born in the eighteenth century and found fresh life in the twentieth.

A. T. W.

IRAQ. By S. H. Slater, C.I.E., C.M.G. *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April, 1926.

This article is a brilliant summary of events in Iraq during the last five years. Nobody is better qualified to write their history than Colonel Slater, I.C.S., who, until the end of 1924, was Financial Adviser to the Government of Iraq. Whatever that country may have lost through his return to India, we may congratulate ourselves on the liberty of speech which his withdrawal has brought to him.

The author begins his story with the promises made to the Arabs during the Mesopotamian campaign. He points out that no undertaking was giving to set up a national government immediately. Any such pledge would not only have interfered with the military administration, but would have embarrassed the peace negotiations. In referring to the much criticized régime of Sir Arnold Wilson (1918-20), Colonel Slater, with intimate knowledge, says that the country enjoyed good government (perhaps better than it has ever had before or since), that taxation was lighter than it had been in Turkish times or was to become later when a constitution was set up, and that medical and utility services were introduced "of a standard of excellence beyond all natural expectations." Nor can Sir Arnold Wilson be blamed for the rising of 1920.

In 1921 Mr. Winston Churchill held a conference in Cairo for the prime purpose of cutting down drastically British expenditure in the Middle East. That

object was achieved, mainly by replacing regiments by aeroplanes. But it was in the hope of still further reductions, and of an eventual cessation of British expenditure in Iraq, that the conference also decided to hand over the administration of Iraq to an Arab government, with Faisal as king, but with a British High Commissioner and British administrative inspectors, who had "numerous definite functions but indefinite responsibility." Colonel Slater states incidentally that the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office "entirely separated the Iraq Government's British advisers from the High Commissioner." In these circumstances, it is surprising that British assistance has achieved so much. One would have assumed that the advisers would be required to subordinate to the general policy of the High Commissioner any advice which they give to their ministers, and that the High Commissioner would be instructed to consult the advisers before initiating any policy, not while interfering with them in matters of detail.

The author pays a tribute to the dexterity with which the first High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, "a man with the sagacity of Ulysses and the front of Wellington," set Faisal upon his throne and an Arab ministry upon its feet. Then he passes on to the change of British policy in 1928. The reduction in the mandatory period—from twenty to four years—has been sometimes attributed to Arab progress or Arab agitation. Colonel Slater rightly traces it to the British Press cry for the evacuation of Iraq. The reduction was ill-advised, and seriously retarded the progress of Iraq.

"Was Iraq in the least likely to be able to defend and support herself in four years? No one could seriously answer that question in the affirmative. What, then, would happen at the end of the period? Chaos? Turkish domination revived, with its inevitable reprisals on those who had coquetted with the infidel? or a plausible pretext for further and more intense British control? No wonder that a profound uneasiness possessed the minds of men."

Little more than two years later, the new policy had to be reversed at the bidding of the League of Nations Boundary Commission, who quickly realized that an Iraqi Iraq was utterly impossible without British protection for a prolonged period.

Colonel Slater gives an illuminating account of the working of the new administration, and of the responsibilities assumed by King, High Commissioner, Constitutional Assembly (now replaced by a two-house Parliament) and Cabinet. It is fairly obvious that in the last resort the most important wheel in this somewhat elaborate machinery is the High Commissioner, now Sir Henry Dobbs. To the services which he and his staff (especially Miss Gertrude Bell) and the British advisers have rendered the author gives generous praise.

As to the future, the author is somewhat pessimistic:

"A rapid increase in the Iraq army is postulated by the existing policy, and its ultimate cost cannot be less than £1,500,000 a year. Mr. Amery is confident that the full strength can be attained, and its cost met from Iraq revenues, probably by 1928. There is no foundation for this optimism. The finances of Iraq cannot for many years support a greater expenditure than the present. And, even if the financial difficulty did not exist, no one seriously believes that a country like Iraq, internally turbulent and externally subject to aggression along an immense open frontier, can ever provide for its own defence with local forces drawn from a total population of 5,000,000, of which the tribal part (at least two-thirds) is not amenable to recruitment."

And again, on the political outlook:

"There are no signs that Faisal's government has yet struck root in the soil of Iraq. The constitution has had no organic growth. It was thrust ready-made on an inarticulate country. It has been neither strong nor beneficent. If the

inhabitants of Iraq enjoy an unusual tranquillity, they owe it to the foreign Power which protects them by its forces. Not all the wizardry—or should we say witchery?—of Miss Gertrude Bell can prevail over the plain fact of the insufficiency of the Faisal kingdom. She has hypnotized the minds of many. She has practised Couéism on King Faisal himself with such assiduity as to make that susceptible monarch actually begin to believe in himself. But the star of the Hedjaz dynasty is not in the ascendant. The balance of power in Arabia has recently changed against the Sherifian line. In defending our new protégé we may soon find ourselves fighting our old friends. There is little doubt that, if we adhere to our present policy, Iraq will remain for many years an anxious charge and financial burden on future British Governments."

Perhaps Colonel Slater would have been rather more hopeful if he had written after the execution of the new Anglo-Turkish-Iraqi treaty, which gives Iraq a satisfactory northern frontier, a reasonable prospect of friendly relations with her most powerful neighbour, and fair security for British capital. But there can be no doubt that the country's hopes must long continue to depend on the presence of British aeroplanes, like guardian angels, above and around her.

Everybody who wishes to know what is going on in the Middle East should read this article. Nor should it be overlooked by students of political science. Few more courageous or interesting constitutional experiments than the new régime in Iraq have ever been given birth.

E. H. K.

RELIGIONS OF THE EMPIRE. A Conference on Some Living Religions within the Empire, held at the Imperial Institute, London, September 22 to October 3, 1924, under the auspices of the School of Oriental Studies (University of London) and the Sociological Society. Edited by William Loftus Hare, Joint Hon. Secretary to the Conference. With an Introduction by Sir E. Denison Ross, C.I.E., Ph.D. Duckworth. 1925.

In 1923 it was decided to hold a Conference of Living Religions within the Empire, in conjunction with the Wembley Exhibition. Although it was originally decided to hold the Conference at Wembley, it finally took place at the Imperial Institute from September 22 to October 3, 1924. The papers read, together with an Introduction by Sir E. Denison Ross and a Sketch of Modern Religious Congresses by the Editor, have recently been published, and form a very interesting and instructive volume. The book is useful, not only as a record of the proceedings of the Conference, but as a work on the religions of the Empire of permanent value.

The record contains the work of some notable people. The Khalifat-ul-Masih, head of the Ahmadiyah sect, came to England especially to attend the Conference, and contributed a paper on the sect he leads. Mr. N. C. Sen, son of the famous reformer, Keshub Chander Sen, dealt with the Brahmo Samaj religion. Mr. Ruhi Afnan, who contributed one of the papers on the Bahai cause, is nearly related to Abdul Baha, after whom that religion is named. Sir Francis Younghusband, Sir Patrick Fagan, Professor Margoliouth, and Professor Giddes—to name only a few of the better known—have contributed to the volume. In all, some seventeen religions were dealt with. Christianity and Judaism were omitted. It was felt the Conference would be unduly extended if these were included, while they were probably too well known to need expounding to any audience meeting in London. Some religions of recent origin, such as Christian Science, Theosophy, and the new Spiritualistic Church, were also omitted.

Lack of space precludes any individual review of the papers now published.

Nearly all were written by adherents to the religion with which they dealt. They are, therefore, descriptive rather than analytical, and criticism and comparison are absent. But, on the whole, they each form a sincere and fair summary of a religion as seen from the standpoint of a well-informed believer. Written entirely without any spirit of aggressiveness or controversy, collectively they strike a note of strength combined with tolerance, and mutual trust without surrender, in keeping with the highest ideals of the Empire, which all would like to see perpetuated. Two papers were devoted to Hinduism, while two more dealt with the Arya and the Brahmo Samajes, comparatively modern movements which sprang from it. Two papers dealt with the general aspects of Islam, while the Shiah sect, the Ahmediya movement, and Sufism were discussed separately. The Bahai cause, which originally sprang from Islam, is appropriately placed in a different section. Primitive religions were discussed in four papers—namely, "Some Account of the Maori Beliefs"; "Beliefs of Some East African Tribes"; "The Bantu Religious Ideas," and "Some Aspects of the Religion of the West African Negro." These were, perhaps, in some ways the least satisfactory of the collection, but it is, of course, more difficult to give a satisfactory account of the beliefs of a primitive people within the limits of a paper, as the gulf between such people and the reader is so much greater and more difficult to bridge. Neither can the influence of environment nor the embodiment of customs required for tribal or individual self-preservation, which are important factors in primitive religions, be sufficiently explained in any short account, and knowledge of them cannot be assumed by the writers. Eight papers dealt with the Psychology and Sociology of Religion, the side of religion of special interest to the Sociological Society, which, with the School of Oriental Studies, promoted the Conference. Again a detailed review is impossible. By agreement all politics and controversy were excluded whereby harmony was secured, even if practical interest was curtailed. But, in these days of acute antagonism and conflicting racial and party interests, none can doubt the wisdom of the limitation. Probably members of over a dozen races attended the Conference.

Finally, it can be said that the promoters of the Conference succeeded in a very difficult task. Interest, as well as harmony, was achieved. Most divergent beliefs were stated and mutual understanding was promoted. Sir Francis Younghusband certainly struck the right note in his opening address when he urged that "not even patriotism is enough," and that religion should form the basis of imperial unity. The Editor, in his Sketch of Modern Religious Congresses, gives a brief account of those which took place up to the war (the Report of the Conference of Paris in 1924 was not to hand when the present volume was published). It is said that another World Congress is to be held in Rome in 1927. But it is to be hoped that the importance of following up this Conference will not be lost sight of. If the spirit then displayed can be preserved, it offers a great asset towards the attainment of imperial unity and international amity. The present volume deserves to be widely known and studied. It contains in one volume a mass of information only previously available in many scattered sources.

M. F. W.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR MORTIMER DURAND, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.: A BIOGRAPHY. By Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G. London: Cassell. 1926. 25s.

To members of the Central Asian Society this Life of one of our most distinguished Presidents has a special interest, but Sir Mortimer Durand's career has a claim on the attention of all who are interested in our Imperial history. His

record of thirty-one years as an Indian civilian was followed by twelve years in high diplomatic posts, and perhaps no other officer of his service, except the first Sir Bartle Frere, has played so important a part in public affairs unconnected with India. In 1910 he contested a Parliamentary seat unsuccessfully, and was possibly fortunate in escaping those disappointments which so often befall men of great ability, trained in a school that is out of touch with Home politics, when they enter the House of Commons late in life. But if Sir Mortimer failed to become a Parliamentary figure, his pen added to his reputation. Possibly his friend and biographer is inclined to claim somewhat too much for his verses, some of which are closely modelled on those of Sir Alfred Lyall, but three well-written biographies, a regimental history, an historical romance, and a novel of current Indian life, make up a remarkable literary output for a man who was for more than forty years engaged in exacting official duties.


Durand, the son and brother of soldiers, would have chosen the Army as a career, but his father's judgment directed him into the Indian Civil Service. He was lucky in being selected for political employment within two years of his return to the country of his birth, and his very brief apprenticeship as a junior district officer in Bengal was followed by continuous service for thirty years under the Indian Foreign Office. It is somewhat tantalizing that the exceptionally vivid and interesting diary in which he describes his boyhood and student days breaks off when he was only twenty-three: the extracts printed in this book show that it might have been an autobiography of high merit. The account of a trip to Paris in 1877 to help a French aunt amidst the Communist troubles, and the descriptions of the daily life of a newly joined Indian civilian in Calcutta and the Bengal mofussil are most attractive. Once Durand had reached Simla his personal record became closely intertwined with the history of Indian foreign policy. Sir Percy Sykes has succeeded in his treatment of the problem that presents great difficulty to all biographers of men engaged in public affairs, the question how far it is necessary to attempt a history of the times in order to write the life. For this book gives us a clearly cut portrait of the man, with just enough description of the political affairs in which he was engaged to make the presentment of his work interesting to the general reader. Durand's official life in India was passed almost entirely as a Secretariat Officer, except for a short term of work under Sir Alfred Lyall in Rajputana, but he got away from headquarters far more often than has been possible for later generations of Indian Secretaries, and acquired a first-hand knowledge of the most important international and frontier questions that confront the Government of India. Sir Frederick Roberts took him as Political Officer to Afghanistan in 1879, and fourteen years later he revisited Kabul, under very different conditions, to conduct the difficult negotiations which secured the fixing of "The Durand Line." In the interval he had gone with Lord Dufferin to Upper Burma, and parleyed with the Chinese on the Tibet border. Sir Mortimer's father had been closely concerned in Afghan affairs at the time of our first Afghan War, and this volume gives a useful sketch of Afghan history for half a century, which might, with advantage to the general reader, have been supplemented by a brief table showing the ramifications of the Barukza's house. Durand saw four Viceroys at very close quarters—Lord Lytton, Lord Ripon, Lord Dufferin, and Lord Lansdowne—and the book adds appreciably to our knowledge of them. Lord Lytton would start serious work with his lieutenant after midnight, devote two or three hours to sketching the settlement of very important matters, and retire to rest in Olympian indifference to the fact that Durand had to sit up all night in order to get things into order for next day. Vicious selfishness of this kind is far too frequent in the holders

of the highest offices, and is far too seldom revealed to the world. Lord Ripon's defects were of a quite different order, and Lord Dufferin and Lord Lansdowne won the affection and respect of their brilliant Foreign Secretary, for in 1885 Durand, with only twelve years' service, deservedly attained this coveted post.

In 1894 he left India to become Minister at Teheran, where it fell to him to face the troubles that followed the murder of the Shah Nasr-ud-Din. It need hardly be said that Sir Percy Sykes's close knowledge of Persian affairs lends special value to his record of this period. Durand maintained his habit of getting away from capital cities and personally studying the conditions of a country, and a difficult tour through Arabistan and Luristan had good results. From Persia Durand, now permanently established in the Diplomatic Service, migrated to Madrid and thence to Washington, where his experiences gave him a peculiar and intimate insight into the character of President Roosevelt. Sir Percy Sykes has done well in giving to the world the true story of the way in which that eminent man succeeded in getting rid of a British Ambassador whom he considered insufficiently accommodating, and one wonders what Americans would say if our statesmen stooped to secret wire-pulling in Washington in order to discredit a United States Ambassador in London. This was the last public post filled by Sir Mortimer Durand, and it is now made clear that he filled it with credit, remote as his earlier experiences had been from the peculiar conditions of American life.

It can be judged from this brief summary what an interesting story Sir Percy Sykes has to tell, and he must be cordially congratulated on the manner of telling it.

M. C. S.



APPENDIX

COUNTESS MALMIGNATI'S TRAVELS IN ARABIA

READERS of this *Journal* will welcome Countess Malmignati's explanation of the various points raised in my review of her book, "Through Inner Deserts to Medina," published in Vol. XIII., Part I., and I trust that I may be permitted not only to offer some further comments on the subject, but to assure her that, far from having any personal quarrel with her, I cordially reciprocate her hope that we may some day meet in the Rub'al Khali, and shall at any time be delighted to provide her with letters of introduction to Ibn Sa'ud should she require them. I would only beg of her to realize that a reviewer's duty to the public is to point out such shortcomings as he may find in the works submitted to him for review, and in this particular case I think I may fairly claim that my criticisms of the Countess's book have been more than justified by her subsequent explanations.

To take first the question of dates, the Countess was so sparing of chronological detail that one was at least entitled to assume that the very few dates she gave us were in accord with facts. As I assumed, the year was 1914. In her book Countess Malmignati tells us that she spent a considerable part of that year's *Ramadhan* at Damascus, and that she started on her great journey on June 5. In my review I stated: "It is quite obvious either that the Countess is romancing about her *Ramadhan* experiences at Damascus, or that she did not start on her great adventure on June 5." In her explanation she admits that *she did not start on June 5*, and tells us that she "did not remember exactly the dates when writing the book." In the circumstances I find no difficulty in believing that she "did see the life of Ramadan" at Damascus and was there in July, 1914.

Now in 1914 the month of *Ramadhan* began on July 21, and we know from the book that the Countess spent the first two weeks of the month—say till August 4—at Damascus while her camels were being purchased by Muhammad Bassam. Incidentally, and with all due deference to the Countess, the gentleman's name is *Muhammad* Bassam and not *Mahmud* Bassam, and I cannot accept her statement that "*everybody* there called him" by the latter name. She then started and spent a few days—say till August 8—at Adra, whence it took her five days to get to Palmyra—say on August 13. There she stayed four days, and on or about August 18 the great march began. On

September 3 the Ruwalla tribe, with the Countess in their train, arrived at Zilfi—700 miles from Palmyra in a bee-line—having covered the distance in sixteen days or, allowing for deviations from the straight line, at an average rate of some fifty miles a day. There is surely still something wrong with the Countess's dates, though she expressly states on page 111 that they "covered sixty miles each day." Such a rate of travel is, to say the least, exceedingly improbable in the case of a moving tribe of 400 tents, but on page 126 the Countess goes out of her way to tell us that she had been with the tribe "more than two months" before the idea of visiting Zilfi occurred to the Ruwalla Sultan. If, therefore, the Countess left Damascus in the middle of *Ramadhan*, it is improbable that she arrived at Zilfi on September 3.

As regards Zilfi itself, I ventured in my review to remark: "The Countess here presents us with an initialled sketch of the mosque of Zilfi, which, to say the least, is a pure fiction of her imagination. Zilfi is entirely innocent of anything so beautiful as the dome and minaret of the sketch." This thrust she has no difficulty in parrying, thus: "But who says that the picture of the mosque on page 134 is that of Zilfi! It only says beneath, 'and the muezzin's cry was heard from the tower of the minaret' . . . But there is no pretence that the picture presents the mosque of Zilfi. It was just put there to fill out the empty spaces marked through the loss of the photos." Unfortunately it also "says beneath" "(p. 134)," and on reference to that page, which the picture faces, I find the following remarks: "We arrived at an inhabited place. It was Zilfi. It consisted of a lot of low, square houses made of dried earth, with a mosque in the centre. We stopped at some distance from it. . . . Suddenly the *muezzin's cry was heard from the tower of the minaret* and all dispersed . . ." It was surely not unreasonable to assume that the picture was intended to be an illustration of the text, but the point is that Zilfi has no minarets, though the Countess returns to the charge on page 141, where she says: "I got a shock when I could still recognize the minarets of Zilfi."

As regards the misprints which figure so prominently in the book, I should be grateful if the Countess would provide me with a clue to the identification of the "El Faidassi," the Ruwalla Sultan's enemy. And I must confess my inability to understand her grievance with the Turks, to whom she seems to attribute her treatment at Zilfi and elsewhere. The Turks in 1914 had no authority of any kind in that part of the world—much less any officials—and it is far from easy to believe that the Governor (Kaimakam) of Buraida at that time was dressed in European clothes! But it is yet more difficult to believe that the worst troubles of the Countess should have occurred in the very district of Arabia—the Qasim—of which Muhammad Bassam himself was no mean citizen. She scarcely seems to realize, indeed,

that the Bassam family is one of the leading families of 'Anaiza, the near neighbour of Buraida.

I still find it difficult to accept Countess Malmignati's book and her present explanation as constituting a satisfactory account of what must have been a very remarkable journey, and she is surely mistaken in persisting that "before accomplishing my journey I was taken prisoner by the Turks, who confiscated all my photos, notes, and sketches." If she was captured, it was by Arabs, and the Turks at Madina more than compensated her for her hardships by allowing her, a Christian woman, to visit the tomb of the Prophet—surely an unique experience. And in view of her statement about the loss of her photos, notes, and sketches, does she wish us to regard her photo of "Arabs from Zilfi" (p. 142) and her sketches of—(1) "At the house of the Kaimakam" (p. 144), presumably of Buraida, (2) "A street scene, Medina" (p. 182), and (3) "The railway station, Medina" (p. 186) as serious representations of local scenes or merely as "tail-pieces"?

But after all, in view of the Countess's admission about June 5 and her claim to have spent a good part of the month of *Ramadhan* at Damascus before starting on her journey, the question of dates becomes all-important, and perhaps the Countess will be good enough to throw further light on the matter.

H. ST. J. B. PHILBY.

To the Editor of the CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL.

I should be grateful if you would insert this note in the next issue of the *Journal*. Mr. Vanderplas, the Dutch Consul at Jidda, has pointed out to me that in my Burton Memorial Lecture I was in error in stating that the non-Muslim cemetery at Jidda is maintained exclusively by the British, French and Italian Consulates at that place. I take this opportunity of admitting and apologizing for my omission of the fact (of which I was unfortunately ignorant) that the Dutch Consulate shares equally with those mentioned by me in the upkeep of the cemetery, and that the Dutch firm of Messrs. Van der Poll and Co. contributes to the work a sum equal to that of the four Consulates put together. Mr. Vanderplas himself was the administrator of the cemetery for two and a half years during 1921-23, and writes: "I found the cemetery in a sad state, the graves having been plundered by thieves and Bedouin. The system of drainage, the rebuilding of the crumbling walls with glass on top which proved efficacious against the marauders, the registering of whatever tombs could be identified, were all my work."

It is as well that these facts should be placed on record, and I would crave a few more lines of your space to tender my apologies to another eminent Dutchman for my omission to mention his work in

what was a very cursory survey of the sources to which we owe our knowledge of the Hijaz. Dr. Snouck Hurgronje is, I believe—now that Charles Doughty is no more—the surviving doyen of Arabian explorers, and the greater part of his active work was done in the Hijaz. In his case I cannot plead ignorance, but merely the limitation of time imposed on the lecturer, and perhaps the fact that his work lay rather in the realm of the scientific study of Islam at its sources than in that of general exploration, with which I was more particularly concerned in my address. Nevertheless I should have included mention of him in the small and distinguished category of explorers of the Hijaz, and I should like to take this opportunity of stating my conviction that his labours have contributed as largely as any other man's to Europe's knowledge of Islam and its birthplace. It is a thousand pities that his publications are not more readily accessible to the English reader.

H. ST. JOHN PHILBY.

18, ACOL ROAD, N.W. 6,

June 9, 1926.

OBITUARY

MAJOR GUY YERBURGH, O.B.E., IRISH GUARDS.

THE Central Asian Society has lost a popular and accomplished member in Major Guy Yerburch, O.B.E., of the Irish Guards, who died on March 13 at Bramshott Court, Liphook, at the early age of thirty-three. Passing straight from Cambridge University into his regiment in 1914, he served with distinction throughout the war. He was a noted golfer and a keen shot and fisherman. He married, in 1921, Hilda, eldest daughter of the Rt. Hon. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Bart., Chairman and Vice-President of the Society, who, with two infant sons, survives him.

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY ACCOUNTS, 1925

RECEIPTS.		£	s.	d.	EXPENDITURE.		£	s.	d.
To 797 subscriptions for 1925	...	797	0	0	By Office rent	...	41	8	10
" 82 " in advance	...	82	0	0	" Rates and taxes	...	22	15	9
" 5 " in arrears	...	5	0	0	" Telephone	...	9	4	2
					" Secretary's salary	...	125	10	0
									198 13 9
" 1 Life subscription	...			15 15 0	" <i>Journal</i> : Printing	...	312	14	9
" <i>Journal</i> subscriptions	...	10	3	4	" Postage	...	27	8	6
" " sales	...	8	13	2	" Reporter	...	88	16	6
" Sundries	...				" Map plates, etc.	...	9	7	10
" Petty cash sundries	...	4	8	6					888 7 7
" Interest on War Loan	...				" Hire of Hall	...	34	18	0
" Deposit	...	5	0	0	" Printing	...	20	14	9
"	...	7	16	5	" Lantern	...	25	4	0
"	...				" Slides, etc.	...	18	5	9
" Balance at bank, January 1, 1925	...	29	14	5	" Due by Dinner Club	...			98 17 6
" " of petty cash, January 1, 1925	...	4	4	5	" Library	...	9	1	5
					" Expenses of Annual Dinner	...	4	2	5
					" Postage	...	25	12	8
					" Stationery	...	45	14	5
					" Office and sundry expenses	...	9	13	9
					" Returned subscriptions	...	51	0	11
					" Bank charges	...	9	18	6
					" Balance of current acct., Dec. 31, 1925	...	55	2	11
					" deposit acct.,	...	25	0	0
					" petty cash	...			10
									80 8 9
									£920 1 0

5 per cent. War Stock... £100
National Saving Certificates ... £150

May 13, 1926.

NOTICES

The following books have been received for review :

- "Religion and Folklore of Northern India," by William Crooke, C.I.E. Prepared for the Press by R. E. Enthoven, C.I.E. 9" x 6". Pp. 471. (Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 21s.)
 - "Life of the Right Hon. Sir Mortimer Durand, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I.," by Brig.-General Sir Percy M. Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G. (Messrs. Cassell and Co. 25s.)
 - "The India Office," by Sir Malcolm Seton, K.C.B. 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. 299. (Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons, Ltd. 7s. 6d.)
-

Journals and cards have been returned through the post addressed to: Captain S. G. Bennett, Rear-Admiral P. M. Royds, C.B., Captain V. G. Robert, and Bassett Digby, Esq. The Secretary would be grateful if any member knowing the address of any of the above, would send it to the office.

Members only are responsible for their statements in the *Journal*.

JOURNAL
OF THE
CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. XIII - 1926

PART. IV

CONTENTS.

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1926-1927.

NOTICES.

THE TRIUMPH OF THE WAHHABIS. BY H. STJ. B. PHILBY.

ANNUAL DINNER.

THE OLD MAN OF MOUNTAINS. BY H. C. LUKE, C.M.G.

REFLECTIONS ON THE MOSUL PROBLEM.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND WANING OF THE FORCES IN
PALESTINE, 1922-1926.

THE KHAIBAR PASS AS THE INVADERS' ROAD FOR INDIA- II.
BY A. S. BEVERIDGE.

THE HADENDOWA TRIBE OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN.

REVIEWS:

THE CHRONICLES OF THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S TRADE
WITH CHINA. THE INDIA OFFICE. THE EDUCATION OF INDIA. LIFE IN
THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE. RELIGION AND FOLKLORE OF NORTHERN
INDIA. THE MOSUL QUESTION. GRASS. THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA.
SYRIA. ISRAEL. TURKEY. THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1926. SOME SAYINGS
OF THE BUDDHA, ACCORDING TO THE PĀLI CANON. THE ETHICS OF
BUDDHISM. CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY, VOL. IV.

OBITUARY: MISS GERTRUDE BELL. THE MAHARAJA OF BHUTAN.

RECENT EVENTS IN CHINESE TURKISTAN.

APPENDIX.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE BAGHDAD BOOK SHOP.

PUBLISHED BY

THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

GROSVENOR STREET. W. 1

NOTICES

MEMBERS are asked to inform the Secretary of any change of address, and when home on leave to send the address to which lecture cards and *Journals* should be sent. Also to notify the office at once if cards and *Journals* are not received.

Journals have been returned by the Post Office for Bassett Digby, Esq., P. H. Tozer, Esq., and Miss Nina Mylne. The Secretary would be glad of their new addresses.

Attention is drawn to the notice of the second edition of Major Soane's book, "To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise." The book has long been out of print, and the new edition with a Memoir of the author by Sir Arnold Wilson will be very welcome.

Mr. Roy Chapman Andrews, whose book "On the Trail of Ancient Man," a very vivid and readable account of his great discoveries and journeys in Mongolia, was received too late for an adequate review in this number of the *Journal*, has promised to lecture to the Central Asian Society on November 10.

Members only are responsible for their statements in the *Journal*.

JOURNAL

OF THE

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

Vol. XIII

October, 1926

Part IV

THE TRIUMPH OF THE WAHHABIS*

By H. StJ. B. PHILBY

THE title which I have chosen for my address to you this afternoon is "The Triumph of the Wahhabis," though I notice that on the invitation cards sent out for this meeting your secretary has seen fit to use the singular of the last word instead of the plural. She has doubtless been influenced in doing so by her sense of the dramatic, and I may perhaps be allowed to congratulate her also on being actuated by the prophetic instinct characteristic of her sex. When I communicated the proposed title of my address to her I had every intention of talking

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held on Thursday, July 8, 1926, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., Sir Michael O'Dwyer, I.C.S., presiding. Mr. H. StJ. Philby delivered a lecture on "The Triumph of the Wahhabis," which was to have been delivered in May last, but was postponed owing to the general strike.

The Chairman, when introducing the lecturer, said: Ladies and Gentlemen, —I do not suppose there is anyone, outside Arabia at all events, who knows more about the Wahhabis than Mr. Philby, and very few who know as much about Arabia. He has acquired his knowledge by close personal intercourse with all the leaders of Arabia, and by travelling in the country; he has, moreover, the advantage of being a personal friend of Ibn Sa'ud, the famous Wahhabi leader. We all know that from the first Mr. Philby took the long view with regard to Arabian politics, and that view appears to have been realized. At the same time he has seen Arabian politics from the other side, because he has had the advantage of close acquaintanceship with the great Shereefian family, King Hussein and his sons, Ali, who is at the moment Regent in Baghdad, King Feisul, and the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan. At one time Mr. Philby was personal adviser of the Emir Abdullah. He was also in the Hejaz at the time when hostilities were still going on between the Wahhabis and the Hejazi. He is therefore more competent than anyone in England to discuss this question. Of course there are many sides to the discussion, and no doubt some here will put forward views not quite in agreement with those of Mr. Philby. The Wahhabis are triumphant at the moment; it remains to be seen whether that triumph is going to be short-lived, or have a permanent and dominating effect on the future of Arabia and the future of Islam.

about the Wahhabis, but she apparently foresaw—and foresaw rightly—that, when it came to the point, I should be forced to descend from the general to the particular, and to use the stage crowd merely as a background for a hero. That hero is, as she has told you, *the* Wahhabi, the great Wahhabi, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, who a quarter of a century ago was an exile in an obscure seaport of the Persian Gulf coast and to-day is King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies—the undisputed ruler of the great bulk of the Arabian peninsula, as his great-great-grandfather was more than a century ago.

The history of the triumph of the Wahhabis is, as you will see in the course of my address if you do not know it already, the history of the triumph of this man, and the secret of his triumph lies in his single-minded and unswerving adherence to an ideal based not on considerations of personal profit or aggrandisement, but on his own conception of his duty to his people and to his God. It lies also largely in his pursuit of that ideal by the purely practical methods dictated from time to time by the actual circumstances in which he found himself, and by a careful study of the reasons of the failure of his predecessors in the same or similar circumstances. That his predecessors—notably his own ancestors at the beginning of last century and the great Muhammad ibn Rashid of the rival Shammari dynasty towards the end of the century—failed on the very threshold of success admits of no dispute. And I shall be told, no doubt—and with much show of reason—that it is yet too early to acclaim as final or lasting the triumph which has crowned the career of Ibn Sa‘ud. Dr. Hogarth, speaking at our annual dinner only ten days ago, warned you of that, and it may be so. Nothing is really final or lasting in this world. The world itself, as the Arab proverb says, is transitory, or, if I may quote from the *Observer* of only last Sunday, “the globe, like those who inhabit it, is an unrestful and catastrophic stuff.” But we are concerned here less with philosophical ideas than with the practical politics of a few puny generations, and, judging from that standpoint, I make bold to believe that there has arisen in Arabia a dispensation which, for reasons which can be specified, may be regarded as permanent for all practical purposes—as permanent, for instance, as the Turkish Empire which endured for some four or five centuries into our own times, or at least as permanent—let us not be too ambitious in such matters—as the German Empire which has collapsed so recently after an even shorter career.

I have often stated the reasons which have imbued me with a conviction of the permanence of the new régime of the Wahhabis in Arabia. It is, I think, well worth our while to have them restated and to ponder over them, and I ask your indulgence to that extent before I enter upon the real theme of my address, but I should like you to bear

two points in mind. The death of Ibn Sa'ud at the present juncture would, as Dr. Hogarth pointed out on the occasion I have referred to, seriously imperil the stability of the structure he has built up, but that is a contingency with which I do not reckon. He is a comparatively young man. He is a normal life in every sense of the term in the ordinary way of actuarial calculation. And his father is still alive and hale and hearty, as may be judged from the fact that he has recently made the arduous journey of 600 miles from Riyadh to Mecca to attend the great pilgrimage. The other point is that, given a normal span of life, Ibn Sa'ud is by no means at the end of his expansionist tether. The new dispensation will yet extend over a greater area than it covers at present, and the unification of Arabia in the wider sense of the term will increase rather than decrease its prospects of permanence under the changed conditions of the modern world.

What, then, are the essential points of difference between Ibn Sa'ud and his predecessors which seem to assure him of success where they failed? Arabia is, as you know, a country of shifting nomad populations eking out a precarious existence in a constant struggle with Nature, and organized for that struggle in a tribal system which more often results in fratricidal struggles between the tribes themselves, than in their combination against the common enemy, who has nothing good to offer them this side of the grave, but holds out to them extravagant promises of the luxury awaiting them in the hereafter as the reward of a lifetime spent with the maximum of resignation in the endurance of various forms of asceticism from which there is no escape in any case. Such a people naturally develops a simple, direct, and purely materialistic philosophy of life, accepting with unquestioning faith the existence of a Supreme Being made in its own shape and blessed with nothing else to do than to shape and direct the destinies of the universe and its denizens. Belief in him is the sole touchstone of human virtue, as disbelief is the one unforgivable sin. However disagreeable his circumstances may be, the will to live is sufficiently strong in unsophisticated mankind to make the preaching of pessimistic doctrines about the future exceedingly unpopular. The trials of the present are but by way of preparation for joys to come. Belief in the future is therefore the common heritage of all Arabian humanity as a shield and buckler against Nature, who by the parsimony of her gifts has turned man's hand against the whole of the animal kingdom, including man.

The history of Arabia aptly illustrates the results which one would naturally expect from such conditions. The normal condition of Arabia is, or has been, one of constant fratricidal warfare—man against man, family against family, tribe against tribe, or principality against principality. But ever and anon across this lurid background of warring elements there flashes an illuminating streak as of lightning—a

spark of the divine quality in man, which for a moment, longer or shorter, stays the sorry pageant of human strife or directs it into more profitable channels, and seems to galvanize the striving factions into union for the purpose of a common onslaught on richer pastures where all can browse at the expense of others. Then slowly but surely the fire begins to glow less brightly and the common harmony fades away. Arabia lapses into the barbarism of tribal conflict to which until modern times—these times of our own—it might have seemed to be eternally and inevitably predestined.

Of the great movement of this kind—the great movement which gave Islam to a great part of the world—I need hardly speak on this occasion. Arabia inspired that movement, but soon ceased to play any effective part in its development, and relapsed into its old anarchy with nothing changed except, of course, that it had permanently replaced its ancient paganism and polytheism with a simple monotheistic creed which it was destined to retain through all the centuries in its simplest form. But the inspiration to unity had disappeared with the exhaustion of the original fire, which could not be kept at white heat without a constant supply of fresh fuel in the form of new provinces to conquer. From time to time thereafter the old spark reappeared only to die down again, but I will pass on to the middle of the eighteenth century, when it flashed forth once more to kindle a fire whose embers, though frequently damped down by the vicissitudes of fortune, have never lost their glow. That was when the Wahhabi movement took shape under a combination of religious and political forces. The appearance of a prophet happened to coincide with the accession of an ambitious and able chieftain to an obscure throne in the middle of Arabia. The tribes were once more galvanized into union by the preacher harping always on the old motif of the one inexorable God of the hereafter, and their united forces were directed into the channel of a worldly crusade by the temporal chief. Within half a century Arabia was a single state under one ruler with a state religion as its backbone. That religion had to be maintained at white heat to perpetuate the unnatural harmony of the tribal forces on which the state depended, but the incentive of fresh lands to conquer was no longer there and the alluring prospect of conquest faded into the dull monotony of defence. And what is more, there was an enemy at the gates, a powerful and relentless enemy, no less an enemy than the Ottoman Empire, the premier military state of Islam. The mighty atom of the Wahhabi Empire slowly but surely disintegrated under external pressure into its original elements, and by the second decade of the nineteenth century Arabia was back again in its old anarchy.

The lesson culled by Ibn Sa'ud from the history of this old movement was that the full pressure of a religious motive cannot be maintained indefinitely in a community incapable of further growth by

conquest, and that, in the absence of such a motive for union, Arabia is destined by its pastoral and tribal organization to anarchy. These drawbacks were enhanced by the existence outside Arabia of a strong hostile state capable and desirous of invading it.

That lesson had not, however, been fully appreciated by the next pretender to the hegemony of Arabia. In spite of an attempt to resuscitate the Wahhabi power about the middle of last century by Faisal ibn Sa'ud, the dynasty of Ibn Sa'ud collapsed incontinently under an onslaught of one who must be reckoned among the greatest men who have ruled in Arabia. Muhammad ibn Rashid of Hail had the initial advantage of being the undisputed chief of the largest, strongest, and most homogeneous tribe in Arabia before he began to look further afield. Perhaps on this account he did not attach much importance to the need of a religious inspiration for the movement he contemplated. The fact remains that his movement was of a wholly political character and aimed no further than the hegemony of desert Arabia, leaving the Turks in possession of what they held on the coasts. Largely on account of the dissensions prevailing in the Wahhabi country he succeeded in his object, and died the ruler of all desert Arabia. But again the factor of the absence of fresh fields to conquer came into play. The Shammar tribe soon wearied of garrison duty in the lands conquered by them and returned to their homes. The tribes they had conquered and ruled reverted to their original independence, and not many years after Muhammad ibn Rashid's death the empire he had left to his successors had ceased to exist.

Here again was a lesson to be learned by Ibn Sa'ud. A powerful, homogeneous tribe can play the part of conqueror without the inspiration of a religious motive just as a group of tribes united by a religious motive may do. In such a case patriotism takes the place of religion, but, under Arabian conditions, is no more lasting as a driving force. Patriotism can be maintained at white heat by an imperialism promising ever greater conquests and riches, but, when the end of the tether is reached, the tribesman has no desire but to return to his homelands, which are spacious enough for his cattle. He leaves his conquests to take care of themselves. The outstanding shortcoming of Arabia is its tribal organization, its pastoral character, and the instability inevitably arising from the complete dependence of its population on the vagaries of its climate.

Now I hope that by this preliminary discourse on the character of Arabia and its inhabitants I have succeeded in convincing you, as I feel sure Ibn Sa'ud has long since convinced himself, that no ruler can hope to establish a permanent régime of any kind in Arabia unless he sets himself deliberately and energetically to tackle the chief enemy, the only serious enemy of the country—namely, Nature herself. This may seem a large order. One is apt to dismiss Arabia summarily as a

hopelessly barren desert country doomed for ever to the precarious pastoral existence, accompanied by anarchy, which has been its lot since patriarchal times. But it is really not such an impossible task as it may seem. Of that I am convinced, and in that conviction I think I can claim to be in full agreement and sympathy with Ibn Sa'ud himself, whose progress up to date in that seemingly impossible task and whose triumph over the preliminary obstacles in his path I propose to sketch as briefly as possible.

In 1901, at the age of twenty, 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, who had spent his boyhood imbibing the elements of political wisdom at the feet of Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait—a good friend of Great Britain and one of the outstanding figures of his generation in Arabia—launched out into the Arabian desert with a small following on a mad adventure which was justified by success. He captured Riyadh from the Hail dynasty and spent the next eleven or twelve years in recovering the rest of his ancestral domain, in consolidating his position, and in thinking out his plans for the future.

He had paid one debt to his ancestors by recovering the territory which should never have been lost, and he unquestionably aimed at paying another debt—a debt of revenge—by wearing down and defeating the rival dynasty of Hail. But whether at this time he looked further back into history or further forward into the unknown—whether he dreamed of the greater possibility of restoring the empire which had been won and lost a century before—it is impossible to say and idle to conjecture. As I have already said, he was intensely practical, and whether he harboured such dreams in the inner recesses of his mind or not, he can scarcely have regarded the accomplishment of such ambitions as being within the range of practical politics. Turkey was still a military Power to be reckoned with in those days, and Turkey was in secure possession of the coast-lands of Arabia—the Hasa on the east and the Hijaz, 'Asir, and Yaman on the west. She also held Mesopotamia and Syria, and the Great War was yet to come. Let us be content, then, to suppose that Ibn Sa'ud went to the wicket with every intention of making a century if he could, but determined to deal with each ball faithfully on its merits. At the beginning of his innings the bowling was too good to be trifled with and he was content to play himself in and lay the foundations of a great score. Even he could scarcely have foreseen how bad the bowling would yet become or that he would reach the coveted century with a perfect orgy of raids on the boundary.

Be that as it may, Ibn Sa'ud contented himself at the outset with attending to the foundations of his state, so often wrecked in the past by earthquakes owing to radical defects of structure. The old cement of religious or sectarian fanaticism was good enough for him and, indeed, could scarcely have been improved on, but the old bricks made

without straw were rejected as lacking in the essential quality of durability. The tribal organization of the Arabs had to be broken up before the virile qualities of the Badawin could be used effectively in the building up of a homogeneous and powerful state, and Ibn Sa'ud saw from the beginning that a policy of agricultural settlement afforded the only hope of success. The only difficulty was to find suitable or sufficient land for the purpose, for we have only to look to the borderlands of Mesopotamia and Syria to realize that, if land is available, the natural tendency of the nomad is to settle on it. So Ibn Sa'ud set himself to look for land for the permanent accommodation of the military contingents which, at first on a small scale and later on an ever-increasing scale, he called to the colours in the name of the old religion.

His first experiment was made in 1912 at the desert wells of Artawiya, which are now the site of a flourishing town of some 5,000 or 6,000 inhabitants—the pattern or prototype of some fifty or sixty *Ikhwan* colonies which have grown up during the last twelve or thirteen years in different parts of the Arabian desert. The scheme was simple in the extreme, and has been faithfully followed without variation from that day to this. The ignorant Badawin were easily aroused to a sense of their backsliding from the principles of the true faith. They were equally easily roused to fight for that faith in a crusade which promised immediate Paradise to the killed and substantial booty to the victor. Necessarily, however, in the absence of external enemies whom it was possible or wise to attack, the victims of the faithful were their own brethren or cousins who still preferred to remain in darkness. Tribe was used against tribe with merciless genius, but the political genius of Ibn Sa'ud never showed to greater advantage than in the reconciliation of the victors and the vanquished. That reconciliation was effected in the name of God, and it was at this stage that Ibn Sa'ud's scheme of agricultural settlement came in.

That scheme primarily served a military purpose, for every colony that was created became in effect a cantonment of a contingent of his standing army; and more than that, it served the greater political purpose of breaking up the old tribal system which was the basis of his policy. The motto of each colony was the service of God as the flag of each was the green flag of the one true faith; and the swearing of allegiance to that flag and that God involved the severance of all earthly ties. The colonists adopted the style and title of *Ikhwan*, or brethren of the faith, and the new tie superseded all the old ties of tribal solidarity and loyalty. Men of different tribes were drafted into the new agricultural colonies, whose nucleus was always a mosque built out of funds provided by Ibn Sa'ud. They were armed by Ibn Sa'ud on the condition that they should be ever at his back and call. Further, they received assistance to dig wells, to build houses to dwell in, and

to make fields out of the desert. In return, they forswore the practice of tribal raiding and the rights of revenge. They would fight only at the call of Ibn Sa'ud in the service of God, and at that call and in that service they would not scruple to attack tribes to which they themselves belonged by birth. The white heat of fanaticism would only have to be maintained for a short time, perhaps a generation, to allow the new system of amalgamations to bear fruit through the operation of mixed marriages. If that could be done, the military strength of the state would be enormously and permanently increased; for we should always remember that the backbone of the Badawin armies of the past has been the contingents drawn from the heterogeneous oasis settlements whose inhabitants have lost their tribal sense. The true Badawin tribe is not and never can be a reliable fighting unit. It has no stake in the land, and its motto is to run away in order to "live to fight another day." That spirit never made conquerors.

Such, then, was Ibn Sa'ud's scheme. It was sound in conception, and circumstances have favoured its development according to programme. Wars of conquest have been the order of the day since its inception, and that factor has facilitated recruitment, which has also been speeded up by the methods employed by Ibn Sa'ud against hesitant or recalcitrant tribes "to encourage the others." Arabian conditions place a natural limitation on the size of armies operating in the country, but the recent Hijaz campaign, to say nothing of the expeditions which knocked at the gates of Transjordan and Iraq simultaneously with its inception, provides proof enough, if proof be needed, that Ibn Sa'ud has so arranged matters as to have a constant supply of fresh military material ready to his hand to obviate any epidemic of war-weariness. Very few of the troops which attacked Taif in September, 1924, and captured Mecca the following month took part in the capture of Jidda and Madina at the end of 1925. That was not due to casualties, for, amazing as it may seem, the official Wahhabi return of casualties admits to losses of less than 100 men in fifteen months. That estimate is certainly not far short of the truth, though the Jidda newspaper published during the siege claimed to have inflicted something like 50,000 casualties on the besiegers, and in doing so it gave circumstantial details of the deaths and burials of various Wahhabi generals who were certainly alive and vigorous at the moment of the final triumph. The credulity of people who read newspapers and hear reports in the East is strange enough but not altogether surprising, seeing that it is paralleled by that of the more sophisticated West. I remember, for instance, that in 1923 His Majesty's Government circularized their various officers in the Middle East—myself among the number—for an expression of their opinions on the probable trend of events in Arabia in view of the death of Ibn Sa'ud, which had been reported on unimpeachable authority from

Baghdad. I replied that it was somewhat premature to consider such a problem, as Ibn Sa'ud was not dead, and I think I can claim without undue immodesty that subsequent events have fully justified my confidence in the star of the Wahhabi monarch. We were also told in those days that Najd was suffering so severely from famine that its tribes were migrating *en bloc* to bask in the sunlight of Mesopotamia, and that financial stringency was tending to impair Ibn Sa'ud's control of his people and the authority of his government. A good many quite intelligent people believed such tales, and nobody ever thought of sending any reliable person to find out if they were true or not. That fact, perhaps, explains his success at least in part. He had the advantage of developing his designs behind a smoke-screen of ignorance with which Europe, and particularly Great Britain, obligingly shut themselves off from a knowledge of unpalatable facts; and when in due course he burst through that screen, it was too late for anybody to intervene.

I must get back to my record of Ibn Sa'ud's progress. I have shown how in 1912 he had initiated his scheme of militant agricultural colonies. At first progress was necessarily slow though steady. He was hemmed in between Ibn Rashid on the north and the Turks in the east and west—a dangerous combination. He made tentative advances to Great Britain with a view to an alliance against the latter, whose philandering with Germany in the matter of the Berlin-Baghdad railway distinctly threatened British security in the East; but the British Foreign Office maintained a "correct" diplomatic attitude, and Ibn Sa'ud was told that he could expect no assistance from us against Turkey. In these circumstances he had to fend for himself, and he decided to take a risk. It was a big risk, and perhaps the only serious risk he has ever taken. He attacked the Turks in the Hasa province, and fortune favoured him doubly. His sudden onslaught met with complete success. The Turkish garrisons surrendered and left the country, and before Turkey could organize its revenge she was busy with other things. The Great War began and Turkey disappeared from the Arabian scene.

At the same time Ibn Sa'ud had an opportunity of playing a part in the game of world politics. He was now assured of British material and moral support in the campaign against Hail, to which he had been committed from the beginning of his reign. That chance passed away from him almost at once through no fault of his own. The British representative, Captain Shakespear, was killed in the first skirmish, and the Indian Government, responsible for the Mesopotamian campaign, became rattled and passed the ball to the British authorities in Egypt, who had the advantage of acting under the vigorous inspiration of Lord Kitchener. The Sharifian campaign was the result. Ibn Sa'ud was immobilized by the skilful diplomacy of Sir Percy Cox, who forced an unfavourable treaty on him in December, 1915, and

extracted from him some months later a formal expression of friendly sentiments towards Sharif Husain of the Hijaz, the leader of the Arab rebellion. And throughout the war period the Wahhabi monarch had to put up with the mortification of seeing himself unable to make any headway against one rival, who enjoyed the full support of Turkey, and of watching the other steadily and lavishly supported by Great Britain in a manner calculated to place him on an unassailable pinnacle. He had the sense to face the facts of the situation and remain quiet in spite of a certain amount of mild provocation from the ambitious Husain, with the result that, at the end of 1918, his position was intact and consolidated, but not in any way advanced, while his rival, hailed by the whole world as one of the victorious Allies, aspired to rule the whole peninsula.

The scene was then already set for the inevitable conflict, with the omens distinctly against Ibn Sa'ud. During the last year or so of the war an increasingly noticeable exacerbation of feelings between Ibn Sa'ud and Husain had compelled Great Britain to resume contact with the former, if only to divert his attention from his grievances against Husain and thus to secure for the latter the complete freedom from other preoccupations necessary for the whole-hearted prosecution of the Hijaz and Syrian campaigns. Husain himself and, more particularly, his son 'Abdullah were more anxious at this period to counter the growing power of Najd than to worry about the Turks, who could be safely left to the attentions of General Allenby. There was no difficulty about finding a reasonable ground of quarrel, and when I went to Arabia in October, 1917, I realized that one had already been found. The border oasis of Khurma, which like other communities of Najd had supplied a contingent to the Sharifan armies in return for a share in the golden stream of sovereigns let loose by the British Treasury, had withdrawn its contingent on account of a stupid slight inflicted on their leader by the king and his son. Husain, enraged by this action, determined to punish the oasis, whose people, being Wahhabis, appealed to Ibn Sa'ud and were taken under his wing. Such was the *fons et origo mali* of a modern siege of Troy, full worthy of the heroics of a modern Iliad, if there were but a Homer in modern Arabia.

While I was at Riyadh Khalid ibn Luwai, the outraged chief of Khurma and the future conqueror of Taif and Mecca, arrived there to visit Ibn Sa'ud. When I passed through Khurma a few weeks later there was already a stirring of the leaves presaging the storm to come. Six months later, when I was back at Riyadh in June, 1918, I heard, as it were, the first shot in a war that was destined to drag on for nearly eight years and to end in the collapse of the Hashimite kingdom of the Hijaz. King Husain had carried out his threat to send a punitive expedition against Khurma and the village folk had routed the Sharifian army, capturing all its guns and machine-guns. The glad

tidings were immediately sent to Riyadh, where the news of the first Wahhabi victory over the forces of the Hijaz was received with great enthusiasm. My main function at that time was to persuade Ibn Sa'ud to maintain friendly relations with King Husain, and you may imagine my dismay as I listened to the volley of rifle shots which heralded the passage of the Khurma messengers through the streets of Riyadh to the Wahhabi palace. Ibn Sa'ud warned me very frankly that he could not maintain friendly relations with a monarch who insisted on fighting, and all I could do was to persuade him to be patient and to leave His Majesty's Government to call off Husain while he himself turned his attention to an attack on Ibn Rashid in the north. But he had no sooner agreed to do this than news came in of a second attack on Khurma by the Sharifian forces, who had fortunately been defeated as on the first occasion.

The position had now become really serious. The people of Khurma threatened that if Ibn Sa'ud declined his duty of protecting them they would send forth their women to rouse the tribes, and Ibn Sa'ud had no alternative but to promise that if they were attacked again he would go to their rescue. The British Government was forced to intervene to keep the peace, and both sides were warned of their responsibilities on the understanding that Great Britain would in due course arbitrate on the dispute between them. At the same time efforts were made to induce each of the parties to adopt a more friendly attitude towards the other. It was obvious that really cordial relations were out of the question, but Ibn Sa'ud, who was anxious to stand well with the British Government in the hope of securing substantial assistance in his campaign against Hail, agreed somewhat grudgingly and unwillingly to write a friendly letter to Husain. The letter was dictated in my presence and duly despatched, but Husain was in no mood for reconciliation after the decisive defeats which his punitive expedition had suffered. He returned the letter unopened to Ibn Sa'ud and apparently issued orders to his son, 'Abdullah, to reduce Khurma at all costs. Meanwhile I had given my word to Ibn Sa'ud that Khurma would not be attacked again, and the British Government had begun to weigh the pros and cons of a dispute which was likely to precipitate a conflict at a moment when, from the point of view of operations in the Hijaz and Syria, a conflict was most undesirable. Cairo and Baghdad, supporting their respective protégés, adopted different views of the problem and put forward irreconcilable proposals for its solution. The British Government was too puzzled to do anything but hope for the best. It would undoubtedly have adopted the Cairo solution if it had not been that Ibn Sa'ud was *de facto* in possession of the disputed oasis and King Husain had already twice shown his inability to dislodge him. As it was, it sat on the fence and did nothing to prevent Husain once more trying conclusions with Providence. Ibn Sa'ud was beginning to

get busy against Hail when the news of Husain's third attack on Khurma arrived at his camp. The Sharifian forces had again been decisively defeated, but Ibn Sa'ud was now definitely committed by his promises to taking up the cudgels for the people of Khurma, who had hitherto looked after themselves. A direct conflict between the two parties had now become inevitable, but the sudden and successful termination of the war in these parts by the armistice with Turkey served to allay the alarm with which such a prospect had hitherto been regarded in official circles. The war had indeed left an almost ideal balance of power in Arabia. Ibn Sa'ud stood where he was at the beginning, while Hail had come through the ordeal practically unscathed. Husain alone had prospered and triumphed, but there was every prospect of his being kept so busy by his neighbours that he would have to leave his Allies to divide up the spoils of war between them in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia.

The shock of the sudden cessation of the World War caused a temporary lull in the activities of Arabia, and it was not till February or March, 1919, that King Husain remembered he had still to deal with Khurma. He had established a friendly understanding with Ibn Rashid and now thought himself strong enough to tackle Ibn Sa'ud, while the prospect of an immediate outbreak of hostilities forced the British Government to take notice of the problems still outstanding for settlement in Arabia. Its policy was to maintain Husain as the pivot of Arabia with a view to using his name and dynasty in the furtherance of the arrangements it contemplated in its newly won sphere of political influence. The mandatory system had not yet been invented and the French had not yet been admitted to Syria, where Faisal, if properly humoured, promised to be a convenient and effective instrument in British hands. To humour him it was obviously essential to support his father in any reasonable pretension which he could maintain without active support from ourselves. That, then, was the attitude—on the whole quite a reasonable attitude in view of all that had already happened—of our Government when matters became critical in Arabia and Lord Curzon, then in charge at the Foreign Office, summoned an inter-departmental conference to consider what should be done. That was on March 10, 1919, and I had the good fortune to be asked to attend it. Mr. Montagu represented the India Office, while the War Office, the Admiralty and the Treasury sent worthy champions of their respective points of view. In all there were some fourteen or fifteen persons present, and when after a long discussion a vote was taken I found myself in a minority of one voting against a policy unanimously endorsed by the rest. "Our policy is a Husain policy," said Lord Curzon, in summing up the decisions arrived at. The question of right was a difficult one to decide, but the benefit of the doubt had to be given to our special protégé, and the conference decided in Husain's favour with

the greater confidence in view of the considered verdict of the War Office on the probable results of a clash of arms between the rivals. In view of his armament and financial resources the War Office had no doubt whatever that Husain would beat Ibn Sa'ud if it came to war, and it was therefore decided—

1. That Husain and Ibn Sa'ud should be informed that His Majesty's Government had been pleased to adjudicate Khurma to Husain, who was to be authorized to occupy it.

2. That Ibn Sa'ud should be warned to relinquish the oasis on pain of incurring the displeasure of the British Government and losing his subsidy of £5,000 monthly.

As I have said, I voted against that decision, and I may add that I left that conference convinced that my Arabian career was over. I had been given every opportunity of proving my case and had failed to do so. But Lord Curzon very generously gave me the further opportunity of expressing my opinion on the probable results of the action decided on, and I stated my conviction that Ibn Sa'ud would not only ignore the order to relinquish Khurma, but would defend it to the last if Husain attempted to occupy it. And I added, with all deference to the opinion of the War Office, that I had no doubt as to the results of an encounter—Ibn Sa'ud would win. With that, I left the conference to prepare for my return to India at the end of my leave. So far as I was concerned the Arabian grapes were sour, and I was content to leave His Majesty's Government to have its fill of them, always assuming that, having so definitely decided on its policy, it would see it through. In May Ibn Sa'ud was reported to have taken the field in person, and King Husain threatened to resign his kingdom if the British Government did not give him active support. The threat was effective, and I was present at another conference at the end of the month, at which it was decided—quite logically—to bring pressure on Ibn Sa'ud by reducing his subsidy by one-half. I then left London for the seaside without considering it necessary to inform the Foreign Office of my change of address, and on Friday, June 13, the following telegram was handed in at my London home: "Urgent Eastern Committee meeting seven this evening. Lord Curzon wishes you to attend." A stupid servant put that telegram into an envelope and posted it on to me, with the result that I only received it on the following Monday. My apology for failure to attend the meeting elicited a reply that it had been postponed till I could attend, and on the following day I arrived at the Foreign Office to hear the news. 'Abdullah had entrenched himself with a large army and some thirty guns and machine-guns at Turaba, a day's march distant from Khurma. In the night the Wahhabis had fallen upon the sleeping host and practically annihilated it. I have often since heard vivid accounts of that scene of carnage and pandemonium from 'Abdullah himself and others of the small band who

escaped from it with him by headlong flight. The Wahhabi victory was complete and decisive, and the Hijaz lay at the mercy of Ibn Sa'ud. Lord Curzon had summoned the conference to consider what should be done, and now in his own inimitable way he painted in the most lurid colours the picture of the situation resulting from the earlier and deliberate decisions of that same conference. The British consul at Jidda had reported that Ibn Sa'ud was marching on Mecca and that some 10,000 or 11,000 terrified refugees—mostly British-Indian subjects—were hastening to the coast to embark on such ships as could be sent to the rescue. The Admiralty had been asked to provide the ships, but in those days of shipping stringency had resolutely declined to divert a single vessel to Jidda. The War Office, having wrongly estimated the relative strength of Ibn Sa'ud and Husain, declined to embark on a military expedition to extricate the latter from his difficulties. There was indeed nothing to be done, and I was asked if I had any suggestions to make. I replied that I saw no reason for panic as I thought it exceedingly unlikely that Ibn Sa'ud would march on Mecca. I was asked almost testily whether I realized that the British agent had reported that Ibn Sa'ud was actually on the way, and I could only reply that still I did not believe it, and I added that, if he were, he could be stopped if the British Government agreed to reconsider the whole matter on its merits. "But," said Lord Curzon, "there is no time to stop him. How can any messenger arrive there in time?" I suggested that an aeroplane could probably get there in a day, and Lord Curzon, snatching at the straw, asked me if I would go. I accepted without hesitation, and three days later I left England by air for Cairo, where we arrived in just over five days—a record for the trip which, to the best of my knowledge, has only been lowered within the last fortnight, when Colonel Minchin appears to have done it in less than three days. I had not reached Cairo quite as quickly as I had expected, but I was greeted on arrival by the news that Ibn Sa'ud, apparently content with his victory, had withdrawn into the desert, leaving King Husain to ruminate on the error of his ways and His Majesty's Government to reconsider its policy. It was still considered advisable for me to continue my journey with a view to getting into touch with Ibn Sa'ud, but, when I arrived by ship at Jidda, I was forbidden by King Husain to land. He had recovered from his fright, and, though he had lost Turaba instead of recapturing Khurina, he maintained a truculent attitude and insisted that the British Government should help him to establish a claim the justice of which it had already recognized. But for the moment the British Government had no intention of burning its fingers any more for the *beaux yeux* of Husain. The arbitrament of force had decided the Khurina question, and one might have thought that it would never again be revived. It did, however, reappear at a later and critical stage of the drama.

For the time being Ibn Sa'ud, having tasted blood, as it were, and added a strip of Hijaz territory to his realm, turned his attention to other matters than the idle menaces of King Husain. From May, 1919, to August, 1922, he was busily engaged in extending his boundaries in every direction. It would be tedious to recite the details of all the operations involved in this process, and I will content myself with stating that without any great difficulty he reduced the mountain districts of the 'Asir province to submission in 1920, fulfilled one of the great ambitions of his life by capturing Hail in 1921, and in the following year annexed the northernmost principality of desert Arabia—the district of Jauz—besides capturing a number of border oases of the Hijaz, such as Khaibar and Taima. By the end of 1922 he was master of desert Arabia up to the nebulous boundaries of the mandated territories of 'Iraq and Transjordan and of the Hijaz itself; and at this period he found himself surrounded on the east, north and west by a chain of Sharifian dynasties all more or less under British protection. From time to time his tribesmen made incursions, not specifically authorized by himself, across those undelimited frontiers, only to find themselves confronted by the British Air Force acting as guardians of the marches. And all this time Ibn Sa'ud himself not only maintained a perfectly correct attitude towards the British Government, but was drawing a substantial subsidy from the British Treasury, for the orders issued for the reduction of the subsidy in May, 1919, had somehow miscarried. His hostility was directed only against the Sharifian princes, who fully reciprocated it, but that did not make the situation less intolerable from the point of view of the British Government.

During the autumn of 1923 the Middle East Department recognized the necessity of trying to arrange a *modus vivendi* between Ibn Sa'ud and his neighbours as a step towards terminating the subsidy paid to the former as a sort of blackmail insurance premium. In pursuance of this aim it invited the various potentates to a round-table conference at Kuwait in November of that year, and by a lump-sum payment to Ibn Sa'ud liquidated its obligations to him up to the end of March, 1924. A British official, Colonel Knox, was nominated to preside over the conference, to which representatives were sent by Ibn Sa'ud, King Faisal of 'Iraq, and the Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan. It had been hoped that King Husain would follow suit, but for the time being he declined to do so unless Ibn Sa'ud relinquished Khurma and the other Hijaz oases in his possession and restored the Hail principality to the Ibn Rashid dynasty. The conference therefore opened without Husain's representatives, and the underlying idea of it was that the various chiefs should be left so far as possible to arrive at any agreement satisfactory to themselves. The principle of a round-table conference was sound, and, if the policy of leaving the chiefs to work out their own salvation had been followed out, I am convinced that a satis-

factory arrangement would have been arrived at. But the Middle East Department could not leave well alone, and it was at this stage that the old Khurma *motif* reappeared with disastrous effect. Colonel Knox received instructions which doomed the conference to futility from the beginning. Ibn Sa'ud was actually to be pressed to give up Khurma, and he was even to be offered the bribe of compensation elsewhere as an inducement to that end. One might have thought that the British Government was not desirous of a settlement, and I think I can best sum up the history of the conference by quoting passages from two letters I wrote at this time—one at the beginning and the other towards the end of the proceedings, which I naturally followed with the closest interest from my distant watch-tower at 'Amman.

"I fear," I wrote in the first of these letters, "that the indefinite postponement of a settlement of the Arabian problem on lines acceptable to Ibn Sa'ud will result . . . in gradual encroachments by him on the territories of his neighbours, and eventually in the occupation of the Hijaz. Such a consummation . . . will certainly redound greatly to the discredit of British policy in the eyes of the Muslim world, which will direct its criticism . . . to the fact that His Majesty's Government have placed the custody of the vital interests of Islam in the hands of a dynasty unequal to such a charge." And a few months later I wrote again in the following terms: "This may be my last opportunity of attempting to influence the counsels of His Majesty's Government. I do so . . . out of my deep conviction that the failure of the past few years has been directly traceable to grave mistakes of policy based on a misunderstanding of the psychology of Central Arabia, and that a continuance of that policy must result in chaos and disaster." But I was a mere voice crying in the wilderness and none would listen. In 1918 I had urged that by leaving the supremely unimportant oasis of Khurma to Ibn Sa'ud we might save the Hijaz and put a reasonable limit to the expansion of the Wahhabi power. My advice was disregarded, and Ibn Sa'ud had within five years extended his sway to a degree scarcely conceived then as possible. And here we were again in 1924 back at the old game of demanding the relinquishment of a village which had already wrought so much woe. At this stage only one policy was possible—namely, to leave to Ibn Sa'ud what he held and to save the rest. But that policy was not good enough for our expert Arabian department, which, not content with the substance, must needs grasp at the shadow. And in the end they lost all, for the end envisaged by British policy and the intransigence of King Husain resulted in the breakdown of the Kuwait conference in April, 1924.

And only five months later—in September—the curtain was rung up on the final act of the tragedy, and the first scene of that act was the sudden Wahhabi onslaught on Taif and the massacre of its

inhabitants. And this time Ibn Sa'ud, having no British subsidy to restrain him and no hope of a reasonable settlement to induce him to be patient, meant business. The sudden fall of Taif, owing to the paralysis of the Hijaz army, had exceeded the wildest hopes with which he had launched the campaign, but the atrocities which attended its capture served rather to delay than to advance his operations. As soon as he received the news he dispatched orders to his lieutenant, the same Khalid ibn Luwai who has already figured in the Khurma affair, to approach Mecca more circumspectly and at all costs to avoid atrocities. But the warning was unnecessary. 'Ali, King Husain's eldest son, made a feeble effort to stem the Wahhabi advance with the remnant of his troops at Hadda in the Taif mountains, but was defeated and fled to Jidda to avoid both the pursuit of the pursuers and the wrath of his enraged father. Husain's cup was now full, and it was suggested to him over the telephone by the notables of Jidda that the only hope of saving the Hijaz, which his folly and obstinacy had brought to the verge of disaster, lay in his abdication in favour of his son, 'Ali. The old tyrant yielded with a bad enough grace, but yielded and left the Hijaz, while 'Ali replaced him on the throne, and, having evacuated Mecca to avoid bloodshed in the holy city, threw himself unconditionally on the mercy of Great Britain. But Great Britain was merciless, for it was too late to intervene, and 'Ali was left to his own resources. The Wahhabis entered Mecca unopposed, but under explicit instructions from Ibn Sa'ud delayed their further advance, and when Ibn Sa'ud himself arrived at Mecca on December 5, 1924, he found Jidda too strongly entrenched and fortified to be carried by assault without risk of the repetition of the atrocities which had marked the capture of Taif. A month later he inaugurated the siege of Jidda, and meanwhile set himself to organize the administration of the territories which had fallen into his hands.

I do not propose to weary you with the details of the operations which dragged on for nearly a year. There was never at any time the slightest doubt as to the ultimate result, though, so long as 'Ali's funds lasted, he made a gallant show of resistance in the hope that the European Powers interested in Arabia might intervene to save him. But those Powers, following the lead of Great Britain, had proclaimed their neutrality in the conflict, and that neutrality was maintained to the end with only two exceptions. The British Government had long had its eyes on the Ma'an-'Aqaba district at the northern extremity of the Hijaz, and proposed to King 'Ali at an early stage of the conflict that he should hand it over to its keeping for its greater security from the Wahhabis. But 'Ali replied somewhat grimly that he was so busy losing his territories in the south to his enemies that he had no time to spare for losing his northern territories to his friends. Unfortunately for him, however, his father had taken up his residence at 'Aqaba, and

the British Government was able to trump up the excuse that the temptation afforded to the Wahhabis by his presence there adversely affected the security of Palestine. And so in due course a British warship was sent to 'Aqaba to deport Husain to Cyprus, and British armoured cars were sent down with the local forces of Transjordan to annex the district to the area of the Palestine mandate. It would be difficult to imagine a more barefaced act of spoliation or a more senseless violation of our traditional reputation for fair play. It will at any rate be interesting to see what the League of Nations will make of the business when some day it is called upon to adjudicate on a claim which Ibn Sa'ud will certainly be justified in making for the restoration of what is indubitably Hijaz territory to the Hijaz.

The second case of breach of neutrality was not so much a breach of neutrality as an injudicious and untimely attempt to intervene between Ibn Sa'ud and his legitimate prey at a moment when an offer of intervention could only meet with a rebuff. It will be fresh in your memories that in October of last year a British mission, under Sir Gilbert Clayton, was sent to visit Ibn Sa'ud in the Hijaz with a view to negotiating an agreement on the vexed question of the boundaries between Ibn Sa'ud's territories and Transjordan, and on various matters arising between Ibn Sa'ud and 'Iraq. I would like to take this opportunity of congratulating Sir Gilbert Clayton on the tact which he displayed in tackling the main objects of his mission and on the results which he achieved—most satisfactory results, both from the point of view of Ibn Sa'ud and from that of British interests. For the first time on record the British Government faced the obvious fact that the *de facto* boundaries of Ibn Sa'ud's influence must be recognized, and it was the practical recognition of that fact which resulted in agreement on a very satisfactory boundary. At the same time it was scarcely necessary to suggest, even if it was only a feeler, as it probably was, that the British Government was prepared to mediate between the combatants if both should express a desire to that effect. That was too obviously an attempt to cheat Ibn Sa'ud of the results of his well-earned victory, and it is only fair to add that his decisive deprecation of such an offer was met in the proper spirit by a reaffirmation of complete neutrality. It was still less necessary, in my opinion, that the Clayton mission should pass from its negotiations with Ibn Sa'ud to negotiations with the Imam Yahya of the Yaman. Such action was bound to create misunderstanding in the mind of Ibn Sa'ud, and the best that can be said for the policy of His Majesty's Government is that the failure of the Yaman mission has left things where they were and done no particular harm. If, on the other hand, the mission had succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Imam and war had subsequently broken out between him and Ibn Sa'ud—as it may yet do if the Imam continues in his present humour—we should once more find ourselves in

almost as uncomfortable a position between the two as that in which we have been for the last eight years between Ibn Sa'ud and the Hashimite dynasty.

It only remains for me now to record the final issue of this long-drawn-out struggle. In November of last year I had the pleasure of visiting Ibn Sa'ud and observing from his angle of vision the concluding operations of the campaign. I had arrived at Jidda in October, only to be confronted with the orders of the British Government forbidding me to go inland. I suppose there is in principle no reason why the British Government should not issue such orders as it thinks fit to do, but I suppose there is equally no reason why anybody should obey such orders if he can disobey them with impunity. Be that as it may, I did go inland, though by a more devious route than I had intended, with the result that I nearly perished in one of those horrible storms that periodically visit the Red Sea coast, and only escaped it to be nearly blown to bits by a bomb dropped from a Hashimite aeroplane. I did, however, have the satisfaction of seeing the Wahhabi army on its march to the capture of Madina and, further, of meeting Ibn Sa'ud himself when he was making his dispositions for a renewal of the attack on Jidda. But I was not destined to be present at the final triumph, for, not thinking it to be so near at hand, I took boat to Port Sudan from Rabigh. The very day after my departure the news arrived of the surrender of Madina, and a fortnight or so later, King 'Ali having departed for 'Iraq, Jidda opened its gates to Ibn Sa'ud, who was acclaimed as King of the Hijaz in the Great Mosque of Mecca on January 8 of this year.

The new dispensation had begun in Arabia and the striving of the chieftains had been stilled by the final triumph of one. Arabia suddenly found itself united and at peace for the first time since the ideal of an united Arabia had been mooted in the counsels of Whitehall, Cairo, and Mecca. The outsider had beaten the favourite, and I had at least the satisfaction of knowing that my money had always been on the winner—and not only that, but that I had predicted the fence at which the favourite would come down. That fence was Khurma, and I cannot in the hour of triumph refrain from quoting to you the passage in which I envisaged the ultimate success of Ibn Sa'ud as far back as 1919, when I was writing the record of my Arabian experiences. "The events of the following year," I wrote, "made me regret bitterly that circumstances had not permitted of a longer sojourn at, and closer inspection of, a locality destined, for all its seeming insignificance, to a fateful share in the making of history, perhaps indeed to be the earthly grave of the Utopian ideal of Arab unity, perhaps—who knows?—to be the anvil on which that ideal may yet be hammered into reality."

Arabian unity has been achieved on the anvil of Khurma in a manner very different from that envisaged by the originators of the

Sharifian policy. Primarily, of course, that policy aimed at the utilization of Arabia for the furtherance of the war-purposes of the Allies, but it went a good deal further than that. Arabia was to serve a British imperial purpose in due course with a descendant of the Prophet to sing our praises in the sanctuary of Mecca—like a linnet in a gilded cage, as Lord Curzon once called King Husain. It was no less a person than Lord Kitchener who had first hailed Husain as the Calif to be, and the famous McMahon correspondence of 1915 definitely engaged the British Government to support the creation of an Arabian Caliphate with our protégé presumably in the chief rôle. But those dreams, which should never have tempted us from the path of reason, have passed away mainly because we mistook our man. We played for a temporary gain on the lute of his personal ambitions, only to find in the end that he insisted on his pound of flesh. And so step by step we deserted him and left him "naked to his enemies." His own unworthiness completed the disaster. Never at any moment did he look like uniting Arabia under his sway, but it may be said without hesitation that, had he been less unwise, less tyrannical, less avaricious, and less reactionary, he could at least have perpetuated a balance of power in Arabia which would have made unity impossible. His vices have served to unite Arabia in despair, and now that it is united—for the moment I leave the province of Yaman out of consideration, though I do not see how it can long remain in detachment from the new union—I return to the problem with which I started. Will it, can it be permanent? To that I answer "Yes" without hesitation. I have already explained to you the modification of the character of Arabian society to which Ibn Sa'ud has devoted his efforts, not without success. That modification will make Arabia easier to rule than it ever has been before. But there is another reason why I believe in its permanence. There is no longer an enemy at her gates—the Ottoman Empire has ceased to be a World Power, and there is no state among the Muslims capable, or ever likely to be capable, of playing the part she once played successfully—capable, that is, of invading Arabia. Indeed, Arabia herself is now in the forefront of the Muslim Powers, and I do not see what can prevent her from becoming the protagonist of Islam against the reviving assault of the West. Ibn Sa'ud is already *de facto* the leading independent representative of orthodox Islam, and it is to my mind only a question of time when he becomes its recognized leader with the actual title of Calif.

And there is yet a third reason for my belief in the permanence of the new régime. Arabia has ceased quite definitely to be the patriarchal institution it has been hitherto. The avarice and reactionary tendencies of Husain delayed the inrush of modern material developments presaged by the Great War. Wireless communication was established, it is true, but only for the use of the tyranny—for the

rest only destructive engines of war were admitted. Even motor-cars were restricted solely to royal and military uses. But now all that is changed. Ibn Sa'ud's first step was to open his gates to the motor-car for the benefit of public and pilgrims. In six months a hundred cars have entered the country, and in a year or two there will be a thousand. And the Muslim Congress at Mecca has only recently passed a resolution in favour of the building of a railway to Mecca. And soon Ibn Sa'ud will have his wireless station at Riyadh, as he already has at Abha, the capital of 'Asir. Those who have seen the modern Sudan may readily picture to themselves what Arabia will become in a generation of modern development, and that change will in itself be a factor of stability. The omens are now as much in his favour as they were against him eight or ten years ago, when the fanatical, reactionary Wahhabi was cursed as a clog on the wheels of progress. But reaction has brought the motor-car to Arabia, and fanaticism has brought in its train orderly government and peace and security for the weary pilgrim. The Wahhabi has triumphed, and British policy, which has ever run counter to the grain of facts in Arabia, has failed to stay the evolution of a natural process. It is never too late to repent of past follies, and I would like to close this address with an appeal. Ibn Sa'ud has from the beginning of his great career never made any secret of his desire for a friendly understanding and cordial relations with Great Britain. It is high time for us to reciprocate that sentiment, and we have nothing to lose by so doing. All we have to do is to refrain from interfering with the internal affairs of Arabia, and we have in all conscience had lessons enough in the last few years to teach us that we can interfere neither successfully nor with advantage to ourselves. So far as Arabia is concerned the capitulations are dead and we need shed no tears over their funeral pyre, while, if our concern for the stoppage of slavery and the efficiency of quarantine arrangements is genuine and not dictated by purely political motives, let us realize once and for all that the good-will of Ibn Sa'ud is worth more than the activities of a thousand consuls.

Dr. HOGARTH: Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I think the hour is rather too late for me to attempt any detailed criticism. Indeed, I did not come here to criticize or speak, but in the hope of hearing from Mr. Philby, who knows internal Arabia better than anybody living, something of its actual state; and I cannot help regretting that he devoted so much of his time to going back over past history, which he has gone over before, and with which, as he will admit, it is quite impossible to deal in the time. Moreover, I have really nothing to criticize in his history. He gave a very fair account of things as they happened, and some of it which is not publicly known, like the history of Inter-departmental Conferences at the Foreign Office,

was particularly interesting. The only things with which I venture to disagree—and he will not be surprised, or even put out when I say so—are his views and prophecies about the future. I cannot regard the word “permanent” as having much meaning in Arabian politics. It is almost a contradiction in terms, and particularly so in this case. The two points that interested me most in what Mr. Philby said were the two factors on which, according to him, the permanence of Ibn Sa‘ud’s empire depends. One of these was the settlement of the Bedouins upon the land. Well, on that I should like more information, and it is just on that point that I had hoped to get more information from Mr. Philby to-day. He has told us about Artawiyah with its 4,000 people. But exactly how much arable land have they, and how much water have they got to put upon their land? How far is the settlement really agricultural? That is the kind of thing one wants to know before one can credit so tremendous a social revolution in central Arabia. So also in those other fifty or sixty settlements scattered up and down Nejd—how much arable land and how much water have they got? How many of their people are really cultivators? How many are really settled upon the land? I should have been glad if Mr. Philby had brought some photographs. It would have been difficult, I know, to get them; a photographer would very probably get shot if he attempted photographing in a place like Artawiyah. The other point is an interesting one. I very largely agree about it. No one can establish permanent empire in Arabia except on a religious basis, and the religious feeling in virtue of which you conquer must be kept at white heat, though it is extraordinarily difficult to keep any people at white heat very long. The only positive suggestion that I caught from Mr. Philby was that Ibn Sa‘ud would perpetually find new lands to conquer—the method pursued in the beginning of Islam. Mr. Philby, however, said also that it was extremely improbable that the Arabs ever again would overflow their northern borders. A parallel between what happened under the immediate successors of Mohammed and what happened in 1919 has often been drawn. The extreme weakness of the Byzantine Empire, due to its conflict with Persia, was reproduced in 1919 by the exhaustion of the Allies, and the fact that, whereas they had suffered heavily by the war, the Arabs had gained money, arms, experience, and a knowledge of the West which they had not before. This situation made it seem possible there might be another outbreak from Arabia into Western lands. But, of course, there was really an enormous difference in the relative situations, consisting simply in this, that whereas the Arabs are pretty well where they were in the seventh century—even Ibn Sa‘ud with motor-cars and machine-guns is not much ahead of the early Mohammedan conquerors—the West has transformed itself. We have weapons and organizations that are too greatly superior, as was shown by the latest Wahhabi

raids on Transjordan, which melted like snow under rain before a couple of armoured cars and a couple of aeroplanes. If, then, the Arabs cannot overflow their northern borders, what are they to do? I suppose they must mop up the countries of southern Arabia—Yemen, Hadramaut, and Oman. These they have not got under them at present. But it is extremely difficult to believe that a Literalist creed, such as that professed by the Wahhabis, will ever make any way in a country like the Yemen, among a people with the spirit, courage, and general tradition of the Yemenites. But even supposing Ibn Sa'ud, by virtue of his 30,000 zealots—he has no more, and it is almost impossible to see how he can ever get more—should mop up the Yemen, Hadramaut, and Oman, what is to happen after that? If he could do it at all it would not take very long to do. Two or three years would see the whole of southern Arabia taken if he could take it at all. After, where would there be any more lands to conquer, and how would the white heat be kept up? Therefore I do not foresee permanence for the Wahhabi empire. There are great difficulties ahead of Ibn Sa'ud now—difficulties on which he appears to be only just entering. One of these is the difficulty of the pilgrimage, and the other is the difficulty of money. His predecessor in the Hejaz quarrelled with Egypt in the most foolish and gratuitous manner; for the whole history of Hejaz shows that it cannot depend only on itself. It must look to some richer country, and that richer country has always been outside Arabia. Now the position seems to be that since no such relations subsist with Egypt as will lead to Egypt paying bills for Hejaz, the latter must rely on a country even poorer than itself—viz., Nejd. There does not seem to be a penny in Arabia; yet without actual ready-money the modern implements of war, which will be necessary if any very great extension of Ibn Sa'ud's empire is to take place, cannot be procured. There are, of course, other difficulties too. It is all very well to try and settle the Bedouin on the land, but in so trying you run counter to the tradition of countless generations, and deprive him of what has always been his chief interest in life. To have an empire in Arabia you must prevent intertribal raiding, which is the Bedouin's one amusement. As was once said to me by an old General in Egypt: "When you interfere with a national sport you are up against more than you know." A further difficulty consists in the fact that nowhere in the coastal lands, not even in Hasa, are the settled people Wahhabites. They have nowhere really thrown in their lot with Ibn Sa'ud, but are merely kept down for the time partly by their own inertia, but more by that armed force of 30,000 zealots. The root difficulty, however, is the extreme poverty of resources, both of material and men, which characterizes Nejd. The country is so poor and its population is so small that it is impossible to believe in it standing for any long time what is known as the "waste of empire." For these and other reasons I am afraid I do not

agree with Mr. Philby that the triumph of the Wahhabi is complete or likely to prove more "permanent" than previous political dominations in Arabia.

Commander CRAUFURD: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have merely come up to say that I really think I had better leave any further discussion alone. Dr. Hogarth has given us a very competent comment, Mr. Philby has given us a long lecture, so we have plenty to carry away with us.

Beyond expressing my own opinion that any hope of Arabian unity is a dream, I have little to add. It is a dream that many of us have held for years—personally, I held that dream for ten years and awoke in the desert with my mouth full of sand. I do not see any more solid substance in it, but I will not go further into the matter than to suggest that for Arabian unity you must have, as Mr. Philby has pointed out, some unity of aim. What unity is there amongst all these various rulers? You have a Southern ruler who does not wish to join up with the Wahhabis, and does not wish to join up with Ibn Sa'ud, the Northern ruler. You have various smaller potentates.

The other aim we might hope for is a religious aim. Islam has not yet come to its own, and until we see Jezirat ul Arab—that is, an inner Arabia with an exterior Arabian Tihama—until we see that Jezirat ul Arab forming there is little hope of Arabian unity. I do not think I should go further, when we have had such a complete discussion for nearly an hour and a half.

The CHAIRMAN: We should like to hear something from the point of view of the Moslems. I see some eminent members of that community present, and would like to hear from them what effects it is likely to produce.

MAULVIE A. R. DAED (Imam of the London Mosque): Ladies and Gentlemen;—I must first of all thank God, as is usual with Moslems, for the opportunity which I have had to-day of listening to so learned and important a lecture. And after that I thank the Chairman for giving me the privilege of expressing my feelings on the subject, and, as well, my deep pleasure and satisfaction at what I have heard this afternoon. I think the account of Mr. Philby, and the criticism that has been passed upon it, appear to us Moslems, being essentially religious people, to be based too much on material considerations. What Moslems would really think on the present situation would be absolutely not from the political or material, or temporal side of the question, but from the spiritual point of view. It may ultimately lend some support to Mr. Philby's assurances, but I should not commit myself to anything like that. I think material considerations, especially as regards the future and the making of prophecies, do not go very far. It is God alone who knows the future. We find Jesus Christ lived in very humble circumstances, and at that time when He

was being crucified nobody could imagine that His worshippers would hold the reins of the government of the whole world, as Britain practically does; and we also find from the Scriptures that Moses defeated the kings that were against him in spite of all his material shortcomings. In the same way we look upon the founder of Islam as essentially a religious and spiritual being, and I can safely say that it was the same Arabia that Mr. Philby and the other critics have said is hopeless that he once aroused and united. I do not, however, mean—and I think the Chairman knows the views of our community very well—that Arabia will ever achieve under the present circumstances any political importance. These are my personal views, and I am not speaking from the political or material point of view. But I must say that the reasons that have been put forward this afternoon against the future of Arabia cannot carry weight with the Moslems. Personally, I believe that the future of Islam, whatever it may be, does not rest in politics. Moslems have left their religion, it may be Christians have done so also, but I think if Moslems achieve anything it will not be in the political world. We are essentially a religious people, and we believe that through a special messenger of His own, God has revealed this fact to us and He alone is the Being that can tell us anything about the future. I further think that the interests of Islam and those of the British people are intertwined. They will go together. I believe the British people will one day become Moslems and the expectations of Mr. Philby and those of his critics will both fall to the ground. These are purely religious and spiritual considerations. It may be they are not matter for any serious consideration now, but they are our views. Apart from that I must say, if I am not boring you—it may be extraordinary listening to an Oriental, but excuse me a few moments—as to Ibn Sa'ud, I have a deeper and a greater respect for him now after listening to the learned discourse of Mr. Philby. But it does not alter the fact that fanaticism cannot last long. If the Wahhabis do not leave their fanaticism and follow experience they cannot stay for long. Honest orthodox Moslems, like all other people, I am certain cannot stand compulsion in religious matters. Be it any Government, French, German, Afghan, Egyptian—any ruler that forces human beings to believe in a certain way will not succeed in this era of enlightenment; and that makes me think that it is only the British people who can help Moslems. If the British keep friendly with Ibn Sa'ud, or, better, if Ibn Sa'ud maintains friendly relations with the British Government, he will succeed, but only within his own sphere—not to become a world power. There is no fear at all from the political or temporal point of view from Arabia in this respect. That is what I believe. I must also thank the whole of the audience, as well as the Lecturer and the Chairman, because it is a great pleasure and satisfaction to me to see so many British people thinking upon and listening to a question which does not

directly concern their own country. The conviction and sincere enthusiasm with which Mr. Philby has delivered his lecture show that he wants to take us above material things and lower motives in our dealings with the Arabs and the world. That is a matter which has delighted me very much. I think it well behoves the British people to think about and study Islam from all points of view, because, after all, the British Empire is, numerically speaking, a Moslem Empire, and I think Mr. Philby's example will inspire other British people to study Islam from his point of view, and other points of view as well; and I pray that just as the physical sun never sets on the British Empire, so the spiritual sun may shine for ever and ever upon us all. (Applause.)

Mr. G. M. LEES : Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Ladies and Gentlemen,—Dr. Hogarth said that there are no more lands for the Wahhabis to conquer, but I think Ibn Sa'ud could absorb most of the south of Arabia without much fighting. But the crucial case is that of the Persian Gulf. There the people are Wahhabi in sentiment, but they do not want Ibn Sa'ud. About two million pounds' worth of pearls are raised from that coast every year, and I think there is no question that when Ibn Sa'ud has straightened out affairs in central Arabia he will turn his eyes in that direction. I do not know to what extent the British Government is involved by treaties with various independent chiefs along that coast. But that is a possible source of revenue for Ibn Sa'ud, and I do not think he will disregard it. As I said, the people are Wahhabi, but do not want Ibn Sa'ud, because they will have to share some of their wealth with him. The rest of Oman is partly Wahhabi and partly belongs to the Ibadhi sect of Islam. They might oppose him, but I doubt if they would be strong enough or sufficiently well armed to resist effectually if he advanced in force. With the exception of Dhofar, Hadhramaut, and Makalla, which receive monsoon rains, the remainder of South Arabia is absolute desert. Although Ibn Sa'ud could easily conquer it, it would be of no advantage to him for revenue purposes. Mr. Philby mentioned the use of motor-cars in the Hejaz. It might interest him to know that last year four motor-cars were hauled across the desert from Qatif, a port on the Persian Gulf, up to Riyadh, the capital of central Arabia and the great Wahhabi stronghold. It was the enterprise of a merchant from Bahrein. The journey from the port to Riyadh was about 400 miles, large parts of it are sandy desert, where the cars had to be hauled by camels; but they got to Riyadh, and I believe are running there to-day. Incidentally, the first car to arrive was a Morris-Oxford. For the rest I congratulate Mr. Philby on a very interesting lecture indeed. (Applause.)

Another Mohammedan gentleman also gave an account of his recent experiences in Mecca and the conclusions he had drawn therefrom.

The CHAIRMAN: I intend to say little, ladies and gentlemen, except to thank the lecturer very heartily and the other speakers for the admirable discourses we have had the great pleasure of listening to. Almost everybody who took part in the discussion to-day was one with special and particular knowledge of the subject. It was particularly gratifying to have the different Islamic points of view by the two Indian gentlemen who were good enough to speak. I think we have all learned a great deal about Ibn Sa'ud. We have heard a good many pleasant, and some unpleasant, things about him. There is one thing to be said in his favour, that all who have met him agree that he has impressed them as a man of great sincerity and singleness of purpose, and as an absolutely staunch friend. The personality of the man must make a magnetic appeal not only to his own followers, but to those who come in contact with him. I will not venture into prophecy, we have been told how dangerous it is. Whether his rule is to be permanent, as Mr. Philby hopes, or whether it is to be transitory—as Dr. Hogarth has told us, only the future can tell; but we all hope with Mr. Philby that the British Government should realize that it has not a very satisfactory record as regards its past dealings with Ibn Sa'ud, and should set itself to arrange matters for the benefit of the world at large, and especially for its Islamic subjects who have to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. It should endeavour to arrive at a good understanding with him in the interests of the Islamic world and our hundred millions of Islamic fellow-subjects. I think that is a prayer in which we can all join, and it is a very good note on which Mr. Philby finished up his admirable lecture, for which again I am sure you would all wish to pass a unanimous vote of thanks. (Applause.)

ANNUAL DINNER

LORD PEEL ON TWENTY-FIVE YEARS' WORK

THE annual dinner of the Central Asian Society was held at the Edward VII. Rooms, Hotel Victoria, on June 29, with the President, Viscount Peel, in the chair. The company numbered more than 200, and included specially invited representatives of the Royal Geographical Society and the Royal Asiatic Society.

Captain EDEN, M.C., M.P., proposed the toast of the Society, coupled with the name of Viscount Peel. He said that when he first received their invitation he was somewhat puzzled as to the motive that could have led to so distinguished a privilege being conferred upon so insignificant an individual as himself. He could only surmise that having had the temerity on one or two occasions to speak in the House of Commons as an amateur on matters connected with Central Asia, they took pity upon him and invited him there, so that he might in the course of the evening garner some grains of the harvest which other speakers would provide in rich abundance. That at least would be his endeavour, and he would do his utmost to make use, as a pupil, of the opportunities which were his on that occasion.

In these days when the number and complexity of issues before the public, national and imperial, was so great, it was a matter of the greatest difficulty for the public to form a just judgment in every instance. Even those who were most anxious to arrive at a fair and equitable conclusion, and who devoted time and study to investigation and research, did not find the task an easy one. Those who were not experts must draw inspiration from wells of mature information and of ripened judgment. Thus could a Society such as this render service of the first value to the Government and to the nation. They were acknowledged authorities, and to them ultimately must the nation resort for guidance and advice in this sphere. The list of their members revealed names which were known to them all for the service which their bearers had rendered—many of them life-long service—in every field of activity in Central Asia. The deliberations and the educative work of their Society had therefore an unparalleled value; it was the fountain-head of knowledge of Central Asia.

One recent event of the first importance in the Middle East was of such a nature as to give real satisfaction and relief to each one present. He referred to the agreement which had been reached between His

Majesty's Government, on the part of the Government of Iraq, and the Turkish Republic on the final delimitation of Iraq's northern boundary. They must all welcome the happy issue of this controversy, and the Government was to be congratulated upon the firmness and fortitude with which it had upheld the rights of its youthful ward Iraq. (Cheers.) There might be—there could well be—a difference of opinion as to whether we should ever have gone into Iraq and accepted a mandatory responsibility for its future. That was arguable; but having accepted such responsibility, there could be no question but that we were in honour bound fully and to the last comma to discharge it. The British Empire was not built up on a policy of scuttle. Its future would be jeopardized if such a policy were ever accepted as a full discharge of imperial responsibilities. To abrogate those responsibilities would be to abdicate our imperial heritage. There could be no British Empire unless we were prepared to shoulder the responsibilities of our own actions. Let it be added that the Government's firmness was the more commendable in that it was maintained in the face of a violent and tireless propaganda by a section of the Press more notable for its achievements in circulation than for the clarity of its judgment or the calm of its reasoning in matters of national importance. In passing he could not refrain from throwing a cap into the air in jubilation that the flagrant extent of the error in statesmanship of the monarchs of circulation had been made abundantly clear to their fellow-citizens.

He did not think that any citizen of this country, however unimaginative, could travel for however brief a span in the lands of the Middle East without feeling a sense of pride in the achievements of his fellow-countrymen in that area. It was a tonic to any who felt that his or her faith in the future of the British race was in need of strengthening. In these days we were apt occasionally, and perhaps inevitably, to suffer our periods of depression, to wonder whether the powers of our race were as great, as elastic, as vigorous as once they were. To visit any part of Central Asia was to dispel those doubts. It was, he thought, Hafiz who said that "there is no pain that has not its physician." Certainly no physician could as effectively cure the disease of despondency and pessimism as a view of the work done by the British race overseas—in the Dominions, in India, in the Crown Colonies, and in the Mandated Territories. The more people took this tonic, the better would it be for the future of the Empire of which they all formed a part. The Society was the epitome of our race in Central Asia. It might well feel pride both in these achievements as a Society and in the achievements of its individual members in their respective spheres. Garlands of public favour and of popular applause might not be round all their necks; but those flowers withered. The Central Asian Society and its members were more secure in the knowledge that

they had served and were serving this country and their fellow-countrymen in a manner most worthily to uphold the traditions of our race. This was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Society. The original members could look back upon a proud record of work and achievements. He hoped and believed that the fiftieth year would see the Society as strong, as fresh, as vigorous, and with yet further achievements inscribed upon its record of service to mankind. (Cheers.)

There was not a member of the Society who did not feel it a source of pleasure and pride that Lord Peel was the Chairman of its Council. In many respects he typified the Society. He had spent many years in the service of the State; he had held some of the highest offices and discharged some of the weightiest responsibilities which it was in the power of the Sovereign to bestow. His vigorous tenure of office as Secretary of State for India was fresh in the minds of each present. They could offer him no higher praise than to say that in that office as in others which he had held, or still held, he had added yet further lustre to a great name in the history of a great people. (Loud cheers.) So aptly, and with pride, they coupled his name with that of the Central Asian Society.

Viscount PEEL, who was received with applause, said that for a young Member of Parliament Captain Eden had shown himself both eloquent and modest. He trusted that his modesty was genuine. (Laughter.) When his father was in the House of Commons he told him that perhaps thirty years might elapse before a new Member made his maiden speech. When he (Lord Peel) entered the House twenty-five years ago, new Members allowed two or three months to elapse before they enlightened the House; but in the last few years a new Member thought himself aggrieved if he did not deliver his maiden speech in the first week or two after taking his seat. (Laughter.) Captain Eden sat for a constituency which was in the very heart of this country, and that might be regarded as one high qualification at least to propose the toast of the Society dealing with Central Asia. That term applied to their work, had given some mental disturbance even to intelligent persons. His distinguished friend Dr. Hogarth had said to him that night: "I am supposed to speak about Arabia, and Sir Ernest Wilton about China: where does Central Asia come in?" (Laughter.) There was therefore scepticism as to the limitations implied by the name even in the highest circles—a scepticism which he believed in the case of Dr. Hogarth to be more than nominal.

On this occasion the Society might be said to celebrate its silver wedding. They had not been overwhelmed with presents (laughter), though he ventured to suggest to those who were their guests that they might very gracefully follow the ancient and reputable habit of this form of commemoration. (Renewed laughter.) He believed that when

the Society began its work early in the present century the Royal Asiatic Society held the field for exclusive attention to Asia. They had with them to-night the learned Secretary of that Society, Dr. Thomas, and wished to convey to him their thanks that all through these years the Royal Asiatic Society had been more than kind to the Central Asian Society. But he believed one reason why the latter was started was that some earnest spirits found the Royal Asiatic Society rather too learned. It entirely cut itself off not only from politics, but from modern religious developments, and many of those who were deeply interested in Asia felt that their field of enquiry should not be so restricted. That was how they came into being. There was also the Royal Geographical Society, upon whose arena they were to some extent trespassers. But right through the history of the Central Asian Society they had received nothing but the kindest consideration, untouched by any tiresome dissatisfaction, on the part both of the Royal Asiatic Society and the Royal Geographical Society.

It was rather difficult to say what the arena was that they covered, because, after all, their papers were read upon almost every subject that affected the whole of Asia. A friend with whom he discussed the matter that afternoon had suggested that their field was almost continuous with the Moslem world, and he thought that that was not an unfair description. They did not limit themselves absolutely to Asia, for they regarded the Red Sea as a very unnecessary geographical limit to their studies. Papers had been read to them, for instance, on the Egyptian Constitution. He was told, however, that when a paper was proffered on the subject of Tanganyika, it was suggested that they were straying rather too far from their ancestral home. (Laughter).

He must, on this occasion, give one or two domestic details. Just recently they had made a new departure by the election of three honorary Vice-Presidents, Lord Carnock, Lord Ronaldshay, and Colonel Yate, whose devotion to the Society and whose contributions to it were too well known to need recapitulation. They had on their list of Chairmen of Council such celebrated names as those of Sir Alfred Lyall, Sir Mortimer Durand, Sir Thomas Holditch, Sir Valentine Chirol, Lord Ronaldshay, Lord Carnock, and Sir Maurice de Bunsen, and the present Chairman was Sir Michael O'Dwyer. The first President of the Society was Lord Curzon, whose deep interest in the East was so widely known. The great variety of subjects they discussed was indicated by a mere list of the papers read during the past session. The Society had considered extraterritoriality in China; recent Persian history; India's defence as an imperial problem; Captain Kingdon Ward's account of his discovery of the hitherto unknown gorge of the Tsangpo River; the Anglo-Persian oilfields; the problem of Afghanistan; and Mr. Philby had still to give his lecture on the triumph of the Wahhabi, which was postponed owing to

the General Strike. The Dinner Club had had some excellent discussions under the chairmanship of Sir Neill Malcolm, unhampered by the presence of that Press on which Captain Eden had animadverted so severely.

The Society had almost all knowledge for its province. They were deeply interested in religion, for they were dealing with countries where the first question a man was asked was not "Where do you live?" or "What is your race?" but "What do you believe?" Nor did the Society neglect the antiquities in those corners of the world where ancient buildings had been preserved by desert sands for so many thousands of years, in contrast to the disintegration which our moist climate wrought upon great buildings, as, for instance, the Palace of Westminster, the stones of which, after an existence of only sixty or seventy years, were beginning to crumble. The Society was also interested in the history of the past as revealed by ancient monuments and inscriptions. They also had their lighter side, and he had noticed that although severe thoughtfulness dominated the majority of their members, when they had lantern slides at their travel lectures the attendance was far greater than when they were dealing with more fascinating, but perhaps more arid, subjects. (Laughter.) Their methods were those of Herodotus. They were ready to listen to the stories of the traveller, the soldier, the peasant, the priest, or the fakir, indeed, anyone who could give them first-hand information; but they tempered it with the severer and more scientific method of Aristotle to such an extent indeed that occasionally they earned even the plaudits of the Royal Asiatic Society. (Laughter.) They went further and studied manners and movements, political and social; they discussed trade and commerce; and went rather profoundly into the subject of the reaction of the Western world upon the East, and the equal effect which Eastern thought was having and would have upon the West. They were not only travellers and observers, but they professed also to be profound philosophers. This was a happy combination, even for such a Society as theirs. They had long ago discovered the complete fallaciousness of the old doctrine of the Unchanging East. If another Rip Van Winkle went to sleep in these times, he would not need to slumber for several hundred years. A year or two would, in many cases, suffice to transform the vision he had seen before taking his repose. Many members of the Society had passed the best years of their lives in the East as soldiers, administrators, and travellers, and therefore the papers read by those who were following in their footsteps were presented to well-stored minds. Men who had spent thirty or forty years in the East were well able to test the travellers' tales which they were told.

Captain Eden had talked about the fortitude of Government in respect to the treaty concluded on behalf of Iraq. These observations

came like balm in Gilead to his soul (laughter), for so rarely did a member of the Government hear such pleasant panegyrics. He had told them that they had in their Society the fountain-head of wisdom on Central Asian affairs. He did not know whether Captain Eden used these words in an after-dinner sense (laughter), but he was afraid for the moment that the eulogy might arouse suspicion and even, possibly, jealousy on the part of the representatives of the learned Societies who were with them that night. As to Mosul, he rejoiced that it had been possible to conclude at last a treaty on behalf of the Iraq Government with Turkey. He could not help admiring the way in which after raising agitation in the whole country and vehemently asserting that not one single inch of what was claimed to be Turkish soil could ever be given up, and arguing that Mosul, although inhabited almost entirely by Arabs, was really a Turkish town—that after all this tremendous agitation the Turks had concluded a satisfactory treaty with us. He could not help reflecting how unfortunate it was that there were people in this country who seemed unable to modify other slogans which were bringing upon us so great a handicap in the industrial world. (Cheers.) Captain Eden spoke of the open diplomacy of the Press. Much had been said in the past of the evils of secret diplomacy, but it was evident, from the agitations of the sections of our Press to which Captain Eden had referred, that there were weaknesses in open diplomacy. Certain newspapers had discussed the question of Mosul with a measure of accuracy which reflected great credit upon the imagination of the writers of those articles. (Laughter.) He had always had a friendly feeling for the Turks, and had no doubt that it was shared by Sir Charles Elliot, who had just come back from representing this country in Japan. It was profoundly interesting to watch the Western orientation of Turkey, which seemed to have a great affection for Western ideas, but not the same affection for Western persons. The Turks were far more ready to carry out Western ideas on their own system than to seek the help of those who were probably more competent than themselves to extend their application.

While they were watching the tremendous transformation going on in Asia, they heard at the same time of discouragement which was being given to young men seeking occupations in that continent, whether in India or elsewhere, whether as soldiers or civil servants or travellers, or as business men. He seldom used a Latin quotation, largely because of his unfamiliarity with the modern way of pronouncing Latin—(laughter)—but there was a saying in that tongue which he might freely translate for the benefit of young men, as follows: "Don't care a straw what your uncles or your fathers say about the East." (Laughter.) There was a tendency on the part of some older men to yearn for conditions which had passed away. Whatever our future

duties and responsibilities in the East might be, he hoped that we would never send any but our best men into those regions. In the rapid changes which were taking place there in the habits, thought, and ideas of the people, our best brains and our strongest characters would be of the utmost value. (Cheers.)

He was much gratified by the warm advocacy of their Society which they had heard from Captain Eden. He believed they did play a very useful part in the study of Asia, because they were always ready to form a centre and focus for a general clearing house of ideas and information on the changing panoramas of the East. They were increasing in numbers, and their roll now had upon it something like a thousand names. It was no small matter that in London, with a multitude of claims upon their time and attention, there should be one great centre like the Central Asian Society to keep alive an interest in the East and its affairs, subjects to which it behoved us to pay attention as lovers of the Empire. Whatever might be our future relations with Asia, it was of immense importance that we should be prepared to deal with each situation as it arose in the light of full knowledge and understanding. In particular young men should be prepared by such studies for dealing justly, fairly, nobly, and honourably with the great tasks that would lie before them when they went out to the East. In that hope he looked forward to the time when the Society would celebrate its golden and its diamond wedding with as good a record as that which had marked its first twenty-five years of existence, and he cherished the confident belief that those older Societies which had watched the growth and development of the Central Asian Society would feel that it had made a substantial contribution to our knowledge of and intimacy with the East. (Cheers.)

Sir MICHAEL O'DWYER proposed the toast of the "Guests" in a witty and much appreciated speech, describing various manifestations of the proverbial hospitality of the East. He said all of them had experienced in one form or another, and sometimes in rather embarrassing forms, the overflowing character of Oriental hospitality, and proceeded to describe the "delicacies" offered to visitors in various parts of Asia.

Dr. HOGARTH, who first replied, said he could fully endorse the remarks which had been made as to the happy relations between the Central Asian Society and the Royal Geographical Society. He could see no conceivable reason for any apology being needed for the existence of a number of societies interested in Asia. It was the most interesting continent in the world. In his youth Lord Curzon, writing from the deck of a vessel in the Red Sea, said that there loomed before him the vast, inscrutable, immemorial land of Asia; and it still remained inscrutable. The Secretary had warned him that he was expected to speak about the Near East, and Sir Michael O'Dwyer had suggested

that he would "sing them songs of Araby." His heart was by no means so much in Arabia as Sir Michael seemed to think. He remembered one distinguished desert traveller, Miss Gertrude Bell, saying to him on one occasion: "We all say we love the desert; I hate it." (Laughter.) When he was a very young man the newspapers devoted a good deal of space to what was called the "Eastern Question." Though it had had many manifestations, it was always in the minds of our fathers one question; there was a unity about it in its relation to our Empire. It was now no longer one question, but four or five or six or even more questions. This was what made it so interesting and so perplexing at the present time. Rudyard Kipling was responsible for the slogan—a word which our enlightened Press had taught us—that "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." If he meant by that a certain incompatibility between East and West, he was right; but if he meant the phrase in any other sense, it was not at all the fact. East and West now met constantly, and we had the difficulty of adjusting our relations in the twentieth century to regions which were living in effect in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, and yet were accepting nominally at least the ideas of the twentieth century. This was an extraordinary position of extraordinary danger. Some ideas in particular were dangerous, and two of the most dangerous ideas in the circumstances were those of nationality and of parliamentary institutions. Nationality was capable of very great things in good hands, but it was a question whether it could be effective in a country where it meant free licence to the privileged classes, or at any rate the division of the loaves and fishes among them. As to parliamentary institutions, he did not think they were the panacea for all evils of the State in countries other than those where they had originated. He doubted whether they had been completely successful anywhere on the other side of the English Channel. In the East they meant very little more than Ali Pasha meant when he sent to Vienna to buy a Constitution. The difficulty in the Near East in relation to nationalism and parliamentary institutions was that the really vital thing now as always was religion. It was this which divided the people on non-political lines. Therefore, though various Parties might exist, they really had no political basis at all. They were very much as Parties were in our country when Tories and Whigs were only nominally divided on political issues and really divided on the upholding of an old creed as against a new. In the Near East it might be said that there were four principal questions at issue, with many minor ones, and that in each case present conditions were transitory. He did not much expect that he would live to see these questions pass out of their present stages, but a great many who were present would live to see everyone in a different stage from that in which it was to-day. He found it impossible to believe, for instance, that the religious peasantry of Anatolia would continue to accept the

existing state of affairs, or that Angora, one of the least desirable places he knew upon the face of the earth, could permanently take the place of Constantinople as a capital. There was no real democracy in Turkey, and such attempts as had been made to set it up had been tempered by successful efforts at political assassination. In Syria they saw a centre of nationalist ferment and apparent solidarity, but there was diversity below. Once the existing foreign power there was withdrawn, that diversity would again be manifested. If there was one part of the world more than another that was permeated by religion, it was Syria, and he could not believe that religious differences would fail to control the actual state of society in the future. In Egypt nationalism was more deeply rooted and more widely spread because civilization was more widely spread. But the question was only not acute because nationalism had something to bite upon in the existence of the foreign element in political control. It was to be remembered that Egypt was probably the strongest natural fortress in the world, and anyone could prove to demonstration that it could never be invaded. Yet it had been invaded by almost everybody, and that fact cast an unfavourable reflection upon the social character of the inhabitants themselves. He could not think the present situation was likely to be more permanent there than in any other region of the Near East. In Arabia the situation was one not so much of nationality as of religion and individualism. It was a country in which the strong man armed had always taken and kept the authority. He believed that even in Arabia the existing state of things was transitory. There had been currents of change through the centuries in Arabia, but they had seldom held the popular mind for long. It was difficult to indulge in any confident prophecy as to the future of these countries. They could only hope that all that made for progress in the long run would be maintained. Progress had been likened to a very impetuous river which at times seemed to be working back upon itself, but which was really making progress all the time. He could see the eddies; he could see the broken waters also in various parts of the Near East; but he believed that the river of progress was flowing on. (Cheers.)

Sir ERNEST WILTON also replied and said that he would respond to the suggestion which had been made that he should discuss the situation in China. In 1923 he was seconded by the Foreign Office for a three years' term of service with the Chinese Government as Chief Foreign Inspector of the Salt Gabelle. The work had been strenuous, and, moreover, he had to face powerful attacks upon the Salt Revenue and interference with the administration on the part of the provincial Tuchuns (or war lords) in defiance of the Central Government at Peking, which was quite lacking in authority to restrain them. The position of the Foreign Chief Inspector might be described as that of a trustee for the joint interests of the foreign bondholders of the loans

secured upon the Salt Revenue and also of the Chinese Government, to whom the surplus revenue is handed over for general purposes. During the three years of his term, the Salt Gabelle collected a net revenue of \$225,000,000, out of which more than \$100,000,000 was handed over to the Chinese Minister of Finance for the general purposes of the Chinese Government. In addition, the obligations on foreign loans were fully met.

The decadent Manchu Dynasty expired in 1912 and was succeeded by a Republic, with Yuan Shih-Kai as President. For the next five or six years the Central Government at Peking carried authority in the provinces, but already a year before Yuan's death in 1919 signs were not wanting of very strong movements towards provincial autonomy. It was difficult to say how many Cabinets had functioned since that date, but certainly over a score. The country, speaking in a general way, might be described as divided into five more or less autonomous provincial zones, each controlled—at any rate nominally—by a military governor or war lord. The latter was not necessarily autocratic, but was often obliged to defer to the wishes of his subordinate generals, who were not infrequently his rivals. The amount of deference varied with the prestige of the war lord, coupled also with the size of his war-chest. Scant respect had been paid by the chiefs of the zones to the Government at Peking.

The two best-known men in China to-day were Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu. The former was, to all intents and purposes, the independent Governor of the Fengtien zone, which comprised the three Manchurian provinces together with those of Shantung and Chi-li: the total population was rather less than 100,000,000. Wu Pei-fu was in nominal control of several provinces along the Middle and Upper Yangtse together with the province of Honan, through which ran the trunk-line from Peking to Hankow. He was, perhaps, more of a dreamer than Chang, but, nevertheless, his name had a great hold upon his countrymen north and even in many regions south of the Yangtse, and he was generally regarded by his soldiers as a second Napoleon. A loyal and lasting alliance between these two was not an easy matter, and there were almost insuperable difficulties in the way, but this co-operation would go far indeed to bring about a temporary subsidence of the prevailing Chinese unrest. A meeting between these two powerful men had taken place within the last few days at Peking, and at any rate on the surface all appeared to be going well. However, the difficulties ahead of both of them were very great and very complicated.

Sir Ernest proceeded to discuss the present-day relations of China with Central Asia. Last year the provinces to the north-west of China, lying along the frontiers of Mongolia, were portioned to Feng Yu-hsiang, sometimes styled the "Christian General." The latter abandoned his

zone about April last, and had sought the hospitality of the Soviets at Moscow, where he was much interested in the workings of the Arsenal. For more than a year before his departure he initiated schemes for the extension of the present railway, Peking-Kalgau-Siuyuan-Paotou, towards the western frontier of China, and he planned to revive Chinese influence again in Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkistan. It was an open secret that he received Soviet assistance in the shape of arms and munitions, and some of his (Sir Ernest's) Chinese friends believed in the existence of a secret treaty of alliance between him and Moscow. One of the clauses was said to be an undertaking for joint action against British influence in Central Asia. Personally, he rather doubted the existence of such a document, although there might be a fairly complete understanding in this direction.

The "Christian General" had been notoriously anti-British in his public utterances, and in this respect stood almost alone among the prominent political and military leaders of China. However, General Feng had now left China, and any aggressive action against our interests in Central Asia was not likely. Neither Wu Pei-fu nor Chang Tso-lin could be described as, in any way, anti-British, nor were they prone to frontier adventures in that direction. For the moment, therefore, there need be no apprehension that the peace of Central Asia was likely to be disturbed by China, the more so as the past history of two centuries had shown that China has not undertaken any wars of aggression.

THE OLD MAN OF THE MOUNTAINS.

BY H. C. LUKE, C.M.G.

I.—THE FORERUNNERS.

WHEN the Arabs, in the first flush of their determination to convert the world to Islam, welled out of the Arabian peninsula, spreading fan-wise in conquest from the "Aqsa al-Maghreb," the "uttermost west" of the Mediterranean, to the confines of Central Asia, it was soon evident that the Mohammedanization of these vast territories, thus forcibly effected, was to all intents and purposes complete and final. More especially did this appear to be the case in the Empire of Persia, whose provinces were now an integral part of the Eastern Khalifate and whose national faith, the ancient Iranian fire-worship as reformed by Zoroaster, had given way, almost without a struggle, before the new dispensation. It is one of the curiosities of history that the worship of Ahura Mazda, once so tenacious that it was able to hold together the Persian people during the five centuries of alien domination that elapsed between the overthrow of the Achaemenid Empire by Alexander and its revival under the dynasty of the Sassanids, so powerful that it kept at bay the heroic onslaughts of Nestorian Christianity, should have capitulated so rapidly to the untried revelation of the Prophet of Mecca. True, the form of Mohammedanism that ultimately prevailed in Persia was not that of the Sunni Arabs: the marriage of the daughter of the last Sassanid to 'Ali's younger son Husein led the Persians to identify themselves, in the civil war that ensued between the fourth Khalif and his opponents, with the 'Alid faction and thus to become in due course the mainspring of the Shiah branch of Islam. But the collapse of the Magian religion was almost instantaneous and almost universal: very soon after the overthrow of the Sassanid State those who remained faithful to the old beliefs had become a despised handful of outcasts, principally confined to the remote oasis of Yezd.

Yet here and there in the provinces of Iran there smouldered the embers of resentment at the destruction of the national religion by the foreign conqueror; here and there were to be found those who feared the invasion of the religion of the Arabs more than they feared that of their soldiery. The conquest of their land was, they did not doubt, a purely passing misfortune, whereas the conquest of the mind would disintegrate, as they believed, the very essence of Persian national consciousness. Realizing that physical resistance was out of the

question, they therefore sought about for some other means of combating the danger to their continued existence as a separate people, and found one that was typical of the subtle Persian mind. Now Islam, although it had been forcibly imposed upon the Persians, was held by them for the first few centuries in but a superficial form, and this circumstance appeared to render feasible the scheme which these men devised. The scheme was as simple as it was ingenious: it aimed at the destruction of the Arab power, not by a resort to force, which at the time was clearly impracticable, but by the undermining of Islam, its motive spring and its *raison d'être*.

The initiator of this movement was one 'Abdallah ibn-Maimun, the descendant of a Magian family of Ahwaz in the Persian province of Arabistan, over against Basra. 'Abdallah lived in the ninth century A.D. and, with the wealth placed at his disposal by a rich adherent, Mohammed ibn-Husein Zeidan, set about to found a secret society for the accomplishment of his purpose. Very cleverly, 'Abdallah and his friends based their machinery on the esoteric sect of the Isma'ili'eh, the most unorthodox and eccentric of the divisions of Islam in that it found room among its doctrines for odd survivals and fragments of all sorts of older and contemporary non-Moslem beliefs and superstitions, reflected sidelights of Greek philosophy, Judaism and Christianity as well as of Gnosticism and the teachings of Zoroaster. The more surely to attract the unsuspecting Isma'ilian, to win the confidence of the entire sect, 'Abdallah proceeded to claim descent from 'Ali, thus mixing in his spiritual prescription all the most active ingredients, all the ingredients likely to make the widest appeal. These he proceeded to dispense with infinite caution, using the curiosity inherent in human nature as the magnet wherewith to draw his disciples, by slow but regular steps, away from the ostensible tenets of his society towards its true aims. The steps were the degrees of the society, at first seven in number after the fashion of the Pythagorean and Indian philosophies and with a special allusion to Isma'il, the seventh Imam of the Isma'ili'eh sect, but subsequently increased to nine. In the first degree, the longest and the most difficult of all (for it was necessary at the very outset to instil into the neophyte implicit confidence in his instructors, so that he might be inclined to take the necessary oath of secrecy and of complete submission to the rule of the society), the pupil's attention was drawn to various obscurities and inconsistencies in the Qoran. He was taught, by insidious questions and by various doubts suggested to his mind, the need for an authoritative teacher to expound its interpretation, without which the actual text of the book had neither meaning nor valre. On taking the oath he was now admitted to the second degree, which inculcated belief in divinely appointed Imams, who were the source of all knowledge. The third degree taught their number, which could not exceed the mystic seven,

for, as God had created seven heavens, seven earths, seven seas, seven planets, seven colours, seven musical sounds and seven metals, so had He appointed seven of the most excellent of His creatures as revealed Imams, of whom Isma'il was the seventh and last. In the fourth degree the disciple learned that since the beginning of the world there had been seven inspired Prophets or law-givers, each of whom had altered the doctrine of his predecessor. He was thus subtly given to understand that Islam was not necessarily the final, the immutable revelation of the divine truth; while in the fifth degree the innuendo became explicit and the temporary nature of Mohammed's doctrine and precepts and the uselessness of tradition were definitely made clear. In the sixth degree, which subordinated positive religious legislation to the general and the philosophical, those disciples, who by their intelligence and steadfastness had advanced to this stage, were absolved from the observance of the practices of Islam, such as prayer, fasting and the pilgrimage; in the seventh, having ceased by now to be Moslems except to the outer world, they passed from philosophy to a mysticism which believed anything or nothing. In the eighth and ninth degrees, which were elaborated at a later date at the Court of the Fatimite Khalifs in Egypt, the positive precepts of religion generally were demolished in the light of the knowledge gained in the previous stages; and the initiate, now emancipated from the trammels of doctrine and observance, was at last enlightened as to the superfluity of prophets and apostles, was free to believe nothing and encouraged to dare all.

This, then, was the instrument which 'Abdallah ibn-Maimun, the Persian patriot, forged for the overthrow of his country's oppressors. Compelled after a while to leave Persia, he established himself in Syria, in the neighbourhood of Hama, whence he sent forth his *da'is*, his missionaries and emissaries, to propagate his designs throughout the Moslem world. By degrees he, his sons and his grandsons contrived to found a vast and widely ramified association which, while nominally Isma'ilian and Shi'ah, had no other object but the overthrow of the 'Abbasid Khalifate and the extermination of Islam. Its manifestations and activities were diverse. As Bathinians 'Abdallah's sectaries in Persia concentrated on the speculative side of their programme. As Qarmathians (so called from one Hamdan Qarmat, a follower of 'Abdallah's son Ahmed), another branch of his political and spiritual offspring at a later date took up arms against the 'Abbasids, established an independent State in the Arabian province of Bahrein, detached for awhile the whole of Arabia from its allegiance to the Khalifate of Baghdad and actually carried off from Mecca, which they plundered, the black stone of the K'aba.* And another spiritual (and, according to some, also lineal) descendant of 'Abdallah, the Mahdi 'Obeidallah,

* It was returned twenty-three years later, in A.D. 950, at the instance of the Fatimite Khalif Mansur.

brought the society to the height of its temporal power by establishing the Fatimite Khalifate, which ultimately extended its sway from Tunis to Cairo and maintained itself in Egypt for the space of two hundred years.

II.—THE THREE FRIENDS.

Some two and a half centuries have elapsed since the apostolate of ibn-Maimun, and the face of the Mohammedan world has undergone certain important changes. In Egypt 'Abdallah's great conspiracy is enthroned under the Fatimite Khalifs and, having now the responsibilities of territorial sovereignty, has diverted a part of its energies, originally confined to the emancipation of Persia from Arab rule, into other channels. In Baghdad the 'Abbasid Khalifate still maintains a nominal and precarious existence, but the *de facto* authority over its extensive provinces is exercised, theoretically in the name of the powerless Khalif, by virtually independent Sultans and Emirs, leaders of invading tribes from Central Asia, who have carved for themselves principalities and kingdoms, and even empires, out of the crumbling dominions of the Commander of the Faithful. Foremost among these invading dynasties is that of the Seljuqs, who, at the moment of which I am about to speak, have made themselves the rulers of a vast territory which includes, but is not confined to, the whole of Persia.

At this point I will quote from one of the best-known passages in the records of mediæval Asia, from a passage that gives to this terrible story of the Assassins one of its few human touches. The words are those of Nizam al-Mulk, the Vizier of two successive Seljuq princes, Alp Arslan and his son Malik Shah, a man who must be ranked among the great statesmen of all time.

"One of the most eminent," writes Nizam al-Mulk—the quotation is from his *wassiyet*, his political testament—"of the wise men of Khorassan was the Imam Mowaffaq of Naishapur, a man highly honoured and revered, may God rejoice his soul; his illustrious years exceeded eighty-five, and it was the universal belief that every boy who read the Qoran, or studied the Traditions in his presence, would assuredly attain to honour and happiness. For this cause did my father send me from Tus to Naishapur with 'Abd-us-samad, the doctor of law, that I might employ myself in study and learning under the guidance of that illustrious teacher. Towards me he ever turned an eye of favour and kindness, and, as his pupil, I felt for him extreme affection and devotion, so that I passed four years in his service. When I first came there, I found two other pupils of mine own age newly arrived, Hakim 'Omar Khayyam and the fateful Ben Sabah. Both were endowed with sharpness of wit and the highest natural powers, and we three formed a close friendship together. When the Imam rose from his lectures, they used to join me, and we repeated to each

other the lessons we had heard. Now 'Omar was a native of Naishapur, while Hasan Ben Sabah's father was one 'Ali, a man of austere life and practice, but heretical in his creed and doctrine. One day Hasan said to me and Khayyam, 'It is a universal belief that the pupils of the Imam Mowaffaq will attain to fortune. Now, if we all do not attain thereto, without doubt one of us will; what then shall be our mutual pledge and bond?' We answered: 'Be it what you please.' 'Well,' he said, 'let us make a vow, that to whomsoever this fortune falls, he shall share it equally with the rest, and reserve no pre-eminence for himself.' 'Be it so,' we both replied; and on these terms we mutually pledged our words."

With this characteristic act, already showing promise of that ruthless ambition and fixity of purpose which was the motive power of his astonishing career, does the sinister figure of Hasan Sabah first present itself to our notice.

"Years rolled on," continues the Vizier, "and I went from Khorassan to Transoxiana, and wandered to Ghazni and Cabul; and, when I returned, I was invested with office, and rose to be administrator of affairs during the Sultanate of Sultan Alp Arslan. There now came to me Hakim 'Omar Khayyam, and I acquitted myself towards him of all the obligations of the pact, of all the pledges of our undertaking. I received him with honour and distinction, and I said to him: 'It is only right that one of your talents should be in the Sultan's service; and since, by reason of the engagement we made while we were pupils of the Imam Mowaffaq, I undertook to share with you such fortune as I might achieve, I will tell the Sultan of your attainments and of the knowledge you have amassed, and will see to it that you are given a post of honour about his person.' But Khayyam answered me as follows: 'The greatest boon you can confer on me is to let me live in a corner under the shadow of your fortune, to spread wide the advantages of science, and pray for your long life and prosperity.' And he remained firm in his resolution. When I perceived that he spoke with sincerity, that his answer was not the empty form of politeness, I caused him to be granted a yearly pension of 1,200 *mithqals* of gold, drawn on the Treasury of Naishapur."

At Naishapur thus lived and died 'Omar Khayyam, "busied," adds the Vizier, "in winning knowledge of every kind, especially in astronomy, where he attained to a very high pre-eminence."

And what of the third party to the bond? Little is heard of Hasan Sabah during the reign of Alp Arslan, but, on the accession of Malik Shah in 1072, he, too, presents himself before his schoolfellow and, with harsh words from the Qoran directed against the breakers of promises, reminds the Vizier of the obligation of his early days. Nizam al-Mulk is faithful to his word and procures for him a post at Court; and it is not long before Hasan has established over the Sultan

an ascendancy which menaces the authority of the Vizier. Hasan labours with zeal to accomplish the downfall of his benefactor, and is within an ace of achieving his purpose when the tables are turned and he is driven from Court in disgrace. He then retires to his native town of Ray, the precursor of the modern Tehran (then only one of Ray's villages), and here, for the ensuing five years, he steepes himself in the doctrines which are to bear such terrible fruits under the impulse of his strong and evil will.

Why, it will be asked, did Hasan, brought up in the orthodox Sunni school of the Imam Mowaffaq, generously befriended by the Vizier, well placed at the Court of the most powerful ruler in Sunni Islam, deliberately precipitate a conflict between himself and the established order? Why was he not content to enjoy the good fortune which his own youthful prescience and the loyalty of his friend had placed in his way? The answer is that Hasan was not only by race a Persian and, despite his Sunni schooling, by birth and sympathies a Shi'ah, but was by instinct and temperament a revolutionary, a destroyer, a Nihilist. "If I had had at my bidding," he once declared, speaking of his sojourn at the Court of Malik Shah, "but two devoted friends, I would soon have overturned the power of the Turk and the Peasant," "the Turk" and "the Peasant" being his contemptuous designations of the Sultan and the Vizier. Now Hasan had originally belonged to the Imamieh sect of the Shi'ah branch of Islam, to the sect which recognizes the succession of the twelve Imams from 'Ali to Mohammed Abu 'l Qasim; but it was not long after his disappearance from Court and his return to Ray that he attached himself to the Isma'ilieh, and to that inner coterie of the Isma'ilieh which held the secret principles of ibn-Maimun. It will be remembered that this element was now all-powerful in Egypt, from which vantage-ground it distributed its agents throughout the Moslem world; so that even in Ray there were to be found the *da'is* of the Fatimite Khalif, despatched by the central Lodge of the Order, which the Fatimites had set up in Cairo. These saw to it that the initiation of so suitable a candidate, of so valuable a recruit to the cause, was not unduly prolonged. That after which he had been groping, unconsciously perhaps, during his sojourn at the Court of the Seljuq, that, they told him, had been the very aim of two noble compatriots of his two hundred and fifty years previously. They now expounded to him the mission and life-work of 'Abdallah ibn-Maimun and Mohammed Zeidan, and urged him to assume their mantle, to be one of the leaders of the conspiracy—now more vigorous than ever—which these men had set in motion so long ago. Hasan, nothing loth, accepted the office of *da'i*, and was then advised to leave Persia, the birthplace of the Isma'ilian theories, for Egypt, where those theories were being translated into practice. "You must go," said his mentors, "to the land of Egypt, to enjoy the happiness of serving the Imam Mostansir."

The Imam Mostansir was the reigning Fatimite Khalif, the grandson of that Khalif Hakim who had founded and become the deity of the religion of the Druses; and to Mostansir's Court in Cairo Hasan now betook himself. Yet even here his intractable spirit led him into violent opposition to the State. Almost at once he embarked upon an intrigue to support the claims of Nizar, one of Mostansir's sons, to the ultimate succession in opposition to those of Mosta'li, the heir-designate, and was banished, albeit reluctantly, by the Khalif. Within eighteen months of his arrival in Egypt he had left the country for ever, taking with him the little son of Nizar.

Now begins the stage in the career of this extraordinary man, in which he is to see the fruition of his nefarious labours. First in Aleppo, then in Baghdad, finally in Persia once again, he preaches his secret doctrines with indefatigable perseverance; and at last he proceeds to reap in tangible form what he and eight generations of his precursors have been sowing. By an ingenious ruse he possesses himself of the stronghold of Alamut, "the Vulture's Nest," a castle perched in the mountains of Rudbar eighteen miles north-west of Kazvin and not far from the shores of the Caspian, in what is now the Persian province of Gilan; and this, his first territorial acquisition, becomes the base for the consolidation of his domain. By degrees neighbouring castles fall into his hands, and his growing power arouses the apprehensions of Malik Shah and the Vizier Nizam al-Mulk. An expedition is sent against Alamut but fails to take it; and Sultan and Vizier, by this time genuinely alarmed, determined to spare no effort to extirpate the Vulture's Nest and its poisonous brood. And now we see the material resources of the strongest kingdom in Asia arrested by a force new in history, namely, by the spiritual impulses of man directed scientifically and with consummate method into criminal channels. Hasan, having no armies to range against the troops of the Sultan, devises another weapon of defence and offence, a weapon which becomes in his hands one of tragic and dramatic efficacy. Its first victim is none other than Hasan's old school-friend and benefactor, Nizam-al-Mulk, who falls by the dagger in 1092. Forty days later Sultan Malik Shah succumbs to a sudden and mysterious illness. Quickly there follows the Vizier's elder son Ahmed, who is stabbed in Baghdad; then the second son, Fakhr al-Mulk, who is accosted at Naishapur by a beggar with the words: "The true Moslems are no more; there are none left to take the hand of the afflicted." Touched by the man's miserable aspect, Fakhr al-Mulk approaches him kindly, and receives a knife in his heart. And when the murderer is tried and is asked for the names of his accomplices, at one stroke he multiplies the number of his victims and deals the Government a redoubled blow by denouncing falsely, and sending to the scaffold, several loyal servants of the Seljuq State.

With these crimes do the Assassins, whom we may now call by that

name, inaugurate under the direction of their ruler Hasan the series of murders with which their Order will ever be associated in history.

III.—THE SCHOOL OF CRIME.

We must now go back a little in order to consider how Hasan came to forge this singular instrument of his power. His main preoccupation, after he had established himself on his own territory, was to organize the political system of that Brotherhood within the fold of the Isma'ili^h, of which he was at once the founder, militant chief and Grand Master. There was to be established a body politic, for which he had not only to legislate; it was a body politic in which the absence of troops and treasure, essential to the existence of the ordinary State, had to be replaced by some equivalent. Hasan's own experience had taught him, by the slender results that had attended until now the efforts of the Isma'ilian missions in Asia, how hopeless would be the attempt to impose his rule and his principles unless the leader had not only heads, but also hands, at his command.

Hitherto the Order of which, subject to its allegiance to the Fatimite Khalif, Hasan had constituted himself the ruler, had possessed the former but not the latter. It had consisted only of the *da'is*, of those missionaries to whom, as initiates into all the degrees of the secret doctrine, nothing was true and all was allowed, and of *refiqs*, who were undergoing the process of initiation. It was now manifest to Hasan's practical and enterprising mind that for the furthering of his designs a third class was requisite, not a class whose mission it would be to convert and to command, but a class whose sole function would be unquestioning obedience. This class would not be initiated into the mysteries and true aims of the Order; it would provide the blind and willing tools for the execution of the leaders' behests. So, while the *da'is* worked with their heads, with the full knowledge of what they were about, the *feda'is*, the "devoted ones," were to work with their hands, in complete ignorance of the significance of their labours.

There are few more striking phenomena in the history of the Middle Ages than the *feda'is* of the Assassins. Drawn from divers countries and composed of adventurers, of men in search of excitement, of men with a love of fighting for its own sake, of desperate men with nothing to lose, they were in some respects the precursors of the Foreign Legion of our own day. Like the members of the Foreign Legion, they were required to possess great physical vigour, resolution and endurance; like them, they were subjected to the most rigid discipline. But not discipline alone, not alone the love of danger and adventure, were sufficient to make of the *feda'is* the fanatical instruments of their sovereign's will, which under the skilful direction of Hasan and his successors they became. To this training and to these qualities was added something else, that something being a blend of supreme religious

exaltation with the most callous fatalism, which was only possible in the soul of an Oriental. How can we explain otherwise the unflinching devotion of these people, which recoiled before no task, however appalling, which enabled them to carry out, not only without hesitation but with positive enthusiasm, murders of the most fantastic audacity that meant swift and inevitable retribution? I will cite three episodes in the annals of the Assassins to illustrate the spirit of the *feda'is*, not because these episodes are exceptional, but because, on the contrary, they are typical of this amazing organization. The Seljuq Sultan having sent an envoy to Hasan to demand his submission, the son of Sabah called into his presence certain of his *feda'is*. Beckoning to one of them, he said: "Kill thyself," and instantly the man stabbed himself. To another he said: "Throw thyself down from the rampart," and the next moment the *feda'i* lay a mutilated corpse in the moat. Thereupon Hasan Sabah turned to the envoy, who was unnerved by terror, and said: "In this way I am obeyed by seventy thousand faithful subjects. Be that my answer to your master."

About a century later, during the Third Crusade, Henry II., Count of Champagne, who was to become *jure uxoris* Latin King of Jerusalem, found himself in the neighbourhood of the Syrian territory of the Assassins. The Grand Prior, successor of the celebrated Rashid al-Din Sinan, of whom more anon, sent messengers to welcome him and to invite him to visit his fortresses. Henry accepted the invitation, and came; the Grand Prior hastened to meet him, and received him with great honour. He took him to several castles and brought him at last to one having very lofty turrets. On each look-out stood two *feda'is*, and the Grand Prior, pointing to them, told the Count that these men obeyed him better than the Christians obeyed their princes. He then gave a signal, and two of them hurled themselves from the top of the tower and were dashed to pieces at its foot. "If you desire it," said the Grand Prior to the astonished Count, "all my *feda'is* shall throw themselves from the battlements in the same way." Henry declined, and confessed that he could not reckon on such obedience from his servants.

To offer up his life in an act of devotion to his duty was, as I have indicated, a joy and an honour for the *feda'i*, and this joy was shared by his relatives. A mother learned that her son, one of the "devoted ones," had been killed, together with several of his companions, in the execution of his orders, and manifested her gladness by putting on festal array. Shortly afterwards the son returned unharmed, having in some remarkable way escaped hurt. The mother blackened her face, cut off her hair, and abandoned herself to the profoundest grief.

Now by what means was there created that blend, as I have called

it, of fatalism and religious exaltation which could make these things possible, and not only possible but habitual? In the answer to this question lies the essential characteristic of this strange body of men, the characteristic whence the Order derives that glamour, terrible but not without an element of romance, which has surrounded it ever since the Crusaders made the West aware of its existence. I will allow an Occidental, who first entered Persia only fifteen years after the fall of the last Grand Master, who was thus almost an eye-witness of what he relates, to give the story in his own words :

"In a beautiful valley between two lofty mountains," says Marco Polo, speaking of the Grand Master of the Assassins, "he had formed a luxurious garden, stored with every delicious fruit and every fragrant shrub that could be procured. Palaces of various sizes and forms were erected in different parts of the grounds, ornamented with works in gold, with paintings, and with furniture of rich silks. By means of small conduits contrived in these buildings, streams of wine, milk, honey, and some pure water were seen to flow in every direction. The inhabitants of these palaces were elegant and beautiful damsels, accomplished in the arts of singing, playing upon all sorts of musical instruments, dancing, and especially those of dalliance and amorous allurements. Clothed in rich dresses, they were seen continually sporting and amusing themselves in the garden and pavilions, their female guardians being confined within doors and never suffered to appear. The object which the chief had in view in forming a garden of this fascinating kind was this: that Mahomet having promised to those who should obey his will the enjoyments of Paradise, where every species of sensual gratification should be found, in the society of beautiful nymphs, he was desirous of its being understood by his followers that he also was a prophet and the compeer of Mahomet, and had the power of admitting to Paradise such as he should choose to favour. In order that none without his licence might find their way into this delicious valley, he caused a strong and inexpugnable castle to be erected at the opening of it, through which the entry was by a secret passage. At his court, likewise, this chief entertained a number of youths, from the age of twelve to twenty years, selected from the inhabitants of the surrounding mountains, who showed a disposition for martial exercises, and appeared to possess the quality of daring courage. To them he was in the daily practice of discoursing on the subject of the Paradise announced by the Prophet, and of his own power of granting admission; and at certain times he caused opium to be administered to ten or a dozen of the youths; and when half dead with sleep he had them conveyed to the several apartments of the palaces in the garden. Upon awakening from this state of lethargy, their senses

were struck with all the delightful objects that have been described, and each perceived himself surrounded by lovely damsels, singing, playing, and attracting his regards by the most fascinating caresses, serving him also with delicate viands and exquisite wines; until intoxicated with excess of enjoyment amidst actual rivulets of milk and wine, he believed himself assuredly in Paradise, and felt an unwillingness to relinquish its delights. When four or five days had thus been passed, they were thrown once more into a state of somnolency, and carried out of the garden. Upon being introduced to his presence, and questioned by him as to where they had been, their answer was: 'In Paradise, through the favour of your highness;' and then before the whole court, who listened to them with eager curiosity and astonishment, they gave a circumstantial account of the scenes to which they had been witnesses. The chief thereupon addressing them said: 'We have the assurances of our Prophet that he who defends his lord shall inherit Paradise, and if you show yourselves devoted to the obedience of my orders, that happy lot awaits you.' Animated to enthusiasm by words of this nature, all deemed themselves happy to receive the commands of their master, and were forward to die in his service. The consequence of this system was, that when any of the neighbouring princes, or others, gave umbrage to his chief, they were put to death by these his disciplined assassins; none of whom felt terror at the risk of losing their own lives, which they held in little estimation, provided they could execute their master's will."

Thus far from Marco Polo, whose narrative requires only one small correction. His "opium" was really a decoction of *hashish*, the Arabic name for Indian hemp (*Cannabis indica*), whence the *feda'i* came to be known among Arabic-speaking peoples as *hashishi*, "the hemp-taker." From the plural of this word, *hashishin*, is derived not only the appellation of the entire Order in history, but the term which has perpetuated in half the languages of Europe the sinister associations of its name.

IV.—THE OLD MAN OF THE MOUNTAINS.

From the fact that Alamut and the neighbouring fortresses acquired by Hasan* were situated in a highly mountainous region, a region that adjoins the great range of Elburz† with its culminating peak of Demavend, the Grand Master of the Assassins was known in Arabic-speaking countries as *Sheikh al-Jabal*—that is to say, as the chief or

* The Persian geographer Mustawfi gives a list of fifty of these castles.

† Not to be confused with the peak of the same name, but generally spelled and pronounced Elbruz, in the Caucasus range.

ruler of the mountains or mountainous district. And as the primary meaning of the word *Sheikh* is "old man," it was this version, albeit the inappropriate one, which was adopted in the West and gave to Hasan and his successors in Occidental literature the misleading if picturesque title of "Old Man of the Mountains." As *Vetus de Monte* and *Senex de Montanis* the Grand Master of the Assassins and his Grand Prior in Syria figure prominently in the chronicles of the Crusades, and obtained a celebrity in Europe that fell not far short, although it was of a less edifying nature, of that enjoyed by Prester John.

Now Hasan, despite the material delights that he prepared for his *feda'is*, himself led a life of grim austerity. Night and day he shut himself up in his library at Alamut, engaged in the composition of treatises concerning the domination of the human mind and the scientific corruption of consciences, which he compiled for the benefit of those who had the wit to make use of his subtle prescriptions. From his library he ruled his Order and his territorial dominions; and he, who had travelled so incessantly in the years of his preparation, now, during the whole of his long reign at Alamut, only issued twice, so says the historian Hamd-Allah, from his own apartments, only ascended to his terrace on a single occasion.

Hasan died in his bed at Alamut on the 12th June, 1124, aged more than ninety years. Ruthless no less to his own kin than to his foes, he had, shortly before his death, slain his two sons because he considered them incapable of profiting by his teaching and unfit to govern the Order. Declaring that capacity alone should qualify for rule, he chose as his successor a *da'i* of obscure origin named Kia Buzurg-Umid: in the words of an Oriental chronicler "Hasan, when his end was near, brought out a young man who was concealed in his establishment, and handed over to him all his fortresses."

Buzurg-Umid reigned for fourteen years; his son, Mohammed I. (for Buzurg-Umid turned from the elective to the hereditary principle), for twenty-five. During this period many of the most powerful princes of the East fell under the daggers of the *feda'is*: two Khalifs, a Sultan of Khorassan, an Atabeg of Mosul and sundry Seljuq Emirs head the long tale of their Eastern victims. And the Order now became, if we are to believe the mediæval historians, not only a religious sect that assassinated its own enemies but an organization of hired murderers ready to undertake, for a consideration, commissions to despatch those against whom they had no cause for enmity. The most conspicuous Western chief to suffer from this aspect of the Order's activities was to be the Marquis Conrad of Montferrat, who was stabbed by two "devoted ones" in 1192—the centenary of the deaths of Nizam al-Mulk and Malik Shah—just after he had been recognized as King of Jerusalem. But with the death of Mohammed I. another and more

fundamental change takes place in the principles of the Assassins, and there comes into prominence one of the most outstanding figures in their history, that of the Sheikh Rashid al-Dîn Sinan.

One day in the year 1150 a youth, slightly built and lame, limped up to Alamut, seeking admittance. The lad was a stranger from Syria, of Nossairieh parentage, and he had come, he said, from 'Iraq with the intention of entering the Order of the Assassins. Young Rashid al-Dîn Sinan soon attracted, by his mental gifts, the favour of the Grand Master Mohammed, who caused him to share the studies of his son Hasan; and an intimate friendship grew up between the two youths, who proceeded to apply themselves with zeal to the writings of Hasan Sabah. Young Hasan, afterwards the Grand Master Hasan II., who was possessed of great intelligence and was well versed in history and philosophy, rejoiced at the companionship of one who shared so fully his interest in the mysteries and secret doctrines of the Order he was to rule. What stimulated Hasan's imagination above all else was the presence at Alamut of the mysterious Egyptian, the son of Nizar and the grandson of the Fatimite Khalif Mostansir, whom Hasan Sabah had, it will be remembered, carried away with him on his expulsion from the Cairene Court. In due course this interest assumed a concrete shape, and young Hasan began—perhaps with the encouragement of Rashid Sinan—to put about the belief that he was the son, not of the Grand Master Mohammed, but of this son of Nizar, and that thus there ran in his veins the sacred blood of the Khalifs. It was not long before the affections of the wilder spirits among the Assassins began to turn under this stimulus from Mohammed to his infinitely more brilliant but less stable son, with the result that the Grand Master, becoming aware of his loss of popularity and of Hasan's growing ascendancy, put 250 of the latter's adherents to death. Hasan was compelled, therefore, for the remainder of Mohammed's life to abjure his friends and his heresies; but when, in 1164, Mohammed died and he succeeded to the Grandmastership, he lost no time in putting his peculiar views into execution. Summoning, on the seventeenth day of the first Ramadan of his reign, the entire population of the neighbourhood of Alamut, he caused an open-air pulpit to be erected at the foot of the castle, and from it he proclaimed *urbi et orbi* the doctrine that had hitherto been confined to the initiates of the Order only and had been jealously concealed from the masses, the doctrine that all men were freed from the obligations of the law, were released from obedience to the commands and prohibitions of religion and were at liberty to do as they liked. He then descended from the pulpit, caused tables to be covered, and commanded the people—at the height of the Ramadan fast—to give themselves up to eating, drinking and merrymaking. His next step was to revive, but this time with greater

precision, the fiction of his descent from Nizar, and formally to proclaim himself the Khalif. This assumption of the highest office in Islam by the man who had just released his people from obedience to the injunctions of Islam, the consummation of this paradox, was made easy by conditions in Egypt, where the Fatimite Khalifate was tottering to its fall, having only a few years to live before it received its *coup de grâce* from Saladin, the arch-enemy of the Assassins, in 1171. Hasan having now assumed the dignity of the Khalif, took the additional name of 'Ala-zikrihi-al-selam ("Peace to his glorious memory"), and the historian Mirkhond records that the following inscription was set up in Alamut to commemorate the events of the 17th of Ramadan :

" With the help of God
Were loosened the fetters of the law
By the Ruler of the World
Peace to his glorious memory."

After four years of blood-stained rule, Hasan II. died at the hand of one of his brothers-in-law, and was succeeded by his son Mohammed II. This prince, throughout a long reign of forty-six years, followed in his father's footsteps and multiplied the crimes whereon his Order thrives. Dying, it is believed, by poison administered by his son, he was followed in the Grandmastership by this son, who reigned as Hasan III. Jelal al-Din, the last of the princes of Alamut whose career presents any feature of interest, any variation from the monotonous shedding of blood that marked the reigns of his predecessors and of his two successors. Hasan III. instigated his father's death only to save himself from a similar fate, which was threatening him at the hands of his parent ; but this was the first and the last murder of his twelve years of rule. Not only in this respect did he reverse the policy of preceding reigns ; he came forward, says Hammer in his "History of the Assassins," as the restorer of the true religion according to the strictest principles of Islam. He prohibited everything that his father and grandfather had declared to be allowed ; commanded the erection of mosques, the re-establishment of the call to prayers, and the solemn assembly on Fridays. He called round him Imams, readers of the Qoran, preachers, scribes, and professors, whom he loaded with presents and favours, and appointed to the newly built mosques, convents and schools." What is more, he sent his wife and his mother with great pomp on the pilgrimage to Mecca ; and, so complete was his repudiation of the impious policy of his grandfather, Hasan II., that he was universally acclaimed by his contemporaries as "The New Mussulman." How far this ostentatious return to the observance of the forms of religion was genuine, how far it was a stroke of policy, it is difficult to judge, for the "New Mussulman" perished from the effects of poison at the early age of thirty-seven. His son

Mohammed III. 'Ala al-Din, who succeeded as a boy of nine, reverted at once, despite his tender age, to the criminal traditions of the Order. After a sanguinary reign of thirty years he, too, died in the manner usual among the rulers of the Assassins, at the hand of a murderer instigated by his son Rukn al-Din, who became in 1255 the last Grand Master of Alamut. The life of the Order in Persia had now run its evil course, for in the following year the Mongols under Hulagu, who had destroyed and were to destroy so much that was good, wiped out the nefarious principality of Alamut and thus exterminated at least one thing that was bad. Yet one of their acts on this occasion must, in the interests of science, be ever deplored, namely, that in sacking the castle of Alamut they burned the famous library of Hasan Sabah, including the only copies which existed of the writings of that singular man.

Let us go back for a moment to follow the fortunes of Rashid al-Din Sinan. While Hasan II. was yet at the height of his activity as the emancipator of mankind from the bonds of religion, Rashid sought the leave of his schoolfellow, now his sovereign, to withdraw into Syria in order to organize the energies of the Assassins in their Western sphere of influence. Himself a Syrian, he was peculiarly fitted for this task. Around the walled towns of Masyad and Qadmus in his native Nosairieh mountains he, too, built up a principality, which he ruled, theoretically as the Grand Prior of the Grand Master in Persia, in practice as an independent prince. Here Rashid became to the Crusaders, who knew little of his distant overlord, the Old Man of the Mountains *par excellence*, and from his Syrian fastnesses revived, in the camps of Christians and Saracens alike, the awe-inspiring traditions of Hasan Sabah.

V.—IN THE MOUNTAINS OF THE ASSASSINS.

The western offshoot of the Assassins survived its eastern parent by fourteen years. In 1270 Bibars, the Mameluke Sultan of Egypt, who brought practically all Syria and Palestine under his sway, included in his Syrian conquests the principality established by Rashid al-Din Sinan; and the temporal power of the Assassins came finally to an end. The Fatimite Khalifate having disappeared a century earlier, there now existed no State where the Isma'ili'eh exercised political power; and, although the sect survived, its adherents were dispersed among the various territories of Western Asia, in India, the Arabian peninsula, North and East Africa and even in Zanzibar. In these several lands they pursued their existence as religious sectaries, having no political organization or centre and little spiritual cohesion. The latter was to be restored to them in the nineteenth century in an entirely unforeseen manner.

The fall of the Fatimite Khalifate, whose sovereigns were regarded as the senior representatives of the descendants of the Imam Isma'il, did not involve the extinction of the family of him whom the Isma'ilieh revere as their seventh Imam. Shorn of their temporal power, the family withdrew to Persia, where they maintained their existence in an obscurity mitigated only by the fact that the scattered Isma'ilieh (including, after the suppression of the eastern and western States of the Order, those who remained of the Assassins) continued to look upon them as the heads and quasi-deities of the sect. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the head of the family was a certain Hasan 'Ali Shah, better known as the Aga Khan, who, born in 1800, became Governor-General of the Province of Kerman under Fath 'Ali Shah, the Persian sovereign immortalized by Morier in "Hajji Baba." In 1838, after Fath 'Ali Shah's death, the Aga Khan became involved in a rising against his grandson and successor Mohammed Shah, and was compelled to leave Persia. He took refuge in India, where his influence over his spiritual subjects on the Frontier enabled him to render material aid to the British forces during the first Afghan War and subsequently in the Sind campaign. For these services he was rewarded by the Indian Government with the hereditary title of Highness, and he remained to the end of his days a firm friend of the British. He settled in Bombay, where he died at a ripe old age in 1881, being succeeded in his dignities, spiritual and temporal, by his son, the second Aga Khan, who was followed in his turn by the present Aga Khan, Sultan Mohammed Shah. The present Aga Khan, well known not only by his influence in Moslem politics in and beyond India, but also by his successes on the turf, has done much through his personal prestige to raise the condition of his scattered flock of Isma'ilieh. He has travelled widely to visit and to receive the homage of his followers; and even the poor remnant of the Assassins, still lurking impoverished and almost forgotten around the crumbling fortresses of Masyad and Qadmus, is at pains to send annually one-fifth of its scanty revenues to its pontiff in Bombay. When I visited Masyad early in 1908, in the last months of the personal rule of 'Abdul Hamid II. the unhappy Assassins were in difficulties with the Government on this very account. On the day of our arrival at Masyad the Qaimaqam of the district, a Syrian Moslem, visited us in our camp and lost no time in acquainting us with his opinion of his charges.

"When first I came to Masyad," he related, "I summoned their Sheikhs. I said to them: 'The Moslems have mosques, and a muezzin to call them to prayers, the Christians have churches and bells. But what have ye for a place of worship?' And they could not answer me. So I said: 'It is a bad thing for men to hide their religion, and ye cannot be good people.' And as they still answered nothing, I had

them arrested; and the Mutesarraf has granted my request that they should be sent away."

It did not require the Qaimaqam's deprecating smile, when he said "as they still answered nothing," to make it quite clear that the answer he had expected was the oiling of his palm. The regular tribute of a fifth of the Assassins' income (they are miserably poor, but there are about twenty thousand of them in the eighteen Isma'ili'eh villages about Masyad and Qadmus) paid to a wealthy and distant potentate, and above all to one living in British territory as the subject of a foreign and infidel monarch, was evidently most galling to this underpaid Ottoman official, who could have found such infinitely better use nearer home for these Moslem Peter's Pence. In the event, however, the Assassins were not deported but have survived, by the turn of fortune's wheel, to live under the rule of the French, political descendants of those performers of *gesta dei per francos*, whom their ancestors fought and assassinated eight centuries ago.

Masyad is interesting architecturally, being entirely enclosed by thin crenellated walls and surmounted by a castle which is a strange jumble of Græco-Roman, Byzantine and Saracenic fragments. Four or five families of Assassins (they allude to themselves, of course, not by this name but as Isma'ili'eh) still inhabit its sombre, vaulted recesses: and over castle, town and district there yet broods the spirit and memory of Rashid al-Dîn Sinan. A little outside the walls is a pool of water, which the heavy rains at the time of our visit had enlarged to the dimensions of a small lake; and it is related by the people of Masyad that the supernatural powers of Rashid Sinan were first recognized at this pool. Shortly after his arrival from Alamut, Rashid was walking beside it with a man of Masyad, when the latter suddenly noticed that his image alone was reflected by the waters. Terrified, the man prostrated himself at the Sheikh's feet, and was commanded to keep secret what he had seen. Maurice Barrès, who was here in 1914, tells another story of Rashid Sinan, related to him by Isma'ilians at Qadmus.* One day Rashid encountered a vagabond with a performing monkey. He gave the monkey a coin, whereupon the animal spun round rapidly, then lay down and died. "The monkey," explained Rashid, "was once a king, and that coin bore his superscription. At the sight of it, the Almighty caused him to remember his past glory and his present degradation. The violence of his grief at the recollection killed him."

The modern Assassins live on bad terms with their Nosairieh neighbours. These, by a stratagem, seized Masyad in 1809, but were compelled by the Turks to restore it to its owners; and ever since they have pursued the Assassins with their ill-will although they have

* "Une Enquête aux Pays du Levant," Paris, 1924.

borrowed certain of their beliefs. Hence the accusation, spread by the Nosairieh, that the Syrian Isma'iliyah indulge in the course of their rites in obscene and bacchanalian orgies, centring around the person of a girl known as the *rodha*. Some trace of the old Phœnician nature-worship does indeed seem to have found its way hither from that ardent Valley of the Adonis, that hot-bed of Asiatic gods which runs down to the Mediterranean between Beirut and Jebeil, and to have lingered, the shadow of its former self, in these remote and unvisited fastnesses. As to the facts, so difficult to establish, I will quote Dr. Bliss,* who is satisfied that a girl figures in the worship of the Assassins of to-day but rejects the interpretation placed upon the circumstance by ill-disposed neighbours. "This girl," he says, "is called the *rodhak*, which may be translated a greensward or pleasance. As long as she remains a virgin she is regarded as sacred, and the Isma'ilians wear bits of her clothing or hair from her person in their turbans. But should she marry—and she may do so honourably—search is made for a successor, who must be a girl born on a certain day in the year, and who should conform to certain characteristics regarding her height and the colour of her hair and eyes. At least two persons have surprised the Isma'iliyeh at a service of adoration of the *rodhak*. One, a Government official, who broke in forcibly, found the girl seated on a high chair dressed in a white robe, with a wreath of fresh flowers on her head. The worshippers were kneeling before her chanting sacred songs. According to the testimony of the other witness, a simple Syrian Christian, whom I questioned some ten years after his adventure, his observations were confined to the brief period between his accidental stumbling into a secret assembly and his rough ejection by one of the worshippers, who told him that anyone else would have been promptly butchered! He happened to be on friendly terms with the prominent sheikhs. He remembers seeing a circle of some twenty or thirty initiates, seated on the floor, in an attitude of adoration of a girl of about sixteen years of age, dressed in a black robe that entirely covered her person, with her hair hanging down on either side of her face, which was left exposed. Someone held a book, but he was not sure whether it was the girl or her father, a prominent religious sheikh. In fact, the witness was evidently conscious in discriminating between what he remembered clearly and what he was hazy about. This girl has since been married and her place taken by another."

I have never ceased to regret that my only visit to the Persian province of Gilan, a hasty journey made on war service from Baku across the Caspian to Enzeli in the disturbed spring of 1920, allowed me neither the time nor the facilities to penetrate to the ruins of the "Vulture's Nest." It was tantalizing to be so near to Alamut and to

* "The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine."

be unable to reach it, for not many travellers of modern times can have entered both the western and the eastern principalities of the Assassins. But what I have seen of their survivors within the crumbling walls of Masyad is sufficient to prove that these cowed and rather pathetic people, who abstain wholly from drink and almost wholly from tobacco, who deny themselves that they may have the more to send to their amiable divinity in distant Bombay, are indeed far removed from those drugged and ruthless *fedais*, who carried the fear of the Old Man of the Mountains into the heart of the mediæval East.

REFLECTIONS ON THE MOSUL PROBLEM

THE general significance of the Mosul problem is adequately shown in the cogent sentences respectively of Sir Thomas Holdich and the late Lord Curzon. "Of all sources of international irritation, boundaries seem to be most prolific; and of all countries in the world, England has probably suffered the most from them," says the former; the latter: "Frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations." The truth of those statements emerges clearly when we consider how often since the Armistice the Mosul question has brought us to the brink of war with Turkey, and in what expenditure, financial and military, it has involved us. The settlement of the problem was an imperial necessity, and after a long struggle against the bluff, bluster, and traditional contumacy of the Turks, a settlement has been finally effected. It would, however, be political folly to look on the recent agreement with Turkey as the final or best solution of the Mosul problem. Equally foolish would it be to assert that the Treaty of Angora had either dispelled the misgivings of the British public on the score of expenditure, or satisfied its humanitarian desire of safeguarding the destinies of certain Christian minorities in Anatolia. Hereunder it is proposed to set down some reflections on the frontier as delineated in the recent negotiations at Angora, in so far as it concerns British policy, the legitimate aspirations of certain oriental peoples, and the generally accepted conditions of a sound frontier.

BRITISH POLICY.

The issues of the Mosul problem have been almost universally misunderstood in England through a failure to grasp the real, constant, and ultimate object of British policy. That object has scarcely ever emerged from a welter of discussion on the parochial politics of Iraq, of sentimental outbursts on the woes of Christian minorities, and of nebulous dissertations on oil and oil-fields. It is well to be clear on this, that the founding of an Arab state, the support of an Arab renaissance, the search for oil, and the protection of Christian and Kurd are subsidiary to the main object of British policy—how best to maintain and guarantee the security of the British Empire. Although the implications of our policy in the Middle East have developed with events, that policy has never become, except for a short time, merely

opportunistic, nor changed in essentials. Neither Britain nor any other power is, or can afford to be, in the world as it exists, altruistic in its policy or sentiment. We have been concerned, and must be concerned, primarily with our own existence and the preservation of what we consider requisite to that existence. With this principle in mind, it is proposed to consider briefly the operation of British policy in the events which constitute the Mosul problem.

Before the Great War the axiom of our Eastern policy was to nurture buffer states on the way to India, in order to prevent the inroads of Germany and Russia against our communications to the East. By the "partition" of Persia into spheres of influence in 1908, we postponed for a time the inevitable clash with Russia, the Power which to-day, despite the change in her administrative machinery, is more frankly imperialistic than she ever was in the days of the Tzar. As a result of the Great War we eliminated the German threat to our Eastern Empire and found ourselves firmly established on the Persian Gulf and in 'Iraq. With the Armistice arose the problems of deciding on the exact relationship of 'Iraq to the security of the British Empire, and of disposing of 'Iraq in such a way as to maintain our fundamental policy in the Middle East.

The British Government decided that the retention of 'Iraq within the orbit of the British Empire was essential to our security, and that the best mode of assuring its retention was by establishing in it an independent Arab state. But if the decision were correct, it is not easy to find that its implications were either visualized aright or that any steps were taken to give it immediate and permanent effect. As far back as May, 1915, we had given a definite pledge to the Arabs to establish and uphold an independent state in 'Iraq, and, unless we were to practice the same gross political immorality as the Germans in their repudiation of Belgian neutrality, there was every reason why we should honour and redeem our pledge. It has been stated that in making such a promise, and thereby adopting a pro-Arab rather than a pro-Turk policy, we acted against our own interests by ranging on the side of our traditional enemy, Russia, the might of the Turkish Empire. This is a fallacy, born of a sentimental and outworn evaluation of Anglo-Turkish friendship. During the war the Turk was our bitter foe. The Arab was our friend. It is time that we disabused ourselves of illusions regarding Turkish friendship and the danger of Turkish enmity. We are, and should be, strong enough to help our friends, and, if need be, to defeat our enemies. The fact must not be lost sight of that Turkey, spent and helpless, her finances in chaos, and her armies beaten and destroyed, surrendered unconditionally. Our great blunder and the cause of our later troubles with that decivilizing power was that we allowed our preoccupation with European affairs to cloud our Eastern policy, and to postpone for nearly two years negotiations for a final

settlement with Turkey. We pandered to the innate habit of the Turks for procrastination, forgetting that a decision, to be effective among orientals, must be clear cut and put into immediate and forceful execution.

Meanwhile, while negotiations with Turkey lapsed, the General Staff of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, in furtherance of the policy to establish a kingdom of 'Iraq, chose what they, in conjunction with the political authorities in 'Iraq, considered to be the best strategic, political and economic frontier for the new state. This frontier did not include within 'Iraq the terrain inhabited by the Nestorian Christians in Assyria. Nor can it be found that the authorities, when the line was selected, ever contemplated the inclusion of these Christians within the state of 'Iraq. Promises may have been given that Assyrian destinies would be safeguarded, but such promises cannot be interpreted either as meaning the establishment of an autonomous Christian state or the inclusion of the Assyrian home in 'Iraq. At the same time it must be recognized that policy is never a product of pure reason and that, selfish as we must be where our interests are concerned, a Great Power can never afford to neglect the humanitarian aspect of a political question, and that to some extent we undertook the responsibility for the welfare of the Assyrian Christians.

Following the Armistice, Turkey was wracked with the travail of a genuine movement for reform that took the shape of a fervent nationalism. In 1919 Mustapha Kemal and Kiazim Kara Bekr (in later days a bitter opponent of the Ghazi) recognized at the Erzeroum Conference that Syria, 'Iraq, and Arabia were finally lost to the Turkish Empire. Again in 1920 the Turkish National Pact was framed in such elastic terms that, had we seized the opportunity it presented of a final settlement with Turkey, it is conceivable that the Turks would have accepted the establishment of a frontier that would have provided for the security of 'Iraq, and the inclusion of the Nestorian home in 'Iraq. Had we acted then, before our military forces had dwindled from five to two divisions, Turkey would have bowed inevitably to our will. It cannot be too sufficiently emphasized that policy ultimately depends on force, that either our military forces must be kept commensurate with our policy or our political commitments must be reduced to our military capacity.

In 1920 was signed the Treaty of Sèvres, wherein was laid down the boundaries of the 'Iraq state, and definite assurances were exacted from the Turkish Government for the humane treatment of the Nestorian Christians. The Treaty, however, succeeded only in inflaming the patriotic zeal of the new Turkish Nationalist Party, and in hastening the overthrow of the Sultanate in Constantinople. As a settlement it accomplished nothing. During the succeeding years Turkey achieved a remarkable military and political renaissance,

uprooting her traditional form of Government and advancing her victorious banners once more to the gates of Europe. She asserted herself, at the expense of Italy and France, recovering her lost provinces of Adalia and Cilicia; she expelled the rabble soldiery of Greece beyond the Hellespont; in time she that had lain like a whipped cur at the feet of the Allies so waxed in prestige that she found friends in Paris, New York, and Moscow. She was thus free to consider again the fate of her other lost provinces, and, in her new-found arrogance, to demand their return. As she had made such a successful use of propaganda against Italy and France, she turned this weapon against the British in 'Iraq. Trade embargo, political intrigue, the encouragement of unrest and sedition, concentrations of troops on the frontier—she tried them all, and forced us once more to assure 'Iraq that we would not desert her. In 1922 the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty was signed wherein we promised (a) to establish a stable government in 'Iraq, and (b) to delimit its frontiers. About this time the neighbourhood of the frontier was in a continual state of troublous effervescence from Sulaimaniyah to the Jabal Sinjar. Eventually the territory formerly inhabited by the Nestorian Christians—i.e., territory beyond the boundary fixed by the Treaty of Sévres—was left by the Turks to wallow in utter lawlessness, and in order to prevent this lawlessness from infecting the territory under our mandate, we were compelled to extend our administration to include Southern Hakkari in 'Iraq. No one will doubt the wisdom of such a step, or demand further justification for the step than that of imposing law and order.

The events of this period cast an interesting light on Turkish methods of provocation and bluff. In 1923, she saturated the frontier tribes with anti-British propaganda; she aided and abetted the notorious Shaikh Mahmud, a half-civilized barbarian, who, after being condemned to death for an insurrection against British authority in 1919, is, thanks to an unwarranted piece of political leniency, still the ringleader of a revolt in South Kurdistan; she sent a Turkish adventurer Euz Demir to stir up the tribes, and finally she concentrated part of her forces in the Nisibin-Mardin area ostensibly for the invasion of 'Iraq. The Air Officer commanding 'Iraq, Sir John Salmond, realizing the Turkish concentration was nothing else but bluff, called it by the despatch of air and military forces to Mosul, and the annexationist designs of the so-called Jazireh army simply faded away. The inference is obvious. The Turk will bow inevitably to the strong hand.

After some obstinacy on the part of Turkey, an effort was made to solve the Mosul problem at Lausanne. The proceedings of the Conference were almost wrecked by what can only be described as the pigheadedness of the Turkish delegate. A statesman has well described the Turkish attitude: "Negotiating with the Turks is like sitting down to play bridge with a man who insists on the right to revoke, and who, if

refused, will kick over the table." Britain based her claims on its duty to protect the populations of the disputed area, on the necessity of that area to the economic, strategic, and political existence of 'Iraq, and on the desirability of safeguarding the interests of the Assyrian Christians. Turkey opposed these claims ostensibly on the grounds that ethnologically, geographically, and legally the Mosul vilayet formed part of Anatolia. There seems little doubt, however, that her opposition was chiefly excited by her natural nervousness of a Kurdish separatist movement, by the secret support of certain interested parties in Paris and New York, and by the active advice of Moscow. Eventually it was agreed that the delimitation of the Turkish frontier be left to the mutual arrangement of Turkey and Great Britain, and, if these Powers failed to come to any agreement, the decision should be left to the Council of the League of Nations. Turkey and Britain failed to agree. Now in any negotiations with a nation of such perverse mentality as the Turks, there is only one sure mode of successful action—to offer it a piece of sugar from one hand, to have a stick in the other, and if the sugar is refused, to use the stick. We offered the sugar, but forgot the stick. Moral suasion, mild reproof, and concessions are poor weapons with which to tilt against the obstinacy, intrigue, and habitual procrastination of the Turk.

Negotiations having broken down, the decision was referred to the Council of the League, which instituted a commission to examine the question on the spot and to set out its opinion on the respective claims. Seldom has an international commission performed its mission with more zeal and less effectiveness. What the situation demanded was a report which would enable the League of Nations to give an immediate clear-cut and binding decision. The report, unfortunately, avoided imperatives and dealt in conditionals. The issues were clear. Either the Turkish claim was valid on ethnological grounds, or because the Mosul vilayet wished to be incorporated in Turkey, or, on the other hand, the claim of 'Iraq was economically, geographically, and strategically sound. Briefly the report came to the conclusion that legally the vilayet belonged to Turkey, economically and geographically to 'Iraq. It then went on to suggest that if Mosul became an integral part of 'Iraq, there should be no question of Great Britain abandoning the mandate at the end of four years. If, however, Great Britain were to surrender her place in 'Iraq after four years, it would be better for 'Iraq to revert to Turkey. The frontier should follow the Lesser Zab, Mosul and Arbil being handed over to Turkey. The Assyrians should return to their former homes under a complete amnesty and local autonomy. The report appears to be a pathetic effort to hunt with the hounds and run with the hare, and certainly in its Assyrian aspect betrays a childlike faith in the ability of the Turkish leopard to change its spots.

In October, 1924, the League of Nations had fixed a provisional boundary known as the Brussels Line, the line of the *status quo* to be observed by both parties pending the final decision of the League. While the League were trying to find in the monumental, if futile, report of its Commission some basis of permanent settlement, the Turks attempted to solve the Assyrian problem by a wholesale deportation of Christians settled in the region between the Brussels Line and the frontier claimed by Great Britain. When questioned on this point, the Turks at first denied that any deportation had taken place, but later, doubtless at the instigation of Soviet Russia, declared that, if Christians had been removed from the area concerned, it was their business and theirs alone. Is other testimony required of the Turk's peculiar power of provocation and his dog-in-the-manger mentality?

In December, 1925, the Council of the League of Nations recorded its decision that the frontier between 'Iraq and Turkey should be the Brussels Line as laid down in 1924. On June 5, 1926, this Line was agreed to by Britain, 'Iraq, and Turkey, in a treaty signed at Angora.

To-day the problem of 'Iraq has to be contemplated not only *vis-à-vis* Turkey, but, perhaps, even more in relation to Soviet Russia. The critical problem now is not the possibility of a conflict with Turkey, but the probability of a clash between our civilization and the anathema—that is, Bolshevism. Turkey has few ambitions beyond her pre-war empire. The energies of Russia are turned to world domination to which Britain is the chief obstacle. The Soviet has emasculated Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; it has lately tried to creep into Afghanistan; it exercises no little power in the councils of Turkey, and in Persia, despite a loss of ground with the advent of Riza Khan, it is still an influence for evil. By remaining in 'Iraq we will do much to prevent the southern encroachment of Soviet propaganda and the ultimate and apparently inevitable march of Soviet armed forces towards India.

THE FUNCTIONS AND CONDITIONS OF A FRONTIER.

So far an attempt has been made to indicate the 'Iraq boundary demanded by British policy. It is proposed now to set down what the functions and conditions of a good frontier are, and thereafter to examine how far the Brussels Line satisfies these conditions.

A frontier is, and must always be, so long as nationalism persists, an area of separation between contiguous states, a barrier whose effectiveness is largely relative to its physical character. A frontier is not, as some have stated, an area of assimilation or a means for facilitating intercourse. It is an obstacle whose chief function is to provide for the states concerned the strongest possible measure of protection against attack. Its main effect is to maintain peace by placing upon adjacent peoples a definite limit to the national horizon, a restraint upon man's

predilection for unauthorized trespass. A frontier, however strong a barrier it provides, will never save from conquest and ruin a corrupt and decadent people. It depends in the last resort on the might of a nation. Its strength is to be measured only by the swords of that nation's citizens.

What conditions should a sound frontier satisfy? Briefly a frontier should satisfy, but never does nor ever will satisfy, the often conflicting and mutually exclusive claims of strategy, economics, ethnology, religion, language, and policy. A frontier should provide an adequate physical boundary which is strategically defensible, and should embrace an economic, ethnological, religious, linguistic, and political unit. How far does the Brussels Line meet these conditions?

STRATEGICAL ASPECTS OF BRUSSELS LINE.

The strategic problem of Great Britain was to select a frontier which would at once ensure the security and development of 'Iraq, be easily defensible by local 'Iraq forces, and thus least likely to necessitate the withdrawal of British troops from more vital strategic points elsewhere.

Between Kurdistan and the sea two general types of frontier were available—a mountain barrier or an open plain that forms no obstacle whatever. The selection of the latter would have entailed the lengthy location in 'Iraq of large British military forces, or, failing these, have led ultimately to the total evacuation of 'Iraq with a resultant increase of our Indian establishment to counter the increased menace to India. A mountain barrier alone satisfied strategic necessities. Though such a barrier has never stemmed the tide of a determined invasion, it at least limits the avenues of approach, perplexes an enemy, and especially where communications are difficult, embarrasses his power of supply and movement. The extent to which it is an obstacle varies inversely with the ease with which it can be crossed.

Once it was recognized that a mountain barrier formed the likeliest and best frontier, the question arose of its actual location. Now in the area with which we are dealing, the obvious strategic centre is Mosul, from which irradiate all communications to Kurdistan and to which the produce of the neighbouring country is brought. The lines of approach to the Mosul plain are west of the Tigris from Nisibin via Tal 'Afer and Sinjar, east of the Tigris from Van via Neri and Rowanduz, from Van-Bitlis area via Aqra, from Jazirat-Ibn-Omar via Zakho and the Tigris. The obvious centres in front of which the frontier should run were Rowanduz-Neri-Aqra-Zakho-Tal-'Afer-Sinjar, and the British line was accordingly selected to include those localities. Such a line gave command of the main Turkish lines of advance. In addition the barrier was of such depth as to cause considerable delay to a hostile advance, enough to give ample time for the concentration in Mosul of forces from

Baghdad and Southern 'Iraq. Incidentally it included the homes of Assyrian Christians, whose country would have formed an excellent bastion of defence against invasion. The Brussels Line not only deprived 'Iraq of some 1,400 square miles of territory, mostly inhabited by Christians, but cut in two, in the eastern section about Neri, tribes that are only likely to become amenable to law and order, if under the 'Iraq Government.

There has been ample, if somewhat ill-argued, criticism of the strategic feasibility of the mountain frontier. Such criticism mostly rests on misconceptions born of an inadequate knowledge of the region, of the difficulty of communication, of the anti-Turk character of the people, and of the Turkish capacity to supply and maintain any army capable of taking and holding Mosul. Critics of the strategic position in 'Iraq have generally spoiled their case by indulging in picturesque but unconvincing hyperbole after the following style. 'Iraq is an alluvial basin surrounded by high plateaus and desert. It has been invaded more often than any other country in Europe or Asia. It is a perpetual magnet for invaders from Persia, Arabia, Syria, and Anatolia. The Akkadians, Sumerians, Kassites, Persians, Parthians, Arabs, Seljuks, Greeks, Romans, Mongols, and Turks have all held it at one time or other and lost it. It has persisted for any period as a political entity, only when it was bounded by the Oxus, Caucasus, and Mediterranean. Such was the view of that eminent soldier, Sir Henry Wilson. Lord Kitchener believed otherwise.

The question of defence, however, must be considered not in reference to non-existent British troops, but in reference to the forces which the 'Iraq Government can and is prepared to employ, the efficacy of the Royal Air Force, and the probable forces which the Turks can send and maintain over the frontier. It has been stated on the authority of a high official in the 'Iraq Government that it is ready to fight the Turkish menace tooth and nail, and it is because this menace is the real problem of 'Iraq foreign policy, that conscription will be introduced into 'Iraq at a very early date. It was suggested by the same official that it might be advisable, in order to guarantee 'Iraq's existence as a nation, to negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance with Turkey's chief enemy in Europe—Greece. The point is: 'Iraq is prepared to fight Turkey, and 'Iraq at the present time is worth one division to the British Empire, and in twenty years' time will be worth six.

Little need be said on the air aspect of the case, as that is adequately and clearly set out in Sir John Salmond's report on the 'Iraq Command. One quotation will suffice: "The ground north of Mosul is favourable for defence, especially for delaying and harassing action by air forces . . . possible lines of approach lie through country particularly suitable for the employment of aircraft in direct attack upon ground targets."

The chief bogey of military critics has been the size of the Turkish

forces that can intervene in 'Iraq. A concentration 60,000 to 80,000 strong was, it is reported, causing alarm and despondency in certain military hearts. Now the Ottoman forces that can be brought into action immediately against 'Iraq must be drawn from roughly three divisions that are scattered in the area Mardin-Nisibin-Diarbekr-Bitlis-Van-Jazirat-Ibn-Omar. The units of these divisions lie at six to fifteen days' march from Mosul, and except for the Nisibin-Mosul route, west of the Tigris, can utilize no road fit for wheeled transport. Even this road passes through a waterless stretch of some forty miles, and along it there is not a vestige of cover from the air. The Turkish Air Force is negligible. That being so, it is not difficult to imagine how any force using this route would suffer in its six days' march from Nisibin to Mosul. East of the Tigris the maintenance of more than two brigades on a pack scale of transport is beyond the wit or contrivance of the most ingenious "Q" staff. It took Turkey three months to concentrate and prepare a punitive expedition against Shaikh Said in the recent Kurdish rebellion. Is it likely to take less to prepare an expedition, not against a thousand ill-armed brigands, but against an 'Iraq division supported by several squadrons of aeroplanes and a host of Kurdish, Arab, and Yezidi irregulars? It has been calculated that the Turks could make available for the invasion of 'Iraq in seven days 4,000, in five weeks 10,000, in eight weeks—the maximum that can be released without prejudicing the defence of the Turkish Empire—80,000 rifles. The problem of supplying and maintaining these forces without extending the railway from Nisibin to Mosul and in face of a growing opposition in 'Iraq, and attack elsewhere, is not one that need cause the British Army many restless nights.

ECONOMIC ASPECT OF FRONTIER.

Much need not be said on the economic aspect of the frontier, as the economic argument for the allocation of the Mosul vilayet to either Turkey or 'Iraq does not carry any conviction. The fact that one portion of the world is economically essential to another, or forms an economic unit with another, has little influence on the political destiny of either. Because the oil of Mexico and the silk of China are necessary to the existence of Great Britain, the latter has no claim to draw them within its political orbit. And because Canada and the United States comprise an economic unit, do they for that reason form a political unit? The Mosul vilayet, however, does have a complete economic affinity with the rest of 'Iraq and little commercial intercourse with Anatolia. Zakho, Amadiyah, Aqra, and Rowanduz, also, are oriented economically to Mosul. The trend of communications by river and road is to the south, along the valley of the Tigris, not northward across the Anatolian mountains or north-westward to the unfinished Baghdad railway. The latter railway is never likely to be of commercial use to

Mosul or 'Iraq. The actual wealth of Mosul is grain, which finds a market in Baghdad; the potential wealth is oil, which must find its way to the Mediterranean via Hit. Obviously, in the Middle East where oil fuel is consumed by locomotives, the way of the railway must be that of the oil pipe. Finally, Mosul is the granary of the south. "It is," as a prominent Arab said, "the head of 'Iraq. Cut it off and we perish."

RACIAL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS.*

Racially the Mosul vilayet comprises elements of the following races—Arabs, Kurds, Nestorians, Chaldaeans, Yezidis, Turcomans, Bajwans, Chabaks, Jews, and Sarlis. How does the Brussels Line affect these—their religion, their language, and their political desires?

Consideration of the problem is made difficult by the interlacing of this motley of races, interlacing of such extent that it is practically impossible to lay down ethnical, linguistic or religious boundaries. In one small glen you will find Jew, Kurd, Christian, and Arab, never intermarrying and often unmistakably differentiated in dress and custom. The dissemination and intermixture of population, especially in the vicinity of the Brussels Line, naturally makes the political problem of satisfying the particular desires of the various communities almost impossible of solution. It has been stated that the great principle to be taken into account in the partition of territories is the satisfaction of the desires of the people concerned. The Arab, the Kurd, the Christian, and the Yezidi have each of them a racial individuality as strong as our own, and the expression of this individuality has of late taken on the garb of nationalism. While we admit all this, and that nationalism will spread with every extension of road, rail and telegraph in these parts, we still hold that there must be a sound basis for nationalism. Not only must a race have the wish for autonomy. It must have the physical, moral, and mental power to carry its wish into practice. The Yezidis, Bajwans, Chabaks, Sarlis, Jews and Christians of Mosul town have not the physical power, and few of them the political intelligence to stand alone. Moreover, their political affinity and disposition make them contented members of the new 'Iraq state. The case of the Arab, the Kurd, the Nestorian and Turcoman cannot be so summarily dismissed.

The Arab belongs to an old race, a proud race, a race that has known the glory and responsibility of empire. In late years he has developed a political consciousness that has helped to found Arab states in 'Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, and the Hedjaz. His political horizon extends to a self-supporting Arab empire that will include the Arabian peninsula, 'Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and Palestine. The nucleus of this empire is 'Iraq, where political intelligence and administrative capacity yearly increase under the guiding hand of Britain. So far as

* *I'ide Appendix.*

'Iraq is concerned, the Brussels Line east of the Tigris is satisfactory, but would be sounder strategically, if it were carried north to include the Assyrian enclave. With the Assyrians 'Iraq has no quarrel, and is only too willing to incorporate them as potential wardens of the northern marches. West of the Tigris she still sees in the Nisibin-Mardin area, territory that is essentially Arab in race and strategically desirable.

The Kurd was the crux of the Mosul problem, and will continue the chief menace to the stability of the new frontier. He belongs to an old race, conscious of its individuality, but politically inept and split into warring factions. Never in history has Kurdistan formed a political entity, nor, having regard to its incoherence and size, is it likely to become a state in the near future. Scattered in tribal groups, often nomadic, in Persia, 'Iraq and Anatolia, from Hamadan to Cilicia, the Kurds can only achieve autonomy after long years of political education and the production of a personality, Napoleonic in personal power and capacity for government. Latterly as their more enlightened chiefs imbibed the political wisdom of Europe, there has arisen a half-hearted desire for independence without any definite conception of what such independence means or entails. We experimented with Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimaniyah and found his ideas of government so destructive and insensate that we had to depose him. Simco in the Urumia district, Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimaniyah, the Amadiyah pashas, Shaikh Said in Kharput, have all acquired hazy ideas on autonomy and each has endeavoured to establish a Kurdish state that was little else than a collection of brigands and an excuse for brigandage. It cannot be too deeply impressed that the Kurd is at the beck and call of his Agha, who is a non-moral creature, an Ishmael with his hand against every man. Only in the Kurdish fringe under 'Iraq jurisdiction has the acclimatization to British administration made the Kurd amenable to law and order. The spread of law and order amongst the Kurds, with its political consequence, a separatist movement from Turkey, is the bogey of Angora, and has probably been the chief cause of Turkish obstinacy over the Mosul settlement. The Kurdish question admits of three solutions, all of which are temporarily impossible:

- (a) Kurdish autonomy under the ægis of Turkey or Britain.
- (b) Turkification of Kurdistan north of the Brussels Line.
- (c) Kurdish immigration into 'Iraq.

If we are to support nationalism through thick and thin, we are theoretically bound to support the claims of the Kurds to self-government. This will involve us in Persia, Anatolia, and 'Iraq, an extension of our political commitments that is beyond our military capacity and might even involve the loss of our own security. Life is a balancing of evils to achieve existence. As regards Kurdistan it is common sense

to stop fishing in troubled waters. It might be different if there were a more virile temper in England, were imperial adventure still the spice of youth, were our young men still ready to roam the world free and masterful, instead of rotting in domesticity about tennis courts and night clubs. We may sum up the Kurdish aspect as follows: The Kurd racially and linguistically has no relation with Turkey or 'Iraq; religiously he is at one with either; politically he favours neither, and is yet incapable of working out his own political destiny. The Brussels Line only affects him in affording to his lawless Aghas the prospect of a safe refuge from Turkish and British law as occasion may require.

The Turcoman element in the population was the basis of Turkey's ethnological claim to Mosul, and as such was a sorry quicksand. From Kifri through Kirkuk and Arbil to Tal 'Afer there lie scattered Turcoman colonies, holding a quiet agricultural population which has no other political desire than a government capable of guaranteeing the security of its crops and homes. The Turcoman has become largely Arabicized, and displays no aversion from 'Iraq nor desire for Turkish rule. His racial affinity with the Turk is analogous to that between the Highland Celt and the modern Frenchman. It cannot by any stretch of the historic sense support the annexationist claims of modern Turkey. To the Turcoman the Brussels Line is a protection against the inherent rapacity of the Turkish administration.

The Christian tribes of Tiari, Tkhuma, Baz, Jilu, and Diz, some 100,000 souls, inhabited before the war the southern highlands of Hakkari from Amadiyah to Nurdaz, Urumia, and Salmas. These Assyrian mountaineers have been Anglophil since the Canterbury mission was first established among them in 1836. Always maltreated and occasionally massacred by the Turks, they gallantly threw in their lot with the Allies in 1916. For two years they resisted the punitive expeditions of their Turkish taskmasters, but were finally uprooted from their immemorial mountains and driven forth—the remnant that remained—to find a haven of refuge in 'Iraq, Persia, and Caucasasia. With the final overthrow of Turkey they prepared to reoccupy their old homes, but every attempt at repatriation was frustrated by Kurdish brigands, instigated by Turkish money and agents. Their habitat originally lay beyond the boundary fixed by the Treaty of Sévres, but the civil administration of 'Iraq was extended to include it, when it became a centre of Kurdish dissension and brigandage. Part of the refugees from 'Iraq drifted back to the mountains, relying on the permanence of British administration and unofficial promises that Britain would safeguard its interests. The men joined our levies, playing a notable part in defending the Mosul frontier against Kurdish and Turkish incursions. Their sole wish is to return to their ancestral lands, and there live under the protection of Britain. They are not averse to incorporation with 'Iraq—even desire it, if we are to believe Arab reports. The

Brussels Line has placed their homes in the tender keeping of a malignant and cruel foe.

Four solutions of the Nestorian problem present themselves :

(a) Repatriation of Assyrians to their homes under a guarantee of security from the Turks.

(b) The incorporation of the Nestorian habitat in 'Iraq.

(c) The setting up of a Nestorian home in 'Iraq—i.e., south of the Brussels Line.

(d) The settlement of the Assyrian people in Australia or Canada or South America.

On the grounds of humanity and the moral obligation of protecting from the Turk the Christian tribes who served us so loyally during and after the war, we should have held out for the extension of the Brussels Line to include Southern Hakkari. As it is, we have deliberately abandoned the Assyrian countryside to the Turk, relying on his promises to mete out justice and some measure of freedom to the few Christians that now reside there. Has not the Turk made such promises before and broken them with that persistent guile which is the hallmark of his mentality? Is he likely to be any more tender towards the Nestorians than he was to the Cilician Christians? Cannot we learn from experience that the Turk, despite the adoption of Panama hats and European clothes, remains the bond-slave of cruelty, corruption, and oppression? Repatriation would merely be an invitation or prelude to massacre. Nor is the incorporation of Southern Hakkari in 'Iraq within the realm of practical politics. It may, however, prove to be a basis for future bargain with a Turkey that is almost now bankrupt, and whose political background is that of the bazaar.

Of the solutions set out above only (c) and (d) seem at the moment feasible. It is impossible to say how far Britain is prepared to support the latter, but it would seem when so much is written about the empty spaces of tropical Australia and the difficulty of getting settlers of a right type, that here is an unique opportunity to people these areas with an industrious, self-reliant, law-abiding, and agricultural population. But so long as any hope remains that Hakkari may become once more the home of this down-trodden people, (c) offers the best means of satisfying Assyrian aspirations. 'Iraq is willing to give them a home and to look after them. She is quite prepared to treat national questions on their merits, as witness her treatment of the Kurdish population within her borders. It is well to remember also that whatever atrocities the Arab has been guilty of in the past, he has never massacred or emasculated the Christian minorities in his midst.

SUMMARY.

It now becomes possible to summarize our conclusions on the Brussels Line :

(a) It does not fulfil the object of British policy completely in that it surrenders to Turkey the control of Assyrian destinies. It does, however, provide for the establishment and security of an 'Iraq state sufficient to assure our own security.

(b) The frontier does not, and cannot, satisfy the linguistic, racial, and religious requirements of a good frontier owing to the chaotic intermixture of these elements in its vicinity.

(c) It is not strategically the best frontier for 'Iraq, but it is sufficiently defensible to guarantee the security of the 'Iraq state. It is economically sound.

(d) It satisfies the political desires of the minorities concerned, except those of the Kurd and Assyrian.

CONCLUSION.

A note of warning. There has been a tendency to dissociate consideration of the Mosul problem from the larger issues of civilization, and the existence of the British Empire. The Middle East has become politically conscious, is casting from it a nightmare of tyranny and acquiring for its peoples and individuals a measure of freedom largely by the force, equity, and efficiency of British administration. For tribal and internecine feud we have substituted the law of orderly government; we have given justice in place of corruption; we have driven out universal ignorance and superstition and replaced them with education and knowledge. It is because we are the prop and the mainstay of struggling humanity, that, if we withdraw from the Middle East, if we should bow before the will of an intransigent Turkey, then 'Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan—*the new Arab world*—will collapse and drag with it India and maybe the Empire:

While stands the Coliseum, Rome shall stand,
When falls the Coliseum, Rome shall fall,
And when Rome falls, the world.


Finally, in any commerce with Turkey weight should be given to the pregnant words of Clemenceau: "History tells us of many Turkish successes and many Turkish defeats, of nations conquered and nations freed. . . . Yet in all these changes there is no case to be found either in Europe, or Asia, or Africa, in which the establishment of Turkish rule in any country has not been followed by a diminution of its material prosperity and a fall in the level of culture. Nor is there any case to be found in which the withdrawal of Turkish rule has not been followed by a growth in national prosperity, and a rise in the level of culture. Neither amongst the Christians of Europe nor among the Moslems of Syria, Arabia, and Africa has the Turk done other than destroy wherever he has conquered. Never has he shown himself able to develop in peace what he has won in war. . . ."

SEAST.

APPENDIX
TABLE SHOWING RACES, THEIR DISTRIBUTION, RELIGION, ETC., IN MOSUL VILAYET

Race.	Numbers.	Habitat	Language.	Religion.	Political Wishes.
ARABS ...	150,000	Mosul and Jazireh up to Nisibin and Mardin.	Arabic.	Moslem (Sunni).	Independent 'Iraq and founding of Arab empire.
KURDS ...	260,000	Kirkuk and Arbil districts, Rowanduz, Aqra, Amadiyah, Zakho, West of Tigris from Hogenia to Jezirat, Ibn-Onar.	Kurdish; a few tribes speak Arabic.	Moslem (Sunni).	Vague aspirations for autonomy; no coherent political thought or desires.
CHRISTIANS ...	60,000	Chaldeans in Kirkuk, Mosul, and Mosul district; Nestorians in Hakkari, but now mostly in 'Iraq.	Chaldeans, Arabic; Nestorians, Assyrian.	Christian.	Protection of Great Britain; incorporation in 'Iraq, falling autonomy in Hakkari.
YEZIDIS ...	80,000	North-east of Mosul and in Sinjar district.	Kurdish, some Arabic.	"Devil - worshippers," type of Manichæism.	Protection of Great Britain; not averse to incorporation in 'Iraq.
JEWS ...	14,000	Mosul and other towns.	Arabic.	Judaism.	Incorporation in 'Iraq.
TURKOMANS ...	50,000	Kirkuk, Arbil, Almun-Kupri, Tal 'Afer towns.	Turkish dialect; nearly all speak Arabic.	Moslem (Sunni).	Incorporation in 'Iraq.
CHABARS, SARIS, BAJWANS	5,000	Villages in Mosul district.	Arabic.	Akin to Ah-Allah sect of Islam.	Incorporation in 'Iraq.
TOTAL ...	569,000	—	—	—	—

NOTE.—The figures are only approximate, as no proper census has been carried out.



MOSUL BOUNDARIES

MAP OUTLINE BY KIND PERMISSION OF THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND WANING OF THE FORCES IN PALESTINE, 1922-1926.

I.—INTRODUCTION.

THE recent reorganization of the gendarmerie in Palestine, which took place early in the year, is an eloquent testimony to the efficiency and popularity of the administration of their mandate by the British, and also of the adequacy of the Air Force for supplying such force as may be required. The gendarmerie and the police were threefold: the British and Palestinian Gendarmeries—a semi-military striking force—and the Police proper. So wide-spread is now the *Pax Britannica* that the British Gendarmerie have been broken up, and the Palestinian Gendarmerie have been reorganized as a frontier force for guarding the Eastern marches between Palestine and Moab.

The following outline showing the constitution of the various forces, military and other, between 1921 and 1926, has been contributed to the pages of this *Journal*. In reading it, these are the factors conducing to the results which should be borne in mind. The first is the success of the Arab Legion under Peake Pasha in Transjordan, which has brought law and order into Moab itself, and therefore lightened from the Arab side the burden of the raids from east of Jordan. The combined result of Transjordan's own efforts and those of the Palestinian Gendarmerie will be realized if we reflect that never since the days of the Romans have the Arab raiders and graziers under arms been kept out of the plain of Esdraelon and the deepening of Jezreel. Esdraelon, that fertile watered plain, has been bare of settlement for generations. Under the Sultan no one would buy the land, save distant speculators for a song. Come the British, and the Zionists buy the land and can settle on it in peace, which perhaps none have done since Saul and Jonathan fell on Gilboa. The second factor is the presence of the French on the northern border. All the ill-will of Turkey has fallen on their shoulders. Had Syria been in Turkish hands, very different forces would have been necessary in Palestine. The Arab and the Mosaic Arab,* thanks to the presence of the French in Syria, have only to look eastwards while an improving Transjordan stands between them and the real Bedouin.

II.—THE DEVELOPMENT AND WANING.

At the commencement of the year 1922 the armed forces in Palestine consisted of:

(a) One Indian and two British Cavalry Regiments, two British and three Indian Infantry Battalions, a British Horse Battery, and an Indian Pack Battery with Divisional Headquarters at Bir Salem.

* As Disraeli called the Jews.

(b) No. 14 Squadron R.A.F. at Ramleh, with a flight at Amman, and two R.A.F. Armoured Car Companies.

(c) A force known as the Palestine Gendarmerie was in process of formation, recruits from the inhabitants of the country, organized into squadrons of fifty men, each under a British officer; the whole under Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Bewsher, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.

(d) The Palestine Police, then about 700 strong, raised and organized by the late Colonel Bramley, O.B.E.

Mr. Winston Churchill, who at this time was Colonial Secretary, decided to replace the army units by a force to be raised from ex-members of the R.I.C., who were then in course of disbandment.

In March of this year, Colonel A. J. McNeill, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., was given command and ordered to raise 750 men, to be known as the British Gendarmerie of Palestine; they were recruited and equipped in England and arrived in Palestine in May.

This force was organized into six companies, each of four officers and one hundred men and a mounted squadron. The companies were equipped with Ford tenders and touring cars and were very mobile.

On the arrival of the British Gendarmerie most of the army units were withdrawn, and by the end of the year only one Indian Cavalry Regiment and one Indian Infantry Battalion were left at Sarafand (nine miles from Jaffa).

The British Gendarmerie were stationed as follows: two companies at Nazareth, one company at Nablus, one company at Jerusalem, headquarters, two companies and the squadron at Sarafand. In 1924 one company was withdrawn from Nazareth and stationed at Hebron.

The Palestine Gendarmerie squadrons were stationed at Rosh Pina, Semakh, Beisan, Tul Keram, with a camel squadron at Beersheba. In 1924 a squadron was sent to Metullah and another to Jericho.

Early in 1923 all the remaining army units were withdrawn from Palestine. But in the spring of 1924 the 9th Lancers were transferred from Egypt and stationed at Sarafand; this unit returned to Egypt early this year (1926).

In the spring of 1925 Mr. Amery, the present Colonial Secretary, paid a visit to Palestine, and as a result it was decided that the forces in Palestine should be reorganized, and in the spring of this year the following changes have taken place:

1. The British Gendarmerie have been disbanded.
2. The Palestine Gendarmerie have been increased in strength and reorganized, and are now known as the Transjordan Frontier Force.
3. The police have been increased to 2,000 men, with a British section of 200 men in course of formation.

Since the war the River Jordan has always been considered the defensive frontier for the protection of Palestine, the main body being stationed along the central range of the Galilee and Judæan hills, with an outpost zone along the west bank of the river.

This arrangement has undergone a radical alteration. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan has now been handed over to the Palestine police. The Transjordan Frontier Force will eventually be stationed on the eastern border of Transjordan. Squadrons of the force are already at Amman and Maan.

In the period under review the state of public security in Palestine has undergone a remarkable change. Four years ago armed raids and hold-ups were of frequent occurrence. Though the incursions of Arab tribes in strength from the east of the Jordan had ceased, raiding bands from that side were a perpetual source of trouble to the gendarmerie and police.

As a result of the war there was a large store of arms and ammunition hidden in the country. When the crops had been gathered and time hung rather heavily on their hands, it was a favourite form of amusement for pillagers to go out with a gun and hold up travellers on the roads.

An intensive campaign of confiscation of arms, besides the gradual weeding out of the criminal classes and their incarceration in gaol, has transformed the country and raids and hold-ups are now of very infrequent occurrence.

That this satisfactory state of affairs is largely due to the presence in the country of a well-armed and mobile force such as the British Gendarmerie there can be no question. Their duties have been many, but mainly as a readily available and mobile reserve to the police; their duties have carried them into every district, and their presence has undoubtedly had a most tranquillizing effect on the unruly elements in the country. For the work they have done and their excellent organization and discipline the entire credit is due to Colonel A. J. McNeill. In fact, the reason for the disbandment of this force is that they have done their work so well that, in the opinion of the powers that be, there is no longer any need for them in the country.

To the constant watch on the border maintained by the Palestine Gendarmerie is largely due the decline of armed raids. Often stationed in unhealthy districts and in tumble-down old camps their training and discipline was excellent. Recruited as they were from every race and sect in Palestine, the welding together into a whole of these often opposing elements is a matter of great credit to the officers concerned.

On the formation of the Transjordan Frontier Force the majority of the Jewish gendarmes were transferred to the police, and only the Arabs, Circassians, and Druses were incorporated into the new force. This discrimination has caused rather an outcry on the part of the Jewish Press and people in Palestine.

The Palestine Police Force is now well organized and is a reliable and efficient body of men.

THE KHAIBAR PASS AS THE INVADERS' ROAD FOR INDIA.—II.

(Continued from J.C.A.S. III., 1926.)

II. SULTAN MAHMUD OF GHAZNI.

HERE and there one finds an English writer saying that Sultan Mahmud passed through the Khaibar when making his first expedition into India. If one understands by "India" the country of which the Indus (since A.D. 1215) has been the western limit, this is a manifest mistake, because Mahmud's first expedition into Trans-Indus India was made (*for Multan*), down the Kurram Valley and across the Kala-bagh-Dhankot Ferry (A.D. 1005).

Some historians say, however, that in this same (A.D. 1005) campaign he had already defeated a Hindu confederacy (Anand-pal's) near "Waihind" (*i.e.*, the *Hind Ferry*), and they surmise him to have reached Peshawar and "Waihind" by the Khaibar route. This surmise overlooks the ancient Ghazni-Peshawar route, which takes off the Kurram road near Kirman and comes through the Kohat Pass down into the Peshawar Plain. It was used by Chingiz Khan and Babur (*reversed*), amongst others entered in these notes, and is by far the better and better-warranted route than the Khaibar one. If Mahmud dealt first with the Hindu assailant, and then marched south for the Dhankot Ferry and Multan, he would take the same road in reverse order.

One of two pitfalls history has prepared for the rapid writer has been referred to already—*viz.*, that in Mahmud's day (*d.* A.D. 1030), and before and after it, India extended westward beyond the Indus. Alexander, in 327 B.C., fixed the upper Kabul River (*mod.* Panjsher) as his dividing-line between lands conquered already and India.* In Mahmud's day it seems to have included Kabul town, which was in the territory of Raja Jai-pal, whose eastern territorial limits were Trans-Indus Lahor and Sirhind—the whole being in "India."

A second pitfall is made an easy one by the modern notion of the general and long-standing uses of the Khaibar Pass as a military road. Against this I find Ptolemy testifying (*McCrindle*, p. 141), when he writes of Bannu as lying "on the line of communication between Kabul

* Was Babur's "Hindustan the Less" ("B. in E.," p. 46) a fragment of ancient Cis-Indus India?

and the Indus . . . distant from Lamghan a fifteen days' journey southwards" (cf. *Chingiz Khan and Timur Sections*).

Oriental history abundantly exemplifies the ancient fact that the highway to the Indus took off the Balkh-Kandahar trade road near the "divide" between Ghazni and the Logar Valley, and served, not Ghazni alone, but the wide region through which runs that "road without a pass" (*Babur*). Roads from all sides were commanded by the Fort of the Iri-ab; one of them goes on into the Kurram Valley to Kirman, near which it divides north-east for Kohat and Peshawar, south-east for Bannu and the Kala-bagh-Dhankot Ferry across into Hindustan.

An important factor in the long popularity of this ferry will have been that it is open all the year round, is safe, rapid, and easy, and is constant in its position (*Bannu Settlement Report*, 1879, S. S. Thorburn).

III. SULTAN MUHAMMAD GHURI.

Nothing need be added here to what has been said of Sultan Mahmud's routes for the Indus except that Sultan Muhammad used to halt each year in Kirman on his *ghazi* journeys to and from India.

IV. TIMUCIN, CHINGIZ KHAN.

Chingiz Khan's routes are entered here, though he did not go through the Khaibar, or, in person, cross the Indus, because they are such as, if not clearly stated, might be mistaken to show that he did both.

He wintered in Bactria in A.D. 1221-1222 (A.H. 617-618), and in April of the latter year started reliefs by the Balkh-Kandahar road to various Khurasan garrisons. These reliefs were successively attacked and worsted on their way by troops from Ghazni, where Sultan Jalalu'd-din *Mankburni* of Khwarizm had assembled 130,000 horsemen, good soldiers, and keen to destroy infidel Mughul tribesmen. The defeats becoming known, stirred risings in subjected towns and murder of garrisons. Angered particularly by a reverse at Burwan (near the source of the Logar), in which a thousand of his men were killed, Chingiz Khan set his face for Ghazni, and led his whole army towards Burwan.

Meantime Jalal Sultan's power to oppose such strength had weakened through the desertion of his Ajamis (*Persians*) and his Ighraqis* (*Khilji Turks*), 20,000 of each, who had squabbled over the booty of Burwan, and deserted by night, no warning given. Prudence dictating, the Sultan hurried down for the Dhankot Ferry, hoping to put the Indus

* I hesitate to accept a courteous suggestion that "Iraqi" should here replace "Ighraqi" on the ground that the latter is archaic for the former; (1) because I have no assurance that these Ighraqis belonged to 'Iraq (Mesopotamia), and (2) because of several distinguished Oriental historians who write of the Jalalu'd-din-Chingiz Khan episode, each uses both 'Iraq and Ighraqi. Cf. E. and D. II., App. Note 2, p. 562, and Raverty's translation of the *Tabaqat-i-Nāsiri*, Index, p. 43, s. *ighraq* (cf. Bib. Ind. Pers. Text also).

between him and his pursuers. Boats had to be waited for; the Mughuls overtook and hemmed his force between the river and curved rank behind curved rank of foes, resting on the river. To penetrate these ranks or defeat them was impossible. Oriental historians describe as heroic the Musalman attempt to make a stand; it could have but one end. Friends led the Sultan's horse to his tents; he bade his family farewell, cast off his mail, called for his favourite horse, seized his royal umbrella, rode at and scattered a press of Mughuls, drew rein sharply to the left, came to where Indus rushed past thirty feet below, and leapt his horse down into it.

Chingiz Khan looked on, saw horse and man fight their way across to the desert—known thereafter as Chul-jalali—watched the Sultan off-saddle, spread housing, tunic, and arrows to dry, empty his scabbard of water, fix his umbrella on the head of a spear, and sit down in its shadow. It is recorded that Jalalu'd-din then vowed never again to risk that horse's life in battle—and that he kept the vow.* No pursuit was permitted.

The Khaqan is said to have declared to his own sons that such as was the Sultan should a man's sons be; and that to no other father than his had such a son been vouchsafed, nor ever would be. Moreover, he did the rare thing by restoring to his beaten foe, wife, family, and possessions, safe and un plundered.

He left the battlefield without delay—but after despatching a force to ruin Ghazni—and moved up the Bannu-Kohat road in pursuit of the Ighraqi who had helped to defeat his men at Burwan—vengeance being, perhaps, tinged with contempt for soldiers who, squabbling over booty, had deserted such a leader.

The Ighraqi had gone as far as Shinuzan, where a few turned off for their homes in Ningnahr; the rest went on into the Peshawar Plain, whither the Khaqan, following, annihilated them.

He himself went on up to Bajaur, and there destroyed the various forts successive armed visitors are recorded as having destroyed. Thence he sent an envoy to "Altamsh" in Dehli to announce his intention of going through Himalayan passes in order to shorten his return journey to Chin and Kashghar. Meantime he stayed near Chitral, a sojourn which may be the basis of a tradition about him mentioned in the "Imperial Gazetteer of India" concerning Chitral (*q.v.*). He left in the early spring of 1222, while snow still had to be cleared from his path, and went down to the Indus. No reply came from Dehli; affairs of Chin eased off; repeated divination gave no good omen for crossing the Indus; he decided to return as he came—*i.e.*, by Peshawar, Kohat Pass, Kurram Valley, the now devastated Ghazni, Burwan, Bamian, and (here turning east), took "Kabul passes" into Badakhshan, whence on to Lob, Tibbut (*Tangut*) and Kashghar.

* Elliot and Dowson's "History of India," II., 389, 543.

V. TIMUR BEG.

Timur Beg will have known the route he took to the Indus before he resolved to make holy war in India, because he had already possessed himself of the country it traverses—Ghazni and Kabul.* He left Samarkand in March, 1398 (*Rajab*, 800 H.); on reaching Andar-ab was petitioned by Badakhshis to punish neighbouring Kafirs for oppression, left the direct road for Kabul at the Khawak Pass, rebuilt Khawak Fort, and spent eighteen days of adventure and hardship through snow in the roadless mountain-tangle of Kafiristan. He emerged by the Panjsher Pass, worn out by fatigue (*et. 62*), went down to a camp in the Baran Plain, and whilst resting there had Baran water conveyed to near Kabul by a canal named the Mahi-giri (perhaps to supply a stocked fish-pond).

From the Baran Plain he moved to near Kabul, the seat of the Governor in his Cis-Indus territory—his grandson Pir-i-Muhammad. Here he received complaint from the Ghazni border that an Afghan adherent of his own, Malik Musa, had demolished the Fort of Iri-ab. This news angered him greatly because, as he said, the fort had the importance of safeguarding communications, and as standing at the head of the southern road to the Indus.† He sent an order for its immediate rebuilding, and remained near Kabul until assured of the completion of the work. He gave other administrative orders also—viz., that an officer, Amir Sulaiman, should go forward to the Fort of Naghr (*near the confluence of the Kurram and the Tochi*) to strengthen and repair it as a protection for Musalmans against the Parni Afghans.

On hearing that the Iri-ab Fort had been rebuilt, Timur marched up the Logar, and on August 18, 1398 (Zu'l-hijja 4, 800), inspected the place—not without risk, for he was shot at within its walls. On September 1 (Zu'l-hijja 18) he left it for Shinuzan and the Fort of Naghr; from the first place he sent off his baggage for Bannu (by way of Q : b : ch : ghai), and rode light and fast with some few thousand horsemen for the Fort of Naghr, where he found Amir Sulaiman's work finished. He then made a three days' detour up the Tochi to punish Parni Afghans who had looted a convoy on its way from the south for Kabul; returned, and left a garrison of 5,000 men with Amir Sulaiman in Naghr, left one also in Bannu, and rode on for the Indus. On September 20 (Muharram 8, 801) he was "at the very

* His route is fully described in the "*Zafar-nama*," thence translated by Pétis de la Croix, largely quoted in Price's "*Retrospect*," and by Elliot and Dowson's "*History of India*," vols. iii. and iv.

† The Iri-ab Fort (*var. Hari-ab, etc.*) was in Khost; it commanded roads from all sides. Timur's description of the Kurram Valley road as "the southern" one for the Indus suggests that the counterpart "northern road" was current in his day to distinguish the Balkh-Kunar-Hind Ferry road for Lahor.

spot where Sultan Jalalu'd-din *Khwarizmi*, fleeing from Chingiz Khan, had swum the Indus. On September 24 he and his whole army crossed the river to Dhankot by a trestle-bridge.

* * * * *

The *Khutba* was read in Timur's name in Dehli on December 17, 1398 (Rabi' II, 8, 801).

* * * * *

He returned to Dhankot after five months and seventeen days (*Price*) spent east of the Indus, and on March 8, 1399 (*Rajab*, 801 H.), encamped on the Chul-jalali after a sixty-mile ride. On the following day he and his whole army recrossed the river by the same trestle-bridge which his Bannu and Naghr garrisons had kept in order. At midday he went to Bannu, left it on the 11th, and was in Naghr on the 12th. After delaying there to see a desirable spring of water enclosed within the fort walls he rode up the Kurram Valley, twice halting, passed the defile of Araumek to a place said to be within a nine-hour ride of Kabul, and did the distance.

From Kabul he hurried forward to inspect his Mahi-giri Canal, and thence passed by Shibertu and Ab-dara, Tirmiz and Kesh, to Samarkand.

VI. BABUR PADSHAH.

Western advocates of the Khaibar-Attock theory of Indian invasion routes appear to take Babur Padshah as one of its main props. It is true, as they say, that even his mutilated book records several instances of his use of the Pass, and when uninjured may have contained others. But this is a commonplace result of the fact that for him the Khaibar was just a road—a bad and robber-infested road in his own territory. He used it on one of his five expeditions into Hind (*December* 6, 1525)—viz., on the fifth and last which he made with resolve to meet Sultan Ibrahim *Ludi* in battle.* The remaining and earlier four crossed the Indus by his usual Char-sadda ford, which they will have approached from Kabul by crossing the Kabul River near Mandrawar and taking the Kunar road. On this fifth occasion the river-crossing place was to Nil-ab (*in the dhab of Indus and Haro*), and this though the season was one in which the ford was serviceable; some special reason for crossing by boat will have dictated the use of the Khaibar. Such a reason may well have been that the army was to be numbered and the men's names entered in a list; such work would be better effected as man after man was going into a ferry-boat than if they were riding or walking through a ford.

This suggestion brings me to the marked difference between Babur's position and that of the commanders of large armies with whom he is arbitrarily grouped—viz., that the others had tens of thousands of

* Cf. "Babur-nama in English," p. 478 ff.

soldiers, while his was a modest—and in 1525 his maximum—force, good and bad, of 12,000 men.

A second marked difference is that Babur's military action, though taken willingly, as in accord with his own desire for rule in Hindustan, was invited, and his strength augmented by Trans-Indus co-operation. His 12,000 men were greatly outnumbered at Panipat; he could hardly have won there but for the stalwart reinforcement by Turks, who recognized him—the sole regnant Timurid—as their rightful suzerain; and, secondly, the help given by Afghans malecontent with Lodi government.

A third difference is that at Panipat he was not opposed by Indian Hindus, but by a family foreign to India, Muhammadan and with little rooting in the soil. This difference appears to me an interesting matter of consideration.

A fourth difference resides in Babur's personality and in his method of approach to his aim of refounding Timurid greatness. He had deep family devotion, and that Timur Beg's name had once been read in Delhi in the public prayer for the ruler of Hindustan fixed a goal towards which he moved, not tumultuously as loosing an overwhelming flood of men on the peoples, but with long, slow steps, one of the first of which took him to Kandahar, while later ones were planted in Bhira and thence spread south and east—all taken with an eye on political chances, with caution and weighing of facts perceived. Over and above what catches the eye in his diary, he had the statesman's quality and the scholar's patience with detail. It is worth while to make one's way to the fibrous roots of his character, a matter made the more difficult by the lamentable mutilation of his book.

VII. NADIR SHAH.

In Nadir Shah we find the military monarch and leader of a horde estimated variously at 80,000 and 130,000 men, who, of the seven great invaders, chose the Khaibar-Attock route into India rather than the better ancient roads to the Hind or Dhankot Ferry. One cannot but surmise some odd reason why he did so. He suffered great anxieties in coming through the Pass (*he had started for Hind in March, 1738*), and great terror from thieves in returning through it with his Delhi loot (*he started from Delhi on April 14, 1739*). Akbar had made the Pass-road practicable for wheeled traffic (*query bullock-carts*); Nadir is said to have widened it so that forty horsemen could ride abreast through it, and so well to have cleared it that "nor stone, nor thorn" caused inconvenience. How long his amenities survived him the makers of the Pass railway may be able to reveal to a labouring historian.

None the less for his great army and his precaution, Nadir found

the eastern gate of Khaibar closed by Kabul troops and kept closed against the advance of his long file of soldiers until he had sent for part of his rearguard, who turned the Pass (by the Mullagori road?) and attacked the Kabul soldiers, who, taken front and rear, were cut to pieces. These various details of invasion through Khaibar do not recommend Nadir's choice of route.

Nadir is not the invader one cares to think of. He claimed ancient kinship with Timur in speaking to the decadent Muhammad Shah *Mirānshahi* and he shared the Dehli palace. But there exists a story for which I have no better warrant than the *vraisemblance* which has given it currency. As is well known, Hindustan had no organized defence against the incursion of Nadir Shah. He came, collected his loot, and left, having replaced Muhammad Shah "on the degraded throne of Dehli." It was little to pay for being classed as a "great" invader. But he gave us this anecdote.

He was, as has been said, on friendly terms with Muhammad Shah. The latter went, on due occasion, to pay respects and convey gifts to his conqueror. The gifts should have numbered nine, by immemorial Turki usage. They were eight, and being so, attracted criticism perhaps from their recipient. The donor explained by, "I am the ninth."

ANNETTE S. BEVERIDGE.

CORRIGENDA IN PART I.

Page 251: Transpose misplaced dates of death of the Invaders' List—viz., No. IV. Timucin, Chingiz Khan, died 1227, and No. V. Timur Beg, died 1405.

Page 256, line 9 from foot: Read *Perdiceas* for *Perdiceas*.

Page 258, line 5 from foot: *Separate* could not.

THE HADENDOWA TRIBE OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

"In a maze of mental obfuscation this Boeotian tribe seems to imagine itself (as far as we can follow such mentality) a race wholly independent of Turk, Egyptian, and British rule alike."—ABEL CHAPMAN.

"The Hadendowa are an extremely bad tribe."—SIR SAMUEL BAKER.

THE above opinions of such trained observers as Mr. Abel Chapman and Sir Samuel Baker are entitled to respect, and it is difficult even with a closer acquaintance of the Hadendowa than either of these travellers possessed not to agree in some measure with their sentiments. It is in fact only too painfully true that the Hadendawi does, on first acquaintance, make a thoroughly bad impression, and the epithet Boeotian churl summarizes most of his qualities then apparent. He does, however, improve to some extent as one gets more in touch with his life and history and, whilst it would be too much to say that in his case "tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner," a closer acquaintance explains much that is unpleasant in his manners and makes one hopeful of latent possibilities. For many years, thanks to Mr. Kipling, his fame as the redoubtable Fuzzy Wuzzy was widespread, but apart from his fighting qualities little is known of him or his tribe in England. It is true that Professor Seligman published an article in the *Anthropological Journal* on the Hamitic problem in the Sudan,* but this is rather for specialized than popular reading. It may therefore be of interest to readers of the CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL to know more of the tribe and to learn how they have fared since the reoccupation of the Sudan.

Geographically it is located in an area bounded roughly on the north by the Port Sudan-Atbara Railway (though a few sections are to the north of this), on the east by the Eritrean frontier, on the south by the Atbara River, and on the west by the 35° 30" degree of longitude. The country is one of hills to the north, grassy rolling plains in the centre, dotted here and there by isolated mountains of a dome-like shape, and towards Kassala town itself is situated the fertile Gash Delta with its rich vegetation, its wells, and good grazing. Nowhere can water be said to be very scarce, unless in exceptionally bad years, and the many khors which traverse the country, running both east and west from the watershed, provide wells with water at no great depth. This accounts for the fact that the Hadendowa as a tribe are not really

* Vol. 43, 1913.

very nomadic, for in normal years water and grazing are adequate and it is unnecessary to move from place to place in search of either. For this reason also, as we shall see, the tribal organization is exceedingly loose, each little family group staying near its own well; and the different kinds of country, varying from hill to plain, have produced a variety of types within the tribe, some approximating to the almost sedentary Arabs round Kassala, others who live in the mountains being still as wild as hawks.

In climate the Hadendowa country is also varied, the Red Sea hills in the winter affording a climate not unlike that of England, with mists and a cold north wind, the southern half being more tropical. Administratively about one-third of the tribe is found in the Red Sea Province and two-thirds in Kassala. Until the construction of the Kassala Railway this administrative split militated against a uniform administration over the whole tribe, but communications are now rapid from north to south and many of the old difficulties are passing.

If a Hadendowa Sheikh is asked the origin of his tribe he will probably reply that he does not know, but if he is one of the better educated he will say "from the Abbasiyin."^{*} Very little is known indeed, of their origins, but the claim to a noble Arabian ancestry can be considered more a pious hope than an historical fact. Professor Seligman gives as his opinion that the Hadendowa, with the other Hamitic or Beja tribes, are essentially similar to pre-dynastic Egyptians, and that the rise in head breadth is probably due to the influence of some round-headed race, a fact which may also account for their greater stature. He suggests also that these modifications may be due in part to negro (nilotic) influence. We will not, however, waste time discussing a problem on which even the experts are not agreed, but it is important to stress the point that the Hadendowa are Hamitic and not Semitic, a fact which accounts for the difference in temperament and characteristics between them and the other largely Semitic tribes of the Northern Sudan. In appearance they are at once distinguishable from the Semitic Arabs by their "hay-rick head of hair," and from the other Hamitic tribes by a larger physique and more truculent bearing. The origin of the custom of wearing their hair like gollywogs is buried in antiquity. If pressed for a reason they will tell you that this coiffure acts as a head protection against the sun, and also that the mutton fat with which it is dressed percolates into the skull and makes the eyesight keen. The first reason is by no means fantastic, for apart from the big tuft on the head the little plaits hanging over the nape of the neck do literally afford considerable protection. It should be noted, however,

* It is said that the Hadendowa are descended from one Hadat, whose grave on the bank of the Khor Amet is still recognized. Her husband was one Muhammad Barakwin, from the other side of the Red Sea, and a descendant of Abbas, Muhammad's uncle.

that the tiffa," as this is called, is generally discarded in middle age or when a youngish man attains the position of Sheikh.

So much for appearance. In temperament they are sullen and suspicious. This suspicion is most noticeable when touring amongst them, and is due largely to a keen desire to be left alone and the fear that one's arrival has something to do with the payment of taxes. For this latter reason the Hadendawi is extremely unwilling for one to see his flocks, and the memory of past Governments does not encourage him to appear more wealthy than necessary. This taxpayer relationship which is inevitable with Government officials has militated against a more cordial feeling, but the tribe is gradually realizing that tax payment is only an unpleasant necessity and that the Government can and will provide certain benefits in return.

Another difficulty to a closer contact is the fact that the tribal language is ToBedawi and not Arabic. This language is spoken by about half of the Hamitic tribes, whilst others like the Beni Amer speak another, called Tigre or Khasa. As, however, the tribes are gradually establishing closer relation with traders and Government, a large number can now talk Arabic sufficiently well to maintain a simple conversation. Many more talk and understand Arabic than is at first apparent, as their suspicious temperament encourages them to pretend they do not understand when spoken to, and even now it can be said that unless they want something very badly, they will prefer to talk through an Arabic-ToBedawi speaking interpreter instead of direct.

On the other hand, should they come to market with animals to sell, it is remarkable how much Arabic they can produce if by lengthy bargaining in that tongue they can get a slightly higher price. These same tribesmen, if called as witnesses in a case or any other Government work, will look blankly and answer all questions in ToBedawi "Iktein Kiki," "I don't know." Their everyday life is bound up with the care of their animals, and it is the greatest mistake to think that the native of Africa leads a lazy existence. On the contrary, the herding and provision of water and grazing for large flocks necessitate constant activity and labour, and a visit to a well-centre soon disabuses one of any misconceptions on this point. There will be found early in the morning the men of the tribe diligently drawing water, chanting the while, and it takes many hours' hard work to fill the large basins from which the animals drink. By ten o'clock these well-centres are an animated scene, swarms of women and children arriving on donkeys with water-skins to fill, and by noon the area is covered with herds of camels, cows, and sheep watering. It is truly a grand sight—the thirsty cattle swarming round the troughs in the middle of which stands a herdsman controlling the animals with shouts and blows, whilst another draws water to a chant to keep the troughs filled. These chants are of interest and go somewhat as follows: "Come and drink, my

dear ones ; Oh, yellow cows, are you thirsty ?—here is good cool water ; O Mohammed, O Prophet of God," and so on, till by two o'clock all the animals have watered and are resting under the shady trees near by. About four o'clock the return to the pasturage takes place, the animals being slowly driven off, whilst women and children mount their donkeys and return heavily laden with water to their encampments, leaving some of their men-folk behind to start filling the troughs for the morrow. At eventide the animals, except possibly the camels, are driven into enclosures adjoining the encampments where they are safe from the depredations of hyenas. On the return to the huts the women and children off-load their water, the children start to play about or adjourn to the local fiki or teacher, where they intone the Koran in a sing-song voice, and the women prepare the evening meal and exchange gossip collected at the well. The Hadendowa housewives, whilst bearing a considerable burden of work, exercise a great influence in tribal affairs, and their shrill voices at night, haranguing their swains, recall to mind Kim's Lama friend with his prophecy that the husbands of the talkative will have a great reward hereafter.

It will be seen, therefore, that this pastoral life is arduous, and all the work has to be done by the herd-owner himself and his family. This fact is of considerable importance administratively, as it means that about ninety per cent. of the tribe are bound closely to their animals, an arrangement which tends to keep them out of mischief. It is the remaining ten per cent., consisting mainly of youths without animal property and professional brigands, who cause all the trouble, and it is one of the Government's aims to find for these occupations, animal theft being the greatest curse of the district. Except for this and occasional intersectional fights in which a few persons get wounded, the tribesmen are not really lawless, and the reputation for fanaticism they have acquired is due largely to the memory of their fighting qualities in the old days. In fact, it can, I think, be fairly said that they are definitely less susceptible to fanaticism than the Baggara Arabs of Kordofan and Darfur. As well as their pastoral interests, the tribesmen cultivate during the rainy season considerable areas of durra (millet sorghum), and in the Gash Delta had evolved a simple but effective scheme of basin irrigation. It is this area which has been taken over as a cotton field, and the Fuzzy is now turning his attention in that direction. The tribe, therefore, has for the future the prospect of a nicely balanced pastoral and agricultural life, and if this balance can be maintained, a very healthy development can be hoped for, as the two interests can be made complementary and not antagonistic. It is this state of affairs which the Government is now trying to bring about, and there are grounds for some optimism as to the result.

Such is the life of the tribe to-day, and before finishing it may be of interest to note briefly its history for the last few centuries down to the present.

All local pundits agree that the first records start with a certain Wail Ali and forty ruffians who lived in a mountain in the Sinkat direction. They appear to have been doughty fighters, and by raids and inter-marriage gradually established a wide sphere of influence. This leader Wail Ali is the founder of the Wailalib section from which the Nazir or leading Sheikh is invariably chosen.* They claim never to have been subdued by the Fung Kings (*circa* A.D. 1750), but were eventually brought into some sort of control by the old Egyptian-Turkish Government which dealt with them spasmodically but ruthlessly. On the other hand, they were never more than temporarily cowed, and nothing in the shape of close administration was ever attempted. For purposes of taxes the tribe was divided into five divisions, each under an Omda Khut, and were assessed at 22,000 riyals each—viz., £E11,000 per annum for the whole tribe. When this was not forthcoming a posse of Bashi-Bazuks was quartered on the Ferik or village of the Omda and the tax forcibly extracted. The appointment of Omda, strange as it may seem at first, was one sought after, for the simple reason that it afforded ample opportunities for the holder of the post to extract large sums for himself whilst backed by troops. These and other appointments were very often made from Egypt itself, and the most notorious case was that of Nazir Musa Ibrahim, who, having been forced to flee the country for ambushing a party of soldiers, was able after a lapse of years to get himself reinstated by bribing the authorities in Cairo. It may, therefore, be imagined that very much more than the actual tribute paid into the Government chest was extracted from the reluctant tribesmen, and some Sheikhs still alive say that about three times the proper amount was taken in one way and another. There was little justice, and the Egyptian Government did practically nothing to provide public security outside the towns, intertribal fights being left unpunished, and the profession of robber was the only one open to an enterprising man. Such being the state of the administration, it was not surprising that the Hadendowa were some of the first to revolt in sympathy with the Mahdi under the leadership of the redoubtable Osman Digna. The immediate cause of the revolt appears to have been a supposed breach of agreement by the Government over a camel contract, and in General Gordon's despatch No. 117 from Assuan, dated February 1, 1884, the following paragraph appears :†

"As for the Hadendowa revolt, it would appear to have been caused by the robbery of Reshid Pasha and Ibrahim Bey. These officials engaged to pay this tribe seven dollars per camel to transport the Egyptian troops to Berber. Instead of paying them the sum promised, they, however, only paid them at the rate of one dollar per camel. The loss to the tribe was considerable, for at least 10,000 troops marched over the road."

* The present Nazir is fifth in direct descent from Wail Ali.

† This story is confirmed by the present Nazir, Sheikh Ibrahim Musa.

These troops, it is interesting to note, were the reinforcements for ill-fated Hicks Pasha's Expedition.

This revolt was of great importance, as it completely closed the Berber-Suakin road and was a vital factor in the subsequent disasters to the Egyptian Government. By the end of 1885 only the coast round Suakin remained in the Government's possession, and for the next few years the Hadendowa, under Osman Digna, kept the Government forces closely invested there. During these early operations the Hadendowa displayed the most remarkable tenacity and an absolute fearlessness, and the names of El Teb and Macneil's Zariba are still remembered to their credit. However, years of famine and the extortions of the Baggara Dervishes sent from Khartoum to garrison Kassala and to strengthen Osman Digna's hand gradually lessened their ardour, and many tribesmen escaped from the Dervish army and took to the hills. Tokar was recaptured by Government troops in 1891, and Kassala was occupied by the Italians in 1894. Osman Digna withdrew to Adarama, taking a certain number of the reluctant Hadendowa Sheikhs with him, but by this time the tribe as a whole had had enough and as an active danger had ceased to exist. Thousands had been killed and many more died of famine; their flocks and herds had been almost completely destroyed and the tribal units scattered. Kassala was taken over by the Anglo-Egyptian Government in 1898, and since that date to the present day the task of the Sudan Government has been to pull the tribe together again and repair the havoc of the years of rebellion. This has been no easy task, as in the first place the damage was so great as to be almost irreparable, whilst the characteristics of the tribesmen made close contact difficult and administrative exigencies necessitated the division of the tribe between two provinces. All these factors have made for very slow progress, but the great benefit which the Sudan Government has been able to give them has been "the King's peace over all," and natural increase under peaceable conditions has replaced in some measure the loss of their wealth. Their numbers have increased, although slowly, and they are now fairly wealthy in animals. For taxes they are assessed at a tribute of some £E5,000, and except for certain sections this can be and is paid without great trouble.

The greatest difficulty, however, has been the reorganization of the tribe and its sub-sections under the rightful Sheikhs, and the tribesmen in their proper family groups. As has been seen, during the Mahdia the tribal organization was completely shattered, and even down to the present there are still sections who have not yet found their proper niche in the tribal pattern. Until this has been attained and the whole framework has settled down, the machinery for carrying out the normal administration of the tribe works but creakingly, as it is only through a properly working organization that the tribute can be properly appor-

tioned and promptly paid, that offenders against public security can be brought to book, and a sense of leadership instilled into the Sheikhs. Progress is, however, being made on these lines, and since the war the Sudan Government has had more staff and time to devote to this problem. In fact, the danger now is that the progress may be too fast, as the construction of Kassala Railway and the intensive development of the Gash Delta as a cotton field has created certain problems which the tribe was not quite ready to face. These are, however, in course of solution, and whilst the railway has provided rapid communication and markets for their animals, the attraction of agricultural profits is tending to draw the tribesmen down from the hills with considerable educative effect. In addition to this development, the railway has afforded an opportunity for the economic exploitation of the dom-palm nut,* which is to be found in large quantities in their country, the collection and marketing of which provide a profitable occupation in keeping with the natural course of their lives. The Fuzzy is learning rapidly that by coming into line and bringing what he can to market, he can provide himself and his family with little luxuries, such as sugar, rice, and tea, never dreamed of before, and he is showing considerable initiative in taking of the advantage of the opportunity now opened to him.

Politically, therefore, the barometer may be regarded as set fair for the Hadendowa, and the peace and security which the Sudan Government has been able to give them for the past twenty-five years is now beginning to bear fruit.

To many of their District Commissioners they have been the cause of much depression mingled at times with despair, so little has been their response in the past to efforts made on their behalf. That these efforts have not been in vain the stirring now apparent is the answer.

* "Vegetable ivory," from which buttons are made.

REVIEWS

THE CHRONICLES OF THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S TRADE WITH CHINA. Four volumes. By H. B. Morse. Oxford University Press. £3 10s.

The origin of the Honourable East India Company is described by Mr. Morse in a few terse sentences in the introductory chapter of his book :

"In 1596 a company, with Sir Robert Dudley at its head, sent out three ships [to China], taking a letter from the Queen [Elizabeth] to the Emperor; the ships were never again heard from; and as there is no record of tribute having been received from England during the reign of Wanli (1573-1620), they must have been wrecked on the outward journey. On the last day of the century, December 31, 1600, letters patent were issued by Elizabeth incorporating a company under the title of 'The Governor and Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies,' and granting to it a monopoly for fifteen years of trading between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan. The monopoly was made perpetual by a charter of James I. issued in 1609, was strengthened by another of the Lord Protector Cromwell in 1657, and again by another of Charles II. in 1661. In 1698, under the sanction of an Act of Parliament, the Government of William III. chartered a rival company—'The English Company Trading to the East Indies.' In 1702 it was agreed to amalgamate the old and the new Companies, and the amalgamation was carried into effect in 1709."

After the amalgamation the official title of the new Company was the United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies, but this was shortened in practice to "The Honourable East India Company," or simply "The Company."

Though the trading monopoly thus granted by successive charters only finally came to an end in 1834, the Company during the whole of its existence never succeeded in opening up a trade at any other port in China except Canton. Mr. Morse has searched the old Canton records, now stored at the India Office, and has methodically transcribed everything that could interest a student of Chinese affairs. Every fact of economic or historic value has been carefully extracted and set forth dispassionately, though necessarily somewhat disconnectedly, in these four volumes.

This method of writing history makes excellent browsing, but not very easy reading. Its value, however, is immense, for the student will find ready to hand in convenient form a mass of material unspoiled by any attempt to throw it into shape or make it fit into any preconceived thesis of the author. The conclusions that take shape in the reader's mind are the natural result of the facts themselves and not of any conscious artistry of the author; and the student is likely to find that the mere bare record of a series of disconnected facts can be more overwhelming than the most skilful of arguments.

The burning questions of the present day all have their roots in the past, and every problem which we are studying to-day—from the obscure origins of extraterritoriality to the sordid history of the unsecured debt—is illuminated by the flood of light which Mr. Morse's patient labours have thrown on the events of 200 years ago. Prior to 1700 the Chronicles merely consist of scanty records of isolated attempts to force a way past the jealous and obstructive Portuguese, who held the gateway at Macao, into some share in the trade with China. "The English had now, at the opening of the eighteenth century, thrust their

feet over the threshold of the China trade, but had not yet obtained a seat at the table." These early adventures were mostly made at Amoy or Chusan, but from about 1710 onwards the Company gained a regular footing at Canton, to which port for the next 130 years the Chinese succeeded in rigorously confining the whole foreign trade. On the English side this trade was conducted by that once important, but now extinct, person, the supercargo.

Two hundred years ago a trading ship went exploring to new countries. Each voyage was an odyssey, full of romance and high adventure. The supercargo must not only have the commercial skill to dispose of the "stock" and make a good return "investment," he must also have diplomatic abilities of no mean order, for he might have to deal with kings and princes, with admirals and generals, with emperor's merchants or great mandarin's merchants (monopolists, that is to say, with influential backing) as well as with common traders. In the early years the Company had no permanent establishment at Canton; each voyage was a separate venture, the supercargo went out and returned with the ship, and we even find "supercargoes of five English ships (all Company's ships) scrambling for a cargo, competing with each other and sending prices up, concealing their transactions, and all working to get the earliest despatch for their own ships." Something of the sort occasionally occurred even after 1716, when the Company ordered that the supercargoes on arrival in Canton should form a council, consult together, and act in all matters jointly for the general interests of the Company. It was not till 1731 that one of the supercargoes for the first time stopped over between seasons in Canton. In 1779 the affairs of the Company were placed under the control of the Select Committee, consisting of a President and a varying number of senior supercargoes. This plan was made permanent in 1786, and the Select Committee was only finally dissolved when the monopoly of the East India Company came to an end in 1834.

These early supercargoes and presidents of committee were men of character, but they were handicapped by having to fill the dual rôle of merchant and diplomatist, and they were still further handicapped by being under the necessity of taking their orders from a Court of Directors in England, whose sole objective was the profit to be derived from the trade with China.

In the early years the supercargoes successfully asserted the personal superiority of the Englishman over the Asiatic; they were received on terms of equality by the highest officials in Canton, to whom they presented annually before commencing the trade of the year lists of demands which bear a strange embryonic resemblance to the stipulations of the unequal treaties of to-day. It is by no means pleasant, however, to note how, as time went on and the trade became more valuable, the English in Canton gradually sank from their high estate and submitted to every species of humiliation rather than risk losing the profits of this lucrative trade. It is easy to see now that the conduct of the relations between England and China and the protection of British interests in China should not have been entrusted to the merchants themselves.

Apart from the fact that much technical knowledge and special experience is required for the successful conduct of relations with the Chinese, it was not fair to the supercargoes of those days to expect them to fill the dual rôle of merchant and official as well. It requires no great insight to see that as soon as a regular intercourse had been established special officers should have been appointed with full powers over King's ships, Company's ships, country ships, and all British nationals in China. For a hundred odd years the supercargoes blundered along, complaining to the Court at home and to the Chinese officials in Canton that they were only Company's servants and had no authority over

King's ships or country ships; but nothing was done, and every mistake that should have been avoided was committed. The supercargoes occasionally blustered and threatened when they were in the wrong, but more often—in fact, generally—they tamely submitted to every species of wrong and humiliation in the mistaken belief that this was the best way to preserve the trade that had grown so valuable. Naturally their treatment grew worse and worse until war provided the only means of escape from an intolerable position. This lesson, when to use force and when to be patient and conciliatory, is one which we are still painfully learning to-day, and we must not therefore be too hard upon the Court of Directors and their much harassed agents in Canton. It is possible, however, to lay down the simple rule that in dealing with Chinese, however tortuous their conduct may be, the Englishman must be absolutely straight and above-board; he must never make any demand that is not just and honourable, and he must be prepared to back any such demand by force, but only in the last resort; and, however great the apparent odds may be, he must always be ready to resist by force the wrongs and humiliations which the Chinese in their ignorance and arrogance are ever ready to inflict upon him. The failure of the supercargoes to act upon these principles may be illustrated by two notable instances which have their bearing upon the problems of to-day.

The first is the famous case of the *Lady Hughes* in 1784. The facts are well known to all students of Chinese history, though Mr. Morse's chronicle brings out some poignant details not hitherto available to the historian. The *Lady Hughes*, a country ship from Bombay, fired a salute, as was customary, on arrival at Whampoa, and, unfortunately, a Chinese chop-boat (licensed lighter), lying alongside apparently without the knowledge of the gunner, was damaged by the discharge and two Chinese on board her were killed. Only four years previously a Frenchman who had killed a Portuguese, under circumstances which amounted at the most to manslaughter, had been decoyed out of the factory under the pretence that an examination was necessary, and had been immediately publicly strangled without any form of trial whatever. It was not therefore surprising that the unfortunate gunner, though entirely blameless, should have absconded and concealed himself. At first all went well: the accident happened on November 24. By eleven p.m. on the 26th the Chinese had given an assurance that the examination of the gunner would be conducted in the factory by the District Magistrate "accompanied only by his ordinary retinue, without soldiers, and that no force whatever should be used." Next morning, however, the committee learned, to their dismay, that Mr. Smith, the supercargo of the *Lady Hughes*, had been "decoyed from his factory by a pretended message from Puankhequa, seized and conveyed into the city under a guard of soldiers with drawn swords." Encouraged by their success in thus securing a hostage, the Chinese immediately stiffened their attitude. Communication between Canton and Whampoa was cut off, the factories were beset with soldiers, and the avenues leading to the quay were barricaded. "The French, Dutch, Danish, and Americans rallied to the support of the English" (this was in the eighteenth century, not the twentieth), and the pinnaces of all the ships at Whampoa were sent up to Canton manned and armed. The boats were fired at on their way up, but pushed through without returning the fire. Late that evening (the 27th) the supercargoes "met a petty mandarin strolling along the quay, and he gave them a copy of a mandate of the Viceroy addressed to themselves." This mandate was filled with dire threats of what the Viceroy would do with his "troops with muskets and artillery" if the supercargoes "dared in our country to disobey and infringe the laws." The courage both of Mr. Smith (still in custody) and of the English Council now rapidly oozed away, and, in response to

their commands, the captain of the *Lady Hughes* sent the unfortunate gunner to Canton with the following letter :

"I now send this chit by the poor gunner ; I hope you will leave a maintenance if he is detained ; pray, dear Smith, take care of the old man, you had better leave something with Munqua for the old man's maintenance, I hope the Chinese will not do harm to the poor old man as it was only a misfortune."

Nothing more is heard of the proposal that the trial should take place in the factory. The Council feared that "the safety of all the English may be endangered by a refusal," and the gunner was accordingly handed over to the tender mercies of the Chinese with no greater protection than a plea for clemency. The accident occurred on November 24, the gunner was surrendered on November 30, the embargo on trade was removed on December 6, and the gunner was strangled on January 8 without, so far as is known, any form of trial whatever. Had the protection of British interests in Canton been entrusted to duly appointed officials backed by the armed forces of the Crown instead of being placed in the hands of merchants with inadequate powers and a dual rôle to fill, this humiliating tragedy could never have taken place. The case of the *Lady Hughes* is worth studying also as one of a long sequence of homicide cases which show that extraterritoriality was never imposed upon the Chinese as one of the articles of an unequal treaty, but grew naturally out of their own doctrine of responsibility behind the shelter of which they consistently shirked the duty of governing, and administering justice to, the strangers within their gates.

The second case we shall quote of a tame submission to gross and humiliating injustice is that of Mr. Flint. James Flint, who, from the fleeting glimpses that we get of him in these Chronicles, appears to have been a man of the authentic breed of Warren Hastings and Raffles, in 1736 was a young lad who had been left in China to learn the language. We hear of him later as being appointed linguist and acting as interpreter. In 1759 he was sent to Ningpo to put into execution a plan which he himself had pressed upon the Company—namely, to endeavour to open 'up a trade at that port and thus break through the irritating restriction which strictly confined all foreign trade to Canton. He found, however, that the Viceroy of the place, who had previously been at Canton, had received large bribes from the Hong merchants to exert every influence which he possessed in excluding Europeans from the other ports of the Empire. Finding himself completely baffled at Ningpo, "Mr. Flint, with that decision which formed a striking part of his character, immediately proceeded to Tientsin" and succeeded in getting conveyed to the Court of Peking a memorial setting forth the intolerable grievances and humiliations which the British at Canton suffered at the hands of the Hoppo. The results were certainly surprising. The Peking Government sent Mr. Flint back to Canton in the suite of an Imperial High Commissioner, with whom he established the friendliest relations, actually residing as his guest for a fortnight in Canton city, a privilege quite unprecedented both then and long afterwards. The Hoppo was suspended, and later found guilty by a commission of high officials specially constituted to enquire into his crimes. Various exactions on trade were abolished, and the barometer seemed set fair. The Canton officials, however, came to the conclusion that it would be far too dangerous to allow foreigners to make direct representations to the Throne ; and they secretly determined to make an example of Mr. Flint. The Viceroy desired to see Mr. Flint, and he attended the Yamen accompanied by the members of the Select Committee.

After they had been thrown to the ground in an attempt by the attendants to force them to perform the kowtow, the Viceroy "gave orders to Mr. Flint to advance to him. He pointed to an order which he said was the Emperor's edict

for his banishment to Macao for three years, and then to return to England, never more to come to China." Mr. Flint was imprisoned at a village near Macao "locked up in rooms with bars like a cage," and all communication with his fellow-countrymen was forbidden. After three years of solitary imprisonment he was at length released and allowed to return to England, where no doubt he died of a broken heart like so many gallant comrades of the Lost Legion who spent themselves—but not in vain—in the service of the British Empire. After the visit to the Viceroy's Yamen "the French, Swedes, Danes, and Dutch met at our factory when we agreed one and all to tell the Hong merchants, who were then present, that we protested against the proceedings of the Viceroy." But this, as the Select Committee of 1831, seventy years latter, bitterly remark, "was mere declamation employed to the Hong merchants, who seem to have been aware that any degradation would be submitted to for the preservation of trade."

In circumstances such as these there is only one argument that will prevail with the Chinese—the argument of force, and there is little doubt that even the small amount of force at the disposal of the Select Committee would have sufficed for the purpose. The failure of the supercargoes adequately to defend their own and the national honour, and their willingness to submit to any degradation for the preservation of trade, accounts for the unsatisfactory and humiliating conditions under which that trade was so long with difficulty carried on. The story of Flint should not be forgotten, partly because his memory should be honoured by all Englishmen in China, and partly because the sordid sequel to his high adventure marks the parting of the ways. The course we embarked on then was only finally closed with the war of 1840, eighty years later.

Another topic of absorbing interest which there is only space to touch on very briefly is that of opium. An enemy would find ample justification in these chronicles for the charge of hypocrisy so frequently levelled against the English. The Company grew the opium in India, sent vast quantities to China, and relied on the proceeds of the sale of opium to finance their trade, but not an ounce of opium was ever carried on a Company's ship, and the Company's agents in China never had dealt in the drug. On one occasion, however, in 1792, Mr. Warren Hastings, the Governor-General of India, "initiated a commercial transaction which created some degree of embarrassment for the China Council." He shipped some 3,000 chests of opium to China on the sloop *Betsy* and on "Lieut.-Colonel Henry Watson's private ship of war, *Nonsuch*," and the good supercargoes were put to considerable straits to maintain their virtuous aloofness from all dealings in the drugs. We must not, however, judge those days by the moral standards of the present, and, in any case, should any American missionary read these lines it will be as well to state that the Chronicles show that the most eager competitors with the British were the Americans, who turned many an honest penny by importing Turkish opium from Smyrna. The present reviewer is firmly convinced that opium in China is an unmitigated curse, and that the trade has wrought as much harm to those who shipped it to China as to the besotted people who clamoured for it. It is therefore a curious reflection that opium was probably the chief instrument by which China was opened to foreign trade. For 200 years ignorant and corrupt officials succeeded in rigorously confining the whole foreign trade to Canton, and they were able to do this and to dictate their own terms as to the way in which the trade was to be carried on, because Europe supplied nothing which the Chinese wanted. The Company's ships trading to Canton brought out a "stock" of which 98 per cent. was silver and 2 per cent. woollens, and the woollens were only brought and sold at a loss

to reluctant Hong merchants because the law compelled English ships to carry a proportion of English manufactures. So impossible was it for ships to find a cargo that they regularly carried to Canton as ballast hundreds of tons of flints which were sold at Tls. 1.50 to Tls. 2.00 per picca! (Is this why Celtic flint implements are so rarely found by English antiquarians?) But when towards the end of the eighteenth century opium began to find its way in large quantities to China the opium ships congregated at Lintin, and thence, with the connivance of the Chinese officials, conducted a roaring contraband trade, not only in Canton but all up and down the China coast. The foreign ships which were formerly vigorously excluded now found an eager welcome, and the modern trade with China began.

The connection between the Cohong and the Tariff Conference now sitting in Peking at first sight seems somewhat remote, but the connecting link is to be found in the question of debts. It may well turn out that the most valuable service Mr. Morse's book has performed is the light which it has thrown on the way this question of debts was handled in the eighteenth century, for it seems that in the usual course of human nature the mistakes and follies of 150 years ago are about to be repeated in Peking to-day.

Monopolies are dear to the Chinese mind, and the supercargoes had great difficulty in staving off the establishment of a Cohong, or merchant guild, to engross the foreign trade. The danger hung over them like a nightmare during the whole of the eighteenth century, and it was their well-founded fear of what actually did happen that made them reluctant to champion the cause of the speculative moneylender. This gentleman makes his first appearance in the *Chronicles* in 1716, when "many of the Europeans and others left their money behind at interest rather than risk it at sea." Sixty years later, in 1777, "the Presidency of Madras wrote asking the good offices of the Council in collecting certain sums of money due from sundry China merchants to Mr. George Stratton." The Council shied off, but in 1779 the Court of Directors in London, having received a memorial from several persons with regard to debts due from Chinese amounting to nearly one million sterling, directed the Select Committee—now in charge of the Company's affairs in Canton—"to lend their aid and exert their utmost influence to obtain satisfaction for all the just demands of British subjects in China." None of these debts were due to the Company, who monopolized the whole trade between England and China, but who conducted their business on sound lines. The debts were owing to private merchants, and mostly to people who "made a trade of taking up money at low interest from the different Settlements in India and placing it in the hands of the Chinese at a high interest." Two of the debts of which Mr. Morse gives details are calculated to excite the envy even of Mr. Nishihara himself:

	Interest.	Principal.
	£	£
<i>To Mr. George Smith</i>		103,681
Interest at 20 per cent. for nine years ...	180,694	
Paid	131,925	
		<hr/> 43,769
Amount of claim in 1779		152,450
<i>To Messrs. Hutton and Gordon</i>		24,569
Interest at 20 per cent. for nine years ...	41,594	
Paid	38,323	
		<hr/> 3,271
Amount of claim in 1779		27,840

The debts due to Mr. George Smith amounted to \$789,379 and to Messrs. Hutton and Gordon \$1,776,688, while the total of all debts was \$4,347,300. While the Select Committee were struggling to unravel the whole sordid tangle the Royal Navy—of all people!—decided to take a hand in the game. "Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Vernon had received a memorial from the creditors at Madras, and conceived it to be his duty to take steps to enforce their claims and secure them justice. He thereupon dispatched the frigate *Sea Horse*, Captain John Alexander Panton, to Canton with 'addresses' which the captain was positively instructed to deliver in person to the Viceroy and Hoppo." The Select Committee protested in vain. The debts, they pointed out, arose from "accumulating interest, bribing the Mandareens, and probably their own extravagance." The merchants had not the assets to answer the demands, and the only result of official Chinese intervention would be the establishment of the Cohong, against which the supercargoes had struggled for so many years: "The most likely way of raising the money will be to form a company of merchants at Canton, who alone will be suffered to trade with Europeans; and who by exacting what prices they please may be enabled to fund annually so much as will in time liquidate the sums ordered to be paid. Should this be the case the East India Company, by means of Captain Panton's representation, will be obliged to pay the debts of private people, many of whom have remained here against the repeated remonstrances of the Honourable Court of Directors, and this we conceive will probably be done by changing the present mode of trade to a pernicious monopoly." Captain Panton, gallant sailor that he was, "was not to be dissuaded from his purpose." He duly delivered his letters, and the result answered exactly the Committee's gloomiest anticipations. "The Cohong was firmly established with all its privileges, and was made the instrument for extracting a great revenue from the foreign trade, for the benefit primarily of the Hoppo, and, indirectly through him, of the Canton officials and the Court of Peking." The moneylenders were paid at the expense of fresh burdens laid on legitimate trade, and the shackles of the "pernicious monopoly" then established were only finally shaken off by the war of 1840. The parallel with the events preoccupying the attention of the Tariff Conference of 1925-26 is very close, but the present reviewer will refrain from dotting the *i*'s and crossing the *t*'s except to ask why it is that the speculative moneylender, instead of being treated as the bane and the incubus that he really is, should be able to swing so much influence that every legitimate interest—150 years ago as much as to-day—is sacrificed in order to secure for him his pound of flesh.

There are many other topics of absorbing interest which this review, if it is to remain within reasonable limits, can hardly mention: the glimpses of a China seething with rebellion and piracy even in the palmiest days of the Manchu Dynasty; the troubles of Mr. Catchpole, the first Consul-General in China, the authenticity of whose commission as Consul-General was doubted by a certain Captain Roberts, who declared that "he could not be a Consul, since he would not protect anybody from the natives" (Foreign Office please note); the first germs of extraterritorial jurisdiction; the French missionaries and their friendly relations with the Company; the work of Dr. Morrison, the first of a long line of distinguished British missionaries; the baneful influence of clocks and toys on Sino-British relations—for all these and many other matters of absorbing interest the reader must browse for himself in Mr. Morse's fascinating pages.

THE INDIA OFFICE. By Sir Malcolm C. C. Seton, K.O.B. Messrs. G. P. Putnam, London. 7s. 6d.

The desire to "see wheels go round" is a childish instinct that deserves every encouragement as a preparation for the time when the grown man may himself have wheels to control. It is all to the good, therefore, that a number of distinguished servants of the State have combined to enlighten the members of a democracy, that is yearly growing more democratic, as to the character of the machinery by which it governs itself and its dependencies; and the appearance of a series of monographs dealing with the inner working of the great offices of government is to be welcomed. The writers are masters of their subjects; they write as highly competent operators themselves, and they know by intuition exactly how far it is right and proper to admit the public to the *arcana imperii*.

There is a difficulty in making any account of the processes of government as vivid as the public would like, because the description must necessarily be static rather than dynamic. The machinery and the material with which it deals lend themselves to minute and detailed exposition; but to show the machine at work, to explain how the material is pounded and combed and teased in the course of the operations so as to produce the finished product, that is a more difficult art, and one for which an official training is not necessarily the best qualification. We must not expect in these serious manuals the vividness of description that comparatively irresponsible observers were able to achieve in their revelations of the *modus operandi* of certain great offices in war time.

In dealing with the India Office Sir Malcolm Seton has had to face this difficulty in an exaggerated form. It was necessary for him, as he says, "to trace briefly the earlier history of the connection between Britain and India, and to give some account of the framework of Indian administration." Now to make either of those two subjects interesting and intelligible in a small book of less than 800 pages would in itself be no mean feat. To attempt them both is to run the risk of packing the work so closely with facts as to make the wood invisible for the trees, and we can only congratulate the author on the deftness with which he has handled his mass of material so as to avoid this danger as far possible. He has not only included all essential facts, but has contrived to intersperse them with scraps of quaint information of historical or personal interest, and with occasional anecdotes that lighten the gravity of the official record and give a human touch to the account.

A distinguished Viceroy, equally distinguished as an orator, once complained of the impossibility of making interesting speeches in India, because of the effort involved in being minutely accurate. To jest was dangerous. A mixture of a lie may add pleasure, as Bacon says, but this resort is barred to the official dealing with India, whose first care must be scrupulous accuracy; and it was doubtless for this reason that the East India Company impressed on its servants the virtue of a "humdrum" style. Sir Malcolm, as we have indicated, has striven with considerable success to avoid this Indian dulness, but the influence of officialdom is sometimes too strong for him, as for example when he loses the flavour of the old story of the stationmaster and the tiger by substituting a characterless official message for the lively "Tiger making havoe on platform; please arrange."

Space does not permit of any attempt to follow the closely condensed account of the evolution of the India Office from the establishment of the Board of Control in 1784, when there was, as the author points out, a "dyarchy" in the administration of Indian affairs in this country, to the final transfer of power to a Secretary of State in Council in 1858. How the composition of this Council

was originally determined, how it was changed from time to time, what powers the Council had, and to what limitations it was subject—all this is described at some length, while the bearing on its procedure of the signification attached to various technical terms such as "secret," "urgent," "direct correspondence," and "private telegrams" is explained. Theoretically the Council might so exercise its powers as to produce a deadlock; but the impression is left that in practice it had less influence than was originally intended.

Those whose interests have lain in the East will, we imagine, turn to this monograph chiefly from a curiosity to see what light it throws on the influence of the home authorities on the actual administration of India; but the writer, while suggesting trains of thought that whet that curiosity, is necessarily too discreet to gratify it. A distinction must be drawn between the India Office and the Home Government or the Secretary of State as its mouthpiece; otherwise some of the remarks might convey an exaggerated idea of antagonism. To the great majority of those concerned in the actual administration of affairs in India, the India Office is too remote to excite much interest of any kind. It settles the terms of their service; it pays their pensions (or used to do so); it has an appellate authority, to which they can resort when suffering real or supposed injustice in India. They may on occasion talk of it irreverently, as the regimental officer does of the "Staff"; but on the whole it is a protective institution towards which they have a kindly if patronizing feeling, such as children might have to a grandparent. It is only in the higher strata of administration that a certain want of conformability, to use a geological term, occasionally produces a sense of discomfort and even of irritation. We are quite prepared to accept the author's conclusion regarding the India Office that

"The Government of India can hardly know how often either the rejection of doubtful advice by the Secretary of State himself, or his willingness to listen to expert opinion on his own ideas, may have prevented the issue of instructions which Simla could not have accepted without a struggle."

The interference of the Secretary of State on his own account or as mouth-piece of the Home Government stands on quite a different plane. At times it has taken the form of encouraging the Government of India in a more enlightened and liberal course than that Government might otherwise have pursued. At other times it has forced on that Government a policy contrary to the interests of India as locally understood. Sir Malcolm refers to the case of the cotton duties in 1875; he might also have instanced the subsequent imposition of an excise duty on cotton goods manufactured in India. In the former case the Viceroy was obliged to overrule his Executive Council; in both cases the Government of India was forced to adopt a policy condemned by public opinion in India. Indians felt, not without some show of reason, that their interests weighed less with the governing authority than those of the voters of Lancashire. A sense of injustice and of helplessness was created that long rankled, and that we believe had a large share in stimulating the political discontents of recent years.

For action of this description, whether its results are good or bad, the responsibility rests on the Home Government as a whole, but much depends on the manner in which the policy of that Government is communicated and enforced by the Secretary of State. That high officer may, in exerting his indefinite power of control, adopt an attitude that belittles the Government of India—a course which is open, though in a much higher degree, to the same objection as the public depreciation of the manager of a business concern by its directors. Such was the attitude, or such at least it appeared in Indian eyes to be, of the late Lord Morley, who in his love of power contrived to pose before

the public as the real ruler of India, with such success that a frontier dispute in which the Government of India insisted on military action was popularly known as "Morley's week-end war." Whether the initiation of the reforms of those days came from Simla or from Whitehall, it was Lord Morley who dominated their elaboration and appropriated the greater part of such credit as their short life justified. To him the Viceroy and Government of India were mere agents, and it was believed that in an unguarded moment he said so publicly. The damage done by such an attitude does not lend itself to proof, but it is at least an interesting speculation whether, had the home authorities allowed a greater degree of independence to the Government of India, and left it to settle its differences face to face with its critics in India, a system of rule might not gradually have been evolved, not less liberal, but better adapted to Oriental conditions and traditions than that which has been imposed in slavish imitation of Western institutions. We are glad to find our author protesting vigorously against the attitude criticized above.

"Much harm has been caused by wrong-headed or ill-informed utterances suggesting that the control of the Home Government does, or ought to, reduce to the position of a mere subordinate agency the authority charged with the actual government of three hundred millions of the human race."

The shrewdness of Lord Morley found in the system of "private telegrams" an instrument admirably adapted to facilitate the treatment of the Viceroy as an agent. As the system has since been criticized by a Royal Commission, we may express our complete agreement in all that Sir Malcolm says in defence of it. The practice is inevitable, and to object to it would be futile. But, like all good systems, it may be abused, as happened in war-time, and as may at any time happen when adroitness at one end of the wire communicates with ingenuousness at the other. The only guarantee against misuse is that both correspondents should have a clear idea of the limitations of this mode of communication, and that it should never be used with a view to evading any of the checks that the constitution imposes on official action.

We cannot deal further with the great variety of useful information compressed into this monograph, but attention may be called to the excellent accounts of the Indian Exchange and Currency problems, and of the Railway policy in the chapters contributed by Mr. F. S. Stewart.

"The main purpose of the currency policy," he tells us, "has been to stabilize the rupee." It is interesting, therefore, to note that, during the years of inflation, the currency of India was more stable than those of other countries—that is, "the rise in prices in India was much less than the rise elsewhere."

THE EDUCATION OF INDIA. By Arthur Mayhew, C.I.E. London: Faber and Gwyer. 1926. 10s. 6d. net.

It is somewhat paradoxical that books on such a subject as education should be generally considered as dull. For, after all, education is a process through which, in some form or other, we have all passed, though so much modern journalism and political debate make this difficult to believe. And one would suppose that a matter of universal experience ought to be a matter of universal interest. Yet it is notoriously not so. The only explanation that seems to fit the facts is that most books about education really are dull—terribly dull. Nor, for light reading, does the ordinary man or woman rush to obtain serious studies of the more technical aspects of Indian political and social problems. Mr. Mayhew, then, shows courage, when (like the gentleman in Dickens who wrote on Chinese Metaphysics after "combining the information" on China and Metaphysics to be

found in an encyclopædia) he publishes a study of the Education of India. But he is abundantly justified by the result. Already known to a circle of friends as a brilliant writer, he has had exceptional opportunities of studying our Indian educational system from inside, having served in Madras and Hyderabad State, as well as in the Central Provinces, where he was Director of Public Instruction and took part in the transfer of educational affairs to the control of a Minister under the dyarchic system. "Emotion recollected in tranquillity," a famous definition of poetry, is not a bad recipe for the discussion of controversial questions, and this book gains from its composition in the study of an Eton master a certain detachment which could hardly have been attained amid the worries of an Indian Educational Service officer's labours. Further, to have come from educational administration in India to the work of teaching in an English public school enables the author to consider how far an official in the East may insensibly acquire a way of looking at things that diverges from the point of view of educational experts in this country, and Mr. Mayhew is thus furnished with a broadness of outlook necessarily rare amongst writers on such subjects. He possesses another uncommon quality: he is an enthusiast for educational ideals without illusion as to educational realities. There is much salutary plain speaking in his book, and, as we know, anyone who speaks plainly about India is liable to be charged with racial prejudice. But Mr. Mayhew not only sees the faults of our educational policy in India, but has the sympathy and insight to perceive how their results strike the Indian student. "To the system he attributes unjustly many of the defects in his training which are ultimately due to circumstances beyond the educationalist's control and to India's social and economic past and present condition. What he realizes is the unpleasant fact that he is being swept along a channel that leads the more fortunate only to Government service, condemned by patriots as soul-killing servitude, and the less fortunate to a few overstocked professions." For our system, so often criticized as purely literary, has, in fact, been unduly vocational: it has equipped young Indians to be lawyers or clerks, and not taught them to care for literature. The dual life that the ordinary Indian pupil leads has never before been so plainly presented as in this book: the youth devotes his school-hours to acquiring knowledge as directed by Western canons, and returns home to the absolutely different atmosphere of Hindu or Muslim family life. His brain is trained to one set of values, but his life is regulated by a very different code.

A systematic study of British educational policy in India has long been needed, not only by those practically concerned with Indian affairs, but by all serious students of the interaction between Europe and Asia, and here at last we have a comprehensive survey by a man who has read widely, and combines the results of practical experience with the fruits of study. From the first rather drowsy awakening of the East India Company to the claims of education Mr. Mayhew traces the story, not overloading his study with detail, but always with an eye to the original authorities and to the mass of information buried in official reports. The early battle of the Anglicizers and the Orientalists is ably described, and while Macaulay meets with due recompense for his ignorant and cocksure superficiality, it is shown that we did not so much force English teaching on India as meet a growing demand for it among Hindus. The hollowness of the "permeation" doctrine is emphasized, and it is really astonishing that even politicians should have supposed that the instruction of the literary castes in English would lead automatically to the education of the masses in Western learning. Female education—"the response to a demand that does not exist"—receives special attention in these pages. Mr. Mayhew explains the difficulties, but stresses the lesson that nations do not absorb the benefits of education unless

both sexes can share them. He is very conscious of the inadequacy of any system that, debarred from trenching on religion, leaves untouched the deepest influences on human character. He recognizes the inevitability of State control in the conditions of nineteenth-century India, but points out that the blend of bureaucracy with teaching is utterly uncongenial to the English character, and was bound to produce unforeseen results when introduced by us to India. While not altogether despondent as to the future—in fact, he thinks that English teachers will be more welcome when invited by Indian authorities than they have been as the nominees of a purely British Government—he sees the dangers that may arise in a country habituated to Government control as political and communal factors enter more largely into the machinery of the State. The book is clear without dryness, to adopt a taste for metaphor which occasionally runs away with the author, and in one place commits him (after playing with the notion of masons working on an educational citadel) to the novel doctrine that bees may produce not only sweetness, but light. M. C. S.

AN INDIAN CIVILIAN'S MEMORIES

LIFE IN THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE. By Sir Evan Maconochie, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.
London: Chapman and Hall. 1926. 18s. net.

A novel and unexpected objection to a career in India was lately advanced by a small boy, asked whether he wished to follow a distinguished father into one of the Services. "No!" he said. "If I went into the I.C.S. I should have to associate with Governors and Viceroy, and that sort of riff-raff!" Sir Evan Maconochie is more tolerant, and, indeed, in his estimate of Lord Curzon, whom he sums up as "the greatest Indian Viceroy of our times—possibly of all time—fearless, creative, ardent, human," contributes a note to history which should be of lasting value. But the attractiveness of his book rests largely on the fact that it describes, cheerfully and vividly, the life of a district officer who enjoyed his work, knew and liked the people committed to his charge, and preserves a healthy detachment as to the ways of Secretariats. The author dedicates the book to "the undergraduates and schoolboys of this country," and if the pedagogues of to-day have courage enough to discard the old convention that a school prize should be unreadable, they ought to put this book on their lists. Sir Evan is not of those who talk as if service in India under the new conditions were as enjoyable as in the old paternal days: "No official appreciates political agitation, least of all when it is directed against his own existence, and I cannot pretend to have enjoyed the atmosphere of 1921. But political agitation has come to stay, and the Indian civilian of the future must accept the fact." Yet he does not let the consideration that his own last year in India coincided with the most uncomfortable epoch of official life discolour his recollections of happier times, or darken his estimate of the permanent factors of Indian administration. Clearly he thinks that India is still a good country for the Englishman who is prepared to make friends among Indians, to shed insular prejudices against unfamiliar ways, and to realize that "a rough and overbearing manner and temper, or a swaggering assumption of racial superiority simply stamp you with all classes as not a gentleman." And, indeed, when full weight is allowed to all the well-known drawbacks, is there any profession other than the Indian Services (apart from the Army and Navy) which offers greater premiums to the combination of mental and physical fitness, which gives a better chance of really absorbing professional work, or which allows a man with "out-of-doors" tastes equal opportunities of sport in its best forms?

But this book is not written to maintain a thesis, or to discuss political problems: its object is to describe a career of thirty-two years in India from the point of view of a man who enjoyed it. And few books of the kind are so completely devoid of egoism and so free from every kind of uncharitableness. There are good stories in it, and if the author is never malicious, he shows clearly enough that he possesses a soundly critical spirit. His service was spent mainly in the Bombay Presidency, but he had a spell as an under-secretary with the Government of India (*consule* Curzon) and an interlude as private secretary to the Maharaja of Mysore. Some of the most interesting chapters are devoted to the Kathiawar States, a region about which not very much has been written of recent years. The book contains excellent illustrations, ranging from spirited photographs of elephants rampaging about a kheddah to admirable coloured drawings of Indian insects from the brush of Lady Maconochie. M. C. S.

RELIGION AND FOLKLORE OF NORTHERN INDIA. By William Crooke, C.I.E.
Prepared for the Press by R. E. Enthoven, C.I.E. Milford: Oxford University Press, 1926. 21s.

A difficult book to review thoroughly in a short notice, but one to which it is easy to give the complimentary notice which it so well deserves. It is fortunate that Dr. Crooke's work should have had as editor a man so competent and with such a keen love of the subject as Mr. Enthoven. There is little in the book on the subject of the really great religions of Northern India; but then they appeal little to the masses, and are practised only by the small proportion of learned, philosophical, or truly pious folk who might be said to have religious convictions in the ordinary acceptance of the word religion. These 489 pages are full of examples of the grossly absurd superstitions connected with the grotesque and petty deities of the mass of the people.

Would not "Superstitions and Folklore" have perhaps been a more descriptive title?

Although a wide field has been covered in the research, "Northern India" is rather a vague definition. The book is most carefully arranged, with copious references to authorities and a good index. Only one printing error was discovered, on p. 408, where *his* is evidently a mistake for *her* in the penultimate line.

One is rather bewildered by the extraordinary mixture of polytheism, anthropomorphism, animism, and ancestor worship, all of which seem to find a place in this quaint conglomerate of beliefs. Fear is the outstanding feature of all, and fear is, of course, essentially irreligious. Symbols of the godlings are not in every case considered by the people as the godlings themselves; but the concept of a supreme deity, although it may be making some headway in the urban areas, is as yet too high an ideal for the intelligence of the ordinary peasant. The feeling uppermost in one's mind on finishing the book was one of great pity.

Enthoven in his book on "Bombay Folklore" says: "Fear of the numerous hostile powers by which the Hindu feels himself to be surrounded—a fear fostered by natural timidity due to poor physique . . ." But this fear permeates as well much of the lives of the virile and warlike nations of India—perhaps not so much physical fear as the dread of ill-fortune from all the forces of evil, and which leads in both Hindu and Muhammadan to the universal practice of charms. Ruskin said: "Superstition, in all times and among all nations, is the fear of a spirit whose passions are those of a man, whose acts are the acts of a man; who is present in some places and not in others; who makes some places

holy and not others; who is kind to one person and not to another; who is pleased or angry according to the degree of attention you pay him or praise you refuse to him; who is hostile generally to human pleasure, but may be bribed by sacrifice of a part of that pleasure into permitting the rest. This, whatever form of faith it colours, is the essence of superstition."

Imagine the life of a peasant girl brought up in a remote village in the foothills of the Himalayas, subject to terror from all the manifold hill godlings, jinns, bhūts, witches, and ghosts, as well as from those of the plains. The incessant watchfulness not to offend, the necessity of continuous propitiatory offerings to ward off possible evil, added to the awful possibility of widowhood or barrenness; throughout her life dread of superstitious evils in addition to all the cruelties of caste oppression. What wonder that they are old in youth, and overcome with apathy and fatalism. There is, however, another side to the shield—all the bright, amusing folklore connected with good fairies and kindly sprites, the village games and dances, when for a space fear is forgotten.

It has been the same through all the ages and all over the world until the light slowly breaks in upon the mist of ignorance. In 1716 Mrs. Hunt and her daughter of nine years of age were hung as witches in England! Only sixteen years since the writer witnessed and took photos of a demonstration by one of the last of the witches of Nagar. It is, by the way, the pungent fumes of the burning juniper, and not the deodar, which are usually employed to bring on the trance.

There is a great similarity in the village, of the ideas of both Hindu and Mussalman, the first having an absolute faith in his local godling for all family and agricultural troubles, as the latter has in the village shrine, ziarat, and priest. Both will go on long pilgrimages to places where the greater gods or saints have been or have blessed, but will always have a more secure and comfortable association with their own godling or saint, who knows so intimately all about them and their relations. The Mussalman tribesman under an autocratic ruler holds in veneration the supposed miraculous powers of his chief, in the same way that a Hindu does the divine authority of his Raja. The Thum of Nagar with his miraculous drum has power over the forces of nature! The chief of the Marri Baluch can cure most diseases! Folk-tales even of the higher sort "are not told to amuse children in the nursery, but are narratives of the truth, which the peasant implicitly believes." On p. 251 it is said that the ceremonies at the beginning of ploughing at Gilgit, are done by members of a clan believed to be specially lucky; but it was the Raja of Gilgit who had to plough the first furrow, scatter some gold dust over the ground, and supply the first handfuls of seed-grain as well as the feast. The head of the sacrificial goat was dragged by a horseman about the polo-ground amid great excitement. It was at one time attempted to revive the custom of the women at this festival lining the village road with long rods in their hands with which to belabour those who were unpopular; but the Kashmiri official did not dare face the ordeal!

We are apt to forget what a large part superstition plays in the lives of the population of the Western as well as the Eastern hemispheres. This book, compiled with such care and thought, should be studied by all who have an interest in India, and certainly ought to be a compulsory subject for all recruits to the I.C.S., as well as Secretaries of State for India and all their staff. A sound tonic for the statesman at home, who meets only the suave, ingratiating, and educated Swarajist to learn what is the mentality of the individuals who go to make up a mob either in the towns or country districts. We should never forget that the Brahman and high-caste man control the masses through this greatest of all power in India—*fear*. One fact stands out clear—that unless

there is a strong rule during the spread of enlightened civilization, the ignorant would soon fall back to the original motives underlying most of these practices—namely, cruelty and human sacrifice.

Is it not possible that all these weird ceremonies and rites will be slowly purified and become simple, helpful, and consoling ritual as in the Western Churches, and no longer terrifying and full of the prospects of ghastly horrors. "And when they shall say unto you, Seek unto them that have familiar spirits, and unto wizards that peep and mutter: should not a people seek unto their God? for the living to the dead?" (Isa. viii. 19). It is so necessary to be sympathetic to those oppressed by the importance of rites and ritual of all sorts; and we can but hope there are not many to-day in the Western world like that terrible American tourist, who blew out the lamp lighted by Francis of Assisi and kept burning in a small chapel in Italy for nearly 700 years.

No compliment that can be paid to a European in India by the people is so valuable as "Sahib, you understand"; and it is only by a careful study of the people, either through books like this under review, or at first hand oneself, that it can be earned.

There is a nameless grave of a European in a little village far from the railway in the Kalat State, in the corner of a pleasant Eastern garden, amidst shady trees and rose-bushes; it is carefully tended, and on fête days garlanded and little lamps lighted at the head. Nobody knows who was the "Sahib" buried there, but doubtless somebody in the first advance in 1888. The Hindu bunniah to whom the garden belongs simply knows that his grandfather and father tended the grave, and that they attributed all their luck and good-fortune to its being on their property. So an English subaltern may some day, according to Dr. Crooke, be promoted by a Brahman, to be a doorkeeper to one of the greater gods. Surely it is a most engrossing study, and one the Government might do more to help in co-ordinating and publishing in popular editions.

It was a careful study of religion and folklore which enabled Alfred Lyall to understand the psychology of the people as he did:

"I am the God of the sensuous fire
That moulds all Nature in forms divine;
The symbols of death and of man's desire,
The springs of change in the world, are mine;
The organs of birth and the circlet of bones,
And the light loves carved on the temple stones.

"I am the lord of delights and pain,
Of the pest that killeth, of fruitful joys;
I rule the currents of heart and vein;
A touch gives passion, a look destroys;
In the heat and cold of my lightest breath
Is the might incarnate of Lust and Death.

"Let my temples fall, they are dark with age,
Let my idols break, they have stood their day;
On their deep-hewn stones the primeval sage
Has figured the spells that endure alway;
My presence may vanish from river and grove,
But I rule for ever in Death and Love."

ALIF SHAHNAMEH.

THE MOSUL QUESTION. By V. F. M. *Reference Service on International Affairs of the American Library in Paris, Inc.* With 2 maps, 1 dollar. April 15, 1926.

This is a painstaking and scrupulously documented summary of published documents relating to a question which has now, fortunately for the peace of the Middle East, been definitely settled, in accordance with the best traditions of European diplomacy, by a tripartite agreement between Turkey, Iraq, and Great Britain. It has the defects of its qualities. The writer, like most of his countrymen who write or speak on diplomatic problems, emphasizes, in his efforts to be impartial, the legalistic aspects of the problem; the views of individual and irresponsible private members of the House of Commons are set forth at some length in large print, whilst facts and diplomatic documents of great importance are merely cited in footnotes. The political advantages accruing to Great Britain through the award of Mosul to Iraq are strongly emphasized; it is claimed that "by removing the frontier far to the north of the Mesopotamian plains, Great Britain obtains more security for the imperial communications which may eventually be developed between the shores of the Mediterranean . . . and India." In support of this statement, an article by Père Poidebard, a learned Jesuit priest, is cited in a footnote; the views of the late Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson on the subject are not mentioned!

"The Mosul settlement," says the author, "completes the encirclement of Persia by zones of British influence," a statement which carries its own refutation, and would cause amusement in Russia!

Rawanduz, it seems, is important to Iraq "only on account of its situation at the head of several tracks leading into Azarbaijan," and which before 1917 was "the stronghold of Russian influence." If such were the case, strategical prudence would surely demand that Rawanduz be awarded to Turkey, so as to prevent Russian penetration into Iraq if and when Azarbaijan once more becomes the stronghold of Russian influence. As a matter of fact the Rawanduz—Sanj Bulaq track is, as the Russians found to their cost during the war, exceedingly difficult; the Wazneh Pass, fifty miles to the south, is more promising.

Making allowance, however, for the natural bias of the compiler, the pamphlet is a masterpiece of the art of précis-writing, and, read in conjunction with the terms of settlement, will serve to emphasize to the student of affairs that the solution of complicated international problems is to be reached, less by the painstaking study of public documents than by the friendly personal interchange of views between accredited diplomatists. In fact, the diplomatist has come into his own again, and the efficacy of old-fashioned diplomatic methods has been signally vindicated in the statesmanlike settlement of this thorny question.

A. T. W.

GRASS. By Merian C. Cooper. G. Putnam's Sons, Knickerbocker Press, London and New York. 1925.

Mr. Cooper went to Baghdad, in company with Mrs. Harrison and Mr. E. B. Schoedsack, to take cinematograph pictures of the Kurds, but political trouble prevented that, so they visited instead the Baba Ahmedi tribe of the Bakhtiari, in south-west Persia. (The author adopts the spelling "Baktyari" on the somewhat cryptic plea that it will simplify the reader's task). This book is the story of the resulting film, produced in London some months ago, and exhibited by Sir Arnold Wilson to a joint meeting of the Royal Asiatic, Central Asian, and Persia Societies. Those who saw the film will be glad to have the book, with its sixty-four full-page photographs, as a permanent memento of one of the finest cinematograph records of actual life—unrehearsed

and exactly as it had been lived for centuries—ever made or likely to be made. Those who did not see the film will perhaps never get another chance, and the book will arouse vain regrets.

Fifty thousand people—men, women, and children, with their flocks and herds and all their other possessions (except their tents, which they leave behind)—move from their winter grazing grounds in the neighbourhood of Shushtar to summer pasture on higher ground, more than a hundred miles to the east. There is a wide and swift river to be crossed by swimming or on rough rafts, rocky cliffs to be climbed, snow-covered mountain ranges to be scaled. This colossal task is accomplished every year, across a roadless wilderness, where no supplies can be obtained, and no shelter from rain or storm. The tribes live on whatever they can carry with them; the animals on the country. It is spring, and there are "baby sheep, baby cows, baby horses, baby goats, baby donkeys, not to speak of any quantity of human babies." All this the author describes with a fine sense of adventure, romance, and beauty. But you should have seen the film.

E. H. K.

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA. By Arthur C. Millspach, Administrator-General of the Finances of Persia. 8 x 5½. 322 pp., illustrated. Messrs. T. Werner Laurie, Ltd. 1926. 15s.

This book gives an account of the work of the American Financial Mission to Persia, written by its chief. It is a record of honest, hard work, and although not written from an entirely impartial point of view, it is, generally speaking, reliable. The Americans, who had no knowledge of the East, were at first much troubled by intrigues, and the corrupt state of affairs might well have daunted them, but they showed steady determination and settled down to fight the good fight for financial reform. At the end of four years they have evidently won over the Persians to accept their views, and, although there is still much to do, there is hope that Persia will not only produce a budget that balances, but will gradually improve her communications and develop her resources. The book is not well written, and is in one important respect misleading, for it does not clearly show the rise to the throne of Reza Khan and the overthrow of the Kajar dynasty. This is an event of the greatest importance for Persia, and if the life of the new Shah be spared for twenty years he should be able to leave Persia in a far better condition than he found it, for he evidently understands the fundamental facts of the situation, and is a strong supporter of the American Mission. Already he has restored order and disarmed the turbulent nomads.

Another criticism is the very careless manner in which the book is written. For example, *Qarun* or *Korah*, the typically rich man of the East, is confused with the *Koran*, which surely is a mistake that any Persian member of Dr. Millspach's staff would have corrected. The spelling, too, is partly American, and altogether the book wants "pulling together."

Apart from these errors, which are due to lack of knowledge of the language and to haste, the book is one that merits careful study by members of the Central Asian Society, who will be gratified to realize that historical Persia is setting her house in order under a strong monarch, and that there are greater hopes of progress than at any time during the present generation.

P. M. SYKES.

SYRIA. By Leonard Stein. Ernest Benn. 3s. 6d.

The object of this book, as stated in its preface, is to provide the general reader with an historical background which might help him to a better appreciation of the present situation in Syria. As Mr. Stein says, there is no book in

English to which the student can turn for a concise and objective account of the course of events in Syria from the Armistice down to the outbreak of the Druse rebellion in July, 1925; and this volume represents the author's endeavour to supply the want. The result is somewhat disappointing. Mr. Stein, who as political secretary of the Zionist organization in London is in close touch with Near Eastern affairs, might have given us, even within the limited compass of this slight volume, a work of real value. As it is, and for all the lucidity and the studied detachment of its style, his essay will not help the general reader to a better appreciation of the Syrian problem. For the picture he has drawn, and drawn so skilfully, is essentially one-sided and incomplete, and therefore misleading.

The key to the present situation in Syria lies in the universal feeling of disappointment and distrust which the post-war settlement engendered among all classes of the Syrian population. The national awakening in Syria and in other Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire had begun long before the war, and had secured for those provinces a substantial measure of local autonomy—the presage of the political liberation for which they strove. But it was only two years after the outbreak of the war that Arab nationalism found its opportunity and made its vital effort. Of this effort the mainspring was the pledge given by Great Britain in 1915 to the Arabs through the intermediary of Sherif Hussein. The pledge was, in effect, a definite promise to recognize and support an Arab independent state in Syria, and its fulfilment was conditional upon the military co-operation of the Arabs against their Turkish masters and co-religionists. That the Arabs adequately performed their share of the mutual obligation no one in authority has yet denied. As for the British side of the bargain, its execution was left to the chances and changes of post-war Allied diplomacy.

The hopes of Syrian Nationalists were still further raised when the Anglo-French declaration of November, 1918, was issued. In that declaration Great Britain and France stated that their aim in pursuing the war in the East was the establishment in Syria and Mesopotamia of national governments “deriving their authority from the initiative and the free choice of the native populations.” Moreover, these were the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which makes provision for the tutelage, to be exercised by mandatory powers, of certain communities formerly under Ottoman rule, and in which it is stated that “the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.”

It is a matter of common knowledge that those promises were left virtually unfulfilled, and no impartial student can overlook the harm that Great Britain and France did to their own interests as well as to their good name when they forced the astonishing fruits of Sèvres and San Remo upon an unwilling population. The promises made to the Arabs in 1915 were treated as a dead letter; Syria was partitioned and her unity destroyed; and an unwelcome mandatory was imposed upon the country in the name of that very League of Nations which busily preaches the Covenant.

The discontent which this settlement engendered lies at the root of the Syrian problem, as everyone knows who is in direct touch with Syrian opinion. It is idle, therefore, to state and worse still to imply that the troubles of France in Syria are of her own making, or that they are due to the fact that the Moslem Arab “resents the intrusion of Christian Europe, no matter what form it may take.” Those who were there at the time remember that the Allied armies when they occupied Syria were received with striking demonstrations of friendliness by Moslems and Christians alike, and that the desire for European tutelage was

universal and profound. When the King-Crane Commission toured the country in 1919, an overwhelming majority of Moslems and Christians declared themselves—as Mr. Stein ought to know since he is aware of the contents of the Commission's Report—in favour of a mandate being entrusted to a Western Christian Power.

It may be that the author has not had an opportunity of travelling in Syria and obtaining his information at first hand; and that he has had, for his study of the problem, to rely on documentary sources alone. If that is so, the inaccuracy of his account is still further explained by a glance at the bibliographical list on p. 91 and at the other references mentioned, as they occur, in the footnotes. Of these, only two are Syrian sources; and of those two, one was published in 1916 and the other is the work of an author who admittedly represents the point of view of a Christian minority. The remaining sources are French, English, Italian, American, or Russian. To Syrian Arab sources there is not a single reference. Mr. Stein's thesis is set forth with admirable lucidity and with a moderation which cannot fail to appeal. But he has been unhappy in the choice of his sources, and he omits facts which are material to the story and which, had they come to his knowledge, might have rendered the elaboration of his thesis in its present form impossible. G.

ISRAEL. By Ludwig Levisohn. Messrs. Benn Ltd.

Zionism has now become one of the prominent questions of the day since the Balfour Declaration changed what was an aspiration of enthusiasm into some measure of practical politics. Its advantages, its possibilities, and its objections are now the theme of every Jewish paper, as well as of the Press of the world. "Israel" is a fervent appeal for Zionism on psychological grounds, and a passionate refutation of the placid satisfaction of those Jews who contend that assimilation is their proper future. The author declares that in no country in the world, even in tolerant England, are the Jews assimilated. Jews of England may declare that they are more English than the English, but do the English accept them? In America, the land of the free, where no tradition of the Ghetto exists, where disabilities are unknown, are the Jews, he asks, assimilated? He tells of a small dinner party in an American club, of a distinguished Jewish surgeon, 'broad, blond, sagacious, blue-eyed,' bursting out: "We are not wanted anywhere! I hate the Jews, I hate myself." He tells how in America the situation in a generation has changed, and while the old folk believe they are accepted, the young folk know they are not. How Jews press zealously in all the professions, eager to lead, eager to reform, eager to use their brains for mankind, in art, in music, in literature, in politics, only to find that eternal bar sinister. Nobody wants their help, nobody wants their brains, nobody welcomes their sympathy; and he treats powerfully of the psychological despair of the race that is often unrealized even when felt, as well as the horrors of the past. Never, he declares, can this race be a race till it has a locus and a temporal power of its own. With that they can be men once again. And it is all very convincing and very logical, and very spiritual, too. He talks of the Jewish mystery—that remarkable belief in the "Masters of the Name," which has been the source of so much mediæval legend. What was it on Aaron's rod that the sea saw and fled? The Shem Hamphoreah? The writer of "Israel" knows and feels it all. Then he turns in comfort to the sights he has seen in Palestine—the live wires in the new settlements, the energy and resource with which the lost race returns to agriculture, the orchards and vineyards of the Rothschild and

Montefiore settlements, the new villages of Esdraelon, and the deepening of Jezred, and takes heart of grace.

It is a powerful book, and it aims at converting not the Gentile, but the placid, comfortable Jews who regard assimilation as their future and the mixing of oil and water.

The writer does not touch on the real practical problem of the mandate and how to blend the interests of what Disraeli very properly termed the Mosaic Arab with the Arabs of the desert, and the dilution of the Arabs of Palestine. It is no more possible to evict them because of earlier rights than it is to restore the Celtic inhabitants of Britain to the lands that the Saxon and the Norman have taken, and yet eviction by purchase or by pressure will be inevitable if Zionism is to rise to where the enthusiasts would have it. The problem is difficult, yet, the British hope, not insoluble. Mr. Levisohn aims at stirring the Jews of the world to make use of their imperishable race consciousness for some more definite purpose than to apologize for themselves and the abject past that fate has put on them. It is a strange story from the wars of "them old McCabes," as the Ulster farmer has it, to the laying out of Esdraelon as the result of Lord Allenby's victories.

To those in England, and there are many, who hold Zionist convictions, even the enthusiasts of the British-Israel cult, Mr. Levisohn's book will make a considerable appeal, and some there be who want to know what was the train of thought that made the compilers take the Epistle for the last Sunday in the year from Jeremiah instead of from the New Testament, and why the passage containing that remarkable prophecy about the gathering from the North country.

TURKEY. ("Modern World" Series.) By Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood. Ernest Benn, Ltd. 15s. net.

Frankly, this book, or at least the greater part of it, is a disappointment. Where we expected history we find propaganda, and unstinted panegyric is often served up to the reader in place of sober criticism. The faults of repetition, overlapping, and even occasional contradictions, to which the system of joint authorship is peculiarly liable, might have been minimized by more careful co-ordination; while the desire to show the Turkish nation in a favourable light need not have entailed the avoidance of facts telling against it.

If we may hazard a guess as to the parts taken respectively by the joint authors in compiling the book we should say that, roughly speaking, Professor Toynbee is more directly responsible for the earlier portion and his collaborator for the later. When the progress actually made by the Turkish Republic comes to be dealt with towards the end of the work latent pessimism is in strong contrast with the exuberant optimism of earlier passages.

The sketch of Turkish history prior to the Armistice of October, 1918, with which the volume appropriately begins, is remarkable for one unaccountable omission. The terrible series of Armenian massacres which disgraced the last fifteen years or so of Abdul Hamid's autocracy, were continued on a lesser scale by the Young Turks, and culminated in the holocausts of the Great War, are entirely ignored. And yet it is these massacres, which incidentally freed Turkey from the embarrassing Armenian question by the elimination of all but a poor remnant of the Armenian nation, as well as the atrocious treatment meted out to the unfortunate British captives from Kut, that have cost Turkey the sympathy of so many erstwhile well-wishers in this country and render it difficult to share Professor Toynbee's enthusiasm for the Turkish race.

Chapters V. and VI., headed respectively "Mustafa Kemal" and "The

Græco-Turkish War (1919-22)," cover a period of extraordinary interest, though far from grateful to British *amour propre*, and it is a pity that the writer was unable to deal with it in a more convincing manner. But passionate admiration of the Ghazi Pasha tends to obscure his judgment. That Mustafa Kemal is a gallant and able soldier who, when the Turkish nation seemed utterly prostrate after the Armistice, by his courage and driving power raised it to its feet and led it to victory over the Greek invaders; who was quick to detect the weakness of the allied position, and could call the bluff of others while concealing his own, are facts that few would wish to deny. Between that, however, and the pedestal on which Professor Toynbee would place him, there is a considerable gap; and it is at least premature to assert that the President of the Turkish Republic "has made a unique place for himself in the annals of history . . . as the builder of a new Western State out of an Oriental people." This appreciation seems to be based rather on what one hopes that the Turkish Republic may eventually become than on what it actually is to-day, and more convincing proof than bare assertion is required before we can agree that by a mere change of label Turkey has wiped out a sombre record and raised herself within three or four years to the level of the civilized states of Europe. The leopard does not change his spots by the simple process of calling himself a white lamb. Nor has Mustafa Kemal Pasha, though agile enough in overturning existing institutions, yet given much proof that he possesses the quality of constructive statesmanship.

The account of the Græco-Turkish War and the vain efforts of Great Britain, unscrupulously deserted by Allies with axes of their own to grind, to carry out the original intentions of the Coalition with regard to Turkey, is vividly written, though the narrative is marred as much by anti-Greek bias as by the almost doting affection for the Turkish Nationalist party, which leads the writer to regard with manifest complacency the successive failures of his own country's policy. It is interesting to note the manner in which misconduct on the part of the Greeks (who were unfortunately guilty of unexcusable excesses, both on the occasion of their first landing at Smyrna and in their final retreat to the coast) is treated as compared with the indulgence shown to the Turks, though in such matters the Greeks are but bungling amateurs by the side of the experienced Turkish professionals. "Ruthless warfare against the Turkish population," "the commission of atrocities in the worst Near-Eastern manner," "a reign of terror which shocked the whole world," is what the Greeks did. For the Turks quite mild chiding suffices, not unmixed with admiration. "Order was only partially maintained." . . . "In the next few days of disorder there burst out the terrible fire that swept half the city away, burned for a week, and destroyed the richest section of Smyrna. It was the pyre of the unfaithful city, 'Gyaur Izmir,' and it was the symbol of the final purging of Turkey. The Nationalists had won in the ordeal by combat; they were tested in the ordeal by fire, which burned the European quarter and left the inflammable Turkish quarter seatless."

What does Professor Toynbee exactly mean by this last sentence? To the ordinary man it would appear that the people "tested in the ordeal by fire" were not so much the Turks, who escaped, as the Europeans and native Christians, whose quarter was burned down; and it is a ground for regarding the origin of the conflagration with the gravest suspicion that it should not have started until the direction of the wind ensured the safety of the Turkish part of the town.

The slaughter of many thousands of Armenians by Nationalist troops in Cilicia after the French withdrawal in 1921-22, which left a nasty stain on Mustafa Kemal's halo, is not even referred to.

Space permits of only the bare mention of chapters concerning the Lausanne Conference and Treaty, the "Ideas of 1789," and the abolition of the Capitulations, the Sultanate, and the Caliphate. Then come chapters dealing with "The New Turkey," its administrative and economical situation, population, agriculture, railways, commerce, industry, and finance. This, the most valuable portion of the book, we conjecture to be the work of Mr. Kirkwood, who, as we learn from the preface, has resided for some time in Turkey since the war and can therefore write with knowledge of his subject.

While a sympathetic attitude towards the Nationalists is still manifest, the early optimism has somewhat waned, and there is no tendency to gloss over or ignore the facts of the situation. It is not a very encouraging picture that is presented to the reader. The Turkish Republic, the new Western State, appears in fact as "a despotic oligarchy dressed in the garb of constitutionalism"; or, as an alternative, "an autocratic duumvirate," composed of Mustafa Kemal and his henchman, Izmet Pasha. While the constitution of the Republic assures "freedom of thought, of speech, of Press" for every Turk, nothing of the sort is allowed in practice. The newspapers are muzzled or suppressed; and the editor of the *Tanin* was even prosecuted, not for criticizing the Government's policy, but "for the tacit criticism implied in the editor's prolonged abstention from discussing politics at all!"

Side by side with the adoption of new codes of law adapted from those existing in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, and the inauguration of a Faculty of Law at Angora to train qualified judges for a reformed judiciary, we are told of the establishment of "Tribunals of Independence" to dispose arbitrarily of political opponents after the most approved Cheka methods.

The extravagant chauvinism of Nationalist policy towards every institution and enterprise not purely Turkish, its irritating and obstructive interference with the working of foreign educational establishments, the hampering of foreign trade, and the financial bad faith of the Angora Government, receive due mention. The policy hitherto followed by the Turkish Nationalists in the matter of State obligations, approximating as it does to the principle enunciated by Major Pawkins in "Martin Chuzzlewit," "Run a moist pen slick through everything and start fresh," inspires the writer with natural apprehensions regarding the future supply of foreign capital, without which the resources of Turkey can hardly be developed.

In sum, a record of much promise, but so far of little performance, affording small justification for the contention that a new Western State has arisen in Asia Minor.

The Turks may yet succeed in rising on stepping-stones of their dead selves to higher things, but the process of regeneration must inevitably be a long and a difficult one. It is too much to expect that men brought up in traditions of secular venality and misgovernment should suddenly be transformed into upright, capable, and disinterested administrators; indeed, there is little ground for believing that the officials of the Republic have attained a much higher standard of honesty and efficiency than was usual under the Sultanate.

Only a bold man would venture to make any prediction regarding the stability of the present régime in Turkey. Recent trials before the Tribunals of Independence indicate that the unanimity of the Republic's earlier days can no longer be reckoned on, and it remains to be seen whether repressive measures will suffice to stamp out all opposition. The conciliation of political opponents does not seem to enter into Mustafa Kemal's methods. For the time being he continues to enjoy popularity with the army, which is the main thing; but there are reports that he is not the man he was, and that self-indulgence and

the exercise of unlimited power have had a baneful effect on his character. The outlook for Turkey remains on the whole obscure.

A. C. W.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1926. By Colonel E. J. King, C.M.G., F.S.A., Knight of Justice of the Order; with an Introduction by Major-General the Earl of Scarbrough, G.B.E., K.C.B., F.S.A., Knight of Justice and Sub-Prior. London: St. John's Gate. 1926.

It is a pleasure to note that the members of the Grand Priory of England maintain their reputation as students of the history of their Order. Colonel King, Mr. Pirie-Gordon, and Mr. Fincham, all of whom went on "The Pilgrimage," have proved themselves competent and, on occasion, brilliant writers on Hospitaller history and traditions. In my earlier days in the Order Colonel Gould Hunter-Weston and the Rev. W. K. Riland Bedford were best known to me as students of history, and tempted me to compile the lecture which I delivered at the Royal United Service Institution in 1900. Earl Egerton of Tatton, the Chancellor of the Order, took the chair at that lecture, which was afterwards developed by the genealogist (Mr. Bedford) and the librarian (Colonel Holbeche) into the "History" of 1902 which bears their names. I am personally always attracted by Colonel E. J. King's style, and his faculty for introducing the reader to subjects new or set in a new light is always attractive and refreshing.

The Sub-Prior, the Earl of Scarbrough, in the very first sentence of his Introduction, sums up the significance of "The Pilgrimage of 1926" in the words: "It is the first occasion of an official visit of one of the Tongues of the Order to the scenes of its activities since its evacuation, firstly of Palestine in 1291, secondly of Rhodes in 1523, and thirdly of Malta in 1798."

Colonel King takes his readers first of all for a most fascinating visit to the Grand Priory of Venice, and thence almost in the footsteps of the famous itinerary of the Dean of Mainz, Bernhard von Breydenbach, to Corfu, Modon, Coron, Candia, and past Rhodes and Cyprus to Jerusalem. In February, 1914, I succeeded in finding in a dark corner of the Dom of Mainz the monument and effigy of this Dean, dated 1497. He made his journey to the Holy Land and Egypt in 1488-4. I note that Colonel King, in passing the islands of Sapienza and Cabrera, refers to their cession by the Greeks in 1823 to the Capitular Commission of the Order at Paris. Any who would desire fuller information about this League of Hospitaller and Greek against their hereditary foe the Turk I would refer to "L'Ordre de Malte," par le Baron Olivier de Lavigner (Paris, 1889), chap. xii.

When the British nation heard that on December 11, 1917, General Allenby had made his formal entry into Jerusalem, and, after a Moslem tenure of 730 years, received its surrender, it could not but be that such intelligence turned our thoughts for at least some minutes into a channel of solemn reflection. Some of my readers must know an attractive little book by Major Vivian Gilbert, entitled "The Romance of the Last Crusade," and if they know it they cannot but have read with amusement the eleventh chapter, entitled "The Surrender of Jerusalem." The spirit that inspires that chapter is not one of "solemn reflection," but, putting that aside, the humour of it is irresistible, and the progress of the Keys from the Cook to the G.O.C. is entertainingly told.

The reversion of Rhodes from the Turk to the Christian after a lapse of close on 400 years recalls to the memories of those who know something of late mediæval history the gallantry with which the Knights Hospitallers held Rhodes in the very teeth of the Turks from 1310 to 1523, and the enterprise and ability

with which they used it alike as a centre of commerce and a base for naval operations against Turkish fleets and Turkish trade. It was some time before I got into touch with Italian action in Rhodes, after that nation had reoccupied the island during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12. But the action of M. Bompard, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, could not escape my attention. For, on March 27, 1914, the special correspondent of *The Times* at Paris telegraphed, "The French Government has just accepted from M. Bompard, its Ambassador in Constantinople, the gift of the historic house in the island of Rhodes known as the 'Auberge de France.'" I drew attention to this then and there (in a letter to *The Times*, as far as I remember), and suggested that England should follow this example and acquire the "Auberge d'Angleterre." However, the authorities most interested would not move in the matter, and, as far as I remember, the only person who showed any sympathy with my aims was Mr. (now Lieut.-Colonel) E. V. Gabriel, of whose eminent services in connection with the Auberge of England at Rhodes and as a channel of communication with the Italian officials of the island, Colonel King speaks with just appreciation. It was Mr. Gabriel who, in June, 1914, wrote to me from Mount Abu, in India, expressing his concurrence in my views, and it was he also who, when attached towards the end of the War to the Ægean Squadron, seized his opportunity, visited Rhodes, purchased all he could of the Auberge of England, and arranged with the Italians for its restoration. I may further just mention, in connection with Cyprus and Budrum, both of which "The Pilgrimage" proposed to visit, that Mr. George Jeffery, O.B.E., F.S.A., Curator of Antient Monuments in Cyprus, and a member of this Society, using his influence with the High Commissioner, had the Castle of Kolossi placed under protection as an ancient monument, and that it was the lecture delivered to this Society shortly after the War by Signor Gilbert Bagnani which reawakened in the precincts of Clerkenwell a sense of what Budrum had meant to Rhodes and to Christendom from 1408 to 1523. The English tower of the Castle of Budrum is a most interesting monument of English chivalric devotion in the fifteenth century, and has been a subject of close study to the late Lord Amherst of Hackney and Admiral Sir Albert Markham. An endeavour was made, when Signor Bagnani lectured on Budrum to the C.A.S., to initiate a movement for the reconstruction of that tower, which had been bombarded and damaged during the War, but nothing came of it. That is greatly to be regretted.

I desire to draw special attention to the ceremonies of investiture which took place at Jerusalem (pp. 53-56), at Rhodes (pp. 88-90), and at Malta (pp. 111-114). At the Jerusalem ceremony* the Right Rev. Rennie MacInnes, D.D., Bishop of Jerusalem, was invested as Chaplain and Sub-Prelate; at that of Rhodes, His Excellency Signor Mario Lago, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Ægean Islands, and Signor Biliotti, Mayor of Rhodes, respectively, as Honorary Knights of Grace, and Honorary Associate; and at that of Malta, His Excellency General Sir W. N. Congreve, V.C., K.C.B., Governor and Commander-in-Chief, as Knight of Grace. The scenes of these investitures were, severally, the High Commissioner's residence in the Holy City, the Hall of the ancient Hospital of the Knights at Rhodes, and the Throne Room of the Grand-Master's Palace at Malta. As the author adds: "The Pilgrimage of 1926 must stand out for all time as one of the greatest and most significant events in the modern history of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England.

* The *Diocesan Magazine* of the Anglican Church in Jerusalem for April, 1926, gives a very interesting and appreciative account of the visit of "The Pilgrimage" to Jerusalem in that year.

I will in conclusion say a word or two on a subject to which the author in his book twice (pp. 27 and 102) alludes—viz., the Relics of the Order, to wit the right hand of St. John the Baptist, the Icon of Notre Dame de Philermno, and a fragment of the Holy Cross. It was known that these relics were preserved up to the War at Gatchina, but after the Revolution of 1917 and the introduction of Bolshevik Government, they were lost sight of. They had been in Russia since 1798, when the Knights of St. John, ejected from Malta, sought refuge with Paul I. of Russia, and took their most valued treasures with them. When there was much talk in our Press about the sale of art treasures in Russia, it occurred to me to try and ascertain what had become of the Hospitaller Relics. I commenced my enquiries in October, 1924, and aided by a French diplomatist, a Russian historian and art critic, and a British Consul-General, I ascertained that when General Yudenitch with his White Army retired from the neighbourhood of Gatchina in 1919, the Orthodox clergy of the Cathedral retired with him, taking the Relics with them to Reval. It interested me to ascertain, after I learnt this, that Mr. Pirie-Gordon of *The Times*, a Knight of Grace of the Order, had been in Reval in 1919 and frequently met General Yudenitch. What became of the Relics after Reval is unknown. A complete copy of the correspondence connected with this enquiry has been handed over by me to Colonel E. J. King for record at St. John's Gate.

It remains to correct the inscriptions on pp. 91 and 119. P. 91: For "Podatus Aglie" read "Prioratus Angliæ." P. 119: Sir Oliver Starkey's epitaph is correctly given in de Villeneuve-Bargemont's "Monuments des Grand Maîtres," Vol. II., p. 102, and Porter's "History of the Knights of Malta" (Edition 1858), Vol. II., p. 383. In "The Pilgrimage of 1926" five words must be thus corrected: Libyæque, edomitis, Getis, condidit, sepultus. I wish to draw special attention to the excellent and appropriate illustrations. A. C. YATE.

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1. SOME SAYINGS OF THE BUDDHA, ACCORDING TO THE PĀLI CANON. Translated by F. L. Woodward, M.A. (Cantab.). 6 x 3½. Pp. 356. Oxford University Press, 1925. Cloth, 5s.
 2. THE ETHICS OF BUDDHISM. By S. Tachibana. Royal 8vo. Pp. 288. Oxford University Press, 1926. Cloth, 15s.

1. The translations are of selected passages from the Vinaya, the Four Great Nikāyas, and parts of the Short Nikāya (including the whole of the Khuddaka-Piṭha). To add anything to our translations of the Pāli Scriptures is a worthy deed in itself; and Mr. Woodward's abilities as a translator are so well recognized that it is scarcely necessary to praise the pleasant and simple style he has adopted in his rendering. The Pāli text when translated is only with difficulty prevented from being wearisome to a reader, the original having been constructed for mnemonic rather than literary purposes. Of a handy size, this well-printed little book should be especially welcome to those who have taken up the study of Buddhism (and there must be many such nowadays), for here they will find at low cost some of the sayings cherished as the actual words of the Buddha, and which, therefore, may be looked upon as containing many of the original doctrines of the religion, "which objectively is a religion of truth, subjectively is a religion of knowledge." It is thought impossible to assign the Khuddaka-Piṭha (probably the most recent of these here translated) to a later date than 400 B.C. according to Professor T. W. Rhys Davids. As to which sayings are and which are not authentic that must, perhaps, always be a moot question. Though some seem to strike a genuine note, others, such as "Progress in the Heaven World," have the ring of at least a subsequent

elaboration. Incidentally, p. 5 contains no saying of the Buddha. Buddhism depends on authority less than other religions for the value of its teachings, any doctrine taught must be substantiated by itself, and this is manifested in the sections given us under "The Test of True Doctrine" and "Use Your Own Judgement." Mr. Woodward's selection is a good one, bringing out as it does various phases of the teachings. The Khuddaka-Pāṭha, the whole of which is translated, is thought to have been a sort of first lesson book for young neophytes when they joined the Order. It is noticed that "Trance" is made use of to render "Jhāna"; but is not this latter one of those terms, such as Sati, Pātimokkha, Upasatha, Āsava, Kāmmā, Nibbāna, Arahant, and Bhikkhu, which are better left untranslated? Would that there was a recommended list of these terms drawn up by those in authority!

An index to the passages would have been useful.

2. Professor S. Tachibana tells us that the difference is so little between the ethical systems of the two schools of Buddhism—Hīnayāna and Māhāyāna—that he has changed the original title, "Ethics of Pāli Buddhism." Does he consider Lamaism as a branch of the northern school or a distinct cult? One hopes the latter. He is Professor of Pāli and Primitive Buddhism at the Komazawa-Daigaku of Tokyo, and this volume is an extension of the thesis he successfully presented to the University of Oxford in 1922, where he was sent to prosecute his studies by the late Abbot of the Sōjiji institution near Tokyo. The book is divided into two parts, the first treating of thought and conditions previous to and during the Buddha's lifetime, and also a short, simple account of his life; and, finally, a classification and an explanation of the chief characteristics of Buddhist morality. One would like to have seen in the chapter devoted to the characteristics more stress laid on the fact that the Buddhist's idea is that the practical conduct of life successfully begins only when the delusions about an immortal self-owned soul have been completely abandoned. The second part deals, under fourteen heads, of the virtues specially valued by Buddhists, in the last of which (on Righteousness) we are told that the highest attainment, the Buddhist goal, is reached by refining away all non-righteous taints, so that "his whole being is righteousness itself—he is all righteousness"; "has absorbed himself into righteousness"; "makes righteousness his whole body"; or, as Professor Lakṣmi Narasu puts it, "he has become one with those eternal verities of which he was an embodiment in life." Any student of Buddhism soon realizes the very great value of its system of active ethics, and this work, being by a Buddhist authority of the oldest form of the religion, should have a good reception; moreover, it is the first work specially devoted to the study of the subject. It is not without significance that these moral teachings have guided a large section of the human race for over 2,000 years, and neither a god nor a soul, as we understand them, has any part therein. There is also a sentimental attraction for us, for was not its founder of the same racial origin as ourselves? Then, again, does not our great authority on the religion, Professor T. W. Rhys Davids, say "the study of Buddhism should be considered a necessary part of any ethical course"? The whole system is based on the Buddha's realization of the universality of natural causal genesis.

In spite of an occasional tendency to repetition (perhaps a legacy of life-long reading of the Buddhist sacred books), and written in an alien tongue, this volume of Professor Tachibana deserves the greatest credit. His whole treatment of the subject is honest, clear, and masterly. Throughout the book one is impressed by the dignified seriousness of a member of the southern school, and yet there is no lack of enthusiasm. One feels the attraction of the

author's personality, whose task has been a labour of love. It is pleasing to note how the writer has taken pains to emphasize the almost complete disconnection between the Buddhist and Hindu conceptions of such terms as *Karma*, *Nirvana*, *Brahman*, *Vedagu*, and the Heavens with their gods, for only when the exclusively Buddhist significance of such terms is applied can the Pāli Scriptures be properly interpreted. On the other hand, it is unfortunate the use of the word "monk" has been adopted throughout the book.

Each chapter of the second part of the book is of high ethical value, and especially those on Self-restraint, Benevolence, Veracity, and Righteousness; but that on Humility does not seem up to the standard of the rest. Perhaps Western ideas are too strong to permit its appreciation. The one which perhaps will have least attraction for the West is that on Contentment, the closing paragraph of which is written not without a pathetic note. The one on Celibacy incidentally contains one of the beautiful tales of Buddhist literature. Obedience, it should be noted, though included in the other-regarding virtues on p. 95, is not further considered. Professor Rhys Davids says it is most worthy of notice that "obedience" does not occur in Buddhist ethics. On p. 148, lines 19 onwards are not clear; the stages in destroying the Bonds on the Four Paths seem to overlap. We learn on p. 205 that the practice of regarding the *Bhikkus* as the recipients *par excellence* of gifts "seems to be more often mentioned in later than earlier Pāli literature," which is as one would expect. This acceptance of valuable gifts was not in accordance with the Buddha's original teaching. The point was largely responsible for the first serious schism, and it is probable that its subsequent indulgence, followed by the accumulation of wealth, had much to do with the persecution and wholesale destruction of the Brotherhood in India. In the chapter on Reverence it is explained that any feelings of this sort for parents are given up after they have departed from this world. This is puzzling, as we know, according to the Buddha's reputed sayings, how much in debt is the offspring to his parents. Then, again, great stress is laid on the reverence due to the Buddha; and further it is said, on p. 228, that grateful minds will remember that they owe some benefits to those who now inhabit far distant regions of the world or to those who lived in a time of antiquity. Is no regard or reverence to be shown to their memory? Perhaps the *Tiro-Kudda-Sutta* of the *Kuddaka Pāṭha* may be understood as a plea for the honouring and keeping in memory of the departed. Numerous extracts from the Pāli Scriptures are usefully quoted by Professor S. Tachibana. One of the best is: "Let a wise man," says the Buddha, "blow off the impurities of his self as a smith blows off the impurities of silver, one by one, little by little, and from time to time."

It would seem that "from covetousness" should be deleted from lines 16 and 17 on p. 76.

H. V. N.

CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY. Vol. IV.: The Persian Empire and the West.

The fourth volume of "The Cambridge Ancient History" is entitled "The Persian Empire and the West," and is therefore of particular interest to the Central Asian Society. Chapters are devoted to the rise of the Persian Empire, to the reign of Darius, to Marathon, to the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and to the repulse of the Persian invaders. The first chapter gives a good account of Cyrus, and of his conquest of Lydia, which brought the Persian Empire to the Mediterranean Sea and included the whole of Asia Minor. The subsequent conquest of Babylon and of Egypt created an empire that far exceeded the ancient monarchies of Babylonia and Assyria. The reign of Darius is also

described, the organization of the empire into satrapies, the improvement of communications and the laying-out of postal stations being based on the pages of Herodotus.

The Persian invasions are less successfully handled. The information is, of course, mainly derived from Greek historians, but there is a distinct lack of lucidity in dealing with the campaigns and of realization of the Persian point of view. This is, of course, due to the fact that probably none of the writers has ever visited Persia or studied its ancient monuments, whereas a visit to Greece is nowadays undertaken by most Professors of that language.

There is also an incomplete realization of the military problems in the various campaigns. The chapters relating to Persia are supplemented by others dealing in great detail with politics at Athens, the outer Greek world, Carthage and Sicily, and Italy. There is a masterly chapter on Coinage. The volume suffers from the number of contributors, and, to quote one example, the date of the battle of Marathon differs in chapters written by two of the contributors; but, taken as a whole, it is essential to the student of ancient history, and contains stores of learning. But I would repeat that Persia is viewed through Greek spectacles.

P. M. S

OBITUARY

GERTRUDE MARGARET LOWTHIAN BELL,
C.B.E., F.R.G.S., F.S.A.

Born July 14, 1868.

Died July 12, 1926.

GERTRUDE BELL was, perhaps, the most distinguished woman of our day in the field of Oriental exploration, archæology, and literature: in Iraq she made for herself, and retained to the day of her death, a position which was as unique as it was useful alike to the British Empire and to the budding state over whose destinies she had watched so long and so anxiously, and for whose creation she, jointly with the late Sir Mark Sykes, was as much responsible as anyone. The eldest daughter of Sir Hugh Bell, well known as a formidable critic of political follies in the economic sphere, and a lucid exponent of the inexorable laws by which men and nations live and trade, she inherited from him gifts of insight and of self-expression which enabled her to impress her personality as few women have done on affairs as well as on men. After winning academic distinction at Oxford in 1887 she went to Persia on a visit to the British Minister, the late Sir Frank Lascelles. But it was not in Persia or amongst Persians that she was destined to develop her natural bent. Her travels thereafter lay "between the desert and the sown," in Syria, Palestine, and Arabia: and to these early journeyings we owe her first book and "Safar Namah," published anonymously by Bentley and Co. It was followed four years later by "Amurath to Amurath," published in 1910, which displays an increasing knowledge and appreciation of matters archæological, and a breadth of judgment in the political field which was perhaps, in subsequent years, obscured to some extent by a new-found enthusiasm for self-determination in its protean local development. In 1913 she accomplished a remarkable journey to Hayil in Central Arabia, which increased her already great reputation and was destined to qualify her in a special degree for the work that fell to her lot during the Great War. After brief periods of somewhat infructuous work in France and Egypt under military auspices she was temporarily transferred to G.H.Q. Busrah ostensibly to undertake liaison work

connected with Arabian tribes. G.H.Q. Busrah found it no more easy than had their colleagues in Egypt to "place" Miss Bell, and she was taken over by the Civil Administration which was then beginning to take shape under Sir Percy Cox. In her new position she found ample scope for her abilities, and a measure of freedom both in writing and in council, the absence of which she had found so irksome whilst in the military departments, and she proved a most loyal and devoted colleague. Not that her zeal did not sometimes outrun her discretion, for she had in this respect on occasion the defect—albeit a trifling one of her high qualities.

To quote the writer's tribute to her in *The Times* of July 15:

Her first care was to synthesize and systematize the mass of detail regarding Arab personalities and tribes that poured into civil administrative headquarters from every part of Iraq. With unwearied diligence she indexed and cross-indexed, collated and checked, wherever possible by personal interviews, every scrap of available information, making the dry bones live by her enthusiasm and the charm of her literary style. Her "office-notes" were vivid, accurate, but feminine withal. Her sympathy with the victims of "military exigencies" was tempered by common sense—her righteous wrath was mingled with a sense of humour which never deserted her. It was in these years that she laid the foundations of the influence which she deservedly acquired latterly in high councils. Those in authority from 1917 to 1920, unable to obtain a decision as to the future of the country from the Home Government "pending the conclusion of peace with Turkey," had perforce to adopt as their motto, "Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor"; the weary months and, indeed, years of temporizing and of expensive improvisations were as repellent to her as they were irksome, but she loyally accepted them as inevitable and necessary, and the writer will always cherish the remembrance of her unwearied industry and her indomitable cheerfulness, at a time when the work of years and the hopes of a great race seemed likely to be swept away in the destructive confusion of religious and racial excitement.

The younger generation of civil administrators who came under her influence will recall gratefully her readiness to help and her willingness to listen and to learn, as well as to teach; for she was big-minded enough to modify her views in the light of experience and was not ashamed to confess it. The elder will remember, not less affectionately, her facile pen, her fund of accurate knowledge, and the human sympathy that informed her daily life.

Her archaeological interests, to which reference has already been made, found full scope in her appointment in 1921 as honorary Director of Antiquities. To quote Mr. C. L. Woolley: "She brought to her task the enthusiasm and the untiring energy which characterized all that she did; she started single-handed, with no antiquities and no funds, and if she received the willing help of other departments it was due to the infectious quality of her zeal. The excavations at Ur and Kish provided the nucleus of a fine collection such as justified the creation of a National Museum. This spring Miss Bell secured a large building

really suitable for the purpose, together with a grant for its conversion and for the installation of the antiquities, and to the laborious work of its arrangement she has sacrificed herself.

"In these last years nothing was nearer to her heart than this museum. She initiated it and she was ready to do all the spade-work of its creating, but she looked forward to the time when that should be done and the Government of Iraq should see its way to the appointment of a scientific director with a proper staff for the institution which she had built up out of nothing. Her ambition was to make the museum worthy of the great history of Iraq and essential to the study of its past, and the fulfilment of that ambition would be the best material monument to her memory."

Her last published work on Mesopotamia is her contribution to the latest volumes of the "Encyclopædia Britannica," but she will be better known, amongst experts, as the author of the "Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia," published officially as a Blue Book in 1920, in which the public were for the first time given a glimpse of the herculean efforts made during and after the Armistice to weld together the dissonant elements of the three provinces into a homogeneous state, efforts the success of which made possible subsequent political development, as, in later years, she recognized and generously admitted.

She scorned publicity, and disliked the numerous journalistic tributes to her influence and skill: creative achievement, literary, cultural, and political, meant everything to her.

As wrote Virgil (*Ecl. i.*): "The cause was Freedom; she, though late, did yet at length regard her tardy follower . . . and after long time came." She lived to see her hopes substantially accomplished.

Many of those who listened to the anthem at the Memorial Service must have wished that the last sentence of the text of Ecclesiastes had not been omitted by Goss, when he set it to music. "And their works do follow them" may as truly be said of her as of any of those who "rest from their labours."

A. T. WILSON.

HIS HIGHNESS SIR UGYEN WANGCHUK, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.,
MAHARAJA OF BHUTAN.

THE first hereditary Maharaja of Bhutan, Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., died in Bhutan in August at the age of 65. There must be few, if any, rulers at the present day who have carved their way to power literally with the sword. In his young days Bhutan was given up to internal strife, and the late Maharaja, who succeeded his father as Tongsa Penlop when quite a young man, on several occasions displayed great personal valour in rallying his followers and leading them to victory sword in hand.

In the sixteenth century one Ngawang Nangyal came from Tibet to Bhutan

and established order in the country and ruled with great success. He is known as Shaptrung Rimpoche, and his white-bearded image is a familiar sight in Bhutanese temples. In a manner not uncommon in this part of Asia, on his death he was believed to have been reincarnated; this reincarnation was known in India as the Dharma Raja, and exists to the present day. The Dharma Raja was gradually deprived of temporal power and became a purely religious head of the state, and alongside appeared the true ruler of the country, known in India as the Deb Raja. In 1774, when Bogle was sent by Warren Hastings on a mission to Bhutan, he reported that the Deb Raja was appointed by election. In the course of time the Deb Raja also gradually lost his power, and the feudal barons were practically independent. There is little doubt that the repeated aggressions by the Bhutanese which led to our troubles with them and which culminated in the war of 1864 were directly the result of the independence of the smaller chiefs. Requests sent by the authorities in India to the Deb Raja were not complied with, chiefly because the Deb Raja himself had no power to enforce his desires; it is probable that in many cases communications sent from India were never forwarded to the Deb Raja by the smaller, irresponsible chiefs who lived between the capital and the frontier.

The Deb Rajas, who appears to have been powerful in Bogle's time, gradually diminished in importance and influence, and Pemberton in 1837 witnessed a rebellion against the Deb Raja of that time, and his attempts to conclude a treaty with Bhutan were frustrated by the Tongsa Penlop. Later, in 1863, the opposition to Sir Ashley Eden's mission was caused by the quarrels and rebellions of subordinate chiefs. The two chieftains of greatest importance were the Penlops of Paro in the West and of Tongsa in the East.

The late Maharaja Sir Ugyen, during the many years that he was Penlop of Tongsa, adopted a policy of friendliness towards the British Government, and, in 1904, at the time of Sir Francis Younghusband's mission in Lhasa, he was far-sighted enough to visit Sir Francis and to give him great assistance by acting as a go-between with the Tibetans, who were prepared to meet their powerful co-religionist. As a reward for this assistance, which was continued in the subsequent negotiations with the Tibetans, he was created a K.C.I.E. No doubt all this increased his prestige in his own country, and at Punaka on December 17, 1907, he was elected first hereditary Maharaja of the country by the chiefs and notables, who affixed their seals to the oath of allegiance. A translation of this is given in "Sikkim and Bhutan," by Mr. Claude White. Thus for the first time for many years Bhutan had a powerful and responsible ruler.

Having consolidated his position, the new Maharaja's next step was to place the foreign relations of his State under the Government of India by a treaty signed by himself and Sir Charles Bell on January 8, 1910. The country continued to progress peacefully under his rule up to the time of his death.

Sir Ugyen visited India on two occasions—in 1906, on the occasion of His Majesty's visit to India when he was Prince of Wales, and again in 1911, when King George visited India for the coronation Durbar. During the war the Maharaja offered the whole resources of his state to the Government besides presenting a large sum to war funds and encouraging recruiting in his hitherto closed land. By an early marriage His Highness had no son, and at one time it was thought probable that he would be succeeded by the husband of one of his daughters, and later by a grandson; by a later marriage, however, he had two sons, the eldest of whom, Jigmed Wangchuk, should now succeed him. During his lifetime Sir Ugyen gradually appointed his own near relatives to the important posts in Bhutan, and at the time of his death his son and heir was Tongsa Penlop, the son of his daughter, Paro Penlop.

Without the support of the prestige of a long line of rulers the young Maharaja will have to show strength of character and powers of determination to fill the gap left by such a remarkable man as his father, and his task as the first to succeed to the position of Maharaja will not be an easy one. The new Maharaja has learnt a little English and Hindustani at a school started by Sir Ugyen at Bumtang, but he has never left the hills of his native land.

Formerly Bhutan had a summer capital at Punaka and a winter capital at Tashi-chö-dzong, but for the last few years the late Maharaja has lived at Bumtang, about twenty miles east of his former official residence at Tongsa; consequently Punaka and Tashi-chö-dzong have dwindled in importance. At the former place is a large and magnificent but empty fort, and at Tashi-chö-dzong a large and influential monastery.

RECENT EVENTS IN CHINESE TURKISTAN

THE most important political event in the New Dominion during the past year has been the establishment of Soviet Consulates at Urumchi and Kashgar.

The new Consuls-General arrived at their posts in September of last year, each accompanied by staffs of secretaries, commercial counsellors, diplomatic couriers, etc., which have varied from eight to ten persons in number, and which still show a tendency to increase. As the U.S.S.R. have abandoned all rights of extraterritoriality with their consequent judicial and other functions, and as no agreement has yet been reached for the resumption of normal trade relations between the New Dominion and Soviet territory, it can readily be understood that this plethora of officials is far in excess of any legitimate needs. They have not, however, remained idle.

The Chinese authorities, who were at first anxious to welcome the Soviet representatives, have not been long in showing suspicion of their ultimate aims—a suspicion which has been acerbated by pronounced dislike of an overbearing and truculent attitude which, though apparently characteristic, is nevertheless ill-suited to the "friends of China," whose loudly-declared policy it is to uphold her sovereign rights against the domineering and grasping capitalistic powers.

Chinese Consulates have been established at Tashkent, Andijan, and Semipolatsinsk, the new Consuls being selected from officials serving in this province, and therefore nominees of Governor Yang.

Governor Yang, the Civil and Military Governor of the New Dominion, still remains in power as the semi-independent ruler of the province, a position which he has held unshaken since 1912. This remarkable old man shows no falling-off in those qualities of energy and determination which have enabled him, with no real force at his disposal, to maintain peace and good order throughout the country.

There was a possibility at one time that he would be supplanted by some nominee of Marshal Feng's, but there seems to be no longer any present fear of such an eventuality. As His Excellency not only governs with an efficiency and success which seem in marked contrast with the efforts of other provincial Governors, but is very much alive to outside dangers and unusually capable of dealing with them, it is to be hoped for the sake of his province that he will long continue to remain in power.

He is no lover of foreigners of whatever nationality, but recent events have led him to adopt a decidedly friendly attitude towards the British Government and their representatives, and this attitude has

naturally been reflected in the conduct of his subordinates. There have been no signs anywhere in the province of those anti-British tendencies which have been so marked and unfortunate a feature in the recent history of China Proper. Kashgar itself has been fortunate in having at the head of its administration Erh Taoyin, a capable and conscientious official who assumed charge of his present office two years ago, after his successful appearance as G.O.C. the force despatched by the Governor to suppress the outrageous Ma Titai, the provincial Commander-in-Chief, who had established himself as the unofficial but excessively tyrannical ruler of this part of the province.

Yarkand has been less fortunate in its recent administrators, but the Governor is carrying out changes amongst the officials which should lead to improvement.

The Afghan trade agent in Yarkand continues to style himself as Consul-General for Afghanistan, but has failed to obtain recognition as such from the Chinese authorities, and finds himself in frequent difficulties with the latter.

The long-established and lucrative opium trade from Afghanistan and Semirechensk has been meeting with genuine opposition from the provincial authorities, who have captured and burnt several consignments, sentencing the smugglers concerned to lengthy terms of imprisonment and removed officials who had been taking part in the traffic. It is, however, too much to hope that a trade which holds out such large profits and which can be carried with comparative immunity through almost uninhabited country, can be stopped under present circumstances. There is no poppy cultivation anywhere in the province itself.

Though not yet finally reopened and liable to frequent interruptions, a certain amount of trade is being carried on with Russian territory, where there is a constant demand for raw cotton and wool. The chief imports are kerosene, sugar, and coloured cotton fabrics. The British Indian traders who have to carry their goods over the Leh-Karakorum route naturally do not look forward to competing with a trade which possesses a railhead only some ten marches distant and with only one comparatively low pass to negotiate, but the resumption of full, normal trade with Russia remains indefinite; disturbed conditions in China Proper also continue to afford a similar unnatural stimulus to the Indian trade.

APPENDIX

NOTE ON THE PLAN PUBLISHED IN BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES'S BIOGRAPHY OF SIR MORTIMER DURAND, SHOWING THE APPROXIMATE RUSSIAN AND AFGHAN POSITIONS AT PANJDEH ON MARCH 30, 1885.

THE Plan, as it appears in Sir Percy Sykes's Biography, purports to be "From a Sketch by Charles E. Yate (Captain), Political Officer, Afghan Boundary Commission." As this is incorrect, I intend to explain exactly the origin of the Plan.

On October 21, 1925, I received from Sir P. Sykes's publishers, Messrs. Cassell and Co., a letter saying: "General Sir Percy Sykes is writing for us a life of Sir H. Mortimer Durand, in which he wishes to include the plan of Panjdeh, showing the approximate Russian and Afghan Positions on March 30, 1885, which appeared in your 'Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission,' published in 1887."

On receipt of this letter I looked into the two or three copies of my book which I have kept for myself, and I found in one of them an annotated tracing of the scene of the engagement which afforded information of value which finds no place in the Plan which appears in my "Travels" of 1887. I could not remember after a lapse of forty years where this tracing originated, but I saw that it reproduced on a slightly enlarged scale the Survey by Sergeant Galindo which, dated "Tirpul, 15th April, 1885," accompanied Captain C. E. Yate's Report on the Panjdeh conflict, which General Sir Peter Lumsden forwarded to the Government of India, and doubtless also to the Foreign Office in London. To Sergeant Galindo's Survey, Captain C. E. Yate had, from his own personal knowledge, added the positions of the Russian and Afghan troops, but my annotated tracing gave much additional information. Accordingly I sent it to Messrs. Cassell and Co., and gave them permission to make use of it. I should add that I recognized all the notes, etc., on it as being in my own handwriting. Messrs. Cassell and Co. acknowledged it and said they would lay it before Sir Percy Sykes.

On December 8, 1925, I received from Messrs. Cassell and Co. the following letter, dated December 7: "I am sending you herewith the plan of the Panjdeh position which we have had drawn from your rough sketch (which I am enclosing). You will see that they have incorporated one or two things from Sergeant Galindo's plan, which I also sent to the map-makers as a guide for the redrawing of your sketch. Will you be good enough to see if this meets with your approval, or whether you would prefer that your plan should be strictly adhered to?"

To this I replied that I was perfectly satisfied with the Plan of the Panjdeh position which they had had drawn from my rough sketch, and incorporating with it one or two things from Sergeant Galindo's plan, and that it therefore had my approval. I returned to them their drawing, and that, I presume, is what now appears in Sir Mortimer Durand's Biography. The Russian lines of attack and their composition, and the "Details of the Afghan position, March 30," as well as one or two other notes, are taken from the tracing which has been so long in my possession. There is no one, of course, who has, from personal experience, such an intimate knowledge of the scene of the Panjdeh engagement as Colonel Sir Charles E. Yate, but it will be noted that the Plan which appears in Sir Percy Sykes's "Biography" is not "From a Sketch by Charles E. Yate."

I publish this "Note" with Sir Percy Sykes's consent.

A. C. YATE.

BOOK NOTICES

THE Council wish to express their thanks to Mr. Kenneth Mackenzie for his valuable gift, "A Journey from London to Persepolis, including Wanderings in Daghestan, Georgia, Armenia, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Persia," by John Ussher, F.R.G.S. (1865.)

Books received for review :

"Turkey," by A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood. (Modern World Series, No. VI.) 9" x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. xi + 329. Map. (Ernest Benn, Ltd. 1926. 15s.)

"Israel," by Leonard Stein. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5". Pp. vii + 94. (Ernest Benn, Ltd. 1926. 3s. 6d.)

"The American Task in Persia," by Arthur C. Millsaugh. 8" x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. 322. Illustrations. (London and New York: Messrs. T. Werner Laurie, Ltd. 1926. 15s.)

"Grass," by C. Merion Cooper. Pp. 362. Illustrations and map. (London and New York: Messrs. G. Putnam's Sons, Knickerbocker Press. 10s. 6d.)

"On the Trail of Ancient Man," by Roy Chapman Andrews, Sc.D. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 6 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". Illustrated. (London and New York: Messrs. G. Putnam's Sons, Knickerbocker Press.)

"The Pilgrimage of 1926," by Colonel E. J. King, C.M.G. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. 144. Map and illustrations. (St. John's Gate.)

"TO MESOPOTAMIA AND KURDISTAN IN DISGUISE"

With Historical Notices of the Kurdish Tribes and the Chaldeans of Kurdistan. By E. B. Soane. Second Edition, with a Memoir of the Author by Sir Arnold T. Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., etc. With additional illustrations. Demy 8vo. (Published by Mr. John Murray. 18s. net.)

One of the most interesting of travel books, which describes the author's adventures during a journey from Beyrut to Bagdad, disguised as a native. He was successful owing to his wonderful knowledge of dialects—which knowledge enabled him to write this graphic record.

"His additions to our knowledge of Kurdish history and of Chaldean history are as important as they are interesting."—*Illustrated London News*.

THE BAGHDAD BOOK SHOP

If one day you were to find the Magic Carpet at your door ready to fly with you to Baghdad, you would expect to see—many things. And you would not see them; for the simple reason that old Baghdad, the “dim moonlit city of delight” of the Thousand Nights and a Night, has gone for ever—has disappeared far more completely even than its predecessor, old Babylon the mighty. But one thing you might not expect to see; but, strange to say, you would see it (which is, after all, quite characteristic in the city of Aladdin and his wonderful lamp). And the thing in the case is an up-to-date modern book-shop, equal in its appointments to any in London or New York, but stocking a variety of general Oriental literature such as possibly cannot be found to-day in any other one spot in the world.

Modern life being what it is, one need scarcely add that Aladdin in this case is a Scotsman. All modern magicians are Scotsmen, for the simple reason that they are the only human beings who combine the romantic and enterprising spirit of the English with the financial genius of the Jew. An Englishman who will build a great business is forced to employ Jews, to help him keep a check on his own extravagance; a Jewish man of ideas is bound to employ Englishmen, to teach him to expand his range of vision over the top of the counting-house door; but the Scotsman needs no one but himself. In one frame he combines brilliant initiative with that sound caution which has made Scotland the only country where the moneylender can gain no footing. He is entirely self-sufficient. That is why he stands out in the world to-day as the only complete business man—with the possible exception of the Chinaman.

But the particular Scotsman, let us hasten to add, who owns and runs the Baghdad Book Shop, is no ordinary type; he is not the half-Anglicized denizen of the Glasgow streets, or the gallant Tube-riding Highlander of the northern London suburbs. Kenneth Mackenzie—no mistake about country or clan there—is a man hailing really and truly from the north of nowhere. He can (if you care to listen to him) give you the time of day in genuine Gaelic, and it is whispered that in the seclusion of his own Baghdad home (or should it be *harim*?) no other language is heard; for Mrs. Mackenzie also hails from the north of nowhere—to be precise, the same village—and is also a proficient scholar in the one and only true language. “How terribly provincial,” you will add; but no, for Mr. Mackenzie is an Edinburgh University man, and before the war owned a book shop familiar to many discriminating Londoners—especially the boys and masters of St. Paul’s School.

Come to think of it, it is not after all so strange that Baghdad should prove so suitable a *locale* for an experiment in bookselling. Time was when the city could boast the best book shops in the world. Readers of *Le Strange* will remember that under the early Abbassids there were over one hundred book-sellers in the Suq al-Warrakin alone, and mediæval Baghdad was perhaps the only city of its age that could boast of an entirely literate population. Indeed, it would hardly be untrue to say that it is doubtful if any other city in history, except ancient Athens has ever produced such a flood of brilliant writers, orators, preachers, philosophers, poets, and artistic dilettanti—to say nothing of the mathematicians, doctors, and musicians—in so short a space of time. In the turmoil of the later Middle Ages, Baghdad’s intellectual glory departed from her, and a hundred years ago the English traveller, Buckingham, found literature “at so low an ebb that there is no one known collection of good books or manuscripts in the whole city, nor any individual Mullah distinguished above his contemporaries by his proficiency in the learning of his country.” Fortunately, in the last fifty years things have improved somewhat, and there are now among the citizens of Baghdad many cultivated and intellectual men, and at least two notable private collections of books.


The quick success of the Book Shop presupposed, of course, the existence of fruitful ground, ready for the sowing. No amount of enterprise—even Scottish enterprise—could build up a high-class bookselling business in the face of an ignorant or indifferent public. Not that the entire clientèle of the shop could be claimed truthfully as of Baghdad. Many of the best customers are drawn from the ranks of the numerous British residents, the frequent visitors, and the

officers and men of the Air Force and Army, deprived of theatres and other Western amusements, and thrown back largely upon literature for mental entertainment. Nor does the Book Shop cater alone for Baghdad or for Iraq. Its Persian mail is a heavy one, it has regular customers in America, and has been known to deliver books in Japan. Regarding as its daily job the retailing of current English literature to the local Baghdad public, it is becoming increasingly well known in the West as a likely centre for rare Eastern works. Its stock of books on Islamic subjects is probably unique; its collection of technical, scientific, medical, and historical works is very wide; and you can find on its shelves a more catholic and varied selection of modern literature than can probably be found in any one book shop in the West.

Like most good things, the Book Shop came about by accident. After the Armistice a new civil administration was organized in Iraq by Sir A. T. Wilson, then Civil Commissioner, and early in 1920 the Director of Education, Major Bowman, was sent to London with a fairly free hand to recruit suitable personnel and material for the new schools which were springing up on every hand. The poverty of the local booksellers' resources led the Major to consider the engaging of a technical man to organize the importation and sale of school-books and material. To cut a long story short, the job was offered to Kenneth Mackenzie, who, on arriving in Baghdad, immediately saw the chance offered for the sale of ordinary general literature, and suggested that the school book shop might be made to pay for itself in this way. After some deliberation, he was told to go ahead, and was given a small Government grant as capital. That grant was never touched; the business was started with the aid of the wholesalers three months' credit, and it has never looked back since! Let it be added that the authorities, having made sure that they had got a good man, were content to leave him alone; from the first the "Controller" had a free hand, and he was never handicapped by those petty restrictions or vexatious regulations which so often hamper Government enterprise in the East. In 1925, however, the Iraq Council of Ministers (the Iraq Government having previously taken over the Book Shop from the British authorities) came to the conclusion that the shop "did not form a proper sphere for Government activity," and they accordingly decided to put it on sale. As was only right and proper, the tender of the "Controller" was accepted, and Aladdin entered into full possession of the fascinating business which his lamp of Scottish penetration had built up.

And fascinating it is. The Baghdad Book Shop has an atmosphere of its own—a trite saying, but in this case a true one. Suppose you could number among your business customers for the day picturesque figures of Arabs, *chaffiyah*, *agal*, and well-trimmed beard complete; native dignitaries from Kurdistan; white robed Sabæans; romantic-looking feminine forms, modestly swathed from head to foot in dark garments that, as a visiting journalist from India so aptly suggested, inevitably bring to mind the Ku Klux Klan; stout effendis, some of them more conversant with current English literature than the English themselves; youthful Jewish-looking students, their pale faces gazing at some financially unobtainable work with that ardent look of book-lovers the world over; Air Force officers, with their breezy air of combining the gossip of Baghdad, Cairo, and London in one morning's work; smartly-dressed English ladies of the modern type, looking self-possessed and masculine when seen in an Oriental background; American visitors, full of incorrect information about every city from Tokio to Tripoli; earnest-looking Indians, obviously bent on following the difficult road (so popular nowadays) of self-culture-at-home-in-your-spare-hours—all the varied types of a city which, even in its decay, still has about as much right to the much-abused term "cosmopolitan" as has any city in the world. Suppose you had a clientèle of this sort, would you not be tempted to feel that, after all, business was a very pleasant way of spending the time. Add to this the attraction of books in themselves as articles of commerce, and you see why Mr. Kenneth Mackenzie, as he steps out of his *arabanah* at the Book Shop door in the morning and beams at you through his gold-rimmed glasses, always strikes you as one of the happiest men in the East.

RICHARD COKE.





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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XIV

LECTURES AND PAPERS

	PART	PAGE
Air Route to India, The ...	By Col. H. Burchall, D.S.O. i.	3
American Financial Mission to Persia, The	By Agnes Conway ... iv.	334
Anniversary Meeting ...	iv.	373
Annual Dinner ...	iv.	376
Bayezid Ansari, The Story of, Founder of the Sect of Roshanias	Compiled by Alif Shabnam i.	72
Education in Iraq ...	By Agnes Conway ... iv.	344
Ferments in the World of Islam	By Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah .. ii.	130
Five Years' Progress in Iraq	By Ja'far Pasha el Askeri, C.M.G. i.	62
Italian Red Sea Colonies, The	By Comm. Luigi Villari ... ii.	115
Karakoram Himalayas, The	By Captain B. K. Featherstone ii.	165
Lost Lands of Ophir, The ...	By Commander C. Crauford iii.	227
Notes on the Motor Route to India	By Captain B. K. Featherstone ii.	181
On the Trail of Ancient Man in Central Asia, Notes on a Lecture	By Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews i.	43
Overland Route from China to India, The	By Captain F. Kingdon Ward iii.	218
Persian Affairs ...	By Captain B. K. Featherstone ii.	177
Position in China, The ...	By E. M. Gull ... ii.	147
Railways in Persia ...	By Agnes Conway ... iv.	340
Report of the Indian Sandhurst Committee	By R. L. N. M. ... iv.	349
Republic of China, The ...	By Professor P. J. Bruce ... iii.	258
Struggle and Intrigue in Central Asia, A Story of	By R. L. N. M. ... iv.	359
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, The	By Captain G. J. Eccles ... i.	19
Syed Ahmed, The Story of, Mosstrooper, Freebooter, Saint and Crescentader	By Alif Shabnam ... iv.	369
Syria, Notes on a Lecture ...	By H. Charles Woods ... ii.	103
Tatar Domination of Asia, The	By Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B. iv.	319
Transjordanian, A Note on ...	By R. L. N. M. ... iv.	346
Waziristan ...	By Major-General A. Le G. Jacob, C.B. iii.	238

REVIEWS

		PART	PAGE
<i>Afghanistan :</i>	Beyond the Khyber Pass	ii.	201
	Unter der Glutsonne Irans	iii.	296
<i>Asia :</i>	The Changing East	i.	77
	The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement	iv.	389
	Der Kampf um Asien (i.)	ii.	191
	(ii.)	iii.	277
	The Revolt of "Asia"	iii.	294
<i>Arabia :</i>	Arabic Literature, an Introduction	i.	89
	The Darvishes	ii.	193
	The Revolt in the Desert	iii.	282
	The Wilderness of Sinai	iii.	301
	Lughat el-Arab	i.	89
<i>Iraq :</i>	Ancient Cities of Iraq	ii.	204
	Mesopotamian Campaign (Vol. IV.)	iii.	802
<i>Palestine :</i>	Land Problems in Palestine	ii.	206
	Prophets, Priests, and Patriarchs	iv.	401
<i>Syria :</i>	Cedars, Saints and Sinners in Syria	i.	92
	The Middle East	i.	90
<i>Central Asia :</i>	Among the Karakorum Glaciers	i.	84
	Chinese Central Asia	i.	88
	In Himalayan Tibet	i.	87
	The Riddle of the Tsangpo Gorges	i.	94
<i>China :</i>	China and her Political Entity	iii.	290
	China in Revolt	iv.	893
	China in Turmoil	iv.	891
	China of Today	iii.	293
	In China	ii.	189
	On the Trail of Ancient Man	i.	81
<i>India :</i>	A Book of South India	iii.	285
	An Indian Career	iii.	285
	Mother India	iv.	885
	A Pageant of India	iii.	289
	Sir Pratab Singh	iii.	287
	Beyond the Khyber Pass	ii.	201
<i>Assam :</i>	The Ao Nagas	ii.	195
<i>Minorities :</i>	The People of Ararat	i.	93
	Moscou et la Georgie Martyre	iii.	305
<i>Memoirs :</i>	Leaves from a Viceroy's Notebook	ii.	200
	Letters of Gertrude Bell	iv.	403
	Memoirs of Halidé Edib	ii.	202
<i>Persia :</i>	Suhalil	iv.	407
	Unter der Glutsonne Irans	iii.	296
<i>Siam :</i>	An Asian Arcady	iii.	295
	A History of Siam	iii.	296
<i>Miscellaneous :</i>	The Himalayan Letters of Gipsy Davy	ii.	205
	The Mosque of the Roses	iii.	299
	The Travels of Marco Polo	i.	90

JOURNAL

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CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

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PART I.

CONTENTS.

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1926-1927.

THE AIR ROUTE TO INDIA. BY COLONEL H. BURCHALL,
D.S.O.

THE SULTANATE OF MUSCAT AND 'OMAN. BY CAPTAIN
G. J. ECCLES, I.A.

ON THE TRAIL OF ANCIENT MAN IN CENTRAL ASIA.
BY ROY CHAPMAN ANDREWS, D.Sc.

FIVE YEARS' PROGRESS IN IRAQ. BY JA'FAR PASHA EL
ASKERI, C.M.G.

THE STORY OF BAYEZID ANSARI, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS PIR-I-ROSHAN AND FOUNDER OF THE SECT OF
ROSHANIAS. COMPILED BY ALIF SHABNAM.

REVIEWS:

THE CHANGING EAST. ON THE TRAIL OF ANCIENT MAN. CHINESE
CENTRAL ASIA. AMONG THE KARA-KORUM GLACIERS. AN UNEX-
PLORED PASS. IN HIMALAYAN TIBET. ARABIC LITERATURE; AN
INTRODUCTION. LOGHAT EL-ARAB. THE MIDDLE EAST. CEDARS,
SAINTS AND SINNERS IN SYRIA. THE PEOPLE OF ARARAT. THE
RIDDLE OF THE TSANGPO GORGES. CENTRAL ASIATIC EXPEDITIONS
OF THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF ROY CHAPMAN ANDREWS. THE TRAVELS OF MARCO
POLO THE VENETIAN.

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THE AIR ROUTE TO INDIA *

By COLONEL H. BURCHALL, D.S.O.

IN reading a paper before the Central Asian Society on the Air Route to India, I feel very diffident in that I can tell you only of the plans that Imperial Airways have formulated for the first stage of this route—namely, the Cairo-Karachi section.

I would rather have prepared the paper after our service had been in regular and successful operation for a year or more, but as the project is viewed with such keen interest, not only by people of our

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal Society of Arts, John Street, Adelphi, W.C., on Wednesday, October 20, 1926, Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the Chair. A lecture on "The Air Route to India" was delivered by Colonel H. Burchall, D.S.O.

The CHAIRMAN: The subject for discussion is the air route to India—a subject of close interest to every member of the Central Asian Society. The Cairo-Karachi route which we are to hear about in a few minutes links up all those regions with which we have been chiefly concerned—Egypt, Palestine, Trans-jordan, Iraq, Persia, and India. For the present, it ends at Karachi. That end, I hope, and we all hope, will be a purely temporary one; for I have no doubt Colonel Burchall will tell you it is hoped eventually to push this air service on and link up with Australia. Sir Alan Cobham, in his recent brilliant flight, has demonstrated that even in the most adverse conditions the journey to Australia and back is quite feasible; so that we hope that Karachi is only the first link in that stage which will bring Australia into closer connection with the Mother Country. It is a happy augury that while we, the Society, are discussing in our own way this question of communication between Britain and India, the Imperial Conference has for one of its subjects for discussion the very same question, with a view to bringing the Empire more closely together. I remember five or six years ago, in one of the Imperial Conferences that met soon after the war, this question was touched on in rather an offhand fashion at a banquet given to Mr. Hughes, the Premier of Australia. The Prince of Wales was presiding at the dinner, and in a cheery, optimistic way said he looked forward to the time when Mr. Hughes would pay week-end visits to England, coming by air. Mr. Hughes was less optimistic, and cited his experience of travelling by air. He was in France during the war, and was suddenly summoned to a war conference at Whitehall. An aeroplane was placed at his disposal, and in twenty miles they had four forced descents. Eventually he asked for a wheelbarrow to complete the journey. Things have changed since then, and Colonel Burchall, who was connected during the war with the Middle East, Egypt, and Salonika, will now explain to you what it is proposed to do with reference to the connection between Cairo and Karachi. I have great pleasure in asking Colonel Burchall to deliver his lecture. (Applause.)

own Empire but by the world in general, there is perhaps some justification in agreeing to tell of what we hope to do, instead of waiting until we can speak of what we have done.

It is natural that the first Empire route should arouse great interest, for ever since the war, which developed aviation at such an enormous speed, and, stimulated by Sir Alan Cobham's wonderful flights, great expectations have been cherished that regular aeroplane services would bring the far-flung parts of the Empire nearer together, and knit even more firmly together the peoples that compose it.

Civil aviation is destined to play an increasingly important part in the history of the world, and it would be most regrettable if the British Empire, which perhaps needs civil aviation most, should be behind other nations in its development. The United States of America has its transcontinental air line, operated, it is true, by the air service, and carrying only mail; France has its long line from Paris to Constantinople, which it keenly wishes to extend to Baghdad, and its lines from France and Portugal to North Africa; while Germany, unable under the terms of the Peace Treaty to have an air force, appears to have unlimited money to spend on the development of civil aviation. Already over forty internal lines are in operation. Through an associated company a line is run to Moscow, and some experimental flights through Siberia to Peking have actually been made. Another route also is to run through from Stuttgart to Madrid. Belgium has its long line in the Belgian Congo, and the Dutch, in addition to their European services, are planning to run a long line in the Dutch East Indies in 1928.

It is therefore a source of some satisfaction that in addition to the British European services (which are certainly not inferior to the services of other countries), the Cairo-Karachi line is about to be opened, and that already there are two most successful and highly creditable Australian services, one of them running from Perth to Derby, a distance of over 1,400 miles. Clearly, then, it should be only a matter of time for the English and Australian companies, perhaps with the assistance of India, Burma, and the Federated Malay States, to connect and provide a through service from England to Australia.

Apart from the Imperial aspect of the establishment of the Cairo-Karachi route, and eventually the England-Australia route, there does not appear to be any doubt that a new and fast means of communication from one country to another develops trade, and therefore instead of injuring the existing and slower means of transport actually benefits them.

The telegraph and telephone do not appear to have anything but a good effect upon postal traffic, and it is hoped that in a similar way the air service will work in harmony with all other forms of transport to the benefit of them all.

trains maintain a somewhat higher average speed, rather less than half the normal time taken by a long-distance passenger train. Quite evidently, therefore, the air service between Egypt and India, if it can be regular and reliable, should be of considerable value for passengers to whom time is of importance, for mail, documents, and certain classes of merchandise. It is, however, imperative, if the desired ends are to be attained, that regularity and reliability should be assured.

AIR ROUTE RELIABILITY.—On the European routes of the company the following regularity was achieved in 1925: Total flights commenced, 4,179; completed same day uninterrupted, 3,888; completed same day after interruption, 148; not completed, 143. Percentage completed uninterrupted, 93.

While the percentage of flights completed without interruption is, perhaps, not as good as is maintained by the older forms of transport, it is of sufficiently high an order to justify air travel being accepted as a reliable method of transport, and it is interesting to examine the causes of interruption to estimate if the same degree of reliability is likely to be attained on the Cairo-Karachi route. In Europe 52 per cent. of the interruptions are due to weather, 33 per cent. to engine installation failure, and the balance to other causes. The "weather" interruptions in Europe are chiefly fog and low cloud, which are much less evident in the Middle East. The engine installation failures, it must be remembered, have occurred in a fleet of one, two, and three engined aircraft fitted with engines of four different types. Most of the engines are water-cooled, and the water-cooling system accounts for about one-third of the failures. The Cairo-Karachi route will be run with a fleet of new machines fitted with air-cooled engines, which thus have one serious possibility of failure eliminated, of a type that has already been tested under official observation for 25,000 miles without a failure of any sort. With the company's accumulated experience, and engines of the latest type that have been subjected to the most rigorous tests, the engine failures should be very considerably reduced; and since the aeroplanes will be equipped with three engines, and will be able to continue in flight with any one of the engines stopped, the degree of machine reliability should approach very closely the 100 per cent. mark, while the weather interruptions should be materially less, unless any special difficulties occur on this route that do not occur on the European services.

THE ROUTE TO BE FOLLOWED—EGYPT TO PALESTINE.—Let us, then, examine the actual route and see the climatic and topographical conditions to be encountered.

From Cairo the route lies along the edge of the Delta, and crosses the Suez Canal, and then follows the Palestine railway to Gaza. On this section navigation is simple; there are no mountains to cross, and

the heat is not intense even in midsummer, fog is practically unknown, and winds and thunderstorms are no worse than are encountered in Europe. It may be asked, Why do we not go via Jerusalem? The hilly nature of the country in Central Palestine answers the question. There was an aerodrome at Jerusalem during the war, but it is not suitable for big commercial machines.

PALESTINE TO TRANSJORDAN.—From Gaza eastward the Jordan Hills have to be crossed, but as they do not reach a greater height than 3,000 feet they do not offer a serious obstacle. It would, of course, have been desirable to have made a halt at Amman, the capital of Transjordan, but the aerodrome is much less suitable than that at Ziza, where there is an almost perfect surface.

TRANSJORDAN TO IRAQ.—From Ziza in Transjordan the desert begins and extends for 500 miles to the Euphrates. The western side is a plateau at an average altitude of 2,000 feet, and no complete information is available of the meteorological conditions. The height of the ground above sea-level and the heat experienced in the summer are conditions that have not been encountered in civil aviation in Europe, and call for aeroplanes with a greater reserve of power than is necessary in Europe. In addition high winds, thunderstorms, and sandstorms are not unknown. Navigation over this section is also more difficult, firstly owing to the sparsity of the meteorological information, and secondly to the absence of readily identified landmarks. Both factors introduce a difficulty in making the necessary correction to the compass course to allow for the drift produced by unknown and possibly varying wind. If there were no wind a compass bearing would be sufficient for navigation purposes. To give a readily appreciated illustration of the stretch from Ziza to Ramadi on the Euphrates, it may be mentioned that the distance is the equivalent of London to Aberdeen, and that there is water throughout the year at practically only one place, the equivalent of York in point of position but in nothing else. When the R.A.F. first started the cross-desert air-mail a double furrow track was ploughed across the desert, and thus provided a continuous landmark, and so long as this furrow is kept in sight a pilot has no need for navigation as generally understood.

The only disadvantage of the furrow is that it is by no means readily picked up again if sight of it should have been lost. We who follow the R.A.F. in establishing the cross-desert air service as a commercial undertaking have the greatest respect for what was done by the R.A.F., and are more than pleased to have the opportunity of expressing our admiration of their work which alone has made it possible for us to undertake the organization of this service. We follow with the difficulties greatly reduced. Originally the R.A.F. flew from Ramadi to Amman—with two emergency petrol dumps in the desert. When we start operations there will be a police post with hotel accommoda-

tion, petrol supplies, wireless station, and meteorological instruments and resident engineers at Rutbah in the middle of the desert, and we therefore, instead of having to negotiate a stretch of 500 miles of desert, will have the 500 miles divided into two sections of 250 miles each. While, therefore, the desert section is perhaps the most difficult on the route, careful organization will leave nothing but the spice of adventure in the trip.

I should, perhaps, mention that all across the desert emergency landing-grounds have been made at intervals of about twenty miles. The desert formation is very curious. In one place the ground is covered with basalt boulders for about sixty miles. At various points there are mud flats, which are just like solidified muddy lakes. Whether they are the craters of extinct volcanoes, or merely depressions that have been filled up by constant washing down of soil from higher levels, I must leave the geologists to determine. They make, however, excellent landing-grounds. At another point there are lakes of bitumen, and yet again various hills with a crowning of basalt.

THE IRAQ RIVER VALLEY.—From Baghdad to Basra navigation is simple, and no special difficulties are encountered except sandstorms, which, however, can generally be forecast with reasonable accuracy. They are the equivalent of fogs in Europe, and will have precisely similar effects upon the regularity of the service. Fortunately they are less frequent than fog in Europe, and their incidence elsewhere is less than on this section where the country is soft alluvial soil. In the summer the heat will be trying, and will require a greater reserve of power for "taking off," but once a height of 4,000 or 5,000 feet has been attained, which can be done in about ten to fifteen minutes, a much more pleasant temperature and a calmer atmosphere is reached.

PERSIA TO INDIA.—From Basra to Bushire, and in fact on to Bandar Abbas, Charbar and Karachi the coast is followed, and navigation presents no difficulties whatever. It is true hills come right down to the sea in places, and the coastal plain is swampy in others, but so long as two of the three engines with which our machines will be equipped function, no difficulties are to be expected. High winds, however, on this section are not uncommon, and the monsoon region extends between Charbar and Karachi, and bad weather and a certain amount of fog is to be expected at times, with occasional gales, heavy rain and thunder. It will be remembered that Sir Alan Cobham met bad weather on this section, but it is doubtful whether in the aggregate the weather here is worse than in Europe during the winter. Fortunately the humidity that is so oppressive on the ground becomes less with increased height, and travelling by air is very much more comfortable than by sea or land.

Thus taking the route as a whole it may be said that navigation presents no special difficulty, and the weather conditions, although

different from those in Europe, should have no more serious an effect on the regularity of operation. It is to be expected, therefore, that a reliability of 95 per cent. will be attained.

THE MACHINES TO BE USED.—One of the chief advantages of aircraft is that they can fly a direct course over mountains, valleys, sea, swamp and desert; but this very fact brings in its train the disadvantage that in the event of a forced descent alternative methods of transport may not be available. To avoid this disadvantage Imperial Airways are using only three-engined machines, which will fly on any two of the engines, and they have gone to great trouble to select an engine that offers great promise of reliability—the Bristol Jupiter, a nine-cylinder air-cooled radial. The machine, too, is being specially designed by the De Havilland Company to suit the conditions to be encountered.


Briefly, the machines will be 80 feet span, 60 feet long and 18 feet high. They will have a top speed of 125 miles an hour, and a cruising speed of 95 to 100 miles per hour, and will be able, if necessary or desirable, to reach a height of 17,000 feet. The cabins will be 16 feet 6 inches long by 4 feet 3 inches wide by 6 feet 5 inches high, and will be capable of seating fourteen passengers. Special provision is being made for warming the cabins in winter and keeping them cool in summer, and for ventilating them at all times. The machines will carry 300 gallons of petrol, which will be sufficient to fly for about five hours or about 450 miles. Each engine will develop 425 horse-power, so that each machine will have well over 1,200 horse-power available.

IMPERIAL AIRWAYS' EXPERIENCE.—All the accumulated experience of the operation of air transport on Imperial Airways European routes will be used in the organization of the Cairo-Karachi route. The system of engine and aeroplane maintenance in force at Croydon, which has won the approval of all competent observers, will be adopted, and will there, as at Croydon, be such as to satisfy an independent, highly qualified and experienced official of the Aeronautical Inspection Department of the Air Ministry. Each machine will be certified as airworthy by a qualified engineer before it is allowed to undertake a flight. Certain routine will be carried out after every flight, and at predetermined intervals engines will be changed and completely overhauled, while after a specific number of hours flying, or the lapse of a certain time (whichever happens first), the whole machine will be subjected to a complete overhaul.

Before they are accepted by the Company all Imperial pilots must have had great flying experience, and must also obtain an Air Ministry licence for flying with passengers, and thereafter submit to strict medical examination at least once in six months.


Government control of pilots and engineers licences, certificates of airworthiness and pilots medical examination, has the Company's cordial approval, since it conduces to the excellent record established

THE AIR ROUTE TO INDIA



THE AIR ROUTE TO INDIA

11



on the British services of no accident involving the slightest injury to a passenger since 1924.

METEOROLOGICAL STATIONS.—In Europe meteorological stations are numerous, and observations are broadcast practically throughout the twenty-four hours. These reports greatly assist the experts of the Air Ministry to forecast the weather that is to be expected on the air routes. The forecasts are now remarkably accurate for the periods occupied by flights, and to obtain the same advantages on the India route a number of stations are being established, as shown on the map. These stations will be able to warn pilots of the direction and force of the wind to be expected at various heights, the presence of cloud, sandstorm, or thunder, and so enable them to take advantage of favourable and avoid unfavourable conditions.

THE USE OF RADIO TELEGRAPHY.—Wireless communication is also of incalculable value. It permits rapid passage of information from one ground station to another on weather, traffic requirements, and any other subject of importance connected with the service; and as every machine will be fitted with transmission and reception apparatus will permit the flight of a machine to be followed both by the aerodrome of departure and that of destination, and will permit them to pass to the pilot any desired information of sudden weather changes, etc.

It might be mentioned that wireless telegraphy will be used on this route in preference to telephony, as the range is greater and the messages more certain in an atmosphere liable to electrical disturbances. In view of the fewer machines wishing to use the wireless facilities in these parts, the lower speed of passing messages by telegraphy will not be a material disadvantage.

It is perhaps needless to say that for navigation purposes the machines will be fitted with all the instruments used in Europe, including the "turn indicator," which enables a pilot to remain on a proper course and in perfect trim even, as when flying in cloud, he is unable to see any horizon.

THE RELATION OF LOAD AND DISTANCE.—British civil aeroplanes are licensed to carry a specific load according to their type, and this load includes crew, petrol, oil, passengers, baggage, freight, mail, and, in fact, every item that is put into them. Accordingly, in order that the permissible weight is not exceeded, everything is weighed prior to embarkation. It will be obvious, therefore, that with a greater supply of petrol on board less accommodation is available for passengers and freight. Thus, if unequal stages are adopted, fewer passengers can be carried where greater petrol capacity is required, and the number of through passengers is governed by the capacity on the longest stage.

The passengers carried become less and less as the length of flight is increased, until, in the hypothetical case, the machine which would carry 8,000 lbs., or fifteen passengers, over a 300-mile flight,

will carry nothing but the pilot, engineer, and the necessary petrol for an 800-mile flight. On the European routes flights of about 250 miles are the rule; and in deciding for the Indian route what stages to adopt we have many factors to consider—passengers' convenience, the available aerodromes, important trade centres, anticipated traffic requirements, any special equipment that must be carried, reduction in speed that would be caused by frequent refuelling, cost of providing refuelling points away from trade centres, and winds to be expected. On the last point it may be noted that, although ground distance is fixed, air distance is variable. Thus, if a distance on the ground is 100 miles, the time required to fly over it at 100 m.p.h. in still air will be 1 hour, but against a wind of 20 m.p.h. the speed over the ground will be reduced to 80 m.p.h., and the time required to cover 100 miles is then 1 hour 15 minutes.

FLIGHT STAGES.—I need not go into all our deliberations on this subject, but we have decided to adopt the following stages :

					<i>Miles.</i>
Cairo	to	Gaza	212
Gaza	"	Ziza	91
Ziza	"	Rutbah	274
Rutbah	"	Baghdad	241
Baghdad	"	Basra	300
Basra	"	Bushire	218
Bushire	"	Lingeh*	304
Lingeh	"	Bandar Abbas	97
Bandar Abbas	"	Charbar	335
Charbar	"	Pasni	170
Pasni	"	Karachi	250

It would have been a great convenience if we could have made a halt near Port Said to pick up passengers from the P. and O.'s; but no civil aerodrome can be found near Port Said, and political considerations prohibit the use of other aerodromes in the Canal zone.

In addition to the above landing grounds we are providing a number of other emergency refuelling points for use when high winds are encountered.

It may also be mentioned that, as we cannot at present change the engines of an aeroplane as the horses of stage-coaches were changed, we shall run the route in relays of machines as well as in relays of pilots. The scheme of operation has been carefully worked out so that no machine or pilot flies too long at a stretch, that adequate time is available for rest and adjustment, and that each machine returns in regular sequence to the main workshops for regular attention.

THE TIME-TABLE.—Having now briefly touched upon the country

* On the west-bound flight the stage will be :

					<i>Miles.</i>
Bandar Abbas	to	Daiyir	301
Daiyir	"	Bushire	100

over which we have to fly, the conditions to be met, the refuelling points to be adopted, and the machines to be used, we can examine the time-table of flight in each direction.

As the stage from England to Egypt is not at present being done by air, it has been considered essential to arrange the air time-table to connect both outward and homeward with the arrivals and departures of the P. and O. liners at Port Said, so that the through journey between England and India may be completed in the shortest possible time. Night flying is not being included in our programme at present, and therefore the total flying per day is limited to the daylight hours.

TABLE OF TIMES ON SECTIONS
ON REVISED MILEAGE ADOPTED 12/10/26

	Miles.*	At 75.	At 80.	At 85.	At 90.	At 95.	At 100.	At 105.	Time Variation.
CAIRO-GAZA ...	221	2:58	2:45	2:36	2:27	2:20	2:13	2:06	12
GAZA-RUTBAH ...	377.4	†5:02	4:43	4:26	4:11	3:58	3:46	3:36	24
RUTBAH-BAGHDAD	250.9	3:21	3:08	2:57	2:47	2:45	2:31	2:23	16
BAGHDAD-BASRA	311.1	4:09	3:53	3:40	3:27	3:16	3:07	2:58	13
BASRA-BUSHIRE ...	227.5	3:02	2:50	2:41	2:31	2:24	2:17	2:10	12
BUSHIRE-B. ABBAS	419.2	†5:36	†5:14	4:56	4:39	4:25	4:12	3:59	22
B. ABBAS-CHARRAR	346.8	4:37	4:20	4:05	3:51	3:39	3:28	3:18	19
CHARRAR-KARACHI	438.6	†5:50	†5:29	†5:10	4:52	4:37	4:23	4:11	24
Total		34:35	32:22	30:31	28:55	27:24	25:57	24:41	2:22
Total time going East by the clock		36:57	34:44	32:53	31:17	29:46	28:19	27:03	—
Total time going West by the clock		32:13	30:00	28:09	26:33	25:02	23:35	22:19	—

* Miles are computed as ground distance + 5 miles for circling aerodrome + 2 per cent. for error.

† Shows stages where stage cannot be completed on fuel capacity without refuelling at an intermediate halt. Based on a consumption of 60 gallons per hour.

At midsummer the sun rises at 5 a.m. and sets at 7, and at mid-winter rises at 7 and sets at 5. We have, therefore, a maximum of fourteen hours daylight and a minimum of ten hours. Now as the route lies roughly east and west, daylight is lost going east and gained going west. Further, the average wind throughout the year is ten to fifteen miles an hour from the west or north-west. Our machines will have a cruising speed of 95 miles an hour; and in working out our time-table we have made allowance for the normal unfavourable winds, but have not taken advantage of the help that favourable winds will give. The table above gives the distances of the main stages, and the times taken at various speeds, and the daylight gained or lost. We have assumed what we think will be the normal speeds realized on the various sections, and have made allowance for the

various stops for refuelling, and have compiled a time-table which we expect to be able to realize from April onwards when our whole fleet has been delivered. Between January and April we shall be forced to run a restricted service as far as Basra only, and we have allowed slightly more margin of time for our initial service.

As you doubtless know, the Company's contract with the Government calls for a fortnightly service, and the service will leave Basra for Cairo every alternate Friday, commencing on January 7, and will leave Cairo for Basra every alternate Wednesday, commencing on January 12.

FARES.—The time-table without a table of fares leaves the picture incomplete, and I have accordingly included a provisional table of fares, which will enable the cost from any point to any other point to be ascertained. It should be noted that at Gaza, Basra, and Bunder Abbas, where no suitable hotel accommodation exists, the Company will provide rest-house accommodation, and they will also provide food on the journey.

ACTUAL TIME SAVED.—In comparing the fares with the alternative means of travel, the saving of time and the relative comfort will doubtless be taken into consideration. The charts on pages 10 and 11 seek to show in a graphic manner the saving of time achieved from any one point to any other. It will be noted that the saving of time varies according to the place in India the traveller wishes to reach; but if the air route could be extended to Delhi—and to do so would not involve the provision of additional machines—the saving of time would be increased to seven days, as from Karachi Delhi can be reached in one day's flying across the Sind Desert. You may ask, Why do we not then extend the line to Delhi? The answer is that civil aviation at present unfortunately cannot be carried on on its traffic receipts alone, and the subsidy provided by the British Government does not permit of any extension into India; but if, as we expect, a regular and reliable service can be provided as far as Karachi, we trust that the Indian Government will desire to have the line extended to the capital of the Indian Empire.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.—I have endeavoured to give you an insight into the problems we have to face in organizing this service, and I trust I have made it clear that we have approached the problem in no happy-go-lucky frame of mind, but with a full realization of the conditions with which we shall have to contend, and have in our preparations taken all possible precautions to ensure success. We therefore, even at this early stage, look forward with confidence to further developments when once these initial plans have been proved. We shall not rest content until we have connected the European services with the India service, and stretched further out to provide a through service to Australia, but undoubtedly the next development will be night flying, which will still further increase the time saved

on the present Cairo-Karachi route. Night flying is not hazardous, and, in fact, it needs only adequate ground organization, wireless, and navigation lighthouses to make it immediately realizable. It has already been done experimentally between London and Paris, and is in regular operation in America and Germany, and can be adopted by us when traffic warrants its adoption.

In conclusion, I should like to pay a humble tribute to the Secretary of State for Air for what he has done for this service, and to Lady Maude Hoare, for the wonderful inauguration that will be given to the service by her trip with the Secretary of State on the first of our machines to fly to India. We highly appreciate this confidence in our organization.

It would be extremely ungenerous not to record the continuous and the great work that the Director of Civil Aviation, Sir Sefton Brancker, is doing for British civil aviation, and we trust that we shall worthily follow up the magnificent work done by him and his staff at the Air Ministry in connection with civil aviation.

Finally, without the pioneer work done in the Middle East by the R.A.F., and without the assistance we have received from them in our preliminary work, it would not have been possible for us to have contemplated opening our service in January, 1927.

Captain ACLAND : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel it to be a great privilege and pleasure to say a few words regarding the admirable paper which Colonel Burchall has delivered to us this afternoon.

He is very shortly leaving England to take up his post, and I think we should be grateful to him for finding time to prepare such a deeply interesting and detailed résumé of the organization which is about to start operating the Cairo-Karachi Air Route.

Speaking as a member of the public, yet with inside knowledge, I am convinced that a better organization could not have been selected than Imperial Airways with their executive officer, Colonel Burchall, to organize and operate this new air line. They have demonstrated without doubt during the last few years that air services can be run with safety, comfort, and a high degree of regularity. Difficulties they have had ; but theirs has been a story of steady progress, technical improvement, and constantly increasing traffic. This has been effected to a large extent by really good organization and attention to detail. It is insufficiently understood among the general public that the most vital work in connection with an air service is carried out on the ground ; the aeroplanes and their engines have to be kept in perfect running order by a skilled staff, including inspectors, and only when they are satisfied should a machine be handed over to the pilot to fly. I think that Colonel Burchall has convinced us that in this direction

his company has an ideal—and that is absolute reliability. To turn to our Society—I had the privilege some six years ago of speaking to you on air transport, and endeavoured to discuss the possibilities of this particular route. At that time, however, for political as well as for other reasons, it was impossible for private enterprise to make a start. We were fortunate in that our political chiefs and the higher command in the Royal Air Force realized the great imperial necessity for this line, and immediately the control of Iraq was taken over by the Royal Air Force this route was opened up and used for the transport of mails, etc., and a beginning made. The initial steps were described to us in Air Vice-Marshal Brooke-Popham's paper read before the Society. And now we find that the general security of this line is to be maintained by the Royal Air Force for the peaceful and secure passage of commerce. It is, indeed, a matter of the greatest interest and importance to find that, as with the sea, where the Navy protects the Mercantile Marine, so in the air the same development of policy is beginning to take place.

As regards the airship—you have heard the stages which will be served by the aeroplanes, and I think it opportune to say that with this beginning we can now consider the next step—namely, the linking up of the larger centres separated by greater distances, such as London, Cairo, Karachi, etc., by airships carrying the through traffic, and rapid distribution being effected from the great air junctions.

Finally, I think this evening we have a picture of progress before us, stimulating to the imagination, a quick means of transport both practical and feasible, and I do congratulate our Society on having arranged this talk at a time when the Imperial Conference is sitting; for, carrying the weight our members do, the effect on public opinion will be a stimulus to bring nearer the ideal for which so many of us are striving to-day, the knitting of our Empire closer together, and not least by making the fullest use of transport by air.

H.H. THE NAWAB OF DERA ISMAIL KHAN: It gives me great pleasure and honour to have heard the lecturer, and on behalf of Indians I say that we thank him and welcome the undertaking. We look forward to it as one of the blessings of the British rule that we are already enjoying, and will continue to enjoy. We thank the lecturer for all that he has given us, and for the lucid way he has shown it to us. We congratulate him on behalf of Indians and India. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: I am very glad that the Nawab of Dera Ismail Khan, whom we are all very pleased to see here to-day, has, on behalf of India, put in a word of appreciation for this great project. Nearly all of us here have connections in India and are interested in it, and this project will undoubtedly do a great deal to bring India into closer connection with this country, and will also be a great help not only to India but to those of our kith and kin serving there. It was therefore

particularly appropriate that the Nawab Sahib should say something as to how this scheme would be appreciated by the people of India. But, as indicated by Colonel Burchall, the air-way should not stop short at Karachi, but should be pushed on to Delhi and Calcutta, and pave the way to the great scheme of linking up with Australia. Colonel Burchall referred to the fact that they had stopped short at Karachi for financial reasons, because no air service could at the start pay its way. He might enlighten us whether the Indian Government has done anything to subsidize the scheme or help it financially. It is obviously one the Indian Government should endeavour to foster and promote by all means in their power. It is not only a great gain to us to have this speedy connection with India, but a great security to India to be brought so much closer to England. I do not think any of us have listened to a lecture which has been characterized by so much lucidity, precision, and detail. (Applause.) The tables in particular at the end which Colonel Burchall showed us, as regards rates, distances, weights to be carried—including that of ladies, who do not like to be weighed in public (laughter)—were most informative, and showed, as one speaker pointed out, with what great care the whole scheme has been worked out. I am sure that any apprehensions any of us may have had as to undertaking the journey to India by air have been dissipated by Colonel Burchall to-day. Many of us are dying to make the five days' journey to Karachi and contrast it with the awful experience of travelling down the Red Sea, fighting the monsoon, and the unpleasant landing at Bombay, altogether taking ten, twelve, or fifteen days. I now ask you to pass a vote of thanks and of appreciation to the lecturer for the extraordinarily interesting lecture he has delivered to us, and the wonderful amount of information not only as to this particular route, but as to the work of air-ways in general, which he has been good enough to place at our disposal. (Applause.)

Colonel H. BURCHALL: Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much indeed for the way you received the lecture. It gives me great pleasure to tell you what I can about the air, as it is a subject on which my whole mind is centred at present. As to your point about the Indian Government and what they are doing towards this service I am not absolutely clear myself. Our negotiations have taken place with the Air Ministry, and any arrangements with the Indian Government are between the two Governments, and come outside our particular ken; but I have no doubt that as India has provided some financial help for the airship station, that we shall be getting a certain amount of assistance too, probably in the way of wireless facilities, housing, and land for our terminal aerodrome. I hope, however, that the time will come when they will want to give us more to extend our services into India. Very many thanks. (Renewed applause.)

THE SULTANATE OF MUSCAT AND 'OMAN*

WITH A DESCRIPTION OF A JOURNEY INTO THE INTERIOR
UNDERTAKEN IN 1925

By CAPTAIN G. J. ECCLES

GEOGRAPHICAL.—Although for some years public interest has been roused by events in Northern, Western, and Central Arabia, yet the large projecting corner on the south-east known as 'Oman has received practically no attention at all. Isolated by the Great Sand Desert to the westward from the rest of Arabia, she has been left alone to follow her own customs and feuds. Although she has been nominally subject at various periods to Persia, Baghdad, Portugal, and the Wahhabi kingdom of Central Arabia, yet these rulers have been for the most part content to hold the seaports and to levy taxes, and with the possible exception of the Wahhabis have had comparatively little influence on the life and habits of the tribes of the interior. Geographically 'Oman includes the Trucial coast to the north-west and the independent oasis of Biraimi, as well as Dhofar in the south. The latter, however, is at present kept by the Sultan purely as a summer resort to which he can escape when cares of State and his family's importunities become too burdensome. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the territory over which the Muscat Government claims suzerainty, though in fact the greater part of it is entirely independent.

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held on Wednesday, October 27, 1926, at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1, Sir Michael O'Dwyer (Chairman) presiding. A lecture was delivered by Captain G. J. Eccles, I.A., on "The Sultanate of Muscat and 'Oman."

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The Council has to-day elected thirty-eight new members, the first being the Viceroy of India, Lord Irwin. The members include people from all parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe in which the Society is interested, beginning with China and ending with Nigeria. The subject for our address this evening is the Sultanate of Muscat and 'Oman. I fancy most of you, like myself, are blissfully ignorant of those delectable regions. Muscat, we know, is the place where the dates come from, and 'Oman is the place where the pearls come from; but by the time Captain Eccles has enlightened us, we shall know a great deal more than we do now about them. Captain Eccles is fortunate in having a unique experience of that coast of Arabia, so little known. From recent lectures we have come to know a good deal about the Hejaz, the Yemen, and even about Nejd; of the further side of Arabia we know very little. But within the last two years Captain Eccles, who is an officer of the Indian Army attached to the Sultan of Muscat, and in command of the Muscat levies, has had the opportunity of penetrating into the interior and carrying out a survey of the eastern side of Arabia. The results of that survey he will now put before us, and illustrate with an admirable series of slides which he has been fortunate enough to obtain.

The range of mountains which forms the backbone of 'Oman begins at Ras Musandam and is known here as the Ru'us al-Jibal. This promontory includes the famous Malcolm and Elphinstone inlets, where the pirates of old used to hide, and is inhabited by an aboriginal tribe, the Shihuh, who are very primitive and speak a non-Arabic dialect. The mountain range continues in a curve parallel to the coast to Ras Al-Hadd, the south-eastern point of Arabia. The valleys on both sides of the ridge are studded with villages and cultivation in varying degrees.

Between Ru'us al-Jibal and a point some twenty miles along the coast west of Muscat the mountains recede from the sea and leave a coastal plain called the Baṭinah. Close to the shore of this plain date plantations run in a long continuous line. The population is very mixed. The villages on the shore are chiefly inhabited by Baluchi and negro fishermen. The Arabs live a little inland to look after the date groves and the grazing herds of camels and flocks of goats. Well-built but now for the most part ruined forts are dotted along the coast, in the most important of which live the Walis appointed by the Government of Muscat.

On the opposite side of the watershed lies the Dhahirah, a flat and stony plain sparsely covered with the usual prickly desert bushes and shrubs. It contains, however, many villages with excellent date plantations and gardens.

The hilly district to the west and south-west of Muscat on both sides of the watershed is 'Oman proper and contains the Wadi Sama'il, which is the most populous part of the country with the possible exception of the above-mentioned Baṭinah plain. The local population when using the word 'Oman always refer to this district.

Adjoining 'Oman on the inner side of the mountains is the Sharqiyah, a network of small valleys running from the hills.

The coast to the south-east of Muscat is a mass of hills, the valleys of which are thinly populated by various tribes. The corner district is known as Ja'alan.

The Dhahirah, 'Oman proper, Sharqiyah, and Ja'alan are all bordering on the great desert.

Muscat town is situated at the extremity of a small cove. The splendid little natural harbour is formed on the east by a long island which leaves only a narrow channel between it and the mainland, and on the west by a long spur of precipitous rock. On the land side it is surrounded by bare and bleak volcanic hills which greatly resemble those of Aden. There are no roads leading to the interior except narrow and rough footpaths suitable only for pedestrians and donkeys. All caravans to and from the interior use Matrah as the terminus, and goods have to be transported by sea between the two towns—a distance of two miles. The streets of Muscat are narrow, tortuous, and uneven.

There are several good though plain buildings, such as the Consulate, the Palace, and the leading merchants' houses. Mosques are plain, and there are no Minarets. Two picturesque and strongly built Portuguese forts stand one on each side of the sandy beach. They are built on cliffs some 150 feet above the sea, and were completed in 1587 and 1588. The population is very mixed. The majority are Baluchi. The negroes come next. The Arab community is comparatively small, though there are always many visitors from the interior. A community of Indian merchants has lived here for generations, as the local Arabs are very tolerant provided that those professing other faiths and following other sects do not interfere with them or speak disparagingly of their beliefs. The Híndus are allowed to celebrate their feasts just as if they were in their own country, by illuminating their houses and letting off fireworks, etc.

Before I leave Muscat I should like to make a small digression. Mr. Philby, in discussing in "The Heart of Arabia" the reliability of Palgrave's account of his visit to Muscat, quotes a remark made by Colonel S. B. Miles to Sir William Haggard, in which the Colonel stated that Palgrave talks about a road up the great precipice which overlooks the harbour of Muscat. Let me quote Palgrave in the only paragraph to which this can apply: "I had gone on an early walk and was sauntering on between the gardens and wells at the roadside where high rocks shut out the further view to right and left." So far he is absolutely right. He was walking up the bed of the Wadi Kabir, in which lie the wells which are Muscat's water supply and where are the gardens of the town. Here he met three inhabitants of the Jabal Akhdhar and accompanied them. To quote again: "During about two hours our way led across the rough hills which encircle Muscat from the land side, till we passed the last isolated fort on their heights and began to descend by a narrow gorge on the level lands to the south." This is an excellent description of the usual path taken by pedestrians who have no caravans and therefore need not go round to Matrah to reach the broader and more level track. I have several times traversed all the routes along which Palgrave states he passed in 'Oman. Beneath his highly coloured imaginative views and his inaccurate nomenclature, there still remains an atmosphere of verisimilitude which I find it difficult to believe he could have created if he had written only from hearsay evidence. I therefore disagree with Philby in his aspersions on Palgrave's veracity.

Two miles to the west of Muscat lies al-Matrah, the gate of the interior. In the centre of the town facing the sea the Khoja community is found. Originally from the Hyderabad Sind district of India, the majority are followers of the Agha Khan. Their houses are built in a square mass with all the doors inward, thus forming a large fort which can only be entered by two gates—one in front on the sea shore, and

the other at the back. They allow no outsiders to enter except their Baluchi servants.

The next port of importance is Sohar, the ancient capital of 'Oman, 120 miles west of Muscat. It is a straggling town, and contains a walled-in bazaar and a large fort. Saiyid Thawaini, who was Sultan when Palgrave visited Muscat, was murdered here, and his body was entombed in one of the rooms of the fort. The present Wali is the Sultan's half-brother, and administers the western half of the Baṭinah plain.

The only other large port is Sur, eighty miles south-east of Muscat. This is at the moment the most flourishing port in 'Oman, and should produce revenue not far short of Muscat. But the town itself is distracted by the continuous feud of the four sections of the Jannabah, who live each in a different quarter, and snipe one another. The Wali lives in his fort, and is esteemed of no account at all. The control of the port and district is at present in the hands of the Shaikh of the Bani Bu 'Ali, who likes to call himself Amir al-Ja'alan. He has lately been writing to the Government of India, objecting to receiving letters from the Political Agent at Muscat, and insisting on corresponding as an independent sovereign direct with the Government.

POLITICAL.—As the present political situation in 'Oman originated to a great extent in the old tribal divisions, I must give a very brief and incomplete résumé of the history of the country.

The earliest Arab settlers were of Qahtani or Yamani stock, and came some before and some after the bursting of the great dam of Marib, which took place in the first century of our era. These were followed by further streams of Ishmaelite or 'Adnani Arabs, who settled for the most part in the northern provinces. The two stocks, the Qahtani and 'Adnani, have always been at feud with one another, and the strife, intensified by religious animosity, reached its height in the eighteenth century, when, in 1722, the 'Adnani Taminah, or paramount chief of the Bani Ghafir, was grossly insulted by the Imam's regent. Swearing vengeance, the chief returned and collected all the tribes in alliance with the Bani Ghafir. The regent, apprehending that war was inevitable, sent to the Bani Hina for support. So began the civil war which divided 'Oman into the two great political factions which survive to this day. For the most part the Hinawi are of Yamani descent and Ibadhi persuasion, while the Ghafiri are of Ishmaelite descent, and the more important tribes are of Sunni or Wahhabi persuasion. But there is no hard-and-fast rule. In some cases the same tribe is divided between the two factions, and the continued regrouping of the parties from that time has been kaleidoscopic and extremely puzzling to the inquirer from without.

The predominant sect of Islam in 'Oman is the Ibadhiyah. They are the descendants of the Khawarij or Seceders, who broke away

from 'Ali, the prophet's son-in-law, and were defeated and scattered by him. Some of them came to 'Oman. Their doctrines quickly spread, and were adopted by the majority of the Yamani and certain of the 'Adnani tribes. One of the most important tenets concerns the Imamate. They deny the claim of the Quraish to the Khalifate, and object to hereditary succession in the Khalifate and the Imamate. They do not consider a Khalifah or Imam essential, but that when one is required any Muslim suitable in all respects may be elected from any tribe. In this way the founder of the present dynasty, Ahmad bin Sa'id, was elected Imam in 1741 as a reward for organizing the expulsion of the Persians from 'Oman. His grandson, the great Sa'id, however, for reasons which would take too long to explain here, never took the title of Imam, being known only as Al-Saiyid. He it was who moved the capital from Rostaq to Muscat. The former place had held this position since the first of the Ya'arabah dynasty had moved it from Nizwah in 1625. As the present dynasty weakened and tended to rely more and more on foreign support, the interior tribes revolted and set up an Imam of their own; so that at the present time the Sultan in reality has authority only in Muscat and a stretch of coast to the north and south, which can be intimidated by British gunboats.

The present Imam of the interior, Muhammad bin 'Abdillah al-Khalili, of the Bani Ruwailah, is merely a puppet in the hands of Shaikh 'Isa bin Salih of the Hirth. Under this powerful chieftain a confederacy of the Hinawi tribes of 'Oman proper and the Sharqiyah has been formed, with the Imam's banner as a rallying point. A combined attack was made on Muscat in 1915, but the Arabs suffered a severe reverse at the hands of the regular Indian troops who then garrisoned the outposts of the town. Through the mediation of the Political Agent a treaty was signed, since when there has been no further aggression; but last year Shaikh 'Isa, alarmed at threats of Wahhabi invasion, determined to advance into the Dhahirah, and bring by force or persuasion all the tribes of that district, both Ghafiri and Hinawi, up to and including the Biraimi oasis, into his confederacy. All went well at first. Dariz, 'Ibri, and Dhank submitted, but a severe attack of dropsy and a quarrel with one of his most powerful allied tribes caused him to break up the expedition and hurry back to 'Oman. This ignominious retreat so humiliated the Imam under whose banner the tribes had been united that he offered to resign the Imamate, but was persuaded to carry on by the leading Shaikhs. This was the position when I left 'Oman in May, 1926.

During the past two years the success and increasing strength of the Wahhabis has given rise to much anxiety, more especially as some fifteen months ago Ibn Jiluwi, the Wahhabi governor of al-Hasa, sent messengers to all the northern tribes of 'Oman demanding in the name of his master, Ibn Sa'ud, the payment of *zakat* or tithes. There is

little doubt that if 'Oman could combine in a determined opposition the Wahhabis would have an extremely difficult proposition; but many of the Trucial coast tribes are Wahhabi in sentiment, as also is the powerful tribe of Bani Bu 'Ali in the Sharqiyah and Ja'alan districts, whilst many others would probably prefer Wahhabi domination to that of the 'Oman confederacy. For example, the Bani Na'im in Biraimi, when Shaikh 'Isa was advancing toward them, sent a messenger to Ibn Jiluwi, asking for help in man-power, arms, and money. It is not difficult to see, therefore, what would happen if the Wahhabis made a serious effort against 'Oman. The question at once arises, What attitude should we take up in that event?

There is little doubt that but for British support the dynasty of the Al Bu Sa'id would have ceased to exist. Since 1891 we have been bound to a guarantee of protection in a treaty in which no definite termination has been stipulated. The present Sultan, Taimur bin Faisal, though a capable man and commanding respect, is weak and is lacking in ambition. His family are, with few exceptions, degraded and dissolute; and though there are still strong men to be met with from the more distant branches, who have not been debilitated by luxury and idleness, they are as a whole too weak to stand against the same popular opinion which in the beginning brought their founder to power. Also, the hereditary principle to which we committed ourselves when we undertook the protection of the Sultan and his heirs is foreign to Ibadhi sentiment, especially when forced on the country by foreign and infidel power.

Again, our support of this house against the whole of 'Omani popular opinion destroys any hope of a country united under one strong man against Wahhabi or any other encroachments. This is Shaikh 'Isa's ideal, and not, I think, an impossible conception, though admittedly not supported by previous history.

We must remember that the interior has been in open rebellion since 1913, that a treaty has been signed between Muscat and Shaikh 'Isa, which is a virtual acknowledgment of his independence, and that in any case we are not in a position for obvious reasons to defend the tribes of the hinterland. The question therefore narrows down to the Batinah plain to the north of, and the strip of coast to the south of Muscat, which indeed are the only districts outside the area of the capital which contribute to the state revenue. If the Wahhabis were to enter 'Oman and we were determined to support the Sultan there are two alternatives:

1. To defend the whole strip, which would require a considerable increase in land forces as well as more constant patrolling by the gunboats.
2. To retain only Muscat and Matrah.

In both cases the expense would fall on the British Government,

as for some years Muscat has been declining and it is with the greatest difficulty that the state remains solvent.

It would take too long to study the question in all its bearings. Our position and prestige in the Persian Gulf, the extent of our obligations under the treaty, the importance of Muscat to us at the present time, are all points for consideration. I propose, therefore, to turn to the less controversial subject of exploration.


EXPLORATION UP TO 1925.—Badger, writing in 1871, in his preface to the "Imams and Seiyids of Oman," says: "It is remarkable and by no means creditable to the British Government in India, that notwithstanding our intimate political and commercial relations with Oman for the last century, we know actually less of that country beyond the coast than we do of the lake districts of Central Africa."

Since then other writers have quoted this remark to draw attention to the paucity of our knowledge of this corner of Arabia, but with two notable exceptions, which I shall mention later, very few attempts have been made either by those on the spot or by outsiders to remedy our dilatoriness in this respect. Mr. Philby, in the discussion on Sir Percy Cox's paper to the R.G.S. in April of last year, notes that Sir Percy's predecessors number no more than three. Some twenty years have passed since the latter's expeditions, yet no one has come to displace him as the last on the list of explorers of 'Oman. Let us briefly review the journeys of these four with the aid of the map.

Pioneer, and most extensive traveller of all—Wellsted, with whom may be bracketed Whitelock. Wellsted was a naval lieutenant who had long been engaged on survey work on the west and south coast of Arabia, and had made other journeys in Hadramaut. His knowledge of Arabia was small, and though not badly supplied with instruments his map is unreliable. But Dr. Hogarth pays him the high compliment of comparing him with Niebuhr in that he did for 'Oman almost as much as Niebuhr did for the Yaman. In the Sharqiyah and Ja'alan districts, as the map shows, he stands alone, and his general information is for the most part accurate and full. He and Whitelock were in 'Oman between 1835 and 1837.

A generation passed before anyone made a journey of sufficient importance to justify his inclusion among the names of explorers in 'Oman. In 1876 Colonel S. B. Miles, who was then British Consul at Muscat, made the first of his expeditions. The retirement from 'Oman of the Wahhabis, whose presence had prevented Wellsted from reaching Biraimi, enabled Colonel Miles to make a flying visit to that oasis. He was also the first to pass from Jabrin to Dhank, and to visit the country between Muscat and Quryat, including the Wadi Taiyin, "one of the largest, most beautiful, and most populous valleys in Oman." Colonel Miles undoubtedly was the greatest of past authorities on the country. But unfortunately his book, "The Countries and Tribes of

ROUTES OF THE EXPLORERS OF 'OMAN



- Wellsted and Whitelock, 1835
- Col. S. B. Miles, 1876 & 1884
- Rev. S. M. Zwemer, 1901
- Sir Percy Cox, 1903 & 1905
- Geological Expedition, 1925

the Persian Gulf," was written in the evening of his life, when failing sight and illness prevented him both from setting forth even a small percentage of his great knowledge and from correcting his notes.

Another generation elapsed before the next and last period fruitful in exploration. In 1901 the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, of the American Reformed Church's Mission in Arabia, travelled from Sharjah to Shinas by the Wadi Hatta. He was the first to describe this valley, nor, as far as I know, has any other account of it been written up to the time of our expedition of last year. He also was the first to journey from Abu Dhabi on the Trucial coast to Biraimi. To my mind his chief title to fame is that he and his companion managed the whole journey from Abu Dhabi to Sahar and on to the Muscat coast for ninety rupees between them.

He was followed after a comparatively short interval by Sir Percy Cox, whose first journey was made in 1903, and who only last year read a paper on his travels to the R.G.S. His two main achievements were firstly, the journey over hitherto unexplored country between Ras al-Khaimah and Dhank via Biraimi; and, secondly, the fixing of the position of the Biraimi oasis, for which purpose he carried a ship's chronometer to that place from Ras al-Khaimah—a distance of over 100 miles. He is our greatest living authority on 'Oman and the last of those who can justifiably be called explorers of the country. The detailed map of the Ras al-Khaimah-Biraimi route published with his paper proved most useful to us last year, and, considering the short time taken by Sir Percy in his journey, is marvellously accurate.

A study of the map will show that up to the date reached the Dhahirah plateau has been crossed, 'Oman proper has had several visitors, and, of course, the coastal plain has been thoroughly explored; but the main hills of the watershed, except for certain well-known routes such as the Wadi Jizzi, the Wadi Hawasinah, and the Wadi Sama'il, are still unexplored territory. And in this lies the interest of last year's expedition, of which I propose to give a brief account.

D'ARCY EXPLORATION COMPANY'S GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF 1925.—The party was composed of: Messrs. G. M. Lees and K. W. Gray, geologists; Mr. Joseph Fernandez, deputed by the Bombay Natural History Society; Mr. A. F. Williamson (al-Hag 'Abdullah); and myself.

I was in charge of the social and political branches; Williamson organized the transport and messing; the remainder were free to carry out their strenuous technical work.

It is a great pity that Williamson, or someone for him, does not write the story of his life. Some twenty-five or more years ago he was in Aden. There he became a Muhammadan and went up to Sana'a and the interior of the Yaman. Since then he has wandered over the greater part of Arabia. He has performed the Hajj—twice, I believe.

At the outbreak of war he was acting as agent for the Shaikhs of the great Muntafiq tribe, and during the war he was attached to the intelligence branch in Iraq. His knowledge of Bedouin life and customs is very profound, and it was strange to see 'Omanis, who are famed for their camel-breeding, bringing their camels to him and consulting him as to treatment for wounds and illness.

As the principal object of the expedition was a geological survey, the main scarp of the Jabal Akhdhar naturally offered most attraction. But, as I have already mentioned in describing the political situation, the whole of this region is controlled by Shaikh 'Isa bin Salih in the name of the Imam. The former was at that time (October, 1925) making preparations for his advance into the Dhahirah, and on being approached wrote politely regretting his inability to control his tribesmen should the party enter his territories. Although in consequence all the land to the south and south-east of the Wadi Hawasinah was barred to us, Shaikh 'Isa's advance, which coincided with our journey, was undoubtedly a help to us, as many Shaikhs who might otherwise have proved refractory received the party with open arms, hoping that exaggerated reports would reach Shaikh 'Isa of the presence of Muscat officials in their territories, and perhaps also seeing a vague chance of getting some help from the Muscat Government.

Williamson for the greater part, and I for the whole journey, travelled in Arab dress, and we found that it had a great effect in making our various hosts and visitors more friendly and in loosening their tongues. Every day after we had camped, between the afternoon and the sunset prayers, he and I and the Shaikhs and their followers would sit round chatting, and many were the amusing conversations we had. Another helpful factor in overcoming the shyness and suspicions of the Arabs was that one of my personal following was a slave of the Sultan's household famous for his coffee-making. He would carry all the apparatus on his riding camel, and wherever there was a long halt he would hastily prepare coffee for the party.

On November 3 all the transport and stores had been collected at Bait al-Falaj, my headquarters, two miles inland from Matrah, and on the following morning we made a start. Passing through Boshar (the Besheyr of Palgrave), famous for its hot springs, where we were hospitably received by Shaikh 'Ali bin 'Abdillah al-Khalili, brother of the Imam, we entered the Batinah plain at Sib, and followed the coast to Khaburah, where we arrived on the 10th. The Wali of the place, Mudhaffar bin Sulaiyim, is the son of an African slave who rose to a position of great influence in 'Oman, becoming Wali of Sohar and controlling more than half of the Batinah. Mudhaffar accompanied us throughout the whole trip. He inherits much of the character of his father—is forceful, active, much liked by the Arabs, and became our general manager and trusted adviser.

THE COUNTRY OF THE TRIBES AL-HAWASINAH AND BANI 'UMR.—Khaburah lies at the mouth of the Wadi Hawasinah, which takes its name from the tribe which inhabits it, and up which we proposed to climb to reach and cross the watershed. Here we were joined by Shaikh Saif bin Muhammad of the Hawasinah, a Hinawi tribe, and Shaikh Ghussun bin Salim of the Bani 'Umr, a Ghafiri tribe. The two tribes are generally at feud with one another, and the two Shaikhs are quite dissimilar in character and disposition. The former proved himself miserly, weak, shiftily obstructionist; the latter a tactful, firm, and helpful disciplinarian.

Our path led us over the Batinah plain toward the mountains. Leaving on our right the deserted village of Qasaf, where the bare stumps of the palm trees bore mute testimony to the repeated failure of the rains during the past ten years, we reached Ghaidhain (555 feet), wrongly placed in Hunter's map of 1908. A description of the village will suffice to portray all the villages of this area, which are alike in essential details. It is well built of stone and local cement and stands on a terrace on the left bank of the Wadi about half a mile inside the foothills. Extensive date groves and gardens lie in a re-entrant behind the village and are watered by a *falaj* or water channel which begins from a spring underneath the surface shingle of the Wadi, a mile above the village, and continues underground for some distance before emerging into an open cemented channel. Those who are familiar with the Persian Qanat, or Kariz, will recognize the same type. In this case the open channel is divided into two streams just before it reaches the gardens, each stream watering a half of the date groves. Hence the name Ghaidhain, "The two groves." Pursuing a leisurely course up the Wadi we passed through Suddan, described by Wellsted, whose route we now joined, Bida'ah, and Falaj al-Hadith. Here we came upon running water, and the valley bed was sprinkled with oleander and ziziphus shrubs, many of which reached a height of 10 feet. As we approached the junction of the Wadi Hawasinah and Wadi Dhillah the valley opened out and we passed a large tower built for the protection of the caravan route and occupied by three men of the Hawasinah. Two of them came down to meet us and to receive the customary *douceur*, which we gave them and passed on. But the third man, either not realizing that we had paid, or thinking it not enough, ran to a point directly overlooking the Wadi, fired over our heads, and started screaming in the sharp, high-pitched feminine tone used by men in this country to warn their friends of the approach of hostile or strange parties. His own companions ran to him from the fort, and our following started loud explanations from below. Williamson and I went steadily forward and left them to settle it.

During our passage up the Wadi Hawasinah we had suffered much

trouble and obstruction from Shaikh Saif, and so we were relieved to turn into the Wadi Dhillah, which belongs to the Bani 'Umr. From a high hill Lees gained a good view of the Wadi Hawasinah above its junction with the Wadi Dhillah. The hills appeared to recede somewhat from the river bed and to allow of small plots of cultivation on the terraces. A number of villages could be seen, including Hajajah, 'Abailah, Tawi, Suwairiq, Washah, and Harm 'Ali. The Wadi Dhillah is narrow with vertical cliffs rising sheer from the valley bed. It is uninhabited except for some Bedouin squatters. As we proceeded the valley became steeper and more narrow and the going became very bad, until we reached a zigzag path known as Najd al-Khabbain (2,970). Here we were forced to dismount and lead our camels to the top of the pass over the range which divides the Dhahirah and the Baṭinah.

We found a pleasant camping site on the further slope and determined to stay here a few days, as I had been having attacks of malaria, and the transport required some reorganization. From Jabal al-Qala'ah (4,900) Lees gained a magnificent view of the Dhahirah up to the edge of the great desert. To the south-east the great scarp of Jabal Akhdhar was plainly visible. The Wadis, draining west and south-west, run out into extensive plains broken here and there by groups of small hills. The villages of Qanat, Dariz, and 'Ibri could be seen, but Miskin was hidden by a range of low hills.

Two miles along the scarp west of the camp we were shown a wonderful gorge, called en-Naqs, 10 to 20 feet only in breadth, with vertical walls rising to a height of 400 feet. From half a mile away it is quite invisible. Breaking through the knife-edge ridge of Jabal Ra'is it joins the Wadi Dhillah and provides for good mountaineers, such as all the local tribesmen are, an alternative track to the Najd al-Khabbain. In the narrowest part the torrent bed drops a sheer 40 feet, and over the precipice thus formed a chain has been hung. Well forged with long, narrow links it is firmly secured between two rocks, but as it is not long enough to reach the bottom a rope has been attached to the further end. The face of the cliff is concave, so that no foothold is obtainable. The tribesmen said that up to twenty years ago there had been only a rope and many had lost their lives by its breaking. They could not name the public-spirited Shaikh who had substituted the chain.

On November 20 we packed up reluctantly and set out for the Wadi Bani 'Umr, by which we had decided to return to the Baṭinah. During the loading up Williamson tried to make one of the tribesmen take on his camel some hens which had been bought for our messing. But the prejudice against the carrying of any kind of fowl by a man proved so strong that insistence would certainly have resulted in a general strike. In the same way we could only obtain eggs if we sent

one of our own servants to fetch them. Our way led along a wide valley under the outlying spurs of the main ridge, which falls in far gentler slopes on the Dhahirah side. On a small hill in the centre there stood a strong but dilapidated fort dominating the valley. A short but difficult pass brought us over the watershed into the Wadi Bani 'Umr, which we followed past the village of Suwaidah to Lislat (or Hail Islat, 2,300 feet). The latter had belonged to the Hawasinah, and was protected by a strong fort built on the summit of a solitary hill which rises abruptly from the valley bed. A well had been dug in the Wadi against the perpendicular side of the hill and enclosed by the semi-circular wall built against the cliff right up to the fort 100 feet above. The place was captured by the Bani 'Umr some forty years before. They have abandoned the old village and built a new and miserable one of palm branches on the opposite bank. When I asked Shaikh Ghussun the reason, he said that his and his father's deliberate policy had been to discourage the use and building of strong forts and villages, which proved only a source of weakness to the tribe, as each petty village Shaikh comes to rely more on his own fortifications than on the unity of the tribe, in which lies their real strength.

A little beyond Lislat the road left the Wadi, and passing the small village of Qisah on the right, climbed over the northern shoulder of Jabal Ra'is by a pass called Najd Bani 'Umr or Najd al-Qafs ("the pass of the cage," 3,110 feet). This was the roughest stretch we experienced throughout the journey, and almost the whole day's trek had to be done on foot. We re-entered the Wadi Bani 'Umr at Furfur, and continued along it to the low foothills, passing Lilhban, a prosperous and well-built village, with extensive date plantations on both sides of the Wadi. Another day's march brought us to Falaj al-Hirith in the Baṭinah, seven miles inland from Saham. During the past few days several misfortunes had overtaken us. Lees and Fernandez had both had severe attacks of fever. Gray had upset a bottle of Indian ink over the plane table, and Williamson one day had lost the way, taking with him our special cook, and had not turned up till eight o'clock at night after darkness had fallen.

THE COUNTRY OF THE BANI 'ALI.—We had been joined in the Hawasinah country by Shaikh Muhammad bin Hilal of the Bani 'Ali, an Arab of the finest type, quiet, unassuming, yet naturally dignified. He now came to me and invited us to visit Yanqul, the capital of the tribe and residence of his brother Khalifah, the paramount Shaikh. By this time Shaikh 'Isa bin Salih in his advance from 'Oman proper had reached Dariz. 'Ibri was still holding out, but its fall was imminent. The Bani 'Ali had always remained loyal to Muscat, and had turned a deaf ear to Shaikh 'Isa's enticements. But now, when town after town in the Dhahirah was falling, Khalifah's position was very precarious, especially as there were in Shaikh 'Isa's camp two

rival claimants to the Shaikhly office. He had twice appealed to Muscat, but without avail. In inviting us therefore his motives were twofold. Firstly, Muscat might be induced through our influence to give him some support; and secondly, if he made a great show exaggerated reports would reach Shaikh 'Isa, who might really think that Muscat and even the British Government were behind him.

But whatever the motive it was a golden opportunity for us, and we determined to start for Yanqul the following day by way of the Wadi Ahin. A rapid journey over the plain soon brought us into the foothills again, and we entered the Wadi at its junction with the Wadi Hibi, which enters from the south, and contains the village of Hibi, wrongly placed on Hunter's map. During the march Lees dismounted and turned aside to climb a hill. His guide immediately started to take the camels on, so that Lees was forced to turn back and stop him. An old woodcutter then appeared, and started chatting with the guide. Lees made another move to climb the mountain, whereupon the woodcutter ran towards him shouting abuse, and, as Lees continued on his way, began to throw stones at him. Lees, a tall and doubtless terrifying figure in his battered panama, turned and took three paces toward him, brandishing his geological hammer. It was quite sufficient. The old man turned and ran, followed by a shower of stones from Lees.

As we approached Wuqbah the river bed narrowed until we reached a part where there was a considerable stream with deep pools. In order to avoid this stretch, which probably in rainy weather became a series of rapids, a road had been built over the side of the Wadi, with steps made of stone and local cement (*saru*) at either end from the river bed. These steps were a source of great pride to the tribesmen, who had several times warned me to look out for them. The valley starts to widen as it approaches Wuqbah, a village with very extensive gardens, wrongly placed in the Wadi Dhank in the "Handbook of Arabia," and gradually broadens above the river into a plateau well covered with jungle bushes and grasses. A short and easy pass brought us over the watershed, which is here not very clearly defined. A mile beyond there stretched from north-west to south-east a wide, well-wooded plain, bounded on the east by the irregular and serrated black peaks of the serpentine hills which form the watershed, and on the west by a long regular limestone scarp, known as Jabal al-Abiadh. We sent the caravan to camp at ar-Raudhah, a mosque and well immediately below the centre of the scarp, whilst we turned aside and made for Yanqul, which lies at the southern end.

I will not weary you with a description of our welcome, as it was almost identical with that given to Sir Percy Cox at 'Ibri, and described by him in his paper to the R.G.S. last year. As soon as politeness allowed we proceeded to the house set apart for us. It was a strong two-storeyed building overlooking a pleasant garden. The upper rooms

were high and well-windowed. The beams were painted red, and decorated with verses from the Quran in white. The staircase, as in all Arab buildings, was very narrow, steep, and low. The baths constituted a pleasant feature, which I saw in no other town. These were formed by irrigation channels running from the main *falaj* directly under the houses, where special bathing-pools were constructed. Strong gratings were placed over the channel where it entered and left the house. I noticed that Shaikh Khalifah could hardly speak, and wondered if he had a sore throat, but when he came to see me privately he told me the true reason. The night before our arrival an attempt had been made to murder him by three of his cousins, who would have succeeded but for the loyalty of the doorkeeper of the fort. There must also have been a disaffected element among the townspeople, as he had lost his voice in haranguing them after the failure of the plot. The three brothers were imprisoned in the fort, and he and Mudhaffar started to discuss their fate. Mudhaffar was all for killing them. "Wait," he said, "till the captain and his friends have departed, then slay them all." "Idhrib bi'l-saif wa kul 'asal." But no decision was made, and I have never heard what happened to them. On the following day news came that Shaikh 'Isa had captured 'Ibri. It was too late for Khalifah to expect any help, and two days later he set out for 'Ibri to make the best terms he could.

Yanqul stands in a strong position between the southern end of Jabal Abiadh and a high conical peak named after the town. The fort is in good condition and is a large rambling building with a low tower. The gardens lie mostly to the west of the town. Whilst Williamson and I were occupied with interviews and conversation, Lees and Gray climbed the scarp of Jabal Abiadh and gained a splendid view of the Dhahirah up to the Biraimi oasis. Bearings were taken on 'Ibri and Dariz which gave intersections with those taken from Jabal Qala'ah.

COUNTRY OF THE BANI KA'AB.—We returned to the Batinah by the same route and entered Sohar on December 7. Our intention was to follow the coast to Murair at the end of the Batinah plain and work back to Sahar under the foothills. But a fortunate event occurred which changed our plans. Between Liwa and Shinas Williamson and I turned aside to visit a Baluchi Shaikh famous throughout 'Oman for his hospitality. I had only intended to drink coffee, but when I told him so he seized my beard (by now quite a respectable one) and insisted on our staying the night. We compromised on a midday meal, during which I was introduced to Shaikh Ma'adhad, brother of Shaikh Salim bin Diyan, Tamimah, or paramount Shaikh of the Bani Ka'ab, whose district in the Dhahirah extends from Jabal Raudhah to the Wadi Jizzi in a long narrow strip among the outlying spurs of the main mountain ridge. Ma'adhad invited us to visit his country and made himself responsible for us in everything. We naturally jumped at the

opportunity. Matters were quickly settled and that night it was decided to work up the Wadi Hatta. Shaikh Ma'adhad gave me the impression of a man of very strong passions repressed by an equally strong will, giving him outwardly a quiet and reserved demeanour. In durbar he never spoke unless appealed to, when he would answer as laconically as possible. But his judgment was always direct and his followers held him in respect. Only when on the trek would he break through his reserve and talk and chant continuously.

For the third time we turned to re-enter the hills. Between Liwa and Wadi al-Qor they are of less elevation than those further south, but north of Fujairah they are reinforced by the Shimailiyah ridge. Our first halt in the Wadi Hatta was at 'Ajib, where, amongst other things, tobacco was being extensively grown. A little above the village the river bed narrows to a gorge, called al-Wajajah, with running water and deep pools which the path skirted. At the near end on a shelf overlooking the gorge stands a strong tower whose only method of ingress is by a rope thrown from a window. This tower marks the administrative boundary of the Wali of Sohar. Emerging from the gorge we passed the village of Mashabbah, the gardens of which have been almost entirely killed by drought, and entered an enclosed plateau dotted with small hills. As we advanced, passing several villages and continuous gardens, this plateau gradually merged into a wide plain covered with desert bushes, whilst in the distance a line of sand-hills gleamed red and gold in the sun. There was no marked watershed or pass. The stony plateau marking the head of the Wadi Hatta simply loses itself in the plain which slopes down towards the Trucial coast. The reason was explained by Lees, who found recent marine shells on the plateau at a height of 1,050 feet. This level plain is in reality a raised beach, and the Shimailiyah country to the north must have been an island when the sea was at this level.

We were now very close to Sir Percy Cox's route, which passed to the west of Jabal Raudhah. Lees climbed this mountain and over-looked Jabal Faiyah and Dubai to the west and the Gulf of 'Oman to the east. Here we turned to the west and passed under the main ridge of Jabal Samaini, keeping to the east of the scarp. Shaikh Ma'adhad had tales of panther to be found, which he said took toll not only of the flocks but also of grazing camels. The southern end of the ridge terminates in a peak known as Jabal Munfarid (3,700 feet). Some miles further on the road climbed a small pass and dropped into the plain, which here has the effect of a backgammon board, as long wedges of sand run right up to the black serpentine hills, leaving patches of stony, well-wooded plateau dovetailed between them. We were forced to cross one sand dune, and then turned again into the first range of hills, and leaving Jabal Abu 'l-Millh on our right reached Sharm, Ma'adhad's home, and the second in importance of the Bani Ka'ab

settlements. The welcome given us was on a scale second only to that of Yanqul, and the dancing, which was of the kind seen by Wellsted at Suwaig, continued throughout the rest of the day. On the same night letters came announcing the murder of Shaikh 'Isa bin Ṣalīḥ at 'Ibri, and the hurried retreat of all his forces toward 'Oman. This was most fortunate for us, as Shaikh Ma'adhad had apparently begun to regret having invited us to his country and tried to persuade me to return by the road by which we had come. But now the path was smoothed, for although the news of the murder was false, it was true that 'Isa and his troops had retired in confusion.

We therefore set out with light hearts for Mahadhah, where we arrived after an hour and a half's riding over a stony plain within the first ridge of hills. The town lies at the side of a broad, bare "baṭṭah" (wide torrent bed), which may possibly be the same as that crossed by Sir Percy Cox on the outskirts of Biraimi. The fort stands on a small hillock in the centre of the torrent bed. On the further side and to the west of the town rises Jabal Mahadhah, blocking any view of the plain and sand dunes beyond. Shaikh Salim ibn Diyan we found to be an older and more sedate man than his brother Ma'adhad. More frequent journeys to Sharjah and Dubai had accustomed him to European manners and town-dwellers' amenities, and he was altogether more polished, more intelligent, and broad-minded, though no less virile, than his Bedouin brother. Whilst Williamson and I listened to the local politics and strolled round the gardens admiring the broad and strong water channel, Lees climbed Jabal Mahadhah (3,400 feet), and reconnoitred the Biraimi oasis and Jabal Haft. The latter, indeed, was constantly coming into view during our journey from Jabal Raudhah to Hail in the Wadi Jizzi, and we heard no other name for it, nor was any mention made of a village named 'Uqdah. It is, as Sir Percy Cox has pointed out, an isolated hog-backed hill some twenty miles in length, but he does not emphasize the difference between it and comparatively small hills such as Jabal Faiyah. Actually it rises to a height of about 5,000 feet, or nearly 4,000 feet above the surrounding plain.

Just before we left Mahadhah a message arrived from the Shaikh of the Bani Na'im inviting us to Biraimi. Lack of time forced us much against our will to forego this great opportunity. Shaikh Salim was much exercised in his mind as to the policy he should pursue in relation to the Bani Na'im. Some two days ago they had sent him a letter to inform him that they had despatched a messenger to Ibn Jiluwi, Ibn Sa'ud's lieutenant in al-Hasa, asking for help in arms and man-power against Shaikh 'Isa. They now wished the Bani Ka'ab to join them. The latter were already in alliance with the Bani Na'im, and Shaikh Salim thought that he ought to have been consulted before so important a step was taken. His grandfather (who visited Colonel

Miles at Biraimi and invited him to Mahadhah) had been taken prisoner by the Wahhabis and led in chains to Dara'iyyah, where he was kept for seven years, so that Salim had no love for them. In the earlier part of the year Ibn Jiluwi had sent his messengers to demand *zakat* from the Trucial coast and from the Biraimi oasis. Certain tribes had paid up, and it was ostensibly to prevent this and to unite the tribes against the Wahhabis that Shaikh 'Isa advanced into the Dhahirah, as we have seen.

Time pressed, as Lees and Gray had to catch the mail-boat from Muscat, so we set out for the Wadi Jizzi, accompanied for the first two miles by our hospitable host. The track crossed a level boulder-strewn plain. To the east a number of wadis emerged from the black serpentine crags, the lower slopes of which were dotted with villages and date groves. Some low foothills hid the plain on the west. By some misunderstanding the caravan had turned aside to a well other than that agreed upon. Finding it unoccupied, we went steadily forward until by sunset we were well into the hills again, and we realized that we must have lost them. After much fruitless wandering in the darkness, during which all the Arabs argued their loudest, some to go back, some to advance, and some to stop where we were, we sighted a lamp on a hill to our right. It had been placed there by Gray, who was with the caravan. When we pointed it out to the tribesmen they refused to believe it. It must, they said, be either a star or a jinn. However, we insisted on turning towards it, and after a rough ride reached the camp very tired.

On the next day we followed the Wadi 'Ubailah, which gradually narrows as it enters the hills, to its junction with the Wadi Jizzi, along which many European travellers have passed. Turning aside to visit the Persian ruins at Hurah Barghah, described by Colonel Miles and others, we reached Sohar on December 23. Here we divided. I rode back along the coast, spending Christmas Day with 'Wali Mudhaffar at Khaburah. The rest embarked on a dhow, and, more fortunate than Palgrave, reached Muscat in two days.

I must trespass on your patience one minute longer to thank Sir Arnold Wilson, through whom the opportunity was given me of accompanying the party. I have also to acknowledge with gratitude the help of the other members of the expedition, who have all contributed to the description of the journey, and have given me the free use of their negatives; and of Mr. J. N. Bower, who visited Boshar with me for the special purpose of testing the reliability of Palgrave's account, and has lent me his photographs. Finally, I must mention another member of our Society, Mr. B. S. Thomas, who is at present Minister of Finance at Muscat. By his tact and knowledge he has gained a great influence over the Shaikhs and leading men, with whom he is constantly in contact. He is always travelling up and down the coast, and is only

awaiting a favourable opportunity to go inland; and no one is more fitted to write a paper on the past history or present position of 'Oman.

Sir PERCY COX: As I spent five very interesting years in 'Oman, naturally Captain Eccles' paper to-night has been of the very greatest interest to me. I think we have not only had an interesting, but a very good lecture. (Hear, hear.) I have made one or two notes of points I would like to mention. In the first place, of course, it is very satisfactory to me to know that the map which I made a good many years ago, and produced last year with a paper I read before the Royal Geographical Society, proved accurate. A traveller is always lucky if the men who come after him do not accuse him of lying in some way. (Laughter.) But I am glad to hear that Captain Eccles, so far as he could see, found there was ground to think that Palgrave's observations regarding his travelling in 'Oman territory, in the part that he knew, seemed well founded. I think it is difficult always to support Palgrave; but his book is a great joy, and I am always glad to hear where it can be corroborated instead of given the lie to. One thing the lecturer mentioned, the Jebel Hafit, along the base of which I marched twice; I am astonished to find that he makes it 4,000 feet above the level of the surrounding country. I could not take any measurements, because I had no instruments with which I could measure the height; but I should have put it at 2,000 feet at the outside, and would like to ask him how the height was calculated. But the mere fact that I could be 2,000 feet out shows how easy it is to go wrong in a matter like that.

THE LECTURER: I am afraid my authority for the 4,000 feet above the other level really rests with the other two who were with me and who were doing all the survey work. They made a point of telling me that the height was 5,000 feet.

Sir PERCY COX: I should like to hear later how they measured it. On the subject of travelling in 'Oman generally, Captain Eccles has drawn attention to the fact that it is only about once in half a generation that anyone has done serious travelling there. I was there five years, and took such opportunities as I could get, on any excuse, of doing a bit of travelling. But it is an extraordinarily difficult country to travel in, and I do not see much chance of it being done very extensively or very often. In the first place, as Captain Eccles says, the Sultan's writ practically does not carry beyond the walls of Muscat. Inland those two main factions of Hinawi and Ghafiri are always ready to get at one another's throats, and one tribe is constantly at feud with the next. To travel you have to make elaborate arrangements at the start to square the chiefs of tribes through whose territories you intend to pass. That means money. As regards officers

of Government, if you are one you cannot divest yourself of your official capacity, and that being so the Government do not encourage you to take on tours, or go on expeditions where you may have some inconvenient incident, which they may be obliged to take up officially. Incidents are a great nuisance to them. On one occasion, on one of my trips, I was held up for six weeks by one of the sheiks to whom the lecturer referred, Aysa bin Saleh. I refused to turn back: they refused to let me advance through their district. They thought I was after minerals of some kind and were very suspicious. I was travelling on my own and wanted to explore the country. It took me six weeks to negotiate, through the Sultan of Muscat, before I was allowed to go on. Such things can often happen and it is very inconvenient for a Government official. For private travellers there is not much attraction except the more or less unknown character of the country. There is practically no sport. You are blackmailed a good deal. With the D'Arcy Oil Company the blackmail of 'Oman would probably not matter very much. But for the ordinary traveller it is a serious consideration. That is one reason we cannot expect a very rapid development of exploration in 'Oman. As regards Hajji Williamson, to whom the lecturer referred as having accompanied them, I was very interested to hear that Hajji Williamson had been with them. I knew him well; he is a man with an extraordinary past. At one time he was married to a tribal Arab woman of one of the main tribes of 'Iraq, and has lived as a Bedouin. He has also been in all sorts of posts. He is a regular rolling stone. He seems to have some kink in him, and an entire lack of initiative; perhaps someone will spend some time taking down the story of his life from him; there is no chance, I think, of his doing it himself. It would be exceedingly interesting. Here is an Englishman who has lived the life of the Arab in the desert, as well as in the towns of Baghdad and Basra, and who does not realize how interesting his experiences would be. But they would be of extraordinary interest to the world in general, I think. I was very sorry to hear that the lecturer's expedition had not been able to get to the Jebel Akhdar. There we have a very fine plateau, about thirty miles in length, on the crest of the range, which is entirely different country, of course, from the plains below. There is different vegetation altogether. There also it is very difficult to remain, or has been up to now; but I very much hope that the D'Arcy Oil Company will turn their attention to it, because they have the funds at their command, and can make a good job of it, which no private individual can. The interesting part is between the place marked Izki at the south-eastern end of the Jebel Akhdar—straight from there to Yenqul, along the crest of the ridge. As to the question of wearing Arab dress, I quite agree that if you can do it, it is much easier to travel in Arab dress. But the lecturer's expedition was there in the winter. It is all right then, you can do

with the Arab *aggal* and handkerchief; but I do not know what Captain Eccles would suggest for the hot weather. I travelled along the edge of the desert from the bottom of the Pirate Coast parallel to the backbone of 'Oman, down to Muscat, in the month of June, when the thermometer was anything from 110° upwards; and I defy you to go without something on your head beyond an Arab *soof*. That is where I think the difficulty is. He has mentioned a very interesting subject, and rather a delicate one—the possible intentions of the Sultan of Nejd and Hejaz, Ibn Sa'ud, in regard to 'Oman. The great Wahhabi ruler, Ibn Sa'ud, was and is a very dear friend, and I have discussed his ambitions with him many times. It may be of interest if I tell you briefly what they are. Practically he thinks that he is justified, in principle, in regaining any territory that his forefathers had a century ago, whether as territory or as a "sphere of influence." 'Oman was in their sphere of influence. Bereimi itself was actually in Wahhabi hands, and that accounts for the fact that even now a large section of the population are Wahhabi in principle. The Sheikhs of the Pirate Coast, too, still retain latent Wahhabi sympathies, and would show their feelings more openly. In my time, before the war, we had intimate relations with Ibn Sa'ud; we had a treaty with him under which we paid him a subsidy; and it was part of the agreement that he should not attack or molest any friends of ours, or any chiefs who were in treaty relations with us. Our friends were to be his friends. After the war, however, we had to reduce expenditure. We could not go on paying the subsidies we had paid before and during the war. We had to make reductions. One of those reduced was that of Ibn Sa'ud. He was hard hit, but he quite realized that we could not go on paying this for ever. But what he felt was, "Up to now I have been under specific obligation not to annoy the British Government by any policy that I pursue. As long as I enjoyed a pension or subsidy from them it was incumbent on me to abide by their conditions; but now that they have felt obliged to stop any payment to me, I think I am entitled to pursue my own policy and work out my own destiny as I think best." He is now doing that. Up to now he has been extraordinarily correct and statesmanlike in all he has done. We have never been able to put him wrong. He has made himself King of the Hejaz, and we have recognized him as such. As long as we paid him the subsidy above referred to he kept his hands off the Hejaz; since it ceased he has extended his authority over that country, and I have little doubt but that in the course of time he will seek to extend his authority over the interior of 'Oman. That I think will be his policy. As regards Muscat itself, we ourselves, the French, the Dutch, and the Americans have all had treaties with the Sultan of Muscat since the beginning of the nineteenth century. But the Sultanate of Muscat has rather changed since then. The rule of the Sultan is relegated to

the coast ports, it being practically recognized that he has no authority over the interior. This fact, I think, would weaken our hands in any attempt on our part to safeguard the hinterland of 'Oman against Wahhabi intrusion. But that is a question of politics upon which I cannot offer a responsible opinion. One more remark and I have finished. I noticed that the expedition came in contact with the sand dunes at one point; if the Lecturer did much travelling over the dunes I was going to ask if he heard the music of the sands, as I did.

The LECTURER: No, we only just touched the dunes near Jabal Raudhah and Sharm.

ADMIRAL RICHMOND: I am afraid I know very little of those parts; I was only a passer-by when I visited Muscat with my squadron. We, of course, have always had a considerable naval interest in Muscat as being a commanding position on the coast. The two principal bases we have used are Muscat and Henjam. Muscat has a great history behind it. As late as 1839 the Imam of Muscat had a naval force of one 46-gun frigate, two of 20 guns, and two or three smaller vessels; it is always bound to be a place which, from the point of view of the sea, will be of interest to this country. I have listened with interest to what Captain Eccles has said, and congratulate him on his lecture.

The CHAIRMAN: We are very fortunate not only in having Captain Eccles and the series of slides in which he has been able to show us something of this very remote and unknown country, but we have also had Sir Percy Cox, who has a unique knowledge of the coast, and Admiral Richmond, who has seen it both from land and sea. One point has not been touched on which may explain its fallen greatness: in the days when the Sultan of Muscat had an overflowing treasury, his riches may have been due to the fact that Muscat was then a depôt for the smuggling of arms into Afghanistan and Persia. Is not that the case?

ADMIRAL RICHMOND: Not quite. The arms' question did not come until long after he lost his naval power.

The CHAIRMAN: Parties used to come from the Afghan Borderland—Mahsuds, Afridis, and Wazirs—to somewhere down the coast of 'Oman to get the arms imported from Europe. No doubt they paid, but whether the Sultan had a share in the profits one does not know. If so, we will not regret that that source of income has disappeared. No doubt our knowledge of 'Oman—my ignorance was such that when I started to introduce the lecturer I called it Ōman; now I know better—has been considerably enlarged by what we have heard from Captain Eccles. We are most grateful to him for his excellent lecture, and also to Sir Percy Cox and Admiral Richmond for their contributions to the discussions. (Applause.)

Before closing, I ought to announce what we decided this afternoon at a meeting of the Council. A memorial is, as you know, to be erected

in memory of Lord Curzon, for years our most distinguished President, and the greatest authority on Central Asia we have had in the Society since its foundation. The Council has decided to offer a subscription of twenty guineas. What form the memorial will take will depend on the amount subscribed, but I am sure the Society will say that the Council has acted for the best in this matter. (Applause.)

ON THE TRAIL OF ANCIENT MAN IN CENTRAL ASIA*

REPORT OF A LECTURE GIVEN BY
DR. ROY CHAPMAN ANDREWS, D.Sc.


SIR MICHAEL, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is with a great deal more than ordinary pleasure that I take the opportunity of speaking to you to-day, particularly because I have had the honour to be a member of this Society some three years. Last Monday, at the Royal Geographical Society, I tried to give a kaleidoscopic picture of the work which the expedition under my leadership has been conducting in Mongolia for the past five years. Inasmuch as the search for fossils has been a very important part of our work, I am afraid that many of the facts I presented were dead, very dead indeed, because most of the animals had been dead for many million years. This afternoon I hope to tell you something more about the living side of Mongolia, because I believe the members of this Society are more interested in the people and the events that are going on and the conditions of the country

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held on Wednesday, November 10, 1926, at the Royal Society of Arts, John Street, Adelphi, and a lecture delivered by Mr. Roy Chapman Andrews, D.Sc., entitled "On the Trail of Ancient Man in Central Asia." Sir Michael O'Dwyer, (Chairman of the Society) presided.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—This afternoon we turn over a new page in the history of the Central Asian Society; a new world is about to swim into our ken. As you know, in the past we have dealt with almost every part of Asia and the adjoining parts of Europe and Africa, from Peking to Khartoum. But there is one region of Asia, a land of mystery, which we have not yet dealt with for some time: that is that mystic land outside the great wall of China, embracing Inner and Outer Mongolia and the Gobi Desert. We know little about it; but some of our members, like Sir Francis Younghusband, have in the past been in that part of the world, and have given the benefit of their various researches to us and other societies. If we know anything of that great region we regard it, rightly or wrongly, as the nursing-ground of those warlike and barbaric hordes who, under Attila and Hulagu and Jenghiz Khan, overran all Asia and a great part of Europe, overwhelming—for the time being, at least—the culture of Rome, of Byzantium, of Delhi, and of Baghdad. That is about all we know of that remote and mystic country. But this evening the veil that has hidden that land from our gaze is going to be drawn aside by our lecturer, Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews. (Applause.) He has kindly undertaken to notify to us the results of the three years' explorations and investigations of the great mission which the American Natural History Museum has sent to investigate Mongolia and the Desert of Gobi. It has been a wonderful work, and we are very privileged to-night to be able to hear some at least of the results from the leader of that expedition. I will now ask Dr. Andrews to speak. (Applause.)

than perhaps they would be in the fossil history. I should not say anything about our fossil explorations at all if I had not been particularly asked not to omit the dinosaur eggs. I find that dinosaur eggs pursue me like a ghost wherever I go, they cannot be laid. Therefore I shall first give you a very brief account of the dinosaur eggs, and then try to tell you something about the living people of Mongolia, and about the people who inhabited it before the Mongols came. I can show you with a map better than in any other way just what we did. Twenty years ago Professor Henry Fairfield Osborn, President of the American Museum of Natural History, propounded a theory that Central Asia would prove to be the centre of origin, and the place of distribution for a great part of the mammalian life of the world. He had no facts upon which to base his theory, it was almost entirely inductive reasoning. But he found in Europe and along the western coasts of America animals which obviously were very closely related, and he said these could only have had this close relationship if they had a common origin. They must have come from a central region and that place of common origin was probably half way between Europe and America, and would be naturally in Central Asia. You will see then how Mongolia does lie almost in the centre of the world and how the arrows follow over to America by way of the Behring Straits, which our work has shown has been land until comparatively recent times, and that the arrows also go southward to India and Africa, and over to Europe. I may say it comes to very few men to see the result of their predictions so well fulfilled as were those of Professor Osborn. We went to Central Asia to test this theory; not to prove it if it were not true, but to find out whether or not there were any facts which did substantiate it. We also wanted to reconstruct, so far as possible, the past history of Central Asia, its physiography, the climate, the animal life and vegetation, so that we brought to bear upon it as many branches of science as would help us to reconstruct it and thoroughly understand it. One of the reasons which have made this area a great centre of distribution is, as we have found, that it is probably one of the oldest if not the oldest continuously dry land in the world. Since Jurassic times the Central Asian plateau has been a high and dry continent, and therefore the upland life of the closing part of the age of reptiles has been preserved and we know just what it was, whereas it has not been preserved in other parts of the world. We might have gone with equal hope of success to other parts of Central Asia, to Tibet, or to Chinese or Russian Turkistan, but I had been in Mongolia for some years, and knew the country very well, so we made our start there.

One of several reasons why Mongolia has remained comparatively unknown up to recent times has been its situation in the heart of a continent of vast distances, tremendously slow transportation and



MAP FROM "ON THE TRAIL OF ANCIENT XIN" BY ROY CHAPMAN ANDREWS, D.Sc.

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very severe climate. If you compare a map of Mongolia and the United States you will see it is more than half as large as the United States exclusive of Alaska, but in all the great territory there is not a single mile of railroad; in the western part there is only transportation by camels, which on a long march travel about eighteen miles a day. Mongolia is divided into the desert and grasslands. The Gobi runs from east to west, very arid in the western part but becoming less arid as one goes eastward. To the north is the capital, the city of Urga, the only large city in the entire territory. Perhaps to-day there are 25,000 people there, and more than two-thirds of them are lama priests. Over in the west we have Uliassutai and Kobdo, but both these places are small villages, which are important rather because there are roads running to them than for any other reason. Except for these three cities the only permanent dwelling-places are the temples which are scattered around in the grasslands and to a less extent in the desert; in some of these temples Chinese traders establish themselves and trade with the priests.

Our work was done almost entirely north of the Altai Mountains; we began at Kalgan, and then went on up through the Gobi, taking different routes each year. In 1925 we went westward and cut through the Altai Mountains at three places. Next year we hope to go from Kalgan south of the Altai, and while we have spent three years north of the Altai, we expect it will take us another three years to make this southern survey. We have run an actual survey line from Kalgan right on beyond Uliassutai and we hope to do the same thing next year in this tract, and to connect up the splendid surveys made by Stein and Carruthers at Ahmi.

Our expedition numbered forty men all told. We had twelve Americans; there were two British in the foreign staff, and there were thirteen Mongols and thirteen Chinese. Some of the Chinese were very highly trained assistants, whom I had sent over to America, and who had been trained in the American Museum of Natural History. We believed that if we were going to have any better success than some of our predecessors in scientific exploration here, we must concentrate a group of sciences on our problem, and that every science which could possibly have any bearing on the problem we were trying to solve should be represented in the field, so that there could be the advantage of correlated work—in other words, so that the paleontologist should assist the geologist, and the palaeobotanist assist both, and so on. Another very important factor was that if we were going to take a group of high-powered men into the field, from whom we expected great efforts, and many of whom had made great sacrifices to come, we must take them there and bring them back in a short time—they must not spend the long seven months of bitterly cold winter in the country. It seemed to me the development of some means of rapid transport would solve our problem. Motor-cars were

the things if we could use them, and we felt that with good organization, with mechanics and spare parts, and all the things that would assist us in repairing a car if it was damaged, we should be able to use them. I am glad to say that the use of cars worked out even better than we expected, and while the camel caravan ordinarily does about ten miles in a day, we, with our cars, could do a hundred miles in a day. The result was we were able to work just ten times as fast as previous explorers who had only camels for transportation. We were the better able to do this because the Gobi is a bed-rock desert, not a sand desert such as the Sahara—in other words, we are driving very frequently right on the surface of rock, and the sediment is merely decomposed rock or very fine gravel. There are sand dunes, but only in isolated places, generally very long and very narrow; so that very often we could get through them if we could not get round. We had to be prepared for all sorts of trouble in the field. Often we would come to rivers, such as the Ongingol in the Western Gobi, one of the few rivers that come down through the desert. We used our cars as submarines by wrapping up their hoods in canvas covers, and we found we could go through the most amazing depth of water if we did it quickly. Mud is the one thing we are afraid of; so long as our car wheels actually grip the ground they are all right, but when we strike the late snow storms of spring or the early snow storms of winter, and the terrain is turned into a mass of mud, or when we get into the marshes which sometimes are found in the grassland, we get very anxious. Still, we have had no very serious difficulties.

The sand of the Gobi does not bother us very much, there is not a great deal of it. When we come to sand areas it becomes a question of taking off the thirty men riding on the seven cars, and making everybody get behind the car which is stalled and push for all they are worth. Sometimes it is strenuous work. We have had times when we have only made ten or fifteen miles in a day, but these times are infrequent; two-thirds of the going is very good indeed. Our explorations have had one very unlooked-for result. Commerce follows rapidly upon the heels of exploration, and we had hardly returned from our first trip to the Western Gobi in 1922 before we were besieged by merchants, most of them Chinese, who wanted to know how to get to the different trading stations so that they could bring in valuable cargoes of furs, and so we told them where they could send their petrol and what sort of cars they could use, and gave them the benefit of our experience. The result was that in the Western Gobi, where no cars were running until our expedition went in 1922, there were last year nearly one hundred cars bringing in various valuable cargoes of things which must be brought into the market quickly. I photographed one five-passenger car loaded with nearly three thousand pounds of stuff—it is designed for seven hundred. (Laughter.) It is a great tribute to

this car that it can negotiate the Gobi Desert under these very strenuous conditions.

It would have been impossible for our motor-cars to go into the desert without a supporting caravan of camels carrying petrol and food for our large party, because in the Gobi there is virtually nothing that one can get to eat except antelope, and sometimes sheep. There are no vegetables of any kind, or any other supplies, so we had to send out caravans with these things. In 1925 there were 125 camels carrying 4,000 gallons of gasoline, 100 gallons of petrol, $3\frac{1}{2}$ tons of flour, $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons of rice, and other food in proportion, for we have to carry our entire party of forty men through more than five months' stay in the desert. The caravan must start at least three and a half months in advance of the motor party, for it can only go ten miles a day, so I would direct the leader to go out and wait for us at a certain well which we both knew of, perhaps 600, 700, or 800 miles out in the desert, and I would tell him to be there by a certain day; it has been amazing how well we have maintained connections between the caravan and the motors. By the time we arrived there we would have finished our gasoline and food. We would turn over to the caravan the collections of fossils we had made, and receive gasoline and fresh food supplies. Then, if we were staying at that particular point for some time, we would send the caravan on again in advance, or it might follow behind, but it was always the supply ship from which our fleet obtained the necessary things for us to go on. The caravan has had some very difficult times, it has had to start out in the middle of winter, when the temperature was forty, and sometimes fifty, degrees below zero, it has had to fight the snows and the terrible winter gales, but under the leadership of our splendid Mongols it has always come through on time. The camels which we use in Mongolia, you must remember, are different from those of the Sahara, they are very slow-moving animals, making an average of two and a half miles an hour, and are not hot weather animals. They are supposed to work in the winter and not in the summer. In the summer they should feed and get their great humps filled with fat, so that they can use them as reservoirs for the work in the winter when food is scarce. Unfortunately we have had to use our camels during the wrong season—during the summer. They cannot stand heat very well, and the result is we have had a tremendous mortality. At one time we lost all but sixteen out of seventy-five camels. That was under difficult conditions when we had a strip of 400 miles of desert to go through, and there had been no rain for nearly a year. There was absolutely no food to be had, and I told my old camel leader that the camels must get through to the other side of this arid region; he said, "Well, I can go, but I cannot bring very many camels alive." I picked out sixteen camels

laden with gasoline and a little food, and said he must get these through. He promised to do it, and got the sixteen through, but they were pretty sorry looking animals, and the others had died. I wanted to speak one word about the old camel leader, Merin. He is a great character. He has been camel leader for a number of exploring parties that have been in Mongolia, and has been in my employ for the last seven years. Merin is one of those men who never promise more than they can fulfil; he will bring our camels to the point where he has told us he will meet us, in spite of brigands and in spite of storms. He has had some very interesting experiences dodging brigands; in 1923 we were certain all our camels were lost, he had not arrived, and after two weeks I knew that something must be wrong, so we went out to look for the caravan. We ran several hundred miles in the cars, and then had no more gasoline and could not go on. As a matter of fact, we had passed within a few hundred yards of where Merin actually was, but he had heard that in front of him was a band of four or five hundred brigands, and so had left the caravan trail and dodged about from well to well during the night, keeping down in the hollows and concealed during the day, playing hide-and-seek with them, and eventually he came safely to camp with camels and supplies. Last year when the war prevented us from getting away from Peking he kept out in the field. He had gone out with 150 camels and we heard nothing from him. Then reports began to trickle in that a great caravan had been seized by the soldiers and brigands and everybody killed, and it seemed to be certain that it was our caravan. Just before I left China word came down that Merin and all the other men had been killed. But just before I left New York to come to London I had a telegram which said that Merin was still alive, as I hoped he would be, in the middle of the desert somewhere; they could not get to him, but he was there, and as soon as the brigands had transferred their operations elsewhere, Merin would come. (Applause.)

I will now turn to the dinosaurs' eggs: we found them first in a great basin surrounded by red sandstone bluffs, which we called the flaming cliffs, because they looked exactly as if they were aflame when we saw them in the distance. They are battlement bluffs, sculptured by the knives of wind, frost, and rain into a thousand fantastic forms; it was in this basin we found the first eggs in 1923, and a great group of eggs was also found here in 1925. When we went out into the field last year our slogan was, "Bigger and better eggs." (Laughter.) So I promised a reward to the man who discovered the best nest of eggs, and George Olson, who is, without doubt, the champion dinosaur egg finder of the world, discovered a splendid nest of an even dozen. The sandstone ledge they were covered with had broken up and left them beautifully deposited in the sand; all George Olson had to do

was to brush them out with a camel's-hair brush. These are far and away the best eggs we have ever discovered yet; the texture of the shell looks like an ordinary hen's egg, but I believe that when they are studied microscopically a great many differences are found between the dinosaur egg shell and that of any fowl, bird, reptile, or turtle. One of the questions everybody asks is, "Why are these eggs so small?" A great many people think of dinosaurs only as huge reptiles, 60 or 70 feet long—the great sauropod which would have looked into a second-storey window if there had been second-storey windows in those days. They think a reptile of that size ought to have laid an egg at least a yard long, and they are rather disgusted because our eggs are only 9 inches. Some dinosaurs were large, some small. The dinosaur that laid these eggs was of an ancestral type, only 9 feet long, and produced an egg 9 inches long—as you will see, an inch of egg to each foot of dinosaur. That is not a bad effort. (Laughter.) A great many people say, "How do you know these are dinosaur eggs?" There are a great many reasons. In the first place they were found in a place where we found nothing but dinosaurs, but perhaps the most convincing reason is that in two of the eggs we have the fossilized skeletons of embryo dinosaurs; so that there is very little doubt now that we have really got dinosaur eggs. We have found several different kinds of them—some larger, some smaller. Once, in 1925, we found several forms, and a new, very elongated egg with an extraordinarily thin shell. These eggs we found quite by chance—five of them—but I have not time to tell you that particular story. I want to say a word about the dinosaur that laid those eggs and why they were preserved. We have got the evidence of geology and palæobotany that this was a very dry region at that time. There must have been tremendous wind storms, as there are to-day, and what probably happened was that the old dinosaur laid her nest of eggs and covered it up with a thin layer of sand to let it be hatched by the rays of the sun, just as reptiles do to-day; then came a tremendous wind storm, and heaped up several feet of sand over the eggs. The air was cut off and the heat of the sun. Incubation, of course, stopped abruptly. The weight of sediment cracked the eggs, the liquid contents ran out, and an extremely fine sand sifted in at the same time, so that now we get a sandstone core in them.

So much for dinosaurs. I want to say something now about the living inhabitants of Mongolia. First I should like to give you just a brief picture of what I think is the most interesting city that I have ever encountered during the fifteen years that I have been wandering into strange corners of the world—that is, Urga, the capital of Mongolia. When you come to Urga across the plain you drop down very abruptly into the valley of the Tola River, and on the shores of the Tola this city has been built. First you come to the Chinese section of

the town, and I was amazed when I first arrived there to find that it looked very much like the pictures of the villages which were built during the North American Indian fighting days in America. Everything is stockaded with unpeeled timbers. Every house, every temple, every shop, is surrounded by these high stockades. Probably a great deal of it is to protect it from the terrible winds. Then, as you go on down the street—Urga has a length of about five miles—and leave the Chinese quarter, you go through the Russian section; here you see the little dwellings of the Russian peasants very much like those in Siberia, with brilliant roofs of green, yellow, or red, and the houses not too clean inside. As you go on further down past the Russian section you come to what was actually a few years ago, I suppose, the most horrible prison in the world. I have seen many poor wretches here confined in boxes only two and a half feet high and four feet long, with just a hole through which they could look out and have food passed to them. I actually talked to one man who had been in one of these coffins for five years, it was so low that he could not sit erect, neither could he stretch out at full length. His arms and legs atrophied and how he could continue to live was an entire mystery to me. Through the winter they were only given a sheepskin covering. I am very glad to say that this horrible form of imprisonment and punishment, so far as I know, has been abolished now. I was in the prison in 1924, and there were only two or three of the coffins then still visible, and these were piled up and had not been used for a long time. The Minister for Justice told me they were not using this terrible form of punishment any more. As you go on past the prison you come to the main street of Urga, which comes into a great square. Here you have a mixture of Chinese, Russian, and Mongol, all mingling together, but, what is very interesting, keeping their separate identities. Outside is the great temple which has been built on the hill, and is surrounded by a city in which live about fifteen thousand lamas. This great temple was built some years ago when the living Buddha, the Khutuktu of Mongolia, was threatened with blindness. He did become totally blind. Urga, of course, is a sacred city, and this was the residence of the Khutuktu until, I think, May, 1923, when he died. Another Khutuktu has not been appointed, and probably will not be, because the Soviet Government is not at all favourable to the encouragement of lamaism in Mongolia; in fact, they are doing everything they can to discourage it. Urga was the Mecca for thousands of pilgrims from all over Central Asia. I have seen here in this market-place Tibetans with many different types of dress which I did not know, and Mongols from all over Mongolia—some of them making their pilgrimage up to the temple, and then going over across the river to the palace of the Khutuktu just below the Bogdiara. I wish I could tell you many interesting stories about the Khutuktu, but I cannot

begin to tell them now. The Urga market-place always reminded me of what we in America call a Wild West show or a three ring circus; it did not seem as if it could be happening in everyday life. The colour was amazing; one would be standing by one of the stores, and suddenly down the street would come a group of Mongols with feathers in their hats and doing extraordinary antics on their ponies. I always felt I was living more or less in a dream-world, and could not be seeing something which went on every day. The Urga horse-market is perhaps the most important part of the town, because the Mongol lives on horseback, and his greatest wealth is in horses. At the horse-market here you can buy a very good pony for about £6, a really good stout little beast. One of the most curious and characteristic sights in Urga is the feeding of the dogs by the lamas; these dogs are very savage, a great menace to human life, and we had to be careful how we ventured near a Mongol camp or caravan without protection from them. I think the narrowest escape I ever had in my life was once when I was attacked by one when I was asleep. The lamas get great credit by feeding these animals. The Mongols do not bury their dead, they throw them out to be devoured by wolves, bears, or dogs.

I am sorry to say I cannot give you the results of any original investigation of the living Mongols, because so far our expedition has not taken up the study of the living tribes, but I can tell you a little about them. We have not had an anthropologist or ethnologist with us, it is rather off our track, but the Mongols are so interesting that before the expedition closes in 1929 I hope we shall be able to put a physical anthropologist and an ethnologist in the field, and make a serious study of these extraordinarily interesting people. One thing that attracted me about the Mongols is that to-day we have life going on almost as it went on 800 years ago in the time of Kublai Khan. There has been very little reason to change it, because for many thousands of years Mongolia has been a country in which people could live only by raising flocks, there has been no manufacturing development because they could not stay long enough in one place. Grazing necessitates moving about, and they have no means of developing any art or industry of any kind. The women's dresses and elaborate head-dresses are picturesque and very interesting, and are entirely different in Northern and Southern Mongolia, on each side of the Gobi. Their hair is dressed over great frameworks, which without doubt were originally suggested by the horns of the argali, or mountain sheep. The woman wears on her head a silver filigree cap studded with precious stones for the richer people and coloured glass for the poorer ones. When going out she almost always puts on top of the silver cap the saucer-shaped hat which is also worn by the men. You cannot possibly overcolour a picture representing a Mongol woman; she wears every colour of the rainbow, and except for her footwear

is altogether satisfying to the lover of bizarre and Oriental costumes. She wears the enormous boots with pointed upturned toes worn by the men, which are more than a cover for the feet—they are a receptacle for anything she cannot conveniently carry on her person, such as a pipe or tobacco. They also provide a convenient place to carry her lunch. (Laughter.) I have seen a woman reach down to her boots, take out a piece of mutton none too fresh and munch away at it. They never take a bath if they can possibly avoid it. The male population is divided into the lamas and the black men—those who are not priests. The black men have their hair done in a queue and are almost always dressed in a flame-coloured or blue gown. The Mongol is always on the back of his horse; he can sit in the saddle twenty-four hours of the day and be happy, but put him for an hour on the ground and he is miserable. One of our party declared he would make an excellent cook if you could give him a kitchen on his horse. About two-thirds of the entire male population of Mongolia is in the priesthood. There is a custom that the firstborn son of every family becomes a lama, in one or other of the orders, red lamas or yellow. I should say that lamaism was probably one of the greatest reasons for the decline of this once glorious nation. The lamas when they live in the temples are the most dissolute and degenerate of people, but fortunately for the country not all of them live in the temples. Some of them only go there a certain number of weeks each year, and then go back to their homes, otherwise there would not be people enough to carry on the work of the country. Here, as in other parts of the East, one has to be very careful about treading on their superstitions. At every temple there are prayer wheels, such as you find in other parts of the East; every time they are turned they are supposed to give a man a certain amount of "face" when he ascends to heaven.

Though they have lost their strength as a nation, I think the Mongol of to-day is physically as good a man as he was when he swept into Europe in the great conquests in the days of Jenghiz or Kublai Khan. They are able to withstand almost as many hardships, and to do almost as much strenuous riding and fighting as they did in the old days. There was a very interesting incident of a reversion to their old tactics in 1921. There were three thousand Chinese soldiers encamped 152 miles south of Urga, when Baron Ungern took over the city; and there was a very famous Mongol general with the Russians, an old friend of mine. Baron Ungern was going to send down some Cossacks to attack those three thousand soldiers, but this Mongol general thought he would like to have the fun himself. He gathered 175 Mongol soldiers, of whom only about half had rifles; the rest were armed with sabres or knives. They rode 152 miles in an incredibly short time, going straight on almost without a halt, and arrived at the Chinese camp just at daylight. I asked the Mongol general what he did there. He said, "We waited

for ten minutes, then rode through the camp, shot everybody we could, turned and rode back again and killed everybody we saw, and then rode through the camp again. My fellows had used up all their ammunition, but it was not necessary, because all we did was to go through with the butts of our guns and club the Chinese." They absolutely annihilated three thousand Chinese. I saw the place there with thousands of cartridge shells all round, and I saw one enormous heap where hundreds of bodies had lain. These were the same tactics they had used in old days—a long march, a whirlwind attack, and then off again to a new field. The old Mongol aristocracy is still very proud of its ancestry, which dates far back into history, but the Soviet Government has taken their power away from them; the four kings and the princes who used to rule Outer Mongolia have become common citizens.

Young Mongolia has rather a hard time of it, and how the children are ever able to grow up one can hardly tell. I remember coming in one day when it was bitterly cold, and I had on my heaviest fur garments; but the little Mongol children were running around absolutely stark naked. If they are able to resist and grow up to manhood they become hardy people. Almost as soon as they are able to walk they are tied on the back of a horse or camel, and are made to ride and herd flocks.

I want to tell you also something about the Mongol home life and their dwellings. They seem to have developed the very best type of dwelling for their particular life. One must remember the Mongols are nomads, and must move from place to place, and so their dwellings must be such that they are taken about without trouble. They have two kinds of tents, one a felt covering, built over a framework which can be shut like an umbrella, and which looks rather like a beehive and is a second type which we ourselves used. It is designed so as to present a sloping surface at all points to the wind, and is quite difficult to blow down. When the Mongol pitches his *yurt*, the first thing he does is to put his furniture in and build his house round it. The whole thing is erected in an hour and the roof covered with felt. The interior is very simple, a fire of dried dung—the only fuel we have in the desert—a chest which is usually the family altar, on one side the place where the family sleep, and on the other side the place where the lambs and calves are brought in for the night. It is something of a community inside the *yurt*, none too clean, and with an odour it is sometimes difficult to stand.

The Mongol lives very largely on animal products; indeed, in the desert he has almost nothing but meat and goats' milk, he has no flour nor any vegetables. Above everything else in the world he loves mutton; he will eat it every day of his life, never get tired of it, and be perfectly happy. His lasso is a long pole, fifteen or twenty feet long, with a sliding noose at the end.

I have very often been asked about the so-called mystic methods of communication which they have in Mongolia. True it is when we go there news of our coming goes in advance; people for hundreds of miles know all about it. It seems mysterious, but the way I figure it out is this: the well is the only place for water, and it is commonly a meeting-place. It is like a telephone switchboard, or a club where people exchange gossip. The Mongols do not have very much to do; if one of them has got a choice bit of gossip very often he will ride forty miles away to a group of *yurts*, tell the people there about it, and spend the night and talk it over. That, I think, is responsible for the mystic communication and the way in which news spreads in the desert. The men are very keen sportsmen; in almost every section of *yurts* they have field meetings once or twice a year, with camel-racing, horse-racing, and wrestling tests. He understands our methods of sportsmanship, and I have never seen a Mongol take an unfair advantage in a sporting contest. He is a good loser, and can take a joke on himself, which is more than a lot of people can do.

I want to go back a few thousand years. I have given a very rapid sketch of the living inhabitants of Mongolia; I want now to tell you what we found about the life that had been there in the past. When we went there, people said, "It is ridiculous to suppose you can find evidence of past human life in the Gobi. How could they live in the desert?" But at practically every one of our camps there were stone implements and other evidences of a long prehistoric past. I should like to go through this very rapidly for you; probably some of you were at the Royal Geographical Society the other night, where I also spoke of it. The peculiar rectangular graves were found in the grassland of Mongolia, and far to the eastward; they are ordinarily more to the west in the grasslands in the Upper Yenesei valley, where the Russians have investigated them, but we also found them in the desert. There were also great circular piles of stones to mark graves, many of which we opened. Some of them gave us nothing, but in others we found the remains of a brachycephalic people, and in one grave particularly a splendid skeleton lying with its head on a saddle. Beside it were bow and reed arrows tipped with iron. The interesting thing to me as a horseman was this, when the archæologist brought the saddle down on which the head was lying, we said, "That is like our M'Clellan army saddle." When we brought it up to camp we had some M'Clellan army saddles there, and the saddle we had found proved to be an absolute replica of the saddle which General M'Clellan thought he had invented at the time of the Civil War. It was not like a Chinese or Mongol saddle, but an absolute replica of our M'Clellans—a curious thing to find in an ancient grave in Mongolia. We do not know much about these people: we think perhaps they are representative of the people who were here just before the Mongols; they may not go back

more than two thousand years, evidently they were living in the period of the Bronze and Iron Age. Near these graves we almost invariably found a pictograph carved on the stones wherever there was a flat surface. Here we had ibex and stag and many human figures; some of the game animals represented there are not existing in that part of the country at the present time. Yet near these stones we never found any stone implement, although this type of pictograph is almost always dated into the Stone Age. In the same valley as the dinosaur eggs we found an extraordinarily interesting type of culture of a people we named the Dune Dwellers, because we found the culture in old sand-dunes. Our geologist told us that in this basin there had been for thousands of years a lake, which was probably more or less intermittent; these people must have lived on the shores of this lake, for we found that where the valleys had been eroded out there were literally thousands and thousands of stone implements, and flakes and chips taken off by the primitive artisans when making weapons and tools. Then again we found evidences of fireplaces, where, by making a cross-section and with very careful excavation we could find the bits of charred woods and heaps of ashes of fires that had blazed twenty thousand years ago. It was very interesting to us to picture the life as it was then where these people had sat around their camp fires, their primitive artisans making their tools, and this going on thousands upon thousands of years, one century after another; because we found that we had here a most interesting cross-section going back from the paleolithic or upper part of the old Stone Age, through a transition period, actually into the beginning of the new Stone Age when the use of pottery had begun. This was right on top, so that it was a continuous development of the culture from that Stone Age onwards. Our archaeologist sorted out a great number of stone and other implements which we found, some finished, and, in sorting these things out, he eventually found he could arrange them in series, and show the evolution of the culture from this extraordinarily interesting old Stone Age culture up into the new Stone Age. He found, among many other things, stone-scrapers and the stone cores from which they pushed off those long, slender strips which they used as knives. There were implements dating to all periods of the old and new Stone Ages. A very interesting thing to me was this: I thought we were the original discoverers of the dinosaur eggs, just as M'Clellan thought he was the original inventor of his saddle, but we found these people had discovered the dinosaur eggs twenty thousand years before we were thought of, and had used them as necklaces and ornaments, because we found bits of dinosaur egg shell and ostrich egg shell, with neatly drilled holes in them, which evidently had been used in this way. In the Stone Age we found pottery already marked with a strong design.

What did these people look like? It is difficult to say, because we

have to use European chronology, and except from implements and things of the sort we do not know what their relationship is. At the same time in Europe, about 25,000 years ago, we had people who had developed this wonderful art, and we find beautiful primitive drawings in caverns in France. Our people, we know, were not cave-dwellers, because there were no caves to dwell in; they were lake-shore dwellers, and they probably made shelters on the sunny sides of rocks, and made shelters in burrows. But what they looked like we cannot tell until we find human bones, for it is an extraordinary thing that we did not find in this great culture camp any human bones. It is probably explained by the fact that for some reason the conditions were not proper for the preservation of bones—there were very few pieces of animal bones, and we should certainly have found animal bones if the conditions had been right for proper preservation.

We have, however, found a much earlier culture than that of the dune-dwellers, though only in a few places. We found implements made by the Mousterian man living 100,000 years ago. As I say, we found these in only a few places, and hope next year to delineate them very much more fully. We can only say of this people that their culture was like that of Europe at the time of the Neanderthal man.

To summarize our finds of human beings in the desert shortly: We have found that primitive human beings were in Mongolia actually as far back as 100,000 years ago; they were very widely distributed, and we have found that their culture was very closely related to the culture of Europe. One question about that relationship is, of course, which is the older—whether they migrated from Europe, or whether they came the other way. This we are not yet prepared to say. But I am prepared to say we have discovered some extraordinarily interesting things as we have gone on a little further. We already know now where to look and how to look, and we think that we know that our men were more to the south in the Gobi. I have one other thing which I think most of you have not heard of. Dr. J. G. Andersson announced at a meeting of affiliated societies in Peking—when the Crown Prince of Sweden was there—that just outside Peking, at a spot twenty-five miles away, which I visited with him, they have found a human tooth which goes back to the Upper Pliocene: that is older than pithecanthropos or any other fossil. That is of the most extraordinary importance. My letter only gave me a brief sketch of it, but it is undoubtedly a human tooth, and a Pliocene tooth, the first definitely human relic from the Pliocene. It is a find of great importance in our hypothesis of Asiatic origin. (Great applause.)

Sir FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I should like to make just a few observations upon the extremely interesting lecture we have heard. It so happened that twenty-nine

years ago I travelled along about midway between where Dr. Andrews was exploring in the territory he has described in his lecture, and the district which he will be exploring—equally successfully we hope—in the next year or two. From what I saw then, on my way from Peking to Harbin, I can entirely corroborate what Dr. Andrews has said as to the nature of the Gobi district. It is not entirely sand, but mostly a fine gravel with a certain amount of scrub, which affords sufficient feeding at any rate for camels and wild asses. Also in some parts there are wild camels and wild horses. The great feature of this desert is the strength and frequency of the wind. There is a perpetual wind blowing practically every day; and at times there come on the most fearful dust storms, in which it is impossible to keep a tent standing, and it is very difficult to keep standing yourself. We often had to crouch down before the onslaught of the wind. As regards what Dr. Andrews will find on his next journey, I should imagine that he will have far greater difficulty as regards water, and as regards going generally, than he has hitherto had. The track which I had to follow took a very considerable bend northwards up towards where he was travelling in order to avoid the exceptionally dry desert to the south. We kept along the southern spurs of the Altai Mountains, and did just every here and there get a little stream of water, and anyhow places where we could dig for water. Probably further south he may find great difficulty. However, Dr. Andrews must be well aware of that. This evening we have had evidence of his great capacity for organization—in his great organization of camel caravans combined with motor-cars; and so we may well look forward to his successfully overcoming the difficulties which now lie in front of him. (Applause.) As regards what he said about the Lamas, I was in very hearty agreement with him. I think there is not the slightest doubt that if Mohammedanism had taken the place of Lamaism for the last 600 or 800 years, if the Mongols had been Mohammedans instead of Buddhists, they would have been a very much more warlike and very much rougher people to deal with than they are at present. I think he said about two-thirds of the men, an enormous percentage, actually become Lamas, and lead rather a lazy kind of life. Some of them, of course, are exceedingly good men, but the great mass are extremely indolent; and I think the whole tone of Lamaism tends to make the people slack and complacent. It deteriorates their virility. I delivered a lecture in this very hall some ten or twelve years ago on that very point, dealing with Lamaism in Tibet. If Tibet had taken up Mohammedanism instead of Lamaism its inhabitants would have been a more virile race than they are at present. Then as regards the Mongols retaining their same form of attack through these years, it was very interesting to me to hear what Dr. Andrews said, because when we were in Tibet in 1904 there were some Mongols brought there

by the Tibetans mounted, as the Lecturer said the Mongols always are, and they proceeded to attack. Their form of attack is not very successful against machine-guns, or against a counter-attack such as we made upon them with our men armed with rifles, but I can see now that they were making that attack in exactly the form Dr. Andrews described—apparently the same form of attack as they used centuries ago. From some of those pictures which the Lecturer showed us, and from what he said, we can partly understand how it was that these great hordes of Mongols, starting from the heart of the world, which Dr. Andrews has been describing to us this evening, invaded and overran all Western and Southern Asia and far into Europe to the gates of Vienna. The fact was that the whole people moved. They are a nomadic people—they move with tents, horses, wives, and families. The whole people moved along and rapidly overran Western Asia. These are a few observations, but the Lecturer has had so many points, and it was such an extremely interesting lecture, that one could go on talking about it the whole evening. (Applause.)

DR. BATHER: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I do not wish to keep you, but I think those who are leaving the room should stay while I propose, if I may be permitted, a very hearty vote of thanks to Dr. Andrews for this lecture. (Applause.) To that I would add that I should like not merely to propose a vote of thanks to Dr. Andrews for this lecture this evening on behalf of this large audience, but I should like to propose a vote of thanks to Dr. Andrews on behalf of the geologists, and, indeed, on behalf of the scientific men of this country and the whole world. Dr. Andrews has shown us a new way. He has been a pioneer not only through the deserts of Central Asia, but a pioneer in methods of exploration. We of the British Museum have at the present moment a great expedition in Tanganyika territory, where we are intending to collect the bones of the dinosaurs which lived there. We wish to proceed further west, trace the ancient river up, and get more bones further to the west. I do not know that the conditions are precisely the same as they are in Mongolia, but we have learned a great deal from Dr. Andrews on the proper way to run an expedition of this kind, and although we are a national institution, the national museum of this country, we have to follow, and to follow a very long way behind, the Museum of New York—the American Museum of Natural History; because they have the art of getting money and we have not. I leave that point, though if anybody here likes to give us any money, of course he can do it. At all events we shall do our best to follow the lead of this American expedition in our own small way.

The mention of dinosaurs in Africa reminds me of something Dr. Andrews said at the beginning of this lecture. It always struck me as a very curious thing that these dinosaurs found in Tanganyika territory

should resemble so remarkably those found right down the middle of North America. You remember he showed you at the beginning two continents coloured green—one was North America and one was Africa. It is odd they should have been coloured the same; besides, he drew one line of arrows going down into Africa to just the place where we are getting the dinosaurs, while the other dinosaurs are found in the part of North America where the other arrows ended. How did they get to North America—and one might add South America, where somewhat similar forms have been found? There is a Professor Wegener, in Germany, who has an idea that the east and west sides of the world were once much closer together—that there was no Atlantic. But, whether true or not, that connection did not last long enough for dinosaurs to get from North America to Africa. On the other hand, if this theory of my friend Professor Osborn is true—and, indeed, this expedition, which owes its inception to that theory, has apparently confirmed it—we have a very simple explanation of this extraordinary resemblance: we know why precisely the same kind of dinosaur is found in Tanganyika as in Wyoming and other parts of North America.

As a reward to those who are so kind as to stop and listen, I want to remind them that if they come to the National History Museum, to the Geological Department, they can there see some excellent models of the dinosaur eggs kindly presented by Professor Fairfield Osborn, as well as an excellent cast of the skull of the little *Protoceratops*—little that is for a dinosaur—which laid some of the eggs. As to the size of the eggs, I would remind Dr. Andrews that a crocodile is a fair-sized beast, and has an egg about the size of a hen's egg. If that egg can produce a crocodile I do not see why these eggs that are nine times the size of a hen's egg could not produce a good-sized dinosaur.

I would like to have heard a good deal more than Dr. Andrews had time to tell us about those ancient remains of men. I am not going to say anything about the Mongols, because I represent the dead side as Dr. Andrews called it—the geology. But I want to mention those ancient forms of flint implements. There is no doubt that if this expedition goes down to the southern part of Mongolia next year and in succeeding years, it will find further evidences. We know already that Pères Licent and Teilhard de Chardin of Paris have found in Ordos (which you saw down in the south-east corner of Mongolia), quartzite implements underneath the loess, that huge deposit of wind-borne and water-borne sand which extends over a great part of China, and which has been formed and then ravined by rivers since the makers of those implements lived there. Dr. Andrews talked about the two teeth of alleged Pliocene Age which were announced the other day in Peking.*

* Dr. Davidson Black, of Peking, in a letter to *Nature* (November 20, 1928), considers that the deposit at Chou Kou Tien, near Peking, which yielded the human teeth, is as likely to be Lower Pleistocene as Upper Pliocene.

We are waiting for evidence of their age. But there is greater difficulty in Mongolia about the evidence, because there are gaps in the succession of the Tertiary rocks up to this loess. I do not know that very much has been found to bridge the last gap, and it is therefore difficult to tell the geological age of the men who lived on this rock surface before the loess was deposited—to say in what age they lived. They may go back there possibly even as far as the Pliocene. There, at any rate, is a long stretch of culture, as Dr. Andrews has explained, going on from very remote periods in the same place, and there is no reason why we should not suppose that the very earliest men of all upon the earth were living and moving there. But what the age is we can hardly say.

Allow me to propose an exceedingly hearty vote of thanks to Dr. Andrews. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Before putting the motion I should like to say a word on behalf of the Central Asian Society. We thank Dr. Andrews for the most fascinating lecture he has delivered to us this evening. He said he hoped he had not spoken too long, but we all would have wished him to go on for another hour. (Applause.) He has dealt with the past and the present, and he has given us a most wonderful picture of a region unknown to most of us. As he spoke I was reminded of the old lines describing people listening open-mouthed to a master of his subject: "And still they gazed, and still the wonder grew that one small head should carry all he knew." (Laughter and applause.) One thing that struck me was that in one respect his silence was even more remarkable than his speech—that is the extraordinary modesty which he displayed. He told us nothing of the hardships of three years' campaign in that inhospitable desert of appalling heat and equally appalling cold. Cut off from all the amenities of civilized life, what he and his companions must have gone through in those years of research would have daunted the heart of an ordinary man. But he did not tell us a word about it. His reticence is a tribute to his innate modesty, and is also an explanation of the wonderful organization which he so successfully conducted.

I was in Central Asia some thirty years ago, and I got a most extraordinary tribute to the American power of organization in a place where you would least expect to find it. I was in Samarkand and wanted to go to Tashkent. There was no railway communication then, and we had to hire a rough country cart and traverse a region, known as the Hungry Steppe, for about 200 miles, and to come back by a fixed date, picking up horses as we went along. When we hired the conveyance the owner said, "When will you come back?" and we replied, "We shall be nine days away; three going, three there, and three coming back." We managed to accomplish it, and got back in the nine days to the office in Samarkand of the man from whom we had

hired the vehicle. When we got there he looked at us and said, "Good heavens, are you back?" I said, "Yes." He asked, "How did you manage to get back?" and I replied, "We said nine days and are back in nine days." "It is wonderful," he exclaimed, and then added in Russian, "Soverskanns po Amerikansky"—"It is exactly what the Americans do." (Laughter and applause.) He was referring to our power of conquering the difficulties of the road and carrying out a programme by the date. That to a Russian was a very marvellous performance.

We were very glad to hear from Dr. Andrews that his labours are not at an end, that he proposes to continue them for three years more, and to complete that wonderful programme which is at present only half-way through. In proposing this vote of thanks I know you will all heartily support it, and I hope that he may complete the great pleasure he has given us this evening by coming back two or three years hence and giving us the benefit of his further investigations. (Great applause.)

The Council much appreciate the very kind letter of thanks from the American Museum of Natural History for the donation of ten guineas which the Central Asian Society was able to make as a sign of their appreciation of the great and far-reaching value of the scientific work undertaken by the Central Asiatic Expeditions under Dr. Andrews's leadership.

FIVE YEARS' PROGRESS IN IRAQ.

By JA'FAR PASHA EL ASKERI, C.M.G.

[A paper, intended to have been read by Ja'far Pasha el Askeri on November 17, 1926, before the Central Asian Society, but never delivered owing to His Excellency having been summoned from London, where he was his country's Diplomatic Agent, to become Prime Minister and to form a new Ministry in Baghdad.]

My subject is the progress of Iraq. The problem is a great one, nothing less than the creation of a modern, scientific administration in a country which was previously an outlying portion of an old-fashioned Empire. To build up an apparatus of government which the inhabitants will be able to work by themselves, or with as little help as possible, is the object to which our efforts have been directed for the past five years and will be continued to be directed. And though I can speak of very few things as an expert, I can perhaps claim to have been as closely in contact with the general questions of administration in Iraq as anyone. And it was on this account that I ventured to accept the kind invitation of the Central Asian Society to speak to you upon the subject of the progress which Iraq has made during these years of its infancy as an independent State.

Let me start with a few figures, though I do not mean to bore you with statistics, which will show you that when we are talking of progress in Iraq, we are still thinking of something in the future. The size of the country, for instance, is 150,000 square miles, which is about three times that of England and Wales, whilst the population is only 3,000,000. In the Nile Valley from Aswan to the sea, where you get a riverside population living upon irrigated lands, there are some 13,000,000 inhabitants. The possible irrigable area in Iraq is certainly not less than that of Egypt. We may start off by saying therefore that what Iraq wants above everything else is more population. This is a necessary condition of progress. Obviously it will take some time to achieve.

The first essential in a country is to provide means of communication between its various provinces. We have improved communications very greatly in comparison with what they were before the war. The only railway in existence in Iraq in those days was that portion of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway constructed between Baghdad and Samarra, a length of seventy-six miles. At that time it took from three to seven days, according to the season, to travel from Baghdad to Basra by

river. It now takes twenty-two hours by train. I can still vividly remember the time when one drifted down the Tigris from Mosul to Baghdad on *kalags*, a picturesque but by no means rapid method of transit, in a week. When the railway from Kirkuk to Mosul is completed, the latter city will be brought within a shorter time distance from Baghdad than is Basra. There are also railways from Baghdad to Khanaqin, with a branch from Qaraghan to Kingerban, from which place the line to Kirkuk has been completed and opened to traffic in December, 1925. There is also a railway from Baghdad to the Diyala, and the railway from Baghdad to Samarra has been extended to Shargat. Another branch line runs from the Hindiyah Barrage, on the Baghdad-Basra line, to Karbala. Many bridges over the Euphrates and Diyala Rivers have been built at Barbooti, Imam Abdullah, Rumaithah, Jarbouiyah, Baqubah and Qaraghan. And at Baghdad we have a ferry capable of carrying 720 tons a day. In all, the approximate mileage open to traffic is 816, and the railways carry half a million passengers and 400,000 tons of merchandise per annum. I think that we have every reason to be satisfied with the progress that this shows.

But though railways are still the first essential for good communications, they have in Iraq a formidable rival, or rather a good ally in the motor-car. There are very few parts of the country where the motor-car cannot penetrate, thanks to the surface of the Iraq plains. With us, indeed, the making of roads is chiefly a matter of building bridges, as almost any part of the plain can be crossed if canals, etc., are bridged. In Turkish times there were few motor-cars in the country, but *arabanas* traversed a few roads, notably those from Baghdad to Karbala and Najaf, to Hillah, to Samarra and Tekrit, and to Baqubah and Khanaqin. *Arabanas* were rarely used in other parts of the country, though there was a small *arabana* traffic round Mosul. Now, however, practically the whole of the country has been opened up to motor traffic by building numerous bridges, and there are to-day some 2,627 miles of earth roads and 124 miles of metalled roads which can be traversed by motor-cars.

I should like in passing to give you a few details of the very considerable amount of work we have done in making bridges. A great many permanent bridges, chiefly of concrete or steel, have been built all over the country, and there are now very few places which cannot be reached by heavy cars. Altogether the Government has built some 300 bridges of more than six feet span. At the moment we are building a permanent bridge over the Euphrates in Fallujah for the trans-desert convoys. In some places, permanent bridges are at the present time impracticable. In such cases floating bridges are used. In Turkish times there were nine of these, many of which could only take *arabanas* with difficulty. To-day we have seventeen floating bridges, all capable of carrying the heaviest cars. In addition we have ten flying

ferries on steel cables, which can also carry heavy cars. Whilst dealing with this branch of the activities of the Public Works Department, I should not forget to mention that electrical lighting is now provided in eight of our provincial towns, in addition, of course, to Baghdad and Basra. And whilst in pre-war days there was practically no water supply in the provinces, there are to-day installations in eight provincial towns. Baghdad is now excellently served, though both here and in Basra the system is under extension at the moment. In all these things, there is reason for solid satisfaction. Admittedly our railways and roads will undergo great extension. We are at the beginning of their development, not the end.

In the meantime the bedrock on which the future of Iraq depends is, of course, agriculture. I am not exaggerating when I say that, potentially, Iraq is to-day one of the richest portions of the earth's surface awaiting scientific cultivation. In the varied climate which Iraq possesses it is possible to grow crops of various kinds. The dates of Basra are deservedly famous, and their cultivation is possibly the best example in Iraq of a crop which is scientifically grown. Date-palms also flourish in the Baghdad district, and around Hillah and Amara. Large cultivators in Egypt have long discovered that their cultivation on lighter soils is a lucrative business, and doubtless, as irrigation spreads in Iraq, we shall do the same.

In passing I should like to mention the really excellent fruits which we grow. We believe our oranges to be second to none; our grapes, figs, and pomegranates have been the inspiration of our poets for centuries.

Other crops which Iraq can produce plentifully are rice, wheat, and barley. Rice naturally depends upon irrigation. But cereals can be grown upon the rain-fed steppe areas of Upper Iraq and on the hilly districts along the Persian frontier, and wheat and barley are crops which can to-day be cultivated upon a commercial scale. Thus, in 1923, the amount of wheat and barley exported was 206,000 tons. I am afraid that 1924 and 1925 were not good years for harvest. But this was only a passing set-back. Wheat and barley will also be continued to be grown, at present, in the irrigated areas in Lower Iraq as a rotation crop. Unfortunately, our Iraq wheat, and particularly our barley, which is of a comparatively high grade, commands a relatively low price owing to the insufficiently clean condition in which it is marketed, for which the middlemen are more to blame than the cultivators.

Improved seed and improved methods of cultivation are both necessary, and cultivators, in Iraq as elsewhere, are conservative folk. Nevertheless, the Government is alive to the importance of this matter, and in 1925 twenty-two new strains of Australian and Indian wheats were tested under Government supervision. I should add that

the Government on its experimental farms is testing the suitability of introducing agricultural machinery, and is demonstrating its uses to cultivators.

Our progress in the cultivation of flax has not hitherto borne out our hopes. The fall in prices and the possibility of further fall, due to the reopening of the Russian supply, have discouraged any fresh capital being invested in this industry.

Then there is the very important question of cotton. The soil and the climate are suitable. There is plenty of water, and Iraq, when our irrigation system has been developed, can be one day one of the great cotton-growing areas of the world. Sir William Willcocks made a careful survey of Mesopotamia before the war and prepared plans which would have turned the district between the Tigris and Euphrates into a garden, as it was in Babylonian or Abbaside times. It has been calculated that in the future, when sufficient labour is forthcoming and the rivers have been harnessed, we might be able to export 3,000,000 bales a year. The British Cotton Growing Association from the start has been alive to the possibilities Iraq affords for cotton-growing, and its help has been consistent and unflinching.

The Government has carried out many tests to establish which is the type of cotton most suitable to be grown in Iraq. The question is a technical one, and I will not inflict upon you details which would be out of place in such a brief survey as I am taking. I should say, however, that we have still to find the ideal strain, suitable at once to the soil and climate, and also producing a high-ginning average. So far we have been most successful with the Webber types. I am still hopeful, in spite of the very real difficulties which have faced us in this matter, that Iraq cotton will one day be our chief export. But we must expect to move slowly, and the fact that many large landowners are interesting themselves actively in the cultivation of cotton is a good augury for the future. We may say, therefore, that if we have not made as much progress as we should have wished, we have at least understood the difficulties which stood in our path.

No remarks, however brief, upon agriculture would be complete without giving you some details of what we have done in the sphere of irrigation. Under the Turks no organized department existed, though the construction of the Hindiyah Barrage was undertaken on the advice of Sir William Willcocks. All irrigation was consequently flood. When the administration was taken over the Barrage was found to be in a very bad state, due partly to its construction—having suffered through lack of funds—partly to bad working, and partly to inefficient maintenance. It has cost the Iraq Government about 6 lakhs of rupees a year for the past six years to put it in a sound condition. The Government has also constructed four large main

canals, all perennial, which altogether command an irrigation area of half a million acres. A considerable amount of work has been done too on old canals, and the spill-ways on the lower Tigris have been put under control so that the navigable conditions of the narrows at Qalat Saleh have been much improved, the low-water depth being now 18 inches higher than it was. The bunds, so necessary to the protection of the country against floods, are also now in a sound condition. So, if the large irrigation schemes have yet to be realized, it may be that, thanks to the Irrigation Department, everything is ready for further development when the time comes.

Then again, apart from our agricultural resources, there is the question of oil. So much attention has been given to this subject that I will say very little about it now. But, nevertheless, in any survey of the progress of Iraq oil must necessarily figure. After all, Iraq is the birthplace of the oil industry. Bitumen was used as mortar in 4000 B.C. at Tel-el-Ubaid, and as the lining of baths and for floors at Kish. Its use as mortar in the Tower of Babel and as caulking for Noah's Ark is referred to in the Bible. The inflammatory nature of petroleum was demonstrated before Alexander. Primitive refining has long been carried out at Kirkuk and elsewhere. The eminent French savant, Jacques de Morgan, was among the first of European scientists to draw attention to the potential value of the Iraq oil fields in 1895, and the D'Arcy Exploration Company, Limited, between 1903 and 1913, made extensive borings on the Turco-Persian frontier at Chiah Surkh, but without success.

During the last few years oil has been struck by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, in the "Transferred Territories"—that is to say, in the territories that were transferred from Persia to Turkey as the result of the final delimitation of the Turco-Persian frontier in 1914—and a refinery is now in course of erection at Khaniqin to meet local requirements. Sooner or later a pipe line will be laid, either to the Persian Gulf or to the Mediterranean, from the Transferred Territories; the route must depend, however, largely on whether and where oil is struck by the Turkish Petroleum Company elsewhere in Iraq. The Turkish Petroleum Company was granted in 1925 a concession for oil in Baghdad and Mosul Vilayets, and during the next eighteen months this Company will drill, I am informed, six test wells at various points selected after careful geological examination. On the result of these test wells will depend further developments. If they prove the existence of oil in commercially paying quantities, further wells will be sunk. If these likewise give satisfactory results, a pipeline will, I take it, be constructed to a Mediterranean port. When this arduous work, involving as it does much expenditure of capital, has been accomplished, the Company will doubtless be paying a dividend to its shareholders. In any case Iraq will commence to draw a royalty,

under the terms of the concession, of four shillings on every ton of oil produced, and the income derived from this source will be, I hope, of material assistance to the Iraq Government. We shall then be in the same happy position as the Persian Government has been in respect of its royalties on oil during the past ten years.

I have mentioned some of the problems which Iraq has to settle to ensure its future prosperity. Perhaps I seem to have been talking rather of promise than of progress actually achieved. If that is so it is because Iraq has such enormous potentialities, and one is conscious that if much has been done very much more remains to be achieved.

With your permission I will now turn to one or two matters of a more purely administrative nature. Here we can point to solid and substantial progress. First and foremost comes the question of defence. It is no good our looking forward to developing our country unless we are ready and able to defend it from any attacks from outside. Happily in the last year our relations with our most formidable neighbour have much improved, and to-day Iraq is on friendly terms with all the adjoining states. Nevertheless, we realize that an army, and an efficient army, is essential to the future peace of Iraq. I think that we have made very considerable strides during the last few years in the formation of that army. Aided by English officers, of whom General Daly is the chief, professional soldiers of Iraq have worked hard to bring an Iraq army into being. In this, as in other things, we have had to work slowly owing to considerations of expense. But we have already made great progress. Our young officers, some of whom have been trained in England, are proving very efficient, and I hear nothing but good of them from all sides. Our programme is to have a small peace footing army, which could be increased by mobilizing the reserves to a size sufficient to ensure the defence of the country against any likely aggression. When a moderate form of military service by ballot is introduced, we shall be in a fair way to realizing our ideal. Our military strength will in case of emergency also be increased by the local tribesmen who are good fighting men. They are now being afforded facilities for taking up agricultural holdings—facilities which will increase with the spread of irrigation. The personnel of our army at present, when it is recruited under a system of voluntary enlistment, is representative of the various strata of the population of Iraq. About 40 per cent. consist of the town and village Arabs, some 35 per cent. are tribesmen, and the other 25 per cent. is made up of Kurds and Turcomans. Such experience of fighting as the young army has obtained in Kurdistan has spoken well of its military qualities. There is an excellent *esprit de corps* amongst our officers, and the relations between them and their British colleagues are most cordial. Though the voluntary system is inadequate to build up sufficient reserves

to enable the army to expand in time of war, there is to-day no lack of recruits. In the all-important matter of defence, therefore, I do not think that we have any reason to be dissatisfied with the progress already achieved.

I can speak with a certain amount of personal experience on this question, since six years ago, when I was Minister of Defence in the first Iraq Cabinet, I drew up a memorandum outlining the form which in my opinion the Iraq army should take. In some respects my proposals, especially in the not unimportant of the rates of officers' pay, have been found too modest. But in general the suggestions we made then have been adopted. It is agreed that the peace strength of the Army should be 15,000, and that it should consist of short-term men, serving for two years with the colours and then passing into the reserve. So far the system of recruiting by ballot, the form of modified conscription which was in force in pre-war Turkish times, has not been reimposed. But it is a practical political question and one that is ripe for solution.

Closely allied with the question of defence is that of internal security. This in Iraq offers special problems from the size of our territory and the sparse distribution of the population. Here again great strides have been made, and the police enforce public order in a way undreamt of a few years ago. The prestige of the police amongst the tribesmen is steadily rising, and the cases where they are unable to deal with any infringement of public security without help from the military are becoming more and more uncommon. The force to-day consists of some 6,000 men, of whom rather less than half are mounted. Again, there is no difficulty in obtaining recruits, and the Arab police officers, with the help of British inspectors, are steadily strengthening the discipline and the *esprit de corps* of the force. The Police School in Baghdad is helping to instil into the police force the sort of technique which in the West is naturally expected from the guardians of public security. New Police Stations are rising in the provincial towns, a sign to all of the majesty of the law; I should mention in particular that at Rutba in the desert, which guards the overland route. Those of you who know Baghdad will agree that the police there make a good show, not least in their efforts to regulate the traffic.

In nothing, I think, is the progressive growth of the authority of Government shown better than in the way the ideal of public justice and public security is gaining ground at the expense of the old ideas of revenge and the redress of private grievances through the intermediaries of the "arfa," the "man of knowledge," who still plies his trade of mediator or arbitrator amongst the beduin. The Magistrates Courts have a growing number of cases each year, resulting partly from the greater efficiency of the police, and in part from the increasing willingness of the people to submit their disputes to constituted authority.

There were, for instance, 18,152 summary cases in 1925, as compared with 14,663 in 1924.

Of the organization of the Courts I need say little. It is sufficient for me to remark that the Iraq Courts are regarded as efficient both by Iraqis and Europeans, and that I do not think Iraq will ever be involved in the legal and administrative handicaps which have beset other countries in the Near and Middle East.

In the very important matter of public health we have made great progress. Cholera, as English people know only too well, for it was this disease which carried off that great soldier, General Maude, has been in the past a grave menace in Iraq. But, thanks to the vigilance of the Public Health Department, and in particular the Quarantine, the last time it attempted to pay us a visit, which was in 1923, its ravages were warded off. It began in Basra on that occasion, having been introduced, I believe, on a ship from India, and it managed to creep up to Baghdad by way of the river. There it stopped, and with only 184 cases altogether to its account. Other diseases, more insidious, though less alarming, than cholera, we have always with us. Bubonic plague in a mild form is endemic, and we have a few hundred cases every year, though it leaves Europeans severely alone. By means of vaccination we hope to stamp this out in time. Malaria, which is found in some parts, is more of a problem. Bilharzia and ankylostoma, which are also prevalent in the analogous environment of Egypt, are by no means uncommon, and amoebic dysentery claims a good deal of attention, particularly in Basra. But do not think from this list of diseases that our bill of health is a bad one. Those amongst the members of the Central Asian Society present here this afternoon who have been to Iraq know that our climate, though in parts it is decidedly warm in summer, is a healthy one. And the fact that our doctors are on the track of the diseases I have mentioned affords us the conviction that their power to harm will be gradually diminished. Already we have hospitals in fourteen of our provincial towns. In Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul there are two apiece. There is also a project for starting a medical school in Baghdad when the time is ripe. I should add that the Government is alive to the question of eye diseases, and that the fight against rabies is most efficiently conducted through the Pasteur Institute in Baghdad. We have also an excellent X-ray institute. Both these are Government concerns.

I must say something about education, a subject which I know most English people regard with suspicion. We Iraqis, on the other hand, who know what it means to be without it, are inclined to think it the remedy for all our problems. If I may say so, I admire the English in nothing more than in the way they have realized that education must discipline the character as well as the intelligence. Otherwise it may be worse than nothing. In such remarks, therefore,

as follow I hope you will remember that by education I mean something more than mere book-learning or the ability to pass Government examinations.

If we look at the statistics of the Ottoman Ministry of Education, published in 1915, we find that the three vilayets of which Iraq consisted were very backward among Ottoman vilayets. At that time there were only in these three vilayets 160 primary schools with 6,470 pupils. To-day there are 228 primary schools with 22,712 pupils. This alone is sufficient to show that we are alive to the need of training our future citizens. But the progress we have made is more striking when it is borne in mind that the schools now are adequately staffed, and that the medium of instruction is no longer Turkish, which has, of course, always been a foreign language in Iraq, but Arabic, and in the Kurdish provinces, Kurdish. In secondary education we have also given increased facilities, and we have taken steps also to enable the many adult illiterates, who are to be found in the towns, to attend evening classes. About 2,400 men are at present going to these night schools. Almost more important than the better education of our male population is that of our women. I think that I speak for all Iraqis in saying that we are proud of the improvements which have been effected in female education. We have now efficient girls' schools in Baghdad (where an American lady is principal), Mosul, Basra, and Amara, and the numbers of pupils is only limited by want of buildings and of teachers. Altogether we have to-day, I quote from some recent figures, 31 girls' schools and 4,055 students. An important side of the instruction is that devoted to hygiene and infant welfare. I should add that the ladies in Baghdad, realizing the importance of raising the status of women, have organized a society which, in addition to its other activities, provides evening classes for women who wish to improve their education. Then again, in order to enable certain picked Iraqis to finish their education abroad, we have this year sent twenty-three to various higher colleges and universities. Ten have come to England, three have gone to America, of whom two are studying agriculture, and eight have gone to the American college at Beirut in order to be trained as secondary school masters.

One or two special problems meet us in the field of education. There is, for instance, that of Tribal education. One cannot say at present that the need for education is felt as a pressing want by the tribesmen as it is by townsmen. And there are obvious difficulties in the way of bringing attendance at school, even were it geographically possible, within the four corners of the tribal Arab's outlook. I am glad to know that the sons of the tribal leaders are at the Royal Iraq Military College. These receive a special education, suitable to their knowledge, and at present they form about a third of the total number of cadets, which is in the region of a hundred. Lastly, I should like to

point out that our future lies in the realization by all classes that technical education is of vital importance. We can only develop the resources of Iraq by the use of machinery and our people must learn to use those machines. Until that has been done, the people of Iraq will not have achieved their economic independence.

I will not detain you long on the question of finance. You have heard so much about this that I hesitate to say anything at all. Yet there are certain points which need to be made clear. It is not perhaps realized that the civil administration of Iraq is self-supporting and that included in our expenditure is about half the cost of the British Residency. In fact not only have our budgets since 1923 balanced, but we have had relatively large surpluses which have been a considerable, though not wholly unpleasant, anxiety to the Ministry of Finance. For instance, the revenue in 1923 was 509.41 lakhs and the expenditure 424.27, which left a surplus of 85.14 lakhs. In 1924 the revenue had increased to 527.03 lakhs and we had a surplus over year of 62.47 lakhs. In the current financial year our revenue is estimated at 551 lakhs and our expenditure at 2 lakhs under that amount. I should add that in these figures are included, neither the revenues of the port of Basra nor those of the State Railways, both of which are self-supporting. The volume of our foreign trade shows a healthy tendency to increase, gross exports having grown from 1.079 lakhs in 1922 to 1.420 lakhs in 1924. The excess of net imports over net exports is another matter which has caused some anxiety. This in 1924, the last year of which I have the statistics, amounted to 492 lakhs, but the experts, in view of the "invisible exports" of Iraq being considerable, including as they do the whole of the cash expenditure of the British forces in Iraq and the expenditure on local labour and purchases in Iraq of foreign capital, are not inclined to think that the country is living beyond its means. Certain outstanding details remain to be settled about Iraq's payment of its share of the Ottoman Public Debt. Its charge on the revenue will, however, amount to about 5.5 per cent. of the budget. One of the most important questions in this sphere of the government which has yet to be settled is that of our land policy, with regard to both the taxation of land and the distribution of Government lands. It is now receiving most careful attention. I should also add a word about the monetary policy which we hope to follow. As you know, the rupee was adopted during the war, and since then it has been the official medium of exchange in Iraq. But the rupee has obvious disadvantages, and we have now decided in principle to adopt the pound sterling—subdivided into a token decimal coinage—as our standard. The Iraq Minister of Finance was in London this summer discussing the question with the financial authorities here. It has also been proposed, and legislation on the subject will be introduced at an early date, to institute a Currency Board, which will supervise

the issue of Iraqi notes against a duly secured reserve in sterling. I hope that if these measures secure the approbation of the Parliament of Iraq that Iraqi notes will be in circulation at an early date.

In this brief survey of what has been done in the past five years, I have necessarily left much unsaid. But I think that you will agree with me that we have begun the work of building up Iraq into a progressive state in a satisfactory way. The foundations at any rate have been laid. For that achievement we should be thankful. But before I conclude, I think it my duty to say a few words about the constitutional life of the country. Since the promulgation of our Constitution and the election of the National Assembly the people of Iraq have taken a lively and healthy interest in public affairs. The Parliament during many sessions has shown a spirit of seriousness and moderation in its debates and has a solid achievement of legislation to its credit. And above the Parliament has stood the King, who is the symbol of our national unity and who by his statesmanlike qualities has earned the respect of all parties. It is no exaggeration to say that in King Faisal, Iraq has its greatest patriot. His ambition, for which he works unceasingly, is to see Iraq a prosperous, progressive, and happy nation.

And, lastly, I should like in the fullest way to acknowledge the help which Iraq has received from Great Britain and from the British officials in the Iraq Government who have worked with such efficiency and enthusiasm in the various departments of the Government. Without their help I should not have been able to give you so favourable a picture of Iraq as I have to-day. And may I add a word to say that those who wish to visit Iraq and see for themselves what we have done will be very welcome? Tourists can now travel in comfort and security, they can enjoy the sunshine and the dry, bracing air of our winters, whilst all around them are sites and remains of those ancient civilizations which have given Iraq the most illustrious history of any nation in the world.

THE STORY OF BÂYEZID ANSÂRI, OTHER- WISE KNOWN AS PIR-I-ROSHAN AND FOUNDER OF THE SECT OF ROSHANIAS

COMPILED BY ALIF SHABNAM

"VERILY God does not regard your forms, nor does He regard your wealth, but He regards your hearts and your actions."

Early in the sixteenth century, about the time of the Emperor Baber's conquests in Afghanistan and India, the descendants in the seventh generation of one Sheikh Siraj-ed-din Ansâri (Arab) were living at Jullundar in the Punjab, and of these the youthful Sheikh Abdullah had been married to his cousin Banin, but, having no affection for her, he left her, and wandering away to the north, at last settled as a priest at Kanigûram, amongst the Wazirs. Banin meanwhile had given birth to a son, whom she called "Bâyezid," and, hoping to gain the love of her husband, as being the mother of his son, followed after him, and, suffering many hardships, found her way with the child to Kaniguram. She was not successful in her endeavours, and Abdullah, having married another wife, spurned her devotion and shortly after divorced her.

Bâyezid passed an unhappy boyhood through the enmity of his stepmother and of her son Yakub, as well as through the lack of paternal affection, though his father had him thoroughly instructed with the idea of his following him in the priesthood. Bâyezid was an exceptional youth, astonishing those amongst whom he lived by his questions and his piety; but, doubtless owing to his unhappy surroundings, and the curious restlessness which seems to overtake most "seekers after the truth," he deserted his home, and, joining the kafilah of a horse dealer, accompanied him to Samarkand, going from there on a trading venture to Hindustan. He tarried for some time at Kalinjar, and there made the acquaintance of a mulla, of the so-called Malhed or Ismailiyah seet, named Suliman, evidently a Sufi of the Sufis. On Bâyezid's return to Kaniguram it was clear that the ideas of his friend Mulla Suliman had had a great influence over him, for he became a solitary recluse, living in a cave in the mountains. After a while he laid claim to close association with God, and, a prophet having no honour in his own country, the orthodox, getting alarmed at his pretensions, reported him to his father Abdullah, who, in virtue of his paternal authority, seized a sword, and, attacking his son, wounded him, exacting from him a promise to renounce his ways and live according to the law. No sooner had Bâyezid recovered from his wound, than, casting the dust off his feet, he left Kaniguram, his native land, and took up his abode with Sultan Ahmed in the Mohmand country, and would probably have succeeded as well with the people as he had with their chief, had not the fear and enmity of the regular ulemas (teachers) increased with the popularity

of his doctrine. Amongst the greatest of all these was Akhum Darwaiza Baba, a very noted Pir, who, being a Zajik, was able to put all the Zajiks of Nanigram against him. Bāyezid now moved to Peshawar, and converted all the Khalil division of the Ghorikhel; and, success attending him, he threw off all disguise and called himself the "Perfect Saint" without whom there was no road to God. "Now therefore," said he, "come unto me that I may bring you unto God; for the holy Koran directs you to seek after the divine union, and it is only through the intervention of a perfect Pir that this union can be accomplished." He also asserted in one of his ordinances that whatever exists in form is the mirror of divinity; whatever is heard or seen is God, who alone exists, while the material world is nothing but thought or idea. "The Lord preserve the faithful," says Akhum Darwaiza, "from such an infidel as this!" Bāyezid was fond of introducing into his composition philosophical ideas and principles maintained by the Sufi sect. In another passage he asserts: "Nothing exists except God, and that besides the being of God there is no other being in existence." "God," says he, "remains concealed in human nature like salt in water, or grain in the plant, and He is the same in all His creatures and the soul of all."

This was very much the doctrine of that other Bāyezid, who lived some 650 years before the subject of this story, and a great teacher of Sufism, who said: "Thirty years the high God was my mirror, now I am my own mirror—i.e., that which I was I am no more, for 'I' and 'God' is a denial of the unity of God. Since I am no more, the high God is His own mirror. So I say that God is the mirror of myself, for He speaks with my tongue and I have vanished." "Verily I am God, there is no God except me, so worship me! Glory to me! How great is my Majesty!"

Many Pathans from all over the country now joined his standard, including the Muhammadzais of Hashtnagar, to which city he removed his headquarters, and from there he issued his proclamations calling on all to come to him. He also assumed the appellation of "Pir Roshan," which may be rendered "Father" or "Saint of Light." It is from this title that his sect were termed Roshania, or the Enlightened—in fact, the *Afghan illuminati*!

Now began the great discussions spoken of by Bāyezid's arch-enemy, the Akhun Baba of Swat in his monumental work, the "Makhzan Afghani," which were carried on by the historian and his Pir, Said Ali Tirmizi, on the one side and Bāyezid on the other. Although the Akhun claims great victories, including the naming of his opponent Pir Tarik, "the father of darkness," instead of the father of light, it is doubtful whether he was a match for the profound knowledge and versatile genius displayed by Bāyezid; for, by his own confession, his victories produced no effect on the easy-going Afghans, who were

attracted by the lax principles of the new leader and the idea of release from strict dogma and difficult rules.

The proceedings of Bâyezid gradually assumed a more serious aspect, and caused the Emperor's Viceroy, Mahsan Khan, at Kabul to become anxious. So by prompt action he surprised the Pir in his fort at Hashtnagar, seized him, and carried him to Kabul. Here he was publicly disgraced and his head shaved on one side. With consummate skill, however, he extricated himself from the difficult situation, and, preserving his credit unimpaired among his followers, and defending himself with great ability and learning, he gained the admiration of all the learned, and secured his own liberty.

Bâyezid, having effected his release, collected his disciples and adherents, and retired to the hills of Totai, but, being pressed by his enemies, and not feeling absolutely secure, he again retreated and took up a strong position in the inaccessible hill country of Tirah, in a part then occupied by the Bangash clan, at that time one of the most powerful of all the Afghan tribes. In this rough and dangerous country, being free from all danger of sudden surprise, he set about retrieving his late disgrace and prosecuting his plans with increased activity. His sect began to assume almost a national character, and he stood to these wild tribesmen in the same relation that Mohammed used to stand to the Arabs.

His treatment at Kabul had sunk deep and festered in his mind, and no sooner had he collected his bands than he started attacks and depredations with great vigour against all who opposed his tenets.

From this time on Bâyezid seems to have lost all sense of proportion, and his religious mania seems to have totally unbalanced his mind. Possessed by a violent megalomania, he announced that he would abolish the religion of Mohammed, and substitute his own in its place, and he slaughtered all ulemas who opposed him. He announced his intention of conquering both Khorasan and Hindustan, and of overthrowing the Emperor Akbar. He got even so far as to partition the various provinces among his followers. The Moghuls of Kabul, hearing of his boasts, prepared to attack him, and entered into communication with certain of the clans in Tirah; but Bâyezid, being informed, determined to exact a terrible vengeance, and told 300 Bangash tribesmen, whom he suspected, to appear before him with their hands bound behind them. The simple mountaineers, deluded by the many mystical and symbolical ceremonies he had practised, did as he had ordered; he had them all murdered in cold blood, and laid their district so desolate that it was deserted by the owners and passed into the hands of another race. After this terrible lesson the whole border from Kohat to Peshawar turned to the new faith and gave up the ordinary observances of Islam.

Bâyezid, with a considerable force, now descended on the plains,

and having ravaged and sacked several towns and districts, was retiring to the mountains with the loot, when he was attacked by Mahsan Khan. His followers were dispersed with great slaughter; he himself escaped to Hashtnagar, where, after a few days, he died of a severe fever, aggravated by chagrin at his failure. His system in the end died out amongst the Yusofzai, but flourished under the leadership of his sons and grandsons for many years in Tirah.

In some way Bâyezid's son, Sheikh Omar, annoyed the Yusofzai, who had long been his father's most strenuous partisans. They collected a party, attacked him, routed his adherents, and killed both him and his brother, throwing the bones of the father, which had always been carried with great pomp and veneration before the army into the Indus. A younger brother, Jalal-ud-din, was taken prisoner and sent to Lahore; but he managed to escape, and again raising the tribesmen, increased his power very considerably beyond that of his father, even to gaining possession of Ghazni by a *coup-de-main*. Being compelled to evacuate the citadel, he was attacked in retreat by the Hazaras and killed.

He was succeeded by Sheikh Omar's son, Ihdad, who was noted as a quiet, peaceful man, and from this time on the temporal power of the sect declined, the last record being of a descendant who accepted service under the Emperor in the Deccan about A.D. 1720.

Followers of this sect are still to be found on the frontier, and the story is by no means dead; but it is not fashionable, nor openly acknowledged, the reason being that a wave of puritanical fervour has swept away most of the old mysticism prevalent in the earlier centuries.

Now, what are the logical deductions to be made from this tale of Indian frontier life?

We learn that a youth, with an unhappy childhood, left the paternal home and took to a wandering life, during which he became acquainted with certain sectarians of his faith, who led him to devote much time to the thought and study of religion. Brought up amongst a wild, adventurous people, whose heroes were the conquerors who, passing through their lands, swept many of the young men with them to wonderful scenes of conquest and the undreamt-of wealth of Ind, he no doubt early formed ambitious ideas of personal grandeur and conquest. Knowing the depths of ignorance and the ingrained superstition in which the frontier tribes were steeped, he hoped by a mixture of fervour and charlatantry to persuade them of his claim to supernatural powers. He succeeded to a really wonderful extent, and it was only because he was naturally in opposition both to the constituted authority of the Empire and the orthodox priesthood that he failed to make any headway beyond tribal limits. But he shook the Emperor's feeling of security, and caused him to put very powerful forces in motion to crush the movement.

REVIEWS

THE CHANGING EAST. J. A. Spender. (Cassell, 1926.) 10s. 6d.

IN the preface Mr. Spender thus defines his purpose: "My object was to study the state of opinion and politics in Turkey, Egypt, and India, and to discover, if I could, how it fared with British policy or British rule. Turkey, Egypt, and India, though otherwise very dissimilar, have one feature in common. They are all countries which for long periods have been either inextricably mixed up with Europe, or subject to European control, and they are all attempting in one way or another to free themselves from the control."

The author has achieved his object with consummate skill, within the very reasonable compass of 250 pages, of which one-third is devoted to Turkey and Egypt and two-thirds to the much more complex questions of political India. There is not a dull page in the book, nor a sentence which requires rereading to be intelligible. One does not know which to admire most: the vivid portraiture of existing conditions and of outstanding personalities—the Ghazi in Turkey, Zaghlul in Egypt, Gandhi in India (each so representative of the varying political development of the three regions)—the subtle insight with which the movements agitating those countries since the war are analyzed, or the literary skill with which the conclusions are presented.

The facts are well up to date, and the book forms an accurate and fascinating picture of events and tendencies which those who have vainly tried to follow the kaleidoscopic changes of the years since the war will find most valuable. The comparisons which a survey of the three regions suggests have doubtless been as helpful to the author in forming his conclusions as they are informing to the reader. In all three we see the struggles of an ancient and genuine or of a newly born and spurious eastern Nationalism to assert itself against the inevitable advance of Western influences.

Turkey, shorn of her European and Arab possessions, has, under the iron despotism of Mustapha Kamal, disentangled herself from Europe and her past by sacrificing the Caliphate and the hegemony of Islam; by turning her back on Constantinople, the glorious heritage of Ottoman rule, because it is indissolubly linked with the West; by massacring or expelling the Greeks and Armenians who were the main factors in her commercial and industrial life. Those were enormous sacrifices to make for a national ideal, and while some of them must appear foolish and others criminal, one cannot but admire the stern resolution that dictated them. As Mr. Spender aptly sums it up, we see character and determination in one part of the Turkish renaissance, ruthlessness and overweening conceit in the other.

The irony of fate is that the overthrow of Greece, followed by the repatriation of one and a half million Greeks from Asia Minor and Thrace, while it has seriously weakened Turkey, has enormously strengthened her hereditary enemy. Greece has now a population as great as Turkey, active and progressive; Athens and the Piræus have prospered in proportion as Constantinople has declined.

Is it incredible that some future poet or historian will write, as Horace did,

"Grecia capta, ferum victorem captum cepit?" Turkey to-day shows nationalism in its apogee, an iron despotism scarcely hidden behind a façade of democracy, and a so-called "Popular Party" which merely registers the decrees of the Ghazi; for there is no use for an opposition, except to provide material for the hangman (fifteen members of the opposition were hanged in Constantinople in July last, after the travesty of a trial).

In Egypt to-day we see a nationalism more vocal, perhaps, but less resolute and less effective. For Egypt by geography and history, as well as by material interest, is so indissolubly linked with the West that she cannot, even if she would, disentangle herself and assert a national independence which, in fact, she has never enjoyed.

Egypt under British protection has prospered so greatly that, however much her politicians may clamour for complete independence, they are unwilling to make the sacrifice—of the fleshpots—which it would involve, or to turn their back on that Europe from which they derive their wealth and importance. As Mr. Spender puts it, "Though the foreign stranglehold is as strong in Cairo as in Constantinople, I cannot imagine the Egyptian pashas proposing to transfer their capital to the Fayum or the Assuan Dam." The Egyptian politician is more modern, more prosperous, more progressive than the Turk, thanks mainly to British administration and European capital. But he wants the best of both worlds; he clamours for a complete independence from Britain which, if granted, he could never maintain against the European powers that would hasten to step into the vacant place, and at the same time he wants to retain all the advantages of British protection. In this he resembles the Indian politician. But the Egyptian has more reason on his side, for Britain never claimed in Egypt more than the right to secure her own financial and imperial interests. Egypt, too, though less homogeneous than present-day Turkey, is infinitely less rent by racial and religious divisions than India (Mr. Spender compares it to a single Indian province—the Panjab), and apart from the incapacity for self-defence (which is common to Egypt and India), has strong claims to be regarded as a nation.

Mr. Spender brings out clearly the similarity between Egyptian and Indian nationalism. Both have their murder gangs; in both "political" murder is condoned or approved by certain extremist leaders; in both the native politicians have got entangled in formulas which logically lead to a complete break with Britain, while most of them are quite aware that such a break would be even more disastrous to them than to us.

The Indian situation has rarely been so clearly and, on the whole, so impartially presented as in this book. The author begins by telling us that—

"Looking at India and comparing it with Europe, one's feeling is not of despair that there should be unrest, but that there should be so much tranquillity over so vast an area. . . . The Indian politician (ignorant of the past of the vast sub-continent and with no historical perspective) takes it for granted, as if it were a happy achievement of nature or Providence, and needs little or nothing to enlighten him about the effort which has brought it about or the mechanism which is needed to keep it in being.

"He, too, being unconscious of what the European has done for him, speaks lightly of throwing off the European partner, and apparently he thinks it a simple thing to govern a continent and keep its peace."

The position could not be more succinctly summed up or more clearly expressed. Mr. Spender, while sympathetic to their aspirations, is not unduly tender in exposing the short-sighted views and irresponsible activities of the Indian politicians (beginning with Gandhi) with whom he came in contact.

But he has not given the obvious explanation—viz., that these Indian “leaders” come generally from a class which has never ruled or known the responsibilities of rule, and they are therefore lacking in any real political instinct. That explains why so many of them have pinned their faith to a muddle-headed ascetic such as Gandhi, and why men with the acute critical intellects of some of the Swaraj traders make themselves and their followers ridiculous by their “cat-and-mouse” tactics in the Indian Assembly, and their incapacity to formulate any constructive policy.

Mr. Spender has not been slow to realize, what many well-wishers of the Indian peoples have been urging since the Reforms took shape, how little claim these “representatives of India” have to speak for the rural population—90 per cent. of the whole. He writes (p. 160) :

“Whatever the future may bring, there is undoubtedly at this moment a gulf fixed between the politician and the peasant which makes it extremely dangerous to accept the opinions of the one as covering the needs of the other, and which is unlikely to be bridged until the peasant himself sends his own spokesman to the Councils and the Assembly.”

He illustrates this argument by quoting his own experience of the Legislative Assembly in March last, when it was left to an Anglo-Indian member to charge, and rightly, the Swarajists, and the Government who truckled to them, with sacrificing the interests of the great masses in their zeal for a protective tariff, designed to benefit a handful of Indian manufacturers. This is not the only respect in which the author shows a clear insight.

He has seized the heart of the situation in pointing out (p. 250) that religion, the one constant and all-pervading factor in India, renders no account to politics; that Indian politics are in consequence to a large extent artificial, for the real masters of opinion are not yet, if they ever will be, the politicians.

Mr. Spender displays equal candour and vision in his remarks on the much-discussed Diarchy. He admits that on the evidence then available (only one side was presented) he was in favour of that cumbersome device when it was first proposed; but he finds that where it has had any measure of success—*e.g.*, in the Panjab, Bombay, Madras—that is due to the fact that the Governor has ignored the unworkable system and treats his Ministers as one Cabinet.

He concludes, and few will differ from him, that “as a political device the thing called Diarchy has great defects; and if it is allowed to continue unamended may, instead of instructing Indians in responsible government, as Mr. Montagu intended, have the exactly opposite result of turning them into irresponsible agitators.”

What a pity that the authors of the Reforms Scheme did not listen to these very arguments when placed before them by seven out of the nine Provincial Governments in 1918-19! If they had, India by now might have made some real progress towards self-government.

Finally, Mr. Spender again goes to the root of the matter in his conclusion—that before any further advance is made towards provincial autonomy the powers of the Central Government must be considerably strengthened, as in the United States, so that it may be able to suspend a Provincial Government and take over the duties if the latter fails to function.

The Reforms Scheme proceeded on the assumption that, while the constitutional experiment was being made in the provinces, the powers of the Central Government would remain unimpaired. In fact, as the history of the last six years shows, the Central Government has at times allowed itself

to be reduced to a shadow—"a ghost sitting on the tomb of the old Indian Empire." That, fortunately, is no longer the case.

Mr. Spender (p. 155) is undoubtedly right in emphasizing the fact that over and above the British *personnel* indispensable for a progressive administration, India's "pressing need is for (British) engineers, men of science, men of business, etc., to combat the poverty which is the great latent cause of unrest." But in dwelling on the inadequacy of roads, railways, irrigation, agricultural development, etc., and comparing it unfavourably with what Lord Cromer and his engineers did for Egypt, he is hardly fair to what has already been achieved in India by British brains, capital, and enterprise. No less than £1,000,000,000 sterling have been invested in Indian railways (now 40,000 miles), irrigation projects (now watering 80,000,000 acres), the great tea, jute, cotton, and mining industries (which employ over 2,000,000 people).

To follow up his own parallel between Egypt and the Panjab. At annexation in 1849, the Panjab had a quarter of a million acres inefficiently irrigated by the spill of her great rivers. In the first forty years after annexation British engineers had raised the area to 2,000,000 acres. Within the last forty it has been raised to 12,000,000 acres (almost all perennial irrigation), so that the Panjab in less than eighty years of British rule has created an irrigation system twice as great as Egypt has achieved in 4,000 years, under the Pharaohs, the Ptolemys, and the masterful efficiency of Cromer. Within the next ten years the Panjab area will approach 18,000,000 acres. The "pauper" province of India is now its granary. But these magnificent achievements are unhonoured and unsung, *quia carent vate sacro*. Our people in India has been too busy doing things to boost their achievements. Perhaps they were wrong.

The only serious error in the Indian portion of the book is the statement (p. 101) that the Council of State (Upper House) "is entirely official or nominated." In fact, over half of its members (thirty-four out of fifty-nine) are elected, and there is a considerable Indian majority.

Few can read Mr. Spender's description of present-day politics in India—all the more valuable as coming from a staunch Liberal—without realizing that the attempt, which Indian politicians have encouraged for their own purposes, to transplant to India our British system of democratic representative Government is foredoomed to failure. The substance of the matter is set forth at p. 249: "Both British and Indians are on false ground when the one pretends, and the other accepts the pretence, that India is a kind of undeveloped Europe, which only needs to be endowed with Western institutions to go peacefully ahead in the path of progress." Those who uttered that warning in 1919 were condemned as heretics or reactionaries. Now that after six years of experiment their warning is confirmed by a writer of Mr. Spender's experience, judgment, and well-known Liberal views, perhaps it will be listened to. The fact is there is as yet in India as a whole no national spirit, no feeling of common citizenship, both of which are the essential bases of responsible government. If that elementary fact is borne in mind, we can set ourselves to the task of developing provincial autonomy in conformity with the varying aptitudes, traditions and stages of progress, as shown in the experience gained since 1920.

How much less anxious one would be as to what Mr. Spender terms "the unhappy date, 1929," if one were assured that before then the members of the various legislatures in India and of both Houses of Parliament here had studied this book so carefully as to be prepared to pass an examination in it. There would then be less danger of the defects in the 1919 Reforms Scheme being perpetuated.

M. F. O'DWYER.

ON THE TRAIL OF ANCIENT MAN. By Roy Chapman Andrews, D.Sc. Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons Ltd., London and New York. 25s.

Those who heard Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews lecture at the Royal Society of Arts to the Central Asian Society will be more than eager to read his written account of his explorations "On the Trail of Ancient Man." The lecture covered generally in outline the same ground as the book, which commences by explaining how the determination was formed to test Professor Osborn's prophecy that Asia and the Desert of Gobi, or thereabouts, would prove to contain the original site of mammalian life from which, by land-bridges and across continents, the mammals had spread north, south, east, and west. To those who appreciate "bandobust" the description of the preparation will appeal, especially the reference to Stefannson's remark that "adventures are the mark of incompetence." In other words, that with all the resources of modern science and invention it should be possible to be prepared against vicissitudes and unforeseen happening.

The expedition was based on Peking and obtained the spacious house of the late Dr. Morrison, *The Times* correspondent, as its headquarters, where it arrived in April, 1920. Before the expedition started for Mongolia, Mr. Granger went off to the province of Szechuan to search for pits and strata containing fossils of primitive fauna, a search in which he was conspicuously successful, and Dr. Andrews himself went off to the country about the Tang Ling or Eastern Tombs, eighty miles from Peking, and in the autumn of 1921 went to the Shensi province in search of specimens of modern fauna for the American Museum of Natural History. The takin (*Burdorcas bedfordi*), which Dr. Andrews describes as the modern representative of the "Golden Fleece," was the principal object of this expedition; the takin, related to the chamois, the serow and the goral, but resembling more a cow, has a really golden fleece, or rather hide with shorter hair. The specimens were only obtained after phenomenal exertion and weighed some 500 lbs.

It was not until April, 1922, that the expedition, now complete with members skilled in every branch of natural history and geology, save only for an ethnologist and an anthropologist, actually started by car (Dodge) on the long and rough route through the Great Wall to Urga in Mongolia, "a land of painted deserts, dancing in mirage, of limitless grassy plains and nameless snow-capped peaks, of untracked forests and roaring streams, a land of mystery, paradise and promise."

Thrice did the expedition penetrate far into Mongolia—viz., in 1922, 1923, and 1925—returning in the intervals to their base at Peking. Thrice did the column of heavily loaded cars wend its way with no great difficulty hundreds of miles into the heart of northern Mongolia, with long convoys of powerful shaggy camels bringing up supplies ahead and behind them to the various depots on the line of communication. Each season for five months the expedition kept out at its exploration, with the most remarkable results perhaps that have ever been achieved. Professor Osborn's theories were amply proved.

The primary object of the expedition was to look for vast fields of fossil mammalia, and these were found exceeding all expectation, first at Irén Dabasu on the eastern edge of Mongolia, not 800 miles from Peking. Here finds of great importance were made, no less than the bones of the dinosaur and teeth of the titanothere and rhinoceros. It meant "that we were standing on cretaceous strata of the upper part of the age of reptiles—the first cretaceous strata and the first dinosaur ever discovered in Asia north of the Himalaya mountains . . . and had opened up a palaeontological vista dazzling in its brilliance."

The expedition soon passed on 350 miles to Tuerin, "the city of the living

god," *en route* to Uрга, and found the camel convoy under its faithful Mongol leader, Merin, duly waiting for them. From Tuerin the expedition pushed on through the passes of Balkuh Gol to the uplands on which stands Uрга, and through the Russian and Mongol settlements to their hunting ground in the valleys at the eastern end of the Altai mountains. Here, close to the lake of Tsagan Nor, they came to the great home of mammal remains they had hoped for, and settled down to the work of the expedition.

Their finds read as one long romance, including, in addition to many remains of adult dinosaurs, the famous discovery of the dinosaur eggs, with the shells intact, in the debris of the "Flaming Cliffs," where natural battlements of rock stood up among the ruins of what were once high cliffs. Each day produced new wonders, including the bones of the giant *Baluchitherium*, which stood twelve feet at the shoulder, hitherto only found in the Bugti hills of British Baluchistan. Finally, in September, 1922, gorged with finds the expedition crawled back by the springs of Sair Usu the 600 miles to Peking.

The finding of the *Baluchitherium*, Dr. Andrews explains, is most interesting, in that it may have lived when man was evolving from the anthropoid apes, and where its bones are, there also remains of primitive man may be found, and this chapter contains fascinating suggestions on life in a Mongolia apparently crowded with giant mammalia and reptilia. Dr. Andrews indeed gives us some drawings of what the beasts must have looked like.

In 1923 the expedition again made for the Flaming Cliffs of the Tsagan Nor and discovered more and more dinosaur eggs, the shells as complete as when laid ten million years before, including even the skeletons of tiny dinosaurs unhatched within the egg.

The romance of the story as told by Dr. Andrews must be read to be believed and understood with all the wealth of discovery of all kinds, including the finding of the sites of the Dune Dwellers of Mongolia, who, many thousands of years earlier, discovered the dinosaur eggs and used them as ornaments. At Shabarakh Usu, some 200 miles S.E. of Tsagan Nor, innumerable flints and artifacts of some very early people were found, which added a new thrill to minds overgorged with fossil wealth.

It is a little hard in reading the book to disentangle the exploits and adventures of one season from those of another, but that does not detract from the charm and colour of the description nor the excitement of the finds, which are most successfully communicated to the reader.

Eventually the expedition hopes to return to a more southerly portion of Mongolia and the Desert of Gobi, where it is supposed the habitat of early man may lie. It is within the bounds of possibility, nay of probability, that finds regarding the cradle of the human race may be discovered as startling as those of the mammalia and reptilia. If nothing else transpires, the origin of the peculiar Mongolian race, which stretches, almond-eyed and beardless, from the Baltic to the Pacific, will alone be worth the toil involved. A Mongol grave of 1,000 years ago was found in 1921, but Mongol remains of 5,000 years will throw much light on a blank page of the world's history, while the possibility of *Pithecus erectus*, some link between man and the anthropoid apes, is not too much to look for.

The next expedition will complete its staff of scientists with an anthropologist and an ethnologist.

G. MACMUNN.

CHINESE CENTRAL ASIA. By C. P. Skrine, I.C.S. Methuen and Co. 21s.

Within the last year we have had two remarkable books on Chinese Central Asia by two successive Consuls-General in Chinese Turkistan.

Lieut.-Colonel Etherton dealt largely with the political significance of the "Heart of Central Asia," and in particular with the Bolshevik thrust through that region towards India and China.

Mr. Skrine, who left Kashgar in the autumn of 1924 after a stay of over two years, gives us a most vivid description of the various races, settled and nomadic, of their ways of life, social habits, their legends, arts, and superstitions. But beyond that he set himself to explore many of the unknown places in the great mountain ranges (Kunlun and Tien-Shan) which separate the Chinese "New Dominion" from Tibet on the east and Siberia on the north, thus filling up blanks left in Sir Aurel Stein's epoch-making investigations, and opening up new ground for the sportsman, the archaeologist, and the geographer.

The narrative throughout shows a crispness of touch, a keen and trained observation, and a pleasant humour that make it delightful reading, and the reader gains information and instruction without any conscious effort.

Mr. Skrine, like others officers of the Indian Political Department, starts with the advantage that having served in many lands—Persia, Baluchistan, as well as India—he could (though he does not) say, like Ulysses: "Much have I seen and known. Cities of men. And manners, climates, councils, governments."

It is this wide knowledge of the East, its peoples and problems, that gives writers like him so much valuable material for comparison and analysis. And nowhere is there more scope for these than in Chinese Turkistan, where three empires meet (if China and Russia can still be called empires) to-day, where in the past the three great civilizations of India, China, and Persia met and reacted on one another, and where three great religions, Islam, Buddhism (from India), and Confucianism have struggled for the mastery.

The persistence of China to reassert her authority over this remote and, in many respects, unprofitable and unpopular possession is a striking illustration of the importance of prestige in the East. The sidelights on Chinese administration are of special interest. Thus, in his first meeting with a Chinese Amban, the author made a *faux pas* by asking the Pir or spiritual head of the important Maulai sect to join them at dinner, for a high Chinese official considers it beneath him to sit at table with one of the subject race.

The Chinese administration follows the traditional Oriental method of combining executive and judicial authority in the district officer. In India that officer, if he is to discharge his duty to the people in his charge, must spend three or four months of the year in touring amongst them. Chinese officialdom recognizes no such obligations. In the course of two years' almost continuous travelling Mr. Skrine only once met a Chinese Amban away from his headquarters.

The fact is that China in her "New Dominion" confines herself to the two elementary functions of raising taxation, which is light, and of maintaining order, which is not difficult among a people so docile as the easy-going Muhammadans of the tract. The Chinese officials work almost entirely through the local Begg or tribal chiefs, whose authority is thus maintained. The Chinese military forces appear to exist mainly on paper, and where in evidence, to be soddenn with opium. An enlightened Amban now and then makes an effort to extend cultivation and establish new villages; and it is interesting to find that, aided by a rich soil and a plentiful water supply, cultivation and population are steadily extending. How productive the country is, is shown by the reply

of a local Beg to Mr. Skrine's inquiry whether maize could be obtained: "You can get anything in this country except chicken's milk"!

But any further material or intellectual progress is outside the ken of the Chinese administrator. Perhaps this has some compensations and one may be forgiven for hoping with Mr. Skrine "that a corner of the earth may long be spared in which a peaceful, contented, simple, lovable, and by no means uncivilized population exists without motor-cars or cinemas, without newspapers or telephones, without broadcasting or advertisements, without a mile of railway or even of metalled road, a land shaped in the Middle Ages, picturesque and quaint almost beyond belief—truly an Arcady of Cathay."

The Chinese Government showed wise prevision in rigorously excluding Soviet influence and propaganda from this Arcadia; and though a Soviet consul (without an escort) has recently been admitted to Kashgar, one hopes that this will not pave the way for the infiltration of Bolshevist ideas, which have already dominated Mongolia and much of Southern China.

But Chinese officialdom itself can at times be as ruthless and bloodthirsty as the worst forms of Bolshevism. The grim account of the rise and fall of the fierce tyrant, Ma Tihai (G.O.C.), who, defying the civil authority, terrorized not only Kashgar city, but much of the province for years, is most graphic. This man, "one of the basest scoundrels in Central Asia" according to Mr. Skrine, was a Muhammadan from Yunnan, and his atrocities are no doubt paralleled by those of more than one Tschun to-day in China itself. Mr. Skrine must have been relieved by the fact that before he left Kashgar this ogre met the fate he deserved.

The value of this fascinating book is much enhanced by the admirable maps and the many beautiful illustrations, nearly all of which are reproductions of photographs taken by the author himself.

In this, as in so many other respects, he was fortunate in having his wife as the capable and intrepid companion of all his journeys and hardships.

John Lawrence, as ruler of the Punjab seventy years ago, is credited with saying that when he came across a young civil servant encumbered with a wife and a piano, he hustled him about from one jungle station to another till the young man parted first with the wife and then with the piano!

Had Lawrence been alive to-day and read Mr. Skrine's account of his travels he would doubtless have altered his views, and prescribed a wife (such as "D" in this narrative), a camera, and a plane-table as the equipment of a young and energetic officer.

M. F. O'D.

AMONG THE KARA-KORUM GLACIERS. By Jenny Visser-Hooft. With contributions by Ph. C. Visser. Arnold. 21s. net.

There will be few readers of Mrs. Visser-Hooft's delightful book who will not experience satisfaction and admiration, but the first point that strikes us is the wonderful enterprise of this Dutch party, who are heartily to be congratulated. It is surely a remarkable fact and one worthy of notice that people from one of the flattest countries in the world should set out to explore and unravel some of the mysteries of one of the most gigantic mountain regions in existence. One would, however, have wished that it had fallen to the lot of a British party to have continued the work in this area, where so many Englishmen have already done so much; but, as has so often been said, exploration is an international arena wherein all may compete.

The Hunza area that this Dutch party selected lies between the Hindu Kush and the Kara-korum mountains. It is one of the most obscure parts

of the Himalayas, and is exceedingly difficult to approach. It is also the one part of the Indian Empire which remains unexplored, though it has been visited from time to time by people of all nationalities, among whom may be mentioned Sir Francis Younghusband, General Cockerill, and Sir Martin Conway. Sir Francis Younghusband in 1889 merely looked into the Shingshal valley and then turned his attention to the Khunjirab, eventually coming down into the Hunza valley through the Mintaka pass. General Cockerill, who was there in 1892, visited the Khunjirab and Hunza valleys, and also had a glimpse of the Gujirab. Sir Martin Conway did some useful work in the Hunza area; but yet there still remained much to be learned.

There were five Europeans in the party, the work being thus divided: Ph. C. Visser, meteorology and geology; Mrs. Visser-Hooft, botany and the collection of butterflies; Baron B. Ph. van Harinxma thoe Slooten, zoology; and, lastly, two Swiss guides. In addition, a surveyor, Afraz Gul Khan, lent by the Survey of India, accompanied the party.

The expedition left Srinagar on April 25, 1925, and returned again on October 30. Bad weather caused a delay at the foot of the Burzil pass, where it was impossible to use pony transport, so coolies were hired, and eventually Gilgit was reached. On May 20 the party continued on to Hunza, where they were fortunate in obtaining the help and active assistance of the Mir of Hunza, who made arrangements for a band of permanent coolies to accompany them. It was then that the Vissers really began their work of exploration into this glacial sea of ice. Their first base was at Pasu, from whence they visited the Pasu glacier. Here the expedition encountered one of the many difficulties of exploration in the Himalayas, due to the unfavourable condition of the snow early in the season. Consequently, Mr. Visser wisely decided to defer the exploration of the great Batura glacier.

The next objective was the unknown valleys at the head of the Hunza river, which had always been looked upon as inaccessible by the inhabitants. The Vissers soon found themselves at the entrance to the Khunjirab, from whence with difficulty they found a way into the Gujirab valley, which was longer than they had imagined. They also discovered the source of the Gujirab and the Hunza rivers. Following the footsteps of General Cockerill, the party then crossed into the Shingshal valley, going to its head to explore the glaciers. They reconnoitred first the Khurdopin glacier, passing on to the Verjirab glacier, which had never before been seen by any white man, and then the Yazghil glacier. Returning to Pasu, they again visited the Batura glacier, the mapping of which was one of the great feats of the expedition, and took about twenty days. On their return journey the party visited the Hispar area, and finally reached Srinagar on October 30, having travelled a distance of more than 1,200 miles, and mapped 2,580 square miles of ground which was practically *terra incognita*. At the end of the book we are given a very brief summary of the scientific results, which is enough to whet the appetite of the specialist. The observations are still in the hands of the experts, and include topography, glaciology, flora, zoology, geology, meteorology, and physiology. There is no doubt that when published, in particular the topographical ones, they will add considerably to our hitherto scanty knowledge of this region.

Transport in the Himalayas is always a source of difficulty, but there is no doubt that in this case the Vissers profited by their experiences gained during their first trip to the Kara-korams in 1922. One gathers that none of the party knew anything of the language, which is a pity, as all travellers should make an attempt to learn something, even if only the rudiments of Hindustani, in order to give the natives confidence. There can be no doubt that to have this confi-

dence is worth any amount of Government assistance in the form of *parwanas* or passes enjoining officials to help one.

A reviewer's duty is to criticize, often adversely, for the benefit of his readers, but, happily, in this case adverse criticisms are few, and fade into the background so far as the general reader is concerned. There are two classes of readers of travel books—those who wish to know scientific facts, and those who are satisfied with a straightforward account. It is for the latter that Mrs. Visser-Hooft has written this book, and we must not therefore regard it from any other point of view. She has a delightful way of keeping our attention by her human touches, and one has but to read a few pages to realize that both the author and her husband are real explorers and pioneers. They possess the right spirit and the proper philosophical frame of mind which are essential requisites for this craft. There are some excellent and striking photographs, admirably reproduced, which form a strong feature of the book.

There are, however, one or two minor things which cannot be passed by unnoticed. The author has an unfortunate and annoying habit of peppering her narrative with untranslated German sentences—exclamations of her Swiss guides. She is also not too fond of translating native terms for us; a glossary would have been a useful addition to the book. We should like to point out that the distances on the maps are in kilometres, whereas in the text they are in miles. Nowadays there seems to be an epidemic of misspelt names in this region, which has also crept into this book, where the word Kara-koram is spelt Kara-Korum. It is difficult to understand why the spelling adopted by the Survey of India is not consistently used in all travel books. In spite of these defects, the book is heartily to be commended, and we wish the author and her husband every success in any future expedition they may undertake, and can only hope that their love of exploration will take them again to this same part of the world to clear up some of the mysteries and topographical problems that still await solution.

B. K. FEATHERSTONE.

AN UNEXPLORED PASS. By Captain B. K. Featherstone, F.R.G.S., with an Introduction by Brigadier-General the Hon. C. G. Bruce, C.B., M.V.O. Messrs. Hutchinson and Co. 18s.

A book of this nature should serve as one of the strongest inducements to young men to join the Indian Army. We have here the plain, well-written, and well-illustrated description of a journey such as hundreds of young officers from India make, well within the capacity of a moderate purse, and, what is more important, within the period of the annual leave of three months granted to officers serving on the frontier.

What can be more delightful or more healthy than to wander away into the glorious Himalayas, and, according to your personal predilections, include in your objective some exploration or some shooting. Many times on these very routes has the writer of this review met young officers with the minimum of kit and the maximum of energy, accompanied by one servant, the all-necessary shikari, and a few coolies, legging it for all they were worth to some distant nullah, returning two months later with health renewed, with bronzed faces and hardened muscles, and incidentally taking away some fine trophies of the chase.

Captain Featherstone's particular objective was the exploration of the New or Western Muztagh Pass. That he actually failed to carry this out is a minor matter, a larger and more expensive expedition led by a man of his energy would probably have been successful, as it would have been independent to a great extent of local transport, but the effort made is worthy of all praise.

Transport difficulties invariably take a prominent place in a narrative of this nature, they are so often the traveller's *bête noir*; but we cannot help sympathizing with the villagers called upon to undertake an arduous journey for what to them must seem such a totally inadequate reason. Since the village of Askole in particular has had to bear the brunt of so many expeditions, the Royal Geographical Society might well consider the suitability of giving such a village one of its minor awards, as assuredly these villagers collectively have done much to further the advancement of geography.

The small but clear map shows the author's route from Srinagar over the Zoji La down the Indus to Skardu, up over the Skoro La to Askole, then the attempt on the New or Western Muztagh Pass, back down the Shigar and up the Shyok River and so to Leh; from thence back on to his old route, and so back to Srinagar again. Little new ground, it may be said, in all this, but none the less a very readable narrative.

The neighbourhood of the Karakoram Range has been a lure to many travellers, and we should soon be receiving further information regarding the northern area and particularly the Shaksgam from the expedition led by Major Mason, R.E., of the Survey of India.

Rudolph Schlaginweit tried the ascent of the New Muztagh Pass in 1856, Godwin-Austen in 1861, Younghusband reconnoitred it from both sides; the Duke of Abruzzi, Martin Conway, the Workmans, de Filippi, and others have thrown much light on the neighbouring glaciers, but the pass itself remains uncrossed by Europeans.

Nowhere in the world can be seen scenery on so magnificent a scale; nature verily in its wildest moods meet the eye on all sides. Steady nerves are indeed necessary when the paths traverse the face of these towering cliffs or cross the roaring torrents by shaky and precarious bridges. The inhabitants, used as they are to these amenities of travel, often quail at some of the worst places; while the white man, the leader, with his heart in his mouth, has to show an undaunted spirit he may be far from feeling. Good leadership is essential to success; firmness tempered by kindness is a sure way to the Balti's or Tibetan's heart. No young officer can spend his leave better than by carrying out similar wanderings; there are many parts of the Himalayas still little known and many of its peaks still unclimbed, and it is a merit in the "Unexplored Pass" that many who read it will be tempted to go and do likewise, while those who have already accomplished some similar journey will read it with pleasure, as it will recall to them incidents just as they occurred in their own journeys. Many have done these trips, but few have written a book about them, and very few certainly could have written so readable a book.

C. H. D. RYDER.

IN HIMALAYAN TIBET. By A. Reeve Heber and Kathleen M. Heber. Seeley, Service and Co., Ltd. 21s.

There can be little doubt that of all the qualifications likely to be useful to a traveller in a strange country—certainly in a backward one, to use the phrase of to-day—that of a surgeon and doctor of medicine probably ranks first. Owing to the intimate nature of his dealings with the natives, he is able to acquire a first-hand knowledge of their mentality which is often denied to the ordinary traveller. This applies particularly to those engaged in mission work, and may account for the success of medical missions in foreign parts. Dr. Heber and his wife have written an account of Ladakh and its people, which they describe as touching only the fringe of all there is to be known of the natives. The book

is based on the experience of a twelve years' residence in the country, and in this respect it compares favourably with the efforts of some travellers who, on the strength of a short trip, rush into print with great confidence.

The historical sketch given at the beginning is one of the weak features of the book. It is a pity that the authors did not see fit to make their account fuller and more lucid, as it does not give a good chronological idea of events to anyone unfamiliar with this part of the world. The authors claim to omit, from the purely travel point of view, a detailed account of the journey from Srinagar to Leh on the ground that it has been described by so many travellers. In spite of this, however, thirty pages of the book are taken up with this part of their journey. Of more interest perhaps to the traveller will be the accounts of two trips rather off the beaten track. One of these was taken from Ladakh through Zaskar to Lahoul, and back by way of the plains of India. The small province of Zaskar consists of but seven villages, which were presented to a former king in reward for assistance given to Zorowar, the Dogra general, on his way through to the conquest of Ladakh.

The most interesting journey described is one made from Leh by Dr. Heber, accompanying the representatives of the British and Kashmir Governments. They went through Pohrang over the Kiula Pass to Drogpo to meet an official styled the "Gaspon," who was to act on behalf of His Holiness the Dalai Lama at Lhasa. A dispute had arisen concerning a Ladakhi who had settled in Tibet proper, married and grown rich. The Tibetan Inland Revenue had then come down on him, asserting that he had become liable to Tibetan taxation. Thereupon the man crossed the border into Ladakh, followed by the Dalai Lama's people, who arrested him and brought him back. The Ladakhi then appealed to the Kashmir authorities and later to the British Government. The Tibetans at first claimed that the spot from which they had taken the Ladakhi was on their side of the border, but this was not correct. Finally, the conference broke up without any agreement being reached, the usual exchange of presents terminating the proceedings.

"In Himalayan Tibet" contains chapters on a great variety of subjects, such as professions and industries, manners and customs, domesticities, sports and pastimes, surgical work amongst the natives, monasteries, rajahs, demon dances, and the mystery play at Hemis. It may be recalled that the subtitle of Sir J. E. Frazer's "The Golden Bough" was "a Study in Magic and Religion," and much of what the authors relate shows the intimate connection between the two in Ladakh. As is well known, the soothsayer plays an important part in the everyday life of the natives, and the Lamas derive a substantial revenue from this source.

The general reader will find a large amount of most interesting matter, which, unfortunately, it is difficult to appreciate, as each chapter is a mass of facts jumbled together and hurled at the reader. The style of the book is very heavy, and often one finds a paragraph over two pages long. The index is poor—in fact, practically useless—as, for instance, the important city Leh is omitted altogether. The many photographs are not striking, but the map at the end of the book is good. The authors have spent over twelve years in Ladakh, but surely this affords no reason for the use of an extraordinary method of spelling place-names, which is entirely their own and is very annoying. The Survey of India is the authority on such a subject, and one wonders why travellers have apparently such rooted objections to using their method.

B. K. F.

ARABIC LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION. By H. R. Gibb. London. Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1926.

This useful little book is a marvel of condensation. In a small volume of some 37,000 or 38,000 words Mr. Gibb gives us not only an easily intelligible account of the structure and genius of the Arabic language, but a complete, though necessarily cursory, survey of the vast body of literature produced in the course of thirteen centuries by writers on grammar, philology, *belles lettres*, history, poetry, theology, mysticism, law, philosophy, logic, physics, medicine, mathematics, astronomy, geography, navigation, astrology, and alchemy. He describes the birth of Arabic literature in the love songs of the Bedawin of the desert, and its spread, with the religion of which it became the expression, and with which, in its later developments, it was sometimes at variance, into Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, Transoxiana, Egypt, North-West Africa, Spain, Sicily, and India. He traces the effects of foreign influence, of Greek science and philosophy, Syrian mysticism, and Persian intellectualism on the literature which originated with the pre-Islamic poets and the *Qur'ân*, and briefly, but lucidly, discusses the principal religious movements in Islam—the clash between orthodoxy and rationalism, the Shi'a schism with its offshoot, the sect of the Isma'îlis, and that sect's odious offspring, the secret society of the Assassins; and the dual development of Sufism, in one direction as a system striving to reconcile the mystic with the orthodox life, and in the other wandering into pantheism and antinomianism.

The slight sketches of the development of strophic verse in Spain, and its influence on Romance poetry, and of the enlightened policy of the Norman rulers of Sicily in an age when toleration was liable to be confounded with heterodoxy, are suggestive, and will probably appeal more strongly than any other part of the book to the ordinary Western reader.

Mr. Gibb's work merits high praise. Not only will it provide the young student with a sound foundation for the study of Arabic literature, but it will be found by the more mature scholar invaluable as a guide and handbook.

The author's style is clear and perspicuous, a desideratum in so condensed a work, but one unfamiliar word appears on page 98, where a court poet is commended for the absence of "flunkery" from his works; but perhaps this is a portmanteau word, compounded of "flummery" and "flunkeyism."

WOLSELEY HAIG.

LOGHAT EL-ARAB, a monthly literary, scientific, and historical review, published by the Carmelite Fathers of Mesopotamia at Baghdad.

Of this useful publication, now in the fourth year of its existence, we have received four numbers, containing, besides articles chiefly of local interest, such as those on the topography of Iraq and the history of the press in Iraq and of the press of the Dominican Fathers at Mausil, others of more general interest on history and philology, with reviews of books.

In No. 3 we are glad to discover a sympathetic notice of the late Miss Gertrude Bell, that accomplished and devoted scholar who gave of her best to Iraq.

The philological articles which call for special notice are those on neologisms, on the mispronunciation of Arabic by foreigners, and on the vulgar dialect of Iraq, which may be read with profit by all students of Arabic, but in the two last it is unfortunate that no use has been made of any system of phonetic transcription to represent modifications of the sounds assumed in literary Arabic, and that no attempt has been made to explain, or at least to represent, the accentuation and its effect on the vocalization. In this aspect it may be

said that the work is good so far as it goes, but falls short of modern scientific methods.

The literary and historical articles are interesting and will repay study, and the review is a worthy contribution to the literature of modern Arabic.

WOLSELEY HAIG.

THE MIDDLE EAST. By Major E. W. Polson Newman. 10" x 6". Pp. xv + 278, Appendices I-VI.; fifty-nine illustrations and three maps. London: Geoffrey Bles. 25s. net.

Although Trans-Jordania, 'Iraq, and Persia are included in the purview of his book, Major Polson Newman devotes his attention chiefly to a review of recent developments in Palestine and Syria.

In the chapters dealing with Palestine he expresses, with some force, his opinion of Zionism in practice, and it is probably this section of his book which will arouse the greatest interest. After describing the new colonies, their inhabitants, and the manner in which they are organized, he concludes that the economic position of the settlements is unsound and that they will be unable to retain permanently a progressive population without the continued financial assistance of European and American Jewry. This opinion does not strengthen some of the arguments put forward in support of the policy which led to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. In his introductory chapter the writer refers to "the obvious advantages of covering the Suez Canal by an outpost territory, in which important elements of the population would not only be bound to her (Great Britain) by every interest but would command the support of world Jewry," adding the remarks that "the Declaration certainly rallied world Jewry, as a whole, to the side of the Entente," and that "in the future Jewish support may exceed its value in the past."

It is generally admitted that Great Britain had no alternative to accepting some degree of responsibility for the future of Palestine; but opinions will differ as to whether the Balfour Declaration was a necessary corollary to British suzerainty or to a decision that a modicum of support should be given to Zionist ambitions; and comparatively few will agree that the Declaration has assisted in the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the neighbourhood of the Suez Canal. However this may be, the Declaration is a *fait accompli*, not to be ignored, and, on the other hand, our pledges to the Arabs must be observed. In depicting the manner in which we have attempted to carry out these obligations, Major Polson Newman has, on the whole, observed impartiality, but he shows a tendency to accept the Arab *intelligentsia* of Palestine at their own valuation as the representatives of Arab opinion in general, and his readers will detect an inclination to attribute pro-Zionist leanings to successive British Governments and to the Palestine Administration. His account of the incidents attending Lord Balfour's visit to Palestine and Damascus is of interest, and not without touches of humour and of pathos. It should be read by those who advocate the innovation of lightning tours by Cabinet Ministers as a satisfactory departure from the practice of placing confidence in "the man on the spot."

To the chapters dealing with Syria some local colour is given by the writer's description of his experiences there, but, taken as a whole, this part of the book will not add considerably to the knowledge of those who have followed the reports of recent events in the more reputable English journals. It is impossible to disagree with the criticisms of General Sarraïl, and the reference to the Bureau des Renseignements (which we should designate the Political Department) as "a glaring example of administrative inefficiency" cannot be con-

sidered an overstatement, especially as regards the linguistic qualifications of its personnel.

Referring to the spread of the insurrection from the Jabal Druze to the Moslem districts nearer Damascus, the writer says: "That . . . antagonism to European influence existed seemed to be beyond doubt, but it appeared more likely that the Druze insurrection with its results was being exploited in the interests of Pan-Islam than that Pan-Islam was the cause of the turmoil in Syria." It appears that the ambiguous expression "Pan-Islam" should be here interpreted as meaning the craving of the more advanced Moslem-Syrians for a preponderating share in the administration of their country. The writer suggests that tranquillity can be restored only by an attempt to meet the demands of the Syrian Nationalist Party, which he calls, not altogether accurately, "the demands of the Syrian people." It is possible that concessions to these demands would go some way to remove the difficulties by which France is now confronted, although it may be argued that the Nationalists would probably take whatever may be offered them and immediately ask for more, since their desire is for nothing less than the unattainable prize of complete independence. It may be observed, however, in this connection that insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that the Moslems who took the field against the French Army of the Levant were not the Syrian Nationalist leaders themselves, but the naturally turbulent tribal and settled inhabitants of a region where the benefits of a stable government have not, as yet, made themselves felt. General Sarraill's inability to stamp out the Druze outbreak as soon as it showed itself offered these elements an irresistible opportunity for indulging in their time-honoured customs, which, there can be but little doubt, would have been seized without such encouragement as, on this occasion, was received from the extremists of the towns. A measure of autonomy for Syria may lessen the grievances of the educated and partially educated classes, but it will not remove the potential source of disorder which exists in the presence of a considerable population that is mobile, well armed and elusive, and ready to lend itself to intrigues against constituted authority, whether European or indigenous. The wilder inhabitants of Syria will not become peaceful and useful members of society before their material prosperity has reached a state that renders the preservation of tranquillity conformable to their own interests. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the Mandatory Power will not make the mistake of adopting what appears, at the moment, to be the line of least resistance by establishing a regime which might prejudice the economic development of the country. The internal security of Syria depends as much upon improvements in communications and agriculture, and satisfactory trade in the towns, as upon the attitude of the politically minded minority.

The chapters dealing with Iraq and Persia appear to have been written to express the point of view of one whose personal acquaintance with those countries has been limited to brief visits to Baghdad and Tehran. The writer was in Baghdad when the report of the Iraq Boundary Commission was received there, but he does not give his opinion of the merits of that document. This is, perhaps, to be regretted. It is in Asia, rather than in Europe, that British interests are most liable to conflict with the aspirations of other countries, and the Iraq frontier dispute is the only international controversy of first-rate importance which the British Government has, up to the present, submitted to the arbitrament of the League of Nations. A survey of the manner in which the League dealt with this dispute would serve, therefore, as a useful means of judging whether we can rely on the League for the maintenance of peace.

Major Polson Newman expresses himself with considerable optimism in regard to Persia's prospects for the future. It is not easy to share this view, much though we may hope that he will be justified by future events. He gives considerable prominence to the question of opium cultivation, but makes no mention of the vital problem of Persia's relations with the Soviets and their effect upon her political and economic stability. He also avoids any reference to the attitude of the tribes and outlying districts towards Persia's new form of government.

"The Middle East" is well illustrated and contains useful appendices. It is intended, no doubt, for those who are unfamiliar with the complex problems of that region, as an introduction to further study. It will be much appreciated.

A. L. R.

CEDARS, SAINTS AND SINNERS IN SYRIA. E. S. Stevens. Hurst and Blackett, Ltd. 1926. 21s. net.

"Good wine," says the proverb, "needs no bush," and this book, quite the best that Mrs. Drower has yet published, does not, as the title suggests, require "apt alliteration's artful aid" to ensure a ready sale and wide circle of readers. Admirably illustrated and indexed, it needs only a good map to take its place in the first rank of travel literature, for its range is as wide as the author's sympathies, themselves almost wholly free from sentimentalism, idealism, and other dangerous "isms" which have played so large a part in recent years in bringing Syria to its present plight. Nowhere are false gods more generally worshipped by politicians than in Syria, but Mrs. Drower will have none of them (*vide* pp. 269 *et seq.*). In no book on Syria that the present reviewer can recall is the historical and racial background of current events better presented to the lay reader. Studied in conjunction with the Syrian chapters of Major Polson Newman's recent work on the Middle East, this book may well serve as a guide not only to travellers but to students of foreign affairs generally. Her observations on French administration are at once sympathetic and discerning; she has not failed to notice the very general ignorance of Arabic displayed by French civil and military officers, and to compare it with the fluency of almost all European officials in Iraq in the same tongue. The excuse offered by a French official that his compatriots are bad linguists may be true—observations in many lands tend to show that in this respect the Englishman abroad outshines all other Western nations—but it does little credit to their administration.

Space does not permit of criticism on points of detail of a book which is full of challenging and stimulating ideas, but the statement (p. 69) that the Arab does not destroy a foundered camel lest he waste powder and shot is surely incorrect. Camels are killed for food by a knife thrust into the jugular vein at the base of the neck—nothing is easier than to destroy an abandoned beast thus. But it is not done, in Islamic countries, because such action is regarded universally as wrong. The present reviewer has frequently raised the point with Arabs and Persians alike, noticing with what disapproval they saw him kill beasts in such case. "It is not right," said one man, "to take life except for man's needs, though there be careless folk who kill for sport. Life is the gift of God and is precious to the liver, be he man or beast; would you put a man out of his pain by killing him, or let him kill himself, even though you loved him dearly and though he must soon die, unless to save his honour from his enemies?" Such beliefs may be wrong-headed, but they are deeply ingrained, and until we in the West can answer the old man's question in the affirmative we shall be well advised to cast no stone.

Mrs. Drower's praise of the American University at Beirut is unstinted, but must not be allowed to blind the reader to the deduction, which may be quite legitimately drawn from a study of her book as a whole, that the fostering of American ideals, whatever they may be, and the English tongue, in competition with the culture and language of France, in a country economically and culturally wholly dissimilar to the U.S.A., has done more harm than good. The *genius loci* is a goddess whom Mrs. Drower has found and done something to reveal; she has perhaps influenced the Jesuit priests who have laboured so long and so devotedly in Syria; but she will withhold her co-operation from the followers of Abraham Lincoln, charm they never so wisely.

A. T. W.

THE PEOPLE OF ARARAT. By Joseph Burt, F.R.G.S. The Hogarth Press. 8s. 6d.

This little book has been produced under the auspices of the Armenian Committee of the Society of Friends. Bishop Gore contributes a prefatory note. The first part of the book comprises a brief description of the geography of Armenia and a short history of the Armenian people down to our own times. In the latter chapters the author discusses the problem of repatriating the scattered remnants of this unfortunate race, and ends with an appeal to the Western Powers to provide the League of Nations with the money required to carry out the work. The interesting, though tangled and blood-stained, history of this ancient race stretches back into the mists of antiquity, but it is only in comparatively recent times that the question of Armenia and the other Christian minorities in the Turkish Empire has become such an urgent problem for the Powers of Europe.

In February, 1856, the celebrated Imperial Edict, or Hatti-Houmayioun, was promulgated by the Porte. This has been called the charter of the liberties and rights of the Christian minorities, and was due to the influence and perseverance of our Ambassador in Constantinople, Stratford Canning. This Edict was embodied in the Treaty of Paris in March, 1856. This Treaty, as the author states, showed "an increased distrust of the Turk's fitness to govern," but by pledging themselves not to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey the signatory Powers effectually deprived themselves of the power to enforce the terms of the Hatti-Houmayioun. The result was it became a dead letter. Lord Stratford had insisted on the necessity of the Powers reserving the right to interfere to enforce the reform. He saw what would be the result of the omission, and declared he would rather have cut off his right hand than signed the Treaty. In writing to a friend he expressed the opinion "that despair on their (the Christians) side and fear on that of the Turks would engender the bitterest animosity between them, and not improbably bring on a deadly struggle before long." Subsequent events showed that he was right. Thus was the opportunity lost. The author sketches the history of the subsequent efforts of the Powers to enforce reform, but in the meantime the condition of the Christian minorities had become more serious, while the delicate European situation prevented the Powers from taking decisive and united action. How difficult the problem was is shown in the interesting chapters on the Eastern Question in Lady Gwendolen Cecil's "Life of Lord Salisbury."

The misery and discontent of the Armenians was increased in the reign of Abdul Hamid, more especially through the arming of the Kurds and their conversion into a national militia or Hamidyeh. Harassed by the Turks on one side and the Kurds on the other, unable to defend themselves and their families, as they were forbidden to carry arms, ground down by an oppressive

system of government and a ruinous taxation, the Armenians lived in a continual state of dread and destitution. Even in the provinces of Russian Armenia they were not much better off, as there they came under the ban of the Orthodox Church. Lynch in his classic work on Armenia shows the state of oppression under which they lived under Russian rule.

Later, under the Young Turks their lot was no better, while the massacres and deportations during and after the Great War are fresh in the memory of all. As the author states in his Introduction, the Armenian problem is a difficult one. It has not been rendered easier in the past by the misguided efforts of their friends. Proposals to found an Armenian Empire without a clear idea of how or where that empire was to be formed could only end in failure. Passionate appeals to sentiment and vilification of the Turk, such as was indulged in during Gladstone's Bulgarian atrocity campaign, only resulted in making the Armenian position worse. The regeneration of the Turk and the amelioration of the lot of the Christian minorities was bound to be a work of time, and the problem could not be solved by heroic measures. The long efforts of the Western Powers to assist the Armenian cause have ended in nothing but the virtual extinction of the race. The reviewer, who had considerable experience of these people while on the Repatriation Staff in Iraq, agrees with the author that the disappearance of the Armenians would be a loss to the world. They have serious defects, such as vanity, acquisitiveness, love of intrigue, jealousy, and a fatal propensity to quarrel among themselves, which has been a cause of their undoing. On the other hand they are a hardy and intelligent people, as skilled in finance as in the arts and crafts, sober and industrious. With their love of education and capacity for assimilating Western civilization they formed a valuable link in Turkey between the East and the West. The reviewer is of opinion that given the opportunity to develop in security on their own lines the Armenians would prove to be the equal of any people now inhabiting the Near or Middle East. With the expulsion of the Greeks the Turks can now boast that they have rid Asia Minor of the Christian population. But will it profit them? Assuredly not. Ximenez, who knew the country intimately during the Great War, paid a visit to Anatolia just after the Greek debacle of 1922. In his book recently published, "Asia Minor in Ruins," he describes the devastation that has been caused, and states his opinion that the loss of the Greek population has been an irreparable disaster for the Turks, and has put the country back 500 years. The same observation might apply to the disappearance of the Armenians. The reviewer hopes that Mr. Burt's book will assist in procuring the financial assistance so urgently required to alleviate the present misfortunes of "The People of Ararat."

F. F. R.

THE RIDDLE OF THE TSANGPO GORGES. By F. Kingdon-Ward, F.R.G.S.
Map and illustrations. London: Edward Arnold. 21s.

Captain Kingdon-Ward's latest book is in many ways the most interesting that he has yet given us. He and Lord Cawdor were fortunate enough to obtain permission from the Tibetan Government to travel extensively in what is botanically the most interesting portion of that country, and probably of the unknown world. In South-Eastern Tibet the flora of Western China meets and mingles with that of the Himalaya in a climate which approaches sufficiently near to that of Great Britain to render it probable that plants collected there could be introduced and acclimatised to beautify our gardens at home. Tibetan religious scruples precluded the collection of the fauna of the country, but, apart from the collection of plants, several points of great geographical interest were

elucidated. The result is this book, a pleasing blend of scientific information and well-told incident.

The journey through Calcutta, Darjeeling, and Sikkim to Gyantse is dealt with in a very few pages. The road to Gyantse has been travelled and described by many, and the botany of Sikkim revealed in detail by Sir Joseph Hooker in his classic "Himalayan Journals." It was not until they had travelled some distance beyond Gyantse that the travellers broke new ground.

Their journey up to Tsetang called for little notice, though a portion of it had not been previously explored. The next section of their journey was down the Tsangpo valley to Tsela Dzong. For about twenty-five miles between Trap and Dzam and for a shorter distance near Nang Dzong, the river flows through gorges, though the drop in the level of the river is not very great in either case. The author and his companion did not follow the river through these gorges, where there must be some remarkable rapids, especially in the uppermost of these two stretches. They were, however, able to make the necessary diversion in one case over unexplored country.

Up to Tsela Dzong the travellers were on the high and dry Tibetan plateau. The plants of this part of Tibet are useless for horticultural purposes in Great Britain, because, as the author explains, they require an arctic or subarctic climate. It was only after reaching the neighbourhood of Tsela Dzong, where the monsoon rains penetrate and give the amount of moisture necessary for the more suitable and desirable plants, that Captain Kingdon-Ward was able to commence collecting in earnest. After moving to the neighbourhood of the Temo La, primulas, meconopsis, and rhododendrons were found in wonderful profusion and of the most beautiful species. Captain Kingdon-Ward's description of these and of his enthusiasm and excitement in obtaining new and beautiful forms is well communicated to the reader. The seed collector has many enemies; autumn snow may cover the plants he had marked when in flower in the spring; grubs may eat the seed; the plants may fail to set seed for various reasons which the author explains. Then there are the ordinary risks of the journey to Europe through different ranges of climate; but great care and attention to detail which comes from long experience resulted in only two per cent. of his collection failing to germinate, and some of these will probably germinate in time. There were, however, some disappointments, and he failed to obtain unquestionable seed of one of his most striking finds, the "ivory poppy"; there is a possibility that some seed of this may have been collected unwittingly, and if so it may flower next year in some fortunate garden.

All this was not done without very strenuous work and great hardship. Few of the people who will eventually grow the plants which Captain Kingdon-Ward has introduced will realize the dangers and troubles entailed in obtaining the seeds for the first time from their inaccessible habitat.

At the end of June the party left the neighbourhood of the Temo La and moved to the Doshong La, where marvellous rhododendrons predominated, and several startling botanical discoveries were made. During a later trip in October to collect seeds of plants which had been noted in flower, much hardship in the snow was encountered. The collection of rhododendron seed is shown to be very difficult, as the time between the ripening of the seed and the heavy snowfall is so short. Captain Kingdon-Ward's previous journeys in a like quest have accumulated knowledge which must have been invaluable.

In August a journey was made towards the North-West. Captain Kingdon-Ward and Lord Cawdor were the first Europeans to visit the beautiful lake, the Pasum Tso, and there is a charming photograph of the island monastery in the lake. In the first week of September they were again in the dry plateau land of

Tibet for a few days, and there they touched the main Lhasa-China road, and connected up with the routes of many previous travellers, and cleared up some geographical questions connected with the watershed between the Tsangpo and the Salween.

In the middle of November the travellers started on what was geographically the most important part of their journey in their attempt to follow right down the gorge of the Tsangpo, and to fill in the fifty-mile gap which was unknown. They succeeded in following some miles down the river below the portion which had been previously explored, after which they were obliged to leave the bed of the river and to cross a spur, descending which they again struck the river at the village of Payi, about midway in the unexplored fifty-mile gap.

They crossed the Tsangpo by a rope bridge and, after climbing a high spur, descended to the junction of the Po-Tsangpo with the Tsangpo; from here again, after surmounting almost superhuman difficulties, they managed to reach the river again some miles up-stream, from which point they were able to see a considerable way up-stream towards where they had been obliged to leave the river some days previously, and must have been able to recognize points seen from there.

They discovered waterfalls about 40 feet high—a very great height for a river of this enormous size. There remains a distance of about five miles at this point which they did not actually see, and it is necessary to postulate a fall of 182 feet per mile to account for the drop in the river level on this stretch. This is an enormous drop for such a river, and is greater than any drop which was measured over such a long distance. They have proved that enormous falls do not exist; but the detailed survey, with altitudes of the still unknown portions of the river, still leaves a very interesting piece of exploration to be done. The unexplored portion of the river between Payi visited by Captain Kingdon-Ward and Lord Cawdor, and Lagung, some twenty miles down-stream, cannot have any great falls. The drop in the river level can be accounted for by a steady fall of about 35 feet a mile.

It would have made this very interesting portion of their exploration clearer if the map had been on a larger scale than 1:500,000. On this scale several of the places mentioned in the narrative and several important altitudes could not be shown.

From the vicinity of the falls the party returned to the country near the Pasum Tso, and were prevented from travelling again over the passes at the head of the Drukla Chu by snow; so, after taking latitudes at important places, they returned, and eventually, on January 18, 1925, they reached the Lhasa-China Road at Gyamda, a place which they had previously visited on September 2. From now on they were undertaking that most unpleasant operation, a winter journey across the Tibetan plateau. The author's graphic descriptions of terrific winds carrying stinging dust, with temperatures below zero, recall to some the bitter months spent at Tuna with Sir Francis Young-husband's Mission in January and February, 1904. The joy and relief with which they eventually reached trees and subtropical vegetation gives the reader a personal sense of relief from the hardships of the plateau in winter. A journey down the wooded Nyamjang valley and through a portion of Bhutan brought the party to the railway in Assam, and their long journey was over.

Apart from the account of the journey and of its botanical results, there are explanations of the causes of climate and vegetation, with scientific explanations of the uncertainty of seed production. Anyone attempting to collect seed in any part of the world should certainly read this book.

There are two chapters by Lord Cawdor, who describes the manner of living,

the architecture, crops, clothes, utensils, trade, etc., of the people among whom he travelled. There are also some useful notes on migration of the people. He has a remarkable photograph of two wooden figures seen in Tibet which seem to be quite unlike anything Tibetan.

There are one or two important misprints. On p. 65 the reference to the Sang La is hard to follow unless this is a misprint for Tang La. No Sang La appears on the map.

Takin are described as weighing between 600 and 700 pounds and standing 2 feet high. This is clearly a misprint. The height of a big Takin is about $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet.

F. M. B.

CENTRAL ASIATIC EXPEDITIONS OF THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ROY CHAPMAN ANDREWS. Preliminary Contributions in Geology, Palæontology, and Zoology, 1918-1925. Vol. I, Nos. 1-63. June, 1926.

Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews has presented the Society with a copy of this work, which consists of sixty-three papers by seventeen authors, giving the preliminary results of the Central Asiatic expeditions under his leadership. Of these papers, twenty-six deal with new mammals, birds, reptiles, and fishes; six are devoted to geology; and thirty-one describe the fossils (mostly mammals and reptiles) from the Mesozoic and Cainozoic rocks.

There are much older rocks than this in Mongolia, but they have yielded no fossils, if ever they contained any. In the early part of the Mesozoic Era those older rocks were folded and crumpled into chains of mountains. These were planed down by water, wind, and frost; and then the more or less level surface thus formed was again raised and bent in such fashion as to produce a shallow basin with an area estimated at a million square miles. It was in this basin that there were laid down those rocks that have yielded fossils to the explorers from the American Museum of Natural History.

The first rocks thus formed in this Mongolian basin were black muds spread out in thin layers and containing such fishes and insects as inhabit fresh water. It is clear that there were broad shallow lakes and swamps in which the great water-loving dinosaurs were at home. Later rocks were largely composed of wind-blown sand and indicate arid conditions. In those deserts lived the land dinosaurs, which laid their eggs in the sand, and were sometimes overwhelmed by the sand-drifts.

As conditions changed, the great reptiles disappeared, and in the Cainozoic Era their place was taken by mammals. The country was diversified, with variable rainfall, and with rivers and vegetation alternating with desert tracts. The mammals were correspondingly various: small burrowers for the deserts, horned titanotheres for the grassy plains, and the strange giraffe-like rhinoceros — *Baluchitherium* — for the wooded country. The remains of this — one of the largest beasts that ever trod the earth — may be seen in the Geological Department at the Natural History Museum. There also are placed plaster-casts of the dinosaur eggs and nest, the carnivorous reptile *Andrewsarchus* (called after leader Andrews), the egg-laying *Protoceratops*, and others.

This volume is the first fruit of the organized exploration of an almost virgin area undertaken by highly competent authorities under unique conditions of time and of the material resources at their disposal. The result is worthy of Dr. Andrews and his distinguished colleagues.

THE TRAVELS OF MARCO POLO THE VENETIAN. With an Introduction by John Masfield. Messrs. J. M. Dent and Sons. 7s. 6d.

The announcement of an edition of the travels of Marco Polo with an Introduction by John Masfield raised hopes that a step forward had been taken, and a solution found for some of the difficulties that still exist in the elucidation of the narrative of the illustrious Venetian. During the last generation remote countries, such as Persia and the Pamirs, have been explored by travellers deeply interested in tracing Marco's route, so that the position is very different to what it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and I hoped that the edition would have used the new information that is available.

I will frankly own that I was bitterly disappointed when, on examining Messrs. Dent's publication, I found that the text was a reprint of Marsden's translation, published together with his notes, the latter considerably curtailed, but otherwise unaltered.

To give an example the thirteenth and following chapters, the country between Yezd, Kerman, and Bandar Abbas has been surveyed, and the routes followed by Marco Polo have been traced. Yet, on p. 58, note 1, we read that "Pottinger's map is the most modern we possess." That explorer, of course, travelled more than a century ago! Again, to turn to chapter xxix., the Pamirs have been explored, and many Englishmen, myself among the number, have shot the great sheep of Marco Polo, the *ovis poli*. Consequently the note on p. 91 in which the great ram is believed to be a goat is utterly out of date and misleading; the same remark applies to many others.

In view of the above facts I cannot recommend this edition to members of the Central Asian Society.

P. M. S.

LIST OF MEMBERS ELECTED IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER.

The Right Hon. Lord Irwin, G.M.S.I., etc., Viceroy of India.
 Amps, L. W., A.M.I.C.E.
 Baird, Colonel H. B. D., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.
 Barker, Captain A. T., M.C.
 Battye, Major T. H., 3rd Gurkha Rifles, I.A.
 Beckett, Captain C. T., Royal Artillery.
 Bell Kingsley, Major H. E. W., D.S.O., 4th Gurkha Rifles.
 Boileau, Colonel G. H., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.
 Brindley, Captain W. W., M.B.E., 4/10 Baluch Regt., I.A.
 Brock, Lieut.-Colonel B. de L., M.C., O.C. 4/10 Baluch Regt., I.A.
 Brown, Captain George, 2/14 Punjab Regt., I.A., attd. South
 Waziristan Scouts.
 Brown, Captain V. C., D.S.C., Royal Marines.
 Bryant, Lieut. A. D., 9th Queen's Royal Lancers.
 Burney, Lieut.-Colonel G. T., The Gordon Highlanders.
 Charvet, G. C. G.
 Clarke, J. C.
 Clay, A. S.
 Clayton, Colonel E. R., C.M.G., D.S.O.
 Coke, Richard.

Constable, Captain J. H., R.A.
 Cox, Dr. R. J. H.
 Crawley, Colonel Archer.
 Deedes, Major R. B., O.B.E., M.C.
 Dodd, Major P. C. R., D.S.O.
 Filippi, Sir Filippo di, K.C.I.E., etc.
 Foweraker, Lieut. H. A.
 Glubb, Captain J. B., O.B.E., M.C.
 Goschen, Colonel A. A., D.S.O.
 Greene, Colonel A. C., R.G.A.
 Hackett, Captain T. W. D., M.C., R.A., Sudan Defence Force.
 Heathcote, Lady.
 Holland, Lieut.-Colonel R. T., D.S.O., M.C., R.A.
 Ikbal Ali Shah, Sirdar.
 Jeffries, J. M. N.
 Jones, Captain W. H. C., D.S.O., 4/10 Baluch Regt.
 Jordan, Stanley.
 Keble, Captain T. H.
 Kirkpatrick, W.
 Livingstone, Mrs.
 MacCormack, Colonel D. W.
 McLeod, Captain N., M.C., D.C.M., The Seaforth Highlanders.
 Massy, Lieut.-Colonel H. R. S., D.S.O., M.C., R.A.
 Mellor, Captain F. H., Northern Nigerian Police.
 Nariman, G. K.
 Nisbet, Colonel T., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.
 Northcroft, E. G. D.
 Partridge, The Rev. W. L.
 Randolph, John.
 Robertson, Captain H. L. C., 2/15 Punjab Regt.
 Schopflacher, Mrs.
 Sherriff, Lieut. Geoffrey, Royal Artillery.
 Simpson, Captain G. O., 16th Cavalry, I.A.
 Smith, Captain C. C. H.
 Waters, Lieut. J. R., R.A.
 Weatherbe, D'Arcy.
 Willis, Major-General E. H., C.B., C.M.G.
 Wilton, Sir Ernest, K.C.M.G.
 Wood, Miss M. M.

BOOK NOTICES

Library Table.—The Council wish to thank Dr. Andrews for the Reports of the American Museum of Natural History's Central Asiatic Expedition, Vol. I., which contains articles and notes by Professor Osborn, W. Granger, W. K. Gregory, and others, including the leader of the expedition; and Mr. Mackenzie for Ainsworth's "Travels in Asia Minor," both of which are very welcome additions to the library.

The following books have been received for review :

- "The Vanished Empire," by Putnam Weale. 9" x 6". 379 pp. Illustrations. (London: Messrs. Macmillan. 15s.)
- "The Changing East," by J. A. Spender. 9" x 5½". 256 pp. (London: Cassell. 10s. 6d.)
- "Chinese Central Asia," by C. P. Skrine, I.C.S. Illustrations and map. (London: Methuen and Co. 21s.)
- "Among the Karakorum Glaciers," by Jenny Viesser Hooft. Map and illustrations. (London: Edwin Arnold. 21s.)
- "Beyond the Khyber Pass," by Lowell Thomas. 9" x 6". xiii + 223 pp. 116 illustrations. (London: Messrs. Hutchinson. 18s.)
- "An Unexplored Pass," by Captain B. K. Featherstone, with a Foreword by Brig.-General the Hon. C. G. Bruce, C.B. 9½" x 6½". 293 pp. Map and 25 illustrations. (London: Messrs. Hutchinson. 25s.)
- "The Riddle of the Tsangpo Gorges," by Captain F. Kingdon Ward. 6" x 9". viii + 328 pp. Map and illustrations. (London: Edwin Arnold. 21s.)
- "Travels of Marco Polo," with an Introduction by John Masfeld 8" x 5½". xv + 461 pp. 11 illustrations. (London: Dent. 7s. 6d.)
- "Arabic Literature," by H. A. R. Gibb. 7½" x 5". 128 pp. (Oxford University Press. 2s. 6d.)
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- "The Middle East," by Major Polson Newman. 10" x 6½". xv + 278 pp. 6 appendices, 59 illustrations, and 3 maps. (London: G. Eves. 25s.)
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PART II.

CONTENTS.

NOTICES.

SYRIA. By H. CHARLES WOODS.

THE ITALIAN RED SEA COLONIES. By COMMANDER
LUIGI VILLARI.

FERMENTS IN THE WORLD OF ISLAM. By SIRDAR
IKBAL ALI SHAH.

THE POSITION IN CHINA. By E. M. GULL.

THE KARA-KORAM HIMALAYAS. By CAPTAIN B. K.
FEATHERSTONE.

PERSIAN AFFAIRS.

NOTES ON THE MOTOR ROUTE TO INDIA.

REVIEWS:

IN CHINA. DER KAMPF UM ASIEN. THE DARVISHES. THE AO
NAGAS. LEAVES FROM A VICE-ROY'S NOTEBOOK. BEYOND THE
KHYBER PASS. MEMOIRS OF HALIDÉ EDIB. ANCIENT CITIES OF
IRAQ. THE HIMALAYAN LETTERS OF GYPSY DAVY AND LADY BA.
LAND PROBLEMS IN PALESTINE.

NOTES:

THE NEJD BOUNDARY. L'INQUIÉTUDE DE L'ORIENT (VII): EN
AFGHANISTAN. ITALIAN EXPANSION IN THE RED SEA. THE SCHOOL
OF ORIENTAL STUDIES.

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NOTICES

MEMBERS are asked to send any change of address to the Secretary and to notify the office as soon as possible if they do not receive lecture cards and JOURNALS.

JOURNALS have been returned by the Post-Office for Bassett Digby, Esq., and Miss Nina Mylne.

The Council wish to thank Mr. Houston for an autograph letter of Mr. Wyman Bury's, written in 1916, which they were very glad to have for the Society.

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SYRIA*

THE situation in Syria is of the greatest importance to the British Empire because that country is located on our route, or on the flank of our route, to the East. Moreover, whilst a short stretch of the Baghdad Railway lies actually in French territory, a much longer section of that line forms the northern boundary of, and is therefore more or less commanded from, Syria. And then the zone under discussion is situated adjacent to the British mandated areas of Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Iraq, where the problems are in some ways the same as those existing in French territory. Lastly, Damascus, the largest town under the control of the French, is the centre of a Nationalist movement which has its influence not only in Syria, but in Egypt, Palestine and the Middle East generally.

The position of the French at the time of, and shortly after, their arrival was complicated by a variety of circumstances. They were unpopular with the Moslems and particularly with the Druzes on account of their attitude assumed towards and in connection with the Christians since the sixties of last century. The presence of the Emir Feisal (now King Feisal) at Damascus created widespread difficulties. Furthermore, French prestige suffered heavily as a result of the treaty made with the Turkish Nationalists in the autumn of 1921—a treaty under which a considerable area of Syrian territory was handed over to the Government of Angora. Finally, the facts that Syria of to-day is much smaller than the pre-war zone known by that name, and that Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan are now separate political units, have affected the prosperity of the people and therefore influenced them against the new state of things.

The mandated area is divided into four separate States—the Greater Lebanon, Syria, the Alaouites and the Djebel Druze. These States are practically linked together only by the persons of the High Commissioner and of his staff, and politically and administratively there is no such thing as Syria except in so far as the name applies to one of the four units under the French Mandate. With regard to the principles of Government, whereas the British in Palestine have not deputed any theoretical or real power to the inhabitants, the French

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held on Wednesday, December 1, 1926, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., Sir Michael O'Dwyer, presiding. Mr. H. Charles Woods delivered a lecture on Syria, of which lecture these notes form a synopsis.

have nominally delegated certain functions to the Syrians, whilst at the same time they have actually kept the real authority in their own hands. The French High Commissioner and the French army are thus in fact the Government of the whole mandated territory, but in most of the States there are native administrations, at the headquarters of which the High Commissioner is represented by a French Delegate, who is an all-important personage.

It has already been shown that the Mandate was established under great disadvantages, and it must always be remembered that the unrest and discontent which have developed in Syria during the last few years are due partly to questions over which the French had no control and partly to conditions for which they were in a measure responsible. In addition to the difficulties above enumerated, the immediately post-war British occupation complicated the situation, since that was a period of liberal expenditure, and since British troops of all ranks, being comparatively well paid, were in a position to be more extravagant than the French administrators and the French army. Moreover, Turkish intrigues have been constant, the Syrian Nationalists have been encouraged by the taste for self-government which they realized at Damascus during the régime of the Emir Feisal, and the highly desirable abolition of the favourable position enjoyed in Turkish times by the upper classes, usually known as the Effendis, has created serious opposition among these territorial leaders in Syria and in Palestine and set them free to agitate against the French and British Administrations.


The French were powerless to prevent such conditions being used to their disadvantage. But their policy has certainly been inconsistent, and whilst General Gouraud and General Weygand—especially the latter—performed their duties efficiently and secured the confidence of the people to a wide extent, the appointment and the régime of General Sarrail were disastrous. He antagonized the Christians by his anti-clericalism, and he offended the Moslems by his lack of consideration for their susceptibilities. In addition some of the French functionaries have tried to govern the country in a Colonial spirit, and certain of the local officials, many of whom have been Turks, have received their appointments rather on account of their sympathy for France than of the confidence which they enjoyed with the people. And then the introduction of a currency based upon the French franc, the value of which has enormously declined since that introduction, has brought about heavy losses for the Syrians, many of whom are shrewd business men, and this has reacted seriously against the prestige of the Mandatory Power. Finally, the enlargement of the pre-war autonomous Lebanon into the present Greater Lebanon State has done a great deal to increase the hostility of the Moslems and the Druzes against French authority.

These were the general reasons responsible for the situation in Syria immediately prior to the Jebel Druze outbreak in the summer of 1925. But there were other and particular causes of discontent in that State, which is the smallest of the units which make up the French mandate. The Druzes had been promised an autonomy, for which they probably were, and are, not fitted, and this autonomy was never properly and fully given. The French Governor, Captain Carbillet, appointed in 1923, did a good deal for the people and the country; but he could not speak the language, and was not popular with the people. When representatives of the Druzes, who are very jealous of their feudal customs, the abrogation of which they greatly fear, were sent to negotiate with General Sarraïl, the then High Commissioner either refused to see them or received them without the courtesy which is expected in the East. At the outbreak of the revolution in July, 1925, the French forces, which then perhaps numbered 14,000 to 15,000 all told, were too weak to deal with the situation, and the earlier defeats, particularly during the attempts to relieve Suseida, encouraged the insurrectionaries.

The events which took place in Damascus in October, 1925, and above all the bombardment of that city on the nineteenth of that month, converted what had been a Jebel Druze revolt into a Syrian national insurrection. The French became panic-stricken; tanks were sent through the streets, and the town was attacked by artillery and from the air. These lasted about twenty-four hours; there were serious casualties, and an area measuring roughly 300 yards square suffered severely. Opinions will always differ on the subject, but if it was a military necessity, as it probably was, to bombard the city, the authorities are seriously blameworthy for allowing the development of a situation leading to this necessity, for not issuing a definite ultimatum to the inhabitants beforehand, and for not warning the foreign communities in advance. After this, while General Sarraïl was removed from his office, fighting spread to a wide area of the mandated territory, and at one time the French were in real danger. However, reinforcements, which should have been sent in large numbers directly after the trouble began, gradually arrived, and with their presence the actual military situation became assured.

The period of M. de Jouvenel's High Commissionership, which lasted from December, 1925, until the late summer of the following year, was principally occupied by detached fighting and by peace negotiations which led to no tangible results. But His Excellency was faced with great difficulties, and if the confidence of the people in the French decreased rather than increased at this time, M. de Jouvenel worked loyally with the British authorities in the neighbouring areas. When his successor, M. Ponsot, arrived in October, 1926, he found a situation in which the country was under the military control of about

50,000 French troops, who could, and probably can, prevent anything except isolated outbreaks. The great question before the French Government, therefore, is whether this force shall be maintained at an expense which is already a heavy drain upon the exchequer, or whether serious concessions shall be made to the Syrians. The adoption of the latter alternative would necessitate an amnesty, in which the leaders would have to be included, and the granting of a wider autonomy at least to the State of Syria. Such an autonomy would certainly require French supervision, but if it were accompanied by



the establishment of a suitable native ruler at Damascus, it might prove a solution of a problem which has now become complicated in the extreme.

In conclusion, it must be said that, whatever have been the faults of the French, their difficulties have been enormous. The country under their Mandate may have been in a disturbed and an abnormal state for eighteen months, but prior to the outbreak of the revolt public security, justice, and general conditions were undoubtedly better than was ever the case in Turkish times. The Syrians are not fit to govern or defend themselves, and although they make special complaint against the

French, they would object equally, or almost equally, to any other Mandatory responsible for their affairs. The French were our allies during the war, their presence in Syria is decidedly advantageous to the British Empire, and it is better for us to understand their difficulties rather than to criticize them.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before the discussion begins I would like to make an apology on behalf of the Council both to the lecturer and to the audience for the shortcomings of the lantern operator. We have really placed Mr. Woods under great difficulties, but he contended with them manfully, and we are most grateful to him. But we are all sorry this should have happened. The remarks of the lecturer will provide a most fruitful field for discussion and criticism.

Sir ARNOLD WILSON: Mr. Chairman, I am sure we all feel grateful to Mr. Charles Woods for having given us such a dispassionate view of events in Syria. For me it was almost too impartial; I do not think we can usefully discuss even current history without a healthy bias, which our lecturer has done his best to exclude. Current history is a sequence of contingencies which may or may not be fortuitous; their interpretation depends in large measure on the tendencies of the historian, whose views lend the spice that aids digestion. I quite agree it is no use condemning French policy, because we have no constructive criticism to offer; their position in Syria to-day is the result of misreading and misunderstanding history and national sentiment. They thought the events of 1860 justified them in going to Syria as the redeemers of Syria. They turned out to be quite wrong. There is a Roman inscription, not official, but by a soldier, scrawled on a rock near Damascus, which may be freely translated, "The Syrians are a rotten crowd." (Laughter.) That was the opinion of the common soldier of Rome about A.D. 200, and I gather it is the opinion of the French soldier who to-day is the lineal descendant of his Roman predecessor. There is no sort of unity in Syria, and as far as we can see there never has been in all its long history from Old Testament days onwards. The unity of Syria might have been accomplished, as in a measure it was accomplished in Iraq, in the years succeeding the Armistice, by two or three years of intensive administration under economic pressure; but such administration as there has been has displayed separatist tendencies, and there has been no economic policy, with the result that Syria is still in practically the same condition politically as it was in Old Testament times. The Christians of the Greater Lebanon, the Moslems of the Greater Lebanon, the townspeople and tribes in and around Aleppo, Hama, Hama, and Alexandretta, the Druzes and Damascenes, all revel in separatist ambitions; they have a passionate desire to be left alone to go their own gait; and at least half of them by independence mean

liberty to control the affairs of their neighbours. The Druzes, with whom I have a considerable sympathy, having seen something of them and a good deal of people who resemble them, have lived from the remotest ages at the intermittent expense of their neighbours ; and to prevent them from doing so involves far more military and economic pressure than the French can bring to bear. The Christians have flourished exceedingly in Lebanon, partly under the tuition and tutelage of the Great Powers, who forced Turkey after the events of 1860 to give them certain privileges. Those privileges they have now lost, and it is not surprising they should resent the levelling tendencies of their redeemers.

I do not fully share Mr. Charles Woods's views as to the great work done by the American Mission at Beirut, and the Syrians themselves, looking at it from their own point of view, may well think they have done more harm than good. For U.S. citizens to start a College and to impart advanced views, made in the U.S.A., into Syria, whilst divorcing themselves from all responsibility for the inevitable result, is of very doubtful advantage to the country. You will recollect that when the question of the French Mandate was under discussion it was a U.S. citizen, Mr. Crane, who led the Commission whose activities raised hopes which the U.S. Senate had no intention of assisting to fruition. The Commission asked the people whom they would like as Mandatory. " Anyone would be better than the French," replied the majority. " Very well," in effect replied the League of Nations, " you shall have the French." Is it surprising that the Commission left a bitter feeling behind ? As to men like Shahbandar, whom I personally respect, it does not lie in the mouth of any European combatant in the Great War to criticize what Shahbandar has done in Syria in defence of his policy ; it does not become any of us to criticize what others have done in Syria ; we all have something to regret. As regards the bombardment of Damascus, it is a very real relief to see how little damage was done ; I was certainly under the impression that the area was far greater. It would have been better if photographs, such as Mr. Woods has shown us had been published in place of the panoramas which appeared in English newspapers immediately after, indicating that the bombardment had been far more extensive. I do not think we can possibly exonerate the French from full responsibility for the bombardment. I was not there myself, but I have had a good deal of first-hand information on the subject. To turn heavy guns on to the most ancient city in the world without notice, to kill at very short notice a thousand people or so, practically all of whom were innocent of any sort of offence, is to commit a crime against civilization which no amount of white-washing by the League of Nations can really wipe out. (Applause.) Not only foreign inhabitants, but the whole population should have had notice. It was a terrible mistake,

and I am convinced that had the French military authorities on the spot been under the full control of the French High Commissioner, and had he really realized the damage involved by letting loose the military arm, it would never have occurred. The fact that there is a French high official, neither soldier nor politician, in the employ of his country abroad is to me a novel thought. (Laughter.) Such men are not uncommon in the service of His Majesty abroad, but my own brief experience is that the French official abroad is generally one or the other.

Finally, if I have any views on Syria, they can be deduced from the map. Syria has no definite geographical boundaries on any side except the Mediterranean. It has neither racial, nor linguistic, nor commercial unity. It has few natural resources, and it has been a cockpit for a period of time that goes well back into Hittite times, if not before. The advice given by the prophet to Naaman to wash in Jordan was not taken because it was too simple and too obvious. He was a Syrian and a prominent soldier; the Syrian to-day will probably adopt the same attitude to any simple scheme for remedying the present state of affairs. The country is now divided into four or five different administrations, none of which have any natural boundaries; and I cannot believe that such a system is more than transitory. Sooner or later the French will be forced to unify the administration, to avoid any sort of communal legislation or communal authority, and revert to the single form of administration which is now enforced on the one hand in Turkey and on the other hand in Iraq and Palestine. In such a policy we may find peace. (Applause.)

Major POLSON NEWMAN: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—You have heard to-night a most interesting address from Mr. Woods, and some very appropriate words from Sir Arnold Wilson. There is just one point I should like to add, and it is on the question of anti-French propaganda. Since I came back to this country, about two months ago, I have always been asked why it is we cannot get any accurate news from Syria, or, on the other hand, why the news from Syria is so misleading. I can tell you in a few words the reason. A great deal of the news or reports which come through from Syria are simply nothing more or less than propaganda directed against the Mandatory Power. They emanate from the Arab Executive in Jerusalem, on the one hand, and on the other hand from the Syria-Palestine Committee in Cairo. Both these institutions are strong supporters of the rebels, and actually go to the length of sending literature and newspapers up to the villages of Syria and the Jebel Druze, in order to encourage the rebels to continue the rebellion. A great deal of this information comes to the ears of foreign correspondents, who perhaps arrive in Syria for two days and are then gone. It also finds its way to London and appears in the London press. A certain amount is also sent direct from those sources to

London, and finds its way into headlines of certain organs of our press. At the present moment the news from Syria is not very exciting: it is not the kind of news that makes headlines. It therefore is rather apt to be neglected. On the other hand, those reports which come from the sources I have mentioned are rather fantastic and are most certainly exciting. Such reports make fine double-deckers in the front pages of the newspapers, and help the newspapers to sell. The consequence is, I am afraid, that a great deal of this stuff has been dished up to the British public, and the British public at the present moment, I think, have a very false idea of the true situation in Syria. I think it is up to us as a co-Mandatory Power with France in the Near East to try and stand by France in every way we can, most especially in our press, and to try and help her instead of hindering her. (Applause.)

Sir GILBERT CLAYTON: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—Nearly everything I thought it possible to mention has already been said; but I have had some experience of Syria both in the country and since the war, when I was a member of the administration of Palestine, and I should like to emphasize the great difficulties which confronted—necessarily confronted—whatever Power took over the Mandate for that extraordinarily mixed country. Those difficulties have perhaps not been solved quite as quickly or quite as cleverly as they should have been. But at the same time I think we should avoid destructive criticism, and remember the point which Mr. Woods brought forward so clearly, that Syria is of extreme importance to Great Britain. If you were to serve, as I did, in the administration of Palestine, you would realize that a great deal more than you can sitting here in London. Every little thing that happens in Syria—any little trouble that arises—reacts immediately on Palestine, and *vice versa*; and therefore I think it is for the two Mandatory Powers to keep in very close touch and co-operation. When we first started the mandatory system there was a good deal of suspicion, at any rate on the part of the French, that we were anxious to secure the Mandate for Syria. I can only say, Thank God we did not. (Hear, hear.) We did not anyhow, and perhaps there was a certain jealousy, and the French watched very sharply anything that happened in Palestine that might react against themselves. When I was there myself there was a brigand affair on rather a serious scale south of Damascus, and there is no doubt the brigands emanated from Trans-Jordan, which is under our Mandate. But directly news arrived prompt measures were taken to put a stop to the trouble, and a force was sent up to the frontier without delay. None too soon, because the day after they started down came a delegation from General Weygand to complain. When the French found what had been done the effect was extremely good, and the foundation was laid of a close co-operation which existed all

the time I was there, and at any rate until General Weygand left. As to what happened after his departure I am not sure. That instance illustrates how very necessary it is to have co-operation between the two administrations, and I think, from everything I have read, there seems to be no trace of criticism against the administration of Field Marshal Lord Plumer and the Palestine Government in this respect. They seem to have co-operated as far as it was possible to do so, and that I am sure will lead us in the end to a solution of our mutual difficulties. (Applause.)

Major SALISBURY JONES: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I cannot help feeling very diffident in getting up and speaking after such distinguished speakers as have preceded me. At the same time, as I have spent the last two and a half years attached to French headquarters, I do not feel that I can very well be present and not say anything at all. I only want to touch on one point—I shall not be very long—and this point is the future importance of Syria, which I think Mr. Charles Woods did touch upon in his extremely interesting lecture, I think Mr. Charles Woods did remark that we did not many of us realize exactly what Syria is. He explained to us what it is, and I would like to say what in my opinion are the future possibilities of Syria. Hitherto we have looked upon the main road to the East as via the Suez Canal—in the old days it was through Syria. Since the opening of the Suez Canal two important things have been invented, one is the motor and the second is the aeroplane. Most of you realize that already there is a very well organized motor service from Beirut to Baghdad: I do not think all of you realize that every aeroplane flight to the East by foreigners has passed through Syria, and I think I am pretty safe in prophesying that the future of Syria from the air point of view is not inconsiderable.

I would before coming down from this platform like to take this opportunity, if there are any French people present, or even if there are not, of mentioning the extreme courtesy which I received under three High Commissioners, first General Weygand, then General Sarrail, and finally Monsieur Jouvenel. (Applause.)

Sirdar IKBAL ALI SHAH: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I can only add a few words from the Moslem point of view to a very excellent lecture that we have had this afternoon from Mr. Woods. Some years ago, when the Indian Khilafat Delegation was visiting this country, Mr. Mohamed Ali, its leader, was very jubilant about the fact that he was received very well in Paris, but the British, he then thought, were imbued with anti-Islamic sentiments. I differed from him on that point then as I differ from him in all points always. (Hear, hear.) The cause of Mr. Mohamed Ali's jubilation has seen a definite change, for in the Moslem world to-day the French and not the British are out of favour with the Mohammedans. You might think that I

am inventing this, but as one of the speakers this afternoon was alluding to the bombardment of Damascus, I could not help recalling to mind the scenes that marked Moslem sentiments at the time. I happened to be in the East then. The degree of resentment which was felt throughout Islamic Asia—almost amounting to a religious fanatical frenzy which tended to decry everything foreign and Christian—I find difficult to portray in words. Again, as a proof of the sentiments of the British people being pro-Moslem, I can refer to the very interesting lecture, with its unbiassed criticism of a very tangled question, by Mr. Woods this afternoon. There is one thing above all that I value in the lecturer's remarks—he takes no sides. Mr. Woods lays before us the facts and he keeps to the best traditions of the Society by giving us an unbiassed lecture. One point I should mention. At the end of his lecture he mentioned that Frenchmen had their difficulties. We all have our difficulties at one time and another. It has been said there were military men and politicians who made the bungle in Syria. In your own case you had Kitchener in Egypt—he was a great administrator; you had a politician in India in Curzon, and he was a brilliant success, as everybody knows. I cannot understand how your next-door neighbours cannot produce generals and politicians equally efficient in this way, and that should be levelled as a criticism against them. Another point of interest is that it has been suggested that the direct control by French people of Syria should be encouraged. It has been hinted that an Arab king should be placed as a ruler of Syria under the ægis of the French Government. It is a most admirable suggestion. I hold no brief for the Sharif Ali Haidar Pasha, but from all I have heard as to his learning and capacity as a ruler he would be the right man in the right place; and I think the present difficulties of the French would entirely disappear if they worked the country through the agency of one of the Syrians' own kinsmen, as you are doing to-day in Mesopotamia. It is a system that has elicited a very great amount of praise for your administrators and those who work the Mandate in Mesopotamia to-day. (Applause.)

The LECTURER: Ladies and Gentlemen,—At this late stage I almost hesitate to get up and speak again, but I want to do so for two reasons. First of all I very much appreciate what the various speakers have said upon the subject of Syria, and upon the subject of my lecture. I value particularly, if I may venture to say so, the remarks of Major Salisbury Jones, Sir Gilbert Clayton, and Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah. The other reason for which I want to say a word or two is I am sure you realize I have very little idea what I really said during this lecture, and I am convinced, in spite of nice things that have been said by people who have spoken since, you must have a very small conception of what I meant to say. Perhaps I should have been inarticulate in any case, but certainly the disorganization of the

lantern slides has made such shortcomings worse than otherwise would have been the case. I wish, therefore, now to refer to three points upon which I do not seem to have been very clear—first of all in regard to the American University at Beirut. When I referred to the good which I feel that institution has done, I was speaking of the general good throughout the Near and Middle East. Of course it may be a question of opinion as to whether it is beneficial to educate these people or not; but I certainly think that, whatever may be the faults of America—I know there have been a great many in regard to the post-war position in the Near East, and I believe the Crane Commission did a great deal of harm in Syria—but whatever be their faults there is no doubt that great institutions like the Robert College at Constantinople and the American University at Beirut have done a great deal for the civilization of the people. Whether that civilization has been used to the best advantage is another question. Second, there has been a pretty full discussion about the bombardment of Damascus. Please do not think that I in any way approve of that. What I meant was that the French undoubtedly got into a panic, and I fully agree with one speaker who followed me, and who said that had the local situation been properly under French control, the developments of October would never have happened. But I did say also that I thought the French were even more blameworthy for allowing the situation to develop which necessitated the bombardment than for the bombardment itself. That is not to excuse the bombardment. When Sir Arnold Wilson suggested I thought the foreign communities should have been warned and not the natives—I do not say natives in any disparaging sense, I mean the local population—that is the last thing I intended to infer. What I meant to say was that a proper and definite ultimatum should have been issued to the whole town, and that the people should have been clearly led to understand what would happen if they did not behave properly. I did add, I believe, that the foreign communities should be warned, because it is usual in those countries to give notice of important forthcoming events to the various consulates. Had the foreign communities been advised perhaps some of the difficulties which took place with our own representative, Mr. Smart, might have been avoided, for I am convinced that he did everything possible to protect the British, and that he was guilty of no acts likely to inflame the situation in Damascus. Thirdly, I stated that Monsieur Ponsot was not a politician. I do not possess his personal confidence, and I know no more whether he is a politician than I know whether many of the gentlemen who represent this country abroad are politicians. What I meant was that he is not a politician by career; he is a functionary by profession. He may be a politician or not, but he does not go out to Syria either as a soldier or as the result of political success. He is there as a consequence of his

distinguished work for his country, as a man who has held high office in the French Foreign Office, and therefore a person from whom I think we may expect perhaps a great deal more than we have had before. I would like to join with Major Salisbury Jones in saying that, whilst I criticized General Sarrail for many things that he did in Syria, I cannot exaggerate how extremely kind he was to me, and how greatly he furthered any objects which I had in visiting that country. I thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention under very difficult circumstances. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before we part I know you would like me to tender on your behalf a very cordial vote of thanks to our Lecturer, all the heartier because of the great difficulties he has had to contend with, and which we so much regret, and for which we must offer him the apologies of the Society. (Applause.)

THE ITALIAN RED SEA COLONIES *

By COMMENDATORE LUIGI VILLARI

DURING the wars of the Risorgimento and at the time of the unification of Italy hardly anyone thought of Italian expansion beyond the seas. Public opinion was so absorbed by the political problems at home that economic questions in general, even those directly affecting the welfare

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, December 16, 1926. Sir Michael O'Dwyer presided, and a lecture was delivered by Commendatore Luigi Villari on the Italian Colonies on the Red Sea and their connection with Central Asia.

The CHAIRMAN: A fortnight ago we had a very interesting lecture on French Syria, and to-day we are going to have a lecture on the Mid-Eastern colonial possessions of another ally, the Italian Colonies on the Red Sea, and their connection with Central Asia. We all know that Imperial Rome was the founder of colonization as we understand it in the West; in fact, most of Europe to-day is based on the colonies of Imperial Rome. When the Empire of Rome disappeared and Italy was broken up into a series of little States, we find that some of these city States, like Venice and Genoa, founded sea-empires in the great trading centres of the Mediterranean and Levant. The advance of the Turkish Empire prevented their further extension towards the East; at the same time the discovery of the Cape route deflected the whole course of colonization of Western Powers to ocean routes. The result was that all the great colonial empires established between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries were built up by countries which had frontiers on the Atlantic—Spain, Portugal, France, England, and Holland. These maritime empires practically filled all the waste places of the world as then known, and one result of that was that when Italy at last became unified seventy years ago she found very little room for colonial expansion. That is the problem which the Commendatore will speak to us about to-day. Italy of to-day is the heiress of the traditions of Imperial Rome, the founder of so many colonies. Italy has a rapidly growing population; she wants a place in the sun. She wants elbow room, and there is a feeling in Italy among many people—and I think it is shared also by some people in this country—that in the post-war settlement Italy did not receive the complete fulfilment of the aspirations which were encouraged in her at the crisis of the war. However, that is another matter. To-day we shall hear from the Commendatore of the progress made by Italy in her colonies along the Red Sea littoral and their reaction on Asia, which is our own particular subject. I think all of us who know anything of Italian colonization regard it with sympathy and with benevolent interest. Wherever we have come across the Italians abroad we have found them good neighbours, and wherever we have had any difficulties with them, whether in Jubaland or the Jarabub Oasis in Egypt, we have been

of the people, were hardly realized. When in later years the economic problem inevitably thrust itself on to the attention of the nation, it was in its internal aspect alone that it was at first considered.

The
Emigration
Movement.

It was the emigration movement which first awakened Italy to the need for expansion in some form or another. During the latter part of the nineteenth century an ever-increasing stream of Italians, unable to find sufficiently remunerative work at home, migrated to foreign lands, attracted by higher wages and wider opportunities than were afforded by Italy at that time. These pioneers showed a great spirit of enterprise, courage, industry and sobriety, and colonized vast tracts of the Argentine, Brazil, the United States, Tunisia, etc., to say nothing of those who made railways, bored tunnels, built roads and bridges, dug canals, and executed other great public undertakings all over the world.

But useful as was this work, public opinion began to regard the exodus of so many of the best workers from the country with a certain anxiety as being no unmixed advantage for Italy and the Italian people as a whole; many of these emigrants were definitely lost to the nation, especially those who settled in overseas countries, and by far the largest part of the profits deriving from their labour went to the benefit of the country in which they were working.

Exploration
in Africa.

At the same time another group of men, smaller by far in numbers, but even more enterprising and courageous, inspired by no thought of personal gain, were exploring the unknown regions of Africa, and achieving fame for their country. Cecchi, Camperio, Bottego, and many others organized expeditions of considerable scientific interest, encouraged by the Italian Geographical Society and the Society of Commercial Exploration in Africa, and not a few of them lost their lives in the quest of the unknown. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, took a keen interest in these enterprises. But after 1885 exploration was discouraged under the régime of the Depretis Cabinet, and no further expeditions of importance were undertaken for many years.

The more intelligent part of the Italian people was, however, begin-

able to settle those difficulties amicably. We therefore are inclined to look with favour on the development of the colonization policy of Italy in Asia and along the Red Sea. The Commendatore has special knowledge of this subject because he was attached as liaison officer to Sir George Milne in the Near East and in Macedonia during the war. After that he was connected with the Italian Emigration Department. Then for years he was working in the League of Nations, and he has travelled widely in the Near and Middle East. He is therefore very competent to inform us of the potentialities of this new colonial expansion now active. In Italy to-day everything has received a new vigour. One consequence is this new colonial expansion which Italy is carrying out. I will now ask the Commendatore to deliver his lecture. (Applause.)

ning to realize the necessity that Italy, like other great countries—and indeed, owing to her rapidly growing population, more than most of them—should secure territories suitable for colonization, where her sons could work and prosper under the national flag and for the benefit of the nation. It was found, however, that nearly all the more suitable territories had been annexed or ear-marked by other Powers. There remained certain parts of East Africa still available, which were believed to be capable of considerable economic development, and in the 'eighties Italy proceeded to occupy various territories on the Red Sea coast. The first point occupied had been the Bay of Assab, but only as a coaling station for the Florio-Rubattino Steamship Company in 1869; owing to the objections raised at the time by Great Britain, Turkey, and Egypt, it was not formally annexed until 1880. Massaua and other places were occupied during the following years, and in 1890 these various possessions were unified in a single colony under the name of Colonia Eritrea.

It was hoped and believed at the time that the new possession Eritrea would prove suitable for Italian colonization by white settlers, and that at least a part of the stream of Italian emigration would be deflected thither from the foreign lands which had hitherto attracted it. The coastal area and the lowlands generally are tropically hot, but on the uplands of the interior the climate is moderate and healthy. But war with Abyssinia made colonization difficult, and the defeat at Adua, which the Government of the day saw fit to leave unavenged, although the reserves under General Baldissera had victory within their grasp, put an end to all ideas of settlement by whites. The exaggerated optimism with which Eritrea had been regarded in the early days of the occupation was succeeded by an equally exaggerated pessimism, both being due to lack of knowledge and experience of colonial affairs and of tropical countries. The colony came to be looked upon as a bad bargain, which was not evacuated simply on account of the loss of prestige which such evacuation would naturally involve. Public opinion for many years ceased to take any interest in Eritrea, and almost tried to forget its very existence. There was during that period a reaction against all ideas of colonial expansion throughout Italy, not only among the Socialists, Republicans, and extreme Radicals, who were averse to any policy likely to distract public attention from home affairs, social reform, and class war, but even among the Conservatives and Moderates of Northern and Central Italy, who saw in colonial expansion nothing more than costly and unproductive adventures, which absorbed Italy's none too abundant capital needed for internal development, and which might involve the country in dangerous international complications.

The Prime Minister, Francesco Crispi, was one of the few Italian statesmen since Mancini who realized the importance of expansion for

Italy, but he had come before his time, at a moment when the nation was not educated up to these ideas, and his really great qualities and far-sighted policy were not appreciated by the mass of his fellow-citizens, not even by the more intelligent part of them. The defeat at Adua brought about his fall—many of his opponents actually regarded it with satisfaction for that reason, so little did they appreciate its disastrous effects on the country's prestige—and he retired from office a broken man.


At the beginning of the present century, when with the general increase of prosperity and of cultural development the idea of colonial and economic expansion revived once more, attention was turned rather to the possibilities of North Africa than to the almost forgotten Red Sea colony, or to that part of Somaliland which Italy had recently occupied, but which was known to the public chiefly on account of some not too edifying squabbles between the civil and military authorities.

The Ascari.

But the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-12, which was the outcome of Italy's schemes of expansion in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, provided unexpected evidence of the utility of Eritrea in at least one respect. From the early days of the occupation a considerable number of Eritrean natives had been enrolled in the Italian army, and indeed the great bulk of the Italian garrison consisted of these Ascari, as they are called. They proved excellent and faithful soldiers, even when engaged in fighting against men of their own or analogous race. The Italian officers and N.C.O.'s in command of Ascari units rapidly succeeded in inspiring in them the utmost devotion and discipline. On the battlefield of Adua, after only a few years of Italian rule, round the body of every dead Italian officer were found groups of dead Ascari, who had fallen fighting to defend the life of their white commander. Between 1896 and 1911 the organization of the Ascari was perfected and extended, so that when the Libyan war broke out it was possible to employ them in North Africa, where they very greatly distinguished themselves. After the end of the war some of them were brought to Rome as a reward, and received a welcome no less enthusiastic than that which greeted the home-coming of the white regiments. In the world war they did not serve in Europe, as Italy did not wish to employ coloured troops against white foes; but they continued to perform garrison duties in Eritrea and Libya, and afterwards helped to reconquer the parts of Libya which had been evacuated during the war.

**Internal
Development
of Eritrea.**

In the meanwhile the internal development of the colony had been proceeding satisfactorily, almost unnoticed by the immense majority of Italians. The administration was improved and simplified, economic progress was advancing, a railway was built, the port of Massaua provided with modern appliances, and other public works were undertaken. The total import and export trade of the colony has expanded rapidly



since the war; the caravan trade, which in 1921 amounted to 45,000,000 lire, had grown to nearly 119,000,000 in 1921, while the sea-borne trade had grown from 96,000,000 to 323,000,000 in the same period. The budget of the colony amounted to 34,420,000 for income, and the same for expenditure, of which 12,000,000 lire were for defence purposes. The total area of the colony is 119,000 square kilometres; its population in 1921 was 393,000, of whom 4,283 were Italians and 398 other Europeans.

The original idea of making of Eritrea a field for white colonization has been abandoned, as even its more temperate zone is not wholly suitable for that purpose. The scheme, warmly advocated by the late Baron Leopoldo Franchetti, of colonizing the uplands with Italian farmers was maintained as a possibility for the future on the statute-book for many years. It involved a measure of expropriation of the land belonging to the natives, which was always theoretically possible in territories formerly under Turkish law, and a beginning was actually made towards its practical execution. But owing to the discontent it aroused among the natives the colonization scheme was suspended *sine die*. Under the present Governor of the colony, Signor Gasperini, the law itself has been altered, and all idea of colonization by white labour abandoned. The area in question is now reserved *de jure* as well as *de facto* for the natives, to their great satisfaction. On the other hand, the lowland area, which does not interest the natives, as its development would require costly and extensive drainage and irrigation works, is to be set aside for exploitation—not colonization—by whites employing native labour.

The Government has undertaken the drainage and irrigation works, especially in connection with the waters of the river Gash, and the hydraulic part of the scheme at Tessenei has now been carried out. An agreement has been concluded with the Anglo-Sudanese Government whereby the Sudan may utilize the waters of the Gash, for which it pays an annual fee; the amount collected goes towards the expenses of the development scheme.

The land thus reclaimed and improved will be divided into concessions, and granted to private individuals or land companies formed into a development consortium, after the method generally practised in Italy in analogous circumstances.

Cotton has long been regarded as the most important product of this area, as Italy, like other countries, aims at emancipating herself from being tributary to the United States. The Government began by an experimental plantation of 1,000 hectares with cotton; the crop was about nine quintals (a little less than one ton) of raw cotton, corresponding to three quintals of fibre per hectare. It is hoped to extend the cultivation, and eventually to secure a total crop of forty to fifty thousand quintals of fibre. Besides the Government scheme, there are

also other private cotton-growing undertakings in different parts of the colony.

One serious difficulty is labour. Eritrea is not densely populated (about 3·3 inhabitants per square kilometre), and up to the present some 15,000 of the best workers were recruited for the army, which comprised twenty battalions of Ascari, several of them on duty in Libya. In former times a considerable contingent of recruits came from Abyssinia proper, the Government of which country encouraged its subjects to serve under the Italians, so that they should acquire an advanced military education. But this no longer occurs in the same measure as before, so that the recruiting has to be effected in Eritrea alone, and even here there are difficulties; owing to the increased prosperity of the colony, the native population is now less inclined to regard the army as the most lucrative and dignified profession, and to find more attraction in agricultural pursuits. The Governor has put a limit to the recruiting of Eritrean Ascari for Libya, all the more so as the two North African colonies now possess well-organized native forces of their own, so that only the Ascari needed for Eritrea itself are at present recruited, in order to leave more labour available for peaceful development.

Besides cotton, Eritrea produces large crops of oleaginous seeds (sesamum, linseed, castor-oil, etc.), which are consumed in considerable quantities abroad. The natives are experts in this kind of cultivation, which has also the further advantage of being less subject to violent fluctuations of the market price than cotton. This year, for instance, owing to the bumper crop in the United States, the price of cotton has gone down, and does not offer great encouragement to the Eritrean cotton grower. But this is, of course, only a temporary difficulty.

At present it is believed that there is an even greater future for cotton in Italian Somaliland than in Eritrea. The great irrigation scheme now being carried out under the direction of H.R.H. the Duke of the Abruzzi is expected to result in a large increase of output.

Among the other agricultural products are, on the eastern slopes, tobacco, pineapples, bananas (which flourish exceedingly), the American aloe, indigo, etc. On the high tableland, cereals (besides the oleaginous seeds already mentioned), lentils, beans, etc., are grown. The commonest qualities of cereals are wheat, barley, and *dura*; the wheat crop averages eight quintals per hectare, which is a little inferior to that of the less highly cultivated areas of Italy. Among the fruit trees, medlars, almonds, and pomegranates are the most important. In the eastern valleys only *dura* and Indian corn are grown, while on the western border, between the rivers Gash and Setit especially, is the cotton belt. There are forests of dum palms in parts of the country, and the baobab tree also abounds. The eastern lowlands are tropically hot and very rainless, so that irrigation works on a large scale would be necessary for their development. As I have said, works

of this kind are being carried out at present in the western lowlands, where, although the climate is almost as hot as in the east, the nights are cooler, and benefit is derived from the rains of the adjoining upland area.

There are also schemes for creating coffee plantations, and there is already a promising beginning of such plantations, as there are two rainy seasons in parts of the colony.

But Eritrea is important not merely in itself. It is in a certain sense a pivot whence Italian commercial influence may radiate outwards into the various neighbouring territories. Eritrea is the natural outlet for the trade both of parts of Abyssinia and of the opposite Arabian coast, and a transit market for goods between the two countries. The above-mentioned Foreign Minister, Mancini, under whose auspices Eritrea was occupied, had grasped these possibilities, but he was not listened to at the time; since then, although this trade has been developing for many years, it is only quite recently that its importance and possibilities have been realized by the Italian public.

Parts of Abyssinia are more easily reached from the French colony of Djibuti or from other points, but a considerable area is more accessible from Eritrea, and finds its natural outlet through Massaua, with its well-equipped port connected by rail with the interior. Relations between Italy and Abyssinia are now quite satisfactory, and even the little flutter caused by the recent Italo-British agreement concerning the development of the country, exaggerated by a part of the foreign press, died down as soon as the terms of that understanding were properly explained; Abyssinia herself, who had sent a protest to the League of Nations, ended by withdrawing it.

Trade with
the Yemen.

On the other hand, the trade between Eritrea and the opposite coast of the Red Sea has been increasing in volume during the last few years. Signor Ferdinando Martini, who was Governor of Eritrea after Adua, was the first to establish relations with the Yemen, and many natives of that territory, then under Turkish rule, although in a state of endemic revolt against the Constantinople Government, entered the Italian service, and fought with distinction in Somaliland and elsewhere. In past times Italian travellers had taken an interest in the commercial possibilities of the Yemen, beginning with the mysterious Bolognese traveller of the fifteenth century, Lodovico de Varthema, of whom very little is known, but who seems to have been the first European to explore the country. Another Italian who in more recent times visited the Yemen was Renzo Manzoni, the nephew of the famous man of letters Alessandro Manzoni; he lived there for a considerable time and wrote what is probably the best account of it. A third Italian, the trader Giuseppe Caprotti, lived for thirty years at Sanaa—the only European then in the town. Through the intervention of a learned Italian priest, Monsignor Achille Ratti, now better known as His

Holiness Pope Pius XI., and of the Islamic scholar Eugenio Griffini, Caprotti's valuable collection of Arabic MSS. was secured for the Ambrosiana library of Milan.

Trade between Eritrea and the Yemen amounted last year to 60,000,000 lire, and the recent agreement between the latter country, now an independent kingdom, and Italy consecrates an existing state of things, and raises hopes for a future still more important development of mutual trade relations. Owing to its proximity to the Yemen, Eritrea tends to become a sort of intermediate market for the exports from that State to a large part of the Western world and the Mediterranean lands.

Italy's interests in Central Asia proper are not at present very extensive. Although the first European traveller to explore Central Asia in the Middle Ages was the Venetian Marco Polo, since his day few Italians have had occasion to visit those mysterious regions, with the exception of some missionaries in the seventeenth century. In the latter years of the nineteenth century and in the first of the twentieth century there have been several travellers and explorers, of whom the most distinguished are H.R.H. the Duke of the Abruzzi and Dr. Filippo de Filippi, whose journeys for the purpose of scientific survey in the Himalaya are as well known in this country as in Italy. Dr. de Filippi is now organizing another Italian scientific expedition to Palestine with the object of carrying out a geological and hydrographic survey of the Dead Sea and surrounding country. Italy and
Central Asia.

Nor has Italian activity been very conspicuous in the past in Persia. But during the last two or three years, in view of the impulse given to the development of the country under the new Shah Reza Khan, various schemes have been made for Italian participation in it. In the matter of railway and road construction, drainage and irrigation, Italians have, through their great experience both at home and abroad, become past-masters; and a syndicate of Italian banks, financial houses, and manufacturers has been formed in view of extending Italian activity in those regions.

There has also been a beginning of Italian enterprise in Afghanistan, and a certain number of Italian traders, engineers, and technical experts have visited the country; but as yet things are only in the preliminary stage.

In a general way Italians have been successful in their dealings with Mohammedan peoples. The large Italian colonies existing in Turkey have almost always got on well with the Moslem population, and in the strenuous years immediately after the Armistice the Italian Government was the first to realize the importance of the Turkish Nationalist movement and to regard it with sympathy and appreciation. If the policy advocated by Italy had been followed by the rest of the Entente a great deal of bloodshed would have been spared, and the

prestige of the Western world in Turkey would stand higher than it does to day.

Under the impetus given by the present Government of Italy, Italian enterprise is extending to ever new fields in the East as elsewhere, and Italian trade is penetrating into many parts of the world where it had been unknown before.

It is peculiarly satisfactory to be able to say that in all the enterprises undertaken by Italians in the countries dealt with by me to-day, where Great Britain has shown such magnificent and useful activity, there has always been the most cordial co-operation between Italians and British. Perhaps no two other peoples are destined to collaborate so closely in the great work of extending European civilization and European ideas, for the benefit not merely of all Europeans, but also of the native inhabitants of those lands, and for the happy blending of the thought of the West with that of the East.

Colonel JACOB: Sir Michael, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I do not think I can say anything to improve on the very able lecture given by the Commendatore except that I have been myself several times to Eritrea. I have been all over the country, and have been most hospitably entertained on every occasion by the Italians there. Therefore I was rather surprised to hear the Commendatore say that they were giving up colonizing Eritrea by Italian colonists, because it seemed to me, from the little I saw of it, that it has tremendous possibilities in such direction. Water is to be had anywhere in the colony—at Asmara on the plateau and various other places—at a very small depth below the surface. But as the Commendatore says, perhaps it is advisable for Italian traders to “boss,” so to speak, the work by Abyssinian labourers. That is perhaps the best idea, in the long run, and yet I would repeat that I am surprised that the whites do not go there in still greater numbers. I had the privilege of being conducted by the Governor over an interesting part of his colony in the direction of Adua. He showed me many of the forts. We had two very instructive field-days, when the troops were all out, and I was much struck by the fine discipline and bearing of all the men, both Christian and Moslem—perhaps preferably the Moslem. In my “twopenny-halfpenny” book, written in 1923, I have said a good deal about Italy, and it seems to me their policy is very much the same as was pursued by Agricola, whom we read of in Tacitus. When Agricola came over to this country he used to educate the Britons in all Roman arts, and used to send them over to Rome to be educated. It seems to me the Italians are doing the same to-day. I know a good many Abyssinians who have been sent over to Rome, been very well educated there, and gone back to spread Italian culture. As I said in my book, and may say again without any undue pride, I have seen a good deal of Italian coloni-

sation, and I have always considered them the very best colonists *next to ourselves*! The French I think highly of, but, of the Italians, I am inclined to say they are *almost as good as ourselves*, but the Commendatore will not, I trust, mind if I say they are, at any rate, "No. 2"! I will not take up any more time, for I am sure there are several others who would like to speak. I knew Signor Caprotti, who was thirty years at Sanaa. Italian enterprise is marvellous and highly to be commended, and I only wish that we Britons were equally enterprising. I thank you for giving me the opportunity of hearing this excellent lecture given by the Commendatore. (Applause.)

MR. ENTHOVEN: Sir Michael, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel I am rather taking advantage of the audience to-day, because I am not a member of the Central Asian Society, I regret to say, but only a member of a somewhat kindred institution, the Royal Asiatic Society. But perhaps I can excuse my intervening in this discussion on the ground that I have known Signor Villari since he was a very small boy indeed, and the Chairman is an old colleague of mine in India. I take advantage of the opportunity given me to make a few remarks to say just two things: in the first place, I think we are all greatly indebted to the lecturer for the very complete summary he has given us of the Italian position in the Red Sea. We have been, I think, most of us interested in the recent developments. Many of us perhaps have not followed them very closely since the disastrous events to which he referred, and which dwell in our memory; and we are very glad to know that the prosperity of those dominions seems now to be assured. I think we are all greatly beholden to the lecturer for the very clear manner in which he has elucidated the subject. We should hardly have expected anything else from the son of such a distinguished professor as his father, Pasquale Villari, whose works on Italian history many of us know well. (Hear, hear.) Those who read *The Times* know also that it is the lecturer's privilege to be to modern Italy what the late Professor Villari was to the Italy of earlier days. The point I want to come to in justification for saying anything at all is that I rather hoped our friend the lecturer would tell us what the ultimate aims of Italy in this direction are. I have had recently some personal experience of Fascismo in Italy. I am not going to enter on a discussion of that subject because it might get out, and I should like the lecturer not to give me away. But I think we would all like to know what the ultimate aims of Italy in Central Asia are. We hear it said constantly, it is repeated by most Italians in the speeches they make, that Italy is Rome renaescent. Now we know that the standards of Rome were carried by Trajan down to the Persian Gulf—some of us perhaps do not know that there was even a Roman garrison in an obscure part of India. That has been ascertained comparatively recently; but I think it is an historic fact. Are we to look forward to

the prospect of Italy being found one day at the head of the Persian Gulf, or in this remote part of India, because such a development is likely to lead to complications between two very good friends, the British Empire and the Kingdom of Italy? The lecturer will, perhaps, discreetly skate over that very delicate subject; but in his lecture he has told us that Eritrea is the centre of Italian influence, and the source of the spread of Italian influence in those regions; and those of us who are interested in Central Asia, and more particularly India and so on, would like to be reassured that we are not going to see in the end the beginning of a new Roman dominion in the Near East. I apologize for having intervened rather hurriedly with no preparation, but I want particularly to thank the lecturer for his very interesting discourse. (Applause.)

Sir GILBERT CLAYTON: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I do not know that there is very much that I can say in addition to the very excellent paper which we have heard read. I have had the opportunity of serving nearly all my life in the area with which the Commendatore has dealt, and I have had a great deal of communication with the Italian authorities in various places, which I must say has been of the very pleasantest nature both officially and personally. It is over twenty years ago I was in Eritrea, and I was at that time serving in the neighbouring province of Kassala, which now belongs to the Anglo-Egyptian Government. I was invited very kindly by the Governor in Eritrea to pass through that colony on my way on leave, and I did so. Nothing could have exceeded the pleasure of that trip, or the hospitality which I was shown throughout. That was in the days of which the Commendatore spoke, not very many years after the unfortunate defeat at Adua, a defeat which, as the Commendatore very truly remarks, would, had a different policy been accepted by the Government of the day, have been merely a temporary set-back. However, I did not observe the effects that the Commendatore has alluded to, and I should like to say to-night how much I was struck by the work that the officials and administrators of the Italian Government were doing in Eritrea even then, although, as I fully believe, they were not enjoying that meed of enthusiastic encouragement which they deserved, and which I am glad to say they subsequently received. Nothing could exceed their kindness or, if I may say so, the common sense which they seemed to me to bring to the task before them, and even in those days, when I was a good deal younger than I am now, I was very much struck by their methods. Indeed, at the risk of being thought conceited on behalf of my own nation—mind you I was only about thirty—I really thought they were nearly as good as we. Also, I think that anyone who works in the Red Sea area will see the great influence that Italy is exerting all over that area. The Commendatore has said that Eritrea is one of their

centres. Well, they don't confine themselves to their centres, and wherever I have found them the Italians have always been foremost in spreading the finer side of civilization, especially in culture, scientific research, and so forth. Take a country like Egypt, where I served for many years, which has few more valuable assets than the Italian colony in Egypt. And throughout that area I believe that Italy, as we ourselves, is beginning to realize that times are moving; nations that were formerly backward are awakening, and a policy of selfish exploitation not only is morally improper, but does not, in fact, pay nowadays. It is, I think, on the lines which we are trying to follow in those countries that we find perhaps keener sympathy from the Italians than from any other colonizing power. I should like to once again say, as a person who perhaps knows something about those areas, how much I have appreciated the Commendatore's paper. (Applause.)

MR. DONALD MELLOR: Mr. Chairman, the Commendatore has given us a splendid lecture. I did not quite catch the name of the present railhead from Massaua.

THE LECTURER: Kerran.

MR. MELLOR: What is the kilomètreage?

THE LECTURER: I think about 200 or 300 kilomètres.

MR. MELLOR: Thank you. It was a difficult undertaking, the railway into the interior, and as it gets farther in it will be more difficult still; but we know the Italians are energetic and enterprising, and the difficulties will not stop them if they wish to go ahead with it. He also mentioned the hydraulic works. I should like to see the photographs of those works, because we know if there is a nation that has really first-class experts in hydraulic work, that nation is Italy, and the experts are her engineers. I should certainly have been very much interested in seeing some of the photographs of those big engineering works in Eritrea. I must again congratulate the Commendatore on his lecture, and thank him very much for it. (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am sure you will all join with me in thanking the lecturer very heartily for the most interesting lecture he has given us, and the admirable series of slides with which he illustrated it. From the account he has given us of Italian colonial development I think we shall agree that, given elbow-room, it has a great future before it. It has a great future for this reason, that the Italians of to-day, perhaps after ourselves—we always put ourselves first in this Society—have a wider outlook than almost any other nation. That is very natural because, as I said before, they have the traditions of the great Roman Empire. They have the secular tradition of widespread rule. The principle of that widespread rule is summed up in the words of one of their great poets: "*Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.*" That was, I think, a saner, a more practicable

idea than the modern one of self-determination. Anyhow, they have that great tradition of rule, and we have had testimony this evening from British officers who have seen the Italian colonies on the Red Sea how admirably they are carrying out that purpose. Then they have also, as Commendatore Villari told us in his concluding remarks, the great cultural tradition, the tradition of Imperial Rome, the mother of laws, of civil administration. I might give an illustration of that which may be of interest here: I claim to be one of the few people who have followed up the system of land tenures and taxation from West to East, and I believe I have succeeded in proving that the system of land administration which we now follow in India—which we derived from Akbar—was derived by Akbar from the Persian kings, who derived it from the Khalif Omar, who derived it from the Byzantine Empire; and it was derived through the Byzantine Empire from Julius Cæsar. (Applause.) Those of you who know the East will know that the land-revenue system is the pivot of the whole system of administration. I will give you one proof of it: Akbar, when he reorganized the system in India, said, "The old system which we inherited from Naushirwan, the Khalif Omar, and others has degenerated. We must go back to two root principles: one is an equitable system of survey based on Cæsar's yard measure, the *kaisari-gaz*," the standard of length which Cæsar introduced into old Rome from the pace of a Roman soldier, 2 feet 9 inches. That to-day is the basis of all the land measurements in the East, and that survives from Cæsar's time. Akbar also went back to the traditional standard of one-third of the produce, which, after Cæsar's land reforms, was taken by the Romans from the State land and conquered countries. He reverted to the two root ideas which had come down from Julius Cæsar through Diocletian and the Byzantine Empire—that is to say, an accurate system of survey based on a fixed standard of length, and a reasonable standard of assessment. That shows how a great idea emerging from the brain of a great man can go down through the centuries; twenty centuries after Cæsar we are practically carrying out the principles that he adopted, though fortunately for India we have been able to reduce the standard from one-third to about one-eighth of the produce of the land or its value. Finally, besides the secular and the cultural traditions, Italy, as the seat of the Papacy, has a world-wide spiritual influence and a powerful spiritual tradition. Given all these advantages, secular, cultural, and spiritual, it is not astonishing to think that Italy to-day should look forward to a great period of colonial expansion; and we are assured that she intends to secure that expansion not at the cost of others by any selfish methods, but by a policy of co-operation and friendly association with other Powers, and a friendly adjustment of boundaries. (Hear, hear.) We, as the greatest empire

of to-day, because we were one of the earliest in the field, must wish well to our latest competitor in the field of colonial expansion. The Commandatore has shown us how admirably that is being carried out, and in passing him a hearty vote of thanks we can assure him that we wish well to the policy which he has explained to us this evening. (Applause.)

FERMENTS IN THE WORLD OF ISLAM*

BY SIRDAR IKBAL ALI SHAH

THE lessons of current history seem to have been lost upon those of us who still disbelieve in the existence of the challenge of Islam. That a challenge has been thrown by Islamic Asia to the scientific civilization of the West is a patent fact to those sons of the Orient and scholars of the West who have not misread the signs of the times even amongst the

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Services Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Wednesday, January 19, 1927, Sir Michael O'Dwyer (Chairman) presiding. A discussion on the "Ferments in the World of Islam" was opened by Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah.

THE CHAIRMAN : Ladies and Gentlemen,—The subject which we are going to discuss this afternoon is "Ferments in Islam," and a very competent Islamic authority, Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, is going to begin that discussion. He is eminently qualified to do so because he comes of an old Kabul family. He has a wide experience of the Near and Middle East, and has also a great knowledge of Europe, so he is very well qualified to discuss this question, and has already done so frequently in the Press in various periodicals. The subject of "Ferments in Islam" is one that must interest particularly the Central Asian Society, because the part of the world which we range over is predominantly Islamic, and anything that happens in one part of Islam, owing to the solidarity of the Islamic religion, has its effects and reactions in other parts ; therefore anything of importance in the world of Islam is bound to affect very considerably the British Empire as the greatest Islamic Empire in the world at the present day. Of the 250 or 300 million Moslems in the world to-day I think over 100 million are in the British Empire or its protected or mandated areas. As an indication of how what happens in one part of the Islamic world has reactions in other parts, I may mention that a few years ago a man named Abdul Krim, a descendant of Yakub Khan of Afghanistan, started a rebellion against the present Amir. That rebellion was put down after considerable resistance, and Abdul Krim fled as a fugitive to India. For some time he was in hiding there, then arrested in Gurdaspur, and taken charge of by the British authorities. I hope he was not eventually handed over to Afghanistan, for he would have had short shrift there. At the same time, 7,000 miles away, a rebellion against the French was raised in Morocco, and the hero of that rebellion or the patriot—according to the point of view from which you regard him—was a man called Abdul Krim. The Mohammedans in India and a large part of Asia rushed at once to the conclusion that the Abdul Krim who had rebelled against the Amir of Afghanistan was the same as he who tried to throw off the Spanish and French yoke in Morocco. That shows how events which happen in one place are closely scrutinized and sometimes irregularly followed in others. Another example arose out of the conquest of the Hijaz by Ibn Saud. The great Wahabi leader,

helter-skelter of shifting scenes in the old world. But to fully comprehend the potentiality of this threat, a few details of its historical evolution are necessary, because it is essential to appreciate the point that this modern movement is not synonymous to Pan-Islamism; for Pan-Islamism has been previously misunderstood in Christendom, chiefly, perhaps, because it was misused by its modern protagonist Sultan Abdul Hamid, who gave it an aggressive tone. And although this "revivalism" has all the soul force of the former thought, yet in conformity with its limited aspirations it should be non-aggressive. It is exactly in this difference that its greatest strength lies. Bewildered by the fact that modern civilization is marching, phalanx after phalanx, into its very heart, it gives a clear call to the faithful to muster strong under the banner of Islam, and "revive" its ancient, but fading, glory.

After explaining the difference of the two movements, it might appear paradoxical, but it nevertheless is true, that the parent trunk of the "modern revivalism" tree is undoubtedly Pan-Islamism; the new has grown out of the old; in the nature of things it could not have been otherwise. Now let us see how this phenomena evolved itself; and to do this, one will have to go back a little to the origin of Pan-Islamism.

The very first indications of Pan-Islamism date back to the declining days of the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid; he perceived a rapid growth of public opinion, not only amongst the Turks, but also in the Asiatic race, which threatened his personal power and prestige. Abdul Hamid.

The young Turkish party had passed the embryonic stage, and in the desert the Pan-Arab movement was rapidly spreading. Observing

after many years, succeeded in expelling the Sherceefan family from the Hijaz. In doing so, no doubt, certain things happened in the holy places which caused a great deal of disturbance in the Islamic world. The lecturer will probably refer to that. Taking the case of our own Islamic fellow-subjects in India, there were two classes of thought most violently opposed. One section looked upon Ibn Saud as the purifier of the Islamic religion, as having driven out the Shereefan family, whom they considered to be not fit protectors of the holy places. On the other hand, a large section of Mohammedans, both Sunni and Shiah, took strong exception to the action of Ibn Saud, or at any rate to some of Ibn Saud's followers; and the Maharaja of Mahmudabad, a leading Mohammedan notable, sent telegrams all over the world, strongly attacking the conduct of Ibn Saud in the holy places, and asking for the interference of the Powers for the protection of the Islamic religion. I mention this as showing how closely anything that happens in one Islamic country produces reaction in the others. That is one of the subjects the lecturer is going to address us about, and by the time he has finished I am sure we shall be in a position to carry on the discussion on broader lines. I may say that he has kindly consented, as it is a subject which invites discussion, to limit his address to thirty-five minutes, so as to give more time for discussion; and I trust the many authorities I see here who come from the various Islamic countries, or who have experience of them, will join in that discussion. (Applause.)

these cross-currents, he quickly organized a scheme of personal consolidation, harnessed the sympathy of the clergy, and inveigled Syed Jamaluddin Afghani—a great scholar and philosopher of my own country of Afghanistan—into his scheme. The necessity of the strength of Islam was preached far and wide; propagandists roamed from Bokhara and Java to Morocco, and exhorted the faithful in the name of religion to look to Abdul Hamid for moral and political resurrection. But under the plethora of these events a great movement of “awakening,” due to Western impact, had caught the imagination of the people; the clergy were fast losing their hold because educated men would no longer swallow dogma. Democratic principles in the life of the people were weighing the scales against the thralldom of autocratic potentates; modern conceptions of liberty were driving the effete conceptions of the Eastern Governments to the wall. But, whilst all these enormous forces were at work, this battle was being fought behind closed doors, for Abdul Hamid was watching.

The Post-
War Period.

Forces of economic life had, however, become too great, and the cumbersome structure succumbed to its own weight. A Western wave passed over Turkey, and the Sultan was swept off the deck. Then the war came and completely revolutionized the ideas of men, old and young, Turk or Afghan. Age-long fetters were broken; the world of 1914 ceased to live; the priests of Islam continued to make desultory attempts to bring the flock back, but none would return to the old fold. Westernization had won the day, even in the slumberous East. Empires rose and fell: Sultans, Khalifas, Shahs, Amirs, and desert chieftains were dethroned. Social order was completely altered, with the result that the East became more Western than the West itself, the pupil had outrun the instructor. The surging tide of scientific civilization of the West had carried everything before it, as it broke wave after wave upon us in Islamic Asia. And the matter of great concern was that it did not make us better men, because the movement, being essentially foreign to our mentality and outlook on life, struck us as spectacular, overpoweringly fresh, full of economic allurements, and we drank of the stream much more than was good for us. We yelled for Nationalism where no nationhood existed; we craved after a representative form of Government in a land where generations had lived and died under benign autocracy; we began to speak of religion but lightly.

In diplomatic affairs Islam had been altered materially. The Nationalist Government in Turkey had led the way, chiefly through Western impact, and the ideals of French culture were beginning to be noticed in Angora. In Persia, the downfall of the Kachar dynasty proclaimed, in no uncertain manner, that the older order could not be tolerated; in Afghanistan likewise, the fact that the third son of the late Amir ruled the country, and ruled it well, was sufficient proof of

the rising public opinion: and, above all, the idea of a Grand League of Moslem Nations—with the sympathy and co-operation, shall we say, of the Russians—was not devoid of potentialities both grave and unwholesome. The ferment amongst the student community of India and Egypt was but the first sign of yet another superwave of Westernization which threatened to further rend asunder the heavy veil of dogma with which the priests in Asia covered the eyes of the younger generation. Last, but not the least important, was the question of the Khalifat, a traditional office, from the responsibilities of which its former custodian was sick at heart. The Women Suffrage movement in Turkey, Egypt, even in India and Persia, were all indications of a "revolt"; insurrection at once vigorous and potent against both the Church and the State. This was, then, the genesis of "awakened Islam."

But side by side with this movement of modernization a spirit of re-
vivalism has been existing, and to-day it has come to play a very
significant part. When politicians and "worldly men" copied Western
scientific civilization to the extent that in certain parts of Asia they can
hardly go any further in their effort of mimicry, philosophers of the
Moslem East were strengthening the roots of the cult of the Prophet
of Mecca. They have shown to their deluded co-religionists that
materialism in excess, and at the expense of the soul of religion, will
bring chaos and disruption. The result has been that now there is a
"call back to the Book"—"back to the real essence of Islam," a revival
toning down the revolutionary ideas of the creed.

The Recall
to Islamic
Principles.

And, curious to relate, that very western culture which undoubtedly
had given birth to Pan-Islamism and nationalism amongst the Eastern
races is now despised and abhorred. To Moslems conversant with the
real motives of the neo-Egyptian and neo-Turkish nationalism it is
none other than an earnest effort to withstand materialistic aggression.

A recent endeavour to organize a great League of Moslem Nations is
a convincing proof of their patriotism, spelt in the real terms of Islam's
love of the fatherland of its religion. Moslem countries of the world,
which still retain their freedom of action and freedom of choice, are
not seemingly nations related in the European sense, but members
of the body politic of Al-Islam, very much after the manner of the
United States of America, with a concrete local basis of cultural tradi-
tions, but built over with a multi-coloured and heterogeneous super-
structure. The revivalists of Islam have now somewhat disappointed
those Europeans who gloated too wildly over the supposed downfall of
the old principle in the renaissance Moslem East, which retain their
love of universal Moslem nationalism, despite their unveiled women
and Occidental dressed men. If symptomatic of anything at all, the
attempt of the Turks and others to cast off worn-out social customs is
indicative of a new attitude of mind, which judges every secular idea in

terms not of age, but in those of utility in a world where sentiment has given place to value.

In this process of regeneration the Wahabi King of Mecca has helped considerably, for it must be appreciated that whereas his exploits are pre-eminently associated with the Pan-Arab movement, yet his success has deeper meanings. All through this period of the ferment of Islam one fact has remained patent—that the Calvinistic tendencies of the people of Nejd had been kept at a white heat by the guiding spirit of their devout leader, with the consequence that Ibn Saud's zealots have not only wrestled the power out of the hands of the Shariffian family, but also have been called upon to steady a too liberal interpretation of the "book." Ibn Saud's cult broke down the barriers which priestcraft has been increasing with each successive generation. He gives a clear call: "Back to the Book," back to the original faith, shorn of all its reservations and additions of the clergy.

Ibn Saud.

It is in the effort of putting a period to the ultra-liberalism of Islam that Ibn Saud's triumph has proved of incalculable value. Indeed, the guiding principle of the working of the Grand Moslem Conference at Mecca—which I attended in June last—showed very clearly the thoughts that actuated the efforts of the Wahabi. What he does strive after is that there should not be any "break-away" from the true spirit of Islam. At the outset many had feared that he, as the guardian of the holy shrines of Islam, might perpetuate an orgy of iconoclasm; but recent events in the Hijaz have shown that Ibn Saud was fully aware that, by assuming the reins of the Hijaz Government, he was committing himself to a gigantic enterprise, in which a disregard of the religious susceptibilities of respective Islamic sects would detract from his influence, and he marvellously stayed the hands of many a zealot prone to go to excesses in "driving the liberalism out of Islam." He is fired by a formidable zeal for cultural reform, both in the Hijaz and amongst quite a large number of foreign Moslems, who have learned to value his advice. Nevertheless, he has not been sleeping on a bed of roses since his accession to the throne of the Hijaz a year ago, as all over the Moslem world frequent voices of dissent, even of vehement denunciation, have been raised against the advent of the Wahabi in Mecca.

The Persian Mejlis once postponed its meeting as a mark of resentment; an Indian committee of the clergy, styled Khudam al Haramain of Lucknow, made no end of noise; and the affair leading to the return of the Holy Carpet of Egypt during the last pilgrimage season not only brought down the anathema of theologians of Alhazr, but also public opinion in Cairo was greatly excited. Feelings at one time ran so high that an Egyptian newspaper proposed that the Egyptians should immediately convene an All-world Moslem Conference, when a mandate should be secured to oust Ibn Saud from the Hijaz, and beat

his army back to the Nejd if needs be. Campaigns of Mohammed Ali of 1810 were freely recalled to mind.

In these connections we must, of course, bear in mind the cross-currents of Islamic politics before crediting such anti-Wahabi movements—Persians, for instance; whilst no one can deny the excellent services of that country towards Islam, yet the Shias (who predominate in Persia) were never too enthusiastic about Mecca as compared to their secular shrines at Nejaf and Karbela in Iraq.

The good people of Khudam al Haramain of India, who have recruited the support of the Ali Brothers, are not over-particularly keen to see anybody guard the holy cities of Mecca and Medina except themselves, and give no cogent reason for it. But in respect of an Arab-Egyptian tension, I have heard it said, both at Mecca and elsewhere, that when the guardianship of the holy shrines was vested in the Sultans of Turkey, and the Shariff of Mecca was a vassal of the house of Osman, the Holy Carpet was sent from Egypt by the order of the Turkish sovereigns, as not only a privilege of the guardianship, but also as a prerogative of supremacy over the whole of Arabia. It was alleged that, along with other causes, it was King Husain who, upon the proclamation of his independence, refused to accept a gift which brought certain implications in its train: and it was frequently "whispered" during the last pilgrimage that this idea might once again be responsible for disturbing the religious felicities between Egypt and the Hijaz. Professors of this view seem also to think that the Mahmal affair is not entirely disassociated with the Cairo Moslem Conference of May last, when King Fuad's name was mentioned in connection with a resuscitation of the title of the Caliph.

There are now no competent observers of world diplomacy who cannot agree that a spirit of revivalism has definitely set in in Islam after the first wave of the revolt has passed. It has also been shown that there has been no revolt against the essence of the faith, but an insurrection against the thralldom of the clergy and the autocracy of Eastern monarchs. When once these two factors were destroyed, Islam has gained its strength, and is fast assuming the solidarity of its former years. And it has been asked whether as such the religion of the Prophet presents a menace to Christianity. I venture to answer this in a negative sense. For when the Christian faith itself is reeling under the impact of scientific materialism, which constitutes a very real danger to any system of morality, the Islamic danger to it—if any—can only be of a secondary significance. And I feel convinced that the modern conception of exclusive material gain is not bringing the life of men and women an inch nearer their original creed. So grave has the situation become that in the words of Lord Ernle "in 1850 it was a courageous act to question details of orthodox Christianity; to-day, in certain circles, courage is needed for their defence." The

Revival of
Islam.

threat to Christianity is through the mad rush after the materialistic as divorced from the philosophical, in the same degree as there was danger to Islam from scientific civilization, through which it suffered, and from which it has now emerged refined and strengthened through the efforts of the "Revivalists." Challenge there is in Islam to-day, but that is a challenge to the materialistic instincts of man, an instinct which never sustains peace in the world for long. (Applause.)

SIR ARNOLD WILSON: Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is not without some diffidence that I enter upon this discussion. It is impossible for anyone to do otherwise than appreciate and sympathize with our Lecturer's suspicion of what he calls "scientific materialistic civilization." We all feel it, never more than when we are in London, and never less than when we are in Islamic countries. I have spent some twenty years or more in Persia, Turkey, Kurdistan, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf—and have visited others, and my first comment upon our lecturer's views is that I am not prepared without very many saving clauses to admit that there is a conflict between what he calls "materialistic civilization" and Islam. On the contrary, I think that Islam has gained very much more that it has lost by adopting certain material and scientific aids to comfort and economic prosperity, without which education and progress are impossible. The adoption of railways, motor-cars, telegraphs, wireless, and aeroplanes by Afghanistan, by Iraq, and by Syria, for example, has in no way weakened the spirit of Islam, to which such things are in no way opposed. Where the Arab and Persian differ in my experience from many Orientals is that they welcome, take to themselves and apply to their own purposes, any scientific improvement that they consider likely to assist to make life more comfortable and to increase their own material welfare; at the same time they do not by any means become "materialists." If they feel that their culture and ideals are being endangered, if they even suspect that the basis of their own social order is threatened, they will at once throw over all those advantages. Sheikhs who have been accustomed to travel by camel and who own ten thousand or fifteen thousand camels have now invested in motor-cars in which they career across their ancestral deserts, but they are no less able to control their own people, and much better able to protect their interests. They have adopted and made their own every successive improvement in means of transport, in means of printing, and in the amenities of life that the West has offered them.

Had our lecturer been more in touch with recent developments in Persia, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, perhaps he might have been a little less inclined to assert that our contribution to the East has been purely materialistic. We have contributed throughout, especially in late years, something more than "materialism." Whatever seeds

of progress are coming to fruition in Eastern countries to-day have had their origin in the West, just as some ten or eleven centuries ago it was to the East that the West looked for light.

The truth is that there has been for the last two or three thousand years a constant interchange of spiritual and intellectual gifts from one to the other. The great religions have come from the East to the West; great advances in mathematics, in chemistry and medicine, improvements in agriculture and stockbreeding had their origin in the East, and after a time we of the West have given these things back in full measure developed and applied to fresh uses. There is nothing more interesting than to study the early origins of, for example, agriculture, which was highly developed in the East before it came to the West, or of astronomy, or of navigation, which were likewise highly developed by Sumerian and Semitic races; it is a theme that might be developed almost indefinitely. The principal fruits of Europe, and many of the animals we now use most commonly in agriculture, came originally in far distant days from the East. On the other hand, we have handed back many and great gifts to the East in things such as medical science, the use of steam and electricity, and, above all, an ethical outlook which has on the whole made life sweeter for the poor, and has mitigated human cruelty and curbed human ambition. But it is still true that Islam has a stability of culture which enables its adherents to face famine, misery, revolution and death with dignity, and still retain their finest characteristics. Eastern peoples are not degraded by misery and poverty as they sometimes are in the West. I do not, however, think that is due wholly or mainly to Islam, but to inherited characteristics far older than Islam.

I do not believe in Pan-Islamism either as a possibility in the future or a real movement in the present. I believe Islam is essentially a decentralized religion, and I think it is all to the good that it should remain so. The flowers that are sown all over the desert cannot be wiped out by years of drought; but once a tree is destroyed, it cannot be replanted without difficulty, and will take perhaps two hundred years to reach maturity. The flowers will come up again when the fruitful rain falls. Islam, like the flowers, has scattered its seeds widely from innumerable centres. It has a vitality which it draws from the national instincts and the habits of each individual race in which it was implanted thirteen or fourteen centuries ago. Though I do not regard Pan-Islamism as a reality, I recognize Islam of to-day as a very great force. It is changing its objectives and its outward manifestations are being altered, but as our Lecturer remarked, it is no weaker than it was before, but rather stronger. Finally, if I might make a suggestion, my own feeling about East and West is that essentially it is a difference of longitude rather than latitude. We do not claim to be on a higher level than Eastern countries, but we have a

common object and with them we are converging towards a common point as do the lines of longitude. Our common objective is the spiritual progress of the human race, the reality of which is, I think, demonstrated by the history of the world. We are moving, however, slowly, in a single direction, and that is progress. (Applause.)

Colonel JACOB: Sir Michael, Ladies and Gentlemen,—You have honoured me, an outsider, by asking me to say a few words.

I put it as a query. It all depends, it seems to me, on the meaning you give to the word "ferment." If you mean an "agitation" or "excitement," there is nothing particularly agitating Islam to-day any more than has agitated it since its earliest history. If, however, a ferment is a "leavening," I think there is to-day a strong leavening in process.

"Islam," says an eminent Moslem authority, "is independent of the Caliph," but let us briefly review the Caliphate.

Al Shāfa'i said that there were only five orthodox Caliphs—viz., Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, 'Ali, and 'Umar b. 'Abd al 'Aziz. Al Shāfa'i may have been biased. Some assert that the 4th Caliph 'Ali was the last of the Spiritual Caliphs. The Prophet said: "My successorship will last thirty years; thereafter will come Kings and Princes." "The rule of the Umayyads was a military despotism maintained in the interests of the *Arabs*. The 'Abbāsīd Dynasty which followed sought a wider basis—a *Moslem* Empire as opposed to an Arab one," so wrote Canon Sell. When the Eastern Caliphate was at its close, 'Abdul Rahman III., in A.D. 929, assumed in Spain the title and insignia of the Caliphate. A few years prior to this, the Fatimite (and Shia) Caliphate had risen in Egypt. This period is important in Moslem history as marking the existence of independent Caliphates—although it was after the 3rd Caliph, 'Uthman's, assassination, in 35 A.H., that Islam became separated into different parties.

With the rise of the Ottoman Caliphs, Islam found a strong Moslem King. The Caliph was one who claimed his right to administer politically the affairs of the Moslem world. This Turkish Caliphate has gone. The Turks in later years, or, more accurately, the *Young Turks*, wished to efface the Arab "tang" from their new programme. Prior to the Great War they were actively intent on altering the wording of the Koran to suit the Turanian taste. In Arabia their policy was the Ottomanization of the Peninsula; in Arab parlance it was expressed as "tatrik Jazirat al 'Arab," or the "Turquisition" of this tract. Finally, Turkish secularism and Turkish *nationalism* has prevailed, and has ousted first the Sultan and then the Caliph. The Turks are thus self-debarred from any voice in Islam's future Caliph.

The question to-day—a purely academic one for the Christian world—is whether Islam can be politically unified. "Is it not more reasonable to suppose," asked Macdonald of Hartford, Connecticut (in 1916),

"that the principle of nationality is now uppermost in Islam?" It is the swing of the pendulum back to the Umayyad's ideal—applied severally by each nation.

Who, in the Islamic world of to-day, can unite Islam politically? No one being, I believe. King Husein of the Hijaz was not able. India, for one, would have none of him. The Hashimite and Sherifial House has been eclipsed in the vicinity of the two sacred cities of Mecca and Al Medina. Can Ibn Saud, the conqueror of the Hijaz, do the needful? Will his Puritan creed, however pure it may be, please all sects in Islam? Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, whom we welcome in our midst, in writing to the Press this month, said: "An Anglo-Arab alliance is the need of the hour. When its results manifest themselves, contentment will prevail from Java to Africa. *Islam will be strengthened*, and anti-British propaganda will vanish into thin air." Yes, I agree that very excellent results *might* then accrue, but I think, with Macdonald, that "Islam is fast becoming more of a simple religion and less of a political system," and that "the Head of Islam *must be independent of external entanglements with non-Moslems*." If the Sirdar is looking for a *Caliph*, he cannot, surely, expect the help of *Great Britain* to affect the choice. Will India, will Afghanistan's ruler, will Persia, or Morocco, or King Fuad of Egypt, or the Zaidite Imam—a strong man in his Yemen Hills, with a vast horde of warriors; a man little accounted of to-day, solely because he is so little known—will *he*, or any of them, submit to the Caliphate of Ibn Saud? I have been associated with the Yemen since 1897, and I can assure you that Imam Yahya will never submit. He is styled by his own followers, "Amir al Muminin"; and the Turkish Power in the Yemen from 1873 to 1918 could not force him to abandon the style. Perhaps the new lord of the Hijaz has no such ambition.

Ibn Saud is not the "Master of Arabia," as his numerous British protagonists so often affirm. Ibn Sa'ud is wiser than his Western supporters. He has bitten off as much as he can adequately chew—to use a vulgarism—and he will be wise to consolidate his rule in the Hijaz, without becoming entangled in the hills and fastnesses of the Yemen—a country which withstood successfully the inroad of Turkish regulars for so many years. Even supposing that Ibn Saud could, and did, displace the personality of Imam Yahya, do you suppose that Zaidi warriors would "lie low" and permit his pacific penetration of the Yemen Province? The whole country would be in a chaotic condition, and remain so for all time; for the creeds of the Wahabis and of the Zaidis are as antagonistic as fire and ice. "Allah," they say, "can reconcile the conflicting properties of ice and fire"; but Ibn Saud? No. Even the Prophet himself would find the problem difficult, for the sectarian spirit was to follow his decease, and he had not to confront this difficulty. There is no outstanding personality

to-day strong enough to weld Islam into an integral and political unit, nor is there any need of this aim, for, if I may venture to say so, Islam will return to its spiritual source. There Allah is supreme, and has no need of Prophet or of Caliph. The word "Mohammedan" instead of "Moslem" is a misnomer. No Arab would adopt this nomenclature. In Arabia the *Shahāda*, or profession of faith, is not, "There is no god save Allah, and Mohammad is Allah's Messenger." The word "and" is omitted as suggestive of co-ordination between the two totally distinct affirmations. A Moslem is one who is *resigned to Allah*.

To revert to the "leavening" process and to take two important Islamic centres. Egypt is instinct with the cult of Europe. India is following hard after the phantom of Western civilization. In India the juxtaposition of Moslems with Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians, as well as with cults redolent of Christian influences—these all have left an indelible impress upon India's Moslems. Even in the "Cradle of Islam" it was left to an old-time Arab to address the worldly learned men of his day as follows: "O possessors of learning, your palaces are Cæsarian; your houses are those of Kasra; your garments those of Saul; your boots are like Goliath's; your vessels are of Pharaoh's pattern; your ships are of Korah; your banquets resemble those of the Times of Ignorance; and your religions are Satanic—where, then, are the things of the Prophet?"

And yet Islam, shorn of accretions, is a simple religion. Modern thought may call for a readjustment in interpretation, but the kernel of Islam remains secure, untouched. Its essence may be expressed in the words of the Koran: "Surely they who believe, and the Jews, and the Christians, and the Sabians—whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does good—they have their reward from their Lord. For them there is no fear, nor shall they grieve." Prohibitions do not constitute the essence of any religion. Is it not the "Sermon on the Mount" rather than the Decalogue of the Exodus that lightens the path of the Christian? So "Al Islam" is an appeal to the spirit that resides in man, and Islam will exist as long as the spirit of Islam exists in its votaries.

I will close my prolix remarks—you must long since have consigned me to a Trappist monastery!—by quoting the words of the prophet of Islam, who said:

"Al Islam has come into the world as a stranger, and will return a stranger, as it came. It will cling to the space between the two mosques, just as a serpent clings to its hole."

This it will do, irrespective of Islam's ruler or rulers. These will ever be in the plural number. I am not apprehensive of any untoward ferments in Islam, which will work out its own salvation, provided we let it strictly alone.

LORD HEADLEY said there was not time enough to say all he should

wish about the many aspects of the subject. He gave an account of his conversion to Islam and his pride in pointing to Islam as the religion most free from dogmatic intolerance. He had lived for some time in Islamic countries and had always found the greatest tolerance among the Moslems; they had always been ready to listen to the other side.

"When I was out in India some thirty years ago I remember very well certain very sanguinary conflicts which took place between the Sunnis and the Shiahhs, the Shiahhs being the Persians I think mostly, and the Sunnis, much the larger numerically, were chiefly in India where the population is about seventy millions. Then we have the Wahabis, who have been alluded to in the lecture we have listened to. The Wahabis came into Mecca two years after I had left. I had the honour and privilege of going to the Holy City in 1923, when I was the guest of the then Shareef of Mecca, King Husein, who was my very kind host. Mecca was full and everything possible was done for the convenience of the visitors. I went about dressed in ordinary clothes and never had any interference or trouble of any kind, but was treated very kindly by all. I am told that when the Wahabis came into Mecca last year, one of the first things they did was to smash up the *hookahs*, because they said it was wicked to smoke. I remember several old friends who used to sit on the doorsteps pulling away at their *hookahs*. I used to try and talk to them, and it is sad to think of them without any *hookahs* to comfort them. Other things were done which tend to show that the Wahabis are rather strict and intolerant people. They are great sticklers as to the letter, but do not seem to care so much about the spirit, it seems to me, though I may be doing them an injustice. There is another sect of excellent people I have been with. I am very fond of them, but they have an idea that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, whose book I have here, was the Promised Messiah, and they make very stringent rules which seem to me to be rather unfair and derogatory. For instance, a man who is an Ahmadi is not allowed to attend a funeral and say prayers over the dead body of a man who does not happen to be an Ahmadi, although he may be a good Moslem; nor is a man allowed to say his prayers under the leadership of another Moslem unless that Moslem happens to be an Ahmadi.

"I would like to say one more word. The Guardian of the Holy Places, the Sultan of Turkey, was for long looked upon as the Sheikh of Islam. He was the Head of the Islamic Faith and the Protector of the Sacred Places, and why was he so? Because as Sultan of Turkey he was the most powerful monarch, and therefore best able by his position and influence and actual force of arms to take charge of the Holy Places. That I think is very well known. Another thing that is important for him is that he should be a good Moslem and that he should, if possible, be a Seyid. My dear old friend Husein, ex-King of the Hijaz, was a

very good Moslem, most religious, and I have said my prayers with him over and over again in Mecca in the Grand Mosque. With regard to the ferments, I think a good many of them are likely to be caused by the Wahabi influence and the Ahmadi influence, and I think it is a great pity. I do not know for certain, but I am told there are nearly 400 sects in the Christian faith, ranging from the Roman Catholic right away down to the lowest of the Plymouth Brethren. (Laughter.) I do not think there are more than about half a dozen sects in Islam—so far as I can make out. That possibly may be taken as a healthy sign of the times." (Applause.)

MAULVIE ABDUR RAHIM DARD (Imam of the London Mosque): Worthy Chairman, Sisters and Brothers,—I thank first of all my God for giving me an opportunity of expressing myself before you, and with that I also thank the worthy Chairman for calling upon me after all other friends.

I may say that I do not think, as my friend Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah has suggested, that it is the Western civilization, or the scientific or material progress of the Western people, that has been the cause of the downfall of the Moslems. I do not see any reason for this, and I have every sympathy with Sir Arnold Wilson. I think he is quite reasonable in maintaining that it is not their fault. The East, in my opinion, must rather be thankful to the West for all that they enjoy now in this respect. Material progress and scientific inventions do not necessarily make a people leave religion and degenerate in life spiritually or morally. It is, on the other hand, the internal mind: if it becomes corrupt, even prayers cannot help. It is really one's own self that is at fault in such matters. Moslems have left their religion and have forsaken their God absolutely, and so they have degenerated; and this is in accordance with the prophecies of the Holy Prophet Mohammed himself. He had said: "A time is coming when my followers will become corrupt and will be divided into a number of sects, and at that time there will appear a man from amongst them who will bring them back to God." I belong to the movement to which Lord Headley has referred in his remarks, and our movement stands for the moral and spiritual regeneration of Islam. I think Lord Headley has been either misinformed or has consciously misrepresented our teachings. I cannot answer his questions in so short a time, but I may say: "How can we give our daughters to, or pray behind, the non-Ahmadis who are actually stoning us to death for our beliefs?" He says ours is like the Athanasian Creed, while we are the only ones of all the Moslem sects, including perhaps that of Lord Headley and his friends as well, that do not believe in anything like that. All the orthodox Moslems believe that those who are not Moslems are going to everlasting perdition. That is the Athanasian Creed; but the founder of our movement, the Promised Messiah, has told us that this is unreasonable. God is love

and more than love; it is impossible to think, and is incompatible with Divine mercy, that He would send a man to eternal damnation for his actions covering only sixty or seventy years of life. It is unreasonable, mischievous, and un-Islamic. Those who do not believe in the prophets of God will suffer hell, but it is not eternal. The word used with hell is *abad*, which in the Arabic language would mean a very long punishment, but it does not mean eternal damnation. There is no doubt that all unbelievers and corrupt minds have to be kept somewhere, here or hereafter, in some hell—you can call it a hospital or reformatory—but it is not eternal or everlasting.

I am sure Lord Headley, if he belongs to any sect, though I do not think he does, will have to admit that it is one of the beliefs of the orthodox Moslems that those who do not believe in the Holy Prophet Mohammed are eternally damned. He may disassociate himself from this and create his own Islam as it were, as he sometimes tries to do, but that will not do. It is a grievous and painful thing to have to refer to such things. I wish he had kept silent; but I remember, some time ago, it was he who suggested that drinking was forbidden by Islam only for hot countries. It does not apply to this country. He went so far as to suggest that Moslem prayers required some modification to suit the Western people. I can show him British people who kneel with me, behind me, like all Moslems, and do not want any modification at all. I am sure the number of such people is increasing and will increase. He has accused us of intolerance, so I may be allowed to say a few words about it. You know that we have built a mosque here, the first mosque in London. It was I myself of the Ahmadiis, a humble follower of the Promised Messiah, who was broadminded enough to call upon Ibn Saud—who regards others as infidels and is an infidel himself according to the orthodox Moslems, Shiah and Sunni—to request him to send his representative to open our mosque.

After that I will say a few words on the subject "Ferments in the World of Islam." I think it is not a ferment only in the world of Islam, it is a ferment in the whole world, and this was written in 1905 by the founder of our community. He says: "There is a ferment in the whole world and in the heavens for the sake of Truth; and the people are coming towards it, even the freedom-loving people of the West," who are accused of corrupting the Islamic countries. The words are no doubt true. He was born in 1836 and laid claim to being a messenger and reformer in 1890. From then until now, you know, kingdoms have been consigned to oblivion and the whole world has been completely revolutionized. His movement is the only ferment that will bring round the whole world to union between East and West, and Islam will be the uniting link. Islam means to be at peace with God and man. I hope the day is not far off when the East will be united with the West, and I believe Great Britain will take a lead in that.

She has already begun to take interest in religion ; the very centre of materialism, as she is accused of being, is taking more interest than the Turks who are turning mosques into dancing-halls. I hope it will be Great Britain, according to the prayers of the Promised Messiah, that will lead the whole world not only in politics, but I should say in religion as well. I end my words with a prayer that, as the physical sun shines and does not set over the British Empire, I pray that the spiritual sun, when they become Moslems, may as well never set on the British people. (Applause.)

The LECTURER : I have not a long speech to make and I am certainly not going to enter into any religious controversy. I fear that the title of the lecture has confused many of us. Some thought that I had come here with a personal message and proposition as to who should be the next Khalifa ; others that I came to tell them what are the new sections which are springing up every other day among Islamic people, as Wahabis, Ahmadis, and so on. I am afraid everybody had made up his mind what he was going to say before he had an opportunity of listening to what I had to say. As to Wahabism I hold no brief for it. To attend a pilgrimage or to be at the Grand Moslem Conference does not mean that I am a Wahabi or pro-Ibn Saud. A man can still tell the facts and not be styled as pro- or anti-Wahabi. Those who were present when Mr. Philby spoke on this platform will remember I was fresh from Mecca and said something which was different from what I am saying to-day. I have learnt a great deal since. The point is that really no constructive criticism has been levelled against what I had actually made out. Its point, which is still somewhat hazy in the minds of most of you, is that materialism, as opposed to philosophy, is entering into conflict with Islamic people. This point, I am sorry to say, the Maulvie has misunderstood too ; I do not mean that materialism has shattered the very root of the philosophy on which Islam is built, but the fact that the Western impact has been felt all along from China to Morocco is undeniable, and that impact has given rise to alien symptoms. I see unmistakable signs of it. This evening questions of theology have been dragged in, but it was no purpose of mine to introduce any point of comparative theology, Christian or Islamic. It was merely consideration of cultural phenomena which was reeling under the impulse of the Western materialism to-day in Asia. Then the question regarding the next Khalifa was not in the scheme of discussion at all any more than it was my purpose to say whether Imam Yahya was going to fight with the Wahabi king. We know they might be at loggerheads, and as to who will win I have no reason to prophesy, and I have no axe to grind whosoever is made Khalifa. This matter stands as a separate form of discussion. But I think the only real criticism which has been offered to me is by Sir Arnold Wilson and some remarks which Sir Arnold made are valuable.

Yet I feel that materialism has made a palpable effect on the culture of the people from which there has been a revolt, and from the revolt we have emerged. That is the only point. (Applause.)

General Sir Edmund Barrow, as Chairman in Sir Michael O'Dwyer's absence, closed the meeting with a hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer and speakers.

NOTE FROM LORD HEADLEY.

Some of my remarks on Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah's lecture to the Central Asian Society on January 19, 1927, seem to have given offence to Mr. Dard, the Imam of the Southfields Mosque. This I regret, but seeing that the title of the lecture was "Ferments in the World of Islam," I think I was well within my rights in calling attention to the attitude and aspirations of certain Islamic sects which have been undeniably productive of no little commotion and ferment.

It will not be denied that the Sunnis and Shiāhs, the Wahabis and the Ahmadis, are recognized sects of Islam, and I took the opportunity of alluding to certain authorized instructions appearing in a work entitled "Ahmad." The present leader of the Ahmadi movement is His Holiness Hazrat Mirza Mahmūd Ahmad, who is described as Caliph II., in succession I believe to his father, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, India, who was recognized by his followers as the Promised Messiah and Mahdī.

I have read the "Teachings of Islam" and other works from the pen of Ahmad of Qadian, who must have been a saintly and beautiful character in every way, and I hold him in the highest esteem and veneration, especially on account of his just appreciation of the marvellous qualities of our Holy Prophet Mohammed, of whom he says: "The grace of God granted the Holy Prophet suitable opportunities for the display of all sorts of morals such as meekness, charity, courage, forgiveness, justice, etc., in a highly excellent degree which is without parallel in history."

Amongst the instructions to the new Ahmadis appearing in the book "Ahmad" are the following:

1. "It is the duty of every Ahmadi that he should pray under the leadership of Ahmadi Imams only."
2. "It has been prohibited that Ahmadis should give their daughters to marriage to non-Ahmadis, for wives are generally influenced by their husbands and thus it is making a soul apostate."
3. "Likewise, Ahmadis should not attend the funeral services of non-Ahmadis, for it would amount to interceding with God for a man who has proved himself an enemy by denying and opposing the Promised Messiah."
4. "He who does not believe in Mohammed—peace be on his soul!—is an unbeliever (Kafir), but he who rejects the Mahdī and the Promised Messiah shall also be deprived of the light of faith. The result is the same in both cases."

To my simple and, I hope, unbiased mind, these declarations are far too dictatorial and can hardly fail to promote dissension, since they must prove distasteful to a large proportion of the great Moslem community. Not very long ago I informed Mr. Dard that I could not myself subscribe to them as they savoured too much of Christian intolerance, and might almost be inspired by the spirit of the Athanasian Creed which most of us unite in condemning.

In one place, p. 462, of the book "Ahmad," the Promised Messiah is reported to have said :

"Consider then the consequences of not believing in me. I do not say it of myself, I solemnly declare it as a truth that my rejection implies the renouncing of the whole of Quran. . . . Again, my rejection means the rejection of the Holy Prophet Mohammed himself, and therefore before one should venture to reject me one should seriously consider whom he is going to reject."

I do not propose to go into the question of the Messiahship of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, but I may be permitted to point out that the high-handed line now being taken by the Ahmadis is hardly in accord with the true spirit of Islam which places toleration very high amongst the virtues to be encouraged. The innovation is entirely from the Ahmadis, who can hardly complain because questions are asked concerning the new rules. The last excerpt leads me to understand that all Moslems who fail to recognize the claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad are to be placed outside the pale and can no longer be regarded as true Mohammedans. I look upon this as a very serious matter, for it looks like an attempt to bind the consciences of the whole Moslem world to the views of one particular sect ; indeed, it reminds one of a slogan used elsewhere—"no salvation outside the Church."

THE POSITION IN CHINA*

MR. CHAIRMAN, Ladies and Gentlemen,—Had I been giving this lecture a month ago, or even a shorter time ago than that, I should have considered it desirable to dwell at some length on certain aspects in the present situation, which I think I can now take more or less for granted. I should have considered it desirable, for example, to dwell on the Bolshevik aspect of the situation, to show how Bolshevik influences began and how they are responsible for a great deal that has taken place. Similarly I should have considered it necessary to point out to you the size of our interests in China — the Chairman mentioned the figure just now — and I should have gone on to emphasize the imperial aspect of the whole question, arising as it very well may, though it has not yet, through Hong Kong. However, to an audience such as this, after all that has been published about Bolshevism, after all that has been published about Nationalism and the very great necessity for distinguishing between the Bolshevistic elements and the Nationalistic elements, I think that I can occupy your time

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held on Wednesday, February 9, 1927, at 74, Grosvenor Street, W., and a lecture was delivered by Mr. E. Manico Gull on "The Position in China." Sir Michael O'Dwyer presided.

In introducing the lecturer the Chairman said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is my pleasing duty to introduce to you Mr. E. Manico Gull to lecture to us on "The Position in China." That is a subject on which he can speak with authority, having lived in that country for twenty years. If there is one subject that is uppermost in our thoughts to-day it is the situation in China; for there not only is our prestige as an empire at stake, but also the security of the hundreds of millions of British capital which have been invested in China for the development of that country, and, above all, the safety of our British fellow-subjects, from fifteen to twenty thousand. How the situation has arisen which menaces those interests it is not for me to say. Anyhow, we know the policy of the British Government as declared in the King's Speech yesterday. There are two factors in the situation: one is our policy towards China, which everyone admits is a just and generous one; the other is the attitude not of China, for to-day there is no China, but of the warring Chinese factions, and especially of the Cantonese or Nationalist movement. How far that movement is one of genuine nationalism, how far it is a camouflage for the personal ambitions which play so large a part in Chinese politics, how far it is dominated by outside influences hostile to Great Britain and the British Empire, I am not in a position to say; but I am sure our lecturer this evening will enlighten us on all those points. He has special knowledge of the situation in China, having lived for twenty years at Nanking, Shanghai, and Peking, having known many outstanding Chinese personalities, including Mr. Chen, and having left China only about two months ago. We are particularly fortunate in having as lecturer one able to bring us so much light and recent information on the subject. (Applause.)

more profitably by dealing with those aspects of the situation with which His Majesty's Government is dealing at the present time in the negotiations at Hankow and Peking. I think if I deal with the points that are there involved I shall on the one hand give you an insight into the views and the aims of the Nationalists, and at the same time show you the very practical difficulties that exist.

I must warn you, I am afraid, that in the endeavour to put these points before you I shall be dealing with a subject which is to some extent a technical subject. I am not going to give you, I am afraid, anything in the nature of a popular lecture. I want to lay these points before you because it is most essential to my mind that the issues involved in the negotiations at Hankow and Tientsin should be clearly understood in England, and I cannot imagine a better audience before which to lay those points than this one.

As you know, the Government has made certain proposals both at Hankow and at Peking, and just by way of refreshing your memories I may run through those proposals as published the other day. As published they state that our Government are prepared to recognize the modern Chinese law courts as the competent courts for cases brought by British plaintiffs or complainants, and to waive the right of attendance of a British assessor at the hearing of such cases. His Majesty's Government are also prepared to apply, as far as practicable, in British courts in China the modern Chinese Civil and Commercial Codes and duly enacted subordinate legislation, as and when such laws and regulations are promulgated and enforced. The Government are also prepared to make British subjects in China liable to pay such regular and legal Chinese taxation, not involving discrimination against British subjects or British goods as is in fact imposed on and paid by Chinese citizens. The Government are prepared to discuss and enter into arrangements, according to the particular circumstances of each port, for the modification of the municipal administrations of British concessions so as to bring them into line with the administration of the adjacent Chinese areas. There are one or two other points, but those are the main ones.

Now in making these proposals, in making these offers, the aim of the Government is to reassert certain principles with which our connection with China began, and to bring to an end where possible the *imperium in imperio*, which through various circumstances has been built up in China; and it has got to do this while at the same time protecting the legitimate British interests that have grown up during the process.

Now the first point I want to make quite clear to you is this, that according to the original treaties foreigners are not exempted from taxation. There is nothing in the original treaties which exempts foreigners from taxation in China, and yet as a matter of fact, with the

exception of Customs duties and land taxes foreigners for the most part do not pay any taxes. Similarly, there is nothing in the treaties to withdraw Chinese subjects from Chinese judicial control, and yet until quite recently there were a very large number of Chinese who to all intents and purposes were withdrawn from Chinese judicial control. The treaties do not state that the Customs duties shall be collected by foreigners, nor do they provide for the banking of the revenue when collected in foreign banks, and yet that has for some time past been and is at present the procedure. So you will see that a good deal has been built up which is not actually provided for by treaties, and it is that situation which is partially responsible for the present movement in China; it is that situation which the Government has now to tackle and to alter.

Now how comes it that this situation has arisen? How comes it that we enjoy in China a number of rights and privileges with which we did not start, and that we do a large number of things in China for which we can give no actual treaty warrant?

Let me take first of all the extensions that have grown up of our extraterritorial rights. The first mention of those rights was in resolutions issued in pursuance of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. In virtue of that treaty, as you will all remember, we obtained Hong Kong, and five ports were opened in China, amongst them the great port of Shanghai; not, of course, then a great port at all, but no more than a mud flat. The resolutions laid down: "Regarding the punishment of English criminals the English Government will enact the laws necessary to attain that end, and the Consul will be empowered to put them into force; and regarding the punishment of Chinese criminals, these will be tried and punished by their own laws." That was developed by the Treaty of Tientsin into the following:

"Chinese subjects who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China. British subjects who may commit any crime in China shall be tried and punished by the Consul, or other public functionary authorized thereto, according to the laws of Great Britain. Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides."

"A British subject having reason to complain of a Chinese must proceed to the Consulate and state his grievance. The Consul will inquire into the merits of the case, and do his utmost to arrange it amicably. In like manner, if a Chinese have reason to complain of a British subject, the Consul shall no less listen to his complaint, and endeavour to settle it in a friendly manner. If disputes take place of such a nature that the Consul cannot arrange them amicably, then he shall request the assistance of the Chinese authorities, that they may together examine into the merits of the case and decide it equitably."

"If criminals, subjects of China, shall take refuge in Hong Kong, or on board the British ships there, they shall upon due requisition by the Chinese authorities be searched for, and on proof of their guilt be delivered up. In like manner, if Chinese offenders take refuge in the houses or on board the vessels

of British subjects at the open ports, they shall not be harboured or concealed, but shall be delivered up, on due requisition by the Chinese authorities, addressed to the British Consul."

"All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British authorities."

"The Chinese Government will place no restrictions whatever upon the employment by British subjects of Chinese subjects in any lawful capacity."

That was the original extraterritorial basis on which our relations with the Chinese were in the first instance founded. I warned you at the beginning that I was bound to be a little technical, but we can pass on now to the next point, which is to show you how this original basis extended, how from having these rights, these rights that I have just read (not all of which of course are connected with extraterritoriality—the right to employ Chinese subjects, for example, is not an extraterritorial right) we came to occupy a position, especially in Shanghai, which exceeds the authority given to us by treaty. I will take Shanghai because the story of that port illustrates the process in the best and clearest way.

Between September, 1853, and 1855 the native city of Shanghai, as you probably remember, was occupied by the Taiping rebels, and in order to escape from them very large numbers fled into the foreign area of Shanghai, which at that time was only about 470 acres in extent (it is now eight and two-thirds square miles, but that was the original size of it); and with this large influx of a Chinese population fleeing from the wrath and cruelties of the Taipings, it became necessary for the authorities of the settlement to seek wider powers of government than they actually possessed. Accordingly in 1854 a set of land regulations was issued, with the approval of the Chinese on the one side and of the Diplomatic Body in Peking on the other, and under those regulations, as Mr. H. B. Morse says, "the Government having authority over the soil and the Governments having authority over the persons and property of the foreigners delegated to those foreigners the highest power in all Governments—that of taxing and policing their own community." It was not intended, however, that this power should withdraw Chinese residents from Chinese control. It was not intended that it should withdraw them from Chinese fiscal control; on the contrary, the Chinese-American treaty of 1858 states quite clearly: "Grants of right or interest in any tract of land should in no event be construed to divest the Chinese authorities of their right of jurisdiction over persons and property within the said tract of land, except so far as that right may have been expressly relinquished by treaty." Mr. Bruce, who was the British Envoy at the time, dealing with this particular point in a communication with the Shanghai settlement, put the matter very clearly. He said: "The Chinese Government has never formally abandoned its rights over its own subjects, nor has

Her Majesty's Government ever claimed, or expressed any desire to exercise, a protectorate over them. The only case in which, consistently with the principles laid down for the guidance of Her Majesty's authorities in this country, the Consul has a right to interfere is where the Chinese is in the employ of a British firm, and where there is reason for believing that the arrest of the Chinese servant is an outrage through him on his employer. . . . Because we protect Shanghai from falling a prey to a horde of brigands—the Taipings—it does not follow that we are prepared to interfere with the natural relation of the Chinese to their own Government." In virtue of that authoritative statement coming down to the Shanghai community from Peking, it was agreed to reach a sort of compromise in the matter of taxation, and to allow the Chinese authorities to levy in the settlement a poll tax that was being levied in the native city. Nevertheless, the Shanghai people replied to the views of the Envoy in Peking, and in their memorial they put the matter this way. They admitted that according to the strict letter of the treaties Mr. Bruce was perfectly right; but they maintained, on the other hand, that according to the spirit of the treaties he was not. They put the point in this way—they said: "It is of very great importance to the future safety and well-being of this important port that some restrictions be placed upon the actions of the local native authorities within the limits of the foreign settlements"; and if you will try and picture for a moment what the condition of things must have been then, with this very large Chinese population—not less than than five hundred thousand—flooding into what was an exceedingly small area, I think you will agree that the desire of the Shanghai community to protect themselves from official encroachments on the part of the Chinese was one which we can quite understand. It must be remembered that for precisely the same reason arrangements had been entered into in regard to Chingkiang, Hankow, and Tientsin, where we have concessions. The leases of those concessions stated quite definitely: "In the allotting of ground to British subjects, in the construction of roads, 'and in every other matter appertaining to the said ground,' the British Consul shall exercise sole control, and may from time to time make such regulations as he sees fit." That was the basis laid for the government of the concessions—the difference between a concession and a settlement being simply this: that in a concession land is leased by government to government—by the Chinese Government to the British Government—whereas in the settlement of Shanghai and other such places land was taken up by British residents direct from the Chinese owners. Well, the suggested compromise of a poll tax fell through, and from that time down to the present time the Chinese have not levied taxes in the settlement other than Customs duty and land taxes, the principle being the one which was contained

in the Shanghai memorial to Peking—namely, that it was essential to protect the Government of Shanghai from interference by the Chinese officials, and to prevent the growth of a dual administration.

How, then, how did the Chinese come to be withdrawn from judicial control? The origin is to be found in exactly the same circumstances—namely, the Taiping rebellion. When all these Chinese began to flood into the settlement, nobody quite knew who was responsible for them. The Chinese authorities were not certain, our own people were not certain; but somebody obviously had to take the job in hand. The Shanghai magistrate proposed that he should be supplied with a list of Chinese who had entered foreign employment as servants, so that he might know exactly who was doing what, and keep an eye over them. That appeared to the Consuls to be a dangerous thing to let the Chinese officials do, and their answer to the request was as follows: "If the Chinese authorities wish to arrest anyone, a specific charge describing the offence must be made, and if the accused claim foreign protection the claim must then be referred for the decision of the Consul concerned." That strikes me, as I think it will strike you, as a perfectly legitimate precaution to take in regard to the request which the Chinese officials had made. However, the problem did not stop at that: it was not as simple as that. The Chinese population was mounting up and up, and some sort of arrangement had to be arrived at in regard to the exercise of jurisdiction over them. The practice for some time was for all cases to come before a sort of mixed tribunal, and it was eventually decided to establish a regular mixed court, the deputy of the Chinese magistrate taking cognizance in police cases, and hearing purely civil cases between Chinese, whereas, in accordance with the terms of the treaty which I read to you at the beginning, in cases where foreigners were concerned—either civil or criminal cases—there was to be present an assessor of the nationality of the plaintiff or complainant. In 1869 those regulations were modified in order to enable any case which had a foreign interest in it to be tried by the Chinese magistrate, with a foreign assessor present. That position continued from then right up to 1911.

But in 1911, as you will remember, occurred the revolution which turned the Manchus off the throne of China. The Chinese magistrates of the mixed court fled, incidentally taking with them all the cash they could lay their hands on. They disappeared and the court was left in the utmost confusion. Again, in circumstances not dissimilar from those of the Taiping rebellion, some actual practical method of meeting the difficulties that arose had to be found, and so, as a temporary measure, it was determined that the Consuls should appoint a Chinese magistrate, and that that Chinese magistrate should be paid for the time being from municipal funds. The arrangement was in origin a temporary one: it was not intended to continue it. It was thought the

best way out of the difficulty at the time. But the arrangement continued for very much longer, and it continued largely because as a result of the anti-Manchu revolution all government in China began to deteriorate. Year after year matters got worse, civil wars constantly succeeded one another; and to avoid the dangers of living under Chinese rule larger and larger numbers of Chinese came down to live in Shanghai, just as larger and larger numbers of them went to live at Tientsin. So that ultimately you had this position: you had a large number of Chinese living in Shanghai, many actually taking out foreign nationality papers. You had a court which was supposed to be a Chinese court, and which was applying the Chinese law, actually functioning under a Chinese magistrate who was really the nominee of the Consuls. It was a very anomalous position, but a position which worked very satisfactorily, the proof of that fact being the large numbers of Chinese who came to live in Shanghai to enjoy the protection which the arrangement gave them. But, as you will see, in two very important directions, fiscal and judicial, the community of Shanghai had travelled a very considerable distance from the original arrangement provided for in the treaties.

Next to come to the Customs, which, as I said at the beginning, are not by treaty supposed to be collected by foreigners, nor is the revenue supposed to be placed in foreign banks. Here again the origin of the present Customs service and the present Customs practice was the Taiping rebellion of 1853. On the seventh of September, 1853, the native city fell into rebel hands. The Custom house was burnt, the Chinese magistrate fled into the settlement, and what was to be done? To whom were duties to be paid? The first arrangement arrived at was not to pay any duties at all, but to give bonds for their payment. Later on, when the arrangement proved unsatisfactory, temporary Custom houses were opened; but they, it was very soon perceived, had insufficient authority to run the administration. As a way out an arrangement was arrived at with the Chinese authorities whereby three foreign inspectors were appointed, the arrangement being dated June 29, 1854. One of these was an American, one a Frenchman and the other a British subject. The Frenchman and the American very shortly afterwards dropped out, so that you were left with a British subject responsible for the collection of Customs duties; and then four years later, by the rules of trade attached to the Treaty of Tientsin, it was provided that "the said officer, that is to say the Chinese superintendent of trade, will be at liberty of his own choice and independently of the suggestion or nomination of any British subject he may see fit to help him in the administration of the Customs." That was how the present Chinese Maritime Customs Service originated: it originated owing to force of circumstances. It originated in and was first applied only to Shanghai; gradually it was extended to other ports.

But up to 1911 all that the foreigners did was to collect the Customs duties: they were not in any sense responsible for the handling of the duties. The money was paid in Chinese banks, and foreigners had nothing to do with that side of the business. All that they were responsible for was to see that the right duties were collected. The circumstances of 1911 I have just related to you, and they had an effect on the Customs similar in a sense to the effect which they had on the mixed court. Some of the Custom houses fell into the hands of the revolutionaries. What was to be done with the money that was being collected? The arrangement arrived at, after various suggestions had been made, was that the duties should be paid into foreign banks; and one reason why that arrangement was arrived at was because the Anglo-German loan of 1896 had fallen into default. You sometimes hear it said that China has never defaulted: it is not true of that particular loan. She did for a time default, and it was owing to that default that this arrangement of paying the money into foreign banks was originally conceived. The agreement was a perfectly formal one made in 1912, and in 1913 altered to read as follows: "The banks chiefly interested—*i.e.*, the Hong kong and Shanghai Bank, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the Russo-Asiatic Bank—shall be custodians of the Customs funds at Shanghai; at the end of each month, beginning with January, 1914, the surplus, after all payments due each month on account of loans secured by the Customs revenue and contracted previous to 1900 have been duly met, shall be divided *pro rata* amongst the banks having charge of the indemnity service" (that is to say, the Boxer indemnity service) "up to the amount of the instalments respectively due to them each month." At the beginning of the Great War the German bank dropped out.

Now that was in origin a provisional arrangement. It was an arrangement arrived at in order to safeguard the moneys collected by the Customs, a certain portion of which moneys was earmarked for the service of three loans, generally spoken of as the pre-Boxer loans. It was not intended that the arrangement should be a permanent one, but as a matter of fact it remained permanent and a number of other developments took place. One was that in July, 1917, the service of the reorganization loan, in which perhaps a good many are interested, was placed on the Customs and taken from the salt. In the same year, after the Chinese declaration of war against Germany, the monthly sums due to Germany as her share of the Boxer Indemnity were cancelled and placed to the service of certain domestic loans, the money being banked in a foreign bank. Subsequently the Austrian and Russian indemnity moneys were treated in the same way, and, furthermore, in 1921 the Inspector-General of Customs, Sir Francis Aglen, was authorized by the Chinese Government to apply the surplus—that is to say, the money left over after foreign loans had been met, and after the Boxer Indemnity

had been met, for the service of domestic obligations. The surplus was used for the consolidation of certain other Chinese domestic loans.

Well, then, what was the position? You had foreigners collecting the money under a British Inspector-General; you had that money being placed in foreign banks, of which one of the chief was a British bank; and, furthermore, you had all that was not necessary to cover foreign obligations being used for certain domestic loans, nearly all of them contracted by the Peking Government, which for a number of years had been fighting the Southern Government.

The consequences were important, especially from the point of view of what has recently taken place. As regards Canton, in 1918 and 1919 the Cantonese put forward a claim to their share of the surplus—that is to say, of the money not required for foreign obligations. They threatened to seize the Custom house if their share was not given to them, a threat which had to be replied to. They were warned that if they did seize the Custom house certain consequences would follow. In 1919 an arrangement was arrived at as between the Cantonese and the Peking Government, whereby the Cantonese got a share—13·7 per cent.—of the total, and they were paid this share until May, 1920, when, owing to the existence of rival parties in Canton, nobody knew who was entitled to receive the proportion. There were three men who claimed it, on one side—Sun-Yat-sen, Tang-Shao-i, and Wu-Ting-fang; but they were all driven out of Canton, and so the money for the time being was withheld and placed in safe custody in the hands of the Inspector-General. Later, in 1920, however, the three men got back to Canton, and they threatened to seize the Customs in Canton. In 1923 they made a fourth threat, and it was necessary for the Powers to keep, from December, 1923, to April, 1924, a number of warships in the vicinity of Canton in case the threat should be carried out. In 1924 there was a fifth threat made. That was the position in which we were landed in regard to Canton.

Similarly we got into awkward relations with the Central Government. In 1919 the Central Government put forward a request that when all foreign obligations had been met, any surplus should be automatically released without the consent of the Diplomatic Body. In 1920 they put forward the same request, and on both occasions the request was refused. The basis of the refusal was in part this: the Diplomatic Body said, "If we agree to release all the Customs surplus without any sort of reference to us at all, we know what will probably happen to that money. We know that it will be spent in armaments and in civil war, and the fact that we are releasing it in this ready way will get us into trouble with the Southerners." So they declined to agree that automatically and without any reference to them the money should become releasable when there was enough of it to release. Then, in 1921, a demand was made by the Chinese Govern-

ment to raid the very fund which they had agreed the Inspector-General should use for the service of the domestic loans. The Diplomatic Body supported the Inspector-General in not yielding to the attempt to get money from him—money which he regarded as being pledged for the service of the loans for which he had made himself responsible; and in consequence of this attitude on the part of the Diplomatic Body and on the part of Sir Francis Aglen, there was a great deal of abuse, not only of him, but of Great Britain. In 1924, when there was a big civil war taking place in North China, the Inspector-General undertook the service of certain Treasury bills, a step which had nothing at all to do with the Diplomatic Body or with Great Britain. But the Chinese believed that it had, and the Chinese accused the British of quite deliberately taking sides in a civil war and using Sir Francis Aglen, who, they said, was a British agent. They accused the Government of using him to back one set of Chinese militarists against another. Thus by the end of 1924 and the beginning of 1925 there was a very great deal of ill-feeling on the part of the Chinese in regard to our position in respect of the Customs service. You had a dissatisfied South and a not particularly satisfied North, and, as you know, it was on May 30, 1925, that the storm broke. It was in May, 1925, that the riots took place in Shanghai, and everything that has followed since then can be linked up with that affair.

Well, I think that in going over these events I have shown you how, through force of circumstances, arising first of all through the Taiping rebellion and then through the anti-Manchu rebellion, we had got into a position which was never originally contemplated. When regard is had to the circumstances, the position is entirely intelligible, and from a practical point of view justifiable. At the same time, we have given cause to the Nationalists in China to resent what we have done.

It is out of this position that the British Government is at the present time trying to get. It has made certain offers, the offers I read to you at the beginning of this lecture, which will modify the position that I have sketched to you. The question of the Customs has not yet, so far as I am aware, come up, but it is pretty certain to come up. Sir Francis Aglen, as you know, has recently been dismissed, and whether he will be reinstated or not remains to be seen. But, in any case, even if he were reinstated, the whole question of the foreign control of the Customs revenue is bound to be raised when and if China gets tariff autonomy, or, in fact, gets the $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. increase, for refusing to collect which the Inspector-General has been dismissed.

It is not an easy position out of which to negotiate this country, for the obvious reason that while the Government is most anxious to do full justice to Chinese Nationalist sentiment, and while it is most anxious to reiterate the principles which were asserted as far back as

1862 by Mr. Bruce—principles which I quoted to you—it has, on the other hand, to bear in mind that, during all these years, there has grown up a very considerable British interest in Shanghai and in the concessions. As the Chairman pointed out, a very large sum of money is invested, and it is absolutely essential, while doing the fullest possible justice to Chinese Nationalism, not to let our own people down—our people who have built up enterprises that are of very great and direct importance to this country. It is very necessary that they, who built up those enterprises in perfect good faith, should not be in any sense sacrificed merely because through force of circumstances with which they had nothing to do, and with which our own Government had nothing to do—owing to circumstances, in fact, for which the Chinese themselves can alone be held responsible—namely, the disorders which followed the Taiping rebellion, and the disorders which have been for years past following the anti-Manchu rebellion—it is not right that our people should in any way be let down. (Applause.)

Sir RICHARD DANE: Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask Mr. Gull whether he can answer one or two questions. First, have the Maritime Customs Department, or the British Chambers of Commerce, prepared any statistics as to the extent to which the eighteen provinces of China and the three provinces of Manchuria are really interested in British trade? I ask the question because I think it has a bearing on the manner in which the right of the Chinese to levy any additional Customs duty is always linked up with the demand for the abolition of Inland Customs taxes throughout China. As I recently showed, Indian opium only went into half China, and I have always been doubtful as to how many provinces of China British goods really go into. Unless they go into the whole of China, to say to the Chinese that before we will give them an additional 2½ per cent. Customs duty they must abolish the Inland Customs Duties throughout the whole of China, seems to me to be unjust.

There is another question: Was it really necessary to retain the Mixed Court for the trial of Chinese cases at Shanghai which fell under foreign control during the 1911 revolution? The court was retained even during the two years when Yuan-Shi-Kai had established a more or less stable Government throughout China. At this time the orders of the Central Salt Administration used to go into every Province except Kwangsi, and we got replies even more promptly than we would have done in India. After the suppression of the outbreak of 1913 until Yuan-Shi-Kai tried to make himself Emperor in January, 1916, it is not fair to say that China was in a state of complete disorder.

I think many people must want to know why it is that Great Britain has now been singled out for this great display of hostility. There is much force in the German contention that when the Chinese

were encouraged to enter the war, and all German rights in China were swept away, the foreigners were sapping the foundations of their own position in China. The Chinese had been able to deal with one set of "foreign devils," and it was a great temptation to them to go on and deal with the others. But when I left China in November, 1918, British influence was strong in Peking, and Great Britain was regarded as a friendly power. Then came the Treaty of Versailles. Mr. Lloyd George now says that Great Britain cannot afford to quarrel with four hundred millions of people with whom she wishes to trade, but it is a pity he did not think so at Paris. In the Versailles Treaty great injustice was done to China. The Treaty professed to transfer to the Japanese the rights and privileges of the Germans in Kiao-chow and Tsing-tao, but it must have been known that the position which the Japanese had seized in Kiao-chow and in Shantung differed entirely from the position the Germans held there. The Germans had mining and railway rights, but the railway from Tsing-tao to Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung, was policed by the Chinese. The Customs were collected at Tsing-tao by a German Commissioner under the Maritime Customs Department, but only a proportion was given to the development of the port, and the rest was treated as part of the general revenue of the Maritime Customs. The Japanese treated the railway zone as Japanese territory, and the railway was guarded by Japanese troops. The Japanese had established themselves there, and there was good reason to suppose that they intended to exploit the railway rights and to make themselves the dominant Power in that part of China. The Chinese were indignant and would not sign the Peace Treaty. I maintain that that was the turning-point.

We should not, it is true, have incurred such great unpopularity if it had not been for hostile Bolshevist and also, I should add, American propaganda. A great deal is said about Bolshevists in China, but, for some reason, British correspondents do not say so much about American propaganda. When the Shameen affair occurred and an armed mob under the instigation of the Russians attacked the Foreign Settlements, the Professors of the Canton Christian College signed a statement accusing the British of firing on unfortunate Chinese students without provocation; and I think that only the Principal of the College has had the honesty to retract that statement. Similarly, when the so-called Christian General was fulminating threats against Great Britain an American journalist at Peking committed himself to the statement that Feng could defeat any force that Great Britain could send against him. That was translated and circulated in China, and did not do us any good.

I think, however, that our Government, and also the people of Shanghai, have been slow to realize that the comfortable state of affairs which existed in China before the war could not be continued in the

changed conditions of the world, and after China had entered the war on the side of the Allies. She was urged to join, and did so, and sent coolies to France, and was entitled therefore to favourable consideration.

The disability which the Chinese have laboured under for years of not being allowed to collect more than 5 per cent. export and import duties was a result of our wars. The privileged position they enjoyed was so far abused by some of the Powers that I understand that, before the Washington Treaty of 1922, the actual duty which the Maritime Customs Department was collecting did not exceed $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; because whenever there was any question of revising schedules of values some interested Power would object, and so the thing dragged on. As the result of the Washington treaty a Revision Commission was appointed, and the matter adjusted, and the Customs Department now collects the 5 per cent. Still, it is a very low duty. When I was in China I tried to convince some of my countrymen that it was very unfair to China that thousands of foreigners should live there drinking the choicest wines, and smoking the choicest cigars, and paying a nominal duty thereon of 5 per cent.; and that that duty and the land tax paid by landowners in the Shanghai settlements should be their sole contribution to the finances of a poor country. For China is a poor country; you may talk about boundless resources, but there is tremendous poverty and misery there.

The retention of the Mixed Court also was a source of irritation to the Chinese. They resented it very much, and certainly during Yuan-Shi-Kai's time I do not think it was necessary.

In addition to these things I understand that roads have been made outside the area of Shanghai, and these also were objected to by the Chinese, as they thought the area of the Settlement was being extended and they did not like it.

These grievances, particularly the Customs duty, were fully exploited by our enemies, and then came this unfortunate incident of the shooting of the students and other rioters in Shanghai in May, 1925. That was the spark on the gunpowder.

Now that our enemies have been able to twist the situation against us, I cannot see how any reasonable man can object to what the Government is doing. To attempt to negotiate with Eugene Chen and the Nationalists with an excited mob behind them, without a display of force, would have been futile. (Hear, hear.) At the same time it is a matter for regret that our people were not more ready to recognize that some change ought to be made in the good old state of things which they had enjoyed for so many years.

The Maritime Customs question Mr. Gull has fully explained, but I should like to ask if he can tell us how many Chinese are now holding administrative positions in the Maritime Customs Department. After all, it is a Chinese Department, and from the time when the Maritime

Customs Department began to collect more than was necessary for the service of the foreign loans and the Boxer Indemnity, it seems to me that the British Government should spontaneously have raised the question of whether the time had not come to reorganize that Department in some way more in consonance with the fact that it is a Department of the Chinese Government. In Sir Robert Hart's time not a single Chinese held an administrative appointment in that Department: the Chinese were clerks. Any qualified foreigner could be a Commissioner of Customs, but no Chinese was good enough in Sir Robert Hart's opinion. In 1863, when the Department was organized, this view may have been justified, but not when I was in China. We collected in the Salt Department, before the country fell into disorder, a net revenue that actually exceeded that of the Maritime Customs; but there were never more than forty foreigners employed in connection with it in the whole of China. That revenue was collected by Chinese banks and the money was paid into foreign banks. It is another grievance of the Chinese that the Customs revenue is all paid into foreign banks, and that the Chinese banks have not the handling even of the surplus over and above the amount required to meet foreign obligations.

These grievances are not great things in themselves, but they lend themselves to hostile propaganda; and I think that is how the very unfortunate present situation has arisen. Instead of Great Britain being regarded as the friend of China, as in 1918, she now apparently is regarded as the enemy, and, if any strong action becomes necessary, there is very great danger that the Northern people will combine with the Southerners in hostility against us. (Applause.)

Major MACLAINE: There is one question I should like to ask, how much the other nations are implicated? Is it solely on the part of Great Britain? What interests have other nations got out there?

The LECTURER: I think it will be most convenient to take the last question first—*i.e.*, as to the extent to which other nations are interested. Well, they are all very greatly interested, and two of them, commercially, are more interested than we are. The largest share of Chinese foreign trade at the present time is done with Japan, and the next Power on the list is the United States. American trade is bigger now than the United Kingdom trade, though it is of course not equal to British Empire trade. All the other Powers have interests in China, and of course the Japanese interest is very large indeed and must ultimately be the largest. It is commercially the largest at the present time, though as regards the actual amount of capital invested in China there is probably more British money than there is Japanese, and certainly more than there is American. From that point we can go on to take one question put by Sir Richard Dane—namely, that of allowing the Chinese a larger duty than 5 per cent.

What has to be borne in mind, I think, is that from the very beginning of our relations with China, or from very shortly after the first treaties, everything had been done in concert with the other Powers. Any agreement arrived at with one Power has by virtue of the Most Favoured Nation clause always applied to the subjects of other Powers, and it has become the stereotyped custom to move in conjunction. As Sir Richard Dane pointed out, that began to break down when the Germans were turned out of China. When they and the Austrians lost their extraterritorial rights a big gap was made in the Diplomatic Body in Peking, and it became more and more difficult to maintain any sort of unity among the foreign Powers. But for a long time the aim was to maintain unity, and it was only quite recently, after it was found during the last Tariff Conference in Peking that it was impossible to get the Powers to work together, that Great Britain began to break away. I think it would have been diplomatically an extremely difficult thing for Great Britain to take that step at an earlier stage. Now, wiser after all the events that have taken place, we are probably quite right in thinking that she had better have taken the step earlier. But it was not an easy step to take, yet as the result of the policy of working together, or trying to do so, a good many reforms that are now considered to be desirable have been delayed. That of increasing the 5 per cent. tariff was delayed not by Great Britain, but by France. It was the refusal of France to ratify the Washington Treaty that held up the terms of that treaty until Chinese Nationalism had actually begun its anti-British operations. We got the blame for something we had not done. In regard to the question connected, in a sense, with tariff revision—namely, the penetration of British trade into the interior—that is a question which was examined with some care during the Tariff Conference in Peking, and it was found impossible to arrive at anything more definite than a sort of rough percentage. I think it was agreed that not more than from 47 to 48 per cent. of the trade actually went far into the interior. In respect of the mixed court it is true that during the years 1913 to 1915 China had a reasonably stable Government. The effort of the Cantonese to overthrow Yuan-Shi-Kai in 1913 was a dismal failure, and for a short time North China at all events was governed with a more or less firm hand and more or less successfully. Looking back, I think it is probably correct to say, as Sir Richard Dane has said, that we might have taken that opportunity of handing back the court. But there was no discontent in the matter at that time. There was no reason to suppose at that time that the Chinese were dissatisfied with the position of the court. It was working very well: a great many reforms had been introduced. It was a better, a healthier, and more effective institution than the one which had existed before.

In regard to the employment of Chinese in the Customs, I cannot

give any figure as to the exact number of Chinese who are employed in the higher posts. Of course, taking the service right through, by far the larger number of employees, if you count heads, are Chinese, as Sir Richard Dane, of course, knows. In the higher administrative posts, on the other hand, the number of Chinese is small. On paper that looks an inequitable state of affairs, but I must say, although Sir Richard Dane, as everybody knows, was the organizer of the great service, the Salt Gabelle, although his knowledge of these matters is greater than mine—I must express the view that even now to place any large number of Chinese in control of the higher administrative posts in the Customs service would be an extremely dangerous step to take. If you are to have a decently and honestly run administration it is absolutely essential, even to-day, to keep the number of posts in Chinese hands extremely small.

Sir RICHARD DANE: The Chinese could not deal with foreign shipping undoubtedly, but there are a large number of stations in China where Customs are collected practically entirely from Chinese traders; and in some of these stations I heard as a fact that the collections were not even sufficient to pay the salary of a foreign Commissioner or Deputy-Commissioner of Customs, and remittances were made for the purpose. Surely in places like that it would pay, and it would be gratifying to Chinese sentiment, to appoint a Chinese Commissioner or Deputy-Commissioner.

The LECTURER: The danger is that what you do in one part of China, especially in matters of that sort, you are almost invariably asked to do in other parts. If you appoint Chinese Commissioners even in those unimportant places—and there are one or two Chinese Commissioners in them—you will be met with a request for their appointment in more important places.

Sir RICHARD DANE: There might have been an arrangement like the arrangement that the Indian services should be Indianized up to 50 per cent. Some such arrangement might have been made.

The LECTURER: Something might have been done to increase the number a little, but I think it would have been extremely difficult to do that and yet maintain the efficiency of the service. (Hear, hear.) One other point Sir Richard Dane made: that was the question of roads at Shanghai being built outside the settlement limits. It is true that those roads were thrust out. There was an extremely energetic member of the Shanghai Public Works Department who saw the necessity of those roads, and whose influence was certainly on the side of building them. But I think this has to be remembered, that he had very good reason to think that no inconsiderable number of Chinese living in those neighbourhoods wanted the roads to be built. They knew that if the roads were thrust out it would mean considerably increased convenience for themselves, and also increased security for

themselves. That is the point. That is what the Chinese have always got out of Shanghai. That is what they have so very greatly appreciated, and that is why they have flocked to Shanghai in thousands, and to Tientsin and everywhere else where they could be assured of decent, honest foreign administration. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am sure you would all wish me to thank the lecturer on your behalf for having enlightened us so much as regards the present state of affairs in China, and how that position has grown up. After his lecture, and after the interesting side-lights which Sir Richard Dane has thrown on the subject, I think we are now in a position to understand the Chinese situation. Sir Richard has very vividly explained to us the various so-called pin-pricks which may have prepared the Nationalist mind of Southern China and made it favourable ground for foreign Bolshevik influence to work upon. There is an irony in the present situation. The lecturer, in a recent article, said that if you want to understand anything in China you must look at it from the point of view of topsy-turvydom; you must stand on your head to understand it. There is a great deal of truth in that. From what we have heard to-night, the more admirable and efficient our administration in the Chinese settlements and concessions, the greater the difficulties we have raised for ourselves; that is to say, by the security and the justice that we have established in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and elsewhere, we have attracted hundreds of thousands of Chinese to come and live under the British flag. We have employed no compulsion; they have flocked in. We have offered no inducement, but justice and security. This enormous immigration has caused the difficulties with the various Chinese Governments, North and South, which are the crux of the situation to-day. Our very excellence in administration has been, in a way, the cause of our troubles. Another serious cause is our allies. (Laughter.) One expects, as a rule, when one is in a tight place, to find support from one's allies. I am sure the various distinguished military officers here to-night will know that is a first principle in the field. Apparently in diplomacy it is otherwise; you do not always get support from your allies; but when you are in a tight place the difficulty is very often aggravated by the action of your allies. We have been particularly unfortunate in China as regards our allies; I will not specify instances, but you will have gathered what the situation has been. If we alone had to deal with the Chinese that situation would not have arisen. Another instance of the irony of fate in China is that it has fallen to the lot of the British Empire over and over again to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for somebody else. We went to war in 1842 over the question of extra-territoriality, when the Chinese attacked our ships, and attempted to arrest certain British sailors. We fought the war, not on the question

of opium, but on the doctrine of extraterritoriality, refusing to hand over British subjects to a barbarous judicial system, and we obtained in 1842 a treaty in favour of Great Britain. We obtained that concession by force of arms. In 1844 the United States and France came along and gained the advantage which we had won in a perfectly peaceful manner. In the present troubles we have had again to take the initiative in protecting our own and other foreign interests. I do not think we have anything particular to reproach ourselves with in regard to China. With regard to Japan, we know we were the first to accept the position of equality, to recognize the jurisdiction of the Japanese courts, and to do away with the doctrine of extraterritoriality directly we were satisfied that the Japanese courts were in a position to ensure justice to British subjects. That is the position which I take it we have insisted upon in China. As far back as 1902 we assured the Chinese that directly they could give us guarantees as to the proper dispensation of justice we would give up the doctrine of extraterritoriality, as we had given it up in Japan. Here, again, we were the first to make the offer; the year after the United States, France, Sweden, and other countries followed suit. We have always led the way, but to-day the full brunt of all dissatisfaction with existing arrangements, which has grown up through no fault of ours, is borne on our shoulders. We can only hope that the Chinese are reasonable people, though their mental processes are probably not intelligible to us; that they will come to the conclusion that all the evils they are now attributing to us are not due to us, and that they have been the dupes of malicious propaganda by the Bolsheviks and not very friendly propaganda by some of our former allies. I think the lecturer has made the situation extremely clear to us. He told us the lecture would be dry. I do not think it was. He gave an extremely clear summary of the facts which have brought us to the present situation. (Applause.) We are all very grateful to him for having done so much to enlighten us. It is also a great satisfaction to know that he considers that the steps which have been taken (perhaps somewhat tardily, for a single battalion in Hankow two months ago might have saved the situation there) by His Majesty's Government to safeguard our interests in China are all that is possible to be done at the present time. I now ask you to pass a hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer. (Applause.)

THE KARA-KORAM HIMALAYAS*

By B. K. FEATHERSTONE

My object in giving you an account of my travels is to show you what exploration and pioneer work in the Kara-Koram Himalayas entails. It will also, I hope, answer a question which may unconsciously be at the back of some of your minds—namely, “Why has this icy wilderness been so slow to yield up its secrets to mankind?” Unfortunately, the part I played in solving some of its mysteries is very small, but it has served one purpose, and that is to show us again the difficulties which must be encountered. No one man can ever hope to explore these tracts in their entirety, and it is only by constant individual efforts that we can hope to piece together this part of the world, in the same way that we do a jig-saw puzzle. General Bruce once wrote of the Kara-Koram Himalayas in these words: “Remote and repellent, it is a most savage and cruel country, and one of the marvels of the world.” No truer words than these were ever written, and it is only when one ventures into this frozen wilderness that one can form any idea of their size and grandeur.

The Kara-Koram Himalayas are situated at the north-west end of the main Himalayan range, and lie across the direct route between the plains of Northern India and the tablelands of Central Asia. Their physical characteristics may be judged from the fact that this area

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Wednesday, February 16, 1927, Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the chair. Mr. B. K. Featherstone gave an account of his journey in the Kara-Koram Himalayas.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—As you know, we have been lately discussing some of the more torrid parts of Asia, the Italian settlements along the Red Sea, and the very sunny coast of Oman. We made a recent excursion into the regions of Islamic movements, which provoked, as you know, another ferment at our last meeting. To-day we are essaying a higher flight, up to the roof of the world in the Kara-Koram, and Captain Featherstone, the lecturer, will tell you about his efforts to explore the hitherto unexplored pass of the Western Muztagh. I may say he belonged to that gallant force, the Frontier Force, which is never content unless it is fighting either man or nature; and when up in the Khyber in 1922, having found no Afridis or Orakzais to fight, he decided to take on the higher Himalayas. He will tell you the results of that struggle in the lecture which I will now ask him to deliver. (Applause.)

contains, amongst many remarkable peaks and glaciers, the second highest peak in the world, which is only a few feet lower than Mount Everest. The first known European actually to cross this range was Sir Francis Younghusband, in 1887, in the course of his remarkable journey from Peking to India, since when explorers of all nationalities have ventured there. Each explorer must choose for himself what his aim and goal will be. I was attracted by an unexplored pass over this range which leads into Central Asia. This pass is called the New or Western Muztagh, and I hoped to be the first European to cross it, and thus clear up a minor part of exploration. Only three attempts to cross it are on record: Rudolf Schlagintweit in 1856 and Godwin-Austen in 1861 (both these men were driven back by weather conditions); then came Sir Francis Younghusband's attempt in 1887, and he found it impracticable owing to immense glacier changes. Since then no further attempts have been made to cross the range by this pass, and its summit remains untrodden by any European. Travellers in this part of the world have not only the forces of Nature—the climate and the immense disintegrated masses of rocks and ice—to overcome, but also the forces of mankind. One of the most important factors in travelling in the Himalayas is the question of transport, and persuading porters to travel into these glacial regions is one of the greatest difficulties to be overcome. Travellers will always have this to contend with, but the difficulties will be greatly diminished if one is fortunate in securing a good *shikari*, or headman, who will be found to be a tower of strength. In this connexion I must mention Subhana, my headman, whom I was lucky enough to get. Subhana was about fifty years old, and a native of Kashmir. He spoke Persian, Tibetan, Turki, and many hill dialects, and was also widely experienced. I can truthfully say that, but for his ready smile and cheery willingness, and, above all, his influence over the other natives, I could neither have covered the distance nor surmounted the difficulties encountered on my journey.

It was in 1922, while stationed in the Khyber Pass with my regiment, the 54th Sikhs (Frontier Force), now known as the 4th Battalion (Sikhs) 12th Frontier Force Regiment, that I first read of Sir Francis Younghusband's journey over the Kara-Koram Range, and consequently thought of attempting this 1,000-mile trip. My plan was to cross the New Muztagh Pass and return by the Old Muztagh Pass. One of the privileges of officers serving on the North-West Frontier at that time was an extra thirty days, should the exigences of the Service permit, making in all three months a year. I therefore seized the opportunity when my leave at last fell due, with the result that, on June 24, towards evening, I set out from the Dal Gate of Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. With me were four natives, and, after a passage of a few hours in a *shikara*, or canoe, across the Anchar Lake, we reached Gandarbal, where we camped for the night. The

Transport.

following day I began the 220-mile march to Skardu, my first immediate objective. We soon entered the beautiful Sind Valley, and in three days arrived at Baltal, a small village lying at the foot of the Zoji La. We left the next day under a cloudy sky, just before dawn, following a rugged path which in places became a narrow ledge, overhanging a precipice of some hundreds of feet. During the morning the highest point was reached—11,578 feet. Near by lay the skeletons of three men, serving as a grim reminder of the perils of Himalayan blizzards. We were soon overtaken by a blinding snowstorm, but after an hour the weather cleared, the sun revealing a barren and treeless country. This wilderness is called Baltistan, and is practically isolated from the outer world during the winter months. It is a wild district, with peaks over 28,000 feet high, and it has glaciers over 30 miles long. Food is scarce, and the Baltis eke out a miserable existence, but it is astonishing how really cheerful they are. The next day, in the early hours of a frosty morning, we resumed our journey, following downward first a tributary of the Indus and then the main river. The going was rough at times, and the rock-hewn path dwindled away here and there into the face of the cliff. The Baltis probably rank among some of the best road builders in the world. Where there is no foothold, they built *parris* which are made by fixing beams of wood into the ledges and crevices of the rocks. Cross-beams are then laid over them and covered with stones and beaten earth, thus forming a track, the whole being supported by struts. After a week's steady going we arrived at Skardu, the capital of Baltistan, on July 6, having covered 234 miles in thirteen days.

Baltistan.

We spent two days repacking our stores, and then set out for Askole by a short cut rarely used by natives. I had great difficulty in finding porters to carry my baggage, as some of the intervening country is uninhabited, and the Skoro La, 16,700 feet high, had to be crossed. On the third day we were heading up the Skoro ravine, fording the torrent six times in the first four miles, till finally we halted the next afternoon on a narrow ledge about 15,000 feet high. Here there was no room to pitch a tent, so I spread out my bedding on the ground. I had remembered to collect some fuel, so were able to make hot native tea from melted snow, and turned in early only to awake later to find a bitterly cold wind and driving snow. At the first glimmer of dawn I roused the seemingly lifeless porters, and we were soon cutting steps up a steep slope of frozen snow. A sudden rumbling sound reminded us of the danger of avalanches, and, had we been a few yards further on, we might have been swept down thousands of feet. Small avalanches continued throughout the ascent, but we made the summit at noon. Before us stretched a vast snowfield, pierced by enormous jagged rocks, while beyond lay a glacier glistening in the mid-day sun. The porters dropped their loads and, forming a circle, offered up a

fervent prayer of thanksgiving to Allah for having brought them safely through "hell's road," as they termed it. We loaded up again and struggled over the snowfield, sinking in above our knees, and half-blinded by the dazzling whiteness, at length finding a suitable camping place at the end of the glacier. The next afternoon we arrived on the left bank of the Braldoh River, where my carriers at first declined to cross the *jhula*, or twig-bridge. These twig-bridges are made solely from the small branches and twigs of trees twisted together to form ropes. The span of this bridge is 270 feet, the rope ends being about 80 feet above the water level, and sinking to 40 feet in the middle. After an hour's delay, I eventually succeeded in persuading my porters to cross. In justice to them I should mention that none of them had ever crossed one, for they are not used in their part of the country. With a strong wind blowing, these bridges are apt to sway both horizontally and vertically, and are decidedly not the kind of bridge I should choose for everyday use. How these bridges were kept in repair was a source of some anxiety to me. I was reminded of the cliff monasteries in Thessaly, some of which can only be visited by being hauled up in a basket tied on to the end of rope, and the rope is never changed until it breaks. I can only say that at one part of the bridge there appeared to be only a few twisted strands left.

Askole.

About half an hour later we were in Askole, where my welcome was not at all enthusiastic. Askole is the name given to a group of seven villages lying 10,000 feet above sea-level. Wrapped in winter for eight months of the year, it is a kind of world's end on the edge of a sea of ice, formed by some of the largest glaciers outside the Polar regions. It was here that my real difficulties began with the porters. We must look at it from their point of view, and what is it? The Balti finds that whenever he ventures into this icy wilderness, the intense cold makes him feel miserable, and by going to higher attitudes he gets mountain sickness. Often he sees his comrades fall in deep crevasses and killed by avalanches, all of which mishaps he puts down to the evil spirits. The idea of going anywhere with no ostensible object does not appeal to them. They are superstitious about mountains, and fully conscious of the dangers. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Baltis are unwilling to travel in these parts, for Askole is the last village—beyond it lies an uninhabited glacial wilderness.

I shall not easily forget my departure from Askole on July 16. The women tried to persuade the men not to accompany me, and only after hours of incessant arguing were we clear of the village. We soon sighted the Biafo glacier, a mass of ice some 300 feet thick, over thirty-five miles long, and nearly a mile wide. I had never before seen a Himalayan glacier of any great size, and I must own to feeling excited at seeing one of the largest in the world. I had previously

caught a glimpse of it on my way down from the Skoro La to Askole, and instead of the usual blue-green or dark ice-colour glacier, as seen from a distance, no ice of any kind was visible. We finally reached the Biafo, and found the surface covered with detritus, and broken up into a tortuous collection of ridges, depressions, caves, and small running streams, with the ice in places exposed. The porters, eighteen in all, reached the other side about half-past one, and I tried without success to make them go further that day. In order not to waste time I reconnoitred the Biafo glacier, in particular its snout. The question of the movement of these enormous masses of ice is one of great interest, but time will not now permit me to go into this. I will just show you one or two pictures of this glacier.

The next day sleet fell, and the porters threatened to return. Eventually, however, we proceeded, and late that night arrived at Tsok, where the men actually mutinied, throwing down their loads, and starting to desert. With Subhana and others I intercepted them, and drove them back, and after I had promised them one of two sheep I had with me and a day's rest, they agreed to stay. The Baltis, as I said before, are very superstitious, and in order to appease the mountain spirits they sacrificed the sheep the next day. This had the desired effect of putting them into a cheerful frame of mind again. This incident always reminds me of a traveller who, when confronted with a disinclination on the part of his porters to start on a so-called unlucky day, brought out a pack of cards to be used for divining purposes, and having himself previously withdrawn the unlucky cards, succeeded in getting them off. Such is the simplicity of the Balti's nature. When, however, the journey was resumed, and a short march had brought us to the Punmah glacier, which leads to the New Muztagh Pass, discontent was again rife. It was only after a long discussion that they were persuaded to continue up the Dumulter glacier.

On the following day the men refused once more to advance, saying that their food had run out. This was untrue, but I persuaded four porters to accompany me up the Punmah glacier as far as Shushing, which is situated just this side of Chongulter. All attempts to make them go further were useless, and two days later, with one

Skeenmung. porter, I left for Skeenmung, which is only ten miles from the summit of the western Muztagh Pass. The surface of the glacier was very uneven, and it was hard-going. I reached a point just opposite Skeenmung, a point from which I judged it might be possible to make the ascent up the pass, and get back the same day. I was but ten miles from the summit, but it was late, and I had to be back in my camp before dark. I sat down for a few minutes in this vast uninhabited ice arena, with snowy peaks towering above me. To me a snowy peak is one of the most impressive and overwhelming sights

in Nature. Finally, there was nothing to be done but to abandon the attempt of reaching the summit, so with one last look in the direction of the pass I turned back towards camp, disheartened and beaten on the post, so to speak. I could do nothing else, though it was not easy to give in after travelling some 350 miles and getting within a few miles of my goal. I had one consolation left me, however, when I reflected that I had trodden classic ground, and as the names of those who had made attempts on the pass occurred to me I felt that I could say, in all humility, that I had failed in good company. I reached camp just before dark and decided that another attempt was impossible, so the following day we made a short march back to the Dumulter glacier, where my main camp was established, and two days later I reached Askole again. Returning to Skardu, I took the Braldoh River route, which is used in preference to the short cut over the Skoro La. Near to where the Hoh River flows into the Braldoh we crossed a *shwa*, or mud stream. This stream was flowing in a channel 3 yards wide, with perpendicular banks of soft soil, about 10 to 15 feet high, and was very difficult to approach, as the soil gave way under any pressure. The stream itself consisted of semi-liquid mud, interspersed with rocks and boulders. It was uncanny to watch the resistless way in which the moving mud laid hold of—so to speak—these large rocks, moving them in a much firmer manner than water would have done. At times the surface of the stream was reduced, due to the accumulation of mud and rocks causing a temporary block—only, however, to burst forth later in an overwhelming manner. It took some time to cross the *shwa*, but fortunately the passage was accomplished without mishap. Subsequently I followed up the Hoh River, camping at Choga Urdar on the edge of the Hoh glacier. Owing to rain and a heavy mist, little could be seen of either the glacier or the surrounding country, so I returned to the Braldoh and continued my journey along the banks of the river. At Shigar a *zak*, or skin-raft, was placed at my disposal, and I was able to avoid walking the last six miles to Skardu a respite all the more welcome because the way was mostly over loose sands. The *zak* consisted of about sixteen goat skins, inflated and fastened to a wooden framework, six feet square, made of thick branches lashed together; the *zak wallas*, or crew, numbered four, and steered with poles. I climbed on to the raft, which drifted into mid-stream. There were dangerous rapids ahead and our speed increased steadily. We were soon projected violently into what appeared to be a wall of water, half-submerging the raft and causing it to creak in a most alarming manner. Once through the rapid, we floated along quietly and set to work to re-inflate the goat skins, this being done by blowing through one of the legs. Later we were held up on a sandbank for an hour and had a skin torn off by a rock, but we reached Skardu without further mishap.

Return to
camp.

At Skardu we replenished our stores, and on August 7 started off for Panamik on the Yarkand Road, a place just south of the Kara-Koram Pass. At the confluence of the Indus and Shyok rivers, we crossed in a barge, and continued along the right bank of the Shyok for two days, arriving at Khapula. Following upon a day's rest we set off early in the morning, but, unexpectedly, it took us till evening to get over the the Shyok again by skin-raft. We started along the riverbank, and when it became too dark rested in the open until the moon rose, finally reaching our destination at sunrise. Not wishing to lose time, after a belated breakfast, we took fresh porters and made for Prahnu, sixteen miles away. It was not till after dark that Prahnu was reached, after a march of thirty-six miles without resting. We found the inhabitants hostile, and they refused us a camping ground, so finding a suitable place ourselves, we occupied it. While the tents were being unloaded, a squabble began and things looked serious, but order was soon restored, and the rest of the night, on the whole, was peaceful, except for a few rocks and stones which were periodically hurled at us. We had some difficulty in getting out of Prahnu, but managed by means of bribery to get a sufficient number of porters to take our baggage to Turtok, the last village in Baltistan.

The next morning we started on a march of thirty-six miles to Kharu, across the borderland between Ladakh, or Western Tibet. During the day we met a native band which played in my honour, and their music, I understand, has features of interest to students, owing to the intervals employed, which are said to appeal to some of the ultra-modern composers, though easily beyond my musical knowledge. Toward sunset on the second day we came to Kharu, and it was curious to note that the stretch of country which we had traversed since leaving Turtok was a kind of no man's land—absolutely barren, with no important physical features of any description; yet the inhabitants of the two provinces are entirely distinct in race, religion, and customs. We had left behind Muhammadanism and entered the land of Lamaism. This part of Asia is probable one of the most interesting in the world. It has been pointed out that we are here at the meeting-place of the great Asiatic religions, and that from this spot and from none other in Asia can we go eastward to China through countries entirely Buddhist, westward to Constantinople among none but Muhammadans, and southward over lands where the Hindu religion prevails to the extremity of the Indian peninsula.

Meeting-
place of
Muham-
madanism,
Buddhism,
and
Hinduism.

Lamaism.

This now brings me to Lamaism, the religion of Western Tibet. First, what does the word the "Lama" mean? It is a Tibetan word, meaning "superior one." No traveller could fail to notice the influence of the Lamas in every walk of life, with the result that Tibet has become the most priest-ridden country in the world. To become a Lama is a lengthy process, taking about twelve years. The child

destined to become one remains at home until he is eight, when he is sent into a monastery, where he is treated at first like a school boy, being taught to read and write. After three years he is admitted as a novitiate, and receives most of the privileges of a monk, such as having a cell of his own. In twelve years he is eligible for ordination, which cannot take place before he is twenty. His education consists chiefly of memorizing the sacred words and prayers of Buddha, which are in many cases unintelligible even to themselves. The monastery itself is called a *gompo*, which means a solitary place or hermitage. The size of these *gompas* varies from four Lamas to eight hundred, the largest in Western Tibet being at Himis. The actual site is most important. The building should face east to catch the first rays of the sun, there should be a lake in front, and a waterfall is a good omen. Once the site is chosen, it is consecrated, and this is a great ceremony.

I once attended one of the religious services, which are held three times a day, and consist of recitations accompanied by music. Incense is kept burning throughout, and offerings of meat and flour are made to the gods which are represented by images. I was sitting on a wooden bench and, judging by the expression on the faces of those taking part, they seemed to be doing their duties in a most perfunctory manner. This was confirmed when, at the end of the service, one of the head Lamas came up and asked me if I would like more, as, if so, they would continue. I declined this offer with thanks. I was politely informed that the monastery funds were low, so I took the hint which increased my popularity.

Ladakh, or Western Tibet, contains one of the highest inhabited regions in the world. No part of it is below 8,000 feet, and a great number of the inhabitants live at heights of 12,000 to 15,000 feet. The barren aspect of the country that one sees in Baltistan is here repeated. Kharu owes what little importance it has to its being the first place over the border between Baltistan and Ladakh. The houses, generally of one storey, were irregularly spaced, with here and there a tree. From some of the houses were flying prayer-flags of coloured cotton, and women, with their peculiar headdress called *pirak*, gathered on the flat roofs, some to pray and others to watch our arrival. The next day we left for Deskit, where two Lamas welcomed us and kindly offered a place for my camp in the monastery compound. A glance at the suggested place showed it to be very dirty; but not wishing to hurt the Lamas' feelings, I pitched my tent there. As soon as it became dark, three large dogs, rather like Alsatian wolf-hounds, were let loose to ensure our safety. I thought of the stories of the monks of St. Bernard and the dogs kept to rescue travellers in danger on the Alps. In our case these animals did their work so well that none of us dared move, as to do so was the signal for prolonged barking and blood-curdling growls.

Ladakh.

We left Deskit the next day, and waded through stretches of flooded land. After crossing the Shyok River by a fine suspension bridge, built by the Government to facilitate trade, we joined the Yarkand Road, where I soon overtook a caravan bound for Kashgar, with which I travelled as far as Panamik. We had now started on our return journey, and, after two days, recrossing the Shyok River by the suspension bridge, we reached Khardung, one of the highest villages in Ladakh. The next day we set off for Leh, which was twenty-five miles away, with a pass 17,600 feet high to be crossed. We ascended gradually for the first eight miles, and then came to a steep part leading over a glacier near the summit. Ahead of us was a caravan, and I saw two ponies slip and fall, sliding down the ice until brought to a standstill by a projecting rock. This death-trap at the bottom of the ravine was filled with carcasses of animals; above hovered a number of grim-looking birds of prey, probably kites, fresh from feasting on the remains. It was not long before we were all suffering from mountain sickness, my servants being utterly overcome. We reached the summit, and below us saw the Indus River winding its way along the valley, and in the distance the highest peaks of the Kara-Korams showed up clearly. The descent seemed long and tedious, and only at nine o'clock that night did we arrive at Leh.

During the few days I spent in Leh I visited Himis, the well-known largest monastery in Ladakh, and then continued my journey to Srinagar, 241 miles distant. It was a long and dreary march, including the crossing of the Fotu La and Namika La, each pass some 13,000 feet above sea-level. I remember distinctly passing through the small village of Shergol. This village is the farthest western station of Lamaism in Asia, and it was with a feeling of regret that I left the land of the Lamas. Even with a short stay in the country, one sees many good points in the Buddhist cult. Charity and kindness to all living things are everywhere prominent. Cattle are well treated, and it is rarely that a life is wantonly taken. There is also a genuine spirit of consideration and politeness which travellers cannot fail to notice. And so I left what is to my mind the most fascinating country in the world. September 5 saw us in Mechoi, and the next morning we started up the gradual ascent leading to the Zoji La. The snow had vanished and the pass had a very different appearance from that which it had presented three months earlier. Beyond it we again passed through the Sind Valley, which had already an autumn tint. Here all the savage grandeur and the fantastic appearance of the Kara-Korams were left behind and the eye dwelt with enjoyment on the change. Bare rocks had given way to verdure, and the mild air with its smell of earth and its fruits was welcome. We reached Srinagar on September 10, having covered 1,100 miles in just over eleven

weeks at altitudes varying from 5,000 feet to 18,000 feet above sea-level.

There is a saying that there is nothing like experience for teaching, and this is particularly true of Himalayan travel. You have now been taken a thousand miles, and I hope this account will have given you some idea as to what pioneer work entails. I hope also that it has given you a general idea of this part of the Himalayas and its inhabitants. There is, however, just one thing I would like to add, and that is that the Kara-Koram Himalayas form only a small area of the Himalayas. About a thousand miles to the east we have an area which is the exact opposite of this barren and treeless country. It is as rich in vegetation, trees, and flowers as the Kara-Korams are barren and devoid of them. Those who have been to the Kara-Korams, I think, will share my view that neither photographs nor words can ever depict the beauty and grandeur of these gigantic mountains, which are undoubtedly one of the wonders of the world.

Sir GEORGE MACMUNN said he would like to know the difference between the old Muztagh Pass and the new one, and why the old one was abandoned. Was it ever a much-used route?

The LECTURER: There are two passes, the Old or Eastern Muztagh Pass and the New or Western Muztagh Pass. The Old Muztagh Pass was the original pass, and it became disused probably owing to the changes in the glaciers. Sir Francis Younghusband crossed the Old Muztagh Pass in 1887 with difficulty, having found the New Muztagh Pass impracticable. I think the last record of the New Pass being crossed was by two natives in 1861. These passes cannot be described as passes in our sense of the word, but merely as a place at which the Kara-Koram range can be crossed.

The New Muztagh Pass lies some seven miles to the west of the Old Muztagh Pass.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—No one seems disposed to carry on the discussion on these wild regions, and it only remains for me to propose on your behalf a vote of thanks to the lecturer. (Applause.) We have been very much enlightened by his vivid description of his intrepid journey, and also by the admirable series of slides with which he illustrated his experience. One thing that struck us all, I am sure, was his very modest reference to the difficulties of the journey and his own achievements. That one always expects from a great explorer, and though he did not quite succeed in defeating the Western Muztagh Pass, he all but succeeded, and it is certainly no disgrace to any explorer to have failed in such company as that of Sir Francis Younghusband. All the same, he had a most interesting experience, and he has put that experience at our disposal. We were particularly struck, I think, by his comparison of the manner in which two civilizations and two religions, if not three, met on the

roof of the world, the Baltis on the one side and the Ladakhis on the other—the Baltis being Muhammadans and the Ladakhis Buddhists—inhabiting the same country, living under the same conditions, but absolutely different in their outlook on life. We were also much interested to hear what a favourable opinion Captain Featherstone had formed of the Lamas. They did not look particularly prepossessing in the pictures he showed us, but apparently they are very good fellows at heart. The training for a Lama is a very severe one, taking twelve years; but you find full compensation afterwards, because you lord it over the rest of humanity once you have passed the portals and become a Lama. We all congratulate the lecturer on the lucidity of his discourse, on his modesty when speaking of his own achievements, and on the beautiful series of slides with which he has explained his lecture. (Renewed applause.)

PERSIAN AFFAIRS

TEHERAN,

February 8, 1927.

THE past year has not been marked by any sensational occurrences of major importance. The coronation of Reza Pehlevi in April was an imposing affair, with gorgeous new uniforms, processions and plaudits to order, and no expense spared. The populace waited for hours (with nothing to watch but the decorations, or the pariah dogs that ran bewildered up and down the streets) to see the vassal tribesmen from all corners of the Guarded Realms go riding by, and to catch a brief but blessed glimpse of a Cinderella coach, and, within, an unfamiliar Majesty, hunched, in the royal cloak, beneath the weight of a truly royal crown. The crowds were not enthusiastic beyond the limits of decorum. Neither were the people impatient: many of them, indeed, had waited longer outside the bakers' shops, and been rewarded with not even a flap-jack of clean bread.

The effects of the 1925 crop failure lasted till midsummer, when, with the first arrivals of a plentiful harvest, the capital found its bread supply at last adequate. Transport difficulties were eased by the use of the motor-lorries hurriedly imported by the Government during the winter, many of which are still serviceable. The use of motor transport on all possible roads throughout the country continues to increase rapidly, and camels, mules, donkeys, and horse-carts are being diverted to secondary roads. On the Baghdad-Teheran highway everything is to be seen from Fords to 10-ton Scammels, and even on the Bushire-Shiraz road Fords, Chevrolets, and Dodges ply daily, scrambling up and down the dizzy passes at the risk of their lives. The English touring car, unfortunately, is very rarely seen, being too fastidious and expensive a creature for such rough-and-ready usage. The Shimran road to the summer resort of the capital was well served last year by a fleet of motor-buses run by the Russians. A European company has now been given a concession for a similar service in town, though what privileges the "concession" carries is not clear. The negotiations with the postal authorities to enable the Junkers Flugzeugwerk A. G. to implement the concession for aeroplane service granted them a year ago are at last completed, and a weekly air service between Teheran and Baku will commence on February 11, to be followed by a service between Teheran and the Iraq frontier. Meanwhile it is possible to buy from this company a through ticket from Pehlevi to London via Moscow and Riga, by sea and rail.

Parliament, which met in July, after elections of a more or less

traditional type, was adjourned till mid-August, and thereafter spent much time in preliminaries. The achievements of this Sixth Majliss are not so far noteworthy: it has dived extensively into the murky past of some of its members, wrangled in full debate over a few hundred pounds more or less in the salary of a few foreign experts, and shown generally a lack of drive and a disposition to quarrel over inessentials, with latterly an increasing jealousy of its prerogatives and much ill-informed criticism of the independent action of the cabinet. The ministers have been men of no remarkable distinction or energy, if one excepts the peripatetic minister of court, who, after accompanying the Shah to Meshed, visited Russia and Turkey on a confidential mission, out of which nothing has openly materialized as yet. In the present temper of the Majliss it appears difficult to find a cabinet which would both command a working majority and be able to work. Mustoufi ul Mamalik, who resigned the premiership on January 29, rather than face an interpellation, is a master of urbane inactivity, noted for the size of his hunting parties in the old days, and the size of the fortune he has spent here and in Europe. The deputies treat him with good-humoured respect, knowing that at the worst he will not commit the country to active error. The cabinet has been reformed under his leadership.

The most unsavoury incident that has occurred since the murder of the American Consul some years ago was the attempt on the life of Mudarris, the venerable leader of the democratic party. He escaped with shots in the hand and the arm and is now back in the Majliss as a supporter of the Government, but the mysterious elusiveness of his assailants impelled the public to put the worst interpretation on the affair, which has now been hushed up.

It was not to be expected that the first year of the new dynasty should pass without disturbance or challenge. The rebellion of a number of the troops quartered in Khurasan caused much uneasiness in July, as it was feared that the Turkoman would take the opportunity for raiding southwards; but order was restored on the personal appearance of the Shah in Meshed and the arrest of the army commander there whose depredations had been partly responsible for the delay in paying the troops.

Disaffection throughout the ranks of the army was simmering at this time, and in the mind of the general public there was a strong sense of dissatisfaction and apprehension, as it was felt that financial integrity among the officers was not stimulated by conspicuous example. Of less danger to the country's peace was the reappearance in the Kurdish field of that pathetically recurring figure, Salar ed Douleh, who inspired a local rising that was foredoomed to failure. Troops were despatched to Hamadan and Sennah, largely in motor-cars commandeered from all and sundry, and the trouble quickly fizzled out.

Relations with Russia have been during the last year, as indeed they are normally, Persia's gravest problem in politics and trade. The dispute over the fishery rights on the Caspian littoral is still unsettled, and the Russians maintain the embargo against imports from Persia with the exception of cotton. Permits for limited quantities of produce are given spasmodically from time to time, and the Russian trading agencies purchase rice, raisins, and so on, at intervals, when they are obtainable at starvation prices, but much of North Persian produce has rotted unsold. A number of bearer permits have recently been issued for small quantities of Persian exports, to supporters and friends of the Russian legation, and these permits have been transferred to traders for a consideration. The facts are that Persia has no alternative market for most of the produce of her northern provinces, that Russia is obliged to restrict imports, that she is dissatisfied with Persia politically, and that her trade concerns are largely at the mercy of Soviet officials actuated by theory. Meanwhile the sale of Russian sugar is being pushed in all Persian markets as far south as Kerman and Duzdab, and on the Kermanshah road the economically curious sight may be seen of Russian and A.P.O.C. oil passing each other in opposite directions.

The finances of Persia, under the American administration, have been further strengthened during the year. Doctor Millspaugh's sixteenth Quarterly Report, to September, 1926, which has just been issued, shows a remarkable continuance of the drain on the people's capital to swell the Government purse, mainly, of course, in anticipation of railway building, for which the receipts from the Sugar and Tea Tax are earmarked. It might be supposed that the accumulation and hoarding of this latter branch of the revenue at the rate of a million sterling annually could not continue for long in a country of Persia's meagre resources, while on the other hand the amount collected over a few years would not suffice to build more than a small proportion of the mileage contemplated, and the receipts from traffic could hardly be expected to pay the interest on the capital expenditure. It should be remarked, however, that this temporary drain on the country's wealth is set off by about the same amount received in royalties from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company—an annual windfall of recent growth—and it may therefore be argued that the prosperity of the A.P.O.C., and that alone, enables Persia to stand the unaccustomed strain of saving for future capital outlay. A further million sterling annually is spent in the country by the A.P.O.C. for wages, provisions, etc., an important factor which the finance administration shows a curious reluctance to include in its estimates of the balance of trade.

While the recently arrived American railway expert is developing his proposals for a comprehensive survey, increased attention is being given to the less debatable need of roads, the improvement and upkeep of

which is partly provided for by yet another port tax on foreign trade. With the expenditure of a few million sterling on road work under Russian engineers the transport problem would quickly solve itself for the time being by a manifold increase in the use of commercial motors. The road between Baghdad and Tabriz, by way of Rowanduz, is being opened up as an alternative to the Trebizond and Batoum routes, which are economically preferable but are sometimes barred. The traffic between Bushire and Shiraz demands a deviation of route to avoid the worst passes. The Isfahan-Ahwaz road might make a traveller despair of its ever being anything better than what it always has been—a stony test of endurance to man and beast. The Dizful-Khurramabad road is very slow to develop, and its experimental use as an alternative to Bagdad has not encouraged traders to desert Iraq.

The American financial advisers are still moderately popular. There is a general desire among the political classes to curtail the power of veto possessed by the administrator-general, but it is perhaps well that the purse-strings should be held yet awhile by a pre-eminently cautious foreigner who has proved his integrity. Doctor Millspaugh's scheme for an agricultural and industrial bank is now before the Majlis. It is proposed to create the capital for this native bank by the sale of crown lands and of part of the crown jewels. There is much in the scheme to recommend it, the main difficulty being that of sound, economical, and trustworthy administration. It is worth bearing in mind that the only two business organizations of any magnitude which have made good and have held their own in the country are the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Imperial Bank of Persia—both British.

The native press improves as time goes on, but there has been lately a general recrudescence of the hysterical jeremiads which used to issue, many years ago, from the hot brains of idle politicians. The "Iran" is constructively progressive, and now publishes topical photographs in addition to much reliable matter of practical utility.

The winter has been cold and dry so far, and rain or snow is much needed for the autumn-sown crops and the summer water supply. The local form of rinderpest has taken heavy toll of the cattle, and the American agricultural expert has devoted much of his attention to coping with the disease since his arrival last summer. An instance (let us hope unique) may be given of subordinates' action in a matter of this nature. An official in an outlying district had made a pleasant little addition to his salary in illicit fees for inoculation when this was voluntary. Later inoculation was made compulsory, and at first our friend feared the loss of his supplementary income. By this time, however, the dire mortality directly attributed to his inoculations had become known; so his luck held, for the cattle-owners thereafter paid him handsomely to leave their beasts alone.

SOME NOTES ON THE OVERLAND MOTOR ROUTE TO INDIA

IN view of the increasing interest that is being taken nowadays in road communications in Asia, the following brief notes, based on the writer's experience on a recent motor journey from Haifa to railhead at Duzdab, may be helpful to those contemplating a similar journey.

From Haifa as far as Baghdad the road is now so well known as to call for little comment. When the writer went across in July last the Damascus route was closed for political reasons, and the Tripoli-Homs-Palmyra route was followed. The coast road from Haifa to Tripoli is very good going, but from Tripoli to Homs it is thoroughly bad: broken, with a rough, rocky surface, which entails a very heavy strain on springs and chassis. Beyond Homs the desert itself is for the most part excellent going, and one can travel "all out" for long distances.

The stretch from Baghdad to Khanikin similarly presents no difficulties, while the main road from the Persian frontier to Teheran is, or rather was, a proper motor road. Constructed by the British military authorities during the war, it was, when finished, a first-class road. Like most other things in Persia, it has been totally neglected, and is now rapidly falling into decay. With the great increase in motor traffic, particularly with the large number of heavy commercial vehicles constantly moving up and down it, the surface has been ruined; and whereas a few years ago cars could go at high speed practically the whole distance from Teheran to Khanikin, now they have to pick their way carefully over the bumps.

The journey up to Teheran falls into four easy natural stages—viz., Baghdad to Kermanshah, 223½ miles, is the longest, and most travellers would find it more convenient to rail their car from Baghdad as far as Khanikin, a matter of 94 miles, and thus avoid the least pleasant part of the journey. The remaining stages—viz., Kermanshah to Hamadan, 113½ miles, Hamadan to Kazvin, 146½ miles, and Kazvin to Teheran, 92½ miles—are all easy ones. There is a hotel in each of the halting-places mentioned. That at Kermanshah has very little to recommend it. It is infested with flies, and is situated in the bazaar; but as the traveller would only be staying for the night, this would not worry him very much. The hotel at Hamadan is better, and has a less unpleasant atmosphere about it. The Kazvin hotel is a

very unpleasant one, and a single night is the most that anyone would feel inclined to stay. The rooms all open on to one common verandah, which in turn looks out over the sarai. The latter is generally full of cars, and the noise is almost continuous. Here one finds oneself rubbing shoulders with unpleasant-looking Bolsheviks and their equally unpleasant-looking womenfolk on their way up and down from Enzeli. The corridor and verandah are filled with a motley collection of local travellers, whose chief characteristic is their extreme noisiness. The food leaves a great deal to be desired, and it is advisable to limit one's demands to a samovar with tea and boiled eggs.

The remaining ninety-two miles into Teheran make an easy and quite pleasant run. Petrol can be purchased at all the places so far mentioned. Up to Hamadan and in Teheran the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's petrol is obtainable, but in Kazvin, as in all other northern towns, it is not generally stocked, and one has to buy the Russian product. The latter is sold in soft iron tins of one pud, or approximately four gallons. The quality of the petrol itself is good, but with the control in Soviet hands, one almost invariably finds a quantity of dirt and water in the tin, not to mention short measure.

There are several quite efficient repair garages in Teheran, and a number of shops fairly well stocked with the commoner kinds of accessories. Prices are very high, however, and it is most advisable to bring up all the spares one is likely to require from Baghdad. Here it is as well to mention that English cars are very rare in Persia, and can almost be counted on the fingers of two hands. Practically all the cars are American. There are naturally more Fords than anything else, but the number of Buicks, Oaklands, Hupmobiles, Chevrolets, and Dodges is increasing rapidly.

The road from Teheran to Tabriz is fairly straightforward going. The distance is 374 miles, and with a good car one can make Zenjan the first night, and with an early start reach Tabriz by the evening of the next. The only really difficult piece of road is that going over the Kaplan Kuh. The road over the Shibli Pass, where cars had formerly to be hauled up and let down with ropes, has now been properly constructed, and one can get over quite comfortably. It is advisable to carry petrol for the whole journey from Teheran to Tabriz. It can be obtained at Zenjan, but is expensive, and one cannot count on getting any at Mianeh. There is a great deal of climbing and low-gear work to be done on this trip, and this should be taken into consideration. In case one should run short, it is often possible to obtain one tin of petrol at the village of Haji Agha, some thirty-five miles short of Tabriz, but the price asked for it is exorbitant.

In Tabriz there is a good garage with an efficient mechanic in charge. The rates are about 50 per cent. higher than in Teheran. The road itself is not too bad, though there are a number of river-beds

to negotiate, and one or two very steep bridges. The greatest trouble are the countless water cuts, some of them irrigation channels; others, in the hills, simply places where the rain has worn away the road. The latter are in nine cases out of ten at the foot of an incline. One comes coasting gaily down a beautiful gradient with ample impetus to carry one well up the next incline on top gear, but one has invariably to pull up with a jerk to negotiate a broken water crossing, and then work slowly up a long incline on low gear. If only the Persian authorities could be persuaded to lay down Irish bridges at these points the trouble would be obviated and the road immeasurably improved.

The Kazvin-Enzeli road, constructed by the Russians before the war, is still in a fairly good state of preservation, though here also the surface is rapidly becoming destroyed by the number of heavy commercial vehicles which daily ply along it. The Russians are good drivers, but believe in high-speed work. They are apt to come upon one unawares from round corners, and one has to bear this constantly in mind in negotiating the very sharp cliff corners going down the long Kuen Gorge to Menjil.

Some seven miles beyond Menjil one emerges abruptly from the bare, wind-swept mountain road into lanes hedged with thick foliage, and inches deep in mud, for it rains nearly every day in the year in Gilan. The chief trouble here are the strings of Russian country carts, or fourgons, resembling old English millers' waggons, each with four horses abreast. In many places the road is barely wide enough for them to pass. They will naturally choose the inside berth next to the hillside, and it is good policy to stop the car and let them do the passing; otherwise it is quite easy to be misled by the thick foliage on the outside of the road and imagine it is an ordinary ditch, whereas it is in reality the actual khud-side. The writer made this mistake, and slipping into what he casually thought was an ordinary roadside ditch, he found himself hanging at an alarming angle over the side of the cliff itself. The slightest push would have sent the car hurtling several hundred feet into the river below, and nothing could be done until half the inhabitants of a neighbouring village had been collected and the car lifted bodily on to the road again.

All this, however, has nothing to do with the route to India. We will, therefore, return to Teheran and set off afresh.

From Teheran to Ispahan the going is quite straightforward. The total distance is only 287 miles, and this can be done easily in two days, a convenient stopping-place being the small village of Dilijan, 162 miles from Teheran. Here one can doss down for the night in a new *hujra* belonging to the headman of the village. The rooms are perfectly clean, and one can spend a comfortable night there. There is the usual *chae-khaneh* in the village, and quite a good meal can

be had at short notice. The main road to Ispahan formerly ran via Kashan, but the new route via Dilijan is better going and is much shorter.

Petrol can be obtained at Qum, but one cannot count on getting it anywhere else before Ispahan, and it is best to carry sufficient for the whole trip from Teheran.

At Ispahan one can stay quite comfortably at the Hotel Ghar-Bagh, and the food is quite good. There are one or two garages run by Baghdadias. It is extraordinary how the Iraqi has taken the initiative in Persia in everything appertaining to motors. A large proportion of the taxi-drivers in Teheran are Iraqis. They are to be found in and about most garages, and they are more in demand than Persians as private chauffeurs.

Between Ispahan and Shiraz there is only one troublesome place, and that is just beyond Yezdi Khast, ninety-six miles from Ispahan. The road descends and crosses a deep nullah, and the ascent the other side is so steep, with a sharp bend at its steepest point, that very few cars with any load in them will reach the top without assistance. The villagers make capital out of this, and one can always get half a dozen of them to come and push.

A convenient halting-place would be Dehbid, 203 miles. This would leave one with sufficient time to spend an hour or two at Persepolis the following day. Petrol should be carried for the whole journey to Shiraz. Here there is quite a good repair garage belonging to an Indian, but very few spares are obtainable.

The road from Shiraz to Kirman via Niriz and Saidabad was constructed by the South Persian Rifles during the war, and after their disbandment and the withdrawal of effective protection to travellers, the latter abandoned the road altogether. It has remained closed for some years, and the fear of robbers, coupled with the fact that, unlike all the other main routes in Persia, there is no telegraph line, has made people afraid to use it. Caravan and other traffic has, therefore, for some years past, been using the northern and longer route via Yezd. The Persian Government is now arranging to police the Niriz road and open it for traffic again.

The writer embarked upon it with somewhat mixed feelings, particularly as no one in Shiraz was able to give him any information about it, but he met with an agreeable surprise. True, the road was devoid of traffic, and for the first time one missed the welcome little *chae-khaneh* at every few miles' distance; but once one has passed the first seven or eight miles over a very broken mountain track leading from the Shiraz plain the road is excellent, and for the remaining 100 miles as far as Niriz one can go at any speed one's engine is capable of.

It is advisable to make a very early start from Shiraz and make

Niriz as early as possible, so as to have plenty of time to negotiate the Hasanabad Pass. It is desirable to leave Niriz at least a clear three hours before sunset, or, if the car is a Ford, and at all heavily loaded, spend the night at Niriz, and start for the pass the following morning. With a good car the pass can be easily done on a low gear, but a low-powered car, or one that is heavily loaded, would have difficulty in getting up some of the gradients. A convenient place to spend the night would be either Hasanabad, which is nothing but a small, ruined gendarmerie post, with good water, but rather cold at night, or Bishneh village, about twenty-five miles further on, and 137 miles from Shiraz. It should be noted that between Bishneh and Dasht, a matter of twenty miles, there is a total absence of water. Care should be taken in crossing the salt plain beyond Khairabad to keep strictly to the tracks. There the road is perfectly solid, but the moment one leaves the track there is a grave danger of getting bogged in the salt morass.

If difficulty is experienced in making Kirman before dark, the most convenient place to spend the night is Mashiz, some thirty miles short of Kirman. There is a road-guard post there, and water and supplies can be obtained.

In Kirman there is one good garage with an excellent native mechanic. Spare parts are not to be counted on, but petrol and oil are obtainable.

There now remains the final and most trying stretch of all. The distance from Kirman to Duzdab is 317 miles. The most convenient stages are to make Fahreh, 161 miles, the first day. With luck, and provided one did not lose time in the sandy track at Shurgaz, it might be possible to make Duzdab the following evening; though should there be any doubt on this score, it would be better to content oneself the second day with reaching the small telegraph post at Sipi, from which one could comfortably reach Duzdab early the following afternoon.

As this is the least-known portion of the whole journey, it may be of interest to give a more detailed description of the track.

From Kirman the going is quite good. Mahoum village, with its small but beautiful Madrasseh, is reached at twenty miles. There is then a steady ascent until the top of the rise, 8,000 feet, is reached at forty-seven miles. Some six miles further on the road crosses a deep nullah, after which the track remains quite good as far as Dharud (Tahrud), seventy-four miles, where there is a rest-house belonging to the Indo-European Telegraph Company. Some twelve miles further on the road leaves the hills and traverses a level plain about twenty-six miles wide. One then crosses a shallow nullah, and at mile 118 reaches Bam.

At Bam there is a telegraph rest-house with a clerk in charge.

From Bam the going is quite straightforward as far as the large village of Wekilabad, 126 miles. Here there are a number of irrigation cuts, but once past them there is no other difficulty until a rather deep and difficult wadi is reached just short of Fahreh, at mile 160. The water at Fahreh is very slightly brackish, but is the best for very many miles around. One requires to take a sufficient supply of this water for the next stage to Sipi.

Once past Fahreh the going becomes more sandy, and three miles further on one enters a perfectly flat plain, the surface of which is covered with a very fine gravel. The gravel is but a veneer, and below it is nothing but very fine sand. Some patches are softer than others, and while, in the harder tracts, the wheels do not sink in more than 3 inches, one may suddenly strike a softer patch and find the wheels buried up to the axle. To avoid the softer area one should strike away left of the telegraph line and keep away from it for about four miles. One of Nadir Shah's watch-towers can be seen on the horizon, and this can be taken as the point at which one rejoins the telegraph line. The writer got stuck in the sand within half a mile of this tower. The sand was well up to the axles, and digging only made the wheels sink in further. The most effective remedy was to spread a couple of cheap rugs down under the rear wheels and pull out on them. This method proved quite successful, and was used on subsequent occasions. One rejoins the telegraph line at mile 168, after which the going is quite firm and level as far as Shurgaz, mile 191. Here there is a small telegraph linesman's post and a well of brackish water.

The track now becomes sandy again, and the going heavier. Some sand dunes are passed, and at mile 194 the Shurgaz river bed is reached. This is a shallow depression about three-quarters of a mile wide, and consisting entirely of soft drift sand. The going is as heavy as it possibly can be, and it is doubtful if any laden car with less than six wheels could get across it without outside assistance. It took the writer one hour and a half to get across in a Dodge car with the rugs and spades in use, and with three men pushing. This is the *pièce de résistance* of the whole journey, and once the Shurgaz is crossed, there is nothing ahead to give very much trouble.

The going remains rather sandy for some miles, and then becomes firmer. At 223 miles Kunarak telegraph-post is passed about three-quarters of a mile on the right. The track now rises to the Kunarak hills, which are entered some eight miles further on. At mile 245 the Afghan Pass is reached. One follows the track, which is very stony, and resembles a typical North-West Frontier nullah-bed, until the nullah forks. One follows the left-hand track, which gets rapidly narrower until there is barely room for a car to pass. The track is no longer rocky at this point, and a very little pick and shovel work would widen the track and improve it beyond measure.

The top of the pass is reached at mile 247, after which the descent is quite an easy one. The track leads down into the plain, and nine miles across it one reaches the small telegraph-post of Sipi. There is good water, but no provisions whatever are obtainable.

Six miles beyond Sipi the track traverses a belt of hills and then emerges into a wide plain. The going would be quite good were it not for very numerous dry watercourses, which check one every few hundred yards. At mile 313 a telegraph-line branches off left to Dehaneh Baghi, but must not be followed. Duzdab is reached four miles further on.

Though it is just possible to take a car by road all the way through to Quetta, yet with the railway actually working from Duzdab, no useful purpose would be served by doing so, and the journey is a most difficult and unpleasant one.

A few general hints to travellers by car in Persia may be useful.

First of all, as regards the type of car best suited for the country, the Americans are, at present, easy favourites. There is a belief, and one has often heard the opinion stated, that the most suitable car for Persia is the Ford. This is partly based on the fact that Ford cars were used during the war by the British military authorities, and did excellent work; and also because it is perhaps easier to obtain spare parts for this make of car than for any other. What is much more important, however, is the fact of the Ford having such a large clearance and short wheel-base. Nevertheless, there are two serious disadvantages attaching to the Ford for travelling long distances in a country like Persia. Firstly, the Ford car is not made for low-gear work, and in Persia one has a great deal of this to do; and, secondly, the engine heats up very rapidly, and the radiator is constantly on the boil. This in a country where, in many areas, one has to carry all one's water with one, is in itself a very great disadvantage.

The trouble with British cars is usually their lack of clearance. There are numbers of British makes of car which would compete very favourably with the Americans were it not for this one disadvantage—lack of sufficient clearance. Apart from the roughness of the track in some of the hilly areas, where one frequently has to drive over projecting pieces of rock, there are numerous bridges over irrigation cuts to be negotiated. Most of these are short, but they are so steep that a car with a long wheel-base and ordinary clearance frequently impinges on the crest of the bridge and sticks there.

In setting out on a trip across Persia, it is important to time oneself so as to avoid the rainy season. Generally speaking, one can travel quite safely any time after the end of March and before the beginning of November. The Teheran-Tabriz road remains open generally until the end of November, after which time, and sometimes earlier, bad weather must be expected, and the road remains practically impassable

until the spring. The same conditions apply to East Persia. Once the winter rains have broken, the Kirman-Duzdab route is turned into a sea of mud, and neither cars nor camels can get across it.

It would be ungrateful to complete these notes without a brief reference to the British Consulates in Persia. Well known for the kindness and hospitality they invariably extend to travellers, it behoves the latter to appreciate the position of the Consulates. With the development of motor transport, the number of British travellers in Persia is increasing, and there is a tendency on the part of a few of them to regard the British Consulates as institutions existing specially for their convenience. It is true that in many towns in Persia there is still no hotel accommodation suitable for Europeans, in which case the traveller may find himself thrown upon the hospitality of His Majesty's Consul. Out of consideration for the latter, therefore, and as a matter of courtesy, it is desirable, where possible, to write ahead and inform the Consul of one's arrival if it is desired to invoke his assistance.

Most travellers find themselves indebted sooner or later to the Indo-European Telegraph Department for permission to use their rest-houses. These are a real boon, for in most cases they are situated in the smaller and more out-of-the-way places, where no other accommodation is possible. Permission to occupy them should be obtained from the Indo-European Telegraph Department in Teheran. The officials of the Department are always most obliging, and more than one traveller on his way through to India has had to thank them for assistance rendered, without which they would probably never have reached their destination.

REVIEWS

IN CHINA. By M. Abel Bonnard. London: Messrs. G. Routledge and Sons. 15s.

M. Bonnard was merely a visitor to China, but he had made some study of Chinese history and literature, is a shrewd observer, and has marked literary ability. His book is therefore very interesting and instructive.

The description which he gives of Peking in the summer and in the autumn is excellent.

His love of the East and his admiration for the achievements of ancient China in literature, philosophy, and art, lead him sometimes into extravagance. He laments that he was unable to meet any of "the great Taoistic priests in their magnificent monastic libraries, whose minds travel silently through depths that few of their fellows can even conceive of, to the ultimate point which man's speculations on the universe have reached." Are there any such Taoist priests in China? I doubt it. In the "China Year Book" we are told that Taoism, as now practised in China, is a "polytheistic hotchpotch of witchcraft and demonology," and I believe this to be correct. The Chinese are not great religious thinkers. As an educated man once said to me: "I do not think that a Chinese cares much what is going to happen to him in the next world as long as he can have a good time in this one."

M. Bonnard also, like many other people, indulges in unnecessary enthusiasm about the Great Wall of China. They read that the Emperor Shih of the Tsin dynasty constructed a great wall in the third century B.C., and they see north of Peking and at Shanhaikwan the magnificent wall which the Ming Emperors built in the sixteenth century A.D. to keep out the Manchu Tartars, and they imagine that a wall of this character was constructed before the Christian era across the whole of North China. Personally I doubt if the wall built by the Emperor Shih differed materially in character from Offa's Dyke. In Kansu the wall does not appear to have ever been anything but an erection of mud; and in Shensi, along the border of Mongolia, south of the Yellow River, much of the structure was mud, though the guard-posts and barracks were of brick. Kansu and Shensi are regarded by the Chinese as the cradle of their race.

In a passage about Confucius and his design of society M. Bonnard sees visions of a China which, except perhaps in periods of strong autocratic rule, does not ever appear to have existed. "It seems," he writes, "as if the problem of civilization had never been more perfectly solved, nor with such dexterous elegance, because the disorderly element, which exists everywhere else only held in check by fear, had disappeared altogether in China, and there was no need of constraint of anyone, because everyone seemed to be converted." There is no country in the world more subject to periodic disturbances and upheavals than China.

M. Bonnard, however, has an observant eye, and saw China as it is with vivid clearness—a "stark dumb land," where the people are an unfailing object of interest, but the scenery is for the most part dull and uninteresting, and the filth and misery resulting from over-population and overcrowding cause the foreigner to shudder. The following are descriptions of what he saw at Foochow and Chungking in Szechuan:

"But the smells are worse than anything else. Pails of filth without any cover stand about everywhere, and the ill-fitting paving-stones expose the drains into which the filth from every dwelling-house is discharged. The overflow from these drains spreads itself almost with an air of pomp into sheets of filth, breaks out into bubbles, and mixes its disgusting eddies to such an extent that when I passed a stable, from which there came a strong smell of horse manure, it struck me as such a pleasant, wholesome smell by contrast that I stood still an instant to breathe it as a corrective. . . .

"Hideous maladies take hold of swarms like these, just like brambles clinging to a wall. One sees swellings, scabs, mottlings, and bright rashes. Nothing cheerful stands out in the uniformity of the crowd, but now and then you are suddenly frozen with horror at the poor unbearable face of a beggar, a face contracted like a closed fist, with merely the remains of an eye or lip to be seen in it."

When he deals also with modern-day politics M. Bonnard's observations are very sagacious. In 1918 the pro-Japanese policy of the Anfu Government at Peking aroused the indignation of the students, and a number of strikers attempted to set fire to the house of an unpopular Minister. Students headed demonstrations to protest against Japanese influence and to constrain the populace to boycott their goods. When M. Bonnard was in China this agitation was still continuing, and he was shrewd enough to see its possibilities. "If you want," he writes, "to know a nation, you had much better begin by studying the young people. For, thanks to their exuberance and to the fact that they are not yet rendered discreet by the necessity of retaining employment for the earning of their bread, they involuntarily reveal the soul of the nation." . . . "We should not allow ourselves to be deflected from the main issues by our amusement at details, which may be dangerous in so far as they obscure the profound meaning of the movement. Although in these actions the students are obviously only feeling the way, it is unmistakable that a new force is struggling to the light and becoming conscious of itself, and as each of these crises makes it more and more conscious of itself the crises naturally recur."

On the question also whether Bolshevism will spread in China M. Bonnard's observations are very much to the point: "Those who always deal in the small change of received ideas will answer that there are too many smallholders and cultivators here to admit of the possibility of Communism succeeding. But the people who observe for themselves are less decisive. They know what the peasants have to endure and fear, that they will become desperate at last and ready to deliver themselves up to any party which promises them a better fate. Then, too, the soldiers, who are badly paid and badly disciplined, feel quite as much discontent as they give rise to, and would easily be swept into any revolutionary movement. Thus we get the formation of immense masses of people who are no longer attached to any solid principle." . . . "Let us remember what rebellion in China may mean if we want to understand how successful Bolshevism or any other form of excess may become here. As a fire sweeps through the serried ranks of the native wooden hovels from one burst of its appalling energy, so in this race, where there is no effective separation between individuals, one mad idea inflames countless multitudes simultaneously. There are numerous examples of these outbursts of frenzy in Chinese history up to the Boxer riots, and even since then."

These observations were made in 1920-21. It is a pity that some of the people in England, who are supposed to interpret China to the public, were not equally far-seeing.

R. M. DANE.

DER KAMPF UM ASIEN. By Hans Rohde. Stuttgart, Berlin, und Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags-Unstalt. 1924.

The author of this remarkable work in two volumes relates in a continuous narrative the more recent phases of that great struggle between East and West which may be said to run through history from the epoch of the Trojan War onwards. Only the first—namely, the one on the fight for mastership in the Levant and over Islam—is here dealt with; the second treats of the problems of the Far East and the Pacific Ocean.

In the course of a long residence in the Levant Herr Rohde has convinced himself of the truth that the history of Asia—and, indeed, world history—is in our day dominated by the necessity imposed at all times on Great Britain of securing and maintaining by sea and land her communications with her Indian Empire. From this supreme object her foreign policy is never for a moment deflected. When she meets with rebuffs she overcomes them, at one time by force, at another by negotiation and compromise. In the end she is usually successful, and at the conclusion of this volume we are comforted with the assurance that, after a disastrous interlude marked by the triumphs of Mustafa Kemal Bey, the Near East has been left again under the influence mainly of our country. A word of warning, however, is added. The Treaty of Lausanne paid too little attention to Russia and Germany. In the long run the virtual exclusion from the settlement of two Powers, surely not uninterested in Eastern developments, is likely to make itself felt, nor can final equilibrium yet be said to have been attained in the region under review.

In the period preceding the opening of the Suez Canal, when the Mediterranean was only a lake with a narrow issue at its western extremity, Great Britain's main reliance was necessarily on Turkey, the principal Power interposing between Russia and India. After 1869 Egypt, whence the canal could be more closely watched, began to take the place of Turkey, and Great Britain did not rest satisfied until she had firmly established herself on the Lower Nile. France acquiesced, now taking largely the place of Great Britain in Turkey. British sea communications with India were thus secured. It remained to keep safely within the British orbit the lands forming a bridge between India and Egypt: Afghanistan, Persia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia. Although Afghanistan and Persia have now gained their independence, Herr Rohde shows that Great Britain has contrived to retain an influential position in those countries, while Mesopotamia and the Arab lands are admittedly subject to her prevailing authority.

France is represented as Great Britain's principal rival in the Near East, but the author is led to believe that Great Britain has always at hand a sure means of overcoming French resistance in Asia by the simple device of giving France a free hand against Germany in Europe. By a mutual understanding of this kind the field was opened for Monsieur Poincaré to carry out his long-cherished intentions in the Ruhr in return for concessions at Lausanne, enabling Great Britain to settle in her own way some of the outstanding questions in the Arab territories.

On this and other points on which stress is laid in the book before us no reference is given to show on what authority the author relies for some of his categorical statements. His 260 pages are unaccompanied by a single note; and though the reader is thankful never to be distracted from the even tenor of his perusal by tiresome references at the bottom of the page, he is left under the impression that, while the writer possesses undoubtedly an accurate knowledge of the successive situations he so skilfully delineates, some of his conclusions

are perhaps derived more from his inner consciousness than from any definite documentary source. On the whole the book is flattering to the self-esteem of the British reader. His country is represented as the principal factor in world movements, being credited with a degree of intuition, prescience, and unswerving perseverance in the attainment of her ends which he would hardly dare to claim for her. The following passage, taken at random, may serve as an example :

"Lord Salisbury's proposal"—advances made to Germany in 1895—"shows once more the whole vast scope and the far-seeing character of English policy ; how it adopts aims which are perfectly clear and definite, yet never loses sight of its main object, using each new situation towards the attainment of that object, and shaping all its actions single-mindedly to the gaining and securing of England's position as a world power."

At home it is sometimes said that Great Britain's place in the world has been gained not so much by her adherence to a fixed and definite plan as by a certain suppleness in adopting, when in difficulties, the line of least resistance.

However this may be, the book affords very interesting reading. There is no new revelation, but the known facts are linked up in an illuminating manner, and an unbroken narrative is presented of the principal events of Near Eastern history in recent times.

The author naturally devotes a good deal of space to the incursion of Germany into Eastern politics after the accession of the Emperor William II. In the previous period Bismarck had advisedly abstained from taking a leading part in the affairs of the Levant. He described himself as rather pro-British in Egypt and pro-Russian in the Straits ; but he refused to be drawn into any definite line of policy not obviously conducing to the consolidation at home of the Empire he had created. Herr Rohde deplors the departure subsequently made by Germany from this cautious attitude. Germany, he holds, was led to seek expansion eastwards by aims purely economic, forgetting that a policy exclusively economic and unaccompanied by political and military power is doomed to failure. Her great enterprise, the Bagdad railway, was beyond her capacity. Her final discomfiture was largely due to the fact that her only supporters were two Powers, each rotten to the core—namely, Austria and Turkey.

No attempt can here be made to summarize the contents of this work, but attention may perhaps be directed to the dramatic account which it contains of the post-war period in the Levant. Great Britain, in military control of the Asiatic territories of the old Turkish Empire, sought at first to make sure of the land bridge to India, which is regarded by the author as being one of her chief preoccupations. With this end in view she imposed a Treaty on Persia (August, 1919) which amounted virtually to a protectorate. Next she approached Mustafa Kemal with proposals of a similar kind. On these being scornfully rejected, she determined that Turkey must be reduced to impotence. Hence the Treaty of Sèvres, to be enforced on Turkey by Greece, now in military possession of the Smyrna region. Behind Greece stood Great Britain ; behind Turkey, France. The outcome is too well known. Herr Rohde describes it as a triumph of French over British policy, and he regards the Treaty of Sèvres as a turning-point of history. It confirmed the East in its determination to stand up against the civilization of Europe. Greece was expelled with ignominy from Asia Minor. Russia was drawn into a kind of Quadruple Alliance with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. Revolts broke out in India and Egypt. The Treaty of Sèvres was torn to shreds, the first wedge being thus driven into the solid block of the Peace Treaties. The Treaty of Lausanne followed, giving

Turkey all she wanted, but leaving Great Britain, nevertheless, thanks to her skilful handling of the Arab factor, in the position once more of the dominant Power in the Levant.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

THE DERVISHES. By John P. Brown, edited by H. A. Rose. Oxford University Press. 18s.

Sixty years have passed since Mr. John P. Brown, at Constantinople, wrote the preface to his work on the Dervishes, published in the following year. A new edition has long been badly needed, and Mr. H. A. Rose, who has undertaken the task, has accomplished an excellent piece of work which gives evidence of much patient research. It is only those who have made some attempt to wade through the mass of traditions, legends, and miracles, with all their discrepancies, in Persian, Turkish, or Arabic, original or translated, which the subject involves, who can realize the difficulty of such an undertaking. It is perhaps questionable whether it would not have been better to retain the original title of the Dervishes, or if a change was to be made to have adopted that of the Darwishes.

Many travellers, not only students, especially to Egypt, where perhaps more visitors than those to any other Mohammedan countries witness the exercises of the Dervishes (the "Whirlers" and "Howlers"), would be glad to know more of the inner life of the fraternities whose *tekkiye*s they visit. But Brown's work, with all its merits, was the despair of those who consulted it, owing to its want of method, its misspellings and repetitions, and the want of an index, which were the causes of constant perplexity. The author, as the editor says, was "unfortunate in the choice of a scholar who saw his book through the press," and "lacked access to a good library, and other advantages." But perhaps, as Mr. Rose says, this very deprivation had its advantages, as the work "is based on information gleaned by laborious inquiries at first hand." It was more easy, in order to obtain a condensed account of the subject, to turn from the guide-book to Lane's "Modern Egyptians," to Lane's "Thousand and One Nights" (especially the notes to chap. iii.) to the Encyclopedia Britannica, and to Hughes' "Dictionary of Islam" under the terms Faquir and Sufi. A *faqir* (poor) is a man poor in the sight of God, whose mercy he needs; and under that term the dictionary gives its information regarding the Dervish orders.

There are many besides students who would like to have a condensed account of the relations between the Dervishes and Islam, since they are told that the latter disowns the former, and to learn how they "vindicated to themselves," to quote Palgrave, "a sufficient, though not unquestioned, reputation for orthodoxy much as Becky Sharp established her own disputed reputation by presentation at Court." Volumes, of course, could be written on the subject.

It was certain that the mystic orders would come into conflict with the orthodox Ulema, and sometimes with the civil authorities, at different times and places, not only because they tended to lead astray their adepts from the austere and simple purity of the Muslim creed, but because it transpired that some of the fraternities countenanced practices which would sap the foundations of morality. It was equally certain that the teachings of the Sufis could be shown to conform to the inner spirit of Islam. Many devout Mohammedans joined the ranks of the Sufis: no one more eminent than the Imam Ghazzali, who did so much to bring Sufism into line with orthodoxy. In his "Confessions," as translated by Claud Field, he pays the following tribute to the Sufi life: "I learnt from a sure source that the Sufis are the true pioneers on the

path of God : that there is nothing more beautiful than their life, nor more praiseworthy than their rule of conduct, nor purer than their morality. The intelligence of thinkers, the wisdom of philosophers, the knowledge of the most learned doctors of the law, would in vain combine their efforts in order to modify or improve their doctrine and morals. It would be impossible. And what other light could shine on the face of the earth ? In a word, what can one criticize in them ?”

While various orders have been at times subjected to persecution and attempted suppression, some have enjoyed much favour. Sultans and princes have given their patronage. Turkish sultans have been affiliated to their fraternities. Thus Mahmoud II. joined the Mevlevis, In Egypt members of the Khedive's family have been affiliated to the Mevlevi and Bektashi orders, to which rich presents have been made by their harems.

The ninety-nine names of the Deity include those of *Ez-Zâhir* (the clear) and *El-Bâtin* (the secret or hidden), Numbers 75 and 76. In the distinction between these two is contained the essence of the difference between orthodoxy and philosophic sufism, or dervishism. While Mohammed condemned celibacy, and would have no monks in Islam, sanction can be found for all the main doctrines of the brotherhoods. The Sufi is a Muslim and something more. The Muslim is “a bird with one wing”; the Sufi is one with two, by which he can soar to heights unknown to the former, and unknowable except to those who have reached them through faculties out of the reach of reason. The esoteric meanings of the divinely given Kurân were known to the Prophet, and handed down through Ali and other Khalifehs to the mystic sheikhs, whose knowledge transcends that of the ordinary uninitiated Muslim. There are endless differences of opinion among the Ulema. There are *Zahir* sheikhs and *Batin* sheikhs.

The term Dervish has come to cover a wide field ; and while some may be proud of it, others would reject it. At the one extreme is the Sufi, with his lofty ideals. At the other are found the “poor but honest” mendicant, but also a tribe including hypocrites and impostors, who have always been objects of ridicule, pity, or contempt. In all countries there are many who merely seek to lead an idle life, and to evade military service. Many jocose tales have been told at their expense. The story of the ass's grave, which became the shrine of a venerated sheikh, duly finds its place, and occupies fifteen pages.

To the average mind probably the word Dervish suggests thoughts of the hordes of so-called Dervishes of the Sudanese Mahdi, and again of the Senussieh (Sanusyah) fraternities, of whom no mention seems to be made. A good account of them is given in Canon Sell's “Religious Orders of Islam.” More might be said of missionary and propaganda work, which is so largely carried on by this and other proselytizing orders. To the Christian missionary the Ulema and the Dervishes are often said to be the chief opponents of reforms. There seems to be no reference to the division, especially in India, to *bi-shara* and *ba-shara* Dervishes : to those who follow the law, and those who are free thinkers.

There is much valuable information in the editor's introduction, and in his notes throughout the volume. To the question whether any of the Turkish industrial guilds originated in the religious fraternities, no positive reply, he says, can be given. The orders have at times given support to the Sheikh-el Islam, when resisting arbitrary acts of rulers. It may be added that they have served as a refuge for political fugitives, and sheltered the persecuted. The influence of some fraternities before and after the Seljuk Turks is mentioned. To many it will be new to learn that there is an order, or school, which admits

women. The *Doseh*, or Treading, in Egypt, in which the Sheikh of the Saadieh order rode a horse over the prostrate bodies of Dervishes and others, is mentioned as if still practised. It was abolished by the Khedive Tewfik.

There is but little alteration in the text of the original work. Chapter xii, is not reproduced, notes on the orders by Lane being found in their place elsewhere. The long list of Tekkiehs (Tekkés), or convents in Constantinople, including Scutari, is rightly relegated to an appendix (iii.) where, with the editor's valuable notes, it occupies twenty-five pages. The list can probably be of little value henceforth, unless it be for the curious who may visit, or search for, the old haunts.

Wherever the traveller goes in Muslim lands he comes across little domed tombs of reputed saints. But of these, who forget God, the poet El Bedri el-Hejazi, quoted by Lane, says :

"When he" (one of them) "dies they make for him a place of visitation, and strangers and Arabs hurry thither in crowds :
Some of them kiss his tomb, and some kiss the threshold of the door, and the very dust.

Thus do the idolators act towards their images, hoping so to obtain their favour."

To Mr. Rose much gratitude is due for the welcome appearance of the new edition, and for the painstaking manner in which he has carried out a very difficult task. Indeed, one may well wish that he could have rearranged the whole work.

THE AO NAGAS. By J. P. Mills, M.A., Indian Civil Service. (Macmillan and Co.)

This book is the twelfth volume of the series of tribal monographs which is being published by the Government of Assam in accordance with instructions drawn up early in the century for an ethnographic survey of India, and is the second volume dealing with this particular tribe. It is not quite clear why the Aos should have been twice described, and we cannot help thinking that had Mr. Mills's volume been ready a year or so earlier, that of Dr. W. O. Smith, which was published in 1925, would not have been accorded a place in the series; not that it was not worth publishing, but because Mr. Mills, writing as he did while living among the Aos and after a long sojourn in the Naga Hills, has produced so very complete an account of the tribe that no other is necessary.

It is a subject for congratulation that the members of the Governor's council, with whom the provision of funds for the publication of the series rests, have sufficient wisdom and foresight to realize that the money thus spent will bring in a good return. We do not refer to the scientific value of the books, nor do we propose in this review to deal, except in passing, with the contents of "The Ao Nagas" from an ethnographical standpoint. Members of this Society are, we venture to think, not uninterested in ethnography and anthropology; but there are journals that are specially devoted to those subjects, while the Central Asian Society is mainly concerned with practical politics, and therefore with the future of these tribes as members of the British Empire. From this point of view these monographs are of extreme value. Mr. Henry Balfour, M.A., F.R.S., who contributes a valuable foreword to Mr. Mills's book, speaks of these volumes "as a means of understanding and evaluating the status and potentialities of these 'unrisen' peoples, a prime factor in promoting and facili-

tating an enlightened, sympathetic, and just administration," and all who have had experience of dealing with these strange folk will endorse his opinion.

The frequent costly military expeditions have become things of the past, and this may safely be attributed to the policy of which these monographs are the outward and visible sign—namely, the encouraging of local officers to study their people closely, whereby they have come to understand them better, and have also learnt to influence and to some extent control the tribes beyond the border by less clumsy and cheaper means. The Assam Government will therefore, we feel sure, receive a good return for its expenditure, and we trust will continue issuing these books until all the tribes in and around its borders have been dealt with.

It might be thought that tribes living in close proximity would resemble one another in social structure, laws, and customs sufficiently to render detailed studies of each unnecessary for purposes of administration, but such is not the case. The Angamis are the most democratic of communities, and have a very highly developed system of terraced cultivation, with elaborate land laws; while adjoining them are the Semas, who are governed by chiefs each of whom, Dr. Hutton tells us, has an almost feudal position as lord of the manor of his village, and who cultivate on the jhum system. The Angami oath, if taken with all proper ceremony, is considered so sacred that false oaths are seldom taken, and many cases are settled in that way; but a Thado has no such fear, and will take any oath you demand if he thinks that he will benefit thereby. In such a matter as the rules of inheritance there is the greatest difference. An Angami can modify the customary disposal of his property by verbal directions, whereas an Ao has no such power—all his sons must inherit equally; while among the Lhotas, though property goes exclusively to male heirs, the need of the heirs is the primary consideration in the division. The eldest son, who has married and settled down, will get less than the youngest, who has all the expenses of getting married and of performing various ceremonies in front of him. An eminently sensible system, which is said to work excellently. The policy of our administration is to interfere as little as possible with the system of government and the customs of the different tribes, and therefore the great value of these monographs, which can be safely accepted by officers, new to the district, as authoritative guides, will easily be realized.

There are some customs with which it has been necessary to interfere, such as head-hunting, and the torturing of animals before sacrificing them, and the plucking alive of fowls, which used to be part of certain semi-religious ceremonies; but all Government officers are agreed on the importance of maintaining all harmless customs, and here they and the members of the American Baptist Mission differ.

Dr. Hutton and Mr. Mills even regret that it has been necessary to stop head-hunting, and seem almost inclined to think its prohibition was a mistake. Mr. Mills writes: "Life for the Ao, now that head-hunting is abolished, may be less strained, but it is certainly more drab. Much of the spice is gone. No more the thrill of the raid and counter-raid. He is a poor sort of man who does not at times feel a longing for risk." Which reminds us of a friend from whom we parted out Wipers way, and met years after with a bank counter between us, who, in reply to an enquiry as to his welfare, said, "Oh! all right. They kept my job open for me. It's all right, but d——d dull. By Jove, Colonel, I often find myself wishing a shell would drop at the end of the street."

Mr. Mills points out that head-hunting keeps people braced and alert, which must redound to their good, and he explains that this advantage is gained at very little cost, for in Naga wars casualty lists are not long. Tamlu and Nam-

sang, two villages on opposite sides of the same valley, fought for sixteen years, at the end of which the combined casualties totalled four. "There were raids innumerable, but neither could catch the other napping, and an attack is never pressed home against an enemy who is ready."

The same views have been put forward by other writers,* and Dr. W. C. Smith, although once a member of the American Baptist Mission, admits that head-hunting had its good points, and critically observes: "Some new avenue should have been developed for satisfying the desire for recognition, lest they should become disorganized and lose interest in life," and tells us that in the Philippines the United States Government introduced baseball "as a wholesome substitute." With the same intention no doubt the missionaries in the Naga Hills have introduced football in their schools, but, unfortunately, they are doing everything in their power in other ways to deprive the Naga of everything that made life worth living to his forefathers.

The Aos are fond of singing, and every festival is enlivened by songs. "Not only are the traditions of the past enshrined in their songs, but any notable event of the present day is similarly celebrated." The old men are in the habit of reciting tales of the feats of the great men of the past when the whole village is assembled at these great festivals, many of which are feasts of merit, to perform which was the ambition of every Ao, for thereby he left a name which would be sung at future festivals to the honour of his descendants. For these festivals elaborate costumes have to be made and intricate dances have to be learnt. By celebrating these feasts the right to wear cloths of special pattern and to affix certain ornaments to their houses is gained. These cloths and the dance costumes are highly artistic, and the carvings on the "morungs" (bachelor's houses), though in some respects crude, are highly effective. These home industries ought surely to be encouraged; they give the people an interest in life, they develop their artistic taste, and afford healthy relaxation from the monotonous round of daily life, yet it is just these features of Naga life that the American missionaries are doing their best to abolish because they are considered heathenish; and Mr. Mills says: "What care the well-oiled youths of the Impur Mission Training School for the foolish traditions of their ignorant heathen forebears? To bury the past is the tendency of the semi-educated generation which is growing up. Christians never join in the old songs; they are definitely forbidden to do so, I believe."

Dr. Hutton, the Deputy Commissioner in charge of the Naga Hills, suggests that "the native taste for colour and brilliant effects which the Naga possesses should be turned to the glory of God instead of being regarded as an offence before Him." He would have "the insignia of renown in war made badges of rank in the congregation; the bright cloths worn as a reward for the giving of feasts of merit retained by the Christians for their own acts of social service, and the deacons and pastors encouraged to wear hornbill feathers and cowrie aprons as badges of office, and the members of the congregation urged to come in their best native get-up, and the talents of the wood-carvers exercised in the ornamentation of the church instead of the 'morung.'" These measures, Dr. Hutton says, can hardly dishonour the Deity, "while the villages would not be deprived of the brilliant festivities which at present do so much, where Christianity has not destroyed them, to brighten the dull monotony of village life."

Unfortunately, the missionaries are not content with attending to the souls

* Cf. Rivers, "Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia," p. 101 *sqq.*; Kingdon Ward, "In Farthest Burma," p. 235; T. J. MacMahon, in the *Blue Peter* (July and August, 1922).

of their flock, but also aspire to covering their bodies with the garments of a more civilized cut, but entirely unsuited to the climate and mode of life and occupation of a Naga who lives a natural life. Mr. Mills gives three very good reasons for characterizing this insistence on the adoption of civilized clothing as the greatest of the mistakes made by the missionaries. As regards the prohibition of rice beer, we are inclined to doubt the wisdom when we read that the common drink of converts is tea-dust and tea-house sweepings boiled up, diluted with cold water, sugar and milk being rarely added. Sometimes the white of an egg, frequently past its prime, beaten up, is used instead of milk! No wonder that Mr. Mills tells us that Ao Christians have discovered substitutes for the drink of their forefathers, such as opium, distilled liquor, and rectified spirits of wine, which they said it did them good to sip as medicine "when their chests hurt."

Was it to obtain scriptural backing for their teaching that the translators of the New Testament into the Ao language have translated *olvor* in 1 Peter iv. 3, "excess of wine," as *yi sumugo*—i.e., drank rice beer; but the same word where the context is favourable to its use is translated *tzukmenatsu tsu*, which implies the unfermented grape-juice used by them in administering the Sacrament. Another curious mistranslation which Mr. Mills brings to notice is James v. 20: "shall save his soul from death" has been translated by Ao words which mean "shall save his soul from hell-fire"; and Mr. Mills tells us that all Ao Christians firmly believe that their non-Christian brethren are doomed to burn for ever and ever, a doctrine which a member of the Mission told Mr. Mills he himself held and taught. To escape this awful fate many Aos, when sick or getting old, become converts, and others change their religion to escape certain unpleasant consequences of following the customs of their forefathers. Then their souls yearn for *madhu*, and they rejoin the non-Christians; later they may change their minds and give up *madhu*, and be readmitted into the Baptist Church. Dr. Hutton in a note mentions that an old Ao friend of his has done six months each way, turn and turn about, during the last three years. A most worthy Ao Vicar of Bray! In contrast to whom let us quote the words of a brave Chang Naga, who said to Mr. Mills with reference to the teaching of the missionaries: "Even if their words are true, am I a coward that I should fear to join my father and mother and suffer whatever torments they may be suffering? If they can bear them, cannot I?" For whom will the trumpets sound loudest? For Kingsley's Viking old Wulf, dying unbaptized in Spain, and our gallant Chang, or for that old Vicar of Bray with his six months turn and turn about.

Mr. Mills tells us that at the last census in 1921 no less than 1,180 persons, more than one-eighth of the total of the Christians, returned themselves as "sitters in the middle"—that is, people with no religion at all. They had been Christians, but had left or been turned out of the Baptist community, and had as yet not rejoined the faith of their fathers. Naturally, when missionaries acquiesce in these lightning changes of religion, the idea is spreading that it does not matter much what a man believes, and Christianity is spoken of as "a set of customs," and to many Aos it can mean little more. This must have a most disastrous effect on the tribe, and Mr. Mills asks what England would be like if a large proportion of the population was continually changing from the creed of Mahomet to that of Christ and back again. One sad effect of the teaching of the American missionaries is a loss of the sense of humour, and Mr. Mills was able to pick out a large number of Christians without making one mistake, in the course of an evening stroll down the village street, by their solemn faces and dowdy appearance. A more serious charge is that Ao

Christians are inclined to place their individual convenience above the common good, and that very few Christian Aos were prepared to leave the comforts and security of their homes to face the unknown dangers and hardships of service in France with the Naga Labour Corps. A great contrast to the Lushai Christians, who, led by their Welsh parson, provided a strong contingent.

Having dealt thus faithfully with the missionaries, it behoves us to record that Mr. Mills reports that Christians are cleaner, more honest, and less vindictive and quarrelsome, save in matters of religion, and after marriage are stricter than the others, though divorces, some for very trivial reasons, are pretty frequent.

Mr. Mills gives in an appendix a very interesting account of the lines on which the Naga Hills are run. The area of the district must be between three and four thousand square miles, about half that of Wales, and is just as mountainous as that principality. The population is sparse, under 200,000; but it is divided into thirteen tribes, each with its own language, customs, and system of government. The people live in villages scattered fairly evenly about the district, so that the two civil officers responsible for peace and order of the district have to be constantly on the move, for they must keep in personal touch with the people as much as they can. The duties of Deputy Commissioner and his assistant, the subdivisional officer of Mokokchung, are to assess and collect taxes, settle disputes, and look after the well-being of the area in general. The Deputy Commissioner has powers equivalent to those of a Sessions Judge. Justice is administered in the spirit of the Indian penal code, but not by its letter. Chiefs, headmen, councillors, or other heads of communities dispose of cases if they are not of a very serious nature, but appeal lies to the officer in charge of the subdivision. Labour is requisitioned for public purposes, road-making, buildings, etc., but is paid for. If the Naga can no longer take his neighbour's head, neither can his neighbour take his, and this immunity extends to about two days' journey beyond our frontier, so great is the prestige of the "Burra Sahib" of Kohima. The district has been fairly opened up by the construction of good bridle-paths, and the rivers have been bridged. Mr. Mills describes briefly the difficulties that have been overcome in adjusting the disputes between Christians and non-Christians, the chief of which has been over the performance of village duties, payment of village dues, and observance of communal tabus.

The impression that we gain from studying this appendix is that these two officers must have quite enough work to keep them busy, and that they must be extremely interested in their people to devote enough time to the study of them and their manners and customs to produce such excellent volumes as Dr. Hutton and Mr. Mills have done. It is also clear that the Hills are run on sensible lines, the Government at Shillong being content with laying down the general lines of policy without interfering with the local officers in matters of detail, which is the only sound system with these wild folk, with whom the ruler must be a personality, not a mere name. We have used the term "wild folk," but anyone who studies the account of the laws and customs of the Aos will realize that, though they may not be civilized according to our standards, they are a very long way removed from savages; and it is just because their present system of tribal government and internal economy and also their mode of life in general is so well suited to their environment that we consider the American missionaries are so wrong in their efforts to destroy much that they can never replace.

One reason why our officers are so successful in dealing with "wild tribes" is, we think, because they seem always to get fond of their own particular

people, and Mr. Mills is no exception. Though he does admit that "to like the Ao one must know him long and well," he defends them effectively against all accusations, one of which is lack of courage, in reply to which he points out that they did well in the operations against the Kukis, and sent a big contingent of volunteers to face utterly unknown dangers of service in France, who rendered good service in the Naga Labour Corps. In considering this matter of courage, it is well to remember that an Englishman who is killed in battle is looked on as a hero, his name is honoured, his descendants mention it with pride, and no sect teaches that such a death diminishes his chance of happiness beyond the grave. With the Naga warrior it is very different. Death in battle is shameful, and "a man whose head is taken brings shame upon his family and misery upon his own spirit, which is earth-bound till the victor dies and takes it as a slave to the next world." Surely we should all take off our hats to all Nagas who under these circumstances go forth to battle, even if they do look after their own lives carefully while on a raid.

We trust that we have shown that Mr. Mills's book, and in fact all the books of this series, contain much that is of interest and value to the general reader, especially to those who are interested in the welfare of their fellow-subjects of King George.

The illustrations are numerous and good, there are two good maps, an index covering sixty double-columned pages, and the whole is turned out in Messrs. Macmillan's best style. J. S.

LEAVES FROM A VICEROY'S NOTEBOOK. By the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G. (Macmillan and Co.) Price 28s.

This new book by Lord Curzon is rather a revelation. It is neither profound in matter nor treatment, nor bulky in size. It is just a delightful collection of stories told with a distinct touch of humour. Each chapter is, in fact, a little story of some incident or event which pleased him. They not only show characteristic sidelights on the habits and customs of India, Egypt, and Persia, but they reveal somewhat intimately Lord Curzon in bending mood—Lord Curzon reveals himself, in fact.

The thing that strikes one most in reading the "Viceroy's Notebook" is his subtle sense of fun. Who would have thought it to look at him, or even casually to talk to him? The volume is light, and his chapter on the inappropriateness of certain hymns, about which he was particularly learned, his delightful description of his arrival at the Portuguese State of Goa, and quickly learning a sentence in Portuguese at the banquet because no one present understood English or French, are clever descriptions of scenes he lived.

He tells a good story and he tells it against himself, such as the holding up of a grand function because his sun hat could not be found, and finally being retrieved from the cook-pot.

In India in 1920 I was always hearing of Lord Curzon's more serious work, especially his restoration of ancient buildings. One day Mr. Malcolm Hailey kindly motored Mr. Hylton Young, M.P. (the former has now attained the prefix of "Sir" to his name), and myself out to Kutb and the Humayun's tomb near Delhi, where Mr. Hailey explained how Lord Curzon had swept away all the dirty corners, the rubbish heaps, and the human garbage, till then lurking in every corner. He had found new ground plots for this impecunious humanity, scraped away the black fire smoke from those pink walls, grown grass, and planted trees. It was a great work that Curzon did for the antiquities of India, and always with respect and reverence.

Lavish in many ways, a Viceroy who demanded regal state, pompous, awe-inspiring, and extravagant in display, he did the funniest little things.

In 1924, after circling the globe, with many side-tracks, I was back in India visiting the superb white marble Victoria Museum in Calcutta, so superb outside, and so void of light and stairways inside. I was shown a picture of one of the builders of India which Lord Curzon had just sent out to enrich the collection of the famous makers of that enthralling land of colour and surprises. It was an oil-painting, more important for its subject than for its craftsmanship, and with it had come the late Viceroy's orders and a sketch denoting exactly on which wall he thought it should be placed. Curzon possessed a vondrous memory and was great at details. The picture had just been hung, and his suggested space had been found quite suitable, then—yes, then came the bill which accompanied it. The picture and packing and freight had cost a few pounds and some odd shillings, if I remember rightly, and that wealthy man expected payment for this trifling sum. He often sent things to the museum and he always sent the bill—just a strange little idiosyncrasy of the rich!

Lord Curzon, besides being profound and a colossal worker and quibbler for detail, had wide visions. His brain conceived big subjects, and once in the saddle he galloped hard for attainment.

The fine home of the Royal Geographical Society facing Hyde Park owes much to this master-mind, and he looked the essence of power, contentment, attainment, and human success as he received the Fellows at Lowther Lodge on the opening night.

His book does not mention these funny little sidelights, but, after all, the inner man is revealed by such things. The book is an amusing compilation by an amazing man whose brain could seldom have been idle, and whose work in many walks of life did much to mould the history of his time; yet the keynote of this last book is both light and amusing.

Mrs. ALICE TWEEDIE.

BEYOND THE KHYBER PASS. Lowell Thomas. (Hutchinson.) 18s.

A globe-trotter's book on the North-West Frontier of India is nothing new, and is often well illustrated and written with picturesqueness, but Mr. Lowell Thomas's "Beyond the Khyber Pass" is something more than that. It is a really glowing and sympathetic account of the frontier, its troops, and its tribesmen, describing a motor tour from Baluchistan, Dera Ismail Khan, and the frontier road to Peshawur, and thence up the Khaiber to Kabul, a trip for which the necessity permits had taken two years' hard work to obtain. The author is a master of descriptive writing, as he who told the story of Lawrence in Arabia must needs be. Tank, Kazmak, the Tochi, Kohat, Peshawur, all pass in effective and sympathetic review. Perhaps as the journey starts the American is a little inclined to gird unconsciously at the lofty position of the British, guiding and controlling this immense land; but long before even Peshawur is reached his sympathy is very fully given to those who keep watch and ward and sit on the safety valve. He is surely seized of the romance of the frontier. No "Piffer" could have imbibed it more. Listen: "Who shall say in what the fascination lies? The grey hills that jag into the turquoise sky, the little green valleys, the mournful beauty of the dawns and twilights, the majestic cirque of hills that girds the fertile plain of Peshawur, the sunlit plain of Kohat as it stretches out from the pass, the desolate gorges and snowy saltpetre of the river by Bahadur Khel—these things weave a spell, in recollection anyway, that will hold the memory when many more beautiful scenes are forgotten." It is not possible to see it clearer than that!

We need not follow Mr. Thomas and his fanatic photographer, Harry Chase, in their frontier epic. The photographs are extremely well selected, and are more than typical. Some of the types of Mahsud and Wazir and Afridi are devilish in their selection of the more ruthless types. Towers, forts, and tombs are all more than well selected. Speaking of the relief of quitting Waziristan the author says: "As we view it from afar, it comes back to us as the very navel of bedevilment. Surely the men who guard such plague spots on Britain's 'far flung battle-line' deserve much gratitude from stay-at-home Englishmen . . . more indeed than they are likely to get."—All of which is very true, except that just for the moment there are few stay-at-home Britons of mature age, and a good many London bus drivers even have seen the Khaiber in summer.

The talk of Kabul, still a city of romance to the last two generations, is especially fascinating, and to show how the traveller has sensed some of true inwardness of the British position in India, *vis-à-vis* India itself and Central Asia—the following amusing dicta of his acquaintance the Faraz Bashi at his quarters in Kabul may be quoted:

"My friend the Faraz Bashi was consuming a canteloup and looking over the hazy purple mountains that rose against the turquoise of approaching twilight. He pointed to the crescent moon lately risen over the ruins of the Balar Hissar. 'The sickle of the true believers shall reap the harvest of faith,' he said. 'At last Afghanistan is safe. Neither Britain nor Russia would dare attack us. Persia cannot, for she is too weak. In the next decade we may be able to go down to Hindustan and place the yoke of Islam upon the necks of the fat and infidel rajahs, who dress like women, with pearls in their hair and bells on their trousers.'

"And shall you take India?' I asked.

"Inshallah, if God wills,' said the Faraz Bashi, pouting a big chest. 'For India needs a master; he will come through the glades of Kaniguram and the cane-brakes of Bannu and the rose-gardens of Peshawur.'

"Does His Majesty approve of the idea of attacking India?"

"Kings keep their own counsel. . . . Kings know the wisdom of Solomon, who said there is a time to embrace England and a time to refrain from embracing her. . . ."

"So the Afghan waits with the patience of the Oriental for something to turn up. A revolution in India, for instance, will find him in Peshawur."

Mr. Lowell Thomas talks very good talk, and it would cheer him to learn how Peshawur was held in '57 in just such a juncture. The whole talk of the progressive Kabul of to-day and all the foreign Ministers, and of the modern young Amir and his ambitions, are by no means the least effective portion of the book.

G. MACMUNN.

MEMOIRS OF HALIDÉ EDIB. (John Murray and Co.) 21s.

The authoress is comparatively unknown to the English-reading public, except to those persons who have special knowledge of modern Turkey. The memoirs of Halidé Edib Hanoum throw no fresh light on the political events which took place during the period which she covers, since her explanations and criticisms of these events differ in no way from the stereotyped opinions held by the modern Turkish nationalist.

However, the book appeals in other ways—firstly, in the charming pen-picture of the life of a young Turkish girl during the time of Abdul Hamid, and secondly, the tracing of the intellectual growth of the modern Turkish woman

with liberal ideas, of which the authoress is the most brilliant example. We see in her mental development the desire to throw off the yoke of oriental religious fanaticism and blind conservatism, which is interpreted in an ardent desire for the progress of her people along the lines of Western culture and civilization.

In all this she shows herself to be an advanced democrat, yet her conception of democracy is coupled with a strong nationalism; thus she says: "I will almost admit that there is a narrow, negative, and destructive nationalism in the world which has deluded itself with the belief that a nation can only grow and thrive by exterminating and oppressing the peoples under its rule, or by conquering and suppressing the nations around it. Both are forms of wrongly understood nationalism which can be called by the name of Chauvinism and Imperialism." Again she says: "Nationalism used for political purposes is an ideal turned into a monstrosity." One can only hope that these words will sink into the minds of those of Halidé Edib's compatriots who are responsible for the government of Turkey to-day, especially as regards the treatment of the minorities which still remain in Turkey, and as regards Turkey's relations with foreign Powers. In this respect we see the broad spirit of tolerance all through Halidé Edib's life, especially in her affection for her Greek nurse and her friendship for the Armenian priest Goumitas. Commenting on the Exchange of Populations, which formed part of the Treaty of Lausanne, she says: "Although the younger nationalists tried to disregard religion in the national ego, in practice they have been far from doing so. There are purely Turkish Orthodox Christians who were exchanged by the Lausanne Treaty because of their Church difference. And it is strange to think that Rıza Nour Bey, who was one of the Turkish delegates, signed the Treaty, although he is a strong nationalist, on the basis of origin and language."

The minority question in Turkey is too complicated to discuss here, and such discussion would be out of place. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the Turks have had the greatest provocation from their Greek and Armenian minorities. However, one cannot help feeling that if Turkish statesmen had possessed the same breadth of outlook and enlightenment as Halidé Edib Hanoum, they would have found some other solution to the problem than that of massacre. The broader political issues between the great Christian Powers, their divergent interests and even petty jealousies, were responsible for much as regards the massacre of the Christians by the Turks and the Turks by the Christians in retaliation. As regards the petty jealousies between the different sects composing Christendom in Turkey, Halidé Edib Hanoum recounts the following incident, which is as shameful as it is ridiculous. Whilst in Jerusalem, she entered a church connected with the Virgin. She says: "Those ancient churches and consecrated spots (in Jerusalem) had no peace. One felt that all these many creeds and peoples were trying to have them to themselves and were ready to jump at each other's throats at any moment. . . . The Turk alone had a calm, impartial, and quiet look. He divided these spots justly among them all, and stood calmly watching, stopping bloody quarrels and preventing bloody riots in holy places." In this particular church she found a Turk, the guardian of the carpet, marking off the place of each particular creed. He was there to stop any brawls which might occur between the different Christian sects. In reply to a question by Halidé Edib Hanoum, he said: "They would murder each other in an instant if they saw that one crossed the boundary by much as a hair-breadth. See that window? It was black with the dirt and cobwebs of ages. None dared touch it. Each asserted the right of cleaning it. But an attempt to do so on the part of any would have meant a wholesale massacre." "Who washed it at last?" she asked. He smiled as he

answered. "Enver Pasha came two months ago. He saw the dirty state, and he called the heads of the creeds and asked them to wash it. There was an instant row as to who should hold the brush and who should carry the water. Then the Pasha said: 'The Turkish soldiers are the guardians of the place, they shall wash it,' and it was cleaned in half an hour."

The second half of Halidé Edib's book regarding her educational activities in Syria is even more interesting than the first half. Not only does she give a vivid picture of the country through which she passed, but she shows that she was imbued with the highest motives of charity and toleration of all classes and creeds in the cause of humanity, apart from which she shows herself, by the results obtained, to have been a first-class organizer and a profound student of the theory of education.

In conclusion, one cannot help alluding to the present political exile of the authoress and her husband, Dr. Adnan Bey. No one worked harder and more loyally than these two people, under the banner of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, during the Turkish War of Independence. It is deplorable, in the higher interests of Turkey, that Dr. Adnan Bey should have been arraigned before the Turkish Tribunal of Independence in the autumn of last year on a charge of conspiracy against the State and against the person of the Ghazi, and that, although acquitted, he and his wife cannot return to Turkey in safety at the present time. Halidé Edib does not allude to these events in her *Memoirs*; she tells us of all her sufferings and disappointments, but surely this exile from her country, which she lives to serve, must be the cruellest of all. In the epilogue of her *Memoirs* she says of the period between the Armistice of Mudros and the Treaty of Lausanne: "How the new era began, and what was the scene enacted must be told as a separate tale—the tale of one of the greatest epics of modern Europe." Perhaps Halidé Edib will tell us in that volume why she and her husband cannot return to Turkey to carry on the good work they have begun.

The curious part is that there is no fundamental difference of opinion between them and the present rulers of Turkey, but it seems that the latter have not yet learnt the value of team work, and that there is room for everyone who is prepared to work, not in the interests of self, but for the common weal.

It would appear that even among the newest, but perhaps not the most enlightened, republic petty jealousies exist as in every State. Possibly she had something of this in mind when she wrote on p. 124: "A despot is not a real despot if he is not jealous of every popular talent not exclusively used for his royal pleasure, and permitted to the public only through him."

ANCIENT CITIES OF IRAQ. By Dorothy Mackay. (The Bookshop, Baghdad.)

In her foreword to this little book the author truly remarks that to appreciate the flat and dusty plains of Iraq it is necessary to have the eye of faith and the gift of imagination. Endowed with these the traveller, though at first depressed by the monotonous expanse of the Iraq landscape, gradually comes to feel the subtle and mysterious influence which, as the author says, the country exercises over all who try to understand it. Nor must the visitor expect to find in the ruined cities of Iraq the same interest and attraction which he may have felt in viewing the relics of the past in other parts of the world. The interest is there, but it is of another kind. One is impressed, first of all, with the remote antiquity of these ruins. According to the chronology at the end of the book, Kish, the site of which the Oxford and Chicago Expedition is now excavating, was the first capital after the Flood.

Many of these ancient cities and peoples are mentioned in the books of the Old Testament in passages describing the relations between Israel and Judah and Assyria.

Who that gazes upon the mounds which alone remain to mark the site of the once proud city of Nineveh can fail to call to mind the fiery denunciation of the prophet Nahum: "Thy shepherds slumber, O King of Assyria: thy nobles shall dwell in the dust: thy people is scattered upon the mountains and no man gathereth them"; or who can visit Babylon without thinking of the Jewish captivity: "By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion"?

In perusing this book one is struck, too, by the complete devastation and obliteration which has overtaken so many powerful nations and cities. Of Selucia, the once important capital of Seleucus, the successor of Alexander the Great, which numbered half a million inhabitants, nothing remains but "a few insignificant mounds, that are little worthy of a visit," to quote the author's words; while what remains of the famous seven-staged Tower of Babel lies at the bottom of a large hole.

The combined efforts of scholars and excavators are gradually bringing to light much of the past history of this ancient land which was at one time considered lost. It was our countryman, Sir Henry Rawlinson, who gave such an impetus to cuneiform decipherment by the translation of the celebrated trilingual inscription of Darius at Behistun in 1851.

What modern excavators are now doing is exemplified in the author's description of the work of the joint expedition of the British Museum and that of the University of Pennsylvania, who have been able to trace out a skeleton history of the city of Ur for some three thousand years.

The author pays a just tribute to the late Miss Gertrude Bell, who did so much to further the cause of archaeological research in Iraq.

The "Hints to intending Visitors" might well include some information as to the cost of visiting these places, and the book would be improved by a larger folding map of the country in place of the existing one, which is on too small a scale.

It is a sign of the times that this well-produced and printed little volume is published by Mr. Mackenzie of the Bookshop, Baghdad, and it is worthy of mention that he can supply copies of all the works referred to in the bibliography at the end of the book.

F. F. R.

THE HIMALAYAN LETTERS OF GYPSY DAVY AND LADY BA. (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd.) 15s.

This volume records the wanderings in Ladakh, Baltistan, and the North-Western Himalaya of an American couple, who elect to mask their identity under the *noms de plume* of Gypsy Davy and Lady Ba. The journeys, which apparently extended from August, 1923, to October, 1924, are recorded in the somewhat irritating form of a series of more or less imaginary letters from the authors to their various friends.

The travellers do not appear to have ever ventured far from the beaten track, and, as a contribution to the geography, natural history, or politics of the regions visited, their book is of negligible value. Those readers, however, who possess sufficient patience to wade through the considerable masses of irrelevant "small beer" embodied in the "letters" will be rewarded by a number of interesting folk-lore stories and picturesque incidents described with typical originality and humour.

The authors are very partial to the use of vernacular words—Urdu, Tibetan, and Turki. These are all explained in a glossary at the end of the volume, but for the benefit of those who have no acquaintance with the area in question, it would have been preferable to print all such words in italics in the text. By way of further elucidation of the authors' travels the volume is embellished with four somewhat fantastic sketch-maps in the quasi-medieval style of "here be divers wyld beasts."

Perhaps the most interesting portion of the book is that describing a winter and spring spent at Tsam Skang, near Leh.

H. T. M.

LAND PROBLEMS IN PALESTINE. By A. Granovsky, with a Foreword by the Right Hon. J. C. Wedgwood, D.S.O., M.P. (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd.) 2s. 6d.

Mr. A. Granovsky's collection of essays on "Land Problems in Palestine" should be read by all who are interested in the question of Zionism. He emphasizes the mainspring of Zionism, which is "the bringing back to the soil of an adequate proportion of the Jewish race," and brings out very clearly the many difficulties which confront the Zionist organization is their task of placing "the Jewish Homeland" on a solid foundation.

Mr. Granovsky's statement of the problem is above criticism, but his suggested solutions are open to much argument, as is evident from a perusal of the valuable foreword contributed by the Right Hon. J. C. Wedgwood, D.S.O., M.P. It must be remembered that the Zionists have not a clean slate on which to inscribe their policy. Palestine is an old country, and has been for many centuries under the rule of a reactionary and conservative government, which has intensified the national distaste for change and drastic reform. Steady progress and gradual introduction of new policies and modern ideas are better calculated in the long run to achieve the main object aimed at, rather than sudden and revolutionary changes, which can only widen the rift between Jew and Arab in Palestine.

Mr. Granovsky, however, has done valuable service to Zionism by putting forward so clearly and candidly the problem which has to be solved, and solved aright, before the primary aim of the movement can be attained.

G. F. C.

Notes on Articles from American and Foreign Magazines and Newspapers recently added to the Pamphlet Library.

THE NEJD BOUNDARY.

The American Geographical Journal for January, 1927, has a note on the boundaries of Nejd.

The writer points out that the "geographical basis of a grazing society" has been very clearly recognized of late years, more particularly in the Treaty of Kars between Turkey and the Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 1921, in the Angora accord between France and Turkey in October, 1921, and in the Treaty of Angora of 1926 between Great Britain and Turkey. Further examples are found in the Italo-Egyptian accord of 1925 and the protocol of January, 1924, between Great Britain and France respecting the boundary between the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan and French Equatorial Africa. Both of these make detailed arrangements for the regulation of nomadic affairs, the use of wells, etc. Considerations arising out of the nomadic state have influenced all the various agreements concluded between the Nejd Sultanate and the contiguous Powers on the subject of boundaries. The first boundary agreement of May, 1922, between the governments of Iraq and Nejd recognized the right of any tribe to settle in the territory of the other state upon payment of a grazing fee, while the protocol appended to the agreement allows for the common use of wells which are situated near the border, and demilitarizes such points, forbidding the concentration of troops in their vicinity and the building of forts.

The Bahra agreement of November 1, 1925, laid down provision to regulate migration and to prevent raiding, which is rendered liable to severe punishment. Migration is allowed only if the requirements of grazing necessitate it, and is subject to the permit of the government concerned. A similar agreement, the Hadda agreement of November 2, 1925, between the governments of Nejd and Trans-Jordania deals with migration, raiding, etc., on the same lines. The delimitation of the boundary is, however, the interesting part of the latter agreement. The crux of the situation was the possession of the Wadi Sirhan and Kaf. The Wadi Sirhan extends northwards from Jauf to Kaf. The recent conquest by Ibn Saud of Jauf placed his tribesmen at the entrance to the Wadi, and he contended for the possession of the whole of it. It happens that the principal Trans-Jordan tribes use the Wadi in winter and spring, moving northward to the Damascus region in the summer. An effort was made to keep Ibn Saud out of the Wadi, not merely for the protection of these tribes, but also because the depression is largely frequented by the Ruwala nomads, who occupy the region through which runs the route from Iraq to Syria. This British corridor between Palestine and Iraq is regarded as of much importance. Through it runs the Imperial Air Route to the East. It is probable that an oil pipe-line will be laid from Mosul to Haifa, and possibly a Baghdad-Haifa railroad may be constructed.

Kaf is an extremely important strategic outpost of the Trans-Jordan country from which Ibn Saud could launch attacks and propagandize at will. As finally drawn the boundary runs in such a manner as to include the Hejaz railway in the Trans-Jordan country, and it also leaves the four tributary wadis to the Wadi Sirhan—namely Wadis Bajer, Gharra, Hasa, and Hedrej—in the Trans-Jordan, but cuts off the more easterly summer grazing grounds of the tribesmen, swings around Wadi Sirhan and puts in the hands of Ibn Saud a valley upon which he can base attacks upon both the railway and the country west.

As regards the actual boundaries of Nejd, the Sultanate includes the formerly independent kingdom of the Hejaz and the Amirate of Jabal Shammar (Hail) as well as parts of El Hasa Asir and Yemen.

Its boundary, starting from Jabal Anazan in the Syrian desert (39° E., 32° N.) runs south-west to a point on the right bank of the Wadi Sirhan, south-west of Kaf, thence along the Wadi to a point 38° E., 30° N., thence westward to the Gulf of 'Aqaba south of 'Aqaba.

The boundary between 'Iraq and Nejd runs eastward from Jabal Anazan to a point about 200 miles west of the Euphrates, thence south-east at about the same distance from the Euphrates, but with indentations to take in certain wells until it reaches the boundary of Kuwait.

The boundaries between Nejd and Kuwait and Nejd and the south were only roughly laid down some years ago, the former by the Anglo-Turkish convention of 1918, and the latter in 1914. Recent developments render it unlikely that either of these could stand now.

I. C.

L'INQUIÉTUDE DE L'ORIENT (VII.): EN AFGHANISTAN. By M. Pernot. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, January, 1927.

In this article M. Pernot continues the series on the subject of "Unrest in the East," which began in the *Review* of June, 1927. Members of the Central Asian Society will find the whole series, and those which are promised to follow, well worthy of perusal.

In this article on Afghanistan the distinguished French publicist offers us plenty to think about. After describing his journey from Lahore, via Kohat and Peshawar, through the Khyber Pass to Kabul, where he arrived towards the end of April, 1925, in time to witness the triumphant return to the capital of the Afghan Army, under the command of Sardar Ali Ahmad, brother-in-law of King Amanulla, from its campaign in the south against the rebellion of Mangals and Jadranis, he gives a detailed and interesting account of the progress and development towards independence and stability which are now being achieved under the ambitious young ruler.

The part played by the representatives of the French Republic in this progress are put prominently before us. But one cannot fail to notice that the exclusive right to archaeological research which was obtained by Professor Foucher in 1922 has not succeeded to the satisfaction of the writer, owing, apparently, to lack of funds and the absence of personnel.

No mention is made of the good influence which, we know, is exercised by the British Minister at Kabul, and as the writer describes Britain in the same category with the Russian Soviet, as harbouring designs against the independence of the country, one must inevitably conclude that he neglected his opportunity for obtaining more up-to-date information on the subject of British-Afghan relationships.

France, of course, figures as the disinterested friend of the Afghan King and

his people, and it would be interesting to learn more about the school which is described as having been established at Kabul under French professors.

On the whole, the article is recommended to the attention of all interested in the situation on the North-West Frontier of India.

ITALY AND THE ROAD TO INDIA.

The *Neue Freie Presse*, Vienna, commenced on January 14 a series of articles on "Italian Expansion in the Red Sea." The writer's contention is that the English have certain fixed ideas, and one of these is that no European power except themselves has any business in Arabia, since Arabia guards the road to India. He recalls the negotiations between the Imam Yahya and the British since the end of the Turkish domination of the Yemen in 1918, and speaks of the excellence of the Yemen troops under their Turkish officers, whom the Imam kept for several years after the war and only allowed to leave under pressure from Angora. He gives the history of the British evacuation of Hodeida and the handing over of that portion of the Red Sea coast to the Idrisi, a policy which caused the Imam to come down from his hills, fall on the Sultan of Kuwait, lay desolate Da'la and take Hodeida for himself.

The visit of the English Mission in 1926 is narrated with dramatic vividness, their failure to secure a treaty is told in detail, the Imam declaring his inability to sign until a Yemen garrison was in Aden, and he himself occupied the throne of the Hijaz. The Italian Mission, with its gifts of munitions and aeroplanes and its flattering titles, was apparently more successful.

The author proceeds to narrate the various Italian activities in the Middle East: the settlement of large bodies of Italian emigrants in Egypt; the Italian custodianship of the Terra Santa and their building activities in Palestine; the permission their representative is said to have got from King Abdullah to settle a large number of Italian workmen in Transjordan. He points out that the coast of the territory ruled by the Zaidite Imam borders on the Straits of Perim, while Egypt, Palestine, and Transjordan are on the road to India. He then draws his own conclusions.

THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL STUDIES.

THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL STUDIES celebrated on February 23, 1927, the tenth anniversary of its opening. Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, speaking at a luncheon held at the School on this occasion, strongly urged the need for further funds. He dwelt particularly on the fact that although the School was the largest and most important School of Oriental Studies in the Empire, if not in the whole of Europe and America, none of its University Chairs or Readerships was endowed. For this reason recognition as a School of the University of London was only precariously granted by the Senate from year to year. If teaching and research were to proceed as they should in an atmosphere free from the pressure of financial worry and inadequate resources, it was very necessary that this state of affairs should be remedied. The School was founded in the stress of the war; and it was impossible then, as it has been difficult since, to obtain the full measure of public support it deserves. The need for such a School of the University as a learned institution is of course

beyond question; the need for it as a practical institution, undertaking the training in the languages and manners of the East of all those who are going out in any capacity whatsoever, is no less: the 3,000 students who have already attended its classes and courses are the proof.

The University Professorships and Readerships that call for endowment are the Chairs of Arabic, Sanskrit, Persian, Chinese, the History and Culture of British Dominions in Asia with special reference to India, and the Bantu languages; the Readerships in Malay, Bengali, Hindustani, Tamil.

To endow a Chair a sum of £25,000 is required; to endow a Readership, £12,500. These, and the long list of lectureships, indicate the opportunity there is here for public benefaction.

JOURNAL

OF THE

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. XIV.

1927

PART III.

CONTENTS.

NOTICES.

THE OVERLAND ROUTE FROM CHINA TO INDIA. BY
CAPTAIN F. KINGDON WARD, F.R.G.S.

THE LOST LANDS OF OPHIR. BY COMMANDER C.
CRAUFURD, R.N. (RET.).

WAZIRISTAN. BY MAJOR-GENERAL A. LE G. JACOB,
C.B., C.M.G.

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. BY PROFESSOR P. J. BRUCE.

REVIEWS:

DER KAMPF UM ASIEN, VOL. II. REVOLT IN THE DESERT. WITH
LAWRENCE IN ARABIA. FIFTY YEARS OF MADRAS. SIR RATAP
SINGH. A PAGEANT OF INDIA. CHINA AND HER POLITICAL ENTITY.
CHINA OF TODAY. THE REVOLT OF ASIA. AN ASIAN ARCADE.
A HISTORY OF SIAM. UNTER DER GLUTSONNE IRANS: BEING AN
ACCOUNT OF THE GERMAN EXPEDITION TO AFGHANISTAN. THE
MOSQUE OF THE ROSES. THE WILDERNESS OF SINAI. HISTORY
OF THE GREAT WAR: THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-1918.
VOL. IV. MOSCOU ET LA GEORGIE MARTYRE.

NOTES:

IRAQ AND SYRIA. BAFFIN'S GRAVE. ARCHAEOLOGY.

LIBRARY NOTICES.

LIST OF NEW MEMBERS.

COUNCIL, 1927-1928.

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74, GROSVENOR STREET, W. 1

NOTICES

MEMBERS are asked to notify the office at once if they do not receive *Journals* and lecture cards.

Journals have been returned as "unknown," addressed to the following members: Captain S. G. Bennett; Bassett Digby, Esq.; P. B. Haig, Esq., I.C.S.; Captain A. C. Trott, 5th Devon Regt., Political Dept., Govt. of India; Captain S. A. Wright.

The Secretary would be very glad if any addresses for the above could be sent to the office.

Members only are responsible for their statements in the *Journal*.

THE OVERLAND ROUTE FROM CHINA TO INDIA*

BY CAPTAIN F. KINGDON WARD

To most of us no contrast could be greater than that between India and China, two densely populated regions of Asia. Their civilizations, traditions, art, literature, religion, philosophy, architecture, and language are quite different. It is true that the pundits who burrow

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held on April 28, Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The subject of our discussion this afternoon is the Overland Route between India and China, and Captain Kingdon Ward is going to enlighten us on that very difficult question. If we had a map of Asia here it would strike you that the two dominant features in Asia are the great Chinese Empire on the east and the great sub-continent of India on the south. They are very close together—in some places separated by only a few miles—and it is an extraordinary fact that in the past, though so close together, they had so little connection, either in the way of trade or of the passage of populations. The reason is this, that both those countries are very densely populated, prosperous according to the Asiatic standard from an agricultural point of view, and both were inclined to look upon themselves in the past as the only civilized people in the world, and all outsiders as barbarians. The Chinese regarded all outsiders as "foreign devils," and the ancient inhabitants of India looked upon all outsiders as what they call *mlechas* or unclean people. To preserve this exclusiveness India was assisted by the great mountain wall of the Himalayas, which was supposed to keep out the foreign and barbarous races. China had no such natural barrier, and built the Great Wall to keep out the "foreign devil" by land. But it was the irony of fate that neither the artificial Wall of China nor the natural barrier of the Himalayas succeeded in keeping these two great countries secure from foreign invasion. China was invaded time after time through the Great Wall by the Manchus, Tartars, and other conquering races; India was subject to a continuous series of invasions, and it is a most significant fact that no invasion of India, whether by sea or land, ever failed until the British came there. After the British blocked the mountain passes on the north-east and north-west, so making India secure by land; and having the command of the sea they were able to make it secure from the sea. The only point from which India was invaded from the north-east was through Burma or that strip of land between Burma and Tibet, which our lecturer is going to talk to us about this afternoon. There was no doubt a considerable infiltration of Mongol peoples down into Bengal and Assam during past ages through that corridor. Captain Kingdon Ward will explain to you why it is that no great movements of population are possible, at all events in these days, owing to the natural difficulties created by mountain, river, forest, and malarial valleys. He has spent some nine years in exploring as a botanist 'his very

deeply into these matters trace, shall we say, Mongolian influences in Hindu art, or Hindu influences in Chinese philosophy; but to the myopic these are not visible and China and India are as distinct from one another as though they were in different continents.

Being all but continuous land masses, their great fertile plains densely populated, both containing very ancient civilizations, the trading instincts of their peoples highly developed, able to supplement each other's requirements, and their wise men, one would suppose, anxious to meet and discuss philosophy, this is the more remarkable; nor is it due to lack of trying, at least on the part of the Chinese.

Yet the measure of their success is plain for all to see. The veriest tyro could not confuse a Chinaman, using that word in its widest application, with a native of India of any race or creed.


I do not, however, propose to go into the history of the intercourse between India and China. It will be sufficient to say that in the past it has been more intense than it is now. I am speaking of intercourse by land only. Indeed, owing to climatic changes in Central Asia and in methods of transport, the centres of world influences have shifted. The ancient overland routes between China and India no longer exist. They have been replaced by sea routes.

Nor do I propose to enter upon a discussion of various possible overland routes and their merits. My object is merely to discuss the question of a *direct* route between India and China and to make a few remarks upon the route which I myself have followed.

I must here point out that the question of a direct overland route was a very live issue within recent years, although it may be said to have been settled by now. This search for a trade route—a short cut from our Indian markets to the very heart of China, as an alternative to the sea voyage from Calcutta to Shanghai and the long river and overland journey into the interior—implied, if it meant anything at all, the shortest and most direct route, and a glance at any map of Asia will show in which direction that lies, the Yangtze, which is the great highway of China, being the obvious goal.

Although the mouth of the Yangtze is so far from India, the upper Yangtze actually flows within 150 miles of the Indian frontier, and it was this fact which it was hoped to turn to good account. As we pushed up on our north-east frontier and laid down a definite line, up

fascinating and very difficult country. He has gone over it again and again. He has crossed all the great rivers at different points, and he knows the difficulties which beset the various routes which are supposed to be open for trade and the movement of populations. He will explain those difficulties to you in his lecture, and illustrate it by a series of slides which he collected no later than last year, when he made his last visit to that extraordinarily difficult country between Assam and China. I will now ask Captain Kingdon Ward to tell us his story. (Applause.)



to which our administration gradually extended, we approached more and more closely to the great highway of China, until, as I say, there remained only this gap of 150 miles in an air line. The problem then was to bridge that.

Remember, so far as an overland trade route was concerned, it was this or nothing. For our purpose the historical route, in so far as it still exists, from Peking, via Kashgar, the Karakorum pass, and Gilgit, to Leh, is useless; it has been rendered obsolete by the far easier, quicker, and cheaper method of sea transport. The route via Lhasa is equally useless—we want a much shorter route, and one which would avoid the mighty barrier of the Himalaya. Such direct routes do exist in the south—but unfortunately they all land you in Burma, not in India. We wanted to find one further north, but not too far north; and the head of the Assam valley ran up nicely in the desired direction. Therefore just as the Yangtze was the link on the China side, so the Assam valley was the link on the Indian side.

Now there have always been two great stumbling-blocks to any traffic in this direction. The facts stated at the beginning of this paper prove that there must have been; it is safe to say that had this route been comparatively feasible, it would have been used long ago; and since there has been so little intercourse between India and China, it is clear that even the best routes have been very little used, partly for the same reasons, at least for several centuries.

The obstacles are these:

In the first place, that 150-mile-wide belt of country is extraordinarily difficult, being not only very mountainous, but infinitely cut up into a close succession of deep gorges separated by lofty ridges, covered with dense, impenetrable forests, and cursed with a vicious climate and all its attendant evils. Once the plateaux of Tibet on the one hand, or the plains of India on the other, are left behind, one becomes involved in this distracting tangle of mountains.

The second obstacle depends on the first. It is obviously impossible for any great civilized community to occupy such a region, and so this belt of country lying between the highlands of Tibet and the lowlands of India, and separating Mongol and Aryan, is inhabited by tribes who for the most part have always resisted free passage through their territory. In this attitude, often spontaneous and natural enough, they have generally been encouraged by the Power on the other side of the barrier, either because they prefer to keep us at arm's length, or because they themselves are eager to penetrate it, but in their own time and in their own way. Moreover—and this practically clinches the matter—supposing these difficulties were removed, as to some extent they have been, we should still be faced with the unpleasant discovery that the Yangtze at this distance from the sea (nearly 3,000 miles) is not continuously navigable, even for small country boats.

Thus we see that just as deserts have to a large extent isolated India on the one side, so have jungles kept her free of mainland Asiatic influences on the other; the north-west frontier may be the gateway to India, but we must never forget that the north-east frontier is the tradesmen's entrance. This back door, as we have seen, is further strengthened by that splendid line of outposts afforded by the independent tribes, and though these tribes are a two-edged weapon, and have frequently given us trouble, they form a bulwark which it is very much to our interest to strengthen, and not weaken.

* * * * *

Apart altogether from the question of trade route, however, the overland route from China to India is full of interest to the traveller; and I propose now to leave generalities and to deal in rather more detail with the actual route I followed. By means of photographs I shall try to convince you of the great physical difficulties which have to be overcome on this route, and also of the absorbing interest of the country to the naturalist.

It will hardly be necessary to remind you that—I will not say the most beautiful—but the most sublime and indeed terrifying scenery is to be found in regions remote from human habitations; and there can be few places in the world where the scenery is grander than in the great mountain ranges of the Chinese Himalaya.

Let us start from the upper Yangtze in Tibet, the nearest point to India. To north and east of the great mountain barrier which curves round the north-east frontier of our Indian Empire, the country is high and dry. There are caravan routes, towns, villages, monasteries; there is transport and food. The Tibetan people are civilized and friendly, although their official attitude to strangers is largely determined for them by an autocratic ruling oligarchy; the same remark applies to the Chinese.

As we travel westwards, or south-westwards, these conditions change more and more; and we can only escape them by keeping to the north of the Himalaya, or by working so far south that we shall miss India altogether. There is nothing for it but to go straight ahead. Across our path lie these four great rivers, with four great mountain ranges separating them from one another.

Here is the Tibetan Yangtze flowing at an altitude of 8,000 feet. It is still a fine river 3,000 miles from its mouth, but it is subjected to great changes of level, winter and summer, and is interrupted by enormous rapids from time to time. The Chinese call it the "River of Golden Sand." It is navigable for considerable stretches by Tibetan skin boats, and as there are no bridges, the Chinese cross it in great scows.

Beyond the Yangtze we have to cross a great range of mountains. The passes are over 15,000 feet, but, in spite of the intense cold, they

are open all the year round, as not much snow falls. No serious difficulties are encountered so far; there are regular caravan routes, and transport is easily obtained. In three or four days after descending many thousands of feet we reach the Mekong. This river is much narrower than the Yangtze, and goes bouncing along through a deep gash in the mountains. It is quite unnavigable, but being narrow is crossed by rope bridge—a sufficiently unpleasant contrivance.

Immediately after crossing the Mekong we begin to climb up again, the mountains being almost as steep as the side of a house.

The next range also is crossed without great difficulty in three days; the passes vary between 13,000 and 16,000 feet, and there is apt to be a good deal of snow.

Descending into the next trough, where flows the Salween, we notice a distinct change in the vegetation; the country becomes more forested, for the Salween flows at a lower level than the Mekong, and has a wetter climate.

Here we encounter the first of the many tribes who inhabit the enormous rain-drenched jungle-clad enclave at the headwaters of the Irrawaddy. The Lutzus are a docile and friendly folk, but sooner or later we shall encounter the redoubtable Lisu tribe, who also live here. I dare say the Lisus have been maligned—their worst fault is perhaps a fondness for petty larceny—but the fact remains the tribe has at least one European murder to its credit. I have come up against them in the Salween valley under awkward circumstances, and avoided a serious *fracas*, more perhaps by good luck than anything else: on the other hand, I had two Lisus with me last year who stood by me during a crisis and helped to extricate me from an unhappy dilemma.

We now cross the third great barrier, and descending into the abysmal depths of the Irrawaddy itself pass into the keeping of the jungle.

The passes henceforth are the lowest of which we have had any experience so far, not exceeding 14,000 feet, and frequently much lower; nevertheless, they are more difficult than anything we have encountered hitherto. The track is often invisible or, indeed, non-existent, and without knowing the way we could never find it for ourselves. Cliffs have to be scaled, and in places the path is full of unknown terrors.

Here the question of transport is a question of coolies; no mule or pony, even if unburdened, could scale these mountains. Also it is better to choose one's time with some care. In the summer it rains perpetually, and though one can of course traverse the passes then, it is not a very pleasant experience. On the other hand, for nearly six months, in winter and spring, the passes are completely blocked by snow. By far the best time then, can one but choose, is the autumn, when one may get comparatively fine weather at least part of the

time. Crossing the pass then we descend to the Irrawaddy, and now find ourselves thoroughly involved in those difficulties to which our attention has already been drawn.

The Irrawaddy is not like the other rivers we have crossed. Instead of flowing in one narrow trough it flows in dozens. Its basin at this point is about a hundred miles wide; the climate is very bad, with rain all the year round, though more falls in the summer than at any other season.

We have to cross no less than four considerable rivers, besides innumerable small streams, and our best plan is to get out of the Irrawaddy jungles as quickly as possible. We are in a country which has recently been in the limelight owing to the Slave Mission sent by the Government of Burma to release all slaves, whether in administered country or not, and the killing of a British officer by the most belligerent of the Irrawaddy tribes.

This jungly river basin as a whole is occupied by Kachins and cognate tribes; but large areas are almost entirely uninhabited. The tribal country begins north of the point where the main stream of the Irrawaddy splits into two branches, an eastern and a western. There are bridges over the rivers, but they are not pleasant. They may be either monkey bridges, which involve haulage, or cane foot bridges, which are all right when you get used to them.

During the summer the Irrawaddy jungle is a perfect hell of leeches, mosquitoes, sand-flies, blister-flies, and other pests. They give one no peace. For this reason it is more comfortable to travel here in the winter.

On the other hand, we have still to get out of the Irrawaddy basin into that of the Brahmaputra, and the passes are completely snowed up in winter, so that one must not leave it until too late.

I crossed by the Diphuk La, 14,300 feet: but there are passes further south of 10,000 feet.

The route I followed involved crossing all the headwater streams of the eastern Irrawaddy. A better route is one a little further north, by which only the main stream is crossed, after which, climbing one more divide, you come directly into the valley of the Lohit-Brahmaputra.

The geographical barriers which separate India and China, then, speak for themselves. They comprise high snow-clad ranges of mountains, swift unnavigable rivers, dense jungle, and a troublesome climate.

But the dual obstacles to which I have referred cannot be considered apart; they are mutually inclusive. Up to a point, the higher the mountains and the thicker the forest the more obstructive the tribes. As the forest gets thinner and the country more open the population increases and becomes more homogeneous, and as an obstacle the human element disappears, individually at any rate,

though there may be polite organized opposition. On the other hand, in the worst country there comes a time when the jungle becomes so thick, the mountains so steep, and the climate so bad, that there is no population at all. As an obstacle the human element has again disappeared; but it may be questioned whether a country without food, transport, or paths, fenced by impenetrable jungle, enclosed by precipitous mountains, and cursed with a thoroughly bad climate, is not more of a deterrent. After all, you may succeed in getting round a tribesman by making him laugh, or by being in a position to give him something which, in his simple way, he would sell his soul for: but without men you are lost. It was this capital difficulty of no transport and no food I was up against last year during my expedition to the headwaters of the Irrawaddy. So serious did the situation become, that early in August, just after I had received letters and newspapers telling me of the general strike, the same microbe attacked my staff, who, rather than face the discomforts of the situation any longer, risked the long journey back to comparative civilization, decamping quietly in the night.

Throughout last summer I was plant-hunting in the neighbourhood of the Diphuk La, the last pass between me and India. There was a small and decadent Tibetan colony in the valley, but for coolies I had to depend on Nungs and Tarons, the latter an Ishmaelite tribe, lurking in the uttermost depths of the jungles, and these had to be collected from afar. They had no food or clothing, but lived principally on roots dug up in the jungle, their meagre crops having failed for two years owing to the flowering of the bamboos, which had caused such complete decontrol in the birthrate of jungle rats that they had devoured everything.

These Tarons were all right in the summer—when I could get them. In the winter, when I had to cross the Irrawaddy-Brahmaputra divide under snow, though willing enough, the trip proved a physical impossibility for them.

The Tibetans, who would have been equal to the task, since they have to cross the Diphuk La from time to time to get salt, were mostly away. Compared with their fellow-countrymen of the plateau they are a rather poor type. The ordinary Tibetan cannot live below 10,000 feet, but these people had established a colony in the forest region at 7,000 feet, where they tilled the soil and kept flocks. They came from the warm, low-lying province of Zayul, and in olden days Zayul was a penal settlement for the criminal classes, so that many of the people there are connected with the old convict "county families," and may be somewhat degenerate as a result. Much snow falls in the upper Seinghku valley in the winter, and it is hardly possible to cross the Diphuk La between January and June.

I started on the final lap to Assam at the end of October with

sixteen Taron coolies, two Lisus, and four Nungs, two of the latter being my personal staff. Unfortunately, the weather, which had been fine for some days, broke just as we started, and rain in the lower valley meant snow in the heights. The Seinghku valley is about forty miles long, and it is about three days' march from the main river on the Burma side (the Nam Tamai) to the foot of the pass, and five marches from there to the Lohit on the Tibetan side through uninhabited country.

On the last day of October we camped at the foot of the pass. A light snow fell during the night, but this melted so rapidly next morning that right up to the pass the valley was clear. At the summit, however, we gazed upon a very different scene. A bitter wind was blowing from the plateau to the north, and below us we could see nothing but deep snow and bare rocky mountains; there was not a tree in sight. The descent on the Tibetan side is precipitous for a thousand feet to a glacier lake below, and the snow had drifted heavily on this face, so that we plunged into it up to our knees. The Tarons were half frozen. Arrived at the lake a few of us pushed on to stamp a trail as quickly as possible and reach the first fir-trees, where we could make a fire. But as soon as we were out of sight, the Tarons, now half dead with cold, threw their loads down in the snow, and bolted back over the pass into Burma, and of course we never saw them again.

It took us a week to save the loads—some were abandoned—and move them down into safety by the hot spring camp, where we had shot a takin in the summer. Then we pushed on to the Lohit, and from there engaged more coolies to go back and bring in the loads.

The Lohit, like all the other rivers of this region, flows down due south from the Tibetan plateau for some distance, but it then suddenly and conveniently swings down at right angles and flows due west to reach the plains of Assam. Where it flows southwards the climate is comparatively dry, although the altitude is only about 4,000 feet. The rocky flanks of the gorge are covered with pine woods, there is little cultivation, and the country is inhabited by Tibetans.

As soon as the river changes direction, however, we find the valley filled with dense forests again, and here dwell the once formidable but now friendly Mishmi tribe, who have in the past proved a very formidable obstacle to penetration; like the Lisus, they have the ultimate argument of murder to their credit.

The journey down the Lohit, though short, is not easy; it is only about fifteen days from Rima to the plains of Assam, but the going is not good. I found the Mishmis friendly and helpful, thanks to a succession of able political officers on the frontier, and not least to the present officer.

I reached the plains on December 7, and Sadiya two days later. To sum up:

There is no easy direct route from China to India. The chief difficulties are the mountainous nature of the country and its climate, lack of food and local labour, and the political situation amongst the more powerful interests behind the tribal belt—Tibetan and Chinese.

The climatic difficulties are best overcome by avoiding the Irrawaddy enclave altogether. By keeping more to the north, only the Taron or main stream of the eastern Irrawaddy need be crossed, after which one descends straight into the gorge of the Lohit.

Threading a way through these mountains, so as to cross the easiest passes, it may be necessary to a certain extent to march to and fro up and down the river gorges; but the going here is comparatively easy.

The best route from China to India is probably one which, leaving the Yangtze at Pangtzu, crosses the mountains by the Paima La to Atuntzu, thence to the Mekong via Dong, over the Chu-la to the Wi river, and so to Menkung on the Salween. Thence to Rima, up the Rong Thod Chu across the Glei pass to Tawliang on the Lohit, and so to Sadiya. This is by no means the route described in the above paper, but I myself have followed a good bit of it.

General BEYXON: Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Captain Kingdon Ward, Ladies and Gentlemen,—When I came here today I had not the slightest intention of saying anything, but I have been fascinated by what the lecturer said. His photographs and illustrations have brought back to me a very interesting portion of my life, and I want to congratulate him on the vivid and fascinating way in which he has told of the life that goes on there. It was my business at one time to take part in an expedition going up not quite so far as he went, but up more north into Tibet. We were going up into the Arbor country, and from his description and the photographs he showed us the country he described was almost identical with that which we encountered. Nominally, they had killed an Englishman or two, but we were going up more on an expedition to find out whether the Tsangpo, which we had crossed on the way way up to Lhasa, really joined or became the Brahmaputra. It had not been settled in those days, and I am not quite certain that it has been surveyed in these days. I think a few miles have not been surveyed, but I think that it is practically settled that the Tsangpo we knew was the Brahmaputra which comes down into Bengal. The population there, the Arbor, were very much the same as the tribesmen Mr. Kingdon Ward describes, and were invariably drunk about four o'clock in the afternoon. It was always necessary if you wanted to have any business with them to get them when they were fairly sober in the morning. It was no good doing anything after four o'clock, sometimes after twelve. They were also very good shikarees, as you saw in the picture of the man who shot the

takin. They had bows and arrows, and, at the distance of this room, they would plug any one of these lights without the slightest hesitation. They had a nasty habit of dipping the arrows into dead corpses, which made wounds rather deadly, otherwise they were not bad. Another point he has not mentioned is the fishing. I do not know if the fishing is good up there, but it was magnificent where we were. I caught a 44-pound mahseer on a 10-foot trout rod with mahseer tackle, and never had better sport in my life. Up in the hills were fish 6 feet long lying by the dozen in the pool. It was a magnificent fishing country. Going back to a more serious question : as to roads, I do not think there is any difficulty. I do not see the slightest difficulty, speaking as a soldier, why you should not rush a force right through that country if you organized well. It is a matter of organization and, as the lecturer said, of food. We ran our paths right up the Brahmaputra through what looked impossible jungle, and with the pioneer regiment to work and cutting parties of sappers to help us, we had a good mule road as far as we went. There is nothing to stop a determined force going anywhere if they have time, and it is only a matter of time before we shall have a road from Sadiya through Rima to the Yangtze. I see no reason why we should not do it. The passes are nothing. When we went up to Lhasa we had roads over 16,000 and 17,000 feet high. We had a fight at 16,900 feet. There is nothing to stop you ; it is only a matter of organization. Just before we were up there the Chinese had come down and occupied Rima. They had to go, and, of course, they went. But still they may come again, and we shall have to stop them. Again, there is another interesting point. During the rains the jungle we went through was absolutely uninhabited, not only by men, but by animals. The leeches and mosquitoes are so bad that even the tiger, sambar, bison, and deer all leave the lower Terai jungle and clear out. In our road-making parties the advanced guard consisted of one man, who cut down the jungle, mostly lianas and things like that. Two men behind him widened out the path a bit, and also removed the leeches from the man in front. (Laughter.) We lost two Gurkhas who went out shooting. They were used to the jungle, but they lost their way, and we never found them alive again. Their bodies were discovered within a mile of the post some weeks afterwards. They had died of leech-bites. It is a most fearful country, and I think the way the lecturer has gone through it and survived leaves us to congratulate him on being alive. I congratulate him on his excellent lecture. (Applause.)

MR. F. H. SKRINE : Does the lecturer really think it within the bounds of possibility that a road can be constructed over the terrible country he mentioned ? The last speaker talked about a road. I have made hundreds of miles of roads in India : the difficulties even in the

Plains are bad enough, but over these passes and through the jungle, with leeches to poison one, it seems to me perfectly impossible. I would like to have the lecturer's opinion. Another question: What is the distance between the upper navigable reaches of the Yangtze and the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra which are navigable, and does the lecturer think it possible to bridge it by an air service?

The LECTURER: General Sir William Beynon mentioned fishing. There is good fishing on some of the headwaters of the Irrawaddy, and also on the upper Salween; but not, I think, on the Yangtze or the Mekong. But the fish are very small and are either speared or netted. The water, which comes straight from the melting snow and ice, is apparently too cold for mahseer or any very big fish. As to the question of a road, Sir William Beynon said that he thought, speaking as a soldier, it would be perfectly easy to rush a force through that country to any threatened point. So far I agree, but, speaking as a financier, it is a question of money. I have no doubt the Indian Government could find the money, and would find the money, if the north-east frontier was as vulnerable a point as the north-west. In that case I am perfectly certain the roads would be made, but I do not think we are likely to see them made either for the tradesmen or botanists, unfortunately. (Laughter.) Mr. Skrine has raised the point in a more precise form as to what the distance is between the head of navigation on the Brahmaputra, at Sadiya, and the Yangtze. Where the Yangtze is flowing south, 150 miles from the Indian frontier, as I pointed out, it is not navigable. You have to go a long way further east to reach a navigable point. Suifu, about 300 miles from Chungking, is the head of navigation. Above Suifu there are navigable stretches, but there are big gorges also, and it is not navigable for large Chinese junks. I do not see why a road should not be made; it is a question of expense. The difficulty is not that you cannot make the road, but there is no local labour. The expense would be enormous. You would have to feed all your pioneers, engineers, and road-makers, and would have to import labour. The question of leeches does not come into the question, because if you make your road wide enough you are leech-free. There is a road which runs from railhead in Burma, 200 miles, which is quite easy. It does not matter about leeches, the road is six feet wide. The leeches drop on you as you go through the jungle; if you are pushing your way through the jungle you get them down your neck, in your ears, and everywhere; but if you make the road wide enough, they cannot drop on you. As regards crossing the high mountains, if you can have a road over the Karakorum, I do not see why you should not have a road over these great divides. You cannot take a bee-line, but must align your road to cross the lowest passes, and go up and down the valleys until you find a convenient crossing-place. If you keep well up the Salween, and go down the Lohit river

I think you can push a road through—it would not be a motor road to start with. There is a mule road already from the Yangtze to Rima, but it does not go on to India. At the time Sir William Beynon was speaking of, another expedition pushed up the Lohit river, and the Pioneers made a road to Rima. Coming down the Lohit last year one of the most interesting things I struck, and the thing that told me I had stepped out of the blue over the British frontier was a large boulder on which was carved this legend: "5th Coy. 1st K.G.O. Sappers and Miners, 1912." It was carved on the stone, and as soon as I had passed that I knew I was somewhere within the orbit of the Indian Empire.

THE CHAIRMAN: We now know a great deal more than we did an hour ago about the interesting but inhospitable country which the lecturer has described to us so well by word and illustration, and we can realize why, in the past, communications between China and India have been so infrequent and so difficult. It is now intelligible that when there was any regular communication between China and India, it did not pass by the direct road—that is to say, from the north-east of Assam up to the valley of the Yangtze through that 150 miles of terrible country. It went round about through Kashmir, Yarkand, Eastern Tibet, Chinese Turkistan, and so on to Peking. The proof is this: the one great thing which India exported to China was religion, Buddhism. If you mark the progress of Buddhism from India to China, you will find it went by the road I have described—through the Peshawar valley, up through Swat, over the Karakorum, through Chinese Turkistan, and so on past the Great Wall into China proper; and when the Chinese pilgrims wanted to investigate the sacred relics of Buddha, and came to India for that purpose, they did not come by the short road which the lecturer had described, but chose the enormous detour of probably 5,000 or 6,000 miles, rather than the 300 or 400 miles of appalling difficulty between the Yangtze and the Tsangpo. That showed how impressed they were with the appalling physical difficulties of the country which the lecturer this evening finds so pleasant—difficulties he makes so light of. Perhaps it is as well for India that the intervening country—that 200 miles—should be an effective bar for either invading forces or great hordes of immigrants. In fact, our north-east frontier is far more secure than the north-west. One thing struck me when talking of Buddhism. A Chinaman is a very good man at a deal. India exported a very fine religion, Buddhism, to China; what did China give in return? China is now trying to make us a present of Bolshevism. It is a very significant fact, and bears on the way in which ideas follow the lines of communication. Bolshevism started at Moscow and Petrograd, and ran west to east 6,000 miles, all through Russia and Siberia. It penetrated from Siberia down into China, through Mongolia, simply because there was no great physical

obstacle; ideas penetrate easily, and the Bolsheviks are masters in the art of propaganda and peaceful penetration. We hope its further progress down towards the Indian frontier and also down into Burma, will be overcome by the tremendous physical barrier which the lecturer has so vividly described to us tonight. I am sure you will all like to pass a very hearty vote of thanks to him, and show by your acclamation how much you appreciate the work he has done and the very admirable way in which he has described it. (Applause.)

LOST LANDS OF OPHIR*

NOTES ON A LECTURE BY COMMANDER C. CRAUFURD

THREE thousand years ago the land of Ophir solved for Suleiman a political problem. In the present day we are faced with the same problem and the same solution is at hand. Suleiman's kingdom, with its new-found prosperity, was protected to northward and to south by the trade influences of his building activities. His temple and palace in their building gave a steady import incentive to his lands. The kingdom of Suleiman was rapidly becoming the manufacturing centre and the horse market of the Middle East.

Palestine imported raw material and exported finished articles. This kept the trade routes open to north and south.

To the eastward lay the restless Bedou folk. Suleiman realized that Palestine in the Days of Suleiman the Bedou are weak in their offensive, but they are implacable. Their activities would be a tax to his lands, and eventually warding them off Wise. would drain the trading strength of his kingdom.

* A Meeting of the Central Asian Society was held on Wednesday, May 11, 1927, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W. Sir Michael O'Dwyer (Chairman) presided. A lecture entitled "The Lost Lands of Ophir" was delivered by Commander Craufurd, R.N. (ret.).

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Those of you who have been fairly constant in attendance at our lectures here will, I think, agree with me that they combine in a singular degree interest, instruction, and occasionally even amusement. In my own case it has been my duty and it has been my privilege to be a very regular attendant for some years, and the lectures have enormously extended my knowledge of geography and also of history. Perhaps that is because to start with that knowledge was very limited. The lecture we are going to hear this afternoon will, I think, fulfil those conditions in a very marked degree. The subject is "The Lost Lands of Ophir." Many of us have vague recollections of having read of Ophir in our Bible, but we are very vague as to where it is located. Some may think it is in Arabia, others across the Red Sea in Abyssinia, others locate it in Ceylon or India, and others who have read "King Solomon's Mines" would place it somewhere in Mashonaland. It is one of the unsolved riddles, and that riddle we hope to have solved for us this evening. It is characteristic of the Royal Navy, which goes everywhere and does everything, which is the eyes and ears of our Intelligence Department, that no secret is hidden from it; and Commander Craufurd, who spent sixteen years along the shores of the Red Sea and the Gulf, is going to solve for us the riddle of the lost lands of Ophir.

Most people who discover a gold mine, even a derelict one, are inclined to keep the secret to themselves; but the Royal Navy is much more disinterested, and Commander Craufurd is going to share his secret with us. I will now ask him to disclose it. (Applause.)

Bedou life is simple; their wants are negligible. It is almost hopeless to develop a steady market in their countries. Their life is unstable; they know no peace; if they did they would no longer be Bedouin, but would have become a pastoral people.

For a while Suleiman held his eastern frontier quiet. He traded with the gold-mines of the Hejaz. Then, as it seemed the surface outcrops were being cleaned up, that failed—there was no deep surface working possible for mineral then. So the remedy which would keep the Bedou employed and active was to be sought further afield. Suleiman decided to employ the Bedou in the transport trade. Somewhere to eastward there lay the land of Ophir, with its ruler, Bilkis, Queen of Sheba.

If Ophir is lost to modern geography the loss is not due to lack of information. After twenty years' search I had the good fortune to visit Ophir, finding it where it ought to be, and now, after another seven years, I can furnish proofs of its identity. Let me hope that my proofs will be convincing to you. If not, I shall hope to bring you further proofs next year.

To continue the story: after long and exasperating negotiations, Suleiman won his point. The Queen of Sheba consented to visit him. She brought with her the greatest gifts on record: 33 tons of gold, bags of jewels, incense, and spices, algum trees, and probably a small quantity of almg trees, apes, peacocks, and unspecified goods. In her train she brought 1,000 boys and girls. She was preceded by a rumour that she had goat's feet, and some said she was a she-devil. I like to picture her endless caravans winding slowly through the dust of Edom.

* * * * *

Looking into the Ophir problem we note that the presents of Bilkis to Suleiman could not possibly have all come from the same country. King Hiram looked over the merchandise, noted its wholesale markets, and planned a trading scheme which the mercantile marine of the present day could not better. He sent his ships on a merchant cruise to the wholesale markets, including Ophir.

Trading all the way and without wasting time, they returned to Ezion Geber and to Tarshish within three years.

Put the problem on its practical basis of trading and you will find Ophir. To me the problem proved a patient one. Many lands have been suggested for the land of Ophir.

also Ophirs. We went to China, but we did not find Ophir, though we learned something to help us.

Africa gave us its hints, but it did not show us Ophir. The Persian Gulf showed us how to find the ships of Ezion Geber, but it could not show us Ophir. We went to the Mediterranean to learn

about the ships of Tarshish. They could not show us the way to Ophir. We tried South America and the Aztec country. We did not find Ophir there.

We went to India and Ceylon, for there are strong rumours of Ophir in those lands. How could Ophir, the capital seaport of the Sabaean Empire, be outside the Sabaean lands? Back to the Red Sea, and there we learnt what we wanted. We learnt the locality of Ezion Geber. We learnt about the ships of Ezion Geber, and so the way to the true Ophir. Name repetitions have confused investigators. There may have been many a secondary Ophir, for El Darfur seems a very probable repetition of El Ophir or Ed-Oph'r.

By studying ships from before the Flood to the present-day construction, we find that the ships of Ezion Geber were identical with the modern Red Sea dhow. We have the ship that Hiram used. We have the trade winds that Hiram utilized. We learned the markets which were touched by Hiram's fleet.

The Ships of
Ezion Geber.

His ships cargoes with incense, spices, gold, jewels, apes, peacocks, alnum trees, pearls, alnum trees, and the gold of Ophir. Those were the main cargo items arranged in the order of the markets where they were obtained.

Now supposing that we are sailing in a dhow 3,000 years ago from Ezion Geber. We are waiting for the north monsoon to set in firm. It is early in the month of October. The monsoon sets in here between the 7th and the 15th of the month; there have been very small variations.

I ask you particularly to note the name of the port. It was, I suggest, Al Zion Kebir, or the Greater Zion; but in its more ancient language the "Al Zion" was pronounced more mute as Ezion, just as is often done in the colloquial Bedou Arabic of other words, quite apart from the classical distinction between solar and lunar lettering. That classical distinction only came into being somewhere about A.D. 600. This language debate is not a digression. The mutation of the article "Al" has served to hide Ophir for many hundred years.

The fleet would coast down the Hejaz hugging the land, keeping always inside the reefs, for thereby they get calmer water. In the daytime the sea breeze edges the ships towards the land, for it blows steady on the starboard quarter, and later in the day it works round more to the starboard beam. At night they would usually anchor to avoid the coral patches, but weigh before the dawn so as to work a little seaward with the off-shore breeze, which is technically termed the land breeze. On they would go, southward always, past ports and harbours hardly known to modern navigation.

They would come to "Asir," the "difficult land," and would pass Khor-Abu-s-Saba—the port of Saba.

They would come to the borders of the Yemen and on past Khor The Cruise
Guleifaka, that old Sabaean port which is poorly represented by the

modern Hodeida. On through Bab-el-Mandeb, now called the Straits of Perim, when really it is the door which the wicked djinn opened too quickly when he lost his temper, and at last to Aden, the "place of pleasantness," where the fleet anchored, though it did not use the modern anchorage. Aden had then its marble baths carved from the quarries of Shukra stone, and its constant water supply, presumably more than two million gallons a day, coursing down from Hareb, through the wadis, till the flow climbed the hills and found its terminus at the tanks and their overflow to the sea. The tanks of Tuweila are modern reconstructions of some of the tanks which were to be found.

The north monsoon is growing stronger and has turned more northerly. The wind on the port bow blows the dhows down to Punt and Æthiopia, or in modern parlance, the Somalilands and Abyssinia.

These lands are strong with histories of Bilkis and rumours of Ophir. Bilkis finished her reign in these lands, and her son by Suleiman succeeded her. His descendants have fulfilled the prophecy that Suleiman should never lack a reigning prince for descendant. Here the fleet could get incense, and though we may suggest that Ed-Darfur is a name repetition of Ed-Ophir, it is not the land of Ophir. The route now goes past Socotra Island, past Ras Mouni, then round the eastern extremities of Africa and past Ras Hafeon, the harbour of the mermaids, which unromantic scientists classify as Dugon.

Sailing south, the dhows would gain an average speed of 8-10 knots per hour. This brings us to the Sheba lands, made famous by Sir Rider Haggard. Though there would be jewels there, they would not be great enough for the main jewels of the priestly breastplates.

We shall not find Ophir, for this Sheba was merely a name repetition, and this was an outlying colony of the Sabbæan Empire.

At the southern terminus the dhows would have to refit and wait for the change of the monsoon wind.

When the south monsoon sets in, about the month of May, they would set sail with a fair wind for Ceylon and the Malabar coasts. Ceylon has been suggested as the land of Ophir. The suggestion is based on the fact that many of the cargo items can be obtained in Ceylon. The suggestion is weak, the statement is erroneous. How could the city of Ophir be in Ceylon when it was the main seaport of Arabian Sabbæa?

Apes, peacocks, almug trees (some kind of red wood, either cedar or mahogany), and jewels, though not the finest, would be taken from Ceylon. Before the monsoon gets too strong the fleet would sail up the Malabar coast; part goes on to the Persian Gulf, while part probably harboured at Karachi or one of those ports on the Eastern Ocean.

Kishm, an island in the Persian Gulf, has been suggested as Ophir because there are a few Sabbæan ruins there, but a few Sabbæan

ruins are not evidence for Ophir, for traces of Sabaean civilization can be found all over the Middle East.

When the south monsoon died away, the fleet could work southward to Bahrein, where the Sabaean Empire has also left traces. Here the pearls could be had.

In the Persian Gulf the monsoon changes about November 1. With the commencement of the third monsoon the fleet would coast southward along the Trucial coast, past Mascat, round Ras al Hadd, and southward along the coast of Oman. As one works south along this coast the Sabaean traces grow strong and Sabaean inscriptions become plentiful.

We are nearing Ophir. I hesitate to tell you the exact locality, which is astronomically fixed to within about 400 yards of latitude and one mile of longitude. After twenty years of search I look forward to taking you there myself. Then I can show fullest proofs—geographical, linguistic, marine technicalities, and archæology.

The fleet we have been picturing has been cruising for some fourteen to eighteen months. They are in their third monsoon, and there are six monsoons to three years. Consequently they reach Ophir with a month or two to spare for the half time of the cruise.

Digging is sometimes weary work, whether you delve in the earth or through musty volumes. You are richly repaid if you find a jewel such as Ophir. For that ancient city could awaken to prosperity the whole Jezirat-ul-Arab—the Island of Arabia, the peninsula that is larger than India and less known than the polar regions.

The city is ideally situated. It has a harbour to north, sheltering the north monsoon anchorage. It has a rock headland and anchorage to shelter shipping from the south monsoon. Further, it has a very rare feature for an Arabian seaport—a river and khor which give wharfage to the seaport.

With all these advantages, you will ask, Why did the town ever die? The answer is peculiar to Arabia. As jungle is to India, so is sand to Arabia. A ribbon of sand cuts across some fertile land, and cuts off its communications from the outer world; then that land loses its prosperity and dies. With the seaport of Ophir a thin ribbon of coral sand has drawn across the harbour mouth; the city was strangled, and its prosperity died. It would be worth our while to cut that cord, for inland there lays the undeveloped Transvaal of the Middle East.

The journey from Aden is very simple. Thirty-six hours from Aden lies Makalla, the modern Ophir, for it has absorbed the remnant of trade that belonged to the Ophir country. It is a deep-water port with a very large harbour, and could be developed into a first-class seaport so soon as its trade potentialities are realized.

We arrived there at dawn. The officer of the watch grabbed an Arab, who, full of his own importance, had come to call on us, by his

cotton waist cloth. It came off! "Don't do that," said the Arab in excellent English, "I am the Port Admiral." He suggested that we should go in the motor-car to call on the Sultan. We had thought we were three hundred miles from civilization, but we found a modern car waiting for us, and though it had a bargeing match with a camel, it brought us in comfort to the Sultan's palace.

His Highness asked us to dinner. After the twenty-third course I struck, and dinner ended abruptly. We gained valuable information, went back to our ship, and proceeded eastward. We found our landmarks. We knew we were near to Ophir, but a booming surf showed us that our boats could never land. A surf boat came off to us. Abdulla, the Sheikh's son, and his party had come to call on us. He was much dressed, with the village sword girt too tightly about his waist. His sandals nearly tripped him up, but when he had saluted us he threw his sandals down into the boat, and with difficulty unbuckled his swordbelt. Barefoot and at ease he accompanied us round the ship. The wonders of our modern ship left them unimpressed. The wireless excited no wonder. The electric fan amused them, but left them cold. Then Sheikh Hassan, Abdulla's brother, asked for a glass of water. We went to the filter and turned on the tap. Here was a wonder, indeed! By the time they had finished playing with the filter the wardroom was in a flood.

The Town
of Ophir
Located.

* * * * *

We borrowed the Sheikh's boat for landing, and here I must break into Arabic.

"*Salaam a laikoom Sheikh. Fain al bilad el Ophir?*"

It was my best Arabic and the Sheikh looked puzzled. We broke into Bedou talk, which comes easier. "*Yah Sidi. Wain al bilad ed-Ophir?*" (Where is the town of Ophir?).

"*Haza al beled Ophr*" (This is the country of Ophir), answered the Sheikh readily.

"*La la nisht al bilad mush beled*" (I want the town, not the country).

"*Ho, Al Bilad. Hunna. T'Shoof*" (The town. Over there. Look). And in those words he sealed a friendship for life.

Modern
Problems.

* * * * *

To come to modern times and see how the problems are almost unchanged. Palestine of 1927 is closely comparable to Palestine of that date. It is not yet the Palestine of Suleiman's third decade, for at that time Palestine was the manufacturing and trade centre of the Middle East. The country was secure to north and south, more so than at the present time. Only its eastern frontiers were unsettled, and King Suleiman owned one of the most efficient armies in the Middle East. For his father David had been the first ruler to adopt chain mail for his troops. Also his kingdom had the finest horses.

Suleiman had well-equipped garrisons at his important towns. It is questionable if we could afford to give Palestine so certain a military protection as it enjoyed in the days of Suleiman. We must go further back into history for our comparison. In the days of King David the country had accumulated its own gold reserve, and was a well-developed pastoral country. At present Palestine has not regained so full a development. It is partially developed, with somewhat insecure borders to northward and to eastward. In fact, it is the Palestine of King Saul, and it lies within our power to develop the land to the prosperity of Suleiman.

Present-day Palestine is being developed rapidly and with marvellous efficiency as well as boundless tact. Let us hope its cities will be rebuilt with local labour and with local material as in the days of Suleiman.

Let us hope that its Eastern lands will redevelop with their mineral resources. With the help of the Ophir lands we may have a Palestine that includes all Arabia and also the extensive kingdom of Saba.

Then we shall see the fulfilment of the dreams of two of the great rulers of history—namely, Suleiman the Wise and Bilqis the Beautiful.

Sir PERCY COX: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have been asked to enter into the discussion because I spent some years in that part of the world—*i.e.*, in Oman—but I have very little personal knowledge of the particular place that Commander Craufurd has been telling us about, although I have just been there. In any case it is exceedingly useful, in respect of a problem like this, that those who are interested enough to endeavour to advance theories or arrive at conclusions, should come and explain them before others likewise interested. It gives an opportunity for discussion. But, while I am sorry to offer destructive criticism, I must query the conclusions that Commander Craufurd has come to—on several points. As the Chairman has told us, this question of the position of Ophir has puzzled geographers and Bible students for many centuries, and it has been very deeply gone into by various scholars, and several theories have been advanced and so-called evidence brought to bear to prove them. For instance, there is the theory of the Zimbabwe Ruins in Mashonaland, and other theories that it was Malacca, India, or Ceylon, or the place Commander Craufurd has told us about; and if you start with one of those theories you can, I will not say by “manipulation,” but by arguing your points as you go along, practically make the voyage and the conditions agree with your theory, whichever it be; and finally you arrive at the conclusion that you have got the right place. But there is almost always some flaw in the evidence, and in Commander Craufurd's evidence this evening I think there are several. One or two details first. The question of the commodities or animals that were brought from Ophir,

according to the Bible. In all probability we cannot, in regard to a point like this, depend at all upon the accuracy of the English version as we have it now. Our version speaks of the "peacock," but it may just as well have been some other bright-plumaged bird. It is not necessarily the peacock of India. It has somewhere been suggested, in order to suit another theory, that it must have been the parrot. All I mean is that we cannot safely base an argument on any certainty that the peacock of the Bible is the peacock as we know it today.

The place-name referred to by the lecturer—Ezion Geber—seems very likely, as he suggests, to be a corruption of Arabic words. It might be El-Zion El-Kebir (Zion the Great), which would be ordinary Arabic, and there is a general trend of belief that Ophir was somewhere in Arabia, because Havilah and Tarshish, the places coupled with it, are located in that part of the continent of Asia. When, however, we get down to the particular place referred to by the lecturer, and he takes up the grammatical point, I must point out that the district in which Al Bilad lies is not called Dōphir (Dhōfār) at all, but Dhūfār (ذوفار) with a short "ū" and a long "ā." There you have a difficulty, not perhaps an insurmountable one; but if the pronunciations Ōphir and Dōphir are correct, then they cannot be identical with Dhūfār. But of course we may have got the word Ōphir wrong too in the Bible rendering.

Again, in regard to the question involved in the forms "Al Ophir" or "Ed-Ophir," I cannot admit that you can have the form "ed" before a vowel. "Ed-Ophir" would not be possible in my opinion, in any Arabic, Bedou, or other; it might be either Al Ophir or Dophir, but never Ed-Ophir. That is a point which only those with some knowledge of Arabic would appreciate.

As regards the voyage involved—there are no doubt others here with a knowledge of navigation who would be able to work it out, and perhaps have done so. I believe you can work it out to fit that district of Dhūfār, and the man who has studied this question most in the last generation, a scholar named Glaser, came to the conclusion that undoubtedly the Ophir of old was somewhere in the district of Dhōfār. As regards the ruins at Al Bilad, I never examined them myself, but it was the general impression in circles where I discussed the question that they are post-Mohammedan, and they need a good deal more thorough examination before it can be accepted that they are any older than that. Most of my comment is, I fear, somewhat destructive, but I do not apologize to the lecturer for that, because, as I say, the chief use of such a paper as we have just heard is to encourage discussion; and, if I am destructive, I hope someone will be able to argue on the other side. But I think the subject wants more study before we can accept that we are any further advanced towards the proof of the identity of Ophir by what we have heard this evening. (Applause.)

Major REILLY: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I may tell you that I am not at all qualified really to join in the discussion as to the whereabouts of Ophir. Although I have spent many years in Arabia, and I know some of the localities that our lecturer has spoken about, I cannot claim to have made any study of this particular problem that he has dealt with today, nor have I seen the place to which he went, nor the particular spot which he described. The part of the country that I have known is the district which he described as having been at one time such a pleasant place—namely, Aden—but as we know it now has rather a different reputation. We know the districts to the interior by repute very well, and we see many of the remains of the Sabbæan civilization in the district of Saba there. We do not penetrate, unfortunately, from Aden—as many of us as would like—owing to the difficulty of present circumstances; and much as I should have liked at times to have made some journeys into the interior and round about these districts that Commander Craufurd has been talking about, I am sorry that I cannot claim to have done them except the one along the coast.

Admiral RICHMOND: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—So far as the winds are concerned that Commander Craufurd has spoken of, I do not see anything in the monsoon to upset his theory. It is perfectly reasonable to start off from Ezion Geber, go down the Red Sea, and go down to Zanzibar with the northerly monsoon. I do not know how long Hiram's dhows would have to wait at Zanzibar filling up. I presume they were going to draw something from Zanzibar?

The LECTURER: Yes, gold.

Admiral RICHMOND: Then they went across to Ceylon when the south-west monsoon began. They would probably have to spend some time there, and they could, working on the monsoons as we know them now, get up to Karachi perfectly well by the following autumn, and then come down again and get to this port of Ophir. I do not quite follow the lecturer after he leaves the port. How does he absorb the remainder of the time if the voyage is to take three years? He has taken fifteen months getting there, and I am not quite sure how the remaining time is filled up. I take it that the things named as having been brought home from the voyage were got from the different places, the gold from Zanzibar and the birds and stones from Ceylon; but I do not know what he got from Karachi.

The LECTURER: Up that coast he got the alium tree.

Admiral RICHMOND: I do not see how the lecturer identifies either the alium tree or the other tree that he mentions. I do not see any proofs as to the identity of Ophir with the biblical Ophir on the ground of the tree. But on the general grounds of the voyaging, with the exception of some slight doubts as to how the second half of the time

is to be used up, the theory of the winds is perfectly reasonable. It might be wise to have a rather more complete examination as to what knowledge there is of these ruins to be able to make sure whether they are post-Mohammedan ruins or earlier ones. The photographs he showed us had the appearance of being of more recent date than he ascribed to them.

The LECTURER: I will only keep you a minute or two to answer one or two of the questions that have been put to me. These ruins might, of course, be post-Moslem or, as I suggest, very much older. I am not a qualified archæologist, nor am I sufficiently qualified to express a definite opinion on this subject, but I should point out that if they are post-Moslem it is rather extraordinary that we could find no type of writing, even when searching all over those ruins, which suggested post-Moslem dates. We found no writing at all. I next looked for anything that might suggest something to do with any masonic suggestions, triangles, circles, and so on. But as a matter of fact we found no writings of any sort, although the ruins are very solid, and we might have expected to find something on them. That, as a matter of fact, is rather well supported by various traditions among the Arabs—which I have not got time to go into—about the lack of artistic skill amongst the Arabs of the days of Bilkis. The other question that we have to look at rather carefully is how the rest of the time was spent in that eighteen months' cruise. You will remember on the way back they had the rest of the north monsoon to carry them down that southern part of the Arabian coast. Then the south monsoon carried them up to Jeddah and right up to the head of what we call the Gulf of Suez, to the modern place Suez, and then the last touch of the north monsoon would bring them down again to Ezion Geber. It would take eighteen months, for this would be a slower trading trip than the rest of the voyage because it was over a wealthier stretch of coast. I do not think there is any other problem I could deal with at all satisfactorily in the short time at my disposal.

Sir EDMUND BARROW: Could you give us the answer to the riddle?

The LECTURER: The answer to the riddle is this: Bilkis had the true flowers and the artificial ones. When Solomon said to her, "Pray be seated," she sat near a window, and the bees coming in gave the answer. (Laughter and applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have, as I anticipated, listened to an amusing, instructive, and enlightening lecture, and to a very interesting discussion on it. I am not qualified to say anything as regards the geographical questions involved; but it suddenly dawned on me as the lecture went on that the Sultan of Shihr and Makalla (whose beautiful capital was shown to us on the screen), with his sons Abdulla and Hasan, were old friends of mine, and my acquaintance with them throws some slight and indirect light

on the question raised this evening. The old Sultan was the ruling chief of the Arab coast under the political jurisdiction of the Government of Bombay, and was entitled to a salute. I made his acquaintance in Hyderabad, Deccan, where he was known as the Pirate King from his swashbuckler appearance and breezy manners. In Hyderabad this old gentleman was the commander of Arab mercenaries in the service of the Nizams. His ancestors 180 years ago had imported these Arab levies, and they were the backbone of the Nizam's forces, far better than any material that could be found in Southern India. From the fact that he used to provide these forces, who were the body-guard of the Nizams of Hyderabad, he acquired a very high position in Hyderabad, and was known to have accumulated enormous wealth, not from his own Ophir on the shores of the Gulf, but from the Nizam's very well-endowed treasury. I was Resident in Hyderabad from 1907 to 1909, and this old warrior, Abdulla's father, had claims against the Nizam's Government for about one and a half millions arrears of pay for his Arab levies. He was on quite good terms with the Government, but wanted the arrears paid up. The Nizam's Government replied that he had been paid over and over again, and that it had counter-claims against him for about two millions. As British Resident in Hyderabad I used often to be visited by the Sultan of Shihr and Makalla, asking me to bring pressure on the Nizam's Government and get them to settle his claim. I used also to get letters from the Bombay Government saying that the presence of the Sultan of Shihr and Makalla in his own state was very necessary, and asking me to bring matters to a settlement. On one occasion when I managed to get him and the Nizam's Minister together, I said, "Cannot you really come to some settlement, or let us have a commission on it?" The Nizam's Minister repeated that the Sultan had been paid, and in fact overpaid. He added: "Hyderabad has been to him the gold-mine which he lost in his own country." (Laughter.) I did not know anything about Ophir in those days, and I said, "Have you gold-mines in your country, Sultan?" He replied: "I believe there was a gold-mine there thousands of years ago, but it is exhausted." I mention that because it shows that even then the Nizam's Government had this tradition that the Sultan of Shihr and Makalla possessed a gold-mine in his own country; and the Sultan admitted there was a tradition that a gold-mine had existed there some thousands of years ago. I think we are all very grateful to the lecturer for the very delightful way in which he has handled a most fascinating subject, and for the admirable slides with which he has illustrated it. I would ask you to pass him a most hearty vote of thanks before we adjourn. (Applause.)

WAZIRISTAN*

By MAJOR-GENERAL A. LE G. JACOB, C.B., C.M.G.,
C.I.E., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Our First Contact and Relations with the Inhabitants of Waziristan.

BEFORE dealing with Waziristan as it is now, I propose to describe very briefly the country and our relations with its inhabitants from the time when we first came into contact with them.

To many of you here, who probably know the country as well as I do, this will not be necessary, but for those who have not been in those parts a reference to past events will make things clearer. We have here a map of the North-West Frontier Province (or at any rate of the greater part of it) which it will be as well to examine carefully.

It is merely an outline map, and does not show any of the physical features of the country, but it gives the names of the various places of importance and the communications, and also part of the Zhob district of the adjoining province of Baluchistan.

There are two lines marked on the map which are of importance,

* A meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1, on Wednesday, May 25, 1927, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Chairman, presiding. Major-General A. Le G. Jacob, C.B., etc., delivered an address on Waziristan.

The CHAIRMAN, in his opening remarks, said: "Ladies and Gentlemen, this afternoon we are going to hear something about Waziristan. We have heard much about it in the past; it has generally been a thorn in our flesh. No invasion of India from the north-west ever failed before our time; every invader succeeded in effecting his entrance into India, from the days of Alexander down to the Afghans in the eighteenth century. It was only when we came on the scene that the invasions of India stopped. India is particularly liable to invasion from two routes: one is the Khyber in the north—that is held by the Afridis—and the other route is through the more southern passes, the Kurram, Tochi, and Gomal, all of which lie wholly or partly through Waziristan; Waziristan is a very vital factor in the defence of India. Therefore it is essential to us to have a strong position in Waziristan and to strengthen that position by having the local tribes on our side. We are very fortunate this evening in having one of the greatest authorities on the subject to address us. General Jacob, who has kindly agreed to deliver the lecture, belongs to a family which has been known on the North-West Frontier for approximately a hundred years, and has given many distinguished soldiers to the Indian Army. He himself has spent nearly all his service on that frontier except for the four or five years of the Great War. He finished his service by commanding in Waziristan, and he will be able to tell us what a large part Waziristan plays in the scheme of Indian defence, of the policy we are adopting now, and whether that policy is furthering the end in view, the defence of British India. I will now ask General Jacob to give his address."

the Durand Line and the Administrative Border, which I will refer to presently.

The Administrative Border is in the plains, and practically corresponds with the foot of the hills.

The country between these two lines is a mass of mountains, not on the gigantic scale of the Himalayas, but of considerable size, many of the peaks running up to anything between 10,000 and 12,000 feet in height.

This chain of mountains runs all along the north-west frontier, through Baluchistan right down to the sea, some 2,000 miles, and is inhabited by some 300,000 well-armed tribesmen. The lower hills in Waziristan, up to a height of 4,000 feet, are very barren and desolate looking, but the higher hills are well wooded with oak, pine, and fir trees. The Two Tribes.

The inhabitants of Waziristan consist of two main tribes, the Wazirs, or Darwesh Khel, and the Mahsuds. Although undoubtedly having a common ancestor, these two tribes are distinct.

The Wazirs, who are the stronger numerically, inhabit roughly the upper part of the Tochi valley, Shawal, and the country round Wana and Spin, while the Mahsuds occupy the centre. Wazirs.
Mahsuds.

Through this mass of mountains there are five important passes from Afghanistan into India. Commencing from the north:

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------|-------------|
| 1. The Khyber. | 4. The Gomal. | The Passes. |
| 2. The Peiwar Khotal. | 5. The Bolan. | |
| 3. The Tochi. | | |

The Khyber and the Bolan are the two most important, and have been used by armies for the invasion of India for some thousands of years, and there is now a railway through each of them. Khyber and Bolan.

The Peiwar Khotal came into prominence during the second Afghan War, when Lord Roberts advanced by it into Kabul after the massacre of our envoy, Sir L. Cavagnari, and his escort. Peiwar Khotal.

The Tochi has not been used by any modern army, either from or into Afghanistan, but it was traversed several times by Mahmud of Ghazni in his various invasions of India in the eleventh century. It is not a very difficult route. It leads to Ghazni. The Tochi.

The Gomal Pass, which follows the Gomal river, is fairly easy so far as the actual track is concerned, but the country through which it goes is about the worst on the frontier. This route also leads to Ghazni, but has not been used by armies for some centuries. The Gomal.

Both these passes, especially the Gomal, are used every year by the Ghilzai Powindahs during their migration into India in the autumn and their return to Afghanistan in the spring. They move with their wives and families and all their camels, sheep, etc.—about 70,000 human beings, and about the same number of camels, through

the Gomal Pass alone—and this migration takes about two months each way.

Before we came into these parts, the Powindahs had often to fight their way through the pass.

The Administrative Border and the Durand Line.

When we annexed the Punjab in 1849-1850 we took over all the countries which had been under the rule of the Sikhs, and, as regards the frontier, this extended only to the foot of the hills. In some places, notably the Bannu district, their rule was only nominal.

Their only method of collecting any revenue from it was by sending periodically a small army there which looted and destroyed, but it ended generally in their being chased out of the country by the exasperated inhabitants without any revenue.

In the district further south, now the Dera Ismail Khan district, their rule was less shadowy. Raiding by the tribesmen from the hills was constant, but the Sikhs only once attempted to enter the hills and were only too glad to come out again.

After annexation we took over charge and established garrisons and administered the country right up to the foot of the hills—taking revenue from the people—and this is, practically speaking, our administrative border now. Although we have garrisons in the hills and in many places beyond it, we do not “administer” or take revenue beyond it.

The Durand
Line.

Most of you know what the *Durand Line* is, but for the benefit of those who do not, I will explain it very shortly.


The mountains all along the frontier are inhabited by various tribesmen, such as Mohmands, Swatis, Bajauris, Afridis, Orakzais, Wazirs, Mahsuds, etc., who have always been immensely proud of their independence, and acknowledged neither the Amir of Afghanistan nor the British as their rulers, and who look upon the various phases of frontier fighting as their normal existence.

Although all alike in their spirit of independence they are not alike in their tribal constitution and idiosyncrasies. They are all Pathans, and are allied in language and religion to the Afghans, but not in race affinity, except, perhaps, the Mohmands.

They have not the faintest race sympathy with India or the ruling people of India, but all of them would appeal to the Amir of Afghanistan as adviser and supporter. If he has not been their king, he has been their religious chief and their political referee.

It was extremely easy, therefore, for the Amir to stir up these tribesmen against us if ever he wished to make himself unpleasant and to give us trouble.

In 1893 relations with the Amir had been strained for some time. Among other reasons he was very sore about our selection of New



Durand
Mission to
Kabul.

Chaman as the site of the railway terminus on the far side of the Khojak. He considered that we had gone too far down into the plain, and had violated the Treaty of Gandamak. On the other hand, we had various complaints against him for aggression, so negotiations were made for a mission to proceed to Kabul and definitely fix with the Amir our respective spheres of influence. Sir Mortimer Durand, at that time Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, was our envoy, and after some months succeeded in getting the Amir to sign the agreement. The line you see on the map was agreed to, and it has been called the Durand Line after Sir Mortimer Durand. Except in a few places, which it was impossible for our parties to visit, the whole of this line has been marked out by pillars.

Expeditions into Waziristan.

First
Expedition.

I will now mention very briefly the various expeditions which we have had to carry out from time to time against the tribesmen in Waziristan. Raiding has always been looked upon by the trans-border tribesmen as a normal condition of existence, and as a legitimate source of income. In this respect, raiding, temptation with these border people lies all on the side of India. Their own lands are barren and rough, and cultivation is confined to the narrowest strips of alluvial soil which may be found alongside their mountain streams. In fact, their own country is not self-supporting, and up to recent times they looked to raiding and looting the plainsmen to increase their means of subsistence. They are born with the instincts of the old Scottish Border robber in them, and the fat plains of the Punjab were their traditional hunting grounds. After taking over from the Sikhs, we very soon came into conflict with both the Mahsuds and Wazirs. The result was our first expedition against the Mahsuds in 1860 under General Sir Neville Chamberlain. Those were the days of muzzle-loaders, and the Mahsuds trusted chiefly to shock tactics, especially attacks on a camp just before dawn. They made one of these on our camp at Palosin, near Jandola, and managed to get in, but were beaten off with considerable loss on both sides. There was also some severe fighting at the Barari Tangi, but our force went through the country, brought the Mahsuds to terms, and then withdrew from the hills.

The Sack of
Tank and the
Expedition in
1881.

Except for occasional raiding, matters remained comparatively quiet for some years, but towards the end of the second Afghan War in 1880 the Mahsuds and Wazirs came out of their hills in strength and sacked Tank (about nine miles from the nearest hills), and in the spring of 1881 an expedition under General Kennedy started in two columns, one up the Takki Zam from Tank to Kaniguram, and the other up the Khaisora valley, with Razmak as its objective. There was some desultory fighting, and various villages and towers were destroyed. The Mah-

suds and Wazirs came to terms, and the force again retired from the hills to their cantonments in the plains.

The next expedition, the third, was in 1894-1895. Shortly after the Durand Line had been agreed to the Government of India decided to form a military post at Wana. The Amir had built a post there shortly before this, but had been obliged to withdraw the garrison in accordance with the Durand agreement.

The Third Expedition, 1894.
Occupation of Wana.

Wana is some twenty miles from the Durand Line on our side of it, and its strategical importance had been recognized by both our political and military authorities for the following reasons :

A military force established at Wana is in a position (a) to stop Afghan emissaries and troops from entering that area from Birmal ; (b) to dominate the Suleiman Khel and other Ghilzai tribes who enter our territory every year by the Gomal river route ; (c) to check both Mahsuds and Wazirs from raiding in the Zhob district.

It was decided to occupy the place with a brigade of all arms, and incidentally to use this force as a support, which was considered essential to the actual demarcation of the Durand Line west of Waziristan.

This brigade arrived at Wana in 1894, and encamped in the open plain. Here they were attacked by a combination of the Mahsuds and Wazirs just before dawn. The enemy managed to penetrate the camp, and a fierce hand-to-hand fight took place in the dark. They were eventually driven out by the bayonet with heavy loss, and as soon as it was light enough to see, the cavalry were let loose, followed by infantry and guns, and the tribesmen disappeared into the hills.

Attack by Tribesmen, 1894.

This led to the expedition of 1894-1895 under General Sir William Lockhart. Again our troops went right through the country, and the Mahsuds came to terms. Then was our opportunity to occupy Mahsud country, and the Mahsuds were prepared to accept it. There was at that time scarcely a single breech-loader in the country, and occupation could have been followed by gradual disarmament without much difficulty, but again we cleared out.

However, we occupied Wana in Wazir country, and its effect was very soon apparent. Raiding into the Zhob district of Baluchistan almost ceased, and it was found possible to reduce the strength of the garrisons and outlying detachments by nearly one-half.

The force eventually kept at Wana after the demarcation of the Durand Line was one battalion of infantry, one section of mountain artillery (two guns), and one squadron of cavalry.

Before this occupation of Wana the route through the Gomal Pass, from Kajuri Kach to Murtaza, had been opened in 1891 by Sir Robert Sandeman, A.G.G., Baluchistan.

There was thus communication to Wana through this pass from the plains and also communication with Zhob along the Zhob river from Khajuri Kach.

About the same time the Tochi valley had been occupied, our most advanced post being at Datta Khel at the head of the valley.

Attack on
Maizar, 1897.

Except for occasional raids the country was more or less quiet for a few years. Then came the treacherous attack on our troops at Maizar, about ten miles beyond Datta Khel, in 1897, resulting in the expedition against the Wazirs, but with very little actual fighting.

The Waziristan Militia Corps.

In 1900 the Government of India decided to raise two local militia corps in Waziristan, to take the place eventually of the regular troops located there. One, the North Waziristan Militia, to be located in the Tochi valley, and the other, the South Waziristan Militia, at Wana and along the Gomal route. Local militia had been tried with success elsewhere along the frontier, notably in the Kurram valley, but the position there was very different from that in Waziristan.

The inhabitants of the Kurram valley, the Turis, were only too glad of our presence and support in their valley, as they were surrounded on three sides by hostile tribesmen, so they joined the militia freely and worked with us.

The Kurram
Militia.

That corps, the Kurram Militia, was in actual fact what it was intended to be—a corps locally recruited and for local service, and it answered admirably. In Waziristan, on the other hand, it was extremely risky to enlist Mahsuds in large numbers; we were not occupying a single yard of their country, and had therefore very little control over them. Moreover, one of the main duties of the militia would be to intercept raiders, and most of the raiders were bound to be Mahsuds. The case of the Wazirs was slightly different; we were occupying a good deal of their country in the Tochi and at Wana, and we had therefore some hold over them. A good number of them were enlisted and did well.

We tried the experiment of enlisting Mahsuds at Wana, the headquarters of the South Waziristan Militia, and at one time we had about 500 of them—about one-third of the strength of the corps—but it was not a success. They got out of hand, made a plan to seize the headquarters post at Wana, which very nearly succeeded, and they incidentally murdered the commanding officer, so they were all discharged. With the exception of a small number of Wazirs, the corps eventually consisted of other border tribesmen such as Afridis, Orakzais, Khattaks, etc., and was not locally recruited.

Shortly after the raising of these two militia corps had commenced, the Mahsuds, whose offences in the way of raiding and other outrages had been mounting up, were fined, as a tribe, a lakh of rupees. They were given a month in which to pay up, failing which they were to be blockaded. Needless to say they didn't pay, and the blockade started

in December, 1900. This lasted nearly a year, was not successful in bringing them to book, and another expedition—the fourth—was carried out against them. This was in the winter of 1901-1902, and again we went through their country.

The fighting was not severe, and a lot of destruction of villages and towns was carried out as before.

Here again was our opportunity to occupy their country, and again we declined to take it and cleared out. Meanwhile the Mahsuds had become very much better armed. More than one-third of their fighting men had breech-loaders by this time.

In 1904 the two Waziristan militia corps relieved most of the regular troops in Waziristan, and the situation remained more or less quiet until the outbreak of the Great War.

Our position then in Waziristan was this: We occupied the whole of the Tochi valley on the north, and the Gomal route up to Wana on the south side. The east side had always been held by us, but the west towards the Durand Line was entirely open, and both Mahsuds and Wazirs had free communication with Afghanistan whenever they chose. Not a single part of Mahsud country was occupied by us.

Enlistment of Mahsuds in the Indian Army.

In the early nineties Mahsuds had been enlisted in one of our Indian regiments, the 124th Baluchis, up to the strength of one company—114 men—and about ten years later, in 1903, a company of Mahsuds was raised in the 130th Baluchis.

Both these experiments proved successful, and in 1910 it was decided to raise two additional companies in the 130th, and three companies in each of the 127th and 129th Baluchis. There were thus at the outbreak of the Great War, in 1914, ten companies of Mahsuds altogether in these four Baluch regiments—about 1,050 men.

Many of these Mahsuds served in France and East Africa during the Great War and did extremely well.

As was the case among other trans-border tribesmen enlisted in our Indian Army, notably the Afridis, disinclination to serve (to put it mildly) became apparent, and it ended in the discharge of practically every trans-border Pathan in our Indian Army; up to then the situation in Waziristan was more or less normal, but in 1916 and 1917 serious trouble broke out—and we had few reliable troops with frontier experience to cope effectually with it. In 1919 the crash came, fomented and actively supported by the present Amir of Afghanistan.

When the two Waziristan militia corps were first raised in 1900—I happened to be one of the officers first appointed—it was always impressed upon us that we should never be left in the lurch, and that we could always count on support by regular troops in time of trouble.

Retreat from Wana, 1919.

However, in 1919, when real and very serious trouble occurred, no support was forthcoming.

The commandant of the South-West Militia at Wana, Major Russell, a very gallant officer, received instructions by telegram that he could not receive any support, and that he could hang on to Wana or clear out as he thought best. I cannot imagine any officer being placed in a more unfortunate position. He could have hung on to Wana for possibly a month until his supplies gave out—water would not have been any difficulty, as there was a well in the fort—but by that time the whole country would have been up and retreat would have been almost impossible. He wisely decided to clear out while there was still time. He had no transport, and he and his officers and men had nothing but what they stood up in. He decided to retire quietly during the night, and his only line of retreat was to Toi Khullah, twenty-eight miles, and thence into Zhob. Some 200 Afridis of the corps, who happened to form part of the garrison at headquarters at Wana at the time, turned traitors and fired on the others. So the retirement was hampered from the very start. To cut a long story short, the unfortunate remnants of the corps, some 300 or 400, eventually straggled into Fort Sandeman, having had to fight their way down for about fifty miles before they got clear. Major Russell himself was badly wounded, and nearly all his British officers were killed.

Effect of Evacuation.

You can imagine the effect of this evacuation of Wana in the country round.

Afghan emissaries and troops almost at once came in from the Birmal direction. The Wazirs joined in with the Mahsuds, and practically the whole of Waziristan was up.

I have already mentioned the strategical importance of Wana, and our abandonment of the place at once had its effect.

Strong parties of raiders, both Mahsuds and Wazirs, at once started operations in Zhob, and at one time Fort Sandeman itself, the headquarters of the Zhob district and about a hundred miles from Wana, was besieged for some days. The troops in these parts had to be reinforced—to about double their former strength—and all their work had to be carried out as on active service in an enemy's country, where formerly all had been quiet and comparatively peaceful.

We were then compelled to carry out operations against the Mahsuds at a most inconvenient time. The Great War was just over, most of our regiments in the Indian Army consisted of mere recruits with no frontier training and experience, and their British officers, with a few exceptions, were much the same.

We organized what in former years would have been considered a very large force, and more than adequate to deal with the situation, but before the Great War we had many very fine regiments thoroughly well trained in frontier warfare, both officers and men, and up to all the tricks of the game. Now in 1919 we had to rely on quantity, not quality, and to add to our difficulties there must have been something like 2,000 Mahsuds against us, who had been trained by us—about one-fifth or one-sixth of the fighting strength of the tribe. Nearly every Mahsud had a modern rifle and knew how to use it, and he was on his own ground, with every inch of which he was familiar; whereas in the expedition of 1901-1902 our troops, well trained and able to shoot well, plastered the Mahsuds with lead up to 800 yards every time they showed themselves, now the boot was on the other leg. Many of our troops had not even fired a recruits' course with their rifles, and it was *our* men who got the plastering; the result was the biggest butcher's bill on the frontier, our casualties being over 2,000.

Reoccupation.

However, we won in the end, and this time we fortunately did not clear out of the country. We occupied strongly with troops the line up the Takki Zam to Ladha, close to Kaniguram, and proper road construction for motor transport was carried out. The South Waziristan Militia was reorganized at Jandola, and renamed the South Waziristan Scouts.

I may mention that the withdrawal from Wana also entailed the evacuation of all the other posts held at that time by the South-Waziristan Militia and the complete abandonment of the Gomal Pass, which we had held for nearly thirty years.

It was a very heavy blow to our prestige, from which we have not completely recovered. At the same time as the withdrawal from Wana took place, the commandant of the North Waziristan Militia was ordered to abandon Datta Khel and the other posts in the Tochi valley above Miram Shah held by the militia, and actually also to burn them on retirement. Imagine the effect of this on the local tribesmen of the country round and on those enlisted in the corps. They could only think one thing—and that was that we were "down and out." Things were comparatively quiet for some time after the expedition of 1919-1920, chiefly because we were in occupation of the country or, at any rate, of part of it—but there was a distinct feeling of unrest owing to the delay in the decision of the Government of India as to whether we intended definitely to remain or to clear out. Fortunately, Government decided to retain troops in the country; and then came the question of the best place for locating these troops in order to dominate the Mahsuds. Razmak was the place decided upon.

Razmak Field Force.

In the autumn of 1922 the Razmak Field Force was formed from the troops of the Kohat district with orders to occupy Razmak and form a strong movable column capable of operating in any direction from there.

Frontier Roads.

This operation was duly carried out, and the Razmak plateau was occupied in January, 1923, in a blinding snow-storm; at the same time a good metalled road fit for heavy mechanical transport was constructed, branching off from the existing road up the Tochi at Isha and thence all the way to Razmak.

From Razmak this road has been continued, and now joins up with the road from Jandola up the Takki Zam, so that you have a circular motor road now running from Bannu up the Tochi, right through the heart of Waziristan, down to Jandola, and then on to Dera Ismail Khan in one direction, and to Sarwakai to the west.

Razmak itself is an excellent place for a cantonment—6,500 feet in height and a good climate, about five miles from Makin. The garrison is a large one, consisting of three pack batteries, one section medium artillery (6-inch howitzer), one company S. and M., six battalions of infantry, and one battalion pioneers; and the movable column from this force consists of two pack batteries, four battalions infantry, one battalion pioneers, and one company S. and M. I will now deal with the present situation and our future policy in Waziristan.

Policy and Present Situation.

The present situation is this: we have a large force at Razmak with a strong movable column, which dominates the Mahsuds to a great extent; but there are certain sections of the tribe which this column cannot reach at present without a lot of additional pack transport. It is equipped with M.T. A.T. carts, and a certain amount of pack-mule transport, and it can move anywhere along the circular road and up to Sarwekai, and it can also move to Wana when necessary, as it did last year, and in the opposite direction from Razmak into the Tochi up to Datta Khel. It can also strike at any tribesmen within a day's march of the metalled road; but there are two important parts of the country which it cannot reach without pack transport—*i.e.*, camels—and they are (*a*) the Shakta valley, and (*b*) towards Kaniguram and the Khaisara valley.

The road itself from Bannu right round through Razmak and Jandola and thence to Manzai in the one direction, and to Sarwekai in the other, is strongly held by regulars, scouts, and khassadars.

The present policy is, in my opinion, thoroughly sound, but it must be continuous and progressive.

What we have suffered from in the past is a lack of continuity in our policy, or rather a lack of any policy at all. We blew hot and cold alternately, with no practical result so far as the pacification of the country was concerned.

We should therefore continue our present policy steadily and progressively, and the next step in our progress should be the reoccupation of Wana, and the sooner this is done the better.

On a frontier which consists of a chain of mountainous country like our north-west frontier, one of the most essential and important things is good lateral communications, so that troops and supplies can be moved without difficulty where and when required. At present there is no lateral communication by road between Waziristan and the Zhob district of Baluchistan, although the two districts are adjoining: there used to be before we withdrew from Wana.

In this connection there is already a narrow-gauge railway from Khanai (about thirty miles north of Quetta) to Hindu Bagh, and I have reason to believe that an extension of this railway from Hindu Bagh, down the Zhob valley to Fort Sandeman has now been sanctioned. It seems natural and obvious therefore that this railway should eventually be continued down the Gomal valley to Tank, where there is a similar narrow-gauge railway.

I have already mentioned the strategical importance of Wana and the effect of its occupation.

Now, since our withdrawal, there is a big gap in our line of about forty or fifty miles, exposing the Zhob district from the north and west, and communication by road has ceased to exist.

The reoccupation of Wana would at once close this gap, and automatically cause a reduction in the number of troops which it is now found necessary to keep in the Zhob district for its protection. In fact that fatal withdrawal in 1919 has put us back thirty years in that part of the country.

Our next obvious steps, therefore, it seems to be, should be (a) the occupation of Wana; (b) construction of a metalled road fit for mechanical transport from Razmak to Wana; (c) extension of the road from Sarwekai to Wana; (d) a branch from this road to Khajuri Kach and thence to Fort Sandeman.

If the above be carried out, our hold on Waziristan would be complete: Wana should be held by regulars.

It would not mean any addition to the troops now in the country. The garrison I recommend is one squadron of cavalry, three battalions of infantry, and one pack battery, all from the Manzai Brigade. We are not committed to any serious building programme yet at Manzai, and the troops could be hutted at Wana just as easily as at Manzai, and in a far better climate.

The regular troops in Waziristan would then be concentrated in

the two most important places for dominating and holding the country as regards both Mahsuds and Wazirs.

The soundness of our present policy is to my mind apparent. It has resulted in peace and quiet during the past two years, such as was unknown before, and if we continue this policy steadily and progressively on the lines suggested, the gradual disarmament of the tribesmen will most assuredly follow. It is merely a question of time.

The Mahsuds are undoubtedly settling down, and are recognizing and reconciling themselves to the fact that we mean to stay.

There will be no opposition to our reoccupation of Wana from the Wana Wazirs, and as regards a road from Razmak to Wana via Kani-guram, the Mahsuds are already beginning to ask about contracts for work on the road, as they are convinced that this is bound to come.

The civilizing effect of good roads is apt sometimes to be lost sight of.

What we are doing now in Waziristan is exactly what was done in the Highlands of Scotland nearly two hundred years ago by General Wade when he made a road right through them, and the effect will be the same.

The pity of it is that it was not done thirty years ago when we had the chance, and when the tribesmen were badly armed. We should have saved ourselves a vast amount of blood and money.

SIR LOUIS DANE : General Jacob ended up on the note that he was very sorry that what they are doing now was not done thirty years ago. It is almost exactly thirty years since the Punjab Government, which was then in charge of the frontier, but without much means of enforcing its authority, after the Maizar affair proposed to make a road from Datta Khel through Razmak over the Orehaktarhazai to Wana—which is more or less what is suggested now. I am afraid that when we told the Government of India that this Shawal was a fine country with open areas and plenty of trees it rather sounded to them like the old fool babbling of green fields. The Sandeman policy was to try and intern a tribe by getting behind them, and this road through a track which was a sort of no man's land would have cut off the Mahsuds from Afghanistan. The Wazirs were fairly easy to deal with, but the Mahsuds were different. Also their country was fairly easy, and that of the Wazirs appallingly difficult. I suppose it has taken about three years of road-making to get to Razmak up the gorges.

THE LECTURER : Oh dear no, about three months.

SIR LOUIS DANE : The troops, at any rate, were there a considerable time. If the road had been made in 1897 and 1898 it is exceedingly probable that an enormous amount of money and many lives might

have been saved. As to the native levies, those people used to be called in the first instance khazadars, then levies, then militia, and now they are khazadars again. Well, a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, and the levy man is very much the same man as he always was. It was not for want of telling that this valuable road was not made, but unfortunately after the Terah affair we got rather bad cold feet; everybody was for doing nothing and saving as much as possible. Ultimately this policy led to enormous expenditure afterwards. There was a regular Alsatia in the corner at Gumattee which gave endless trouble to the frontier officers until we made a rough track from Idak to Thal. A cart road is an excellent tranquillizer, but a track for pack traffic is not so good. If you have a pack caravan it is fairly easy for the raiders to cut up some drivers and then to carry off the goods on the pack animals; with carts this is not so easy. A railway is best of all, it cannot easily be destroyed, and it gives employment which helps pacify the country. The next best thing is a motor transport road.

As envoy to Kabul and otherwise I had a good deal to do with the Durand Line; one of my instructions was to urge upon His Majesty the Amir the desirability of his not instigating the tribes to raid our territory, and so get them to comply with the conditions of their allowances. It was not a very pleasant thing to have to do; the reply one always met was, "You say they are your people, why not go and coerce them yourselves? I have nothing to do with it." It was a difficult thing to answer this. Where a tribe was divided the difficulties have been greatest. The Waziristan line was not jointly demarcated, but pillars were put up by British officers only. The Mohmand border has never been demarcated. I can tell you an amusing story about this Mohmand border. When I came home in 1908 the celebrated week-end expedition against the Zakha Khelat in the Khyber had just taken place. Lord Morley was exceedingly pleased. He said, "You see how enormously successful it was. Everything went off according to order." The dates had been fixed from Whitehall. I said, "Yes, sir, but I think it went off so well because, when the officer went into the Bazar valley, he did not move out on the day he was expected to. The tribesmen knew perfectly well the day he was expected to move out; they came back to their homes, but found the force still in occupation, and received a nasty knock." Lord Morley said, "At any rate it is all over now." I replied, "I am not so certain of that." He asked, "What do you mean?" and I told him he might possibly have trouble with the Mohmands. I left London and went down into the country, but was summoned to return because the Mohmands had come down and attacked and looted Shabkadar. I found Lord Morley very much disconcerted, and almost inclined to think I must have been in some way responsible. He said to me, "Of course you have heard what has

happened?" I said, "No," and he told me what the Mohmands had done, adding, "How could you possibly have said that would happen when you saw me a week ago?" I replied, "It is what often happens on the frontier. In 1897 the Mohmands rose first. Then they urged on the Afridis to rise, and after a week or ten days of indcision—during which if we had only supported the Khyber Rifles we might not have had a war at all—the Afridis rose, and we were let in for the 1897-1898 affair. Arguing on that I thought it exceedingly probable the Afridis would stir up the Mohmands—which they have done." I very nearly lost my appointment as Lieut.-Governor, but he eventually recognized it was not my fault. I tried then to get him to demarcate the Mohmand border as we had to send up a force there. He very nearly agreed, but ended up by saying, "It would be contrary to my life-long views, and I really cannot do it." It is a thousand pities the Mohmand border has never been settled. It will have to be done soon in view of the changed position of Afghanistan, and it may be a costly affair.

It is a great pleasure to me and all old frontier officers to hear from General Jacob that the policy of lateral communications is being carried out.

Sir HUGH BARNES: Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel some hesitation in speaking on this subject, as it is twenty years since I left India and nearly twenty-seven since I left the frontier. But I presume the principles of frontier management do not change, and to me it has been a real pleasure to listen to General Jacob, and to learn that at long last the policy has been adopted in Waziristan of occupying the country between the Mahsuds and the Afghan frontier. I say at long last, because this was the policy that used to be advocated by Sir Robert Sandeman quite forty-five years ago when I first went to Quetta. I distinctly remember him discussing the matter at Quetta, and putting a big blue pencil mark round Wana on his map hanging on the wall, and saying: "That is the place to go to if we are to quiet down the Mahsuds and Wazirs"; and at a later date he used to say that we ought to run a road from Kajuri Kach to Datta Khel. His theory was that, if you can hold the country between the tribesmen and Afghanistan, they are bound sooner or later to come to terms. I think the most interesting occasion on which I heard him explain his views officially was at a Conference at Dera Ismail Khan in 1889. I happened to have been sent up to Simla from Quetta to act as Under-Secretary for a short time. Towards the end of the season Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary, fell ill of pleurisy, and when he recovered he had to take leave, and I had to carry on until his successor arrived. Consequently I had the pleasure of accompanying Lord Lansdowne on his frontier tour. After visiting Kohat, the Viceregal party went down the Indus in boats accompanied by Sir James Lyall, Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab. We visited Bannu, and finally reached Dera Ismail

Khan, where there was to be a Conference on the subject of opening the Gomal Pass, which had been closed for months by the Mahsuds. The question was whether there should be an expedition or not. The other members of the Conference were Sir Frederick Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, and Colonel Sandeman, who had been summoned from Quetta. Sandeman at once put forward the suggestion that the whole of Waziristan should be included in the Baluchistan Agency, the Baluchistan boundary being fixed at the Tochi instead of the Gomal. Then he said he would undertake to open the Gomal Pass. Naturally Sir James Lyall would not hear of anything of the kind. Sandeman then begged Lord Lansdowne to allow him to go back and complete his work in Zhob, and he said: "If you will lend me Mr. Bruce, the Deputy-Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, we will go down the Gomal from Zhob and open the Pass for traffic." Sir James Lyall was quite willing to agree to this, and so Sandeman went back to Zhob, collected several of his Baluch sirdars and levies, summoned the Waziri Maliks, and under their escort proceeded with a small military force to march down the Gomal most successfully—I think almost without a shot being fired. It was a wonderful feat, and it led to tribal levy posts under the Mahsud Maliks being established in the Pass, and for a long time afterwards the traffic in the Gomal went on all right. Personally, I have never been an advocate for handing Waziristan over to the Baluchistan Agency. Baluchistan is quite big enough as it is, and obviously Waziristan can be more easily managed from Bannu or Dera Ismail than from Quetta or Zhob. But there is no reason why the Baluchistan system of tribal management, and tribal levies, should not be brought into force, and if that had been done, and if Razmak or Shawal or some neighbouring place had been occupied in those days, before the Wazirs had become well armed, and before we had trained them as soldiers by passing the majority of their young men through our levy corps, I think we should have escaped a great many of the expeditions which have occurred since.

General Jacob has described the military arrangements that have now been made, and I entirely agree with him as to the importance of the road from Kajuri Kach to Wana and thence to the Tochi and Razmak. It is astonishing to me that the Government, after the length of time they have been dealing with Waziristan, especially since Razmak has been occupied, have not made the roads long ago. I remember in Lord Minto's time their construction was under discussion.

It is no use nowadays discussing the old controversy between the close border policy of the Punjab and the more liberal tribal policy of Baluchistan, but I should like to correct one or two misapprehensions which exist about the latter, for there are still a few people who believe in the close border policy. One misapprehension is found in the argument that the Baluch are so different from the frontier Pathans that arrangements which apply very well to the Baluch, who are not

democratic and follow their chiefs, are quite useless when applied to the democratic Pathan. Those people who hold that view fail to appreciate the difference between Baluchistan proper, the territory of the Khan of Khelat, which we don't govern, and what we call the administered territories of Baluchistan. These latter are almost wholly Pathan. The Baluchistan Agency is so called because when Sandeman first went up he had to deal with Baluchistan only, but after the Afghan War of 1878-1880 we annexed Pishin and Sibi, which included Achakzai, Toba, Hurnai, and Thal Chotiali, and we gradually progressed down into Zhob and to the Sherani country round the Takht-i-Suliman. All these districts are entirely Pathan. Even the Quetta district is largely populated by Kakar Pathans, so that it is rather an assumption to suppose that a system which has succeeded with the people in these Agency territories is not applicable to the Pathans elsewhere. Of course, the country is much easier. It is not nearly so difficult as the terrible country which General Jacob has shown us. That everyone admits.

Another theory is that the Baluchistan levy system is also quite unsuited to the Pathans. People I think generally do not know how the Baluchistan levy system arose. Except myself and Mr. Bruce, I suppose there is nobody alive who can say. What occurred was this: Before the Afghan War there were very few levies in Quetta and the Bolan. The Baluch and Brahui sirdars in the Kalat State had certain allowances, and there was a mounted levy corps under Major Mosley, known as the Baluch Guides. After the annexation of Pishin and other Pathan districts it became necessary to reorganize the levy system to suit them, and in 1882 or 1883 Sir Robert Sandeman appointed a Committee consisting of Mr. Bruce, Major Mosley, and myself to consider the matter. It so happened that when I was one of Sir Oliver St. John's assistants in Kandahar in 1880 I was ordered to make lists of the Afghan system of tribal militia or levies in the Kandahar province. It was found that the Afghan practice in almost every village or tribe was to pick out their principal headmen or Khans and give them small allowances to keep up a certain number of mounted men (sowars) or footmen (known as khasadars) to act as escorts and police their districts. A small Khan might have to maintain only two sowars, another five, and another twenty. At our Quetta committee the Kandahar system was considered, and it was decided to abolish the Baluch Guides and to distribute the available money in allowances to the principal Khans and Maliks on the Afghan system, with various improvements. The important point on which Sir Robert Sandeman and Mr. Bruce always insisted was that the money paid to the men employed must be disbursed through the selected headmen or Maliks on whom was placed responsibility. When, therefore, it is argued that the Baluchistan levy system is not applicable to Pathans, it is overlooked that it is based on Afghan custom and practice.

Nowadays, since the Punjab frontier province was created, the officers in Baluchistan and the Punjab frontier province are all members of one service, the Indian Political Service. They are interchangeable, and have no doubt much to learn from one another, and as time goes on, if the Government will only stick to the policy of occupying Razmak, extending roads and giving tribal service to the Malikis, so wisely advocated by the Lecturer, I believe ultimately and before very long we shall see Waziristan settle down in a very satisfactory manner.

Lient-General Sir RALEIGH EGERTON: My first acquaintance with the Gomal and the Mahsud border was some forty-five years ago when I marched from Dera Ghazi Khan to Kohat and halted for some days at Dera Ismail Khan. In those days the border was watched by cavalry detachments in small posts along the frontier road, which roughly coincided with the Administrative Border. These posts were under the O.C. the Cavalry Regiment which garrisoned them, and he visited them periodically. In the winter when the Powindah kafilas came down the Gomal to trade in India, they arranged for their own protection *en route* against the Mahsud and other tribes who wished to take toll of them, and it was the usual custom for the cavalry at Dera Ismail Khan to take this opportunity for studying the arts of "Protecting and Attacking a Convoy," with which object the regiment would move into camp near the mouth of the Gomal for training purposes; and when news arrived of the approach of a kafila, the officers with a small escort would ride some way up the Pass to a convenient place from which to view the performance, and this was done without molestation. Any slackness on the part of the Powindahs in preventing straggling on the part of their laden camels, or in the distribution of its escort was promptly seized upon by the Mahsuds, a party of whom would dash out from cover and attempt to drive off the straggling animals towards their own country, pursued, of course, by some Powindahs, and I was told that a good deal was to be learnt from a study of the methods of both parties. In those days we assumed no responsibility for the safety of the kafila till it crossed our boundary, and it was not till some years later that we took over the Gomal and the Powindahs got soft and relied on us for protection while passing through it.

General Jacob has alluded to the attack on Tank by a large force of Mahsuds some fifty years ago as an act of aggression against the Indian Government, and, of course, in one sense it was so, but its primary object was, I have always understood, to settle a matter of grave personal importance to the Mahsuds, who in the conduct of their trading operations with India were obliged to use the bankers or baniahs of Tank as their intermediaries, and had got into their debt in the course of these transactions, as also had their customers in Tank. With the connivance of the latter, therefore, the Mahsuds organized the raid in order to destroy the baniah's books and so wipe out all record of these debts. Much the same action was taken by the sepoy of the regi-

ments which mutinied in 1857, and if you read the accounts of those events you will find that the first act of the mutineers was, in most cases, to burn the baniah's books.

Not only today, but on frequent other occasions, a good deal of caustic comment has been made on what is called the "Punjab policy" of evacuating tribal territory after a punitive expedition. I venture to think that this blame is generally wrongly apportioned. My own experience, which covers a good many such expeditions, is that the so-called "scuttle" was dictated by political exigences in this country. Either the Sovereign was about to open Parliament, or a Foreign Potentate about to visit this country and the Government of the day wished to include in the Speech from the Throne or other proclamation that "Peace reigns in all parts of the Empire." It is quite unfair to put the blame for this inconclusive result on the authorities in India, either civil or military.

As regards the character of the Mahsud, I believe that he is hated by all his neighbours as a predatory wild animal, perhaps even as vermin, to be shot at sight if he crossed his own borders into their territory.

I was glad to hear General Jacob acknowledge the usefulness of and necessity for maintaining pack transport for the maintenance of troops in frontier warfare. Whatever roads are made for strategical purposes and suitable for mechanical transport, there comes a stage in such operations when for tactical purposes troops have to leave those roads and only rough mountain paths are available for their maintenance, and on these occasions pack transport is indispensable. In the days when the Punjab Frontier Force was under the Punjab Government this fact was fully recognized and "mobility" was that Government's watchword in regard to its troops. Every regiment then maintained on regimental charge a half scale of first line pack transport, and the regimental baniahs were called upon to maintain transport for the food supply of half the regiment for seven days. The Punjab Government attached the greatest importance to the efficiency of this transport, for the purchase and feeding of which commanding officers were responsible, and regiments as a rule took great pride in its efficiency. It was thus possible for half the strength of each unit of a frontier garrison to move out at a moment's notice and maintain itself for a week in case of trouble on the border. With the abolition of this a great blow has been struck at the efficiency of frontier garrisons.

The LECTURER: One thing I forgot to mention at the end of my lecture. I heard unofficially during the last few days on very good authority, and I think I am justified in saying it is true, that Wana is going to be reoccupied. (Hear, hear). I understand that the Government of India has decided to do it, and I have also been told it will probably come off before the end of this year.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have had a clear, concise, and convincing exposition of the problem of Waziristan both from the Lecturer and also from the many authorities, civil and military, who have contributed to the discussion. It is very satisfactory to him to find his views have met with support on all sides, and that the problem of Waziristan as he has put it is mainly one of communications, of reoccupying Wana, involving as he says not only a consistent but a progressive policy. We have realized that our failures in the past, some of them most discreditable, have been due to the lack of any such consistent policy, and we are glad to learn that the responsibility lies, not with the civil and military authorities in India, but with higher authority here in London. Anyhow, we are glad to know that we have now got on to the right track. Wana is to be reoccupied, the railway is to be taken up the Zhob valley to Fort Sandeman, and the problem of Waziristan is being placed on a sound and permanent basis. All our trouble in the past has arisen from the fact that the Mahsuds and Wazirs did not know what was at the back of our minds. We ourselves did not know if there was anything there. You can quite understand the dangerous position in which we placed our military and political officers on the frontier, the heavy sacrifices we called on them to make, and the risk they had to run, without any adequate guarantee that we were pursuing a definite policy. It was too much to expect of any men. The loss of the lives of the many gallant officers who were the victims of fanatical outrage or sacrificed themselves in the withdrawal of 1919 testify to the appalling results of a want of definite policy. It is particularly necessary to be watchful at the present time in Waziristan. You know that in the last twenty-four hours we have cleared out from within our borders some of the alien people who have made trouble in this country. Being cleared out of this country they will redouble their efforts to stir up trouble for us everywhere in the East. You may have noticed when Soviet Russia concluded a treaty some years ago with Afghanistan one of the clauses of the treaty was to have three consular posts along the Indo-Afghan border at Ghazni, Kandahar, and I think at Jellalabad. You know that Russian agencies even here in London under the eye of authority have been used for hostile propaganda, and you can imagine what the Bolshevik consulates in these three places are meant for. Anything we can do to strengthen our own position, and also to get the Wazir and Mahsud tribes on our side by giving them increased opportunities for a livelihood, will enable us better to meet any menace from that quarter. You will all agree with me that the Lecturer has brought out most clearly the necessity for the action that has been taken, and for maintaining a consistent and progressive policy. We owe him a debt of gratitude for the admirable lecture he has given us, and for the delightful lantern slides with which he has illustrated it, and I will ask you to show your appreciation. (Loud applause.)

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA*

By P. J. BRUCE

MR. CHAIRMAN, Ladies and Gentlemen,—There are just one or two words I would like to say by way of preliminary. It was with considerable diffidence that I accepted the invitation with which I was honoured to address this Society, because you have recently had lecturing to you such men as Mr. Woodhead, Dr. Morse, and more recently Mr. Gull, who are experts and were able to speak with very much greater authority than I can possibly claim. If I have any claim to speak on a subject like this it is because of my affection and pride for my own country. I do not stand in a white sheet when I speak with regard to our own country and its relations to China. I have also a very great admiration for our merchant community in China, and I want to say in that connection that, living as I have lived getting on for forty years among the people, so far as the people themselves are concerned, when they are apart from anything in the way of deliberate propaganda, they share that admiration of the British commercial community in China. (Hear, hear.) Then I also have, and perhaps that is my strongest claim, a very great admiration and affection for the Chinese people. (Hear, hear.) I yield to none in my admiration of their great qualities, qualities that have been manifested time and again all through their history. They are a great race, and it will yet emerge that they have qualities sufficient to carry them through even this extremely trying period. Now we, in this country, have recently had considerable difficulties in our relations with China. I want to emphasize this afternoon that these difficulties are largely, if not wholly, due to the internal difficulties which China has herself. If there were none of those internal difficulties I do not think that we

* The CHAIRMAN (Lieut.-Colonel F. E. Fremantle, M.P.) : Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have the very great privilege this evening of listening to a lecture by Mr. Bruce, who, after having been in China for thirty-six years with the Baptist Missionary Society in Shantung, has now come home and has taken up the position of Lecturer on the Chinese Language and Literature in the University of London. Consequently there is nobody who would be better qualified to tell us of the conditions of that country which is occupying our attention at the present time—the conditions out of which the present chaos and disorder have arisen. When Professor Bruce was in China he was President of the Shantung University, and that brings in another side of the modern life and development of China. I will now call on Mr. Bruce to give us the lecture.

should have any difficulty whatever in adjusting any question that might arise between us and China. As Mr. Gull pointed out in his lecture a little while ago, the so-called unequal treaties arose out of China's internal troubles, mentioning in particular the Taiping rebellion, and it is so today. These difficulties that we have, and the desire and plea that the so-called unequal treaties should be revised—should be annulled, in fact—all arise out of China's internal troubles. So my subject, although it may appear to be somewhat apart from what is most in our minds at the present moment, is none the less an extremely important subject. The subject is, as I understand it, the Republic of China, and I want to deal with it in three parts—first the collapse of republican government; then that division between North and South which is so markedly to the fore just now; and finally, if I may venture to state them, what I consider to be the conditions essential to a stable government in China.

First of all, as to the collapse of republican government, the first thing to be said is that there is no republic in China, and there never has been a republic in China if we speak realistically. There was what was something of the semblance of a republic in China, which lasted for two or three years perhaps, under the President Yuan Shih-kai, but what we see today is a collapse of even that semblance of republican government, and what I want to do is to inquire into what are the causes of that collapse. I should name three. I do not mean to suggest that there are no others, but they stand out rather prominently in my mind as the result of observation through several years. The first is the ineffectiveness of the Government at the centre, the second is militarism in the country at large, and the third is financial bankruptcy. Of course, one grows out of the other. They are not, so to speak, in three different watertight compartments, but one is related to the other, and the relation is very much that of cause and effect.

To begin with the ineffectiveness of the Government at the centre. I want in speaking of these causes, if I can, to show how there has been in them all a certain measure of what one might call inevitableness. We are rather apt to be impatient with the Chinese people in this their transition stage. I think instead of being impatient we ought to give them all the sympathy that we possibly can. To pass from a millenniums-old despotism to modern democratic government was a gigantic task. I think at first most of us who were friends of China, and most of the Chinese themselves, were optimistic—perhaps too optimistic. It looked as if it was done. It was done without bloodshed. The treatment of the Manchu dynasty was honourable and dignified. There was so much that was admirable about it that we forgot at the time that there must of necessity be certain elements of difficulty inherent in the situation, inherent in the

Causes of the collapse of first Republican Government.

Parliamentary difficulties.

task, altogether inseparable from such a task, and that those elements of difficulty would in course of time emerge. One of the difficulties to which I refer as inherent in the situation was inexperience. Take the question of illiteracy. I believe I am correct in saying that something like 99 per cent. of the population at that time were illiterate. The illiteracy was the illiteracy of an electorate representing four hundred million people electing a Parliament to represent a vast country. I should suppose that the number of those who understood anything whatever about the issues involved was extremely small, and most of them were in the maritime provinces in the eastern section of China. Then take the ignorance of the legislators. I think that the Lower House of the two Houses of Parliament had something like five hundred members elected from all parts of China. I suppose that four-fifths of them—at any rate, at least half of them—had never seen the inside of a deliberative assembly before. I believe that at that time, apart from Christian communities and young men educated in foreign countries, there was hardly anyone that had had any experience whatever of a deliberative assembly. They would not know what a chairman was, and would not have the slightest idea of chairman law. Now, such ignorance of necessity reflected itself in the Parliament that was elected, and so you had a Legislature that was really incompetent. The only political leaders of the time who knew anything about anything so far as modern politics were concerned were young men educated in colleges and schools of a Western type, some in China, but most of them in Universities in America, Japan, and Great Britain—returned students, as they were called. So far as experience was concerned, all that these young leaders had had was in the College Debating Societies of their respective Universities. Now, imagine a Parliament assembled under such conditions as those, and can you be surprised at the ineffectiveness that has obtained ever since at the centre of government?

Then, secondly, there were certain defects in the Constitution, or in the interpretation of the Constitution, which led to considerable difficulties in government. For example, the relation between the President and the Legislature was very imperfectly understood, to say the least. No matter what you had on paper, there were certain fixed ideas in the minds of those who had to handle the Constitution that were not affected very much by what they saw on paper, and these misunderstandings led early to critical relations between the President and the Legislature. I am speaking now of the time when Yuan Shih-kai was President. Those relations were chiefly with regard to the respective functions of the President and Legislature, so far as executive government was concerned. There was a tendency on the part of Parliament to demand that every detail of executive government should be submitted to Parliament for its approval; and with a man like Yuan

Shih-kai—who was a strong man, a man of the statesman type, a man who had a realistic tendency—with a man like that there was bound to be conflict when he was being held up at every turn on administrative details, matters of executive government, and particularly matters of foreign policy, which affected vitally the welfare of the country. In things of this sort, to yield to a Parliament such as I have described—ignorant, inexperienced, and incompetent—was a thing that a man of his type could not brook; and the eventual result was that he dismissed the Parliament and carried on without it. Then, another difficulty arising out of the Constitution was in the relation between the President and the Premier. Now, we have a republican constitution in the West in the United States of America, where you have a President and Legislature but no Premier. We also have a republican constitution in the West in France, where you have a President and Premier. In America, where there is no Premier, the President exercises executive functions such as are exercised by our Premier, in addition to such functions as are exercised by our King. But in France the President does not exercise the functions that are exercised by our Premier, but only those that are exercised by our King—I am speaking, of course, in general—and in France you have as Presidents men who are strong enough, who are experienced enough, and wise enough, to keep their activities within the sphere of those functions. But in China, if you have a President such as Yuan Shih-kai, or any strong President, you will find that he will not want to be a mere figurehead: he will want to exercise functions which would ordinarily be exercised by the Premier, where you have a Premier. So it was that very early in the day there came collisions between the President and the Premier. Later, in 1917, when Li Yuan-hung—by no means so strong a man as Yuan Shih-kai, but a disinterested and good man—was President, there was very strong difference of opinion between him and Tuan Chi-rui, then Premier, with regard to China entering the Great War, and the result was that Li Yuan-hung dismissed the Premier. But the Premier was a strong militarist, and had many friends among the militarists, who came to his help, and the upshot was the flight of the President. In 1918, after Li Yuan-hung had vacated the Presidential Chair, and the Vice-President, Feng Kuo-chang, was in his place, again there arose conflict between the President Feng and the Premier Tuan in regard to the policy of the Government in relation to Japan. Then again, in 1920 the President, Hsu Shih-chang, under the pressure of the Chihli party, one of the important parties of that time, had a strong difference of opinion with Tuan Chi-rui, the same Premier, who was the leader of the An-Fu party, which party was supposed to be in the pay of Japan, and entirely under the control of Japan. So you find that through all this period no steady policy was possible: instead you had intrigues followed by intrigues, which could only result in ineffectiveness. A third

difficulty arising out of the Constitution was the matter of the quorum. A quorum seems rather a simple thing; it is generally put in a corner of a constitution as a sort of side-thought. But it works very great havoc sometimes. Now the quorum required by the Constitution of the Parliament was a majority—a majority of the members must be present for any business to be done. I wonder what our obstructionists in the House of Commons would do with a weapon like that? Any Government would be ready to despair if an obstructionist party, simply by inducing a minority to abstain from attendance, could prevent any business being carried on. I believe the number in the House of Commons required for a quorum is forty. True it was that time and again the Chinese Parliament would meet and no quorum would be there. You see, it was not a case of two-party government. If there had been two-party government, then the party in power would represent the majority, and they could command the attendance of the majority, but there were any number of groups, and it was not difficult in the then state of affairs, with innumerable intrigues going on, to secure at any time that there should not be the necessary quorum to carry on business. So the Parliament became more and more inefficient, particularly when some very important matter had to be decided, for in this case the quorum necessary was as much as three-quarters, and in some particular instances as much as four-fifths.

Militarism.

The second of the causes of the collapse of the republican government is militarism. Now, what is the origin of militarism, not in the sense in which we use it in Europe of one country being aggressive in relation to the surrounding countries, but militarism in the sense of the rise of certain what you might call satraps, commanders-in-chief of large armies in various parts of the country, having full power over those regions, including control of the revenues? The origin of it is a very simple one. For the protection of the republican Constitution there needed to be an army—the President's army—and this army was divided into sections resident in various parts of the country. During the Presidency of Yuan Shih-kai these sections of the army were under commanders-in-chief who had grown up under him, had been trained by him, were subordinates in his army before the collapse of the Manchu régime, and so long as Yuan Shih-kai lived those subordinates of his were loyal to him. But after his death the bond was broken, and thenceforth those commanders-in-chief fought each for himself, and, as I have intimated, eventually had control of the various regions of the country, and that control included control of the revenues. They had political control, and they had financial control, and they had military control; and, of course, under those circumstances—it is not necessary for me to enlarge upon it—under those circumstances it was possible for them not only to ignore the Presidential mandates, but even to overawe the President. Now, that is so far as militarism is

concerned: I do not think I need to take up more of your time on that point this afternoon, but pass on to others.

The third cause of collapse that I mentioned was financial bankruptcy. Financial difficulties.
Under the Manchus tribute was paid by the provinces to the Central Government. In the early years that I spent in China, at any time that you crossed the Grand Canal, or if you went along it any distance, you would find the traffic largely made up of canal boats laden with grain on their way to Peking. It was the tribute of the provinces that were tapped by that canal. But with the revolution of 1911 all that ceased; no tribute went to Peking, so far as I know, after that year. Not only was there no contribution from the provinces to the Central Government, but the demands of the militarists were all the time increasing—demands upon the Central Government, and demands which for obvious reasons could not be ignored by the President as the presidential mandates were ignored by the militarists. In 1913 an effort was made to meet these financial difficulties. There was what you all remember—a Financial Consortium representing the Powers interested in China, and a reorganization loan was negotiated. But the conditions imposed by the Consortium resulted in the collapse of those negotiations. The chief of the conditions that had that result was the demand for an audit of the expenditure under the loan. Now, the demand for such an audit was a perfectly natural one on the part of the financial interests concerned, because experience had already shown that any loan that was given would most likely go to the militarists, and there would be no reorganization resulting from it. But the demand was very much resented both by the Central Government in Peking and by the Cantonese party in the South—resented as an indignity to China and an infringement of China's sovereign rights, and so the negotiations collapsed; and thereafter the Powers practically passed a self-denying ordinance, and there were no more loans forthcoming. The revenue therefore remained inadequate to the needs of the Government, and when you have expenditure at one figure and revenue at a considerably lower figure, you know what the process is. Strikes followed of all sorts—strikes in the different Ministries in the Government of Peking, strikes in the colleges and schools on the part of the professorial staffs, strikes in the armies, going by the name of mutinies. [A good many of the military defeats on the part of the various armies on one side or the other in China were due to the lack of funds to carry on the conflicts, as is largely the case today so far as the North is concerned.] Then there was resort to domestic loans, the result of which was that the Government sank deeper and deeper into the mire, because the moment a loan was raised there happened what the Consortium had feared would happen—the militarists put in their demands for considerable shares of those loans, and those demands, as I said just now, could not be resisted. Now, there were two sequelæ of all this financial

stringency: one was increasing military exactions among the people, and the other was the growth of an agitation against the unequal treaties which, so far as the tariff element was concerned, were held responsible for the financial inadequacy of the revenues available for the Government. But the most tragic result was the increased ineffectiveness of the Central Government.

Division
between
North and
South.

The second main point that I wanted to speak of this afternoon is the division between North and South. This division that we see today so clearly marked is not a new division: there has been a historical recurrence of it. One might go back earlier in the history, but I will only go back as far as the reform era under the last of the Manchu emperors. When the Emperor Kuang Hsu made his abortive effort at reforms he was largely guided by a man named Kang Yu-wei, who was a Cantonese. That was a significant fact because it was typical: all those progressive ideas, those new ideas, came from the South. In 1911, when the revolution took place, in a moment as it were, but the outcome of agitation for years under the Cantonese Sun-Yat-sen, at the very first striking of the signal for revolution the whole of the South was on that side. There was a clearly marked division between North and South geographically along the line of the Yangtse River, and it is significant that at that time the halt of the revolutionary party was made at the Yangtse River at Hankow, and Yuan Shih-kai, representing the Manchu dynasty, went down to Hankow and was in command of the Manchu armies there. Then later, when the revolt against Yuan Shih-kai took place, which led to his virtual downfall, and which preceded his death by a short time, that revolt was started in Yunnan, a province in the extreme South of China; and immediately the whole of the South and the whole of the West were on that side against Yuan Shih-kai. Now, this division between North and South has been somewhat masked for the past few years by two causes: one is the weakness of the Cantonese party. The Kuomintang, really the Cantonese party, was proscribed by Yuan Shih-kai at the time he dismissed the Parliament because of its ineffectiveness. After that proscription there was an interval, and then a Parliament was set up in Canton composed of a number of the members of the original Parliament elected by the people of China, which had sat in Peking, and which had been set aside by Yuan Shih-kai. In 1921 Sun-Yat-sen, the leader of the Kuomintang party, went to Canton, and was elected by that Parliament as the President of the Chinese Republic. He was there, I believe, about a year, and then was ejected by a man named Chen, and in 1922 took refuge in Shanghai. From that time the Cantonese party were weak, and remained weak until recently. At times their control did not extend beyond Canton and the next province, Kwang-si, or a province to the north, Fu-kien. It extended a very short distance so far as actual political control was concerned. At one time Wu Pei-fu,

who avowed himself strongly in favour of centralized government, and tried to procure the unity of China by military force, had almost succeeded in extending his control to Canton, when through the desertion of Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian general, he came to grief. The other cause of the masking of the division between North and South has been the dissension between the Northern leaders. First there was the dissension between the Chihli and An Fu parties, represented by Tsao Kun and Tuan Chi-rui, whom I have referred to before. The dissension issued in civil war, which resulted in the victory of Tsao and the defeat of Tuan, largely by the action of Wu Pei-fu. This was followed by another civil war between Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, whose name you see frequently in the papers as commander-in-chief of the armies in Manchuria. Later there came the division between Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian general, who deserted Wu, and so led to his defeat by Chang Tso-lin. Later still there was a rupture between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang, who had allied their forces to defeat Wu Pei-fu; and so you had one after the other these ruptures and civil wars between the various leaders of the Northern party. Now, these two things have masked for some years the division between North and South, but what I want to point out is that the division remains. It has a deep root, and has re-emerged in the last two or three years. The first sign of it was a rapid march from Canton on the part of the Cantonese party up to the Yangtse and the collapse of Wu Pei-fu's resistance to that march, due largely to Russian strategists on the side of the Cantonese and their expert advice and to treachery on the part of subordinates on the side of Wu Pei-fu, which I attribute largely to financial causes. But again there has come this halt on the Yangtse: I suppose the time the Cantonese have spent since they arrived at the Yangtse is about double the time that it took them to march up from Canton to the Yangtse. And so we have today the two-party situation crystallized, and it is of extreme importance if we want to understand the inwardness of all that is happening in China. In the first place the North retains very largely the monarchical tradition: leaders in the North are generals of the old monarchical régime, and their spirit is a monarchical spirit. Secondly, the South, we have to remember, before the revolution was anti-Manchu, anti-dynastic; and therefore, to say the least, tended to be anti-monarchical. So that in the North the spirit and tendency is pro-monarchical even though it be in republican phraseology, while in the South the spirit and tendency is anti-monarchical; and we have two parties corresponding largely to the parties of the Right and Left in the West. Dare I say, too, that we have Conservatives and Progressives, who tend to emphasize on the one hand the principle of centralization and on the other the principle of local autonomy? They are very like the two parties in the United

States of America—the Democratic party, whose slogan is State Rights, and the Republican party, who stand for National Government. But here comes in the paradox of the whole situation: these two ideals of centralization and of local autonomy, although they are represented in the concrete by these two parties, the North and the South, yet, so far as my experience goes, both exist in every Chinese breast. I have found Chinese who would become passionately indignant at the very idea of China splitting up; they have a passion for the unity of China, and at the same time they would be equally passionate in their demand for the declaration of the independence of their own province. Those two ideas are very really and very genuinely held by the same individuals.

Essentials
for stability:
Provincial
authority.

Now I must pass on to my last point: What are the essentials to stable government? First of all, I would say that an absolute essential to stable government is provincial autonomy. I dare to take my stand with the Cantonese on this particular point. Not by any means on all points. I do not believe it is possible—this is not any mere theory on my part, I rather come to it from the practical side—I do not believe it is possible for any one party to dominate the whole of China. It is too vast a country. If the Cantonese win out in this struggle and become the Government of China in Peking, if they try to dominate the whole of China on any other principle than that of full provincial autonomy they will fail. Disintegration is bound to set in. That is my profound conviction. Provincial autonomy on the same principle as in the United States of America—where the powers of the Provincial Government are not delegated by the Central Government, but the powers of the Central Government are conceded to it by the provincial, the State Governments—that is the only thing that will work. I believe myself there will never be a stable Government in China until it is recognized that every province has the right to independence, and only such rights are given to a Central Government as are necessary for national services. If this is conceded, then the provinces will choose their own governors. Hitherto the governors of the provinces have been appointed from Peking; if that continues we are bound to have a recurrence of the War Lord system. The provinces must have full powers to appoint their own governors, and the provincial chambers must have full powers to vote revenues, to vote taxes, and the size of the army, if any, to be maintained in each province. The second essential is with regard to the Central Government: it should be for national services only, and those defects in the Constitution which have led to such difficulties in the past should be removed. There should be no Premier and there should be no Parliament in the same sense as there has been hitherto. I do not think China has the men, or is likely for some time to come to have the men of experience and statesmanship in sufficient number to provide a Parliament in two chambers

The powers
of the
Central
Government.

of something like a thousand members. A small Council—at most two representatives of each of the different provinces—would be amply adequate to the services demanded of it.

Then financially—I mention this, but need not take up your time with it: To the Central Government certain specific sources of revenue, like Customs, railways, etc., should be assigned, so that the Central Government should not be dependent on the provinces. On the other hand, the provinces should not be dependent on the Central Government: they should have all other revenues in their hands, with full liberty to raise loans and to decide upon taxes without the dictation of any other authority.

Now I come to possibilities—sanctions one might call them. There is the possibility of a Constitution something like what I have indicated being drawn up. There has been talk on the part of the Cantonese party of a People's Conference being called together, and I think it is not at all unlikely that such a Conference would produce on paper a Constitution with provisions such as these. But the crucial difficulty is, how is that Constitution to be maintained? In the first instance, as I said just now, military force was depended upon, and if that is depended upon again we are bound to have a recurrence of all the evils from which China has suffered. On the other hand, there is the absence of tradition, the absence of that spirit of loyalty to a Constitution which is our salvation in a country like this. The only possibility I can see is that of some economic sanction. There must eventually be financial rehabilitation. China cannot possibly get that rehabilitation without foreign assistance, and that foreign assistance should be given on certain conditions—not such conditions as it was endeavoured to impose before, impinging on the sovereignty of China, but simply these: If financial assistance is given in the form of a loan or loans, instead of one huge reorganization loan, the loan or loans might be given in instalments only, and given not to one Central Government, but to all the Governments—the provincial Governments as well as the Central Government. If the loan were given in that way there is only one condition that need be laid down—that is, that the National Government and the provincial Governments alike should observe their own Constitution. Whatever Constitution it is that they agree to adopt, some register of it should be made and deposited with the League of Nations, if you like, as giving some sort of sacredness to it. The Constitution would, of course, contain within itself provisions for its own amendment. If there were such a Constitution, and some sort of register of that kind were made of it, it would be possible for foreign Powers or for foreign financial interests to give financial assistance, on the one condition that the provisions of that Constitution were observed; and if it were given, as I say, in instalments, and given piecemeal to the Provinces and to the National Government, I think you would find

The need
financial
habilita-

that the sanction would work. But that is the suggestion of a novice, and possibly has no value in it whatever. (Applause.)

General WILLOUGHBY: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I really have very little excuse for getting up and speaking except that I happened to be in China at the birth of this rather monstrous thing, the Chinese Republic. As Dr. Bruce has told us—and it wants stressing again at this moment—there is no such thing as a Chinese Republic. I think that nobody who has been closely in touch with the Chinese, and had much to do with the Chinese for any period of years, can have other than a feeling of affection for the people. They are really a very good and sound and kindly race. It does not seem so from the news imparted in the papers; you imagine they are extraordinarily cruel. But in the main they are extraordinarily sound people, and in matters of business Chinese integrity and honesty are almost proverbial. (Applause.) It is continually said that the Chinaman's word is as good as his bond, and it certainly used to be so. About this Republic, what Dr. Bruce told us is a thing that one must bear in mind, that at the beginning of this Republic there were really no experienced people to "run the show" for them; they were largely the products of outside influences, and very largely American influences. I think that the American missions in China—with all due respect to Dr. Bruce—had a great deal to do with fostering this republican tendency. I am skating over rather thin ice, but all along I have felt that. (Hear, hear.) A lot of these young men are full of splendid ideas. They are enthusiastic young idealists, but in most cases, of course, they are utterly lacking in balance. It is a case of *vox et preterea nihil*. As regards action, there is nothing behind it. They will "take in" Western audiences in a wonderful way. I heard the other day an educated young Chinaman who spoke most admirably, but there it was, just words, words; and I think it is rather a pity—again I am on thin ice—that some of the people who direct the affairs of our great country are so carried away by the "Locarno spirit" that practical considerations are rather absent from their minds. Some of the people at the top have not got any idea of Oriental mentality. Yesterday I dare say a great many of us read that letter to *The Times* from that very incisive writer, Mr. J. O. P. Bland. It was really rather like a breath of fresh air on the sickly sentiment that obsesses so many people. There was a reverend gentleman, with a great experience of China, the Abbé Huc. Let me quote what he says about the Chinese: "This people yields nothing to reason and everything to fear." That is very true, not only of China, but in the Orient generally. One has to be firm and show that one means what one says. Our being there has been a benefit alike to China and to ourselves. The trade we have built up has been of enormous benefit to the Chinese;

what these enthusiastic young idealists want to set up in its place will be a pack of cards in comparison with the structure we have built up by a century's effort. It is tragic, really, to see our treaty rights, acquired painfully over a long period of years, being given away and absolutely surrendered without any *quid pro quo*, without any safeguard. I know I am rather carried away (laughter), but I just want to hark back to that point, that I yield to nobody in admiration of the Chinese people as a whole. I have great affection for the Chinese people. I was there a good many years, travelled in eighteen of the provinces, and know the Chinese people very well. I was there at the beginning of the revolution, at Hankow, when the issue was yet on the knees of the gods; we did not know which way it would go. I was one of the little deputation (consisting of the Vice-Consul, the senior naval officer, and myself) who went over to Wuchang to see Li Yuan Hung about the shells falling into the Concession at Hankow. Passing through the streets of Wuchang, one was conscious of the sharp line of definition between North and South of which Dr. Bruce spoke. It was certainly the Yang-tse then. Li Yuan Hung was the rebel commander, but had become so with the greatest misgivings; they had said to him, "You have got to come and command us or we may be under the painful necessity of depriving you of your head." He had to go, but went with the greatest reluctance into the thing. He afterwards became President of China. He was a kindly man. I knew Li Yuan Hung, having inspected his brigade, the 19th Brigade of the Hankow Division; only the year before. He recognized me when I went into the room. There he was now Commander-in-Chief of the rebels. The result of the interview illustrates the value of just stating definitely what you want and what you intend to have done. It was an extraordinary thing that at the beginning of the revolution, while the two sides were fighting across the Yangtse, we, a handful of foreigners, should interfere with two armies fighting, and say, "You must do this and must not do the other." We went over into the rebel camp (as it was called then) to see the Commander-in-Chief, and said, "You are sending a lot of shells into the Concession; there will be a jolly good bill to pay, and of course the fellow who is responsible for firing those shells will have to pay that bill." He replied: "Feng Kuo Chang has his batteries hiding behind your walls, and we are shooting at his batteries on the other side of the Concessions, and of course not at the Concessions." We went over and saw Feng Kuo Chang (the Commander of the Northern forces), whose headquarters was in a railway carriage, the next day, and said, "Look here, you are not indeed right up under our walls, but you are not so very far from them; and, anyway, you are rather in the line that will bring the shells over here; so we are afraid we must ask you to take all your artillery away as far as the golf links." And he did. (Laughter and applause.)

Mr. E. MANICO GULL: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am very anxious to say one thing, at all events, and that is the very great gratification I felt in the opening remark of the lecturer in regard to the opinion which the Chinese have of the British mercantile community in China. It so happens that I have been intimately connected with that community for a period of seven years, and I should not have liked to get up and claim what Dr. Bruce has asserted. It is, therefore, with extreme gratification that I hear outside evidence corroborating what was my very honest, though my private, opinion. I want to go on if I may to discuss one or two of the points in the extremely suggestive and able lecture to which we have listened, and which personally I have enjoyed very much. The lecturer itemized a number of causes as to the failure of republicanism in China. He mentioned inexperience and illiteracy, ignorance of the Legislature, and defects in the Constitution itself. I would like to add what, with all due deference to him, I would suggest is perhaps a more fundamental cause of failure, and that is that the Chinese have not, as far as I understand them, a conception of *res publica*. The Chinese have a great idea of personal rights, but they have not developed a conception of the public weal, and I think that lies right at the root of the failure of republicanism in China. Indeed, to say that is almost to express a truism; but I think it is a truism that wants expressing. They are interested in the family, they are interested in the clan, but they are not interested in the big thing that embodies the family and the clan, that stands outside, that embraces them; they are not at present interested in, nor do they fully realize the conception of the state. I think that what the lecturer said about the payment of tribute is an illustration of that. They were perfectly ready to pay tribute to a personal monarchy, which they thoroughly understood. As soon as the monarchy disappeared the tribute ceased, because it was being paid to something which to their minds was very intangible, which they had not realized or appreciated. I should like also to pass on from that point to the question of North and South. The lecturer is obviously a much greater believer than I am in that division. Personally I take the view—I submit it with all due deference—that that division is very much more geographical than anything else. It is perfectly true that on several occasions in Chinese history the Yang-tse has been the dividing-line. But it has been a dividing-line because of its physical properties, and because of the military events that have been dominated by those physical characteristics. We must remember that the race from whom the modern Chinese are descended sprang from north of the Yang-tse, and while there are great differences in temperament, and certainly very great linguistic differences between North and South, I do not myself believe that those differences are of such a character that they will make a real division along the Yang-tse River. In any event I think

it would be exceedingly difficult to base any permanent settlement in China upon recognition of the Yang-tse as a boundary. It could only, in my opinion, become a boundary either as the result of military stalemate, which of itself would be a very impermanent foundation for any settlement, or as the result of negotiation of a most complicated kind. Remembering that, while Shanghai is on the south side of the Yang-tse, the trading port of Hankow is on the north, I think it would be an exceedingly difficult boundary to negotiate about, and I do not think myself the Chinese have arrived at that stage when any negotiations to that end would be likely to be successful. In regard to the lecturer's very suggestive comments as to the essence of a permanent settlement in China—he said he was putting the suggestion forward as a novice, and I do not claim to have any very great financial experience—it seemed to me that he perhaps underrated the necessity for security when you lend money to anybody. To lend money merely on the assurance that each province is going to work in accordance with its Constitution does not appear to me to be the sort of security the financiers of Europe and America would be likely to accept. I should like again to express the very great appreciation—perhaps I ought not to put it that way—the very great pleasure with which I listened to what the lecturer had to say about the mercantile community in China, and I should like to add my thanks to those already given him for his extremely able and suggestive lecture. (Applause.)

Mr. Moon: I should like to ask Dr. Bruce whether he thinks it would be outside the scope of his lecture to tell us at what point of time the Bolshevist influences arose in Southern China, and how long he anticipates they will continue?

The Rev. Dr. Moon: Thanks, sir, for your extraordinarily interesting lecture. To us who have only travelled in China it was most illuminating to be told the whole history of the Republic from the beginning. There are one or two things, I think, which tend to show that even at the present time China is more united than she seems to be. The wonderful postal service continues to this day throughout the whole of China. We get our letters by Siberia within three weeks. You can send a letter from one end of China to the other for a sum equivalent to one penny, and the postal service continues somewhere from the centre, and I suppose is managed from Peking. There are something like twenty-five great managers of the service in the different provinces. They carry on that wonderful postal service to this day in a most magnificent organization. That shows that somehow China is not so divided as she seems to be.

With regard to the question of the Yang-tse, of course it is a very great natural divider. I believe that for at least 1,800 miles there is not a single bridge, and the river is quite a mile wide through the greater part of its length. There is another great

cause of division: the fact that although the pure Mandarin is the same in all parts of China for the really educated, the different dialects of China are so extremely different from one another that the man from the South will not understand the man from the North or even from a province much nearer. Then I think we might emphasize what the last speaker said, that the Chinese looks out from a very narrow point of view—he cannot appreciate the fact of there being one great empire. He was taught by his original teachers, and their teachings have sunk down very deep into his soul, to emphasize the greatness and importance of the family. Confucius dwelt upon the family virtues, and the outlook of the ordinary Chinese family emphasizes the great virtues of the family, but does not look broad enough to see the importance of the whole race or empire. In that way the Chinaman is entirely different from the Japanese. The Japanese is taught by his religion to emphasize the importance of the race and empire. The great national religions of Japan emphasize the nationality and the importance of the empire, and every man becomes intensely patriotic.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I will do the concluding part of the entertainment by expressing the thanks we all feel to Dr. Bruce for his lecture this evening. It will be of interest to the public generally to realize that this evening in the House of Commons we have a resolution to discuss the question of the Defence Force going to Shanghai, and one or two of us here may possibly find extra pabulum anyhow for our thoughts in that discussion this evening. But it has been very interesting and pleasant to us all to have had from Dr. Bruce the other side of the situation—that is, not the actual military and diplomatic difficulties at the present time, but an attempt to look into the actual thoughts and conditions of China. For these are really at the bottom of the whole trouble.

The more we have been thinking over his words, the more we realize that we are here in the face of a great uprise of feeling in a certain very limited section in China, as a result of the reverberations of Western education and Western thought. As General Willoughby said to us in his striking remarks, many of the young men of China, who have come over to this country or gone over to the American Universities, have naturally been enthused by the idea we have all felt one way or another in our time of independence, self-government, and so forth, and naturally they wish to put their enthusiasms straight into force. They have made exactly the same mistake as Mr. Gull was saying some of our statesmen have made and our whole country have often made in their philanthropic thoughts towards other countries—the idea that you can suddenly raise a nation to enjoy democratic government. It is one of the bitter lessons that we have learned as the aftermath of the late war, that whereas in the warmth and generous

feelings of the war we were promising self-government to all nations, great and small, we have learned how unhappy nations are who have self-government given to them when they are not fitted for it. (Hear, hear.) Nations are happy in self-government only if they fit themselves for it by a long process of education, self-denial, and strenuous effort, such as our own and several other nations have gone through, by which they have reached the right and the ability to govern themselves. The shibboleth of democracy has never, I think, been more thoroughly exposed than by the lecturer this evening. We can realize how absurd it is to imagine that a nation, 97 per cent. of them—the lecturer says 99 per cent.—illiterate, could suddenly spring into having a representative assembly. I think that is one of the many lessons we have had.

Yet, let us look to the other side. In our good will, unfortunately, we have introduced the influence, the westernizing influence—whether we have felt our call to take a share in welcoming and helping those who come to this country or, on the other hand, in sending out our missionaries, doctors, and educational agencies to the East; in one way or another we are responsible largely for having thrust these ideas on the Chinese people, and we cannot be surprised when we see the result now happening. The result is a development we must study from outside and watch with the greatest sympathy. It is full of natural and right feeling, although it expresses itself in outrages and clashes which are obviously most inconvenient to us, and capable of a wrong interpretation.

I remember an incident when I stayed a night with a young officer of the Customs Service in the Yemen in the closed city of Canton some twenty-five years ago. His Chinese instructor had, unfortunately, not been able to come and give him his lesson in Chinese that evening: he had told him he would not be able to do so as he was unfortunately up for his examination. My friend had said to him: "Your examination! You told me you were forty years of age. What is the examination?" The reply had been: "It is the examination for promotion in the army." Then my friend had asked what were the subjects in which the candidate would be examined, and had been told the examination would be in the classics and the use of the bow. My friend had made some humorous remarks on the value of the classics and the use of the bow as a test for service efficiency. His teacher with the greatest politeness had replied to him: "But have you not promotion examinations in the English army, and is it not the fact that the subjects in which you are examined are the Latin and Greek classics and the use of the sword?" (Laughter.)

It only brings one back to the fact that *ceteris paribus*, if you really examine it, man is very much alike all over the world, and the Chinese with four hundred millions of population have the same heights and

depths, breadths and lengths of human wit, intelligence, and possibilities. They have certainly most wonderful virtues and most wonderful ignorances from our point of view; and, as we learn from our own people, the generally ignorant are often the most cultivated and intelligent in their own small sphere. So in China. But take them out of their sphere and you have an abnormal position created which is liable to lead to very inconvenient and incredible results. We have to watch this evolution from both sides of the two main big forces confronting each other on the Yang-tse; we must preserve the utmost patience, as we see our countrymen preserving it out there, maintaining an attitude of absolute neutrality and fairness. We believe if we stand by our people in that country, and they stand by the ideals and traditions of the British race, we shall eventually see China solve her problems in the only way in which they can be solved, solving them for herself, and recognizing amongst her best and abiding friends the country of Great Britain, to which we are all proud to belong. (Applause.) I wish to ask you to pass a very hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Bruce for his extremely interesting and entertaining lecture. (Applause.)

The LECTURER: I am very grateful to you for this vote of thanks, and also to those who have spoken so kindly of my effort. There are one or two questions to which the Chairman has asked me to reply as briefly as possible. General Willoughby made reference to the influence of American missionaries, and was very diffident about it, as he was skating, he said, on thin ice. But he need not be afraid of me, I am thick-skinned enough. But it is true that there was a very strong American influence at that time: most of the returned students were from America. Yuan Shih-kai was very pro-British and strongly in favour of a monarchy; but he had to yield to the strong tendency in the direction of a republic. One thing I would like to refer to that General Willoughby said. I am not quite in agreement with, and I have not the same reverence for, that reverend gentleman whom he quoted. As the result of my own experience, I do not admit that the Chinese yield nothing to reason. My experience is that they yield a tremendous lot to reason, but their reason is not of the same logical order as ours. They have an expression *ching-li*: *ching* means feeling, *li* means reason. They think feelings ought to be taken into consideration as well as reason, and if you have any dispute with an individual Chinese in China, and you ask him to talk *ching-li* with you he will do it. Mr. Gull's references, I think, were extremely appreciative and very kind. I quite agree with him with regard to the lack of a conception of the *res publica*. Why is that? It is because China has been for millenniums under despotism, and it is not a thing that she can do rapidly, to pass from the psychology that has grown up under that into the psychology that grows up under a democratic regime; and it is

largely due to ignorance too, that same illiteracy to which I referred. But I feel this, that it is growing. I think there are signs of its growth already, the sense of *res publica*. With regard to the division between North and South, I would not suggest for a moment that that division is based on a geographical basis. Not by any means. The division between North and South is very largely in social habits. There is a point which is a little north of the Yang-tse, mentioned in the papers today—Pengpu—which I think is the dividing-line between the rice-eating people and the millet-eating people, and the difference between rice-eating people and millet-eating people is a very important difference in the matter of temperament; and I think this difference politically is largely a matter of temperament. It is also very largely a matter of history. Those people furthest south have had a great deal more to do with the West. There are numbers of Cantonese in California, for instance, and the reaction of that relationship upon the people of Canton is immense. There is a great deal of that. With regard to security, of course there must be proper financial security, but I did not venture to trench upon that field. I leave the financiers to do that. There is security now, and we hope it will remain in spite of all that is happening. Of course I know that unless security can be furnished there cannot be financial assistance. Now may I conclude with the question with regard to the Russians: When did their influence begin? My own opinion is that it began with the collapse of Sun-Yat-Sen's power in Canton. That collapse, I believe, was largely due to the cessation of the stream of monetary help that had hitherto been coming to him from California. With the cessation of that stream he had to turn to other sources, and then was the time he began to flirt with the Bolsheviks of Russia. As to the question how long that influence will continue, my own opinion is that it will continue as long as the Chinese can make any use of it. (Laughter.) Not one moment longer. (Applause.)

This lecture has already appeared in the reprint "Some Problems of the Chinese Republic" lately issued, but it has been considered desirable to include it with this number of the "Journal" in order to give the discussion and to preserve the continuity of the lectures.

NOTE ON THE MAPS OF MONGOLIA OF THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

THESE maps are of considerable interest at the present moment, interest not merely of a geographical but rather of a political nature, in view of the fact that Mongolia has recently been Russia's stepping-stone towards China in general, and the Christian Marshal Feng-Yu-Hsiang in particular.

As might have been expected, the maps show little more than a trail with a small amount of detail on either hand. For a part of the way the route can be identified on the Russian forty-verst map as following the recognized caravan tracks from Kalgan towards Kobdo via Sair Usu and a small portion of them from Kalgan to Urga, now transmogrified by its Bolshevik name of Ulan-Bator ("The Red Warrior").

The scale is $\frac{1}{250000}$, and the series covers about 15° of longitude eastwards from 100° east of Greenwich, whilst there are some area sketches on a scale of $\frac{1}{25000}$.

If there be a criticism to make, it is of a scarcity of place-names, whilst the English user may find it difficult to understand some of the American topographical expressions. At the same time, anyone familiar with the tantalizing difficulties of pinning down ephemeral and nebulous place-names in a nomad country would be loath to press the first point.

Briefly, the traveller who wanders through Mongolia with the aid of these maps, whether by motor, by camel, on a horse, or in an aircraft, will have much cause to be grateful to Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews and to Messrs. Roberts, Butler, and Robinson, though his gratitude may well have an Oliver Twist flavour to it.

The reproduction is admirably clear.

L. V. S. BLACKER.

REVIEWS

DER KAMPF UM ASIEN. Vol. II. By Hans Rohde. Berlin, Stuttgart, und Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

The second volume of this work is of special interest at the present time, leading up as it does to the situation as we see it developing in the Far East today. It is divided, like the preceding volume, into three parts, dealing respectively with the pre-war, war, and post-war periods. The first part covers the struggle for the upper hand in Corea, as carried on first between Japan and China, and secondly, after China had been knocked out in 1894, between Japan and Russia. It shows how Japan, victorious in both contests (1894 and 1905), came to realize that, notwithstanding all that had happened, her true interest required a friendly settlement with Russia, if only in self-defence against the rapid advance of the United States towards a commanding position in the Pacific Ocean. Even before the outbreak of the Great War Japan had achieved for herself a prominent place among the competing Powers in that quarter of the globe. How the situation developed is told in considerable detail by Herr Rohde. His inclination, as in his first volume, is to ascribe all happenings to the spirit of deadly earnest, to the penetrating foresight, to the unwearying persistence of England. British action in the surrender of Port Hamilton to China in 1887, in refusing in 1895 to join France, Germany, and Russia when they deprived Japan of the fruits of her victory over China, and finally in concluding a definite treaty of alliance with Japan (in 1902), is set forth with undisguised admiration. The object, of course, as he sees it, is always to put the British Empire in the most favourable position for the ultimate destruction of Germany. France and Russia, it seems, had been manoeuvred into a position of mere vassalage to England for the achievement of this supreme purpose. This indeed was the inner motive of the alliance with Japan, which contributed so powerfully to the overthrow of Russia. Russia, by her defeat in 1905, was driven back into the maze of Eastern European politics. England well knew that this would bring her into antagonism with Austria, and so with Germany. The Entente with France of 1904 was soon completed by the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907. If England had had her way the annexation of Bosnia by Austria in 1908 would have served quite well for the long-desired assault on Germany. But Russia was not yet ready for war, and England successfully employed the remaining years till 1914 by preserving a state of peace in the Far East. She saw that any warlike disturbances in that quarter would hamper the ultimate

Allied attack on Germany. With this end always kept in view, she brought about in 1907 important treaties between Japan on the one hand and France and Russia on the other, by which the independence and integrity of China was assured. In the following year the United States were induced to follow suit by signing with Japan a treaty to the same effect. These three Far-Eastern treaties, we are told on p. 86, "were nothing else than the overseas factors of the great English plan which aimed at the encirclement and isolation of Germany. They were all of English origin. Their conclusion was an undoubted success for English policy, a success all the greater in that on 31st August, 1907, the Anglo-Russian understanding had likewise become a fact."

Apart from such preconceived ideas on the underlying motives of British policy, the author presents an instructive account of the events which made the period between 1894 and 1914 so vitally important in the history of the Far East.

The second part of the volume under review, the war period, is taken up largely with the forging ahead of Japan into a position of scarcely disputed primacy among the Great Powers in the Far East. Her first forward step was the seizure from Germany of the Shantung peninsula, with its important port, Tsingtau, and railways, a successful stroke completed (November 7, 1914) at a loss of over 10,000 Japanese lives. She gave her Allies further and very effective assistance by helping with her warships to clear the Pacific of the scattered naval forces of Germany. Thus she was enabled in a few months to seize and utilize for her own purposes the numerous German naval, cable, and wireless stations in the Caroline, Marshall and other island groups till then under German control. Not satisfied with a commanding position in the ocean, she proceeded to bring defenceless China into a relation not far removed from that of a Japanese protectorate. This far-reaching stroke of policy she accomplished by forcing upon China her famous twenty-one demands. Most of them were reluctantly accepted by China in a batch of treaties signed on May 9, 1915. The author considers that, taken as a whole, these hard conditions placed China virtually in a position of subjection to Japan, no less humiliating than that which years before Japan had enforced upon Korea.

The post-war chapters take us on to the Washington Conference of 1921-22, and ultimately to the conditions in the Far East which have brought about the great Nationalist challenge of China to the Treaty Powers. Japan had emerged from the war unhurt and triumphant. As the result of the twenty-one demands she could now do what she liked with Manchuria. She controlled the entire coast-line of China. She had obtained a valuable hold on the Chinese mines and coal-fields. She had extorted almost exclusive privileges for the supply of munitions, loans, advisers, and even troops to China. In Shantung

she was left with more than the rights and advantages previously conceded by China to the Germans. The German island groups north of the Equator had fallen into her hands, and there was no one to dispute her predominance throughout the Far East, whether by sea or land.

And yet Japan was not happy. She had grasped more than she could hold. She had been weakened by the downfall of Russia and by the complete elimination of Germany. No Power was left to lend her a hand in her growing rivalry with the United States except England, her ally. And she felt that England could not entirely be reckoned on for the future. America, since the opening of the Panama Canal, was sending her rapidly increasing naval forces into the Pacific. Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam were becoming important naval stations, competing with the Japanese island strongholds.

Herr Rohde emphasizes the growing strain between Japan and the United States. By the year 1921 breaking point, according to this German author, had almost been reached, and the issues of peace or rupture would depend on the action taken by England—a Power which had shown evident reluctance to take part in the struggle. Her need of rest and recuperation had discouraged distant adventure. Yet now she was forced to intervene, for in July, 1921, her treaty of alliance with Japan was to come up for renewal or denunciation. Japan strongly desired renewal, seeing no other hope of facing America on equal terms in the impending negotiations. The heir to the throne was sent to London on a state visit and tempting offers were made. The Japanese Alliance had been popular in England, and often helpful. On the other hand, England could not afford to undergo such an eclipse in China as seemed to be implicit in the attitude assumed by Japan towards that country. England, moreover, was falling more and more under the influence of the Dominions, now uniformly opposed to a pro-Japanese policy on the part of the Mother Country. The United States left no stone unturned to attract England to her side, and so to secure the naval support she needed to turn the scales against Japan.

Under these rival influences, all fully detailed and discussed by Herr Rohde, England was successful in devising a compromise acceptable to both sides. She would neither renew nor terminate the Japanese Alliance, but would recast it in a new form—and that, namely, of a three- or four-power in place of a two-power treaty. The difficult problem was discussed and in outline settled at the Imperial Conference in London in the summer of 1921. There were useful conversations with the American Ambassador, and early in July Congress fell in with the idea. It was realized that there must be a joint and friendly negotiation between the Powers chiefly concerned in the solution of the Chinese and other Pacific questions. In this spirit of mutual co-operation was conceived the fruitful project of the

Washington Conference, which met accordingly in the autumn of 1921.

The Conference treaties, both those on the limitation of naval armaments and those relating to China, affected profoundly the political development of the Far East. They brought about a new grouping of the Powers, which soon declared itself in negotiations between Japan and both Russia and China, indicating a strong tendency on the part of those three Powers to settle Asiatic and chiefly Chinese questions in a manner excluding Western predominance and even equality. The United States, on the other hand, lost no opportunity of asserting the principle of the complete independence and integrity of China and the open door for all. The author comes to the conclusion that England, as usual, had secured for herself the strongest position. She remained friends both with Japan and the United States, each of which Powers needed her support against the other in their rivalry for the upper hand in the Pacific. She commenced the construction of a first-class naval base at Singapore, thus showing clearly, in Herr Rohde's view, her intention to hold the balance between the two great Pacific Powers. With the help of the Dominions she would be in a position henceforth to throw the whole weight of her naval power in the direction that would best suit her policy. In other words, the peace of the Pacific Ocean rested in her powerful grasp to keep or to break as she might choose.

The concluding chapters become rather wearisome by their detail, but the author spares no pains in expounding the numerous treaties, whether concluded before, during, or after the Washington Conference, by which each of the interested great Powers sought to secure its own position. Even before the close of the war the United States had sought to come to an understanding with Japan. By the Lansing-Ishii notes exchanged on November 2, 1917, they had recognized that Japan rightly enjoyed special interests in China by reason of geographical proximity, but had insisted at the same time, and Japan agreed, that the principle of the open door in China must be maintained. The Washington Treaties embodied a carefully considered programme of action by which the principal Powers agreed to bring about the revision of the outworn treaties and tariffs of which China had so long complained.

Herr Rohde believes that in the "fight for Asia" Japan and Russia, notwithstanding temporary divergencies, are destined in the end to act mainly in concert, as the two great Asiatic Powers. Between them they can control China and, indeed, the greater part of Asia. They concluded an important treaty on July 3, 1916, establishing a kind of Monroe Doctrine in favour of Japan in China. Five years later Japan, as already shown, was compelled to draw in her horns at the Washington Conference. But soon after (July, 1923) she was

again in negotiation with Russia at Tokyo, and the latest treaty between the two Powers was signed on January 21, 1925. It amounts to a full recognition by Japan of the Soviet Government in return for Soviet recognition of the position secured to Japan in Corea and Port Arthur by the Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan undertook to evacuate Northern Saghalien, to join in a revision of old treaties, abstain from anti-Soviet propaganda in exchange for a corresponding promise by Russia, and grant most favoured nation treatment on terms of reciprocity. In the Japanese Parliament the Government has been repeatedly urged to complete the Russian Treaty by a comprehensive treaty with China. By this combination the United States would be compelled to lean on England, and England, as stated above, would be brought into the position of *tertius gaudens*.

This, broadly stated, was the position when China burst into flame in the summer of 1925. A genuine Chinese Nationalist movement gave Soviet Russia her opportunity to strike at the British Empire. How this great conflagration will finally affect the relative situation of the Great Powers in the Far East cannot yet be determined with any great degree of confidence. But Herr Rohde believes there must be a drawing closer yet of the ties between the United States and England to counteract the claim which he perceives of Russia and Japan to combine with China in support of the cry of "Asia for the Asiatics."

In his view the natural alliance, both in Europe and Asia, would have been one between Russia, Japan, and Germany as against the two great sea Powers, England and the United States. This would have made, he thinks, the Great War impossible; but Germany, in her folly, continued to break both with Russia and Japan. Japan, unless she can come to terms with Russia and China, stands alone against the probable combination of the United States and England. Having lost her natural backing—namely, Germany—she has sought for French support, but in vain. "Only the support of a newly strengthened Germany and of a Russia revived and reawakened can give Japan the hope of extricating herself from the Anglo-Saxon group and of recovering her freedom." Japan, he continues, took the first step in this direction by concluding her treaty with Russia (1925), outlined above. The next one should be a closer union with Germany, which might result in again bringing Germany on to the scene as a World Power. If Russia and Japan need backing they must now turn to Germany. The fight for the control of the Far East and Pacific Ocean must be fought out, the parties being—

- (1) The block of England and the United States.
- (2) Japan, Russia, China, and the "oppressed" people of Asia.

Then ultimately will come the fight for Asia.

Such, in a condensed form, is the final summing up of this well-informed, but rather prejudiced, author. It is to be hoped that he will continue his interesting contribution to the history of Asia.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

REVOLT IN THE DESERT. By "T. E. Lawrence." Jonathan Cape. 1927. 21s.

WITH LAWRENCE IN ARABIA. By Lowell-Thomas. Hutchinson and Co. 1926.

*"Mean men a state may shake;
But 'twere a giant's task to make
Secure the shaken state again
Unless the kindly God should guide
For mortal hand the ruling rein."*

PINDAR: *Pyth.*, iv. 12.

"Revolt in the Desert" will be read, by some, as the literary masterpiece to which reviewers, with rare but justified unanimity, have paid unstinted tribute. Nor will such be disappointed, for it is in all respects a remarkable work, full of vivid word pictures, which will make the most stay-at-home reader realize the wild glare and savage lustre of Arabia Deserta—"a land of iron with a sky of brass," to quote Disraeli, a crucible in which the Ishmaelites of Arabia have been tried by fire and have emerged, not free from dross, but more keenly tempered and more militant than any other race in touch with Europe and the Mediterranean basin. Other readers again, in the cant phrase of the book-trade, will study it as "a human document": they will find what they seek.

"The bird of Minerva," wrote Landor, "flies low and picks up its food under hedges." Lawrence's hermaphrodite deity flies lower than Landor's bird, and seems to have a preference for the cesspool, but we must be grateful to be spared, in this edition, more detailed references to a vice to which Semitic races are by no means prone. To most English readers his *Epipsychidion* on this subject will be incomprehensible, to the remainder, unwelcome.

Those who study this book as a human document will find little trace therein of the modesty claimed as an outstanding virtue of "T. E. Lawrence" (the inverted commas are his own) by the publisher and by the innumerable articles of that prince of press-agents, Lowell-Thomas, with its sixteen posed photographs of its hero in almost as many costumes (though the same "chefish" seems to have done duty for different persons on several occasions), and if the reader's curiosity carries him further to study Lawrence's published writings in post-war years in English and American journals and magazines they will wonder the more at the genesis of this particular myth, for the book is permeated by a pardonable vanity of which the following is a random example:

"Allenby was . . . morally so great that the comprehension of our littleness came slowly to him . . . he was hardly prepared for anything so odd as myself—a little barefooted silk-shirted man offering to hobble the enemy by his preaching if given stores and arms and a fund of two hundred thousand sovereigns to convince and control his converts."

This is almost the only reference in the book to the financial aspect of the Arab revolt. The Official History when it appears will perhaps tell the world how many hundred thousand sovereigns were needed *monthly* to feed the languid fires of Arab nationalism; "boxes of sovereigns," to quote Lowell-Thomas (p. 249), "gold conscripted from every part of the Empire, to help arouse enthusiasm in the breasts of the Bedouin whenever the spirits of those temperamental gentlemen began to flag." For an idea as to how this gold was disbursed, see Lowell-Thomas (p. 312). We do know, however, that the cessation of the golden stream that flowed freely from the British Treasury to the Sharifian family, and thence, much less freely, to the Bedawin, was the signal for the break-up of the Arab revolt, so painfully fostered. By 1924, King Husain and his eldest son had been evicted from the Hejaz by the united voice of the people of Mecca and Jeddah; Abdullah had been saved from a like fate at Amman only by British arms; Faisal survived, thanks to the grace of God, his own abilities, the support of the Royal Air Force, and to the efforts in Iraq of a corps of British advisers, who were able to build on the sound foundations they inherited from the war and post-war period foundations for which Lawrence and Faisal had no words bad enough.

"Our aim," writes Lawrence, "was a façade rather than a fitted building. It was run up so furiously well that when I left Damascus on October 4 the Syrians had their *de facto* Government which endured for two years, without foreign advice . . . against the will of important elements among the allies."

Is this so? There were at least half a dozen *de facto* British advisers with the Arab Government in Syria in 1919, and a substantial Army of Occupation with numerous technical departments still heavily subsidized by the British taxpayer, engaged in propping up the said façade which, had the French not pushed it down, would indubitably have collapsed a few months later for lack of Syrian support.

For the estrangement of Anglo-French relations in the Middle East, due to not unjustified suspicions on the part of the French of the good faith of British agents on the spot, suspicions which had very, widespread repercussions elsewhere, and for the present deplorable situation in Syria, Lawrence is, more than any other single person, responsible. To quote Lowell-Thomas (p. 258) once more: "Lawrence's personal attitude . . . was straightforward and simple: if Great Britain was not going to guarantee independence to the Arabs . . . he intended to devote his energies and talents to helping his Arab comrades in arms contest France's claims and obtain the rights for which they had so

valiantly fought." Yet it is clear from Lowell-Thomas's narrative (p. 307) that "he knew all along the French would never agree to the Arabs even keeping Damascus," and that "the Allies, once victory was assured, would find it difficult . . . to fulfil their obligations to the Hejaz leaders."

Nor does this book, regarded as a work of art, ring true. It was Sainte-Beuve who said that literature never seems to have more savour than when it comes from someone who is unaware that he is making literature. A conscious artistry is too often apparent in its pages—unworthy alike of author and his theme.

"The women . . . came across, straddling their bellies in the billowy walk which came of carrying burdens on their heads" (p. 134).

"I learned to pick . . . the feral smell of English soldiers: that hot pissy aura of thronged men in woollen clothes: a tart pungency, breath-catching, ammoniacal: a fervent fermenting naphtha smell" (p. 423).

The author's references to Indian troops, to whom, in the main, in Iraq, and to a large extent in Syria, the Arabs owe whatever of independence they have obtained, disclose a complete lack of understanding combined with an intellectual snobbery which would be remarkable were it not fairly common amongst those Arabian experts whose knowledge of the East is confined to Western Arabia.

"My mind felt in the Indian rank and file something puny and confined; an air of thinking themselves mean; almost a careful, esteemed, subservience, unlike the abrupt wholesomeness of Beduin. The manner of the British officers toward their men struck horror into my bodyguard . . ." (p. 418).

Elsewhere (p. 417) he is at pains to accuse Indian troopers of theft on the strength of an incident which suggests souvenir-hunting at the expense of somnolent Arab sentries, rather than any base motive.

The Arab forces seem seldom if ever to have been called on to endure heavy casualties or to attack unbroken Turkish formations, except occasional outposts. They excelled, as ever, in harrying retreating hordes, but the sterner task of defeating the enemy in the field was reserved to British and Indian battalions, to whose prowess little or no reference is made in these pages.

Nor does Lawrence approve of negroes.

"Their faces, being clearly different from our own, were tolerable; but it hurt that they should possess exact counterparts of all our bodies" (p. 83).

As a contribution to history this book is little worth, for the story is needlessly involved in the telling and the essential facts are obscure: it is not without significance that Ibn Saud, who today holds almost all Arabia in fee, is barely mentioned in its pages.

The Arab Bureau of Cairo died unregretted in 1920, having helped to induce His Majesty's Government to adopt a policy which brought disaster to the people of Syria, disillusionment to the Arabs of Palestine,

and ruin to the Hejaz. Its members and protagonists, amply mirrored in these pages, appear to constitute a mutual admiration society—almost a cult, of which Lawrence is the chief priest and Lowell-Thomas the press-agent. But a prophet is not without honour save in his own country, and outside Arabia the cult is assured of a long and (if the price current of the limited edition in the U.S.A. is any indication) a profitable life.

It remains to note that the best friends of Lord Lloyd, Sir R. Wingate, Dr. Hogarth, and Jafar Pasha would have difficulty in identifying them from their portraits.

The style of printing is worthy of the publisher, Jonathan Cape, which is to say that it is very good indeed; but why has he inflicted upon the public (p. 7) a gratuitous parade of the author's amiable eccentricities, couched in the language of the private schoolboy? Is this the latest development of "Truth in Advertising"? If so, its justification may perhaps be found in one of Pope's letters to his friend Addison, with which this too lengthy review may suitably be brought to an end:

"I have often found by experience, that nature and truth, though never so low and vulgar, are yet pleasing when openly and artlessly represented; it would be diverting to me to read the very letters of an infant, could it write its innocent inconsistencies and tautologies just as it thought them."

A. T. W.

FIFTY YEARS OF MADRAS.

A BOOK OF SOUTH INDIA. By J. Chartres Molony (Indian Civil Service, retired). London: Methuen. 1926. 7s. 6d. net.

AN INDIAN CAREER, 1853-1908. By Sir Philip Hutchins, K.C.S.I. Privately printed. 1926. (Copies on sale by the League of the Empire, 124, Belgrave Road, S.W. 1. 7s. post free.)

During the last few years several books of interest about Southern India have appeared: it would seem that the Madras Civilian, observing the mass of printed matter in which it is assumed that the India about which the public wish to hear centres round Calcutta or Bombay or Delhi or the frontier, has said to himself: "*Semper ego auditor tantum*?" and seized the pen of reminiscence. Mr. Molony, who rather prides himself on having spent twenty-five years in India without exploring north of the Vindhyas, proves successfully that the people and places of the South can give an observant man abundant scope. Sir Philip Hutchins, though his position as member of the Governor-General's Council enabled him to range from Quetta to Bhamo, from the Khyber to Shillong, evidently rates Ootacamund and the Nilgiris as far more delectable than Simla, and finds the mosquitoes of Calcutta more objectionable than all the *puchis* of the Tamil lands. The two books between them span the years from 1858 to 1925, though Sir Philip left Madras in 1888 and India in 1898 (seven years before Mr. Molony joined the Service), to complete at Whitehall the fine record of half a century given to the service of India.

Mr. Molony, whose book is full of good stories, possesses to the full that sense of humour which carries a man cheerfully through the troubles and vexations of official life in a trying climate. His book is eminently good-tempered,

and he has the faculty of liking primitive folk, such as Todas and Khonds, and also seeing the attractive side of the highly sophisticated Madras Brahmin. His story is mainly of district work in the ordinary line, but he superintended a census, administered that small (and very unconventional) Moslem state, Banganapalle, and filled the rather thankless office of President of the Madras City Corporation. His friendly encounters with Indian lawyers added to the spice of life. He nearly paralyzed a vakil who tried to get a decree from a British court served in an Indian State by declining to recognize the jurisdiction of "my brethren of Madras" because "I am the High Court of Banganapalle." On the other hand, he pays tribute to the candour of another vakil, who suggested that he might "suspend the High Court's decision" and prevent a lawful religious procession in Trichinopoly. "Don't you know that you are talking nonsense?" "I do," replied the lawyer blandly. "Why do you do it?" "Why do you charge me income-tax?" queried the lawyer, with unabated good humour. "I've got to earn it somehow or other, haven't I?" And he can sympathize with the vaccinator who, called to account for neglecting a particular village, explained: "Sir, I visited this village and explained the advantages of vaccination to the inhabitants. But they replied ignorantly by beating me with a pickaxe!"

On caste and religion Mr. Molony has much to say that is well worth reading, and also on the reasons which led to the estrangement between the races which was so marked a few years ago, but now seems to have passed its worst stage. "I have little patience with the pretence that the Englishman saves India every morning from plague, pestilence, battle, and anarchy; or that, immolated on the altar of humanitarianism, he spends body and soul in a thankless and ill-requited service. This pretence was intensely irritating to the Indian." But he thinks that a Government ought to govern, is outspoken on the follies of "non-co-operation," and writes frankly yet without offence on the much-advertised question of Indian membership of clubs. There is food for thought in his answer to a protest by a newly arrived Englishman against the refusal of English society to accept on equal terms his Indian friend X., educated and well liked at an English University. "I handed to my questioner a card; it was an invitation to the wedding of X.'s daughter aged *five years*."

If he disdains Simla, Mr. Molony has visited the capitals of French and of Portuguese India, which few Englishmen know, and his descriptions of Pondicherry and Goa are vivid. But a short stay at Hyderabad produced an impression decidedly more favourable in some respects than those who know that city intimately appear to have received. As regards the graver political issues, this book points out that while an older generation of Indians saw tangible improvements introduced by our officers, and realized what these had done, its grandchildren take such things for granted, which, after all, is human nature. Thus a villager in Kurnool, who could remember the famine of 1877, knew that the introduction of the railway made it in future impossible for people to die of hunger simply because grain could not be brought into the district. But to his grandson the railway is just part of the landscape, and does not affect his views of the British.

Apart from this, however, it is interesting to find an Indian civilian of Mr. Molony's generation observe: "I sometimes think that the high officials of my young days were bigger men, more likeable men, than their successors of today." For in the second book on our list we have the reminiscences of one who passed through Haileybury, landed in India in 1858, saw the Company's rule come to an end ("Apart from Queen Victoria's wonderful and most beneficent Proclamation, the change seemed to make no sort of difference, and in many parts of the

country passed almost unnoticed"), and, as a member of the Secretary of State's Council, assented to the Morley-Minto reforms. When he retired in 1908, after thirty-five years in India, five years as a Departmental Secretary at the India Office, and ten years as Member of Council there, Sir Philip Hutchins was the last of the Company's servants to lay down official harness. Now in his ninetieth year he enjoys the respect and affection of all those who served with or under him. His recollections of his earlier experiences in India are wonderfully fresh, but the book is a model of official discretion as regards political questions, though it throws light on many matters of administrative interest, particularly the history of Lord Lansdowne's Viceroyalty. Sir Philip was a district and a secretariat officer, a High Court judge, and a member of the Executive Council in Madras, before he passed to the Government of India. He witnessed the introduction of the Indian Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes, without which it is hard for our contemporaries to visualize the work of an Indian magistrate. As Home and Revenue Member of the Viceroy's Council he showed extraordinary energy in touring to the ends of the Indian Empire to see things for himself; in those days quasi-parliamentary duties did not imprison a Member at Delhi. He evidently found the India Office restful, but while he is quite justified (as a former subordinate gladly testifies) in saying that when he was Judicial and Public Secretary he could easily have done all the work of that department single-handed, he passed to the more serene atmosphere of the Council just when Lord Curzon went to India and began to overhaul the whole administrative machinery, and well before Constitutional Reform schemes engendered despatches. The India Office had plenty to do between 1898 and 1898, but its anxieties were bestowed mainly on fiscal, financial, and frontier problems, and the Whitehall counterpart of the Indian Home Department was not much worried. In fact, this fine cricketer—for at cricket Sir Philip excelled—could see something of the game at Lord's towards the end of the afternoon without in the least neglecting his work, whereas it has not always been easy for a later generation to get to a dinner-party in time. While he was at the India Office Sir Philip began his association with the League of the Empire, to whose activities the last chapter of his book is devoted.

M. C. S.

SIR PRATAP SINGH. By R. B. Van Wart. Oxford University Press.

The Indian States are lands of romance to all who travel or sojourn in the East, and even to those who can only hope to know India from books. The spell is hard to analyze, but it can be felt without crossing the British border. In British India there is an atmosphere of Western order and method, a conformity to implanted type, an admirable dissemination of British institutions which have taken root and flourish bravely to outward view, and a comparative security and peace which mirror the might of the Empire. The beholder may rightly marvel at these things, but after a time they cease, by their very familiarity, to hold his interest when he has comprehended the impulse of the machinery and marked the uniformity of its motions. The airs that blow from the States bring suggestions of primæval and incalculable things, of forces that stir in remote depths and manifest themselves with seeming caprice, of immemorial custom that is almost impervious to new ideas, of prescriptive right that defies the iconoclast, and of sentiment that is stronger than reason and deeper based than political dogma. At the great Delhi Darbars of 1908 and 1911, it was the presence of the Princes and their retinues that gave colour to the picture and held the thoughts of all who desired to penetrate the screen of Western discipline and culture and discern something of the real India that lies

behind. The unswerving obedience and implicit devotion which a ruler can command from his subjects, his responsiveness to their emotions and needs, the passionate loyalty which he himself displays for the throne and person of the King-Emperor, the pride with which he clings to his ancient rights and privileges, his readiness to make any personal sacrifice for the honour of his State and family; all these things compel admiration and excite attentive interest.

Among all the ruling houses of India, the Rajputs hold pride of place, distinguished by their ancient lineage, their gallant past, and their proud, sensitive spirit. Of the Rajput clans, the Rathor is one of the greatest and most famous, providing as it does rulers not only for the parent State of Marwar or Jodhpur, but also for seven other States in Rajputana and other parts of India. Sir Pratap Singh, the hero of Mr. Van Wart's memoir, was the third son of the Rathor Prince Takhat Singh, Maharaja of Jodhpur. He never succeeded to the rulership, but he governed Jodhpur as Regent during three minority periods, on the second occasion, in 1911, relinquishing for the purpose his position as Maharaja of Idar, to which he had been appointed by Lord Curzon in 1902, as the nearest suitable heir. Sir P., as he was affectionately called in his later years, was unquestionably one of the most remarkable Indians of his time. His strength of character, courage, and endurance would have singled him out in any walk of life, but as a member of the great House of Jodhpur, his many exploits, which Mr. Van Wart relates so vividly, have already ranked his name with those of legendary heroes of Rajasthan. Who else but Sir Pratap would have wrestled with a monkey at the age of five, would have killed two panthers on foot single-handed at nine, would have thrown up a sword to catch it by the sharp edge when dared to do so, would have ridden in the hot weather 250 miles in twenty-one hours, or followed up a wounded tiger armed only with a dagger? The reviewer remembers seeing Sir Pratap, when nearly seventy, playing in an inter-statal polo tournament at Abu, growing more and more furious because none of the opposing side would ride him off the ball, and at last falling from his horse from exhaustion. When he recovered consciousness, he said that he hoped to have died from the fall, since he was growing too old for fast polo.

Sir Pratap's acumen and administrative ability were considerable, as the author shows, but in Jodhpur his forceful personality was his greatest asset. The reviewer was in Jodhpur in 1911 at the time when Sir Pratap was appointed Regent, and well remembers the wholesome and immediate effect of the announcement; how intrigue subsided, evil livers and boon companions slunk to their dens, and the great city of Jodhpur waited, good as gold and with considerable apprehension, for the coming of the autocrat. From the point of view of efficiency, an abler and more enlightened administration could easily have been constructed without Sir Pratap, and on paper there were cogent reasons in favour of adopting this course, but Lord Hardinge wisely decided that all other considerations were outweighed by the importance of enlisting Sir Pratap's assistance to revive the true Rajput spirit from the temporary eclipse which it had suffered in the State. The measures which Sir Pratap took to this end were drastic, including edicts that all nobles should revert to the habit of riding, eschewing carriages and ears, and that tobacco and alcohol should be *taboo*. He relaxed them to some extent as soon as the lesson had been well learnt. In spite of his long absences from the State, on military and other duty, his authority never waned and orders passed in his name were never questioned.

The author has collected many good anecdotes of Sir Pratap's downright sayings and trenchant criticisms of things that met with his disapproval, which readers may be left to cull for themselves. Perhaps too much emphasis is laid

in these stories on Sir Pratap's "little language." The habit of speaking broken English, hardly intelligible to the uninitiated, grew on him in later years, possibly because he knew it was expected of him and because it gave him additional license. He had, however, in reality quite a fair knowledge of English, and could carry on a serious conversation in it when he liked. He also had a *penchant* for making after-dinner speeches of considerable length, starting in English and lapsing into Hindostani.

The mainspring of his life was his passionate devotion to Jodhpur and its traditions, with all that they embodied of Rajput chivalry. A short while before his death he planned to build a hot-weather abode at Mount Abu, on a point whence he could see across the plains to Jaswantpura, the nearest point of his beloved Jodhpur. He was never really happy in Idar, where he found it hard to create the environment which his spirit needed. The recall to Jodhpur was the most fortunate thing for him, as well as for the State of which he became Regent.

Had he lived a few centuries earlier he would probably have been a great king and leader of men. In modern days he was a Don Quixote whose dreams came true. He challenged and overturned shams and abuses, and he recreated in Jodhpur and in Rajputana, and among the military races of India, much of the old martial spirit that had been overlaid and stifled under changed conditions. In this he performed a service of inestimable value to the Empire. His character was an inspiration to everyone, whether European or Indian, who knew him, and in his death he was mourned with true affection and respect by the highest and the lowest in the land.

Mr. Van Wart has succeeded in producing a book which can be read with amusement, interest, and profit, even by those who were not privileged to know Sir Pratap personally, while his many friends may regard it as a worthy and appropriate memorial of a really great man.

From the point of view of historical accuracy, it may be noticed that, in the first chapter, Mr. Van Wart adheres to the theory enunciated by Colonel Tod in his "Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan"—namely, that the Rathors reigned at Kanauj, and that the Marwar dynasty was founded by migration of members of the clan to the desert when Kanauj was conquered by Shihabuddin at the end of the twelfth century. Modern criticism, however, holds that the ruling dynasty of Kanauj belonged, not to the Rathor, but to the Gaharwar clan, and that the first Rathor settlement in Rajputana must have occurred anterior to the conquest of Kanauj by the Musulmans. An inscription found at Hathundi in Marwar names four Rathor Rajas who reigned there in the tenth century.

A PAGEANT OF INDIA. By Adolf Waley. Constable and Co., Ltd. 1927. 15s.

"He that no more must say, is listened more
Than they whom youth and ease have taught to gloze."

The author of this book was throughout his short life plagued by bodily infirmity. He never saw India, but devoted years to studying its history, and has left behind him this book which begins and ends with stanzas from Omar Khayyam:

"Think, in this battered caravanseraï
Whose doorways are alternate night and day,
How Sultan after Sultan with his pomp
Abode his hour or two and went his way."

Mr. Waley is mainly concerned with the various great Sultans, with the conquerors and kings of ancient and mediæval India. He tells us of the strong

attraction which the distant prospect of the plains of India exercised over stream after stream of invaders from the mountain barriers of the North-West Frontier, of the doings of Alexander, Mahmud of Ghazni, Timur and Babar, of the desperate valour of the Rajput chiefs, of the heroism of their women, of the bitter rivalries of Moghal princes. Some space he gives to philosophers and religious leaders. But his interest mainly centres in the men of action, the warriors. And yet the futility of constant wars was never more manifest than in these pages. No Indian dynasty long survived its founder. The longest lived of all was the Moghal; and even that, after giving to India four Emperors far superior to the average Asiatic despot, sank rapidly into impotence and degradation. Even in the day of its power it was constantly discredited by wars of succession fought out with extreme ferocity. Little mercy was shown by fathers to sons, or sons to fathers, and none at all by brothers to brothers. Yet the fruits of victory and revenge turned speedily to dust and ashes. Occasionally, however, a tragic story is relieved by episodes of a different kind which are feelingly described. "There is," Mr. Waley writes, "no more moving scene in Indian history than that which depicts the parting of Shah Jehan from his favourite son, the only one who had always behaved towards his father with loyalty and affection. The Emperor held Prince Dara in close embrace as though incapable of letting him go, but at length he raised his hands in prayer and called the blessing of Allah and His Prophet down upon the son who was to go and fight for "the empire." Dara, overcome with emotion, seemed for the moment speechless, and making a reverent salaam to his father, prepared to take his departure; but as he was leaving the Hall of Audience, his natural buoyancy reasserted itself, and there issued from his lips in clear tones the words of a proverb, after applied by members of the house of Timur, and in this instance of prophetic meaning: "Ba Takht ya Tabut" (the throne or the tomb). Shah Jehan, as though turned to stone, stood with grief-stricken eyes watching for the last glimpse of the gallant young figure which he was destined never again to behold in life" (p. 440).

Mr. Waley has spared no pains to acquire accurate knowledge of a wide subject. Many passages testify to his care, industry, and the untiring enthusiasm which carried him through a heavy task.

H. V. L.

CHINA AND HER POLITICAL ENTITY. By Mr. Shuhsi Hsü. Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press. New York. 12s. 6d.

The author's recital of what China has suffered in the past century from foreign nations is, it must be admitted, impressive. But the book has evidently been written to revive American interest in Manchuria, and to secure thereby a counterpoise to the dominating influence which Japan has secured in that region. The full account which is given of the attempts made by the Government of the United States to interest itself in Korea in 1882-87 and to obtain the neutralization of the Manchurian railways in 1907-10, though there was no permanent political result in either case, is an illustration of the author's object. It may, however, safely be held that Mr. Shuhsi Hsü imagines a vain thing if he counts upon American intervention. The letter which he quotes from President Wilson to Mr. Reinsch, the American Minister in China, is instructive:

"I have had the feeling that any direct advice to China, or direct intervention on her behalf in the present negotiations, would really do her more harm than good, inasmuch as it would very likely provoke the jealousy and excite the hostility of Japan, which would first be manifested against China herself. . . .

For the present I am watching the situation very carefully indeed, ready to step in at any point where it is wise to do so."

This letter is said to have been written in February, 1915, at a time when the independence and integrity of China were seriously threatened by Japan. It was left to Great Britain, the ally of Japan, to incur the odium of deprecating the more obnoxious of the twenty-one demands, while the Government of the United States remained aloof, and contented itself, when the Treaties of 1915 had been forced upon China, with a notification to both countries to the following effect:

"... The Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic (or Japan) that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or which may be entered into, between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door Policy."

As the author sadly remarks, the Wilson Administration made it clear in 1915 that "its interest in the Open Door was to enter it rather than to maintain it." If we may judge from what has happened in the past in China and from what is happening now, the policy of other American Administrations is not likely to be materially different.

In fairness also to Japan it must be admitted that, although China has a better title to the country than any other nation, the three Provinces of Manchuria are not on the same footing as the eighteen Provinces of China proper. The Manchu conquerors of China have in their turn been subjugated by the Chinese; but to substantiate a claim to the home of the Manchus China must be able to show effective occupation. But as the author readily admits, the Manchus for nearly two centuries tried to prevent the colonization of Manchuria by the Chinese.

The account given in the book of the early political relations between China and the Nuchen Tartars, Korea and Japan, is interesting. It is possible, as he says, that a Japanese attack on Korea in the time of the Tang dynasty was routed by the Chinese. The successful attack upon Nepal made by the Chinese in the reign of Kienlung is one of the unexplained military puzzles of history. But Mr. Shuhsi Hsi's statements to the effect that Japan sent periodical missions of homage to China in the time of the Tang dynasty, and that Yoshimitsu's son was invested by the Ming Emperor as King of Japan in 1402, must be read in the light of the facts that the ambassadors sent by Great Britain to China in 1792 and 1816 were taken up the Peiho River to Tientsin in boats, with flags inscribed "ambassadors bearing tribute"; and that China, as the Viceroy of Canton informed Captain Elliott in 1837, claimed to stand "at the head of the lands at its remotest borders in no other character than that of a ruler amid ministering servants."

According to Mr. Shuhsi Hsi, in the early days of the Manchu (Tsing) dynasty the country east of the Liao River was formed into a province of China, with two prefectures and nine districts. Chinese officials were employed and Chinese colonization of the province commenced. In 1751, however, the Emperor Kienlung (1736-1785) modified this policy. Chinese were gradually excluded from all important appointments, and measures were taken which, as the author says, "snatched Shengking from the Chinese and gave it to the Manchus. After this Shengking ceased to rank with the intramural provinces, and came to be associated with Kirin and Hailungkiang as a group." An edict issued by Kienlung in 1776 is quoted: "Shenking and Kirin are the home

of the dynasty. To permit immigrants to settle down there would greatly affect the Manchu mode of life. In Shengking, which is adjacent to Shantung and Chihli, immigrants have during years of peace gradually gathered. It is not possible to order them to leave without at the same time depriving them of their means of subsistence, and thus we have established civil governments to accommodate them. As to Kirin, which is not adjacent to Chinese territory, they ought not to be allowed to stay there. Report has it that new settlements have gradually been formed in it. Let Fu Sen be commissioned to investigate and settle the matter, and orders be given out that immigrants are for ever prohibited from entrance."

Kienlung's policy in the matter of appointments is said to have been relaxed after his death, and, notwithstanding the prohibition, some Chinese colonists established themselves in the vicinity of Changchun, the number of families (according to a report submitted in 1799) amounting to 3,330, with about 50,000 acres under cultivation. An Imperial edict then issued permitted the settlers to remain, but added the injunction that "not one more settler was to be permitted to enter the country."

The Rev. C. Gutzlaff, one of the first missionaries to China, who visited the Shengking or Fengtien Province about 1830, says in his book "China Opened," which was published in 1838, that the Emperor Kanghai encouraged emigration to Shengking, which was depopulated when the Manchus swarmed into China, but that "his successors, less anxious for the welfare of the nation, left the colonization to take its natural course." The prosperity of the province was ascribed to the colonists. "On a moderate calculation," as he writes, "the population has been tripled within the short space of ten years; for the needy adventurers from Shantung flock there in increasingly large numbers, so that it may be hoped that within twenty years no spot will be left uncultivated, and that these thrifty farmers will have found their way into the adjacent province, Kirin."

In later years immigration was facilitated by the opening of Neuchwang as a Treaty Port and by the introduction of steam navigation on the Liao River; and, according to Mr. Shuhsi Hsi, at the end of the nineteenth century the population of Manchuria amounted to 14 millions, of which 80 per cent. were Chinese. Kienlung's prohibition of immigration into the Northern Provinces was not, however, finally withdrawn until 1906, when the Dowager-Empress Tzu Hsi ordered the replacement of the Military Governor by a Viceroy at Shengking and the appointment of Civil Governors in Kirin and Hailu-kiang, and directed that measures should be taken for the reorganization of the three provinces. Manchuria, therefore, was not formally recognized as part of China until five years before the downfall of the Tsing dynasty.

It is also necessary to remember that the greater part of Manchuria was practically lost to China before the Russo-Japanese War. In the seventeenth century an incursion of the Russians into Manchuria was checked by the Manchus; but, when the weakness of China was disclosed by the war between China and Great Britain and by the Taiping Rebellion, the Russians made themselves masters of the Primorsk Province. The country was practically derelict; and, by the Treaties of Aigun and Peking in 1858 and 1860, the Russian occupation was recognized without much opposition from the Manchus, whose attention was fully occupied with the war then in progress between China and Great Britain and France. Several years then elapsed, but the intervention of Russia, France and Germany after the conclusion of the war between China and Japan gave Russia an opportunity for strengthening her position in Manchuria. A loan was guaranteed and an alliance was made with China, and by a mixture of

cajology, bribery, and intimidation a complete stranglehold on the three provinces was secured. The construction of a railway across Manchuria, linking the Primorsk Province with the Trans-Baikal region in Siberia, was arranged for; Port Arthur and Dairen (Dalny) were leased to the Russian Government; a neutral zone north of the leased area was established; and the construction of a railway (the South Manchurian), linking the ports with the railway running through Manchuria (the Chinese Eastern), was also arranged for. After the Boxer Rising the Russians further strengthened their position. The three provinces were occupied by Russian troops, and evacuation was only agreed to in 1902 after prolonged negotiations. Evacuation was begun, but was stopped in 1903, when Admiral Alexiev was made Imperial Lieutenant of the region under Russian control, and further evacuation was made dependent upon the fulfilment of certain demands. These were rejected by the Chinese, but from the nature of the demands made throughout the negotiations it is clear that the Russians had no intention of departing, and it is practically certain that in a few years the rest of Manchuria would have followed the fate of the Primorsk Province, if Russian ambition had not overreached itself in the attempt to extend Russian influence to Korea and to exploit the forests on the Yalu River. This brought on the Russo-Japanese war.

The recent awakening of the national spirit, and their greater capacity to stand the rigour of the climate, may enable the Chinese to hold what remains to them in Manchuria; but it is not possible to feel the same sympathy with complaints of Japanese aggression in this region as with complaints of Japanese aggressiveness in Shantung.

R. M. DANE.

THE CHINA OF TODAY. By Stephen King-Hall. L. and V. Woolf: Hogarth Press. 2s. 6d.

"The China of Today" is a useful contribution to the discussion of the Chinese problem.

In his reference to the past Mr. King-Hall is hardly fair to the Manchu Government, which, at its best, was a benevolent despotism well-suited to the circumstances of China and, at its worst, was preferable to the misgovernment and anarchy which have succeeded it. The Muhammadan rebellions in Yunnan and in Kansu and Shensi were certainly suppressed with ruthless severity, but the slaughter in the Taiping rebellion, to which Mr. King-Hall refers, was mainly caused by the Southern revolutionaries, the precursors of the ruffians who committed the Nanking outrages. Chinese officials employed by the Manchu Government were certainly corrupt: but it has yet to be seen whether the officials employed in the new China will be any better than their predecessors.

It is also an exaggeration to say that in China the "State was organized on a system unknown to Western minds." A Hindu trader, who had spent his life in Yarkand, said to me in 1890: "The Chinese administration is a copy of yours": and there were certainly many points of similarity between the Governments of the British in India and of the Manchus in China.

Mr. King-Hall, however, appears to be unquestionably right in his view that China, aroused and excited, cannot be treated by foreign nations in the manner that was customary in the period of the decline and fall of the Manchu dynasty; and he rightly acclaims as an act of statesmanship the Memorandum which was addressed by H.M. Government to the other interested Foreign Powers in Christmas week in 1926, advocating the adoption of a constructive policy in China adapted to the altered situation of the time and the abandonment of the

idea that the development of the country can only be secured under foreign tutelage. Great Britain has suffered much in the past three years from the attempt to work in concert with the other Powers, and H.M. Government will probably be more successful in its negotiations with the Chinese if it takes its own line.

It is more difficult to follow Mr. King-Hall in his enthusiasm for what he calls the renaissance in China, or in the view, which he evidently holds, that salvation can only come from the south. The Government at Peking is contemptuously called a "ghostly thing." In discussing also the probable efficacy of local arrangements he is unwise enough to prophesy. As, he writes, "the prize of victory will be the privilege of representing that particular area in dealings with the British, it is fairly certain that all contestants will take every care to see that British interests are well protected."

It is certain that Great Britain has gained nothing by the local arrangement made at Hankow: and at the present moment the so-called Nationalist Government at Hankow is a more ghostly thing than the Government at Peking.

It appears to be both unjust and unwise to cold shoulder the Chinese in the north, who have on the whole treated foreigners well since the time of the Boxer rising, in an attempt to conciliate the bitterly anti-foreign politicians and soldiers in the south. Apart from the Customs and Salt Revenue organizations, the Chinese postal and telegraph service, which Mr. King-Hall rightly praises, has been destroyed whenever the Southerners have obtained control. The establishment, with the assistance of foreigners, of this service was one of the achievements of the Government at Peking.

There is at present no Government of China; and *de facto* rulers of particular areas must, as Mr. King-Hall says, be recognized: but they should all be treated alike and no favour should be shown.

R. M. DANE.

THE REVOLT OF ASIA. The End of the White Man's Dominance. By Upton Close. G. P. Putnam's Sons, Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.

Pythagoras is reported to have required from those whom he instructed in philosophy a probationary silence of five years. It is to be regretted that writers on Asiatic questions, particularly graduates of Transatlantic universities, do not impose a similar probationary period upon themselves before putting pen to paper. The author's qualifications are succinctly indicated by the publishers' blurb, which describes him as "one who really knows," whilst the difference in outlook of the New York *Times* and that of London is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the former has referred to the book as "so timely as to be almost inspired," adding that "it deserves to be read by every American." It may be said at once that it deserves no such attention either in the Old or the New World. If any, or indeed most, "white" men shared the views or the attitude of the author, such "dominance" as they at present exercise in Asia would have come to its unregretted end long ago, for, like many writers of the Socialist-Communist variety, he has only exchanged one set of prejudices for another.

The author seems to have taken the trouble to make some investigation on the spot into the affairs of the Far East, but his acquaintance with the rest of Asia seems to be restricted to a hasty trip across India through Baghdad to Egypt, during which he has just enough time to place on record a few obvious misstatements and a somewhat larger number of equally obviously imaginary interviews with impossible Englishmen, such as a "genial Scotchman," who, at page 48, refers to the inhabitants of India as "niggers" and indicates incidentally in the course of a conversation that he himself belongs to some

trade union; on his way from Delhi, apparently to Madras, "across the Indian Desert" he records a conversation with a "cultured young officer of the Education Department," who claims that Indians should certainly "get off the street" on the grounds that "we are a superior race." At Madras and on the Afghan border he falls in with "military men," from whom he learns of "the largest concentration of tanks in history" which, reinforced by an air force, will strike decisively at Kabul "on the next vernal outbreak of the Afghan menace." He learns, apparently from the same officers, of "a little Sikh mutiny in the Punjab," and is told that "Indian troops are no longer trusted to do any job alone," from which he deduces that India is only a little behind China in the Revolt. He meets Persian merchants and Persian students in every city from Rangoon on his way to Duzdab, "whose sallow faces darken as they bring up the \$170,000 indemnity they are paying for the death of an American Consul at the hands of a mob whose religious prejudices he had offended." He emerges from Persia, "after a well-earned experience in jolted bones," at Abadan, from which we can only deduce that he is the first European to have reached Mohammerah by car from Duzdab; but as to this part of his journey and of his journey and of experiences throughout Persia the book is silent. At Mohammerah he meets the "fanatical human sacrifices of the Shiah sect," and in Iraq hears Arabs everywhere voicing "lazy dissatisfaction with the political situation under Britain." He learns that the Arabs dislike "the Scotch honesty" of the administration of the Auqaf, and he is dragged in—by whom is not stated—"to address boys, whose faces glow as they hear of sister peoples of Asia struggling for self-assertion. Russia is their inspiration, Turkey their model, and the Imperial Powers their antipathy."

He leaves "the opportunistically created kingdom" thankfully, but not without making some insulting remarks to "the modernized Arab" in charge of the Passport Department. After he crosses the Euphrates he proceeds on his way to Damascus cautiously, with all lights out, "for the Druse warriors are still a peril." He notes with regret "the camaraderie which seems to have grown up between the urban Moslems of Damascus and their rulers," and finds much bitter feeling in Turkey at the rejection by the U.S. Senate of the Lausanne Treaty. He insults the Egyptian quarantine officials and gets into trouble, but revenges himself by describing the Egyptian intellectual as "vain, crafty, super-sensitive, sexually depraved . . . the most impossible human being on earth." The fanaticism of a million inhabitants of Cairo causes him to liken Egypt to "a sullen hound watching a man who has thrashed it for opportunity to bite his throat in two while he sleeps," and he here finishes his journey through Asia thankfully "lest it bring him more such experiences." His observations convince him of the Revolt that is taking place in every country on the Asiatic seaboard, and he assures us that close investigation would bring out many more. We do not doubt it, for publicists of this type usually find what they seek. It is fortunate for the public in the United States that they do not lack other and better guides to world politics, such as Mr. Norman Harris, whose book on "Europe and the East" (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 20s. net) is perhaps the best antidote for these vapourings.

A. T. W.

AN ASIAN ARCADE. By Reginald Le May. 10×6½; pp. xiv+274; sixty-three illustrations and map. Cambridge: Heffer and Son. 1926. 21s.

A most interesting book, dealing with one of the lesser-known countries of Asia. Mr. Le May is to be congratulated on having written so charming and accurate description of Siamese Laos. The author having spent many years in

Siam is in a position to speak with authority on his subject, and his book shows evidence of mature judgment, and is not like the average book of travels written by one who has paid but a brief visit to the places described.

The book is very well illustrated with a large number of excellent photographs, and is one that can be confidently recommended as a thoroughly up-to-date and accurate description of North-Western Siam.

A HISTORY OF SIAM. By W. A. R. Wood, C.I.E. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 6; pp. 293; eleven illustrations and map. Fisher Unwin. 1926. 15s.

This is a very notable book, as it is the first that has ever been published in English dealing with the history of Siam as a connected whole. The author, having been very many years in Siam, and having an excellent knowledge of that difficult language, Siamese, has thus been able to study the native *Phongsawadan*, or *Annals*, and to correlate them with the various works extant in European languages dealing with various periods of Siamese history.

The present work deals in detail with the events of Siamese history up to the end of the reign of Phya Taksin, and there is a very brief summary of the chief events of the Chakri dynasty given in a supplement at the end of the volume.

The author must be congratulated on having produced so excellent a work, and it is to be hoped that he may at some future date produce a companion volume dealing with the history of modern Siam in similar detail. Mr. Wood has been very fortunate to have had the assistance of H.R.H. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, who has devoted years of his life to the investigation of his country's past history.

The book contains a fair number of excellent illustrations, and can be recommended with confidence to those desirous of knowing something about the history of a little-known Eastern land.

UNTER DER GLUTSONNE IRANS: Kriegsergebnisse der deutschen Expedition nach Persien und Afganistan. Oskar von Niedermayer. Munich: Einhornverlag in Dachau. 1926. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$. Pp. 330. Map and illustrations. 7 Mark.

At a distance of ten years, the main events of the world war begin to assume a more historical aspect, even to the active participants. The most evenly balanced minds cannot fail to be influenced by skilfully directed propaganda, the very *raison d'être* of which is to bring the enemy into disrepute and, at the same time, to glorify the deeds of one's own country, however questionable they may be. Thus the action of Germany in proclaiming herself the champion of Islam in the waging of the Jihad raised a storm of indignant protest in this country, but not more so than that caused in Germany by our employment of coloured troops in France. Germany attempted to take advantage of our embarrassments in Ireland, but not to the same extent, nor with the same success, as the Entente powers encouraged the disaffection of the component parts of the Austrian Empire. Political stratagem is a legitimate weapon of warfare, however much it may be deplored, especially when it concerns the employment of Eastern nations by one European power against a fellow-white and fellow-Christian nation.

The story of the German political expedition to Afghanistan in 1915-16, told by its leader, is one of exceptional interest. It is a story of a difficult and dangerous mission, well, and in a measure successfully, accomplished in the face of almost superhuman hardships and trials. It is a story of adventure, well and

forcibly told, which compels the recognition of real sportsmanship for those who participated therein.

In an early passage the author hints at many accusations which he might have made against his opponents, but he states that he has restrained himself from indulging in past recriminations. On the whole, he has kept his resolve, but in two passages he makes very definite accusations of cruelty against British officers. On the other hand, the conduct of the German personnel is held to be beyond reproach, which may be true in the case of the majority, but unfortunately the records of some, of one in particular, are not without blemish.

The initial chapters of the book make very pleasant reading. Accustomed to think of the great efficiency of the German military machine, it comes as an agreeable surprise to find that it was capable of making as human blunders as our corresponding organization. The great German expedition to Afghanistan to raise the Jihad in that country against British India merely "happened" in its initial stages. The personnel chosen was most unsuitable and mostly without any qualifications for such an undertaking. Niedermayer introduces himself while taking part in skirmishes on the French Front—in the midst of which he receives a telegram asking if he would be prepared to join a foreign expedition. Having travelled extensively in Persia, Afghanistan, and India before the war, and having a thorough knowledge of Persian, he was well suited to be leader of the expedition, yet his participation was the result of a chance suggestion from an Embassy official at Constantinople.

The equipment, including machine-guns, rifles, a wireless set, etc., was arranged in Berlin and despatched to Constantinople via Roumania. To facilitate its passage through this neutral state it was consigned as a travelling circus outfit. The long wireless masts were labelled "circus tent-poles," but the careless omission to remove the insulators led to detection and the whole equipment was confiscated. After much delay a second outfit was got ready in Berlin, and this time extensive bribery assured its safe passage through neutral Roumania. Meanwhile, the personnel of the expedition was awaiting events, partly at Constantinople and partly at Aleppo, and as their patience diminished their quarrels with the Turks increased in number and intensity. The forward journey to Baghdad in midwinter, 1914, is a record of delays and disputes about transport.

On arrival at Baghdad, it was found that the Turks not only had orders to abandon all active participation in the expedition, but they adopted a definite policy of obstruction. The commander-in-chief, Suleiman Askeri, claimed that the German personnel was at his disposal and the whole equipment was confiscated. Later, however, as a result of pressure from Berlin, ill-natured apologies for the "misunderstanding" were tendered, and part of the equipment was returned, but apparently no amount of pressure could make a Turk disgorge a machine-gun!

It was decided to despatch an independent party, consisting of Wassmuss, Lenders, and Bohnstorff, direct from Baghdad to Deshtistan, the hinterland of Bushire. After much difficulty they were sent off, travelling first by ship to Kut-el-Amara, then into the territory of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh, and through Dizful towards their goal Borazjun. At Behbahan disaster befel them. Lenders, their local personnel and equipment were captured, and Wassmuss alone succeeded in completing the journey, Bohnstorff being forced to return to Baghdad.

As a result of obstruction on the part of the Turks, and delays caused by the delicate political question of Persian neutrality, it was March 31, 1915, before the main body started for the great adventure, taking the trail through

Khaniqin and Qasri-Shirin for Kermanshah—a trail which three years later was to see the start of another similar expedition with a somewhat similar mission, namely the British Dunsterforce.

Niedermayer does not state the total strength of his party, but it probably did not ever exceed 100 Germans and Austrians. At later stages they received occasional reinforcements from escaped prisoners from Siberia, but on the other hand they suffered heavy casualties throughout as killed, captured, and died of disease. Nor does he state the amount of money spent to achieve their ends, but he maintains that it was only a small fraction of the fabulous sums which he is usually supposed to have had at his disposal. The caravan for the first stage of their journey consisted of 150 animals.

Kermanshah was reached without serious incident, and the expedition found a strong pro-German sympathy, thanks largely to the zeal of Schünemann who had preceded them. The main body proceeded to Ispahan under the command of Seiler, while Niedermayer visited Teheran to discuss further programme with the German Embassy. The theoretical neutrality of Persia prevented direct interference on the part of the British or Russians, and the pro-German sympathy of the Persian gendarmerie under command of Swedish officers offset the rather stronger court influence of the Entente powers. All attempts to move the populace by a Jihad proclamation produced no tangible result.

In June, Niedermayer rejoined the main body in Ispahan, and on July 1 the first group started on their perilous journey eastward towards the goal—Afghanistan. The route taken was through Nain, Anarak, Chehar Deh, and Birjand. In the neighbourhood of the last-named place the formidable British-Russian East Persian cordon had to be crossed, and, with the exception of a minor skirmish, this was accomplished safely, thanks to careful planning, forced night marches, and good luck. The hardships endured as a result of the natural conditions and the great desert crossings in midsummer with shade temperatures up to 52° C. (!), and the continual difficulty of driving unwilling, hired, local *charvadars* to undergo the unavoidable fatigues and privations are vividly described. Good pay and tempting promises are powerful instruments with the Persian *charvadar* (mule driver), but in the face of hardships or possible danger only the personality of a leader can enforce his orders, and abuse is more effective than fair words. At last the frontiers of friendly Afghanistan were reached, but not before the forced marches had exacted a heavy toll from both men and animals. In three consecutive days after crossing the British cordon 75, 90, and 50 kilometres are claimed to have been covered. Once across the frontier, however, the party travelled as honoured guests, and arrived at Kabul on October 2.

A pleasantly situated house on the outskirts of the town was allotted to the expedition, but after a few days' residence they found to their dismay that they were in reality prisoners. A hunger strike by a political mission does not seem a very glorious weapon, but at any rate it had the required effect, and certain demands, such as the services of a doctor, were granted, but not before Niedermayer's faithful German servant, Jacob, had died of disease. Finally, after three weeks of monotonous waiting, the Amir granted the long-sought interview.

During the course of the following months, every endeavour was made to induce the Amir to declare the Jihad against British India—but in vain. Clever political negotiations on the part of the Indian Government, and the fear of future revenge should he attack England in her moment of weakness, kept the Amir undecided, and the German mission's activities were confined to instigating tribal raids, organizing the Afghan army, and forming a staff college and courses of various sorts. Although Niedermayer was thus unsuccessful in his main object, the presence of the mission in Kabul and the continual menace of an

attack on India kept large numbers of troops in India for internal defence which would otherwise have been available elsewhere. When the large forces employed in the East Persian cordon, and the lavish expenditure incurred are also considered, we must grant to Niedermayer a very generous share of success.

Despairing of further achievements in Afghanistan, Niedermayer determined to withdraw to Persia, and on May 21, 1916, he left Kabul. When the frontier was reached he sent the main body under command of Wagner to break through the cordon near Badshistan, while he himself, travelling in disguise, set out for Teheran, which he finally reached on July 23, after severe hardships and many adventures. The further journey to Hamadan proved to be even more arduous. The caravan which he had joined was attacked by a robber band and ransacked, and, at one time, Niedermayer was reduced to begging for food from place to place.

Meanwhile in Ispahan, Seiler had established German influence both with the townspeople and with the Bakhtiari and Qashqai tribes with such success that the British and Russians were forced to withdraw. The charge that Seiler achieved this success by lavish payments is denied. The total amount paid out for political purposes in this period was only 3,500 toman!

In November, 1915, an advance into Afghanistan was planned, and under command of Seiler the expedition started from Ispahan for Yezd and Kerman. All being fair in such a war, Seiler had no compunction in removing forty mule loads of silver from the British bank in Yezd and in burning a million toman in bank notes. Disaster and hardships dogged this party throughout. Unsuccessful in an attempt to break through the cordon near Neh, the survivors returned to Kerman, and then made their way through Herat towards Shiraz. On the way they were attacked by tribesmen and lost several of their number and all their equipment. Finally they reached Serghun, near Shiraz, where they were welcomed by the Persian gendarmerie. At last, confident of safety, they laid aside their arms—but only to find they had fallen victim to an age-old Persian trick and were prisoners. The activities of this party thus came to an end, except for a bold escape from prison in Shiraz by Seiler and Fasting, who succeeded in reaching the Turks at Kermanshah.

By the end of 1916 the only remaining active member of the original mission was Wassmuss who, alone and unaided, continued his daring campaign against the British forces in Bushire. Unfortunately his exploits are not described in any detail as Niedermayer had no direct dealings with him, and the book closes with the rounding up or withdrawal of the various isolated groups of the mission in the latter months of 1916.

G. M. LEES.

THE MOSQUE OF THE ROSES. By Captain Harold Armstrong. 7½ × 5. London: The Bodley Head. 1927. 7s. 6d.

It adds to one's interest in reading this book to know that the author has some special acquaintance with the Turks. Captain Armstrong was a prisoner in Turkish hands in the Great War. After the Armistice with Turkey he was employed in Constantinople in several capacities. For some time he was Assistant Military Attaché at the British Embassy. Later he served in the Allied police and was one of the British officers in command of a detachment in the Turkish gendarmerie.

"The Mosque of the Roses" is a highly coloured romance; there are spies, intrigues and plots, captures and escapes, brigands and gendarmes, and running through it all the passionate, devoted love of a beautiful Turkish girl for a British Army officer.

The author has caught the atmosphere of those years very vividly, and so

much of his story is based on actual facts that it is of historic interest. During the four years of Armistice the Turks under Mustapha Kemal had risen in revolt, they had triumphantly driven the Greeks out of Smyrna, and at the time of this story they were at last brought into conference with their conquerors in the Great War to settle the terms of peace. It was a time when Bolshevik and other sinister influences were making Constantinople a hot-bed of intrigue and treachery, and the Allies seemed unwilling to assert themselves too strongly lest they should offend the Turks with whom they were negotiating. This confusion lent itself admirably to every kind of perilous adventure and romantic pursuit.

It may be gathered from this story that Captain Armstrong has no love for the Turk; in fact, he expresses this forcibly in describing "Djemal Bey," the Governor of Stamboul, in whose face was revealed "the soul of the Turk." "Through the polish and veneer of everyday politeness and courtesy showed the brutal, unreasoning, inhuman animal. He saw lust to torture weakness and passionate cruelty asserting itself when there was no danger of reprisal. He was looking full into the soul of the Turk, and behind it lay stretched rich countries, depopulated and stricken with poverty, great cities wantonly reduced to ruins, and mass cruelty used as a weapon of government."

It is also evident that the author considers the Turks to be like other semi-civilized peoples, whose respect for others is based upon fear. He makes it clear that in dealing with the Turks firmness alone meets with success. The failure of the British general, in the story, to obtain the release of "Captain Sanford" from prison is entirely attributed to weakness and inability to appreciate that "a little show, a very little show, of strength" would have produced a different result. Later in the story, on the other hand, when the British "Minister" adopts a strong line of action with the Turks, "the show of force acted like magic and almost instantaneously."

The tale is remarkably well told throughout. Suspense is admirably sustained, and the reader's attention always held as one situation, full of danger and audacity, follows another. One of the most vivid passages is that in which the author describes "Captain Sanford's" experiences with the brigands. The flavour of reality is just as intriguing when it concerns the romance and personality of "Yasmin Hanum," the Turkish girl. There are in real life Turkish women such as he describes, who are superlatively feminine, the product of generations of women whose only interest could be in the emotions. And there are Turkish women who, like "Yasmin Hanum," took part in the great effort of Mustapha Kemal. Fired with a passionate love of their country and a long-standing hatred of the Greeks, they even fought side by side with the Turkish soldiery. "Yasmin Hanum," however, was perhaps more a woman than a soldier. Her love for the British officer whose life she saved carried before it her prejudices against him as an Englishman. Nevertheless, her charm and seductiveness were not enough to bridge for long the inevitable gulf dividing an Englishman and a Turkish girl. "Yasmin Hanum" remained to the end only a passionate episode in "Captain Sanford's" life. The author claims that with one exception all the characters in his novel are fictitious. It is felt that the Turkish girl may well be the real one, for he could scarcely have drawn her character with such sympathetic insight had she not entered into his life. All the characters, however, seem to have some substance of reality, and the whole story is most credible.

I. B. KEBLE.

THE WILDERNESS OF SINAI. By H. J. Llewellyn Beadnall. London: Edward Arnold. 10s. 6d.

To geologists "The Wilderness of Sinai" doubtless contains descriptions and theories of great interest. The journeyings were undertaken to study the geology and the book is mainly devoted to that subject.

In addition, however, it gives a pleasing story of many months of wandering in an area hitherto little known even to those whose administrative duties hold them in Sinai.

The Egma plateau was said to hold colossal ibex, interesting rock cisterns and other delightful things, but it is off the track from or to anywhere and few officials have visited it. That the knowledge of it presented in the book would have been of great value from a military intelligence point of view, as suggested in the foreword, is perhaps open to doubt. The fact from a military point of view is that the district is of no interest to those attacking or defending Egypt. And this negative information could have been supplied by at least two or three officials who had served or travelled in Sinai. Certainly for some considerable distance south of latitude $29^{\circ} 30'$ there has been great vagueness in the maps of Sinai, and let us hope that one result of the author's tours will be the production by the Egyptian Survey Department of the necessary sheets to fill in the gap and to complete the topographical map of Sinai.

Throughout the book it is refreshing to feel the author's love of the desert and its wildness and loneliness, which would stand to many as forbidding and harsh. There is also sympathy with the Arabs, tempered with a possibly not excessive amount of impatience at their slipshod methods and squabbles.

He suffers with unconcealed annoyance the irksome administrative rule that camels should be hired from the tribes of the area being surveyed. There are reasons for it—namely, that with a small police force of about 150 men working over an area of roughly 20,000 square miles it is essential to utilize the authority of sheikhs of tribes and to welcome their readiness to accept responsibility over their tribal districts.

To question details in the book: there is a curious mistake on page 5 where the author states that the province is administered by the Intelligence Department of the Egyptian Army War Office. That is an old pre-war story. Latterly Sinai has been under the Frontiers Administration of the Egyptian Government.

On page 9 the population of the region of Sinai is given as 5,480, but some error must have crept in. This figure perhaps included only the Arabs of Southern Sinai. The numbers for the whole of Sinai are probably nearer 20,000. On page 17 Professor Palmer is said to have been betrayed by Meta Abu Sofia of the Deboura section of the Huitat. It is true that some of Professor Palmer's camel men were of this section, but the guide in whom he trusted, and who made off with the money, was Metair Abu Safih of the Safaiha section of the Lehaiwat.

Page 60. The "Juhai," translated as the "old people," probably means "the ignorant" or pagan people—i.e., before Mohammedan times.

Page 85. Colonel Jennings Bramly is mentioned as having written a very interesting account of the Beduin of Northern Sinai. It should be Mr. W. Jennings Bramly, Colonel Jennings Bramly's brother.

Page 94. Numbers of the bustard found in Sinai breed there, a fact probably unknown to the author since his sojourns there were mostly in the winter season.

On page 85 a definition of Arab names for water-supplies is given. The term "Mashash," much used in Sinai, and which applies to shallow water-holes in shingle and sand, is omitted. The word "Galt," quoted by the author, is not commonly used in Sinai. No two persons ever agree in the transliteration of

Arab names, place names, or names of tribes, but as regards the latter certain forms have been more or less accepted and appeared in edited lists of the tribes of Sinai and Palestine during the war. Probably the author was unaware of the existence of this handbook, since he adopts other forms.

The photographs are really excellent and give a wonderful impression of the variety of country. The book is full of interest and should accompany anyone intending to travel in Sinai.

A. C. PARKER.

HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR: THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-1918.

Vol. IV. Compiled by Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O. H.M. Stationery Office. 15s. net.

With the publication of this fourth volume, Brigadier-General Moberly brings to a most successful conclusion his task of recording the stirring events of the war in Mesopotamia and the operations further east related thereto.

The previous volume had carried the story of the campaign up to the end of April, 1917, that is to say, to the series of operations undertaken by General Maude to consolidate our position at Baghdad—viz., westward, the occupation of Falluja, on the Euphrates; northward, the capture of Samarra, consequent on the successful operations of Generals Cobbe's and Marshall's Corps up the right and left banks of the Tigris; eastward, through Baguba to the Jabil Hamrin, to get in touch with the Russians, whose effective co-operation, owing to the Revolution, was becoming increasingly doubtful.

The present volume carries on the narrative from May, 1917, to the Armistice.

Within the restricted limits of a brief review it is impossible to do more than give the barest outline of the events recorded in a work so crowded with incident. Suffice it to say that General Moberly's narrative flows evenly along, the story of the successive operations of the various parts of the expeditionary force being harmoniously correlated and kept chronologically parallel. Such digressions as are necessary into matters of high policy or of allied operations elsewhere which bear on the course of the campaign are introduced just where required, and with a nice sense of proportion.

The brief preface touches on the results of the Mesopotamian campaign. "Our action destroyed German dreams of dominance which constituted a real menace to the security of our Indian Empire and to our sea communications east of the Red Sea; it brought about the defeat of Pan-Turkish ambitions in Caucasasia, Persia, and Central Asia, it assured the independence of Persia and Afghanistan, and it opened to Mesopotamia a prospect of prosperity which she had not known for hundreds of years." It notices, at the same time, that our early successes "had led to our underestimating the enemy's capacity and to our overlooking or disregarding our own insufficient means" which resulted in the disaster of Kut. "After the surrender of Kut it was of advantage to us that, instead of pressing his good fortune, the enemy despatched an Army Corps to invade Persia and left us unmolested on the Tigris to rest and reorganize." During the final phase of the war, dealt with in this fourth volume, "the detachment of large Turkish forces to the Caucasus at a time when their Syrian and Mesopotamian fronts were in urgent need of reinforcement is difficult to understand from a purely military point of view. It can only be explained satisfactorily if it is regarded as an attempt to vindicate their national ideal by building up a new state which would include the ancient home of their race."

There follows a useful chronological summary of the campaign from the beginning, and then a table of the contents of the chapters which constitute Volume IV.

Nine appendices give the distribution of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary

Force in May and November, 1917, and March and October, 1918; lists of the principal officers serving with the Force at the end of 1917 and 1918; an estimate of the Turkish Sixth Army on August 15, 1917; an illuminating letter from Mustapha Kemal to Enver Pasha, dated September 30, 1917; and, finally, a list of the Indian units that served with the Force, with their titles in 1918 and their present titles (this particular appendix will be of great value and assistance to a large number of readers, including even many old officers of the Indian Army, who nowadays find it hard to recognize under their new numbers corps they knew of old).

Thereafter comes a list of the maps which elucidate the history—viz., a general map of the whole region, as frontispiece, and twelve others illustrating the various operations. They are clear and admirably adapted to their purpose.

Seventeen photographs scattered through the book embellish the narrative. Of these it may perhaps be said that some of the aerial photographs, possibly, do not quite convey to the lay eye that ruggedness of the regions depicted—*e.g.*, those of the Fatha Gorge and the battlefield of Sharqat, in contrast to which the two of the Khan Baghdadi battlefield show much more clearly the broken nature of the terrain.

Turning now to the body of the book, the opening chapter commences with an appreciation of the situation. It touches on the increasing Russian disorganization; the formation of the Turkish "Yilderim" Force (including a German Asiatic Corps); Indian frontier troubles, the question of Arab levies (regarding which General Maude writes: "Even if these forces are systematically organized, I am inclined to think that, owing to lack of time and the inadequacy of means for training them, their influence for good will at best be small, whilst they will always represent potential danger in the area of operations"). The matter of reinforcements from home and from India is next touched on, and finally the unsuccessful attack on Ramadi, in the height of summer, involving 586 casualties, of which no less than 321 were directly due to heat. "According to the Baghdadis," says Candler in "The Long Road to Baghdad," "it was the hottest season in the memory of man. Most things were too hot to touch. The rim of a tumbler burnt one's hand in a tent. The dust and sand burnt the soles of one's feet through one's boots."

The following chapter records our reluctant recognition of Russian defection. The British liaison officer with Caucasus Headquarters telegraphed on September 30, 1917: "British gold may keep the Russians in Persia, but it will not make them fight. The old Russian Army is dead, quite dead."

At this time our fighting strength in Mesopotamia was 58,887 British and 107,563 Indians. The capture of Ramadi, brilliantly conceived by General Brooking and resolutely carried out by the troops under his command between September 27 and 29, 1917, at a cost of close on 1,000 casualties, had a decisive effect locally. About the same time, on our other flank, the seizure of Mandali, on the Persian border, by General Norton's Seventh Cavalry Brigade "so affected the supply situation of the Turkish Thirteenth Corps that not only had the First Infantry Regiment to be withdrawn to Kirkuk from Kifri, but the Cavalry Brigade had also to retire to the right bank of the Diyala." The chapter ends with an instructive account of increasing tension between Enver Pasha and von Falkenhayn regarding the respective claims of the Palestine and Mesopotamian fronts and, generally, also regarding questions of command and the German dominance.

Chapter XXXIX. describes the occupation, in October, 1917, of the Jabal Hamrin, by General Marshall's Third Corps, an operation dictated by General Maude's desire "to render his right flank more secure, and to deny to the Turks

this screen for movements against his flank and into Persia." Marshall's well-conceived plans resulted in the attainment of his objective at the cost of only thirty-seven casualties. Following on this operation came the advance of General Cobbe's First Corps up the Tigris to repel a hostile advance down this line. The actions of Daur and Tikhrit successfully disposed of this threat, inflicting 1,500 casualties on the Turks, our own being 1,801, of which, however, the killed numbered 161 only.

About this time a Russian detachment of all arms, numbering some 1,200, under Lieut.-Colonel Bicharakoff (an Ossatin Cossack of Vladikavkaz), which had become isolated at Qasr-i-Shirin from Baratoff's main force, joined us at Mandali, and was attached to our Third Corps.

On November 18, to the deep regret of the whole force, General Sir Stanley Maude died of cholera in Baghdad, after two days' illness. Lieut.-General Sir William Marshall succeeded him, and General Egerton took the latter's place as Commander of the Third Corps.

General Marshall's first move was against the Turks beyond the Jabal Hamrin and along the Diyala. General Egerton's well-planned operations resulted in a loss to the Turks of some 850 men, two guns, and other war material, and a considerable strengthening of our right flank. Bicharakoff's Russians took part in these operations and did good work.

Chapter XL tells us of the inception of the epic of "Dunster Force," to counter the hostile thrust eastward into Persia, laid open by the Russian collapse. Such a hostile move, if successful, would have completely turned our right flank and constituted a serious threat to India. On March 12, 1918, Marshall's responsibilities were extended to cover all military measures necessary to check enemy penetration through North-West Persia. Ultimately, therefore, his widely extended front stretched from Ana on the Euphrates to distant Krasnovodsk on the eastern shore of the Caspian—i.e., a distance in a straight line of some 750 miles. Operations were, at this time, undertaken on our left flank, up the Euphrates. General Brooking occupied Hit on March 9, and the decisive victory of Khan Baghdadi followed on the 26th and 27th. The bold encircling action of Cassel's cavalry cut off the main body of the enemy and resulted in wiping out the entire Fiftieth Turkish Division. A pursuit ensued as far as Ana, where the Turkish stores were blown up.

Chapter XLI describes the operations in Kurdistan, carried out by General Egerton's Third Corps, the object being to drive the Turks well away from the Persian road, which was of vital importance to us. These operations carried our arms to Kirkuk, after the successful action of Tuz Khurmatli, and drove the demoralized remnants of the Turkish Second Division across the Little Zab.

Chapters XLII and XLIII record the thrilling adventures of "Dunster Force" in Persia and Caucasia. It is a tale of surpassing interest. Have British soldiers ever been called upon to fight under circumstances more discouraging than those that confronted the gallant handful of our men who strove to hold Baku against the Turk? The unreliability of the despicable Armenians ensured the tragic failure that ensued. The twenty-two local battalions, totalling about 6,000 rifles, had a twelve-mile front to hold. They were "so lacking in discipline that they wasted much ammunition and left their places in the line whenever they pleased"! "Political meetings, speeches, and discussions interfered with all work." The British troops were too few to do more than hold the left of the line and the "Dirty Volcano," a vital point in the middle of it. "During the fighting on August 18 four-fifths of the local troops retired hastily to Baku, leaving both flanks of the weak North Stafford Company (which was holding a vital part of the line) uncovered." Elsewhere we read in a description

of the defence line, "The above statement does not take into account the dispositions of a large part of the local forces, as these were never known to the British and never accorded with the orders issued to them"! Time and again the Armenians left our men in the lurch. Armenian cowardice lost Baku, but "the stand made by the three British battalions, totalling less than 1,000 rifles, is worthy of our highest admiration."

The two last chapters tell us of the final triumphant victory of Sharqat, where all arms vied with each other in prodigies of valour and endurance, and of the Armistice which followed close on the heels of this victory.

The vexed question of whether we had the right to continue our advance into Mosul after the Armistice came into force is very clearly set at rest. Clauses 7 and 16 of the Armistice terms undoubtedly conferred upon us that right. Space does not admit of more than merely mentioning the growth of railway construction, water communications, mechanical transport, the administrative work of our political officers under Sir Percy Cox, the affairs of South Persia, etc., all of which matters are fully dealt with in this book.

A point which cannot but impress every reader of this history is the record it discloses of loyal and selfless co-operation, not only between the several commanders and parts of the force, but between the several arms—horse, foot, artillery, and air.

Triumph and tragedy are interwoven in the fabric of this work. To the former, the successive victories from Ramadi to Sharqat bear eloquent testimony. The sudden death of our great Commander; the loss of Baku; the pitiable fate of a gallant little nation, the Assyrians, whom we encouraged to withstand the Turk, but could not save when attacked in force and overwhelmed, are episodes that strike a deep note of tragedy.

Before the Great War there were many who prophesied that the day of cavalry was over. The fine work of Holland-Pryor's Sixth Cavalry Brigade at Ramadi, the brilliant achievements of Cassel's and Norton's horsemen (with their invaluable auxiliary the armoured car) at the battles of Khan Baghdadi and Sharqat completely refute this suggestion. Moreover, in the neighbouring theatre of Palestine what would Allenby's operations have been without his cavalry?

An instance of fine marching and endurance by an infantry unit must be mentioned. When Cassel's weak force of cavalry was holding the entire enemy force at Sharqat and was in desperate need of support on October 28, 1918, the 1/89 Garhwalis, each man carrying 170 rounds of rifle ammunition and a bomb, reached General Sanders's position at 9 p.m., after a fine march of thirty-four miles. They were sent on to the ferry, which they reached at 11 p.m., ready to cross and join Cassels early next morning.

An official war history lacking, as it must, the personal note is commonly regarded as somewhat dry and wearisome reading; but of this work it may safely be said that the meticulous student of military history and the casual reader alike may derive both profit and pleasure from a perusal of its glowing pages.

M. E. WILLOUGHBY.

MOSCOU ET LA GEORGIE MARTYRE. Par Raymond Duguet. Préface du Colonel C. B. Stokes: Jules Tellandier. 18 francs.

Late in the fifth century B.C. the first historical traces of the Kingdom of Georgia are to be found. We read that Greek colonists were scattered along the coast of the Black Sea and carried on active trade with the natives of the hinterland. Georgia is mentioned in Greek writings under the name of Colchis, though the Colchians were black immigrants from Egypt, according to

Herodotus, but according to modern authorities they more probably came from India, living in the midst of the white, native population, the true natives of Georgia. It was to the coast of Georgia that Jason sailed in the *Argo* and went in search of the Golden Fleece; even now the two rivers, the Ingour and the Rion, contain auriferous sands, and the peasants still wash the sand according to the manner of their ancestors, by taking a shaggy sheepskin and shaking it in running water, the heavy grains of gold being left in the folds of the skin. The Greeks also refer to Georgia as Eastern Iberia, and praise these Iberians as people well versed in forging steel, from whom arrowheads and all steel weapons may be procured. It may be noted that metal-work is today one of the industries of Georgia, especially in the province of Koutais. Classical reference to Georgia could be multiplied, but it is sufficient to indicate the ancient heritage of which Georgians are justly proud.

In the fourth century of our own era Christianity was proclaimed the State religion of Georgia—that is to say, five centuries before the conversion of Europe.

The twelfth century was for the Kingdom of Georgia the golden age of her history, when Queen Tamara ruled the land from the Black Sea to the Caspian; the military power of Persia, her aggressive neighbour, was weakened, and the great Queen extended and consolidated her frontiers and gave to her country first a sense of security and then a period of peace. The reign of Tamara is also famous for the national epic by Roustaveli, "The Knight in the Panther's Skin." However, the next century witnessed Georgia's downfall, when Tamerlane swept through the country with his Mongols, and the gifts of learning were buried under the invader's pyramid of skulls. Indeed, its geographical position made the land a prey to the onslaughts of all these militaristic chieftains—Mongolian, Persian, or Turkish—and slowly Georgia began to lose both territory and prestige; she suffered several invasions and struggled in vain during the ensuing centuries to maintain her independence, but she was forced finally, in 1785, to make a treaty with Russia, by which she became an autonomous vassal state of that empire; in 1801, however, Russia refused to compromise any longer and formally annexed the country. But it was not Russian policy to develop Transcaucasia; she needed the territory as a military outpost to her own Empire, and as a constant threat to British designs, real or imagined, in Persia and Afghanistan. Moreover, she needed the oil in Baku. But if Russia did not develop Transcaucasia, neither did she destroy the deep-seated spirit of nationalism which was nurtured on the memories of a past history, and made its bid for an independent future in 1917. That bid failed.

Monsieur Duguet, in his careful study of post-war Georgia, gives the main facts of that disappointing attempt to achieve self-determination. Furthermore, Colonel Stokes, who has written the introduction with all the authority of first-hand knowledge, puts his finger on the weak factor in that political experiment: "En fait, le gouvernement géorgien fit passer l'intérêt de son parti avant l'intérêt national."

In 1917 the Bolsheviks seized the power in St. Petersburg and Moscow, and a state of chaos existed in the Russian Empire. The Transcaucasian States took their opportunity and declared themselves independent republics. Georgia was immediately threatened by Turkey, and appealed for protection to the Allies, who, however, had other irons in the fire. She turned to Germany, who came to her assistance and saved her from a Turkish invasion, intending to colonize the country at the end of the war. When the war ended it was Germany who had to withdraw, and under Allied occupation Transcaucasia had a breathing-space to set its house in order. And then the first great mistake was made. The one

chance of independence was in the formation of a Confederated State, linking together Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the mountaineer tribes of Daghestan. But the leader was lacking. No one had the political vision to perceive it or the strength and personality to carry it through. International jealousies predominated, and three independent republics were created with the floating mountaineer tribes outside the circle. The strategical advantages of the geographical situation were therefore lost, and the inevitable attack from Russia had to be met with a disunited front. In 1920 the Soviet armies conquered the three republics piecemeal.

Nor does the history of the political independence of Georgia show a brighter picture.* The Government that came into power at the end of 1918 was a Menchevik Government, whose leaders were linked by many ties with the rulers of Soviet Russia. The most elementary statesmanship must have perceived the imperative necessity of forming a Government of national union, if the young State was to develop and prosper. The Mencheviks, however, determined to experiment in socialistic reform. The application of those principles to the land problem is of historical interest.

Georgia is a nation of peasants; it is estimated that 70 to 80 per cent. of its population make their living from agriculture; and the methods employed are picturesquely antique. Riding across country or down the cart tracks, for there are only a very few good roads in Georgia, you come on the peasant ploughing his field, scratching the soil with what looks like a bit of tin fixed on to his plough. The bigger ploughs are drawn by teams of animals; as many as twenty-four animals drawing one plough is a common sight. The wheat is threshed by a sledge with a flint fixed on the end of it. Artificial manuring is unknown; and even such an elementary principle as the rotation of crops is not generally practised. The necessary rest is given the soil by allowing it to lie fallow, and it is then used as pasture until fit again for tillage.

The agrarian reform of 1918 was finally carried out on the basis of peasant proprietorship; but this solution was not immediately reached. The first step of the new Government which came into power after the Russian revolution was to confiscate all land and declare it to be the property of the State; the next step consisted in a decision to leave a maximum of about twenty-five acres to the dispossessed landowners, but not to give any indemnity for the land which had been confiscated; the third and last step towards the solution was taken on January 23, 1919, when the Georgian Parliament voted a Bill by which all farming land held by the State was to be distributed amongst the peasant population on the basis of private ownership, but at the same time providing that any peasant-holding should not exceed the maximum of twenty-five acres allowed to former landowners. The process of distribution was being carried out at the time of the invasion of Georgia by the Soviet troops. While considering this evolution in the agrarian legislation of the Georgian Government, it is interesting to remember that the men in power had been brought up on collectivist principles, that they composed a revolutionary Government; and yet they had the political sense to perceive that the agrarian problem, in their own country at least, could only be solved along lines opposed to the principles of their social creed, and they had the courage to admit at once the weakness of their theory when translated into practical politics. However, the evils of wholesale confiscation and State appropriation had already destroyed the chief element of stability in the country, and the agrarian compromise came too late.

Beyond farming proper, the peasant of Western Georgia grows successfully tea and tobacco; and in several parts of the country the traveller meets with vineyards and large fruit farms. Gori is famous for its apples.

The mineral deposits of the country are still undeveloped, with the exception of the manganese mines, which are some of the finest in the world. Petrol, coal, and copper exist, but in unknown quantities.

Roughly midway between the Black Sea and the Caspian lies the city of Tiflis, a fine town where Oriental disorder and Western civilization meet and jostle in pleasant amity. Tiflis bears the imprint of the Russian occupation; it was the viceregal capital of Transcaucasia under the Czarist régime, and possesses a European quarter which boasts of all the modern paraphernalia of a Western city. After the Russian revolution it became the capital of Georgia. The main street is the Golovinsky Prospect, which is threaded by a tramway, and possesses a fine opera house where famous Russian singers have made their début. Excellent blocks of flats, chiefly owned by Armenians, are scattered up and down the highway. Here are the best restaurants, and here are the shops where merchandise, displayed in modern windows, costs twice or three times as much as the same wares bought in the Oriental market a few hundred yards away. The street is cobbled; cars, cabs, pedestrians, and the tramway hustle for a passage.

The Oriental quarter of Tiflis, or the old town, is wedged in the valley of the River Kura, built on either bank and linked up with several wooden bridges; these bridges are in varying conditions of decay, and have practically fallen into disuse, except for foot passengers. The hills on either side rise sheer above the clustered houses, and at the end of the valley there are the remains of two ancient fortresses. The buildings have been constructed on different levels in a haphazard fashion; the narrow streets, therefore, for the most part cobbled, are a series of precipitous inclines and declines. Eastern customs prevail; whole streets are given up to merchandise of a single denomination, and one street, for example, is thus naturally named Silver Street, inhabited by the silversmiths, etc. It is to this quarter that the caravans of camels make their way, bearing the wares of the East; there is trade carried on between Tiflis and Tabriz. It is a common sight along the single street, which traverses this part of Tiflis, to see three or four supercilious camels eyeing with contempt the oily snorts of a Ford car. They will never understand each other.

In March, 1921, the Bolshevik troops burst in on this rich and pleasant country, and the Georgian army, after weeks of gallant fighting, was finally overcome, being driven back to the sea coast. As the Red troops reached Batoum the Government evacuated in Allied ships and made their way to Constantinople and Paris. The Soviets took over control and instituted a reign of terror. The horrible details of Bolshevik methods of repression are given and graphically described by Monsieur Duguet. The irony of that Menchevik Government trusting in the fair promises of their late associates is clearly underlined. In May, 1920, the Soviets recognized the independence of Georgia. During the succeeding months the Soviets prepared the campaign of occupation, reannexing first Azerbaijan and then Armenia, and carrying on at the same time intensive propaganda in Georgia behind the screen of their diplomatic representation. Yet the Georgian Government still hoped that the spiritual bond of socialistic ideals would strengthen the loyalty of Soviet Russia to her written engagements. When the moment came Russia reannexed this rebellious province, and the punitive expedition became a terrorist army of occupation.

Monsieur Duguet's book has a special interest at this moment, since there are many signs that the Bolshevik experiment in Russia is coming to an end; this will mean division in the empire, and undoubtedly the suppressed nationalism of the southern provinces will reawaken, and a second bid for freedom and political independence will be made. It seems that Georgia may

well have, within the next year, her second chance, and her friends are waiting to see how the game will be played, and what lessons have been learnt from 1920.

The problem is not an easy one. Any Russian Government will consider Transcaucasia as a Russian province, and if they will not be prepared to fight for sentiment they will be obliged to fight in order to retain a guaranteed supply of Baku oil. On the other hand, ethnographically Transcaucasia has nothing in common with Russia; its inhabitants are not Slavonic and have no sympathy with the Slavonic mentality. The history of the nineteenth century has sown seeds of resentment, hatred, and distrust of Russian administration. No permanent or peaceful solution of this problem is possible as long as Russia occupies Transcaucasia. It will therefore be the task of politicians, when the Soviet Empire breaks up, to discover a *modus vivendi* under which Russia retains a first lien on the Baku oil supply and the Transcaucasian peoples retain political independence, if possible within a confederated union.

The British Government can ill afford to stand aside when this problem shall demand immediate consideration. The strip of land between the Black Sea and the Caspian is a natural buffer State between Russian imperialism and our Eastern Empire. If the frontiers of Turkey and Persia were protected by a friendly confederation of Transcaucasian States, and Russian activity restricted to her natural territorial limit—the Caucasus range—an important step would have been taken towards the reconstruction of British prestige in the Near East, if at the same time Downing Street seeks to develop that friendship, which should surely exist, between ourselves and all Moslem countries.

We have to thank Monsieur Duguet for calling our attention to a problem which at any moment may become a matter of international importance.

J. K. R.

NOTES

IRAQ AND SYRIA.

M. Pernot, writing in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, concludes his series of articles on the "Unrest in the East." The paper on the Mandated Territories—Iraq and Syria is perhaps the most interesting of the series. M. Pernot was in Baghdad in 1912 and so is able to judge the progress made since the Turkish domination ended.

Coming through the Persian Gulf, he gives an admirable series of short sketches of the towns he visited—Abadan, but a few years ago an insignificant village but now a large commercial city, headquarters of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, with schools, hospitals, and large and imposing buildings furnished by them; Mohammerah, destined to be the rival of Baghdad and Basra once it becomes the terminus of the Trans-Persian Railway and is linked to Ispahan, Teheran, and the Caspian by rail; Basra, with its interminable quays and empty warehouses, a city of the dead, a corner of the earth into which for some years thousands of pounds were poured, but now going through a critical period of poverty and loss of trade.

A leisurely journey brought him in twenty-two hours to Baghdad, where he deplors the loss of "atmosphere," the transformation into an Anglo-Indian town. Here he had a long interview with Miss Bell, and discusses at some length the wisdom or non-wisdom of the British policy; he had, too, an audience with King Faisal, and gives a short summary of the difficulties of the King and of the British High Commissioner in passing the Treaty, and he gives, too, an amusing account of a luncheon to which Miss Bell invited him, when his fellow-guest, "a high official, a Mr. C.," rubbed in all the faults of the French administration in Syria but would hear nothing of the mistakes of the British in Iraq. After Baghdad he went on to Mosul, which he says the French should never have given up. In his general criticism he approves of the efforts which are being made to advance the education of the people—a great number of schools have been started, and over 50 per cent. of the revenue is devoted to education and to the Iraq army—but in other ways he finds the country less advanced. Mosul is run for the benefit of the oil. The Persian trade which had so much to do with the prosperity of the country has now been diverted to the north, owing to the great enmity between Persia and Iraq, an enmity which has benefited Russia while Mosul has suffered; and Sir William Willcocks's great irrigation schemes, which were to have done so much to bring prosperity to the country, have been shelved for better days—or in accordance with some change of policy.

Mosul itself had suffered from two years' drought and was importing instead of exporting cereals, and the introduction of the rupee and the fever for speculation had made matters worse, at any rate for the time being, in a country where so many of the smaller transactions were made in Turkish currency.

He had cherished a great affection for the slow method of crossing the desert with a caravan, and the quick run in a car has not for him the same attraction, while the terrible poverty of the Bedouin, whom he had known in better days, shocked him. He arrived in Syria while things were at their worst, and refuses to speak about it, but rests on the security of an ultimate good understanding.

On the whole he concludes that both in Iraq and in Syria there is much to be done before the Mandatory Powers can claim that they have well fulfilled their undertakings.

The following papers have been added to the Library: *Revue des Deux Mondes*, VI., noticed above; "A Picture of China," from June number of the *Round Table*, which gives an excellent account of the present state of affairs in that country.

BAFFIN'S GRAVE

A correspondent, writing from the Persian Gulf, says: "It may interest you to know that I have found what I feel certain is the grave of William Baffin, the explorer who gave his name to Baffin Bay. This grave is on Kishm Island, near the town. It has been kept in good repair by former Sheikhs of the island, and the last repairs were done about fifty years ago. It is known as the grave of 'Al Ferangi' or of 'Al Anglazi.' I found the sea was making encroachments on one side of this grave, and out of a feeling of pity for this lone Englishman I left sufficient money to have it built up from the sea. . . .

"As far as tradition goes amongst the older inhabitants of Kishm, this was the grave of an officer (the word used was *Hakim*) who had been killed fighting."

MEMBERS will look forward to the publication of the reports of Sir John Marshal's and Sir Aurel Stein's excavations in North India, the importance of which are known to be great; but to most of us, who have no special knowledge, the greater interest lies in the fact that these results when taken in conjunction with Mr. Woolley's latest finds at Ur give irrefutable proof of a widespread civilization earlier than any yet known, for although it cannot be dated, it is certainly earlier than the civilization which spread over the Mediterranean from the Nile Valley. Mr. Woolley's excavations will be continued next season if sufficient funds can be obtained. Any members who care to contribute even small sums should send them to the Director, British Museum, by whom they will be acknowledged. An exhibition of the principal finds of the last season is now on view in the Assyrian Gallery of the Museum.

LIBRARY NOTICES

THE Council wish to thank Colonel Grey for "A Literary History of the Arabs"; Colonel J. A. Stewart for Bellew's "Enquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan"; and Mr. H. C. Luke for "A Spanish Franciscan's Narrative of a Journey to the Holy Land," for all of which they are very grateful for the library.

The following books have been received for review:

- "The Wilderness of Sinai," by H. J. Llewellyn Beadnall. 9" x 6". xii + 174 pp. 2 maps and illustrations. (London: Messrs. Edwin Arnold. 1927. 10s. 6d.)
- "A Pageant of India," by Adolf Waley. 9" x 6". 556 pp. (London: Messrs. Constable and Co. 1927. 15s.)
- "Revolt in the Desert," by T. E. Lawrence. 9½" x 6¾". 446 pp. Maps and illustrations. (London: Messrs. Jonathan Cape. 1927. 21s.)

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- "A Spanish Franciscan's Narrative of a Journey to the Holy Land," translation by H. C. Luke. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " \times 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". vii+83 pp. (London: Palestine Exploration Fund. 1927. 4s. cloth, 2s. 6d. paper.)
- "The Northern Hegaz," by Alois Musil, American Geographical Society: Oriental Explorations, No. 1. 10 $\frac{1}{4}$ " \times 7". vii+374 pp. Illustrations. (New York: Vols. I-VI. \$36.)
- "The China of Today," by Stephen King-Hall. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ " \times 5". 45 pp. (London: Hogarth Press. 1927. 2s. 6d.)
- "China in Revolt: How a Civilization became a Nation," by Leang-Li T'Ang; preface by Dr. Tsai-Yuan Pei, Chancellor of the University of Peking. vii+176 pp. (London: Noel Douglas. 1927. 7s. 6d.)
- "The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918," Vol. IV., by Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, C.B. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " \times 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 447 pp. Map. (London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1927. 15s.)
- "Asiatic Elements in Greek Civilization," by Sir William Ramsay. 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ " \times 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". x+303 pp. Illustrations. (London: John Murray. 1927. 12s.)
- "China and her Political Entity," by Shunhsi H'sŭ, Ph.D. xxiv+488 pp. (New York: Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d.)
- "Prophets, Priests, and Patriarchs," by H. C. Luke. Sketches of the Sects of Palestine and Syria. 8 $\frac{3}{8}$ " \times 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 129 pp. (London: Faith Press. 1927. 6s.)
- "Tibet, Past and Present," by Sir Charles Bell, K.C.I.E., C.M.G. 8 $\frac{1}{4}$ " \times 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". 326 pp. Maps and illustrations. (Oxford: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1927. Cheap edition, 10s.)
- "Le Congrès du Khalifat (Cairo, May 13-19, 1926); Le Congrès du Monde Musulmane Mecca (June 7 to July 5, 1926)," from the *Revue du Monde Musulmane*. 10" \times 6 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". 219 pp. (Paris. 1926. 25 frs.)
- "The British in China and Far Eastern Trade," by C. A. Middleton Smith. 9" \times 6". 295 pp. (London: Messrs. Constable and Co. 1927. 10s. 6d.)

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JOURNAL

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PART IV.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
NOTICES	317
THE TATAR DOMINATION OF ASIA. By LIEUT.- GEN. SIR GEORGE MACMUNN, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.	319
EDUCATION IN IRAQ. By AGNES CONWAY-	334
RAILWAYS IN PERSIA.	340
THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL MISSION TO PERSIA	344
A NOTE ON TRANSJORDANIA. By R. L. N. M.	346
REPORT OF THE INDIAN SANDHURST COM- MITTEE	349
A STORY OF STRUGGLE AND INTRIGUE IN CENTRAL ASIA	359
THE STORY OF SYED AHMED, MOSS-TROOPER, FREEBOOTER, SAINT, AND CRESCENTADER.	369
ANNIVERSARY MEETING	373
THE ANNUAL DINNER	376
REVIEWS	385 TO 408
MOTHER INDIA. THE ISLAMIC WORLD SINCE THE PEACE SETTLE- MENT. CHINA IN TURMOIL. CHINA IN REVOLT. PROPHETS, PRIESTS, AND PATRIARCHS. ASIANIC ELEMENTS IN GREEK CIVILIZATION. THE LETTERS OF GERTRUDE BELL. SUHAİL.	
LIBRARY NOTICES	409
LIST OF NEW MEMBERS	410
CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY ACCOUNTS	411

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
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NOTICES

MEMBERS are asked to notify the office at once if they do not receive *Journals* and lecture cards.

Journals have been returned marked "unknown," addressed to Lieut.-Colonel Willoughby Wallace and Bassett Digby, Esq.

The Secretary would be glad if addresses for the above could be sent to the office.



Empire of Jenghiz Khan, 1227
" " Timur, 1405

Scale of Miles
0 200 400 600

THE TATAR DOMINATION OF ASIA.*

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACMUNN, K.C.B.

MANY who have some knowledge of Asia, whether personal or otherwise, but especially those who have been there, have been attracted at some time or other to the mystery of the almond-eyed man. A feeling is bound to arise in those who think of such things, that the whole of Asia is permeated or tainted with a people, or traces of a people, who seem different in every way from the rest of the world. The physiognomy, the language, the habits, and the humanities of these races are entirely apart from Aryan, Semite, or Hamite. The various nomenclatures in use to describe this great race are perplexing. We may call them Turanian, which is the term in more scientific use, which is but the Persian word for desert dwellers, used to describe the nomad Tatars who swept over Persia as over the rest of Asia. In the earlier days of Moslem domination we hear often of the eternal conflict between the lords of Iran and the lords of Turan. We may call them Tatar, which should be spelt without the *r* in the first syllable, and is apparently Chinese for "barbarian"; or we may call them Turk or Turki, which is said to be derived from "Tu-kuen," a helmet, the name given to a hill in China, near which the first Turkish settlement was founded in A.D. 420. But, on the other hand, early Europeans will speak of Turcæ and Tyrcæ earlier still. In Chinese history the Huns or early Tatars seem to have been called the "Hsiang-nu," and we have mention of them as early as 2800 B.C., and certainly by 1400 B.C. So we can realize what a long and terrible thing this domination has been. I propose to conform to the more modern custom and to use the name Tatar to describe the Ugro-Altaic, Tartar, Turkish or Mongol races; and Turanian to include both Tatar and the descended races such as Dravidian, wherever situated. The term Mongolo-Turkish is another all-embracing term which is used by scientific writers.

Now, I want to draw your attention to the fact that this strange people, in addition to overrunning a large part of Eastern Europe, actually ruled, dominated, and controlled the whole of Asia from the Bosphorus to the Pacific. Only last year did the last of the four great Tatar dynasties disappear—that of the Khajar Empire of Persia. The Sultan of Constantinople, the Shah of Persia, the Mogul Empire

* The Anniversary Lecture, given on June 8, Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the Chair.

of Delhi, the Tatar Emperor at Peking, at one time divided Asia between them more or less intimately and completely, and now the last of these emperors or sultans has faded from off the screen of history. Three out of four have done so in the last twelve years, while the Mogul Empire itself nominally endured till 1857.

I will now ask you to speculate with me on the origin of these Tatar peoples, so different from the rest of the world that they would seem to have sprung from some entirely different source. Those who probe further into the ape theories hold that the Tatar, or yellow man, comes from the ourang-outang, the Caucasian from the chimpanzee, and the negro from the gorilla, while searching yet for those who come from the baboon, the fourth of the anthropoid apes. I am not competent to take you far into that theory, but I may say, as of some interest, that the chimpanzee is apt to sit with legs and arms folded, as do the Mongoloids, and as the statues of the Buddha are shown, while the descendants of the chimpanzee *baito* on their hunkers, as does their putative ancestor, and place their hands on their knee like the statues of the Pharaohs. In *dementia præcox* the white race always sit thus, and the yellow race with folded feet and arms.

Leaving the anthropoids to those who have deeper knowledge, I would ask you to come back with me for a moment to that most wonderful of all histories and genealogies—in fact, the only extant history of early man—those remarkable opening chapters of the Book of Genesis, and I want to introduce you to a remarkable theory as to the origin of the Tatar peoples—those of the almond eye and the Mongol fold.

The opening chapters of Genesis go, as you know, at great length into the ethnological divisions, and it seems to me that we have read our chapters but carelessly. It is the fashion to say that Genesis claims to tell us the story of the beginning of man, and then to point out how futile such an account must be in view of the universally accepted modern doctrine of evolution from inferior species over countless æons of time. But there is something wrong to begin with in our conception, for Genesis distinctly tells us that there were other people in the land, whom the children of Adam and Eve married. My interest in the study of Genesis was very much heightened by the fact that for three years of the War I was Inspector-General of Communications in Mesopotamia, and travelled in my steamer 25,000 miles on the Tigris and Euphrates, and I was Commander-in-Chief for another year after the War. My spare time was devoted to studying everything I could lay hands on that dealt with ancient history and geography, and, egged on by Sir William Wilcocks to apply the facts of the theodolite to the story of Genesis, I visited innumerable sites. It is not suitable to develop these in my lecture tonight, but I want to point to one or two facts to emphasize the extraordinary accuracy of that narrative in

those places where it can be checked, and to deduct from that the possibility that it may be as accurate in the portions that we cannot check, though I would admit we have not always understood them aright. That accuracy is germane to the point I am leading up to as to the origin of the Tatar or Mongoloid races. I like, myself, to think that the story of Eden is not the story of the first man, but possibly the story of the man who had been evolved, as were the beasts, through countless ages of development, at last arriving at that stage when the Creator judged that he might now receive a soul and become *homo sapiens*. If that were the story of Eden, and if the Creator had made an experiment in trying to make some of those beings a race apart, and failed, we have a story over which scientists and fundamentalists may lie down together, and one which immediately solves the puzzle of those other contemporaneous human beings Genesis tells of, and of the "daughters of men," and also all those people whom Cain feared should have a blood feud with him.

I will, if I may, just quote two instances to show how accurate Genesis can be in its details. Now, in our endeavour to settle revenue problems in Iraq during the days of the war, we soon came upon a curious condition of land tenure whereby a man who owns land does not necessarily own the trees thereon. And we see to this day that to own land and trees a man must have a *mirri sannad* as well as a *tapu sannad*. But this explains an apparently redundant account in Genesis, where we are told that Abraham, when he bought the field of Machpelah as his burial-place, sought not only the land thereof, but the trees thereon as well. This was in reality a most essential thing to do, and shows that the custom has remained unchanged to this day in those lands. The other point, as an accurate description of detail, is still more remarkable. In the account of the Deluge we are told that the "gates of heaven opened and the fountains of the deep came up." Now, the gates of heaven we can all accept as a picturesque description of heavy rain and melting snow. We have accepted that, and not probed deeper into the meaning of the "fountains of the deep." The fountains of the deep, however, is an expression often used in the Old Testament for the sea. Now, to this day, at the same time as the flood season, the south-west *shumal* blows the sea water of the Persian Gulf right up over the low desert flats that lie between the Shattal-Arab and the higher ground right and left of the river for sixty or seventy miles inland. And this wall of sea water coming up meets the flood waters coming down, and banks the latter up so that they cannot run off till the wind ceases to prevail. Now, what more accurate reference could be made to the spring conditions which so hampered us in trying to relieve Kut—that is to say, that the gates of heaven opened and the fountains of the deep came up?

It most accurately describes the physical situation today. I have

given you these two instances to emphasize my point that everything told in Genesis refers to some historic happening, though we may not yet have got the inwardness of the story right. Now we come to the point regarding the Tatar races, to which I have been working up. Cain is a man that we hear a good deal of—the names of his children and descendants, and how they were nomads and tinkers, and would be so for all time; and we are given the name of the cities of his descendants, a mighty people. Then suddenly the story ends with Chapter IV. Never again is there any mention of Cain and his descendants. Chapter X. gives a remarkable account of the races of the world, accurate in many respects to this day, but never a word of the descendants of Cain. Never a word in the whole of Holy Writ (except, perhaps, an obscure allusion in Isaiah) to any descendants of Cain at one time so often referred to, and never a mention of the Tatar races or of China. Cain and the Mongoloid races are *taboo*, in spite of the fact that the early inhabitants of the Euphrates country, the Sumerians, were, from their carvings, obviously Mongoloids. Now, it has been suggested that the almond eye, this "Mongol fold," a twitch of the skin and not the shape of the skull, is the mark that God put on Cain for men to know him by, and that his descendants are those Mongoloid races who never are mentioned after Chapter IV. in this most wonderful early history of the rest of the races of the world. Out into the land of Nod and out of the recorded history went those races marked with the brand which was to give protection and also to carry a curse. I venture to give you this idea as a most romantic one, and one which, I think, the more you ponder over it, the more will appear to you to account for many queer things.

The Chinese, you know, have a tradition of Western origin which brought them to the Hoang-Ho, their putative matrix.

You will remember how Mr. Roy Chapman Andrews told us that when next he goes out it will be to study the human settlements in Southern Mongolia with an ethnographer and an anthropologist added to his otherwise complete staff. He may greatly add to our very scanty knowledge of Tatars, Turks, and Turanians.

EARLY TIMES

In early times—times which a little while ago we should have called prehistoric, but which research and discovery are bringing within the domain of recorded history—the Turanian peoples occupied a part of Northern and part of Eastern Asia, and had penetrated into Southern Tibet, Bengal, and had even mingled with Negritic races to form such people as the Dravidian and Kolarian races in India, the Bengali as well as the races of the inner Himalaya and the Tibetan plateaus. They are even to be found in the Valley of the Euphrates, where we find them as the Akkado-Sumerians of the earliest days of Ur. And we find them

separated by the peculiar trait of the Mongol fold, and the high cheek-bones, flat faces, lank hair, and earless faces, as well as by a language that is quite different in its type from the Aryan or Caucasian or white races, however we like to call them. I am not competent to talk to you of the curious monosyllabic and agglutinative languages, which all have a similarity, and which in the main are talked by all the true Turanians from the Bosphorus to the Pacific, and which is to be seen in its construction in Burmese, Shan, Kachin, Chinese, etc. There is no language which is so universally spoken as is Turki proper and its immediately allied varieties. An excellent example has been quoted of how this agglutinative built-up Turkish language is constructed. It is that such an expression as un-get-at-able-ness would be a typical Turki form. It is interesting to look at our maps of Asia and to see the same words in use for mountain and river in China, in Tibet, in Turkestan, and right up to the borders of Europe in Anatolia.

I but mention this curious language to emphasize the fact that these Turanians seem to be of a different order of beings from the rest of the world—these putative descendants of Cain, whatever the story of Cain may really stand for in historic value, a curious race, capable of great cruelty and the most implicit obedience, in many ways a slave people. If you took an ordinary Turkish battalion of pure Anatolian Turks, and said, "Here are two hundred Armenian babies, take care of them, be good to them," the grinning Turk would nurse and pet them; but if you said, "Bayonet them," bayoneted heartily they would be. The great waves of Turkish and Tatar invasions have been the occasions all through history of the most devastating massacres. Those who know the jolly, grinning little Gurkhas of our Army know how horribly barbaric they would be if their officers did not restrain them sternly.

In studying the countries over which the Tatars spread, it is important to remember that Turkestan, as we now know it, the various more western Turkestans of which Bokhara and Samarkand are the centre, did not become Turkish till about A.D. 400. Before that the people were Iranians and the country was known as Iranistan, the country over which the Macedonian influence extended, and which Alexander conquered on his way to India, leaving behind him the province of Bactria. Now Græco-Bactrian control and influence lasted many centuries here as in the south of Western Asia; indeed, one finds, 600 and 700 years after, the Persian dynasties using the Greek characters for many official purposes. Just as the Romans were longer in Britain than the British have been in India, so the Macedonian control existed in what we now call Turkestan before the Turks came there, and many of the ruins and influences are pre-Tatar in origin. With the civilizing of Afghanistan in progress, and should the Central Asian-soviets encourage it, there is immense archaeological research to be done in the Valley of the Oxus. But the knowledge we shall get will not be of the Tatar story.

One great fact stands out, that these curious Turanian races, impelled by various causes, one of which we know as the smothering of habitable areas by rotting sandhills, a phenomenon which we can see any day we like on British cornlands in the Indus Valley, and probably by great prolificness such as we have seen in Egypt in the last twenty years where the population has doubled, moved westwards, and swept into many parts of Western and Southern Asia and into the middle of France. And we know that these waves have continued up to quite modern times, and are historical facts from the days of Attila the Hun to those of Urtogrul and Othman in the fifteenth century. But it is most interesting to see how these hordes of Tatars have acted as it were for the chastisement of effete and degenerate Western races. Historians tell us that the appearance of the barbarian Tatar hordes, with their accompanying massacres and cruelties, have been the signal for a regeneration and a revival of their own better cults in the peoples over whom they swept, always supposing they left any, for in Seistan and in Babylonia the ruins that they left and the lands they laid waste have remained so to this day—nothing but the haunt of the dragon and the bittern.

Those of you who have marched or flown over the old brown battle-fields of Mesopotamia know the long lines of deserted Babylonian canals and village mounds, mostly as yet unexplored, which mark the track of Hulagu and his Turks.

No doubt if we explored the prophecies to this end we should find many that alluded to the "Scourge of God," as Attila has been called. And there are some who think that the "horses of Togomar" are the Tatar hordes.

THE HUNS AND EARLY HISTORY

In the third century B.C. we find that a great Tatar or Turanian people, known to history as the Huns, dominated the whole of Northern Asia from the Volga to Korea, and conquered China so far back as 219 B.C. But they spread and conquered to the west as well as to the east, for they were in Hungary in A.D. 370 and for centuries made the Danube Valley their European centre, and under their great leader, Attila, overran the greater part of Europe, and were not stemmed till they got to the Marne, where they were defeated in A.D. 451 by Aetius at Chalons-sur-Marne, as another enemy was stemmed in 1914 by Joffre and French. For this Tatar hand lay heavy in Europe. Half Russia is Tatar to this day, and the Letts and the Finns and the East Prussians show their Mongol origin very clearly. When the German Emperor claimed relationship with the Turks of yesterday he spoke for Prussia only too truly. We do not always realize that those Prussian characteristics so disliked by their German fellow-subjects are due to the presence in their blood of this savage,

callous-Tatar or Mongol blood, so essentially different from the Aryans of the true Germanic races.

Attila died in 453, and the Hun power in Europe waned, but for generations they remained in East Europe. Gradually the various Tatar-divisions became more marked under the names and groups we now know them by, now one group, now another, gaining ascendancy, and for the time giving a new title to confederacies of the same old peoples.

It would be quite impossible in the space of an hour's talk to take through the history of the Tatar waves, but I can do no more than run through the more famous ones, with a few of the leading dates.

B.C. 250. The Great Wall or parts of it are built to keep the Tatars out of China, though they had, of course, in earlier days overrun it for hundreds of years and peopled it.

421—430 A.D. The settlement of the Tu-Kush or Turks in Western China is recorded, and in 567 the Turks of China sent an embassy to the Emperor Justin. For the next few hundred years there are records of wars between the Chinese and the Turks.

400 A.D. The Tatars conquer and settle in Turkestan.

714 A.D. The Tatars of Turkestan abandon their somewhat indefinite paganism and adopt Islam, and under its influence become a more civilized and enduring power. A branch of the Tatars, the Urghurs, conquer territory to the north of Turkestan and embrace Islam in the year 1000 A.D.

1050 A.D. Another great section of Turks, the Seljuks, under Toghrul, sweep into Persia and Iraq, restore the power of the Caliphate, which before long they usurp.

1206—1227 A.D. The Mongols as such come on the scene, and under Jhenghiz, or Chingiz Khan, not only conquer China, but spread far into both Russia and Central Europe, bringing more than the usual fire and sword.

Jagatai, son of Jhengis Khan, succeeded to the rule of those tribes and provinces who called themselves Turk as distinct from Mongol. Baber, who conquered India in the sixteenth century, was a Jagatai Turk, and the name Mogul was probably adopted for the prestige that it carried. He did, however, claim descent through his mother from Jhengiz Khan.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In the eighteenth century we see the four great Tatar thrones controlling practically the whole of Asia—the Sultan of Turkey, the Shah of Persia at Teheran, the Mogul at Delhi, the Emperor of China at Peking. At the beginning of that century Russia had not begun her absorption of the Khanates. Great Britain was but the tenant of coastwise settlements of the Mogul. The Mogul Empire was still that astonishing

mighty Empire which dazzled the imagination of the West. China was still China. Almost the whole of Asia, in one sense or another, definitely or indefinitely owned the sway of these four Tatar potentates. The seeds of decay, however, were already at work in the great empire of Akhbar; the component parts were too diverse, as we know so well today, for anything but a first-class rule to keep together. The Mogul Empire toppled by its own weight. The Great Mogul was a puppet when Maratha and Afghan fought for the body at Panipat, one of those recurring battles on that great field. This one, known as the "Battle by the Black Mango Tree," broke the rising Maratha power for many years, and the most interesting item about it now is that curious message which passed through the underground channels of the financiers, the first news of the disaster:

"Two pearls have been dissolved, twenty-seven gold muhurs have been lost, and the silver and copper cannot be cast up."

The Mogul Emperor, you will remember, endured in name till the last flicker, when he was replaced on his puppet throne by the mutinous Bengal Army. Till then to many Eastern minds we ruled India under the *firman* of the Great Mogul. I won't dwell further on this story of Tatar dominion in India, except to tell you an interesting little story of the kind which so appeals to me. I was riding near Delhi, with an officer who had been on the Central Asian steppes. We passed some flocks of sheep, with their shepherds. All over the world shepherds retain the touch with long gone ways. I believe, in Sussex even, the sheep are still counted up on the downs with the British, viz., Celtic, numerals. The shepherds on Salisbury Plain link back with many a bygone tradition. As we passed the flocks the shepherds were gathering the sheep. "Hullo!" said my companion, "those men are calling with the Central Asian sheep call, the cry of the steppes." Accosting one who was near, a wild-looking creature, he said, "What tribe are you?" "Mogul," said the man, "Mogul." It was the remnant of more or less unadulterated Mogul settlements who had come in with the conquerors. For ever since Delhi was a kingdom it has been Tatar, with one short exception, as I have explained.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

First of the four Tatar dynasties to fade from the screen was that of the Mogul or more properly of the Jagatai Turks, which lost its last vestige of power in 1857. The other three tyrannies remained much longer, and the next to follow the Mogul was the Manchu, which disappeared in 1912. It has always interested me to notice, as evidence of the affinity of these two Tatar empires, when I look at those miniatures you get at Delhi copied from originals of the Mogul Empress Nur

Mahal, Mumtaz Mahal, and even that little cat of the Mutiny tragedy, that they wear headdresses and clothes of very definitely Tatar Pekinese type.

His Majesty of Peking was soon followed by his cousin of Rome, for the Sultan of Rome, of the City and Empire of Constantine, has now disappeared.* The fourth Turkish throne endured till last year in the shape of the Turkish Shah of Persia, the last, for the present at any rate, of the Dynasty of the Khajjar Turks. Reza Shah, as we know, is pure Aryan. So end the four great Turkish Dynasties which shared Asia from the Bosphorus to the Pacific, the descendants in one form or another of Attila, of Hulagu, of Ertagru and Jhengiz Khan, of Timur the Lame, and of Babur. Mighty and relentless in their day beyond belief and now none so poor to do them reverence, I present this reflection to you as one of extreme interest, mingled as I like to mingle it with some memory of Cain and that mysterious brand that was to separate him and his descendants from the rest of mankind.

TURKISH CONDITIONS OF TODAY

It is interesting in endeavouring to see what the future of the Tatars may be, to turn to the Pan-Turk cult of the more theoretical Turks of Turkey in Asia or Turkey in Europe. One Tekin Alp, a pre-war writer, said to be Albert Cohen, a Jew, wrote vehemently on a Pan-Turk revival—*i.e.* political union of all the Turkish-speaking peoples, at any rate outside of China. Pan-Turk journals *Turkismus* and *Pan-Turkismus* were his platform. During the War the Young Turk party found that Islam had failed them. The *Jihad*, the Holy War which the Sultan had called on the Sheikh Ul Islam to proclaim, had failed to rally Islam to the cause of the Caliph. They deliberately let the Turkish Empire go so far as its non-Tatar elements went, and preached a union of the Tatar races. The League of the Grey Wolf from whom the original Turk is said to come was the platform. Prussia with her Tatar strain was behind it also, and the fear that it might take serious form involved Great Britain in far-flung operations in 1917-18. The costly expedition from Quetta to form the North Persian cordon was to stop the Pan-Turkish propaganda from penetrating to the Tatar districts on the Afghan side of the Oxus, and incidentally to give anti-Bolshevist elements in Transcaspia a chance and prevent the Tatars of Transcaspia and the Oxus being swept in. Further, our operations in North Persia and on the Caspian Sea, the enterprise known familiarly as the "Hush Hush Push," which eventually found us trying to organize Tatar elements at Baku, were all part of the same fear.

* The handsome Turks of Europe are but European Moslems. The real Turk of Anatolia is pure Mongolian.

Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanianism failed then to save Turkey from defeat.

We now have before us the interesting racial side of the modern Turks' propaganda and policy, the Turk and nothing-but-the-Turk, just as old Paul Kruger used to murmur gruffly, "The Taal and nothing-but-the-Taal." Turkish policy or thought aims at letting the non-Turks go. The loss of the Arab countries is a good riddance. They have expelled their Greeks and other non-Turks, though the Greeks had been in the land when the Turks were on the Steppes. They aim, as did Tekin Alp, at bringing into their fold the other Turki and Tatar races. What is to be the future no one can tell. Mustapha Kemal has thrown Islam overboard, and as the Tatar races seem not to hold strongly by any religion it may serve their purpose to have done so. It has been said in many quarters that Mustapha Kemal is a Moslem of Jewish descent, and but another instance of the evil influence of the Jew. But I understand that that is not so. Mustapha is a Turk, though, like so many of the more educated and better-class Turks who have so long married with the non-Turkish women, he may have little of the Tatar in his veins. His name is good Turkish, for Naffar Mustapha is the Turkish equivalent of Thomas Atkins. Mustapha aims, too, no doubt at reviving a Turkish Empire of Tatar peoples.

Ten years ago it was estimated that there were only eight million real Turks speaking Turkish in the Turkish Empire, out of a total of 27 millions speaking Turki, exclusive of the Chinese Empire. They are situated somewhat as follows:

The Tatars of Kazan on the Volga (1,600,000) included some of the Great Russians on the west and the Finnish tribes.

Tatars of the Crimea, 200,000.

Tatars of Western Siberia, 50,000.

Tatars of the Caucasus, Baku, etc., 2,000,000.

The Turkish-speaking peoples of Persia, including Azerbaijan.

The Tatars of the Caucasus and the Turks of Azerbaijan were once united as Turkish subjects.

The Turkish Khanates of Afghanistan, Cis-Oxus, only annexed to that kingdom in 1850-59.

The Tatars of Central Asia, 13,000,000, of whom 12,000,000 were in Russia.

It is to bring the greater part of these within the Turkish Empire of the future that Pan-Turanianism dreams. You are aware how on the borders of Afghanistan Russia has formed on Trans-Oxus four small racial soviets, of which three are Tatar (Usbeg, Turcoman, and Kirghiz, etc.) and one is Persian. Similar peoples live under Afghan rule *Cis-Oxus*, and it is understood to be Russia's aim to make these folk demand union with their kinsmen Trans-Oxus. This offers the more immediate possibility of trouble.

In Mongolia there is a slightly Russianized soviet, and it is im-

possible to say with China in her insolvable travail what the Tatar future there may be. Outside China the question is easier to see some future for, though it is quite impossible to say what will be the future of the Tatar races or how they will respond to the more extended Western ideas which are permeating them. Old Imperial Russia, however much we might dislike her as neighbour, was a distinctly civilizing influence, and Russian Turkestan and the Trans-Oxus provinces were kept in admirable order. With Russia in her present condition, a Turkish Empire, republican or monarchical, might be preferable to a Russian soviet as a neighbour. The Tatar races are there if someone can organize and pull them together.

Now, that is the story of Tatar dominion in Asia and its future so far as I can present it you in the space of a short lecture, and if I have been able to picture to you the romantic and rather weird side as well as the historical and political side, I may have enabled you to watch events with the greater interest.

Mr. GIBB: I am afraid it would be rather presumptuous for a junior member of the Society to analyze Sir George MacMunn's lecture, especially in the presence of Sir Denison Ross, who has studied the whole problem more than I. The lecturer has pointed out that first of all this Tatar problem is one of the biggest problems in the history of the world, and a problem which almost certainly no one person can ever encompass: it touches the lives of so many people at so many different points. Consequently, practically no one is able to do more than fasten on one small corner, try to find out what happened in that little corner and then apply his knowledge, and realize by studying that one aspect the general aspect of the problem. In studying, as has been rather forced on me during the last four years, the influence and the methods of the Mongol branch of the Tatars during the first of the expansions, under Jenghiz Khan, one does find certain things which probably are true of all Mongol expansions. First of all that expansion began in a very small way. There was a great deal of military ability on the part of the leaders; no one can possibly call in question the strategic genius of Jenghiz Khan and his great generals. But the way was made easy for all that, because they came up against enemies who, in spite of at any rate an appearance of power, were really powerless to meet their attacks. This was certainly the case with Jenghiz Khan, when his Tatars invaded on the one hand China and on the other Turkestan. It was certainly the case with his successors, who carried the invasion of China a little deeper, and invaded Persia and Russia. In every case they found a state of internal anarchy, more or less camouflaged it may be by temporary unifications under temporary leaders. I cannot give from memory the exact facts about Russia, which was the most striking instance; but in the two

hundred years before the Tatars there were about 243 states, all more or less ephemeral, and 293 princelets, who disputed the soil of Russia in something like eighty-three civil wars. It was obvious that in such a case the Mongols, who were united, and had a very strict military discipline and generals of extraordinary strategic genius, could sweep everything before them; and once a movement like that is started, then one may say without irreverence that it is only chance that stops it. It was certainly chance that stopped the Mongol irruption into Europe by the death of the then Great Khan. A very important point is the effect of these Mongol invasions on the countries which they conquered. There seems no doubt that they did find effete civilizations, and that those effete civilizations were unable to withstand them. They caused a break in the history of each of those countries—a break in the history of China, in that of Persia, and in that of Russia—and things after that were never the same. But they were unlike the Huns in Europe, who also caused a break in history. When the Huns' wave of invasion had passed away, it left a Europe split up into innumerable fragments, a condition from which it has never recovered to this day. The effect of the Mongol Empire was to restore something like unity to what had been previously split up into fragments. One finds after the Mongol period Persia is reunited under one central government; China is reunited, and has never been dis-united since until our own day; and Russia is united as it never has been united before under the leadership of one dynasty. The question naturally arises, how much of this benefit is due to the Mongols? Was it something which they brought that resulted in unification, some element which they introduced? Or was it that they left behind them something much more resembling a desert, that the breach which they had made with the past was so violent that it left the population stunned, and so at the mercy of the first strong man? The Mongols, whatever they were, were not civilizers, and yet they seem to have done a great deal for civilization in Asia. That is the problem which the Mongol Empire and which the Tatar Empire everywhere raised. They adapted themselves to civilizations, but were not civilizers and never civilized. How was it done? What were the moral forces which these conquests managed to arouse amongst those they conquered? (Applause.)

Sir DENISON ROSS: I feel I cannot possibly add anything to Mr. Gibb's remarks. I should only like to make one point that bears out what he said. I think there was every chance of Islam *qua* Orthodox Islam going to pieces had it not been for the Seljuks. This tribe of Turks, when they came in contact with Islam, were converted, though not very quickly converted, and when they came across Asia they came as Mussulmans, and were always most strictly orthodox; that is a very curious point today. The Turk knows no half-measures,

and he has but little imagination, so if he is a Mussulman he is an orthodox and thoroughgoing Mussulman, and when he abandons Islam he is just as thoroughgoing, as is shown by his adoption of the Swiss Code in place of the Koranic law. The fact which is more or less ignored is that the Islamic world might have gone to pieces but for the fact that these totally indifferent but highly orthodox Seljuks came and bolstered up the Khalifate. Thus we owe to a people who are neither artistic nor religious the fact that there was an Islam to oppose to the Crusaders and Christian influences. The Turks have been in recent times led to a very natural feeling, not of imperial unity, but of racial unity—a unity of all the tribes speaking Turkish from Lake Baikal down to Albania. It is a natural thing that where Pan-Islam failed, Pan-Turanianism should become the cry. It must be always remembered that the Turks were without any consciousness of this national or racial unity until the year 1897, when a French novelist, who merely meant to write a popular book, pointed out as the result of recent discoveries in Central Asia that the Turks were the same all through. He told of the decipherment of ancient Turkish inscriptions dating back to the seventh century, where the language was so little changed that you could, by the help of a modern dictionary, make out most of the inscription. Thus it was a Frenchman at the end of the nineteenth century who produced this racial consciousness amongst the Turks. The movement has had very little time to develop, but it is a consciousness they all enjoy, and it is getting now both a setback and an encouragement from the Russian policy. Those four Russian republics of which the lecturer has spoken are now developing, and in all of those republics a very curious thing is happening. These are Tatars of Central Asia; they speak dialects that have never before been put into writing or literature; and now for the first time in history each province of those republics is cultivating its own dialect. I have in my possession little books of kindergarten, short stories for children, little rhymes, and so on, written down in those dialects, which hitherto no one except lunatic scholars like myself has ever thought of recording. It is for someone who knows more about politics than I do to judge whether that is going to lend cohesion to the Turkish tribes or keep them apart. Whether the Russians are doing it to encourage a Pan-Turkish movement, or to encourage each man to cultivate his own dialect so as to prevent any such movement, it is curious that, although they are not actually inventing languages, they are making current and publishing newspapers in languages that have never before been reduced to writing.

The CHAIRMAN: I might say just a word before I thank the lecturer on your behalf for the very interesting lecture he has given us. He has made the old Khans of Tartary and the various empires which the Tatars established all over Asia and over part of Europe living entities

before us. The outstanding feature of it all was this: that the impact of the Tatar invasions was borne by Eastern Europe and particularly Russia, and now the reaction is proceeding from Russia back again to the Tatar countries. As Sir Denison Ross explained to us, it will be most interesting to see whether the movement which has taken place in these new republics, started or supported by Soviet Russia, will succeed in bringing together the various fragments of the great Tatar race or will split them up still further. It is very curious, but it is apparently as the result of a considered policy that Moscow has set itself to encourage this new language movement, and has sent out professors and savants into these republics to help to establish the dialects and prepare the dictionaries and other paraphernalia for linguistic progress. One thing that Sir Denison Ross said does not square with my own experience. He said the Turks were not imaginative, which is quite true, and that when they embraced Islam they embraced and adhered to it in its orthodox form. That is also true; not having the subtle mind of the Persians, they did not develop the various heresies which were associated with Islam in Persia. But what I want to say is that the Turks were orthodox, not so much from devotion to Islam, as from want of the imagination and intellectual subtlety which helped to develop the heretical views which were found in such profusion over Persia.

During the War a tremendous number of Mohammedans from Northern India went to fight the Turks in Mesopotamia and Palestine. I encouraged them to go. There had been some talk about a Jihad, but it fizzled out, and they went like men. When they came back I said to some of them: "What do you think of the Turk?" They replied: "As a soldier he is all right; he is not quite so good as we are, but still there is nothing wrong with him." I asked: "What do you think of him as a Mussulman?" Then they spat on the ground, and said: "Toba, toba. He is not a Mussulman at all. He does not go in for either prayer or fasting." (Laughter.) That rather accorded with my own experience. I remember coming across the Tatar Mohammedans of the Volga, Crimea, and Central Asia thirty years ago when Islam was really more potent and more orthodox than today. Coming from India and travelling down the Volga, at Nijni Novgorod and Kazan and in the Caucasus I was struck with the extraordinary laxity of the Tatar Mohammedans as compared with the Indians. In the refreshment cars, when they sat down to dinner, there was no hesitation in drinking any wine that was forthcoming. I remember seeing a big Tatar merchant in one evening between Samarkand and the Caspian put down at dinner four great bottles of beer. Apparently he considered that beer was not covered by the prohibition in the Koran.

One thing that struck me when Sir George was speaking was

the extraordinary tenacity of ideas among the people of India. He told us of Jagatai, the youngest son of Jenghiz Khan. All over Northern India where the Moguls ruled, the Moguls are spoken of today not as Moguls, but as Jagatais. You ask about an old ruin or inscription: "What period does that date from?" and they say, "It belongs to the time of the Jagatais." Jagatai flourished apparently early in the thirteenth century, and today in the twentieth century these people in Northern India still speak of the Jagatai dynasty, associating the various Mohammedan invasions of India with Jagatai and his descendants. That helps to illustrate what Sir George has very happily told us of the characteristics of this Tatar race. They were conquerors rather than civilizers. They had very little culture, and I think their religion was very skin-deep. At the same time, they have left their mark on the world in more senses than one. One historian, I think, said that wherever the hoof of the Tatar horse fell the grass ceased to grow. That is a poetic exaggeration because, as Sir Denison Ross and Mr. Gibb told us, they also had the faculty, wherever they imposed their rule on people, of leaving the country rather better than they found it; to some extent they gave it cohesion, whether that cohesion was due to the resistance of those they attacked or, as in India, due to their own powers of organization. The Mogul Empire was certainly the first organized empire India ever knew. It did more to consolidate the country and establish an administrative system than anything that happened there before the British appeared upon the scene.

We are very much indebted to Sir George for the delightful lecture he has given to us. It is a worthy close to our year's activities, and I will ask you all to show by acclamation your approval of what he has said and told us this evening. (Applause.)

EDUCATION IN IRAQ, 1927

By AGNES CONWAY

IN the words of the last Report on the Administration of Iraq, presented to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1925, the task allotted to education in that country is to bridge the chasm between a backward and illiterate population on the one side and an advanced form of government on the other. How backward the conditions still are, according to any European standard, is shown by the fact that one Government secondary school in Baghdad, with a boarding section, is sufficient to meet the demand for secondary education for boys in the capital, and that the total attendance at the five Government secondary schools in the whole of Iraq is 562 pupils. The Turks, in spite of a comprehensive scheme on paper, made no provision whatsoever for secondary education in Iraq, and imposed teaching in Turkish in the primary schools with the object of de-Arabizing the population. As a result every mature educated Iraqi today has received his training in Turkey or Syria, and the tradition of the Constantinople military school is shown by the way the Arab boys in the Iraq schools still spring to attention and salute on the entrance of a visitor.

The various post-war régimes in Iraq have thus had to create an educational system from the beginning. This must be moulded to suit the needs of an Arab country with a large minority of Kurds, whose language is unwritten, as well as an important Jewish and Christian population, previously entirely catered for by voluntary community schools. Arabic has been made the official language of instruction, except in the Mosul, Kirkuk, and Suleimani areas, where there are four Assyrian, thirteen Turkish, and six Kurdish schools. In a country where every small boy has herded the sheep and goats, driven the donkeys, or done some small job in the bazaar from time immemorial, anything like universal compulsory education is unthinkable. Even with a system of free primary education, only the boys of well-to-do townsmen and villagers can be enticed to a Government school. Fifteen thousand boys attend the 300 Koran schools kept in the centres of population by the mullahs or Moslem priests, who take the children as young as they can get them, pick up what they can in fees, and teach them to read and recite different parts of the Koran. As they are all at different stages of proficiency, class teaching is impossible, and the share of individual attention that each pupil gets

is necessarily small. There is no equipment whatever except copies of the Koran; the rooms in the private houses of the mullahs where the children are herded together on the floor are tiny, dark, and unventilated, and the rasping sound of the shrill voices of the whole school reciting different portions at the same time is deafening. Never shall I forget the pandemonium in one of these schools in the Shiah Holy City of Karbala, where the children are mostly Persian. Some of the Koran school infants may pass on to the Government schools, but the majority get no other teaching whatever. And even these schools do not exist for the Bedouin tribes in the desert, whose nomadic life prohibits any system of formal education.

It should therefore be a matter for congratulation that almost 40,000 children in Iraq are attending organized schools, and that these schools are becoming more efficient and better staffed year by year. The chief difficulty hitherto has lain in the dearth of adequately trained teachers. The one Teachers' Training College in Baghdad for primary and elementary schools throughout Iraq has 307 pupils, who are taught and boarded free of expense for two or three years, according as to whether they are to teach in a primary school of four or six classes, the latter being confined to the towns. They come from all parts of Iraq, where in theory they have completed a six years' course of primary education, which is planned to begin at seven years of age. The most striking fact about the college is the varying age of the pupils who share in the same classes. This was explained to me as due to the gradual improvement in the standard of the local schools since the war. The clever boy, who in 1920 at the age of seven was able to begin his education at a newly organized village school, is ready today at thirteen to enter the training college; whereas youths, who under the Turkish régime had had no chance of an Arab education, began to go to school after the war, and into the training college at the age of twenty or upwards. For the time being, therefore, the material in the training college is bound to improve, and the superiority in intelligence of the lowest class in the school is very marked indeed. Among the youngest training college boys some looked remarkably intelligent, although the curriculum at present is not such as to inspire enthusiasm. The need to turn out teachers quickly who are sufficiently equipped to teach in the primary schools, and supplant the 300 odd old-fashioned men who have had no training at all, is so great that the pupil is drilled and redrilled in the primary school curriculum to the exclusion of everything else. As he has had no secondary education, and his primary education may be scanty according to the varying quality of the local school, he probably leaves the training college able only to impart one definite, prescribed course of instruction. This deficiency will correct itself in time, as the boys are better prepared. At the moment considerable friction is caused by the arrogance of the

young trained teacher, who thinks he knows everything when he leaves the college, and is obliged to serve in a village school under an old-fashioned headmaster of long service and no training. But these headmasters are being replaced as rapidly as circumstances will allow.

Until the standard of primary education throughout the country can be raised, the question of secondary education is of minor importance. At present the demand for it is comparatively small, and the teachers for the five schools have all to be imported from Syria or Egypt. This in a country which, in common with the rest of the East, is passing through a stage of exalted nationalist feeling causes much heart-burning. A class at the training college for the further teaching of primary school teachers will gradually furnish the necessary supply for the secondary schools. The American Mission School at Basrah in its upper classes gives an excellent secondary education, and is a force for good unique among the schools of the country. English is taught in the fifth and sixth years of the primary schools, and throughout the four years of the secondary school syllabus. In the secondary school at Baghdad the command of English idiom and synonyms possessed by the boys is astonishing. The school textbooks, however, leave much to be desired. It was curious to hear an Arab boy read an old-fashioned, prosy paragraph from his reader about Henry I. and the *White Ship*, a snippet which can have meant nothing whatever to him, as English history is not included in the curriculum. I was told that suitable English textbooks for the use of Mesopotamian Arabs have not yet been written. The oleographs of French country life which decorate the walls of all the Government schools in Baghdad also seemed to me singularly unsuitable, but had been bought up in large quantities when the French exchange was at its lowest.

Throughout all types of schools the class teaching I saw was oral, and removed to the uttermost extreme in method from the Dalton system. The boys do no preparation out of class, and there was no sign of any independent work. The Arab memory is said to be more retentive than the European, and this trait, combined with an entire absence of self-consciousness, made every boy show off extremely well. They gave specimen bits of lessons, acted dialogues, and transposed long paragraphs in English into their own wording on the spur of the moment with aplomb and facility. The youngest class of the primary school, just beginning to learn Arabic reading and writing, was full of eagerness and enthusiasm under the hands of a skilful and exuberant graduate of the training college. The active, wide-awake personalities of these young teachers contrasted favourably with the lifeless-looking mullahs brought in to teach religion in the generous space allotted to the subject in the Government school time-tables. The children were learning by rote the reasons for fasting in the month

of Ramadan. One advantage was "to rest the intestines," ignoring the fact that they ate at night instead of by day. The Arabic language is taught thoroughly, and the Jewish and Christian schools, which have either become Government schools since the war or are State-aided, have been obliged to conform to the standard required in Arabic. Drawing and modelling are taught, and the pupils in the training college were turning out attractive painted pottery.

As yet there is no medical inspection in the schools; and it is to be hoped that the day may not be far distant when the ophthalmia so prevalent among the children of the country may be ameliorated by regular advice and attention from the school centre.

A large framed photograph of King Feisal in Boy Scout uniform hangs in every Government school. There should be a great sphere for the Boy Scout movement in Iraq, where as yet outdoor sports are almost non-existent. But the last report to the League of Nations states that the movement is lapsing into formalism, and might end altogether save for the momentum given by drums and a uniform. No tradition of discipline has yet been evolved among the boarders at the Government schools in Baghdad, and the boys consider themselves at liberty to appeal against the decisions of their Principal to the Minister of Education. The Iraq Minister has under him a Syrian Director-General, with whom he is not always on good terms; and there is an English Inspector-General with the power of an adviser. The Minister has generally been a member of the Shiah community, although there is a smaller field of choice of educated men among Shiah than Sunnis. In the Government of Ja'far Pasha, the Minister of Education was the only member of the Cabinet who wore Arab dress—a trifle in itself, but sufficient to mark his comparatively conservative tendencies.

The beginning of Moslem female education in Iraq since the war may have even more far-reaching effects than the education of boys. About four thousand girls in the whole of Iraq are now attending primary schools, and there are girls' secondary schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, and Amarah. An American headmistress experienced in the Near East has been appointed to the school at Baghdad, and has already revolutionized the physical condition of the children. They are, at least, no longer verminous, as were those from the most well-to-do homes when they came; and the spectacle of the whole school drilling with a certain freedom of movement, in clean washing frocks made by the girls themselves in school hours, presented a normal healthy appearance that augurs well for their future. A beginning has even been made to introduce games, and the girls play basket-ball twice a week. The standard of book-learning is naturally enough extremely low, and it is still difficult to find a sufficient number of girls in Baghdad qualified to attend a secondary school at all. No male inspector can enter the school without notice long enough to

enable all the girls to put on their abbas and veils, and until a female inspector is appointed it will be difficult to judge of the standard attained. The teachers at present are in the nature of things Syrian or Turkish, but the upper forms of the school are beginning to act as training classes for schoolmistresses; and a boarding section is in process of being built to enable the cleverest girls from the country to train for teaching. Night classes for mothers have been started at this school and in other centres in Baghdad, and the time may not be far distant when the staff in the girls' schools will be able to concentrate on teaching rather than on welfare work. At present a great deal of attention is paid to lessons in hygiene and the care of children, and also to kindergarten teaching, where the apparatus is supplied on a generous scale. Girls after their marriage sometimes continue to attend school. The essential incentive for their education is provided by the attitude of the Iraqi young man, who is no longer content with an illiterate and dirty wife chosen for him by his mother. At the American University of Beyrout, where there are nineteen women and over a thousand male students from different Oriental countries, the women experience none of the difficulties that confront them still at Cambridge, but are pushed forward on to committees by enthusiastic men anxious to encourage them in every possible way.

It is too soon to consider the prospects of an Iraq University. Even technical education is in its infancy, though there are over 200 boys in Government Technical Schools. The first Medical School in Iraq will probably be opened next year. A Law School, which existed under the Turkish régime, is confined to graduates from secondary schools, supports itself on fees and gives a four years' training in the law and kindred subjects. But Iraqis desiring higher education still for the most part turn to Beyrout, which has been brought within thirty hours of Baghdad by the cross-desert motor route. There are fourteen Government scholars at the University being trained as teachers.

The only institution in Iraq dignified by the name of a University is the Al el Bait, a Moslem foundation built by the Ministry of Awqaf (Pious Bequests) from its own funds. The first instalment of what is already by far the finest educational building in Iraq was opened by King Feisal, to whom the scheme is largely due, in 1924, and houses the Faculty of Religion in twenty-seven rooms and a great hall. The complete scheme contemplates the construction of a mosque and other buildings in which to house the various faculties of a Moslem University. The aim of the Theological School is to collect under one roof the higher religious classes at present conducted in the mosques and Medresahs of Baghdad, and introduce something of a corporate spirit among the students. The Faculty at present consists of fifty students and eighteen teachers, all specialists in some aspect of

Sunni theology. One of the large lecture rooms is used as a mosque, and as there is still a considerable amount of unoccupied space, the Government Engineering School has been allowed to lodge on the top floor. Here boys are prepared for posts under the Government in irrigation, surveys, and public works. The laboratories have as yet had no water laid on, but excellent work is being done in the Surveying Department. It is too early to prophesy the outcome of this University scheme, which has been conceived on grandiose lines.

The time can be envisaged when a sufficient number of boys will be educated to fill the clerical profession. The need of imparting some technical ability to a large portion of the remainder is imperative, and skill of hand is not natural to the Iraqi. The primary and technical schools are not as yet solving this problem, which is one of first-class importance. The tribesmen are untouched by formal education and live as in the days of Abraham. "How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough, and that glorieth in the goad, that driveth oxen, and is occupied in their labours, and whose talk is of bullocks?" With this question the report of 1923-24 ends.

RAILWAYS IN PERSIA

TRANS-PERSIAN RAILWAY

THERE is no abatement in the deep interest which the Persian people, in following the known aspiration of His Majesty Reza Shah, have shown in the construction of railways in their country since his accession. At first little discussed and perhaps less understood by the general public, His Majesty's enthusiasm has proved infectious until now the subject is regarded as one of paramount national importance.

It is recalled that before the War a British syndicate, known as the Persian Railways Syndicate, obtained a concession to conduct surveys from the Persian Gulf, but had only completed them as far as Shustar and Dizful when the Great War stayed their activities. Little further was then heard of railways in Persia until, after the occupation of Baghdad by the British, a single line, with the object of assisting the British troops pressing through Persia to the Caspian Sea, was laid from Baghdad towards the Persian frontier and had its terminus at Kureta (near to Kasr-i-Shirin) within the borders of Persia.

In consequence of the disorderly state of Southern Persia, the ancient trade route from Bushire into the interior of the country had been abandoned by Persian merchants after the occupation of Baghdad, and merchandise for Western, Central, and Northern Persia followed the route taken by the Army.

No onerous transit conditions were imposed by the British authorities in Iraq, and, as soon as the railway was working to Kuretu, Persian merchants found it an expeditious route and had prominently brought before them in a practical manner the advantages of railways.

The construction of this piece of line, ending abruptly just within the frontier of Persia, seemed to many to decide the route of the first important railway in the country. The Persian Railways Syndicate then sent out its engineers to continue the survey towards Kermanshah and Hamadan, having Teheran as the objective, with possibly a branch to Enzeli (now Pehlevi) on the Caspian Sea.

The survey to Teheran was duly completed, and it is believed the results of the Syndicate's labours are in the hands of the Persian Government.

Shortly after the accession to power of Reza Shah it became increasingly clear that public opinion was opposed to a railway which

would traverse another country before reaching its own, and an all-Persia route caught the fancy of Parliament, Press, and Public. Of the Persian Gulf ports, Bushire was unsuitable owing to its open roadstead, and the difficult passes to be negotiated before the plains, 4,000 feet above sea-level, were reached. Bandar Abbas also had an open roadstead, and the country between there and Teheran, through Kerman and Yezd, was largely desert and very sparsely populated. Mohammerah, at the mouth of the Karun River, had the advantage of being accessible to ocean-going ships and of offering a shorter land journey to the capital. The district through which it would pass on its way, either through Khuramabad or up the Diz Valley, to Sultanabad and Teheran, is amongst the most fertile of the country.

A large party of American engineers, headed by Mr. Poland, who reached Teheran in December last, has been engaged by the Persian Government to survey all possible routes, and the advantages of Mohammerah as the terminus of an all-Persia route were found to be strong. Unfortunately, it has two disadvantages which may, in the opinion of the Persian people, outweigh all that engineers have found in its favour. These are, firstly, its proximity to the Iraq frontier and, secondly, by reason of the water boundary between the two countries having, by an agreement concluded shortly before the War between Turkey and Persia, been fixed at low-water mark on the Persian shore. Search was then made, beyond the waters of the Shat-el-Arab, for a port where a near neighbour would have less opportunity of making the atmosphere oppressive should relations at any time become strained.

Bandar Dilam, almost opposite to Kuwait, with its open and windswept roadstead, is probably out of the question.

There is another inlet, however, which has received attention, though unknown to any not intimately acquainted with the Persian Gulf. Khor Musa, midway between Fao and Bushire, is referred to. It is guarded by extensive mud flats, and although the construction of a commercial harbour is said to be possible, the expense would be very considerable, perhaps prohibitive. Entrance to the Khor is said to be difficult owing to the low-lying coast line. There is a bar at the entrance, giving a clearance in the channel for four miles across of some 26 feet at high tide, which in itself is a lesser obstacle than existed at Fao before the Anglo-Persian Oil Company decided in favour of financing the dredging of the bar there. The width of deep water at the anchorage is, however, only 150 feet at low and 300 at high tide. This would not accommodate even the mail-boats.

Here, too, the southerly gales blow very strongly at times and inundate a considerable area of the low-lying lands surrounding the inlet. There is practically no population in the district and an absence of sweet water.

These few items will give some idea of the difficulties to be faced if Khor Musa is the final decision.

In the early part of the year it was stated that His Majesty the Shah was pressing for the survey work to advance more rapidly, and on August 1 the Teheran Press announced that surveys were proceeding in Mohammerah, Khor Musa, Bandar Gaz, Sabzavar, Nishapur, and Astarabad, and would take two years to complete; also that construction from the south on the one hand and from Bandar Gaz on the other was expected to commence on August 24. In the August 8 edition of the same paper, tenders were called for railway material, and it was mentioned that in due course the invitation would appear in European and American newspapers. It is understood that Khor Musa has practically been decided upon as the Gulf terminus, but there is still uncertainty whether Pehlevi or Bandar Gaz shall form the northern end of the railway. As political considerations would seem to have prevailed in the choice of Khor Musa, so Bandar Gaz may be selected rather than Pehlevi.

As regards the financial side, it is known that for many months the proceeds of the sugar and tea monopoly, estimated to produce some £1,400,000 per annum, have been placed on one side to meet initial expenditure. Should the Government decide to raise a foreign loan, it has this and its Anglo-Persian oil royalty, producing together perhaps two million sterling per annum, to offer as security.

It is at least questionable whether the sugar and tea monopolies will produce as much as seven million Tomans revenue during the second and following years. The natural tendency of extra taxation would be to decrease consumption for a period at any rate.

NORTH-WEST PERSIA

While national interest is centred in this Trans-Persian Railway it will be remembered that apart from the final section of the one from India (between Mirjawa and Duzdab) the only important railroad at present operating is one of some eighty miles in length, from Tabriz to Julfa on the Russian frontier, with a branch line from Sofian to Lake Urumiah, a distance of about thirty miles. The line is the property of the Persian Government.

EASTERN PERSIA

It may also be recalled that during the War the Indian Government extended the Quetta-Nushki Railway from Nushki to Duzdab, thirty miles within the Persian border.

Some two years ago Major Hall (American Provincial Director of Finances in Khorasan) drew up a report for the Persian Government dealing with the question of their extending this railway from Duzdab to Nasratabad (the capital of the province) a distance of some one

hundred and thirty-five miles, where it would tap a corn-growing area. Instead of a standard or metre gauge line it was understood the Government proposed to put down a Decauville Railway, the estimated cost of construction being one million Tomans (£200,000). The lowest estimate for a standard gauge with light rails was said to be half a lac of rupees per mile, with anything up to two lacs over the difficult ground, or, say, not less than £600,000 for the one hundred and thirty-five miles.

On this basis the above estimate for a light railway would appear too low.

No further action having been taken by the Persian Government, the North-Western Railway of India recently offered to build the extension themselves, but the Persian Government is said definitely to have refused the offer. This is in keeping with their known desire that railways in Persia should be Persian in every sense and free from any outside control.

If correctly reported, the decision of the Persian Government would seem to be short-sighted, as the benefits accruing to Persia from such an extension are obvious. Surely there should be means of so arranging the terms upon which the North-Western would construct the line, that Persia's ownership thereof would be unquestioned.

THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL MISSION TO PERSIA

It is with feelings of regret untinged by any traces of *schadenfreude* that members of the Central Asian Society, and indeed a far wider public in this country, have learned of Dr. A. C. Millspaugh's resignation of his post of Administrator-General of Persian Finances and of his departure from Persia.

It is understood that the immediate cause of his resignation was his inability to accept a modification, rather than a reduction, of his powers.

The facts, as set forth by the Persian Minister in London in a communiqué, are as follows:

"Five years ago a law was passed appointing Dr. Millspaugh Administrator-General of the Finances of Persia, giving him full and complete power in every branch of Persia's financial administration. An anomalous situation, however, arose. The provisions of the law were found to embarrass the Persian Minister of Finance, who alone—not Dr. Millspaugh—is responsible to Parliament.

"The new contract, which Dr. Millspaugh has rejected, does not really curtail his powers to any appreciable extent. Its aim is to make the position of the Minister of Finance, and indeed the collective responsibility of the whole Cabinet, in accordance with the law, more clear. Persia, of her own accord, without any outside pressure, gave his powers to Dr. Millspaugh.

"It is added that Persia's chief obligation—viz., the 5 per cent. sterling loan—was floated by the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1911, ten years before Dr. Millspaugh's appointment."

The correspondent of *The Times* adds, incorrectly and somewhat unworthily, that Dr. Millspaugh's recent refusal to increase the salary payable to members of the Majlis by £20 has not increased his popularity in that assembly.

Such a modification as that indicated in the Persian Minister's communiqué does not seem, at this distance, to be really vital—everything in such matters depends on the spirit animating the parties to the contract, and the personal factors involved, and we may safely assume that Doctor Millspaugh was forced by his knowledge of these factors to conclude that, whatever the form, the intention animating those who insisted on the modification was such as to make it useless

for him to remain. It is reassuring to learn that his resignation does not involve the departure of the other members of his Mission, and that the departmental activities with which they have been so creditably associated since the end of 1922 will not be curtailed, but will be continued under the supervision of the Prime Minister, who has temporarily assumed charge of the functions of the Administrator-General. But the general impression created abroad by Dr. Millspaugh's resignation is bound to be unfavourable to Persia. In quarters hostile alike to Persia and Great Britain the idea is being sedulously fostered that Great Britain decided "not to support" Dr. Millspaugh, which, it is further assumed, was equivalent to opposing him. This idea is, of course, entirely wrong; so far as it has been possible for H.M.'s Representatives in Tehran to exercise their influence in a question so pre-eminently domestic, it has been uniformly exercised in support of Dr. Millspaugh and his assistants, as he and they have repeatedly testified both in public and in private.

But there were obvious limitations to the exercise of such influence, which, if generally known, would, and in fact sometimes did, lay open Dr. Millspaugh and his coadjutors to the charge of being mere puppets of the British Legation, as in fact Soviet newspapers frequently described them. Had such a charge been generally believed, it would have been fatal to his influence with the Majlis. But, apart from such charges and counter-charges, British interests will suffer from his departure, though perhaps less than from his retention, as the Persian Government appears to have desired, as a figure-head, rather than as a power and a reality, as has happened too often to European officials in high office in China of recent years. For responsibility without the authority necessary for its exercise is a bad form of administration at all times, and nowhere more so than in countries such as Persia, where the central is often the sole effective authority.

The Shah and the Cabinet have taken a bold and a perilous step in dispensing with the official head of a Mission on whom only five years ago the Majlis unanimously conferred such plenary powers. But all may yet be well if the Minister of Finance and the Cabinet as a whole can rise to a sense of the new responsibilities that they have assumed, and can make the fullest and wisest use of the remaining members of the American Mission. The opponents of Dr. Millspaugh in Persia include in their ranks powerful personages whose motives in seeking to limit his powers were not always identical with their country's good. They have scored a notable success in the first round and will not be slow to follow up the advantage they have gained. Public opinion and the influence of the Majlis alone can hold them in check, and for this, if for no other reason, students of current affairs in Persia will watch the events of the next few months in Tehran with more than usual interest.

A NOTE ON TRANSJORDANIA

WHEN the misguided Turks were routed in the Near East, and some projects of the ex-Kaiser were by implication frustrated, a new chapter of surprises was opened for these historic lands. The region east of the Jordan, now called Transjordan, attracts but little attention; but for those who knew it when nominally under the paternal government of the Turk its prospects are of considerable interest. Happily for itself it has come under the British Mandate, and its security and well-being are being established. It has naturally been a cause of surprise that two comparatively small regions, separated by the Jordan, should not be united under one Government, as an outcome of the redistribution of territories. The reasons need not be recapitulated here.

At a meeting of the Society in June, 1924, Mr. Philby gave an interesting and amusing account of the early years of Transjordan. He referred to the promises made to King Hussein in 1916, and to the Zionists in 1917, and showed how by a compromise—which may or may not be regarded as final—the problem that had been created had been solved by dividing off Transjordan from Palestine, as a sort of sub-mandate. He believed, by the way, that the advent of the Jews to Palestine would be advantageous to the Arabs, as well as to themselves, having regard to their record in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Yemen, it being advisable to encourage the Jews and Arabs to come to an agreement in their mutual interests. Few, if any, will not concur in this opinion, and this is what we have been sincerely trying to do. From 1918 to 1920, when Faisal, son of King Hussein, lost the throne of Syria, Transjordan was part of that country. Then for some months there was a sort of interregnum. In April, 1921, Abdallah was made ruler of the country, Palestine providing political officers. But very shortly unfortunate incidents occurred, which presented difficulties, and in the autumn of 1921 Colonel Lawrence was sent out by Mr. Churchill to investigate and report. Having arranged matters, Mr. Philby was, by his advice, sent out to assume the rôle of adviser to the Emir Abdallah. In October, 1922, the Emir was invited to London, with his Prime Minister, Ali Riza Rikabi Pasha, to discuss matters, the outcome being that in May, 1923, the Emir was informed through the High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, that H.M. Government, subject to the approval of the League of Nations, recognized the independence of Abdallah, provided that the administration should be conducted "on democratic and constitutional

lines." Transjordan's independence was thus conditionally confirmed, the administration being subject to the control of the High Commissioner of Palestine. Lord Plumer is therefore responsible for its good government. At the outset the experiment was not successful. Abdallah's rule was arbitrary and extravagant, and by no means in accordance with British principles of administration. Misgovernment led, in September, 1923, to a revolt of the Adwan tribe, which was repressed by the Royal Air Force. Finances fell into disorder, irregularities increased, and it became obvious that a radical change was called for. During a visit from King Hussein it was suggested that his eldest son, Ali, should take over the Emirate from Abdallah, but this Ali declined to do. During these early years of the régime Mr. Philby regarded Palestine as having aimed at bringing Transjordania more and more "into its orbit."

In 1924 Lieut.-Colonel Cox, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.F.A., was appointed to be Chief British Administrator. He was eminently qualified to undertake the duties of an onerous post, possessing, as he did, a thorough knowledge of Arabs, in addition to an acquaintance with Arabic, and having already successfully administered several districts in Palestine, in all of which he gained the confidence and esteem of all communities. The chaotic state into which matters had drifted has now been brought into order, and progress is proceeding in all departments of the administration. Cordial relations exist with the Emir. The prompt punishment or dismissal of officials and others who have been found guilty of misconduct has been a wholesome lesson, and the people have learnt that the pasha and the *fellah* have now equal rights before the law. Various useful measures have been enacted, including one for the protection of the *fellahin* from unfair dealings by merchants.

Foreign relations are of great importance. At a meeting of the Society, when Mr. Charles Woods read a paper on Syria, Sir Gilbert Clayton laid stress on the need of genuine co-operation between the two Mandatory Administrations in Syria and Palestine. They should, he said, keep in close touch. Obviously Syria is of great importance to Britain. Similarly, Major McCallum, in a paper on the French in Syria, in 1925, said, "Of one thing I am certain, and that is that as long as France and Great Britain remain charged by the League of Nations with their present Mandates in the Middle East, difficulties will go on increasing unless France and Britain work together loyally and frankly in those countries." Co-operation between Transjordan and Syria has been equally needed, and appears to have been fully maintained by tact and goodwill on both sides. There have been incidents from time to time within the frontiers—permanent or provisional—of both regions, which might have tended to cause unfriendly feeling. In Transjordan, as in Palestine, after 1920, feelings

of hostility against the French were aroused, and the hostile element endeavoured as far as possible, especially after the bombardment of Damascus, to foster this hostility.

Having regard to the age-long habits of the Bedouin, it was inevitable that there should be occasional raids and acts of brigandage over the respective borders; but the various difficulties, as they arose, have been dealt with satisfactorily, and matters settled in a spirit of conciliation, either by payment of "blood-money" or otherwise. Possible causes of friction have thus been removed by prompt and judicious action. The Arab tribes, moreover, have been learning to their cost that camel looting is a dangerous game, and that brigandage and other irregularities will not be tolerated in the settled regions; and the desert tribes, for increasing distances into the desert, are being brought under control.

There has been no little trouble in connection with the Druse "revolt." Many Druses have by degrees come to settle in the Azrak oasis, situate to the east of Amman, where regions have had to be placed under martial law. Colonel Cox has evidently done all that was possible to control both the fighting and the refugee Druses, and to aid the French officers who have offered to deal quite fairly with them in the negotiation of conditions for return to their own country. They have now apparently been cleared out of the Azrak region, and have for the most part come to terms with the French, who must have appreciated the help given from Transjordan. It is to be hoped that, if good faith is kept in Syria, all trouble from that source should be at an end.

Then as regards the Wahabis, until recently serious trouble might at any moment have broken out, although in 1923 a Wahabi force which almost reached Amman was heavily defeated. For the present it would seem that hostilities are not to be feared, since Ibn Sa'ud and his followers have more serious matters to deal with. The future of the Wahabis is of course of much interest; and views differ much both in Moslem and non-Moslem countries. Some predict (as does Mr. Philby) that their increasing power will become permanent, and lead to the consolidation of a unified Arab Empire; while others doubt the ability of Ibn Sa'ud or his successors to accomplish the realization of such a dream. To those who seek to take a long view the future of all Middle East regions cannot but seem obscure.

As regards Transjordan in particular, the outlook appears to be a very hopeful one. Relations with the Emir Abdallah are all that could be desired. There are signs of progress in all directions, and the highest credit is due to Colonel Cox, whose guiding hand has brought about an abiding trust in British aims and policy. The people are keenly alive to a new feeling of public security, with all that it implies for the advancement of trade and prosperity.

R. L. N. M.

REPORT OF THE INDIAN SANDHURST COMMITTEE

"Better an army of asses led by a lion, than an army of lions led by an ass."
—*Old Persian Proverb.*

1. THE Committee was appointed in June, 1925, to enquire and report:

(a) By what means it may be possible to improve upon the present supply of Indian candidates for the King's Commission both in regard to number and quality.

(b) Whether it is desirable and practicable to establish a military college in India to train Indians for the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army.

(c) If the answer to (b) is in the affirmative, how soon should the scheme be initiated, and what steps should be taken to carry it out.

(d) Whether, if a military college is established in India, it should supersede or be supplemented by Sandhurst and Woolwich so far as the training of Indians for the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army is concerned.

2. The Committee consisted of Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Skeen, Chief of the General Staff in India, as Chairman, one British member of the Indian Civil Service, twelve Indian gentlemen of position and authority, and as Secretary a Major in the Indian Army.

3. The Committee held their first meeting at Simla, on August 12, 1925.

A Sub-Committee visited educational institutions of all kinds in England, and toured France, Canada, and the United States. A second Sub-Committee visited the Indian Universities.

The final report was considered and passed early in 1926.

4. Before 1918 Indians were not eligible to hold the King's Commission—that is, the commission which is held by the British officer of the British and Indian Armies.

In 1905 a special form of King's Commission in His Majesty's native Indian land forces was instituted for those Indian gentlemen who passed successfully through the full course of the Imperial Cadet Corps, but this commission carried only the power of command over Indian troops, and the holders of it, as they could not rise above the position of company officers in a regimental unit, had no effective military career open to them.

In 1918 Indians were declared eligible on equal terms with British youths to receive the King's Commission in His Majesty's land forces,

which carried with it the power of command over British as well as Indian troops.

At present ten vacancies yearly are allotted to Indians at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst.

5. As a result of their deliberations the Committee recommended that :

“ The scope of the employment of Indians in the higher ranks of the Army in India should be greatly extended, and facilities should be provided in India to train them for the King's commissioned rank. A substantial and progressive scheme of Indianization should be adopted, and, subject to the present standard of efficiency being maintained, should be carried out.

Such a scheme should provide for

(a) Measures doubling the number of vacancies of Indians at Sandhurst until an Indian military college on the lines of Sandhurst is established.

(b) Indians should be eligible to be employed as King's commissioned officers in the artillery, engineers, signal, tank, and air arms of the Army in India.

(c) That in 1933 a military college with an establishment at the start of 100 cadets doing a three years' course should be created in India on the model of Sandhurst.

(d) That 20 vacancies should continue to be reserved for Indians at Sandhurst after the opening of the Indian Military College.

Under the scheme proposed half the total cadre of officers in the Indian Army should be Indians in 1952.

6. These, put briefly, are the main recommendations of the Committee, and the means to obtain these ends, which are carefully thought out and elaborated, include subsidiary recommendations regarding education, age limits, publicity, methods of examination and selection, guardianship of Sandhurst cadets, and grant of commissions to certain classes who do not obtain commissions via Sandhurst or the Indian Military College.

7. Having decided that an Indian military college is necessary, the proposals for its inception are as follows :

(a) In 1928 the number of vacancies for Indians at Sandhurst be increased from 10 to 20.

(b) A further increase of 4 vacancies at Sandhurst per annum up to 1933, making the total number of vacancies in that year 38.

(c) The establishment in 1933 of an Indian Sandhurst with capacity for 100 cadets, to which in that year and each of the following years 33 cadets are admitted for a three years' course of training.

(d) When the Indian Sandhurst is established, Indian boys, who prefer it, continue to be eligible for admission to Sandhurst ; but the number of vacancies at Sandhurst for Indians is then reduced to 20 per annum.

(e) The number of Indian boys admitted annually to the Indian Sandhurst increases by 12 every three years, and on the assumption that all cadets are successful, both at Sandhurst and the Indian Sandhurst, the number of Indians commissioned increase correspondingly until, in 1945, half the number of officers recruited annually for the Indian Army consists of Indians.

(f) By 1952 half the total cadre of officers in the Indian Army are Indians.

8. Shortly after follows a statement to which particular attention may be given. It runs: "We have not attempted to carry the scheme beyond the point at which 50 per cent. of the total cadre consists of Indians, and we make no recommendation as to what rates of recruitment of British and Indian officers respectively should be after that point has been reached. *Again, we do not attempt to forecast the time when it may be possible to dispense with the British element in the Indian Army. We also, for the present, assume, generally, the employment in India of a quota of British troops.*"

So now we know that the ultimate aim of the gentlemen composing the Indian Sandhurst Committee is the total elimination of British officers and men from the Imperial Army in India.

9. The Committee, having thus boldly stated their objective, then consider the details by which the objective may be obtained.

They begin by stating that the first term of reference—i.e., "by what means it may be possible to improve upon the present supply of Indian candidates both in regard to number and quality"—implies that the number of Indian candidates who seek the King's Commission in the Indian Army, and possess the requisite qualifications for service in that capacity, is at present conspicuously small; the proposition so stated reflects a condition of affairs far from satisfactory, which might have been avoided, but which actually exists; that the profession opened to Indians by the decision of 1918 is unfamiliar and arduous; and that some special concessions will be necessary, at any rate in the first instance, to induce suitable candidates to come forward. The age limit has already been raised one year in order to compensate for the later educational development of the average Indian boy, due largely to his having to learn his lessons in a foreign language.

10. The present method of selecting candidates for Indian commissions is by selection, not by open competitive examination, special consideration being made for candidates from communities which furnish recruits—i.e., from classes with a military tradition—these selected candidates being permitted to sit for the competitive entrance examination, which consists of a written test, a medical test, and an oral examination. On the combined results of the three tests the final selection is made by His Excellency the Viceroy for recommendation to the Secretary of State for India for admission to Sandhurst.

11. Since 1918, 83 vacancies at Sandhurst have been reserved for Indian cadets, and for these vacancies only 243 boys have competed in India, and 16 Indian boys educated in England have been admitted to Sandhurst. The percentage of failures passing out of Sandhurst is approximately 30 per cent., whilst that of British boys is approximately 3 per cent.

These figures speak for themselves, and the Committee consider that the system which exists today has resulted in failure. The system is defective and must be attacked.

The causes of failure are ascribed to the fact that until eight years ago Indians were wholly excluded from positions of high responsibility in the Army, that there is on the part of Indians great and widespread ignorance of the possibilities of a career in the higher ranks of the Army, and to this may be added defects in the educational system in India.

Whereas the British boy of seven or eight years of age proceeds to a preparatory school and thence to a public school where he receives an education in which a great deal of attention is paid to character training and assumption of authority, thereby developing the power of leadership and spirit of initiative, these advantages are not provided in the ordinary schools and colleges of India, and consequently the Indian boy is in present circumstances handicapped in a sphere where general aptitude for dealing with and controlling men are of equal importance with purely intellectual attainments.

To counteract these disabilities it is desirable that education should be commenced at an earlier age, and that methods of education should be reformed.

With which pious hope, knowing the product of Indian schools and colleges, cordial agreement can be given.

12. The Committee also advocate that the present method of selection should be radically altered, and recommend primarily, as a general principle, that the basis of selection should be wider, and the method of applying for permission to sit for the entrance examination should be as simple as possible. They propose to allow applicants to deal direct with a single authority at headquarters of the Government of India, which authority alone should have power to refuse permission to attend the examination. Any boy who has passed the matriculation or equivalent standard should be eligible to apply to sit for the entrance examination after forwarding a certificate from the headmaster of his school or college, or tutor, that he is educationally, socially, morally, and physically suitable to hold the King's Commission, the application to be backed by references to two gentlemen of position and standing who have known him for at least three years.

To anyone with any knowledge of India the value of this certificate can be accurately gauged.

The central authority would as a rule consult these two gentlemen or make such enquiries as it thinks fit. If the candidate be found *prima facie* suitable, he, after passing a military medical test in the vicinity of his home, is eligible to present himself for the entrance examination.

Before proceeding let us examine these tests—they boil down to a certificate that the applicant is educationally, socially, morally, and physically suitable to hold His Majesty's Commission as an officer and gentleman; and who is the judge of his suitability?—his schoolmaster, not necessarily the responsible head of a college of repute, but the headmaster of his school or even his tutor! The value of such a certificate is absurd; it is not worth discussion.

13. Having been permitted to attend, the entrance examination will consist of two parts: (a) a written test on the model of the existing entrance examination to Sandhurst; (b) an interview before a board consisting of two military officers of the Indian Army, one educationalist, one non-official member nominated by H.E. the Viceroy.

The final nomination to be made by H.E. the Viceroy on the combined result of these two tests.

The vacancies announced for competition should be allotted to the candidate standing highest in order of merit.

Though it is not stated clearly, it appears as if H.E. the Viceroy can disqualify such candidates as he may think unsuitable, although they may have passed the test of the written examination and of the interview. The reservation that the vacancies should be allotted to those standing highest seems unnecessary—to whom else should they be allotted?

14. Besides those candidates selected as above, a certain number of vacancies, not exceeding 20 per cent., should be reserved for candidates nominated by H.E. the Commander-in-Chief from amongst those who have qualified in the two tests but have not passed sufficiently high to secure one of the vacancies open to competition.

15. The Committee admit that under their proposals there is a possibility of the examination being swamped by obviously unsuitable competitors, and therefore they propose, as a preliminary, that the candidate should appear before a local advisory board in the vicinity of his own home, this board to consist of officials, non-officials, and military officers.

This board should have no power to reject a candidate, but should merely tell him and the central authority in writing whether they consider him suitable or unsuitable.

But even if the verdict of this preliminary board is adverse to the candidate he can ignore it and still pursue his application before the central authority; of what use, therefore, is this preliminary board? Any youth swelling with his own importance or urged on by the

ambition of his parents will ignore the preliminary verdict, and the central examinations will be swamped with obviously undesirable candidates backed by a pundit's certificate that he is educationally, socially, morally, and physically suitable to hold His Majesty's Commission.

16. Now follows a recommendation full of class prejudice and an attempt to oust the sons of the one class which can produce the boys likely to make good officers. "In saying that the basis of selection should be wide, we mean *inter alia* that the preference for soldiers' sons, as a class, which is the feature of the present system of selection, should in future become the exception rather than the rule."

And yet this very Committee, when discussing the reasons for the failure of the system existing today in regard to the recruitment of Indians as King's commissioned officers, acknowledge that "the root cause—plain to see—consists in the fact that until eight years ago Indians were wholly excluded from positions of high responsibility in the Army, and the potency of this cause will be at once appreciated when it is remembered that in the United Kingdom the great majority of Army officers are drawn from families with traditions of military service and military distinction extending through many generations."

They acknowledge that the majority of British officers are of the so-called military class, yet they would have the majority of the Indian officers drawn from the Indian classes which are not enlisted in the Indian Army at all. These have no tradition of military service of any kind, and yet this Committee propose that they should be given equal chances for commission in the Army with those who have natural and inherited martial instincts. And yet again in another place the Committee state: "It is not our purpose or design that the number of Indian King's commissioned officers in the Army should be increased without reference to considerations of efficiency; we recognize that there can be only one standard of efficiency—namely, the highest."

17. The Committee then consider the question of cost of education and training, and after comparing the expenses of a student at West Point, St. Cyr, and Kingston with that of a boy at Sandhurst, they recommend that the fees at an Indian military college should not exceed an amount which can be paid without hardships by parents of the class which will provide most of the cadets—the upper and middle classes. The rate fixed should include all expenses in connection with the college course.

Certain suggestions regarding scholarships are also put forward.

18. The Committee recommend the abolition of the "eight units system." They state that the main reason given them for the adoption of this scheme was a desire to provide a means of testing the worth of the Indian King's commissioned officers. In time of crisis, it is argued, it might be that if Indian officers were mixed with British officers any shortcomings they possessed might be concealed, whilst if

they were put to the test by themselves they would have to stand or fall by their own merits.

The Committee object to this system on the grounds that to confine Indian officers to these units is an invidious form of segregation, that Indians who now qualify have family connections with particular units, and it is natural and laudable that they should wish to continue the family traditions as in the case of British officers.

This last reason is one with which the British officer will readily agree, but the Committee continue and state that there are "objections of a more concrete character. In the first place the test as formulated by the authorities is, we think, an unfair one and too severe to impose upon the first generation of Indian King's commissioned officers who already have sufficient disadvantages of other kinds to overcome," which being put bluntly implies that the Committee do not think that the Indian officers should be put in a position where their capabilities may be properly tested. And this is the considered opinion of a body of Indian gentlemen of position and authority. It is to be hoped that they are unjust to their fellow-countrymen.

There is, however, another really practical reason why the "eight units system" cannot be continued, and that is, that when all the appointments of company officers in the eight units have been filled by Indians—and this at the present rate of progress will be the case in the next two years—no further Indian officers can be posted to these units except to replace an unexpected casualty, until the senior company officers qualify, by length of service and merit, for selection as company commanders. This will mean an interval of some years, during which even the present intake of Indian officers from Sandhurst would have to be posted to other Indian units.

19. *The Case for an Indian Sandhurst.*—It may be admitted that sufficient Indians cannot be educated at Sandhurst, as that institution cannot admit more than possibly 5 per cent. of Indians until the effect of these numbers on the personality of the institution has been tested by actual experience, and that being so it is clearly advisable that India should cease to rely solely on Sandhurst for the training of Indian officers, and therefore it is desirable that an Indian military college should be started now and be functioning fully rather than it should be improvised hastily when war makes the supply of trained officers in large numbers imperative.

This is a really sound and efficient reason for an Indian military college.

It is recommended that the course at the Indian military college should last three years, of which the first year should be devoted mainly to academic study and the last two years mainly to military training, in order to give the cadets who are drawn from the ordinary Indian schools a better opportunity of developing in character and physique, and also that the academic standard attainable at the end of

the course should be so framed as to secure specific recognition from the universities, and to enable cadets, who for one reason or another are found unfit for commissions in the Army, to continue their education at a university without interruption and on a level with their contemporaries in age.

Thus a boy, who may have been granted a scholarship at the Military College, finding the "profession thus opened to him to be unfamiliar and arduous," may at the end of three years' training gracefully retire and continue his education in a state of life less exacting and strenuous. It will be interesting to see how many of "those Indians who do not belong to the so-called martial class" will accept a commission at the end of their three years' training. This scheme of training at the Indian Military College is allowed to be defective in one important point—it does not provide, save to a very limited extent, for that association between British and Indian boys who are preparing for a career in the Indian Army, which is a valuable feature of the present system—and it is therefore recommended that to complete their preparation the Indian cadets, having been commissioned, should be attached to a cavalry or infantry unit in the United Kingdom for a period of one year.

And so now we have the young Indian King's commissioned officer fully trained and launched on his career, and he must be, to have stood the test, a man, to quote Lord Gough, of "go and guts." We wish him good luck and success in the finest profession a man can enter.

20. Having examined the details of the report, it can be undoubtedly described as comprehensive, carefully thought out, and, in most of its deductions, perfectly sound. The scheme, applied to a homogeneous and united nation, could be accepted and tried with every hope of a brilliant success—but is India a homogeneous and united nation? It is not a nation, but a conglomeration of warring tribes—it cannot be called united, as is shown by the bitterness of its racial and religious quarrels. Above all, is this class for which this scheme is particularly framed, this class with no military traditions, and which so far has shown no particular wish to enter the arduous and exacting profession of a soldier, likely to produce efficient officers?

It may be that the middle-class youth may come forward in sufficient numbers and of proper social, moral, and physical qualities to enter the Military College, but will he "stick it"? After the first enthusiasm has worn off, and the dull monotony of arduous training, combined with a strict discipline to which the Indian boy is utterly unaccustomed, begins to pall, only those who are real soldiers at heart will carry on to the end of the college course. Even after he has obtained his commission he is not free, his desires must be subordinated to the will of his seniors, he must keep himself continually and adequately physically fit, and he will find himself handicapped socially. However popular he may be among his brother officers, and however equally they may treat

him on the sports ground and in the mess, there will always be the social question. When one man's womenkind are debarred from social intercourse with the womenkind of his comrades, can there be equality of social intercourse? These difficulties may be overcome in time, but they are difficulties which will have to be faced by the first generation of King's Indian officers. Apart from these minor social inequalities, has the Indian the power to rule with just impartiality the intriguing and warring clans with which the Indian ranks are filled. During the War the writer was discussing this question of commissions to Indian officers with an Indian, the son of a distinguished Indian frontier soldier, who had himself attained high rank in the Civil Service, and who upheld that Indians should be given commissioned rank. He was asked "if, as the colonel of a battalion, he had to choose for promotion to non-commissioned rank between a man of his own clan and another tribesman who had a better claim what his selection would be." He replied unhesitatingly that his clansman would be selected—what other course was possible? otherwise he would lose the support of his clansmen. Until the Indian can learn that efficiency is the sole test for promotion he cannot hold the scales of justice equally.

The Indian may demand equal terms with British youths to secure the King's Commission, which carries with it the power of command over British as well as Indian troops. The power of command may be given, perhaps, but the power to command can only be obtained by character strengthened by training, and the Committee agrees that this power is wanting, that the Indian is handicapped especially in a sphere where physical consideration and genuine aptitude for dealing with and controlling men are of equal importance with purely intellectual considerations. The Committee themselves give as their objections to the present "eight units system" that the test of standing alone and being judged on their own merits is an unfair one, and too severe to impose upon the first generation of Indian officers. Will the second generation of the unmilitary classes be more efficient? And in the meantime is authority and power to command both British and Indian troops to be granted to inefficient? The Committee themselves recognize that in the Army there can only be one standard of efficiency—namely, the highest—and yet they propose that by 1952 half the total cadre of officers of the Indian Army shall be Indians, and these will be Indians of the first generation. The lives of soldiers cannot be jeopardized because an untried class of men think they may, in time, acquire the power to command and control men, even if not in the first generation, then perhaps in the second. The enemy will see to it that there is no second generation.

21. As stated, the scheme is good on paper, the only fault is that it is too hurried; the boys who will make good and efficient officers do not at present exist in sufficient numbers in the educated middle classes who do not belong to the so-called martial classes.

The Committee themselves acknowledge that in the United Kingdom the majority of officers are drawn from families with traditions of military service and military distinctions extending through many generations, and yet they propose to replace them with those who have no military traditions, who are handicapped from their earliest youth by the nature of their education, who have not had opportunities of acquiring training of character by means of games and the throwing of responsibility by school discipline on the shoulders of boys. This replacement is to be carried through so hurriedly, that within the next twenty-five years half the cadre of officers in the Indian Army will be Indians ; and though the Committee are modest enough to decline to prophesy the date by which the British officer can be eliminated entirely from the Indian Army, they even go further, and suggest that the time will come when even the use of British troops in India can be dispensed with. Have the proposers ever studied history? Have they pondered upon the result of the evacuation of Britain by the Roman legions and the disastrous result to the unwarlike British? What will be the position of Pandit Motilal Nehru and Mr. Sinnah as the last British soldier leaves Bombay. We know the opinion of a distinguished Rajput Maharajah, soldier and statesman. Will the Amir of Afghanistan restrain his clans because Captain K. K. Bannerjee, barrister-at-law, argues convincingly against the immorality of might versus right? Doubtless these gentlemen know that this disaster is unlikely to happen during their lives, and the scheme for "gold braid on the breeks" of their followers will secure them present votes which well outweigh future disasters.

You may tinker with the Civil Service and place inefficient in important posts. When they fail they only hurt their own reputations, and the result of their errors may in time be corrected or concealed. Not so with the Army : want of knowledge, lack of authority or stamina, and the resulting disaster cannot be concealed or evaded ; not only the commander is involved, but the lives of his men are sacrificed, and the country's freedom threatened.

Undoubtedly in India there are boys with military instincts and traditions who will make very fine officers after proper training, the sons of the fighting clans of the Punjab, or of the Rajput Thakurs : these are the classes from whom the future leaders of the Indian Army should be looked for, not from amongst the sons of successful barristers and merchants.

The time may come when the Indian youth of the middle class may come forward in sufficient numbers and be fit to command, but not now, and not for many years. The end of this century may see it, the next century should, but in the meantime the British Empire cannot be endangered to satisfy the political aspirations of the leaders of the National Indian Congress.

A STORY OF STRUGGLE AND INTRIGUE IN CENTRAL ASIA

A BOOK entitled "Sturm über Asien, Erlebnisse eines diplomatischen Geheimagenten" (Storm over Asia: Experiences of a Secret Diplomatic Agent), by one Wilhelm Filchner, was published in Berlin in 1924. It was briefly reviewed in the Central Asian Society JOURNAL the same year (Vol. xi., Part iv.).

The writer traces the course of political developments in Central Asia from the end of the last century until 1923, with special regard to the relations of Great Britain, Russia, and China with Tibet. While much has been written on this subject by British writers, the fact that the author of this book is a German, who takes the Russian standpoint, gives it a peculiar interest.

The author prefaces his story by observations on the political awakening of the peoples of Asia as a result of the War, and declares that, though the downfall of Czarist Russia has greatly strengthened England's position in Asia, the end of the War and the formation of the League of Nations has led to a renewal of Anglo-Russian rivalry, which will henceforth be centred in Tibet.

The secret diplomatic agent whose experiences form the theme of the narrative is a certain Zerempil, who, like his master, Aguan Dorji, was a Buriat of Urga. Aguan Dorji is well known to the Foreign Department of the Government of India as Dorjiev, an active agent of Russian policy in Asia. The history of this latter is reviewed by the writer. After education in Buddhist theology, he attained high rank as a Lama; was employed by the Russian Foreign Office and Intelligence Service as long ago as 1885; visited all the capitals of Europe, and became an accomplished diplomat. When the present Dalai Lama came into power at the age of eighteen, it was contrived that Aguan Dorji should become his tutor. He gained his pupil's entire confidence, and was made chief Minister at Lhasa in charge of foreign and financial affairs. In 1900, at the age of fifty-seven, he was received by the Czar at Livadia in the Crimea as emissary of the Dalai Lama. Again, in June, 1901, he visited Peterhof as head of a Tibetan Mission.

Zerempil, the hero of the story, came under the influence of Aguan Dorji at an early age, when serving his novitiate at the Gandan monastery near Urga, and some years later was recommended by his

mentor to the Russian officials who were concerned with the political and military problems of Asia as a likely agent for their purposes. Hence it came about that Zerempil was taken to the Russian Foreign Office in St. Petersburg, then trained in the Indian Section of the General Staff for exploration and intelligence work. As he proved capable and trustworthy, he was sent on secret missions to remote parts of Asia, visiting Calcutta and Peshawar among other places. In January, 1900, at the age of thirty, he was again in Petersburg, and was put under the orders of Colonel Alexander Nikolaevitch Orlov for a special and important task. Indications are given of the elaborate precautions taken by the Russian General Staff to ensure the secrecy of their operations. Colonel Orlov took up residence in the Hotel Europa in the assumed character of a merchant named Bogdanovitch. Here Zerempil, who was ordered to avoid all open relations with military officials, would come secretly to obtain his instructions. In June he started on his mission, travelling disguised as an employee of a Chinese firm of tea merchants in Liang Chao Fu, under the assumed name of Trubchaninov. Zerempil's first destination was Tashkent, where he was to report himself to the Chief of the Staff of the Governor-General of Turkestan. He was informed that the general purport of his mission concerned the Anglo-Indian position along the frontier of Afghanistan, and he was ordered to proceed to Pamirski Post to receive detailed instructions. The account of the journey is given in the form of extracts from Zerempil's diary. He was fitted out with a riding horse, eight pack-horses with ten bales of pressed tea, and an escort of four Jigits.

From railhead at Andijan the party marched by Osh, crossed the Alai Mountains, over the Kizil Art Pass to Karakul Lake, and the Ak Baital Pass to Pamirski Post, which was reached on June 28, 1900. At Pamirski Post, which is described as the outpost for intelligence work to India and Afghanistan, Zerempil found two officers, Lieutenant Ivolgin in command of the post, and another, who was referred to as Professor Stungévitch, a short, keen-featured man, who was in reality the Chief of the Indian Section of the Russian General Staff, on a tour of inspection of the Russian outposts on the northern frontier of India.

While Zerempil is put to study the map of the frontier, this colonel is represented as giving to the commandant an appreciation of the political situation in Asia somewhat as follows :

Our General Staff and Foreign Office have certain aims in Manchuria which we hope to achieve all the sooner now that the Boxer rising has entered upon a phase that will probably lead to international concerted action against China. From this concerted action Russia as well as the United States of America will stand aloof. Nine days ago the German Ambassador in Peking was murdered by

the insurgents. The European Powers and Japan are planning combined punitive action against the Boxers, who naturally oppose the annexation policy of the European and Japanese "parasites." Russia will make use of this opportunity to strengthen her position in Manchuria. In Central Asia the Indian question engages our closest attention, and our chief aim is to drive our old rival, England, out of her Indian possessions. Before we can attain this end we must occupy the outworks of India. India is like a fortress, protected by the sea on two sides, and by a mountain rampart on the third. Beyond this natural rampart stretches a glacis of varying extent: it comprises Siam, Tibet, Pamir, Afghanistan, Persia, and Baluchistan. We Russians must get a firm footing upon this glacis before we can advance to the attack on the main Indian position. England has long been aware of the menace of our advance, and takes every opportunity to thwart it by establishing friendly relations with the peoples of the glacis regions.

For our Turkestan troops the north and west parts of the glacis are, of course, the most important; and the strategic lines of approach, especially the railways. England knows the advantage that Russia has in the Trans-Caspian railway—Krasnovodsk-Merv-Bokhara-Samarkand-Tashkent-Kokand-Andijan—soon to be joined up to the Orenburg-Tashkent line. Two main lines of advance lead to the Afghan frontier from this railway.

First, the railway from Merv to Khushk, where railway material is ready for an extension to Herat, which can be done in three weeks.

Secondly, the railway now under construction from Katta Kurgan to Karshi, whence the Afghan frontier can be reached by four roads:

Kerki to Maimana;
Kilif to Mazari Sharif;
Kilif to Pattar Hissar;
Hissar to Faizabad.

The English are well aware of the strength of our position. They reckon with the fact that we can occupy Herat before they could occupy Kandahar. They know also that the seizure of Herat would lay open to us the way to Kandahar and Kabul. They also know that it would be very risky for an Anglo-Indian force of any considerable strength to oppose a united Russo-Afghan army with the difficult Suliman range in its rear. The tribes west of the Indus are in great measure hostile to the British, so that the Indian Government would first have to bring these tribes into subjection. The British, conscious of their unfavourable strategical situation, are striving to improve and broaden their base in the South Afghanistan and Persian frontier regions. To this end the Quetta-Nushki railway is to be begun in August, 1902, and work has already been begun upon the extension towards Kandahar of the strategic railway Ruk-Shikapur-Sibi-Quetta-

Chaman, one of the greatest mountain railways in the world. England would by these means be enabled to move large forces into Southern Afghanistan from her base on the Indus.

It must be remarked that Nushki is only 230 kilometres from the Persian frontier, and the most likely line for railway connection between India and Persia, by Quetta-Nushki-Seistan, might lead on to junction with the Baghdad railway; also to the English constructing without much difficulty a railway by Kerman, Yezd, Kashan, to Teheran. The Quetta-Nushki line would thus form the first part of a railway that would bring the English on to the flank of the Russian line of advance against India. Russia would have to overtrump such a move by a strategic railway through Persia to the Persian Gulf from Ashqabad, though its construction would be extremely difficult and costly, as the line would cross all the mountain ranges of Western Persia at right angles. England meanwhile is determined at all costs to maintain her supremacy in Southern Persia. As England is thus strategically superior in the South Afghanistan-Baluchistan zone, we must find means to get the upper hand in other parts, especially with regard to the main approaches from India to Afghanistan; from Peshawar by the Khyber Pass to Kabul, and from Thal by the Kurram to Kabul. Measures have already been taken against the line Peshawar-Chitral-Faizabad-Hissar. As regards the routes to Kashmir, by the Khorabohrt, Killik, and Mintaka Passes towards Gilgit, we will do nothing, partly because they are by nature impracticable for troops in any force, also because we want to keep them clear for our agents.

We have successfully hampered the Quetta railway construction project, and are now taking similar measures with regard to the Khyber and Kurram roads. Steps have also been taken to win over the tribes of Swat and Bajaur.

Operations against the Indian-Afghan frontier south of and including the Peshawar-Kabul line are assigned to the 2nd Army Corps in Ashqabad; all the north to the 1st Army Corps in Tashkent. From the latter place special instructions have been sent to Pamirski Post, and these are now supplemented by a charge from the General Staff to you as Commandant to facilitate for one of our best agents named Zerempil the crossing of the Indian frontier south of the Pamirs, and help him in every way to perform his task, which is in close relation to previous instructions.

On completion of this review of the situation Zerempil was called in and his special task explained to him, together with a statement of the general scheme of which it formed a part. The most secret details were omitted, not for lack of confidence in Zerempil, but lest by any chance through his capture the English might gain possession of them.

The task now given to Zerempil was to march via Kizil Rabat to the Russo-Afghan frontier, and along it to the Bijik Pass. To this

point a Cossack escort would be provided. Then through Chinese territory to the Mintaka Pass, and by Misgar, Hunza, and Gilgit to Peshawar. From the last Russian outpost, Istik, a trusted guide would accompany him to the Indian frontier, where he would be met by other guides. He was warned to be cautious on the Karachukkur route, as there were Indian relay posts at Gilgit, Tashkurgan, and Kashgar. A certain Sher Mahomed was named as an agent in Gilgit who would help with transport to Peshawar. On arrival in Peshawar, Zerempil was to deliver at a given address explosives and pamphlets which were hidden in the bales of tea. The explosives were for use in the rising of the tribes of Swat and Bajaur. Further detailed instructions were to be obtained from one William Jones, agent of the Russian General Staff in Peshawar. All necessary papers for the journey in the assumed character were made out in the name of Li, in the service of the Chinese tea merchants Fei of Suchow. Zerempil's arrival in Peshawar was timed for the end of August, 1900, so that the rising in Bajaur and Swat could be brought about at the end of September, and would coincide with another Russian undertaking against Chitral by the Baroghil Pass, the Yarkand River, and Mastuj.

An account of the journey is then given, again in the form of extracts from Zerempil's diary. He describes crossing the Kizil Rabat and Bijik Passes, and being conducted by a friendly Hunza tribesman across the Indian frontier. The author then remarks that the courage and endurance that such a task involves remains necessarily unknown to the public in general, and only very few persons were aware that two short notices which appeared in *The Times* at the end of October, 1901, were closely connected with Zerempil's enterprise. One was from Bombay: "The rising of the tribes of Bajaur and Swat has been suppressed."

The other from Peshawar: "A magazine in the Chitral military area has blown up, probably from spontaneous combustion."

The writer now goes on to tell of very strained relations between England and Russia resulting from the capture by the British of certain secret agents of Russia who were concerned in the above-mentioned rising, one of them a man of Hunza who had long been wanted, and who admitted to being a Russian spy. The conflict was sharp in Parliament and in the Press. A note states that in the spring of 1901 Russia had 30,000 men at Khushk and 20,000 at Tashkent. Russia, of course, denied her agents, and, far from yielding anything, increased her activity and espionage. The Indian Government was compelled to take counter measures, sending "Pundits" on secret service to Russian and Chinese Turkestan, and taking other precautions.

It was now too that Russia began to actively concern herself with the Indo-Tibetan frontier as another vulnerable point, knowing through

the Indian branch of the General Staff that relations between the British Government and Tibet were very strained. The problem was very different from that of India's north-western frontier with the Russians in touch on the Pamir. Tibet was separated from Russian Siberia by the Gobi desert, while India immediately bordered upon the populous part of Tibet with Lhasa the capital, though the great obstacle of the Himalayas stood between. The British, having developed trade routes over the passes, had means of access which gave them a great advantage over the Russians. Nevertheless the Operations Department of the Russian General Staff was not to be deterred from making trouble on this frontier too. It was decided to strengthen the Tibetan Government against the British by supplying them with arms. Again the energetic Colonel Orlov, of the Russian General Staff, was selected for the duty of transporting arms from Urga to Lhasa. Two caravans were organized; the larger, with 200 camel loads of rifles, was conducted by Colonel Orlov himself, with some officers of the espionage bureau of the General Staff. It was declared to be a scientific expedition, and marched from Urga through the Gobi, by Tsaidam and the Tong La to Lhasa.

Another caravan was entrusted to Zerempil, to proceed from Urga via Kuku Nor, Tosson Nor, and Oring Nor to Lhasa. His party numbered forty, including twenty Cossacks, and they had fifty-five horses and 200 yaks laden with rifles and ammunition and small mountain guns. Zerempil travelled under an assumed name as a Mongol merchant.

In his account of the difficulties and hardships of the long march the author evidently strays from the path of history into the region of romance. He describes a series of adventures with the sensationalism of a film producer. In all of these Zerempil is the hero, especially as a sportsman with the rifle, although an orthodox Buddhist of high-priestly rank! In the end he reaches Lhasa with a depleted caravan on November 12, 1902, where Orlov had arrived before him.

Here Zerempil found his old master Aguan Dorji as War Minister actively engaged in organizing for war with the British, and arranging for the transport of arms to Nepal. Under his orders Zerempil started a factory of Martini Henry rifles, jingals, etc. To the activities of these two men is ascribed the development of a situation which at length led to armed intervention by the Government of India to re-establish their waning influence in Tibet. It is recalled that the Indian Foreign Department had maintained almost unbroken touch since 1866 with affairs in Lhasa and Tibet by the sending of agents such as Pundits A. K. and Nain Singh, by Montgomery's reports, and other sources. Latterly the Government of India had been kept well informed about Russian aims, and knew that the agent of their active Tibetan policy, Aguan Dorji, was a formidable opponent. It was he who as adviser to

the Dalai Lama had persuaded the Tibetan Government to refuse to recognize the agreement between Great Britain and China regulating commercial relations with Tibet, and he was chiefly instrumental in concluding a secret treaty between Russia and Tibet. In addition to all this, certain Englishmen who entered Tibet were held prisoners. Letters of protest from the Government of India to the Dalai Lama in 1900 and 1901 were at Aguan Dorji's instance returned unopened. The journeys of this latter to Livadia and Peterhof, together with his personal influence over the Dalai Lama, must be regarded as closely connected with the acquisition by Russia of complete ascendancy in Tibet to the exclusion of Great Britain. In 1902 England made strong representations to the Government of China, knowing that they would not willingly acquiesce in such interference with their authority over Tibet. This step, however, had no real effect. It became known that a secret treaty had been concluded between Russia and Tibet, and the Raja of Nepal informed the Government of India that the Dalai Lama had called upon him for armed support in action against them. Under such circumstances a declaration was made by the British Foreign Secretary in Parliament on February 18, 1903, as follows:

"Lhasa is situated close to the northern frontier of India, and more than 1,600 miles from the Asiatic dominions of Russia. The sudden interest of Russia in these regions immediately bordering on British territory cannot fail to exercise a disturbing influence upon the inhabitants of that territory, or to create the impression that British influence was giving way to the advance of Russian influence in regions where the latter had hitherto been unknown. Our Government has even been informed of the conclusion of an agreement by Russia for the establishment of a protectorate over Tibet."

This warning had no effect in checking the activity of Russia through Aguan Dorji, but to preserve an appearance of right the Russian Ambassador on April 8 made a communication to Lord Lansdowne denying the existence of any agreement about Tibet or any intention on the part of Russia of interfering with Tibet, but declaring that the Russian Government could not remain indifferent to a serious disturbance of the existing situation in that country, and in the event of such disturbance might be compelled to take such steps as they thought fit to defend her interests.

Lord Lansdowne replied to the effect that the proximity of Tibet to India made it unavoidable that the Government of India should exercise some influence in that country, and that while there was no thought of annexation, Great Britain would stand by her treaty rights. As a sequel to this declaration the British Mission under Colonel Younghusband crossed the frontier to Khamba Jong in July, 1903, for the purpose of coming to an understanding with the Dalai Lama. The story is told of the evasions and prevarications with which the

Mission was met by both Tibetans and Chinese, until in November, 1903, the Government of India decided that nothing could be effected otherwise than by a resort to force. The brigade under General Macdonald was therefore mobilized to occupy the Chumbi Valley, with Colonel Younghusband in political charge. The Russian Ambassador in London was notified of this decision by Lord Lansdowne on November 7, and at the same time informed that the action rendered inevitable by the attitude of the Tibetans was not to lead to a prolonged occupation of their territory or interference in their affairs.

The formal ground for the despatch of the expedition was the non-fulfilment of the treaty concluded between Great Britain and China in Calcutta in 1890, especially as regarded the clauses that required all fortifications between the Indian frontier and Gyantse to be demolished, and that forbade the transfer of any Tibetan territory to a foreign Power without the consent of Great Britain.

Russia, taken aback by the unexpected action of Great Britain, could only meet it by violent protests through her Ambassador in London. Lord Lansdowne's reply was prompt and to the effect that it was strange that such protests should come from a Power which had repeatedly annexed the territory of its neighbours on the lightest excuses, and that if Russia had a right to complain of England invading Tibetan territory to obtain satisfaction for flagrant breaches of good faith, how much more would England be justified in complaining of Russia's aggressions in Manchuria, Turkestan, and Persia!

The British Government was able to act with all the more confidence in the knowledge that the increasing acuteness of the Manchurian and Korean questions must soon involve Russia in conflict with Japan, and effectually divert the former from opposition to the British in Tibet.

The Russian Government, being unable to actively support the Tibetans herself, gave urgent instructions to Aguan Dorji to organize defensive measures against the British from Lhasa. He sent Zerempil to Phari with orders to arrange for getting information and to put any difficulties he could in the way of the British advance. On December 18, 1903, Zerempil reported that British forces had crossed the frontier by the Jelap La on the 11th and 12th and were advancing on Yatung. On the 19th Phari was evacuated under Zerempil's direction before the advancing enemy.

On January 8, 1904, the Tibetan advanced guard was driven back from Tuna. It was Zerempil who sent a deputation on January 23 to the British Commander at Phari demanding his withdrawal, and warning him of what awaited him if he ventured upon a further advance. His emissaries reported the British entrenched at Phari, awaiting reinforcements and more clement weather. The resumption of the British advance at the end of March was followed by the defeat

of Zerempil's troops at Guru with a loss of 300 killed. Their failure is attributed to their being armed with muzzle-loaders, flintlocks, spears, swords and shields, bows and arrows; the troops armed with modern rifles being kept back at Gyantse Jong for the defence of the main position at Tsechen, covering the junction of roads to Shigatse on the one hand, and Lhasa on the other. Zerempil is now represented as preparing this main position for defence. It is described as a strong position on a ridge 600 yards long crowned by the Fort, with the village behind in the valley and the Tsechen monastery beyond. On April 11 the British Commander sent a demand to the Chinese General Ma in command of the troops to surrender. On his refusal, the English are said to have seized him as a hostage, whereupon, contrary to Zerempil's will, the position was surrendered.

The story goes on to relate that on May 3 two-thirds of the British force with all the guns and machine-guns marched away from Chang La, the British camp south of Tsechen, to seize the Khari Pass on the road to Lhasa. Zerempil seized the opportunity to attack the weak remainder at Chang La on May 5, compelling them to retreat to the so-called "Citadel," where they resisted desperately "to escape threatened annihilation, falling into the hands of the Tibetans and being cut to pieces." While the British recalled some of their troops from the Khari Pass, Zerempil received reinforcements from Shigatse. In response to his call to a holy war to defend the sacred city of Lhasa, supports poured in from all parts, especially from Kam, and Mongols from the north.

Thus strengthened Zerempil attacked Gyantse on May 3, and made attempts to raid the British communications. Although unsuccessful in these attempts, Zerempil is represented as defending the Jong with 7,000 Tibetans against Macdonald's attack on June 28.

After a sanguinary conflict Zerempil sued for an armistice till the 30th. A graphic account is given of the renewal of the attack, and the prolonged defence by the Tibetans, until on July 6 the explosion of the magazine in the Fort put an end to the defence.

Zerempil, gathering what troops he could, hastened to Lhasa to stand by the Dalai Lama and prevent his falling into the hands of the British. In the Po-ta-la, "the Vatican of the Dalai Lama," everything was ready for his flight via Tengri Nor to Urga. When General Macdonald at the head of the British troops entered Lhasa on August 3 the Dalai Lama had fled, accompanied by Agvan Dorji, the arch-enemy of the British, and Zerempil. Pursuit was useless, for elaborate precautions had been taken to ensure secrecy as to the direction taken. Any attempt would have to be made in considerable force owing to the hostility of the Lamas and the people.

As there was no one with whom to negotiate, the British Commander was in a dilemma. At length, on August 20, Tipa Rimpoche

was induced to come from Kaldan and endeavour to set up a provisional Government.

The Tashi Lama was to be the head, with Tipa Rimpoche and the Chinese Amban as members.

The Tashi Lama, though a respected religious leader, was quite inexperienced in political matters. Tipa Rimpoche was a trusted Minister of the Dalai Lama, who had entrusted him with the great seal of State, but with strict injunctions that under no circumstances was he to use it. The Amban was a man without any great standing or influence. Macdonald (instead of Younghusband) is represented as negotiating with these three, and finding no difficulty in imposing his will upon them. The result was a new treaty entirely to the advantage of the British. The conditions need not be recapitulated here. The writer sarcastically remarks that the signing of this "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" made Tibet the vassal of England.

The Chinese Government protested, recalled the incapable Amban, declared the Dalai Lama dethroned, and transferred the direction of the mundane affairs of Tibet to the Tashi Lama and his officials. The British Expedition started on the return march to India on September 23, 1904. This chapter concludes with remarks upon the greatly enhanced prestige of Great Britain in the eyes of Asiatics as a result of the occupation of Lhasa, and upon the shifting of the political centre of Central Asia from the Pamir to Tibet.

(To be continued.)

NOTE AFTER GOING TO PRESS.—In connection with the foregoing story, special interest attaches to a message from the British Resident in Sikkim which appeared in *The Times* on August 30, and has now been confirmed in *The Times* of September 20. It reports the murder in June of this year by Lamas in Eastern Tibet of a party of missionaries who were within ten marches of Lhasa, on their way from Western Khansu to seek safety in India. The names are given as Mr. Mathewson, of the China Inland Mission, an American named Plymmer, and a German scientist named Filchner. There seems to be no doubt that this last was the author of the story of Zerempil. Reference to the Berlin "Who's Who" shows Wilhelm Filchner to have been born in 1877; attached to the Great General Staff as a Captain; retired from the army and became a traveller and explorer; visited the Pamirs in 1900; led a German-Tibet expedition in 1903, an Antarctic expedition in 1910-12; was to have accompanied Amundsen on his North Polar Expedition, but was prevented by the outbreak of the war. The record begins again in 1920 with the enumeration of Filchner's works, including mapping of North-East Tibet and parts of China.

THE STORY OF SYED AHMED, MOSS-TROOPER, FREEBOOTER, SAINT, AND CRESCENTADER.

BORN in the district of Rai Bareh in the sacred month of Muharram 1201 A.H. or 1786 A.D., Syed Ahmed began life as a horse-soldier in the service of Amir Khan Pindari, afterwards Nawab of Tonk. Early in the nineteenth century the strong administration of Ranjit Singh made it difficult for bandits to pursue their trade, and about 1815 Syed Ahmed gave up a robber's life and went to study the sacred law under Shah Abdul Aziz, at Delhi. After three years' training he started forth as a preacher, and at Rampur he obtained an enthusiastic following among the descendants of those very Rohillas who "John Company" fifty years before had lent troops to destroy. Syed Ahmed boldly attacked the abuses which had crept into the Islamic faith, and preached a return to the pure and simple puritanical religion of Mohammed. In A.D. 1819 he returned to Delhi, where he met one Maulvi Ismail, a nephew of Shah Abdul Aziz, who was noted for his learning, knowledge of philosophy, mathematics, and the traditions, and who had written a treatise in Arabic on logic. The Maulvi came of a family well known for literary accomplishments and religious enlightenment, and which traced its descent from Omar, the second Khalif. Greatly troubled by the abuses and innovations which had crept into the doctrines of the true faith amongst his co-religionists in India, he started preaching in the grand mosque at Delhi on the unity of God, and against idolatry. At the same time he wrote the *Takwiyat-al-Iman*, a clever treatise. Syed Ahmed appears to have had a wonderful influence over Ismail, who with his cousin, Abdul 'Hai, became not only the devoted followers, but the trusted lieutenants and companions of the Syed during the remainder of a life full of adventure and incident.

On the advice of Shah Abdul Aziz, having made numerous proselytes at Delhi, the three friends decided to go on a preaching tour, and then to proceed on the pilgrimage to Mecca. They started in A.D. 1820, and journeyed slowly southwards, gathering a number of followers on the way, the Syed being treated with extraordinary reverence, and his spiritual dignity becoming firmly established. At Patna the movement assumed such large proportions that a long stay was necessary in order to develop some systematic form of government. Four Khalifs or vice-regents were appointed as well as a high priest, and having formed a permanent centre at Patna they moved on to Calcutta, making con-

verts and appointing representatives at every place of importance. Success was immediate in the capital, and finding it was impossible to go through the ceremony of initiation by the separate laying on of hands, the Syed's turban was unrolled and everybody who even touched it became a disciple.

In 1882 the Syed with his most intimate companions embarked at Calcutta to proceed on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and having completed the necessary ceremonies visited Medina.

It was doubtless while on this pilgrimage that the religious fervour of the old moss-trooper, fanned by association with the burning zeal of the Wahabis, was turned into the fighting spirit of the Crescentader.

From 1811 to 1818 there was a bitter struggle between the Arab Puritans and Pasha Mahomet Ali of Egypt, and when the Wahabi leader had perforce to surrender under promise of honourable treatment for himself and followers, he was sent to Constantinople, where the Sultan had them beheaded after cruel torture and insults. There is no doubt that long before Syed Ahmed first went to Delhi there had been much heart-searching and questioning over the events in Arabia and the news of the great reform preached by Abdul Wahab.

It is not difficult to understand how profoundly a man of the Syed's temperament must have been affected by close association in Arabia and Turkey with the new movement, and his strong sympathies awakened with the endeavour to make the purged Faith triumphant. He evidently saw that it was only through the hardier and more martial races of the North that he could hope to resist the two heretical powers who were dividing up Hindustan, and so prevent the eclipse of the Mohammedan Empire.

It must have been a bitter blow to his hopes when he failed to get whole-hearted support from Afghanistan proper in his endeavour against the Sikhs, and from India only meagre subscriptions, with, for such a great project, only an infinitesimal number of recruits. Still, as will be shown, he was able to create an unprecedented religious enthusiasm amongst the wild border tribes, which, however, cooled down when he failed to recognize the difficulties of administration.

From Medina the Hajjis proceeded to Constantinople, where it appears they were very successful, being received with great distinction and adding not only largely to the number of their disciples, but accumulating presents worth some eight or nine lakhs of rupees. After four years' travel the party returned to India.

Again settling at Delhi, the Syed lodged in the Akbar-Abadi Masjid, while Maulvi Ismail used his great eloquence and learning in preaching. They made periodical tours throughout the country preaching Jihád (religious war) and finding many converts among the religious enthusiasts and bigots scattered over Hindustan, who were anxious for the preservation of their religion in its pristine integrity. Although

many amongst the learned and influential accepted the Maulvi's teaching as well as amongst the poor and ignorant, still the principal opponents of the new movement were the regular orthodox Maulvis and the Khadims of the various tombs of the Mohammedan saints.

At last the local authorities got alarmed and prohibited public meetings, thus causing a decided check and preventing further progress in India for some time.

: About 1827 the leaders proceeded to Peshawar via Jesalmir, Sind, and Kabul, receiving considerable pecuniary aid from the Chief of Tonk and other men of note, while many small parties moved up in disguise from India to join the standard, as well as numbers of Afghans.

The Syed with his host now settled in Yusufzai, published a manifesto under the seal of Amir-al-Muminin declaring war against the Sikhs, and while describing all their great cruelties, oppressions, and insulting tyranny to the Faith, called on all Muslims to join his standard. The proclamation was sent throughout India and with a rousing call amongst all the frontier tribes. Ranjit Singh, the "Lion of the Punjab," was not unprepared, and his best generals were with an entrenched army at Attock. The Ghazis surrounded the Sikh force, and reduced it to such straitened circumstances that the leader, Budh Singh, determined to attack, but he first sent word to the Durani Sardars to keep aloof, warning them of the fate they might expect at the hands of Ranjit Singh, who was now approaching. The Duranis, with their usual treachery, deserted at the commencement of the battle, thus causing the Pathans to lose heart and put up a poor fight against the excited Sikh troops, who slew a large number.

The Prophet, with the remnant of his fanatics, retired into the mountains of Swat, from where he made continual raids; but the Pathans still believing in his miraculous power, he was enabled in a few months to return to Yusufzai. Yar Muhammed, Governor of Peshawar, supposedly at the instigation of the Sikh ruler, attempted to poison the Syed, and this so enraged the highlanders that they flocked again to his standard and enabled him to inflict a severe defeat on the Duranis at Zaida. In the attack Yar Muhammed, the Governor, was mortally wounded.

Peshawar was only saved by the presence of General Ventura with a large force, and the Syed therefore turned his attention to Amb, which on the flight of the Chief, he occupied and strengthened. His influence now spread far and wide, even to Kashmir, and the discontented from every State in Northern India flocked to join him. The Duranis, having received help from Kabul, again attacked him, but suffering a severe defeat at Hoti Mardan, fled to Peshawar, closing the ferries behind them. Following them up, the Syed entered into negotiations with the Sardars, and as a result Peshawar was handed

over to him. Leaving a representative in the city he retired to Panjtar, and avoiding all stately pretensions outwardly lived the life of a religious recluse, devoted to prayer and fasting. Meanwhile he had himself proclaimed Khalif and minted coins with the inscription : " Ahmed the Just, Defender of the Faith ; the glitter of whose sword destroys the infidels." It is at this point that the Syed, apparently intoxicated by his success, made his big mistake, which showed that though he was a great religious leader he had little political acumen. Like so many others of his countrymen he failed to understand the Pathan psychology, and not content with levying heavy taxes and having his spies and agents everywhere to see that the strict rules and codes of his puritanical reforms were obeyed, he, ignoring the Pathan code of honour, ordered them to cease taking a bride price for their daughters, and also to give damsels to his down-country Indian followers. This was more than the Pathans could stomach, and they determined to throw off the now burdensome yoke. A wonderful conspiracy was formed, and the word went round : " Let every man kill his sacrifice at the hour of prayer on . . . day." The plot was entirely successful, and at a given signal the bonfires were lighted in the hills, and all of the Syed agents, of whatever degree, to the number of several thousands, were murdered.

Assisted by a few faithful followers the Syed was able to escape to the Pakli Valley. His reign was over, and his wonderful ascendancy of a short duration ended as far as the Pathans were concerned, though Hindustanis still flocked to him in his new settlement. In 1831 a Sikh force attacked him and but few escaped. The Syed, Maulvi Ismail, and the survivors of the great massacre among his immediate following were all slain.

A small remnant under Mir Wali Mohal, the Syed's nephew, who had been away in Kashmir, settled at Sittanah on the Indus ; sometimes they were decreased to a handful by disagreement and desertion, and at others swollen to large numbers by recruits from India in periods of unrest or political tension. With varying fortune this small colony has lasted to the present day, always seditious and a focus for trouble, joining in every frontier rising by furnishing a quota of fanatical swordsmen. Indeed, during and after the Mutiny, more especially in the Ambela campaign in 1863, the colony has been a distinct factor in every anti-British movement on the border.

ALIF SHABNAM.

ANNIVERSARY MEETING

THE Anniversary Meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Wednesday, June 8, Sir Michael O'Dwyer (Chairman of Council) presiding.

The annual report was read by Major-General Sir William Beynon, the HONORARY SECRETARY: Sir Michael, Ladies and Gentlemen—Under Rule 35 the yearly report has to be made at the Anniversary Meeting, and I propose to give you a very short résumé of the work that has been done during the last year. At the last meeting Sir Raleigh Egerton gave a valuable and succinct account of the origin and work of the Society from its inception up to last year, and I think I may truthfully say that the work of the last year has been carried on with equal success—and that now the Society has become virile, vigorous, and to a certain extent influential. We have at the present moment over 1,000 members. We have had our losses during the year. I am sorry to say we have lost five members by death—Field-Marshal Sir Arthur Barrett, Sir James Walker, General Beresford Lovet, Dr. Perry, and Mr. Waley—and apart from these losses there have been twenty-three members who have resigned.

Twelve papers have been read before the Society, covering practically the whole of Asia from Syria to China, and we have even overflowed our borders and crossed the Red Sea into the Italian Colonies. We have collected dinosaur eggs in Central Asia, we have hunted bugs and butterflies on the confines of Assam, and we have explored unknown passes in the Karakorum. We have searched for apes and peacocks in the lost lands of Ophir. We have studied the modern conditions of places like China, Iraq, and Syria, and we have had a discussion on the ferment in the world of Islam. I take it the Society would like to record its thanks to those gentlemen who have interested and instructed us with the results of their explorations and researches. (Hear, hear.)

The changes on the Council are as follows: Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who, under Rule 16, retires at the end of this session; his successor is elected by the Council, and Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby has been elected in place of Sir Michael O'Dwyer. Two Vice-Presidents retire in rotation—General Sir Reginald Wingate and the Rt. Hon. Sir Maurice de Bunsen. In their places the Council have elected Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn and Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. According to the regulations there ought to be eight Vice-Presidents; there is still one place to be filled, which the Council at present do not propose to fill, as there are certain names to be considered.

I regret to say that both the Honorary Secretaries, Major-General Sir William Thomson and Mr. Stephenson, retire. The Society is very much indebted to these gentlemen for all that they have done for it, and their loss is a serious one. They have kept a high standard for the lectures and the *Journal*, and have greatly strengthened the membership; Mr. Stephenson, in addition to the help he has given otherwise, has got us about 400 members off his own bat, and Sir William Thomson has worked with an untiring energy during his term of office, and has given much time and thought to the welfare of the Society. Luckily they are not retiring altogether, and have promised to give their assistance and advice to the new Honorary Secretaries. You are asked to elect today two new Honorary Secretaries to fill their places; the Council have nominated myself and Mr. H. Charles Woods.

I regret to say we are also losing our Honorary Librarian, Mrs. Frazer, who has been appointed Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society, an appointment on which we must render her our heartiest congratulations. I should like to take this opportunity of thanking her for all that she has done for us. The post of Honorary Librarian entails a good deal of thoroughly uninteresting and unseen work, and the Council are very much indebted to her for the great help she has given to them.

Three members of the Council retire in rotation—Mr. Rose, Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn, and Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. Their places will be filled at this meeting by your election, but the Council propose for your consideration the Rt. Hon. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, and Mr. Stephenson. There is one further vacancy, caused by the retirement of Sir Arnold Wilson, which it is proposed to fill later on.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The Honorary Secretary has given you such a very clear résumé of our work during the last year, and of the proposals which now await your consideration, that it is needless for me to add anything. We are fortunate in having secured for Chairman of Council the distinguished soldier Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby, one who has done so much to place Western Asia on its present footing by clearing the Turks out of Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. On behalf of the Society I entirely endorse what the Honorary Secretary has said with regard to the services of General Sir William Thomson and Mr. Stephenson, and Mrs. Frazer. General Thomson, during his period as Honorary Secretary, was indefatigable in every sphere of activity, and we are glad that Mr. Stephenson is now with your approval being appointed to our Council. Mrs. Frazer has done much for the library and in getting books for review in the *Journal*. We regret the retirement of Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, which is due to pressure of other work. He has done a great deal to bring new members into our Society and assist in our dis-

cussions. He has assured us of his continued interest in our Society, and we hope at a future date perhaps to secure him on the Council again. The most satisfactory feature of all is that since the Anniversary Meeting last year the number of our members has risen from 892 to 1,041. Four or five years ago it seemed impossible we should attain the thousand limit and get into four figures: now we are well past it, and we are convinced that the progress which has taken place in the past year will be maintained in the coming year. On the whole, I think the Society has every reason to be proud of its progress and its success, and of the admirable series of lectures by which we have increased the knowledge of the world as regards Central Asia.

The Chairman then asked the meeting for its approval of the names brought before them—i.e., Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby as Chairman of the Council; Major-General Sir William Beynon and Mr. H. Charles Woods as Honorary Secretaries; Mr. Wratislaw as Honorary Librarian; the Right Hon. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, and Mr. Stephenson as members of the Council—all of which were elected unanimously.

The following alterations in the Rules were then proposed:

"That the last sentence of Rule 16 be omitted and the words 'as such' be omitted from the preceding sentence."

That a new Rule, in the place of Rule 5, be proposed:

"The Council may recommend for election at the Anniversary Meeting as Honorary Members persons distinguished for their services in, or their knowledge of, the countries in Asia in which the members of the Society are interested. Such Honorary Members shall never exceed ten in number, nor shall more than two be elected in any one year. Such members shall have all the privileges of ordinary members and shall be eligible for election to any of the Society's offices or as members of the Council."

That the following addition to Rule 8 be made:

"always provided that it shall be in the Council's power to remit arrears of subscription and/or to reinstate defaulters to membership should such remission or reinstatement appear to be an expedient or justifiable."

An objection was raised by Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob to the last sentence of the proposed new Rule (5), and it was finally passed as follows:

"The Council may recommend for election at the Anniversary Meeting as Honorary Members persons distinguished for their services in, or their knowledge of, the countries in Asia in which the members of the Society are interested. Such Honorary Members shall never exceed ten in number nor shall more than two be elected in any one year. Such members shall have all the privileges of ordinary members."

The alterations and additions to the Rules as stated above were then put to the Meeting and passed *nem. con.*

THE ANNUAL DINNER

SPEECHES BY LORD PLUMER AND SIR F. AGLEN

THE Annual Dinner of the Society was held at the Hotel Cecil on July 6, 1927, under the chairmanship of the President, Viscount Peel. Over two hundred were present, and the toast list was contributed to by the President, Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm, Sir Frances Aglen, and Lord Thomson.

Field-Marshal Lord PLUMER, proposing the toast of the Society, said he was glad to have the opportunity to express appreciation of the work it was doing in making people better acquainted with what was happening in the countries coming within its circle—and that circle he understood was very wide. A speaker holding the responsible position he had the honour to occupy was naturally expected to say something of Palestine and Transjordan; but, honestly, he did not think he could tell them more than they all knew—namely, that both countries had made satisfactory progress under British administration. But he would like to pay his tribute to the admirable way in which the administration had been conducted by British officials since the time Great Britain took over the responsibilities of the mandate. In Palestine progress had been very rapid, and in the last few years abnormally so. We had now come to one of those periods when it was necessary to take stock of the situation, to review what had been done, and to consolidate the progress made as a means to further advance in the future. In Transjordan the progress had been necessarily somewhat slower, but it had been steady, and he hoped it would be continuous. Certainly it would be continuous provided it was firmly established on the basis of public security.

But because he could speak quite freely of the progress that had been made it did not follow that those who were connected with the administration were so unseeing or so self-satisfied as to imagine that they did not desire or need help. They did need help, of a kind he was going to ask the Society to give—namely, to support the younger members of the administration. He was sure that all who had reached his time of life, or were approaching it, would agree with him when he said that the best way in which they could serve the country was by endeavouring to train the younger men not merely to follow their footsteps but to do better work than they had ever been able to do. In his opinion the best method of getting the best out of these young men was not by criticism, but by encouragement. Criticism was quite

good for all who were at the top, or at the head of departments: it was always stimulating and was frequently helpful. Most of them at the top drew salaries which were apparently rather liberal, and must expect that the taxpayer would feel at liberty to express doubts whether he was getting value for his money; and they must not complain if at times they were called upon to play the part of the image in the game known as Aunt Sally; they must regard liability to such knocks as attached to their salaries. (Laughter.) But the younger men did not draw salaries which could be called excessive, and they had no entertainment allowance. He knew that at times they were apt to be discouraged. They were young men, and not infrequently they had very young wives. He had no hesitation in saying that this was a great advantage, not only to the officials themselves, but also to the country they served. No one knew better than he did what an asset an English lady could be in Eastern countries. These young men and women naturally looked to enjoy the society of their contemporaries, and to have the recreations and amusements suitable to their age; but many of them were living in localities where there were few, if any, opportunities of so doing and very little chance for the amusements they wished to take. When they saw that the older men and some of their contemporaries were having a good time under more favourable conditions they were apt to feel doubts whether they had chosen wisely in adopting careers which kept them in so much isolation.

He hoped the members of the Society would help in this matter. He spoke in the presence of men whose names were household words in the East, whose utterances were read with respect and attention—men who generally counted. Some of them visited countries such as Palestine and Transjordan, and the more of them who went there the better pleased he and his colleagues would be. They would naturally discuss the situation, the problems of the country, and the conditions of life with those who were at the head of the administration. He would ask them, however, to go further afield and to make a point of becoming acquainted with the younger officials, especially those who were in outlying districts away from the seat of government. He would ask the visitors to discuss with these young officers their problems and conditions of life, to show that they realized the difficulties with which they were faced and the discomforts they were bearing, and to make them feel that they were doing work for Government of real importance. (Cheers.)

He would ask further, that when these young people came on leave, members of the Society would endeavour to show them some hospitality. He did not mean public functions, but private entertainments, such as week-ends in the country, joining shooting and fishing parties, and dinners in London with a play to follow. They would feel

that some of those to whose opinions they attached great weight were interested in them and saw that they were doing their part in sustaining the Empire. (Cheers.) He hoped the members would not think that in making this appeal he was abusing his privilege in being asked to propose the toast of this Society. He felt that they all ought to realize at this juncture of our history that it was of the utmost importance that they should leave no stone unturned to attract to the Government service, especially to service overseas, young men of high character and ability, and that when we had got them we should do our utmost to retain them. With Lord Peel as President and with Lord Allenby as their new Chairman, the Society, he was confident, would continue to do well. They were particularly grateful to Lord Peel for the successful efforts he had made to bring into closer touch members of both Houses of Parliament with those who were working for the Empire overseas. His service in this respect was invaluable. (Cheers.)

The CHAIRMAN, who was received with loud cheers, said that their interest in Lord Plumer was not so much in him as a great soldier and leader of victorious armies, not so much even as a Governor of Malta, but it arose from the great task which he was now discharging as Governor-General and High Commissioner for Palestine. He was there endeavouring to bring together and unite, as they had never been united in the past, two great branches of the Semitic races—the Arab and the Jew. The effort was one which would have attracted and delighted Lord Beaconsfield, and he would have made it the opportunity to write a new chapter in the varied history of Tancred. There was one aim which Lord Plumer had not yet succeeded in reaching, though he would no doubt do so, and that was to bring Arab and Jew together in a friendly test at cricket.

As Lord Plumer had most justly observed, they did not confine their attention to Central Asia, but surveyed practically all the countries of that Continent. If they would excuse the arrogance of the phrase, he would claim that the Society was the Light of Asia. (Laughter and cheers.) He had sometimes regretted that there was no corresponding Society to theirs established in Asia for the purpose of studying the affairs and people of Europe. There would be some advantages in having an opposite member to theirs with whom to exchange information and intelligence. They were a clearing house for all information that came from Asia, and it was gleaned from the most various sources—from soldiers, administrators, travellers, officials and men of business, who studied in the conduct of their affairs the social, economic, religious and political aspects of the various countries of Asia, and came and poured out before them with profuse generosity the knowledge and information they had acquired. They were non-party, for it was more easy to be non-party or non-political in the affairs of other countries than to be non-political in the discussion of the problems of their own

land. By way of illustrating the wide range of the work of the Society, Lord Peel mentioned the titles of the papers read in recent months.

The English people were sometimes charged by foreign publicists with being insular. He had never understood how that charge had been brought against them unless it was by way of paradox, because we had the largest commitments outside these Islands and were most interested in the affairs of other countries. But if they had covered a wide field in the quarter of a century of their existence he felt that the demands of the future upon them would be greater still. They had all heard the ancient and discredited phrase about the "unchanging East." No one believed in that doctrine any longer. Indeed, one distinguished member of the Society, Mr. Spender, travelled through the East a year or two ago and wrote a book under the title of "The Changing East." He (Lord Peel) submitted to them that there was nothing so dangerous in practical affairs as a man with very strong opinions and wholly obsolete information (cheers and laughter). The Society steadily sought to give further information upon the changing East. It studied the question of the grafting of Western ideas and institutions upon the East, and watched with interest the extent to which the political institutions to which we had been accustomed for centuries were adapted to the use of the countries of Asia.

They welcomed the presence that evening of Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate, who had rendered so much and so many services to the Society through a great number of years in the past as Honorary Secretary. He also wished to convey the thanks of the Society to Mr. Stephenson, who was retiring from the Honorary Secretaryship after six years of valuable work. He had performed the remarkable feat of bringing in by his own efforts one hundred new members in a single year.

The first response for the guests, a toast he had the pleasure to propose, would come from Sir Francis Aglen, whose knowledge of Chinese affairs was unrivalled. As far back as thirty years ago he was Commissioner of Tientsin, and for many years past he had had charge of the Maritime Customs as Inspector-General. He noticed that the honours bestowed upon Sir Francis included the Imperial Order of the Double Dragon, which struck him as entitling Sir Francis to veneration, not only as head of the Customs but as obviously a great Chinese mandarin (laughter). It was to be hoped that in the leisure Sir Francis now had he would write a book on the Chinese problem. It would be the more valuable if it gave clues to names and identities. It was unfortunate for those who tried to master the names of the Generals who were leading large armies that very often when once they had mastered a name as that of the general directing a particular army they found the same name appearing as that of a general of some opposing force. Whether it was a case of rapid conversion to the other

side or of the generals wearing the same name, he could not always say. The other guest to reply to the toast was Lord Thomson, who spoke as a guest although he was a member of the Society. He would couple those names with the toast. (Cheers.)

Major-General Sir NEILL MALCOLM said that at short notice he had been asked to take the place of Lord Allenby in recommending the toast to the acceptance of the company. He desired to say something on the position of Chinese in the British Empire, since they were to have a speech from a distinguished guest so intimately acquainted with affairs in China itself. There was now sitting at Honolulu a Commission on Pacific Relations, organized by Americans, which for the first time was attended by a British delegation to represent the British point of view on the various political and other subjects which were brought forward. The delegation was headed by Sir Frederick Whyte, and it was some satisfaction to feel that for the first time the British point of view would be duly presented. We had many relations with the Chinese, and the consideration of our point of view could scarcely fail to affect the attitude of the American and other delegates at the Conference. He was thinking of our relations not with the Chinese in their own country, but with those who left China and went to live under the British flag. Many were settled in British Malaya and many in a country with which he had the honour to be more closely associated, Borneo. He had returned from Borneo only ten days ago. He found that the Chinese were flocking there in vast numbers, the immigration including the settlement of many of them in British North Borneo. The native population in the neutral territories both of Malaya and Borneo was small in numbers; there was plenty of room for immigration, and the adequate supply of labour would largely depend upon the immigrants from Java or from China. There was no doubt that the prosperity of those countries would largely hinge upon Chinese labour and Chinese enterprise. He was happy to find that British officials were dealing with the problem in a way which officials of no other nation could equal. In handling the manifold problems of Asia there was no nation in the world which could deal so successfully with the Asiatic as the British, and he hoped that past success in this respect would be repeated in the matter of the assimilation in Borneo of the Chinese immigrant. There were not educated natives to fall back upon, and for the supply of subordinate officials it was necessary to employ the Chinese. There were Chinese district officers and assistants working in the closest co-operation with British officials in the administration and development of the country. The bringing together under the British flag of so many Chinese was one of the subjects which the Society might profitably study.

Sir FRANCIS AGLEN said that when some two months ago he accepted the invitation of the Chairman and the Council to attend the

annual dinner, an honour which he very highly appreciated, the date was still, comparatively speaking, so far distant that even the intimation he received that he would be entrusted with replying to the toast of the guests did not mar the pleasure of anticipation with which he looked forward to the entertainment. He reasoned that he would have time to study the affairs of Central Asia, a subject on which he was, and remained, profoundly ignorant, and to learn something about the activities of the Society; while to reply adequately on behalf of fellow guests for an evening's enjoyment of this kind would require only the full heart and the general sense of repletion and content which he was sure would be shared by all his fellow guests. (Cheers.) Since he received the invitation, however, certain things had happened. He was informed by some of his friends that he would be expected to say something about that part of Asia which was more particularly his own subject. At the time Chinese affairs were very prominently before the public, and as one of the latest arrivals from that troubled country he felt that it might be possible at least to say something that would be interesting to that assembly. But now China had receded into the background, and was struggling, not with complete success, to keep its place on the front page. There was an apparent lull out there; one of those periods so typical of recent civil wars in the country when regrouping was taking place, and personal gains and losses were being counted up. To all intents and purposes China was again off the slate. The man in the street probably thought that somehow or other we had muddled through again, and weary officials in the Foreign Office were no doubt heaving sighs of relief.

The Times correspondent in Peking, a worthy successor of the famous Dr. Morrison, in one of his recent dispatches expressed the opinion that it would take an astrologer to determine what was going to happen in China, and that was true. If he had been asked one question more than another since arriving in this country it was whether or not China was going to settle down and things become normal again. It was difficult to answer this question; but his opinion was that the troubles in China had only just begun. China, as they knew, had a very long history, and there had been many changes of government in the course of two thousand years. Practically with every change there had been a period of chaos and upheaval in the country, and it had taken thirty, forty, or even fifty years before China had settled down to a new period of peace. He did not wish to suggest that we had fifty years of chaos ahead, but he thought it would be a mistake for anyone in this country to withdraw attention from Chinese affairs merely because they had receded into the background. The Press gave the public what it wanted, and it was left to societies such as the Central Asian Society and kindred bodies to focus opinion on what was still an unsolved problem.

To all well-wishers of that great country and its vast population of patient, industrious, and inarticulate toilers, who in certain areas had suffered all the horrors of civil war, it must be deeply deplorable that at present there seemed to be no prospect of any definite cessation of armed strife. The lull that was now taking place could hardly fail to be the prelude of further events in which this country would be deeply involved. Meanwhile, if stock were taken of the position, there were some gleams of light on an otherwise dark and lowering horizon. In the first place the Nationalist movement could be said to have followed very faithfully the course predicted by himself and others as the result of conversations with intelligent and well-informed Chinese many months ago. Telegraphing to his secretary in London towards the close of last year, before any of the more recent and startling events had taken place, he stated that Chinese opinion in close touch with the Southern movement was convinced that Shanghai would be occupied in spite of what appeared to be an overwhelming array of force for its defence; that the movement would not be stayed then, and that the advance of troops would go on until the Yellow River was reached. There would then be a period of apparent inaction before the final goal, Peking, was reached.

In China itself certain facts had asserted themselves with dominant force over theories which in so intricate a problem had naturally taken on many complications. One fact was that Chinese nationalism, which in its reaction on foreign interests was merely the expression of the sometimes latent, but always permanent, anti-foreign sentiment of the Chinese people, had some driving force behind it which enabled it to progress in spite of errors which seemed to be catastrophic in their consequence. Another fact was that a considerable section of intelligent Chinese was awakening with alarm to the result of allowing Chinese foreign policy to be directed by aliens, who had entirely misunderstood and abused the confidence which the Chinese had always reposed in their foreign employees, so long as they did not overstep the mark by endeavouring to wrest the control of policy from hands where it properly belonged. The reaction against Communist activity in China did not necessarily mean any rupture with Soviet Russia, nor any abatement of the virulent campaign against this country. It merely meant that tools had turned in the hands of those who thought they could use them with safety to their own immediate interests, and this action had produced far-reaching consequences, quite sufficiently obvious to alarm a people so intelligent as the Chinese.

Another fact was that in the present stage of upheaval in China the pronouncement of policies on the part of this country was premature and did nothing to restore British prestige, or protect British interests. The patience and courage displayed by our countrymen in China were worthy of the greatest admiration and support. (Loud cheers.) The

negative policy of patience and conciliation, coupled with the imperative duty of protecting British lives, had led to armed intervention, of which the end was not yet in sight. Another fact obtruding with ever greater force on people in this country was that a policy of complete surrender of all the British enterprises created in China would have the most disastrous effect on even larger interests in other parts of Asia and would be opposed to the best interests of the Chinese people themselves. (Cheers.) Further, the drive of the Southern Nationalist movement to the north was bringing China face to face with problems vitally affecting the interests of her great neighbour in the Far East.

He did not take a pessimistic view of the situation. He thought that if the Government were kept up to the mark by public opinion (an opinion which the Society could do much to influence) it would be able to deal with the situation adequately and sooner or later we should win through. (Cheers.) It was to be hoped that the Society would continue to educate public opinion on the subject by the publication of papers by various authorities containing the full and useful information to which they were accustomed in its publications.

Lord THOMSON said that he knew little of Central Asia, but ironically added that it was a terrible mistake, as he had discovered, to know too much of a thing, as it made one cautious in the expression of opinions. He could only bring to bear upon the subjects with which the Society dealt a general knowledge of affairs and some observation and reading. He had been reading recently a book which set forth the view that the white man had lost his domination in the East largely by having taken there Western education, conducted mainly on religious and philanthropic lines. The young men of Asia, reading Burke, Mill, Voltaire, and Tolstoi, asked how it was that we of the West preached equality and paid lower wages to the Asiatic labourer. It was also suggested in the book to which he referred that another cause of the loss of domination was that we had given the Asiatic the benefits of modern science and mechanical inventions, from the spindle to the machine-gun, and with the aeroplane to follow. Another factor in the change was the wider range of Asian influence. Central Asia might be their special pigeon in that Society, but Asia now extended from Moscow to Canton, from Tokio to Constantinople. On Asia's fringes there were warlike people with recently acquired independence, whose ideas would permeate in time the whole Continent.

In many ways this was a tragedy. Probably the Cantonese had never been ruled so well and justly as by Sir Harry Parkes between 1858 and 1860. He said this by way of illustration of what had been accomplished by the European in Asia. But it was no good crying over spilt milk. On the other hand, apathy in these new conditions would be fatal. To say, as one friend of his did, "God always provides a way for the British Empire," would not do as a slogan. It was

merely an excuse for laziness and inefficiency, an expression of that false kind of faith which made a person profess to believe what he or she really doubted. God had been good to us in the past, but He only helped those who helped themselves. It seemed to him that they had to recognize that a new era was dawning, however slowly, in Central Asia, an era in which competition would be keen, in which trade could not depend on political advantages, in which industries sluggishly administered must inevitably disappear. But if in this new era we displayed the qualities which built up our Empire—enterprise, courage, love of justice—there was, he was convinced, something in the British which so appealed to Orientals that it would enable us to substitute for political domination an enlightened Imperialism, to turn vassals into affiliated nations and suspicious neighbours in the East into allies, bound to us with the steel hoops of friendship and respect. That was the ideal which he submitted they should keep before them, if they were to show that they were inspired by the example of those who had built up the Empire in the past. (Cheers.)

REVIEWS

MOTHER INDIA. By Katherine Mayo. London: Jonathan Cape, 30, Bedford Square. 10s. 6d.

No book on India in recent years has aroused wider interest or excited more bitter controversy than "Mother India." The writer, an American lady, tells us that it was dissatisfaction with the average American's ignorance of things Indian—their only knowledge being "that Mr. Gandhi lives there, also tigers"—that sent her to India to see what a volunteer could observe of common things in daily human life. "I should like it to be accepted," she says, "that I am neither an idle busybody nor a political agent, but merely an ordinary American citizen seeking test facts to lay before my own people."

Whatever view one may take of her conclusions—and some of them are indignantly rejected by Indian political leaders, who regard them as a serious obstacle to their political pretensions—no one can deny that her investigations have been wide, at least in Hindu India, and that she has set herself with characteristic American thoroughness to get down to bed-rock facts. The result is a formidable indictment of the Hindu social system: the child marriages, leading to unmentionable brutalities; the childbirths carried out by dirty, ignorant *dhais*, without any precautions against septic poisoning or puerperal fever, and causing appalling infant mortality; the ban on remarriage of widows, even child-widows, that condemns over twenty million women to a miserable existence; the shocking neglect of female children; the domestic tyranny of the husband, whom the wife is taught to regard as her god; the arrogance of the Brahmins and their claim to the monopoly of knowledge; the grievous lot of the sixty million "untouchables"; the barriers to the spread of primary education, due to the absence of female teachers because, in the words of the Indian head of the Y.M.C.A., "the social conditions are such that no single woman can undertake the task of teaching"; the callous disregard of the conventions of decency and elementary sanitary rules, which makes India the home of epidemics that kill off or enfeeble her own peoples and make her a menace to the rest of the world—these are some of the main charges in the indictment, and they are supported by a mass of evidence, oral and documentary, chiefly from Indian sources. Miss Mayo, however, claims that her object is not to give pain to sensitive Indians, but to point out the evils and thereby encourage the Indian peoples themselves—for the initiative must come from them—to devise the remedies, and fit themselves for the place in the civilised world

which they claim. So far, however, her book has aroused in India not a recognition of the evils but a passionate repudiation of their existence.

An Indian Member of the Legislative Assembly has given notice of a resolution recommending the Government to prevent the circulation of the book in India; the Mayor of Calcutta on September 4 presided at a protest meeting in the Town Hall at which heated speeches were made against the author; and, most significant of all, several prominent Hindus in London—including the High Commissioner, the Members of the India Council, ex-Members of the Government of India and of the Provincial Governments—in August addressed a long letter to *The Times*, attacking Miss Mayo's generalizations as "wild and mischievous," and "warning the British public against what strikes us as being a singularly mischievous book." *The Times* having refused to publish this letter, it was cabled to India, and appeared in the *Leader* of Allahabad, from which it is quoted in the *Pioneer Mail* of August 26. One would attach more weight to this protest if the signatories had not stated: "It has never been our lot to read the book which indulges in such wholesale and indiscriminate vilification of Indian civilization and Indian character."

The author is no doubt quite capable of defending her own position, and the attacks on the book will ensure for it a wider circulation. In the course of her Indian enquiries she was not so much striking new ground as extending the investigations she had recently made of similar conditions in the Philippines, the result of which are embodied in that remarkable book, "The Isles of Fear."

Indeed, in Chapter XIV. she gives an instructive comparison of how the United States and Great Britain have respectively handled the educational and other problems in the Philippines and in India. Her conclusion (p. 181), under the heading "We both meant well," is as follows:

"Schools and Universities in the Philippines and in India have continued to pour the phrases of Western political-social history into Asiatic minds. Asiatic memories have caught and held the phrases, supplying strange meanings from their alien inheritance. The result in each case has been identical. 'All the teaching we have received has made us clerks or platform orators,' said Mr. Gandhi."

Doubtless her Philippine experience gave Miss Mayo an invaluable start in her study of Indian conditions. But as her generalizations have been attacked by Indians of weight and influence, it is perhaps only fair to hear how she arrived at them:

"I made long sorties in the open country from the North-West Frontier to Madras, sometimes accompanying a District Commissioner on his tours of chequered duty, sometimes 'sitting in' at a village council of peasants, or at Indian Municipal Board meetings, or at Court Sessions. . . . Everywhere I talked with health officers, both Indian

and British, going out with them, to observe their tasks and their ways of handling them. I visited hospitals of many sorts and localities. . . . I went with English nurses in bazars and courtyards and inner chambers and over city roofs. I saw as well the homes of the rich. I studied the handling of confinements, the care of children and of the sick, the care and protection of food, and the values placed upon cleanliness. . . . I visited agricultural stations and cattle-farms, and looked into the general management of cattle and crops. . . . I saw the schools, and discussed with teachers and pupils their aims and experience. The sittings of the various legislatures, all-India and provincial, repaid attendance by the light they shed upon the mind-quality of the elements represented. I sought and found private opportunity to question eminent Indians—princes, politicians, administrators, religious leaders; and the frankness of their talk, as to the physical and mental status and conditions of the peoples of India, thrown out upon the background of my personal observation, proved an asset of the first value."

The book shows what an immense amount of information on all those topics she accumulated, and how clearly she has summarized and presented it. It is perhaps open to the criticism that she has dwelt too exclusively on the evil side of the Hindu social system (she exempts Islamic India from her adverse criticisms) and has not given prominence to its brighter aspects: the placid—if sometimes pathetic—contentment of the home-life; the mutual attachment and support of the members of the Hindu joint family; the simple pleasures of the pilgrimage, and of the gatherings at the sacred tank, or temple; the generous, if indiscriminating, almsgiving. Her impressions of Hinduism were, naturally enough, coloured by the lurid first experience of Kali's temple at Calcutta—a sight which causes a sense of loathing even to the hardened and callous Anglo-Indian that it takes years to efface.

But no one can read this book carefully without realizing that the writer is faithfully describing things as she saw them, and is moved throughout by a lively hatred of cruelty and oppression—whether to man or beast—and a sincere desire to alleviate them—to help the under-dog. Nor is she slow to recognize the good work which Indians—but, alas! too few—are doing in this direction. Her quick insight has singled out the most prominent—*e.g.*, in the Panjab she shows us the Sirdar of Kot (p. 196) as the model landlord, who takes no interest in Swaraj politics, but devotes himself to the betterment of his people; also Sir Ganga Ram (now, alas! dead), who has done so much splendid practical work for social reform (p. 88), and who, in a vigorous pamphlet published last year, went quite as far as Miss Mayo in denouncing child marriage and the ban on widow marriage, and in holding that social and economic reform must come *before* and not after political reform.

What a humorous but instructive contrast to these two is afforded by the wealthy Calcutta lawyer (p. 195) who said to the author:

"Take my own village (four hours by rail from Calcutta), where for centuries the head of my family has been chief. When I, who am now head, left it seventeen years ago, it contained some 1,800 inhabitants. When I revisited it, *which I did for the first time a few weeks since*, I found that the population had dwindled to fewer than 600 persons. I was horrified. My question therefore is plain: *What have the British been doing in the last hundred years that my village should be like this?*"

Miss Mayo's caustic comment is: "He could see no one to blame but a Government which has 500,000 such villages to care for, and which can but work through human hands and human intelligence."

On another occasion (p. 267) Miss Mayo took up the subject of vilification of the British Government with one of the most notable Indian Members of the Legislative Assembly, saying: "Your fellow legislators of the Opposition impugn the honesty of the Government; they accuse it of trying to set Hindus and Muhammadans by the ears on the principle of 'divide and rule'; they allege that it tramples Indian interests underfoot, that it treats Indians themselves with disrespect, and that it sucks or cripples the resources of the country for its own selfish interests."

"Yes," he replied, "they say all that and more."

"Do they mean it?" I asked.

"How could they?" he said. "Not a man in the House believes anything of the sort."

Anyone who has an acquaintance with Indian politicians will readily recognize the two types described above. They stand for what is at the root of most of India's difficulties, whether social, economic, or political: intellectual dishonesty, self-deception, and the tendency to blame others for what they themselves are responsible.

That brings us back to the main argument of this notable book:

"What this country (India) suffers from is want of initiative, want of enterprise, and want of hard, sustained work," mourns Sir Chunatal Jetalvad.

"We rightly charge the English rulers for our helplessness and lack of initiative and originality," says Mr. Gandhi.

Miss Mayo (p. 24) replies:

"Now it is precisely at this point and in a spirit of hearty sympathy with the suffering peoples that I venture my main generality. It is this: The British administration of India, be it good, bad, or indifferent, has nothing whatever to do with the conditions above indicated. Inertia, helplessness, lack of initiative and originality, lack of staying power and of sustained loyalty, weakness of life-vigour itself—all are traits that truly characterize the Indian not only of today but of long-past history. All, furthermore, will continue to characterize him, in increasing degree, until he admits their causes and

with his own two hands uproots them. His soul and body are indeed chained in slavery. But he himself wields and hugs his chains, and with violence defends them. No agency but a new spirit within his own breast can set him free. And his arraignments of outside elements, past, present, or to come, serve only to deceive his own mind, and to put off the day of his deliverance."

None of us enjoys having his, or her, defects pointed out. But the process is a salutary and even a helpful one when those criticized have shut their eyes to their defects, and if the object is to indicate a remedy. Let us hope that, instead of arraigning Miss Mayo as a mischievous and hostile critic, her Indian readers will realize that her book is an honest and valuable survey of existing evils, which it is for them to grapple with and eradicate. One hopeful sign is that Mrs. Naidu, one of the most prominent women in Indian public life, and President of the National Congress last year, has publicly testified that much of the indictment is true, and that those who have the interests of India at heart should set themselves to reform the abuses. Moreover within the last few weeks an influential Brahman of Madras, that stronghold of Social Die-hards, has publicly announced his conversion to the policy of raising the age of consent, while the Maharaja of Kashmir has just enacted a law prohibiting the marriage of girls under fourteen and of boys under eighteen. Miss Mayo's work is already bearing fruit.

M. F. O'DWYER.

THE ISLAMIC WORLD SINCE THE PEACE SETTLEMENT. By A. J. Toynbee, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1925-26.

This book constitutes the first volume of the Survey of International Affairs for 1925, but deals in point of fact with events up to the end of 1926, and has been prepared on the same lines as previous volumes of the same series by Professor Toynbee. If the Royal Institute of International Affairs had no other achievement to its credit than the endowment, through the generosity of Sir Daniel Stevenson, of the Directorship of Studies, which carries with it the post of author of this annual "Survey," it would have amply justified its existence. Professor Toynbee has succeeded, where others, particularly in the U.S.A., have failed, in writing a history of current events which is not only a supremely good précis, and, as such, valuable alike to officials, to the business community, and to students, but is also, as intended by Sir Daniel Stevenson, an excellent example of "the teaching of history internationally, and, as far as practicable, without bias."

"Ranke," said Lord Acton, "taught historians to be critical, to be colourless, to be new," and he concluded a fine declaration of belief with the statement that we could be more impersonal, disinterested, and just than the historians of former ages, and that it was in our

power "to learn from undisguised and genuine records to look with remorse upon the past, and to the future with the assured hope of better things, bearing this in mind, that, if we lower our standard in history, we cannot uphold it in Church or State."

Lord Acton would surely have hailed Professor Toynbee's "Survey" as a landmark in the writing of contemporary history; to this expression of belief the present reviewer can only add his conviction that the "Survey," and especially this volume, should be placed, at the public expense, in every British Consulate and Legation abroad, and that banks and commercial firms with connections abroad would do well to ensure that it finds a place on the shelves and in the hands of those responsible for reaching decisions from time to time on matters of policy.

A few criticisms naturally suggest themselves from a careful perusal of this masterly summary. In the first place, the absence of bias, or rather its conscientious elimination, inevitably tends to make the author's style somewhat pedestrian. "It is a matter of common knowledge," said Mr. Baldwin, in the early months of the present year, in the House of Commons, in connection with Mr. Churchill's "World Crisis," "that if there be a certain amount of bias in a history it is far better reading." "Bias," argues Professor J. L. Morison, "is natural: let the historian be honest about it and seek to express rather than repress his natural inclinations."*

A comparison between Professor Toynbee's book, written in conjunction with Mr. Kirkwood, on "Turkey," in 1926, and the present work, shows that, making due allowance for the disadvantages attaching to the dual authorship of the former work, he has followed the advice of the Psalmist, and in the volume under review has "kept his mouth with a bridle," doubtless with the assistance of those collaborators to whom he pays generous tribute in the preface. His earlier work on Turkey, written after a brief visit to the country, was (like other works in the "Modern World Series," edited by the Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher) marred by special pleading and by a tendency to ignore or to gloss over discreditable aspects of Turkish polity—a defect from which the present volume is notably free, though one could wish that greater emphasis had been laid on the deep racial and cultural differences between the Kurdish and Turkish races, differences which the militant régime of Mustafa Kemal, the unwisdom of which Professor Toynbee rightly stresses, have suppressed for the moment, as did Cromwell in Ireland, with, in all probability, the same ultimate results.

The section on Persia is perhaps the least satisfactory in the volume, owing, no doubt, to the difficulty of obtaining reliable first-hand information as to the trend of events. It should, for example, have been stated that the United States Senate have refused to ratify the

* "History," October, 1926. *Bulletin of Institute of Historical Research* for November, 1926. *Times Literary Supplement*, April 28, 1927.

announcement of the United States Government that the monetary reparation paid by Persia to cover the cost of conveying Major Imbrie's body home on a warship would be held as a trust fund, of which the income would be devoted to the education in the U.S.A. of Persian students. The economic and financial services of the American Financial Mission, under Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, would probably not be considered by most Persians or Europeans in a position to form a judgment to merit Professor Toynbee's unstinted laudation, and there is a notable omission of any reference to the continued tension between Persia and Russia during the period under review, for which the foreign and economic policies of the U.S.S.R. are wholly responsible.

Finally, for the sake of completeness, some reference should surely have been made to the intrinsically important and very interesting political developments of the last seven years in the Principality of Oman, where the Sultan, with the assistance of a British financial adviser, with the rank and authority of a Wazir or Minister, has succeeded in restoring more than a semblance of authority, and in pacifying the violent disorders which characterized the war period. Bahrain, too, deserves, in a work of this comprehensive character, more than the single sentence devoted to its affairs, and the outposts of the Islamic world generally scarcely receive the recognition which is their due. For information regarding them the best authority is still that of Professor L. Massignon, whose "*Annuaire du Monde Musulmane*" deserves, not less than Dr. Nallino's "*Oriente Moderno*," a place on Professor Toynbee's table.

The system of transliteration employed is serviceable, and has been used consistently and with scholarly accuracy, but surely the predominant sect in Persia (and for that matter in Iraq) is more correctly written "Shi'ah," not "Shi'i."

A. T. W.

CHINA IN TURMOIL. By Louis Magrath King (H.M. Consular Service, China, retired). London: Messrs. Heath, Cranton. 10s. 6d.

I commend everything that Mr. King writes about China, and particularly this series of studies in Chinese personality, to that not inconsiderable number of Europeans who have interests in China, but little more than an extra-territorial interest in "things Chinese." One is not so much impressed with Mr. King's heroes possessing specially Chinese characteristics as with the fact that his Tupans, Generals, or bandit chiefs and politicians, and "Europe returned" Nationalists differ little, if at all, from their prototypes in character, ambitions, greed, or ignoble or gallant qualities which one might find in any age in China or anywhere else in Asia, or for that matter, in medieval times in Europe. Mr. King's book should be presented to every young British official or non-official to read on his first voyage out to China or anywhere else in the Far East.

General Sir Neill Malcolm, at the Central Asian Society's dinner, held on July 6, most appropriately stressed the need for understanding that the Chinese with whom we work, whether as merchants or officials, have as many good points—if we will only take the trouble, as indeed it is our duty, to find out—as the obvious weaknesses too frequently and loosely ascribed to him by writers of fiction, cinema stunters, and that inevitable proportion of intolerant foreigners whose “Eastern experiences” are so largely and lightly concentrated on club bar lounging and a gay life.

Mr. King's special pleadings—and his delightfully sympathetic insight and knowledge of the friends he writes about surely justify the means—show in a hearty manner that his characters are just men first and Chinese afterwards. This sort of knowledge, with no illusions, comes at first hand to our Consuls in China and to British officials in the Customs and Salt Departments, but even here one finds too many who join in with their merchant contemporaries in particular praise of their *own* compradore, or “writer,” or “No. 1 Boy,” as someone exceptional; just as perhaps in India we are still too often told that “my Subadar Major,” or “my Head Baboo” is exceptional—is a white man.

Of recent years two or three of our largest and leading British business organizations are operating in China—north, south, east, and west—on entirely novel lines, and judging from results one would wish that all British business had realized the value of, and need for, this new business policy forty years ago. This new policy, so eminently suited to the requirements of an ever expanding market and changed conditions, is direct dealing, as far as possible without that picturesque and expensive, and too often intriguing intermediary, the “old style” Compradore. Not only this, but many British firms are now learning to “deal direct” with the local Chinese official. This again relieves the Consul from being referred to on all possible and often petty occasions, and being damned for a pro-Chinese if he does not entirely concur with the “rights” claimed by his aggrieved national. This “new policy” emphasizes and demands the need for a real working knowledge of the vernacular, and it is good to know of many young business men who have gone out to China since the war, who, *encouraged by their employers*, have attained a linguistic proficiency unheard of in the days when the “old hands” were young. How many of the “old hands” of the China ports can speak or read any sort of Chinese correctly, even grammatically, leaving aside any question of pronunciation? And yet they have spent all their lives in China no longer and with no less incentive than any of our Consular officials, who undoubtedly speak and read Chinese very much more efficiently than the average working soldier or civilian in India speaks or writes Hindustani. Mr. King's cameos are of real men, and the

vigour and felicity of his style indicate that in China, as in other parts of the world, we still have men working as officials who have the will to make the best of things and the best of their own abilities, and of the abilities and characters of those they work with. The pleasingly naive way in which Mr. King almost invariably confounded his Chinese friends, were they soldiers or scholars, with counter-quotations from their own masters, provides just the right appeal to the young students of "things Chinese," and the necessary stimulus and encouragement to "get there," as Mr. King does every time.

And yet there is nothing humdrum or even conventional about any of Mr. King's types. They "belong to all types save one—the weak." "They are," writes Mr. King with characteristic enthusiasm, "themselves part of the upheaval in the midst of which they are working out their own and their country's destinies," or in some cases, as Mr. King a little grudgingly admits, "wolves preying upon the herd." Mr. King's book embodies in a most presentable form his impressions and experiences during a long and varied career. He was Acting Consul at Chungking, was twice Acting Consul-General at Chengtu, and was five years as H.M.'s Consul at Tachienlu, on the Chinese frontier of Tibet.

W. K.

CHINA IN REVOLT. By T'ang Leang-li. London: Noel Douglas. 7s. 6d.

Mr. T'ang Leang-li, a graduate of London University, presents an indictment of Western policy in China in his book entitled "China in Revolt." His indictment is full of force and energy, often immoderate, but the author makes no pretence at being impartial, or proclaiming "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." He adopts the rôle of an ardent advocate for China, and he claims that his aim is to "present to the West the attitude which the Chinese intelligentsia adopts towards certain aspects of Western civilization as seen in China." The author is quite frank in declaring that his book is of the nature of propaganda, and there is no doubt that it is written from the point of view of one who has the welfare of his own country earnestly at heart. The book is written in easy style and in excellent English, and provides a handy and exhaustive textbook of Chinese grievances against Western civilization. It is well worth perusal and study, even if it be only to show us what a Chinese gentleman thinks of us. It is, however, more than that and represents largely the views—misguided and erroneous in many respects, if you like—which occupy the minds of Young China today.

The book is divided into four parts: China in Peace; China in Chains; China in Revolt; China a Nation. The author sums up in a conclusion—China as a Great Power.

The first part gives an outline of China as she was before contact with the West, and is intended by the author to convey the essence of

Chinese civilization rather than the actual state of ancient China. In his concise narrative, Mr. T'ang points out that the family is the most important social institution, and that it is the family and not the individual which is the political and social unit in China. The family is based upon the cult of the ancestors, and in this way a link is established with the supernatural. The Chinese are perhaps the most tolerant of all peoples in the matter of religions, and the experience of the reviewer is that the ordinary man in the street will neither persecute nor vilify one of an alien creed unless the latter should transgress or attempt to upset existing social customs. It would be difficult for even the most devoted admirer of the Chinese to describe them as a religious people—although they may be roused at-times to an extreme pitch of fanaticism. In actual life the ordinary native does not concern himself about Heaven and a hereafter, although he does not deny the existence of either. He is a busy and industrious man, and he interprets religion as a way of looking at life; he expects that his neighbour will do his duty towards him in the same way as he does his to his neighbour. He is a striking contrast to the native of India, in whose daily life religion and ceremonial observances play so dominant a part. Politically, the Chinese individual is a true democrat, and there can be no doubt that the governing classes were—and even still are—checked by the gentry who were the spokesmen of the inarticulate masses. The Chinese Government, within these limits, was a nominal autocracy based upon conquest, but an autocracy limited by the right of the people to rebellion.

In Part II. Mr. T'ang traces China's contact with the West from a date as remote as 2697 B.C., and he discusses the iniquities of the foreign trader and missionary in the sixteenth century and onwards. He has nothing good to relate of them except a well-merited tribute to the secular work of the Jesuits. From the foreign trader it is but a step to an attack upon England for the "opium" war in 1840. There is no critic more dispassionate or more accurate in his statement of the international relations of the Chinese Empire than Mr. Morse, and he says at the close of Chapter IX. of his work: "The war came when it did because the Chinese had precipitated a crisis by a vigorous campaign against opium, but it was not fought to uphold the trade in opium, and it was only the beginning of a struggle which lasted for twenty years, and which was to decide the national and commercial relations which were to exist between the East and West."

In the second chapter Mr. T'ang makes a fierce onslaught against the International Settlement at Shanghai and its "foreign oligarchy." The author appears to have overlooked the circumstances which contributed to the original growth and development of the Settlement—that is to say, the disordered state of the country during the Taiping rebellion. In 1853 the Taiping rebels devastated the country for

hundreds of miles around Shanghai, and many thousands of refugees found there under the foreign flag the protection denied them under their own flag. The rebel soldiers menaced the Settlement also, and were driven back by the foreign naval forces which were safeguarding foreign lives and property and, incidentally, those also of the Chinese refugees in the foreign Settlement. It became necessary to devise some method for the supervision of these refugees, and this was found in the Mixed Court which was originally established with Chinese consent and assistance. Mr. Tang complains that when the Republican Revolution took place in 1911 the consular body of Shanghai took over the Mixed Court, and, *in direct violation of China's treaty rights*, appointed their own judges. He omits to mention, however, that conditions in the native city of Shanghai were chaotic at the time of the revolution, and that it was force of circumstances arising from events in China, over which foreigners had no control, which compelled an extension of foreign control over the Mixed Court; this question has, however, been recently adjusted by joint consent of the Chinese and foreign authorities. Again, the reference to the Maritime Customs is most misleading. As a matter of fact, the Custom House at Shanghai had been closed by *force majeure* of the Taiping rebellion, and, in order to enable trade to continue, a temporary expedient was tried whereby duties were paid into the Consulates of the foreign Powers concerned (at that time France, America, and England). The expedient was irksome and did not work satisfactorily, and the three Consuls came to an agreement with the Chinese *taotai*, under which a Board of three inspectors was nominated (one of each nationality). The Rules of Trade drawn up four years later by foreign and Chinese representatives laid down a uniform Customs system under the Chinese Government, with liberty to the latter to utilize foreign assistance by the employment of foreign employees independently of foreign suggestion or nomination. It may fairly be said that the foreign Customs, generally known as the Chinese Maritime Customs, dated its birth from July, 1854. The origin of the establishment was not due to any treaty stipulation made between China and the foreign Powers, but to circumstances over which neither China nor the foreign Powers had any control—viz., the Taiping rebellion, which raged over the country for a decade, brought the Chinese Government to the brink of destruction, and cost China twenty million lives. The Service, as Mr. Tang will admit, is a very efficient machine, and, without doubt, a big asset for China as regards national prestige and credit both at home and abroad.

The references to the police of the International Settlement are both unfair and incorrect. Mr. Tang declares that a local tradition has grown up and the very term "police" has become one of contempt. It would be more correct to ascribe any feeling of contempt in the

Chinese mind for the term "police" to the traditional suspicion and fear the Chinese have had for their own police in past ages. "The rats under the altar," as the district police were nicknamed, were a byword among the people for all that was bad in the shape of extortion and blackmail.

Mr. T'ang gives us his views on the missionary problem in Chapter 3, and he is unsparing in his denunciations of them as political agents and misinterpreters of the spirit of China. It is probable that many of the obstacles which have lain in the missionary path have been due to the fact that their presence and work in China have been authorized by treaty, and it is probable that they would have met with far less suspicion if they had stood on their own feet without the support of treaties and consuls. There are few foreigners living in China today who will assert that the convert is superior in the conduct of his life to the so-called "heathen," and there are many who prefer to have dealings with the latter rather than with the former. Whatever may be the opinion as to the human products of missionary teaching, there can be no question that the medical missions have relieved countless thousands from pain, suffering, and disease, in a civilized land which is strangely destitute of dispensaries, hospitals, and surgeons.

Chapter 4 deals with international loans as "an instrument of subjugation." The author states that the international loans concluded by China had a political origin. As a matter of fact, the origin was not political but financial. It may justly be said that national loans—as distinct from international loans—did not exist in China before the end of the nineteenth century. This was not in any way due to sentiment, but to the fact that the Emperors of China had found that the State treasury, of which the Emperor was custodian, was adequate for all ordinary requirements and that the revenue for extraordinary expenditure could be readily raised either by additional taxes on trade, or by means of a forced levy, or by the sales of titles and dignities; in earlier days, expenditure was also met by the issue of enormous amounts of irredeemable Government paper. The first attempt to raise a national loan dates from 1894 in the shape of the "merchants' loan, in order to meet the extraordinary war expenses of the Sino-Japanese war. The loan partook more of the nature of a forced levy than a voluntary subscription, and the flotation had to be stopped when only a fraction of the amount required had been subscribed. The next attempt was made in 1898 when the first instalment of the war indemnity to Japan had to be paid. The result was again a bitter disappointment, in spite of the fact that titles were offered to subscribers of 10,000 taels (say £2,000) and upwards. The whole history of these and subsequent attempts at floating national loans reveals the fact that only those managed and paid by the foreign (British) Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs have met with success. It seems clear, therefore,

that the Chinese Government had recourse to international loans solely for the financial reason that it could not raise them in China itself. It is, of course, regrettable that foreign politics entered largely into the flotation of some of the international loans, but a large share of the blame in this respect is attributable to the vacillation and cupidity of the Chinese Court and Government officials. Let us glance for a moment at the nature of the British loans to China. It will be found that, speaking generally, they are secured on the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle, railway loans being secured in general on the earnings of the railways. But the fact that these securities were given does not mean that either the British Government or the British financiers concerned entertained for a single moment the extravagant idea that the securities would be seized and administered for their benefit in case of default in payment. The securities were required and given because they were considered to be then the best available, and this procedure was an ordinary business precaution. The amount of China's foreign indebtedness today is probably not less than 160 million sterling; the amount would be much larger had not China exhausted her available securities and her credit. The will to borrow abroad exists, but nobody will lend. Although China has defaulted on nearly every loan which is not secured on the Maritime Customs or the Salt Gabelle, it is safe to say that, given a tolerably stable central Government and a comparatively honest financial administration, the total indebtedness both as regards native and foreign creditors (the former amount is also very large) could be successfully carried without serious inconvenience to the Chinese people.

Mr. T'ang opens Part III. of his book by declaring that "extra-territoriality is a standing disgrace to Chinese pride and a symbol of China's national humiliation and degradation in the family of nations." If we trace the causes which led to extra-territoriality, we shall find them in the contemptuous refusal of China to accord to foreign Powers equality of commercial and diplomatic treatment. Mr. T'ang quotes from an early Chinese writer as follows: "These barbarians are like wild beasts and ought not to be treated as civilized men. To try to apply to them the great principles of reason would only lead to confusion. The ancient kings well understood this, and accordingly ruled barbarians only by craft or violence. And this is the right way of ruling them." He declares that this is the view of the European traditionally held in China, and he naïvely adds that in this background it is, therefore, quite natural that China imposed rigid restrictions on foreign intercourse. Mr. T'ang has omitted a reference to the imperial "mandate" sent by the Emperor Kienlung in reply to the friendly letter from King George, which was presented to him by the King's Envoy, Lord Macartney, at the close of the eighteenth century. The reply refuses the King's request for an exchange of accredited Ministers, and begins as follows:

"You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas; nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial. . . . I have perused your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is couched reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy.

"In consideration of the fact that your Ambassador and his deputy have come a long way with your memorial and tribute, I have shown them high favour and have allowed them to be introduced into my presence. To manifest my indulgence, I have entertained them at a banquet and made them numerous gifts.

"Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State. Strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to despatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated into every country under heaven, and kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious and have no use for your country's manufactures."

The reply is in the form of a superior addressing an inferior, from the lord of the Middle Kingdom, which is fringed in the dim distance by small islands inhabited by barbarians. The tone of arrogance and self-complacency displayed by the Emperor is reflected throughout the relations of Chinese officials with foreigners in the early days. Is it surprising, then, that, when the inevitable trial of strength came and China was worsted, foreign Powers found it necessary to provide safeguards in the shape of extraterritoriality? British policy towards China has followed the general line of trade and not political aggrandizement or territorial acquisition. Trade on fair and equal terms coupled with security for life and property—these sum up in their entirety British policy and aims in China. It is a simple point to grasp, and it would save the Chinese innumerable difficulties if they would only realize the truth of it and act accordingly. Let us glance for a moment at the position of foreign merchants who were permitted to trade at Canton early in the nineteenth century. They were forbidden to buy and sell goods in the open market, but were compelled to trade through the medium of the Cohong, an officially recognized monopoly. They were only allowed to reside in the Factory district, a confined space on the river front. They were not permitted to engage Chinese servants (but this rule was generally relaxed), to bring women or arms into the factories, to use sedan-chairs, or to enter into any direct relations with local Chinese officials. They might not row for pleasure on the river, nor could they enter the city, and only on three

days in the month were they permitted, under the escort of an interpreter, to take the air at the flower-gardens across the river. They were held collectively responsible for the misdeeds of individuals. The local Chinese officials would not recognize, or have any dealings with, foreign officials entrusted with the protection of their interests.

The fact is that China was ignorant of the international canons accepted by the West, and, moreover, had no desire whatsoever to come into the family of nations. Should China, therefore, be required to accord such equality of commercial and diplomatic treatment as was generally accepted in Europe? The question was not debated in a school of philosophy, and was answered in the affirmative by the foreign Governments concerned. The reviewer has full sympathy with the desire for the abolition of extraterritoriality, and he would point out that the British Government as long ago as 1902 agreed to relinquish the privilege of extraterritoriality if and when China put her house in order. Young China of today must realize that the clock cannot be put back; the foreigner has come to China for trade and has come to stay. Face this fact, put the house in order, and extraterritoriality will disappear. The house is not in order yet, and the task before China is a heavy one; but constructive work begun in this direction will certainly gain British sympathy in a very practical form.

The reviewer has not the space to deal with the large number of the author's assertions with which he is unable to agree, but he takes the opportunity to admit that, in his opinion, China was hardly treated at Versailles in the matter of Shantung. England's hands had been fettered in this respect by the turn of events at a most critical moment in the Great War. Nevertheless, an injustice was done to China which required reparation. It was through English initiative that the scope of the Washington Conference was widened so that political questions as regards the Pacific might be entered upon. The breadth of the Conference was thus enlarged beyond the original plan, with the result that a satisfactory agreement was arrived at between China and Japan regarding the rendition of Shantung. Although the negotiation of this agreement was confined to the two Powers concerned, nevertheless America and England stood by in readiness to serve either party if occasion should have required it.

Mr. T'ang is an ardent member of the Kuomin Tang or Nationalist Party, and defines their programme as based upon the three principles of Nationality, Democracy, and Socialism. The elaboration of these three principles shows that they are intended to stir Chinese society to its very depths, to say nothing of their influence upon international relations of China. Mr. T'ang assumes the ultimate triumph of his party. If his assumption should be correct, then the task before them is indeed immense. The reviewer, however, does not doubt that responsibility will bring with it a fuller realization of the difficulties to

be overcome, and will be followed by moderation and a modification of the details of the programme. The primary need for China is a central Government, and the first task of that Government should be to establish order as far as it can throughout the land. Public financial corruption strikes at the root of all permanent authority in China—even-handed justice. It is remarkable that public corruption should be universal in China, inasmuch as the Chinese individual in his private dealings is perfectly honest in money matters. Perhaps the explanation may be found in the inheritance from many centuries when the Court set the example of regarding public money as fair prize for anyone to pocket who might have the opportunity. The Chinese Republic is still young, a mere stripling of sixteen years, and it may be too harsh a judgment to pass upon it at this stage that official corruption under the Republic is not a whit less than under its predecessor, the Manchu dynasty. The latter was rotten, and the Republic was proclaimed at a time when there were no Republicans in China. The reviewer is a sincere well-wisher of the Chinese people, and has enjoyed an experience of many years in China, during which time he has been in friendly relations with all classes of the Chinese. His opinion, which is shared by many others of greater knowledge and understanding, is that the Chinese people are sober and industrious as a race, and are highly endowed with judgment, good sense, and tenacity of purpose. Moreover, the ideals of their intellectual life are not inferior to those in the Western world, and he would indeed be sorry to see a replacement of the one for the other. It is also very noticeable that the private and community life of the Chinese is conducted with tact and consideration. These do not exhaust the Chinese good qualities by any means, but if we reverse the picture it must be owned that the Chinese in common with other peoples have their national shortcomings.

Mr. T'ang and his friends are not always in the right, and while they may, if they wish to do so, throw stones at Englishmen with a certain amount of reason, they should also remember that much bigger stones could be thrown back at them with equal justice.

As regards the assistance given to the Nationalist Party by the Soviets, the time has already arrived when the Chinese intelligentsia, irrespective of party, have discovered for themselves that the seeds of Bolshevism planted by Soviet hands produce only tares, and are poisoning the land. The discovery has been made in good time, and is a credit to Chinese common sense; but the eradication of the mischief already accomplished will add yet another to the heavy tasks which lie before any Government which establishes itself in China.

E. C. W.

PROPHETS, PRIESTS, AND PATRIARCHS. By H. C. Luke. The Faith Press, Ltd.

Mr. Luke's latest book consists of a series of articles in which he deals with the various sects of Palestine and Syria. In a prologue entitled "A Jerusalem Miscellany" the author depicts in a humorous vein the wranglings and rivalries of the inhabitants of the Holy City, which appear to form such a prominent part of their existence. It is gratifying to read, however, of the moderating influence exercised by the Church of England in Jerusalem among these emulous communities. An interesting account is given of the Easter and Christmas festivals, which are celebrated with such zeal that the Government find it difficult to keep the peace. It is, perhaps, fitting that the Orthodox Church, the "aged tree beneath whose shade the rest of Christendom has sprung," to quote Dean Stanley, should hold a prominent position in the land which saw the birth of Christianity; but it is rather surprising to find Holy Week associated with a Moslem festival. The writer of Deuteronomy, in describing the death of Moses, stated that "no man knoweth his sepulchre to this day"; but the Moslems appear to have discovered its whereabouts at a spot near Jericho, and the author gives an entertaining account of their pilgrimage to the shrine of Nebi Musa. This annual festival in honour of the Jewish Lawgiver is doubtless due more to political than religious motives, as Mr. Luke suggests. A learned chapter on the Christian Communities of the Holy Sepulchre is followed by an account of the Samaritans, that last remnant of an obscure Jewish sect, which for centuries has looked upon Mount Gerizem as the one lawful place appointed for the worship of God.

In Chapter V. the author discusses the influence of Palestine and Syria on the world of Islam, though he does not bring out the effect on the Arabs of contact with a civilization superior to their own, and through which they became acquainted with Greek and Byzantine thought and culture. In his chapter on "The Old Man of the Mountains," the author writes of the Arab invaders' "determination to convert the world to Islam"; but the impelling motive was much more conquest and the spoils of war. The story of Hasan Sabah and the assassins, that strange sect that combined the cult of piety and murder, is well told. Assassination for political ends was not, however, a new phenomenon in Islam.

An epilogue, which does not seem very appropriate to the rest of the work, deals with the relations between the Moslems and the rayahs of the Ottoman Empire. It seems rather premature to assume that the Turkish Republic is "divorced from the faith and hierarchy of Islam," and "seeking its inspiration in the Kremlin rather than the Koran." Although the Turks have adopted a European code—the Code Suisse—as the basis of their law, the Government has decreed that Islam is still the State religion of Turkey, but an Islam brought more into keeping

with the evolution of ideas. Also the Turks and Russians are hereditary foes, and it is unlikely that the present rapprochement will last long or become very intimate. It is probably true that the lot of the Christian rayahs was not so bad as it was painted, nor so much worse than that of the Anatolian peasantry. Aubrey Herbert said of the Armenians that they "were seduced by Europe and flattered to suicide." We may not go as far as that, but it is undoubtedly true that Western sympathizers, by raising false hopes, helped towards the ruin of these unfortunate people. Mr. Luke's scholarly and entertaining volume should find many readers.

F. F. R.

ASIANIC ELEMENTS IN GREEK CIVILIZATION. Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1915-16. By Sir William Ramsay, D.C.L., etc. (John Murray and Co.) 12s. 6d.

It is one of the penalties of a great reputation that the reader comes to expect very much of the author, and the title of this book suggests that we may find in it what perhaps only Sir William Ramsay could give us, a real treatise on the effect of Anatolian influence on the Greek stock there, and through it, on Hellenism at large and on the civilization that has been taught by it. The scholar who has made Anatolia his own particular field, and who, after half a century on the spot (in the course of which he has done work on the Pauline problem that has made Christendom his permanent debtor), has now a detailed knowledge of the land and people that no other man has, might give us such a book—but he has not done it yet.

In this work, which consists of two courses of lectures remodelled till the lectures seem to have evaporated out of them, we have, as it were, Sir William Ramsay in his armchair discoursing "of shoes and ships and sealing-wax" (and if only one read "carriages" instead of "cabbages," one might continue the quotation without serious injustice) and of many things Asianic and Greek that do not seem to have much connection with one another.

Constantly, he throws out, as it were, remarks that are interesting and suggestive—as one would naturally expect from him—about things Greek and Anatolian. Thus, "the Anatolian mind," he says, "is today what it has been from the beginning," a remark that at once shows his experience of his subject and his sense of the continuity of history. The old blood is still there, and though there has been much immigration, yet—as in Hellas over the water—physical descent is only one of the factors that go to make a national type. The land makes the character of its sons, and the descendant of the immigrant becomes a child of the soil.

Sir William Ramsay is clear that the Ionian Greek of Anatolia (the Yavan of the Old Testament) is kin to the "Hellen" of Greece, but not the same as him. Of one stock, each has been affected by incomers

from a different hinterland, and though the ambition of the Hellen through the centuries has always been to control the Anatolian Greek, his attempts have always brought disaster, and now at last, destruction, on his kinsman. The Greek is a trader, not a ruler; unable at times to govern himself, he fails to govern others. Yet the Anatolian, from Homer down, has always influenced the Greek of Greece, and in pointing out instances of that influence, Sir William Murray discourses at large, *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*, but always with interest. We read of Epimenides and his Athenian reforms; of the symbolism (surely rather far-fetched) which saw Nemesis in one mountain and the scales of Justice in the twin peaks of another. Then, *via* the two cultures that were not vultures that sate on the trees by Troy, we are led by Troy itself to the question whether Diana of the Ephesians, that Anatolian Great Mother, was not really depicted as a queen bee; and so to Smyrna and Hipponax, who appears, not as a writer of savage satires, but as the compiler of a prosaic and accurate road-book! The position of women, the wheat trade, the local cart, the "Kabiri," all come in. There is a deal of fine confused feeling in the lectures, but it is something short of the treatise that the name of Ramsay led us to hope for.

W. A. W.

THE LETTERS OF GERTRUDE BELL. London: Messrs. Ernest Benn, Ltd.
1927. Price £2 2s.

"In the days of labour and nights of rest
May the love of Allah make you blest."

The rising of the Arab star and the methods of its followers are fair subject for controversy; a review of the intimate letters of the remarkable English lady who followed the rising should deal with the enthusiasms aroused. Never before had our amazing ventures in the East thrown up such a character. Just a slip of an English lass, and a Yorkshire lass at that, who gets bitten of the East for the first time in Judæa nearly thirty years ago. Seized all of a sudden by the romance and mystery of the present and past, by the glory of the desert and the beauty of the spoken word, Miss Bell sets herself to learn Arabic and to travel in the Levant and in the desert.

Her personal letters through the years are chiefly written to her father—delightful, affectionate, intimate letters—and they extend from those days of Eastern yearnings, happily for her, to the day of her death in the little palm-girt rose-garden on the banks of the Tigris, whence in June, 1926, the spirit in the quiet of night returned to the God who gave it. And to many that little garden and the eager, sympathetic soul who lived there is a very precious memory.

Those letters which deal with her many journeys before the War show her gradually gaining knowledge of people, countries, and

language, and the grip of the East fastening on her. The journeys into the desert were many and with varied purpose—travel for travel's sake, the desert for the joy of it, travel for antiquarian study, travel to gain knowledge of tribes and customs and the language of the Bedouin, which is so different from the elaborate grammarian's language of the learned in the cities. Here is travel:

"I have three soldiers—Ali, Musa, Muhammad . . . one Ahmed white-robed and perched on a camel" is provided for a night ride in the hot season. "Ahmed said, 'Oh, lady, the light rises.' I looked, and the east was beginning to pale; I felt as if I had been sitting on my camel a lifetime. The light came quickly across the furrows, and we rode on till five."

The years of preparation were to be put to unthought-of uses when the War broke out and Turkey cast her bread on the waters. The non-Turkish subjects of Turkey had been in unrest for years. If the Arabs sided with their masters the Red Sea would be unfit for Allied shipping, and mines would come by rail to within an easy camel or even lorry drive of the Imperial ways. Now was the time to develop that ancient British sympathy with Arab aspirations and detach the Arab interests from those of Turkey. The Arab Bureau was formed in Cairo to deal with the subject as a whole. By the nature of things Arab matters were dealt with piecemeal by those departments and Governments who had touch with Arab countries—India for the Persian Gulf and Aden hinterland, the Red Sea littoral divided between India and the Foreign Office. The Colonial Office and the Foreign Office also had a hand in other parts. If Arab national feeling as a whole was to be stimulated, it must be treated as a whole and by one Government and one department. This was the aim and object among those enthusiastic believers in the rather uncertain Arab character and race, the noble Arab in the desert, and the like. Who more suitable than Gertrude Bell to join this Bureau? And to Cairo she took her knowledge and her enthusiasms. Very soon she was sent on to Sir Percy Lake's force in Mesopotamia, to which Sir Percy Cox was chief political officer, to arrange for the co-ordination of policy and explain what the Bureau was aiming at.

But Mesopotamia, especially the desert, the chiefs of Hail and Rhiadh, Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud, Baghdad and Mosul, was especially her own province, in which her detailed knowledge could be of most use, and she found herself retained and acting in the military intelligence office and also in the political office. It was not perhaps always an easy time, for it was well known that she was an intimate friend of many prominent people; and it was also known that British statesmen were far more likely to take their ideas from informal correspondents rather than the responsible officials on the spot, and Miss Bell got the credit of much for which she was not responsible. As an enthusiastic believer in a policy, however, which no one had yet adopted for their

own, she no doubt, when opportunity offered, did impress her own views on some of her privileged correspondents. The letters of this period to her friends and to her father being ordinary wartime correspondence are reticent, and have no comments on the earlier situation in Mesopotamia. She arrived there just before the fall of Kut. Her knowledge was amply employed in both offices, but especially in that power of getting inside the feelings of influential and high-grade inhabitants on the situation generally. Thus she writes in these early days:

"I've been doing very interesting work for Sir Percy (Cox). Today there strolled in a whole bank of Sheikhs from the Euphrates to present their respects to him, and, incidentally, they always call on me."

And again:

"I drove straight into our camp, picked up General Tidswell, who is in command, and made him take me round the town; and there we met the Sheikh of Khamisiyeh, who is a friend of mine, and on a pressing invitation went to his house. . . . He had a guest, Sheikh Hamud, of the Dhafir, one of our friendly Bedouin, and we sat for a while listening to the latest desert news, which I translated for the General."

But when Sir Stanley Maude had captured Baghdad, Gertrude was sent for to join Sir Percy Cox, and it was then that the real value of her sympathetic attitude and knowledge came, and she was able to get into touch with points of view which no political officer could have acquired. For we were in a very difficult position *vis-à-vis* the people. Turkish administration had disappeared, and all machinery which in an occupied country is usually available to control it. We had to carry on, and we had to prepare for whatever policy—a liberal one we knew—would eventually come to pass. These were difficulties that came to a head soon after the War, during the long peace wrangle, which entirely spoilt the atmosphere in the Levant and Syria, ending in a widespread and entirely unnecessary tribal revolt.

The most interesting part of the letters comes when the *Khatun*, free of the trammels of wartime secrecy, can write much more freely, and does so with the enthusiasm which was such a feature of her work. Writing in '22 to her father we have it all:

"Today I rode through the dairy farm . . . and back by the gardens bordering on the Tigris. Man and beast were rejoicing in the abundance of green. 'By God, I've never seen the like!' I stopped to say to the shepherds; and they, 'It is the mercy of God and your presence, *Khatun*.' How I love their darling phrases! You know, father, it's shocking how the East has wound itself round my heart, till I don't know which is me and which is it. I never lose the charm of it. . . . I'm more a citizen of Bagdad than many a Bagdadi born."

There are many sidelights on the difficulty of deciding how to rule the country and the eventual declaration for and election of Sharif Feisal:

"It's not all smooth yet. . . . We get reports about the Lower Euphrates tribes preparing monster petitions in favour of a republic, and of the Shiah Alim Mujtahids being all against Faisal."

Among the troubles of the time was the bitter hostility of the Shiahs, for it must be remembered that the country south of Baghdad is almost all Shiah, while the north and Faisal are Sunnis, and the great Shiah religious centres and shrines are all in Iraq. At the present moment the acute enmity and the difficulty, not only of balancing parties, but getting the two to work together for the good of the whole, is very great. The letters are full of the difficulties, and Miss Bell tells of a dramatic visit to some of the religious swells of Shiahdom at Kadhimain, close to Baghdad. It will be remembered that eventually it was necessary to deport some of them.

With Sharif Faisal crowned and on his throne the troubles were by no means over, and from 1922 to 1926 it is one long intrigue, and the prolonged discussion and doubt over Mosul did not make it easier. She is an enthusiastic admirer of the kingly Faisal, and writes :

"Faisal has hitched his waggon to the stars. . . . At the bottom of his mind he trusts us, and believes that one or two of us would go to the stakes for him. . . . I feel as if I and all of us were playing the most magical tunes on their heart strings, drawn taut by the desperate case in which they find themselves. Can they succeed in setting up reasonable government? Can they save themselves from chaos? Their one cry is, 'Help us!'"

And this is the woman whom those who knew little of her called unwomanly. Why, she is the most supersensitive enthusiast that ever was! But many months have rolled by since 1922, and slowly what she longed for and helped to strive for has come to pass. A Government in being has held its own for four years and more, childish at times, grave and earnest at others, but always an anxiety itself, not only by reason of the two bitter religious factions of which Miss Bell tells so much, but of that uncertainty of the Arab character which, as the old Sheikh said, "keeps us from staying in Eden." Every year the devoted advance and assistance of High Commissioners and advisers see, however, a more complete personnel being evolved to carry on the Government. How it all has been done is told in what is a valuable portion of the "Letters"—viz., two retrospects by Sir Percy Cox and Sir Henry Dobbs of their own tenure. To these retrospects the letters themselves contribute charmingly the appropriate atmosphere.

The last year or so, when much of her original work and help was over, Miss Bell threw herself delightedly into her position as Honorary Director of Antiquities, and the forming of a museum which would prevent the best finds leaving the country, and the drafting of the

necessary laws to control excavation. She was herself no mean authority.

* * * * *

And then in the hot weather of last year it rang to evensong, and the brave soul passed about the time, perhaps, that the *Muezzin* in the mosque hard by called to early prayer.

Bismillah ul rahman o ul rahim.

G. F. M.

SUNAIL. By Coleridge Kennard. London: The Richards Press, 1927. 10s. 6d.

This is a remarkable book, embodying the spirit of Persia better than any writer since Professor Browne, who would have read it with intense enjoyment. The author, a member of the Diplomatic Service, spent five years in Iran and was taken captive by the country. He studied deeply, learned the Persian point of view, and became so deeply permeated with the atmosphere and feeling of Persia that what he writes rings true.

In this book he gives an account of a journey that he made across Persia, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, and Kerman to the Lut, the great desert of Persia, which derives its name from the Patriarch Lot. This great waste he crossed to British Baluchistan, travelling with a camel caravan. Here he is at his best, and I have never read such admirable descriptions of the primitive tribesmen, of the scenery, of their bitter, hard life and of its reaction on their outlook and mentality. Moreover, he collected and translated some of the poems which were recited during the long night marches or during the cool evenings. To take an example, I would invite the attention of the reader to the poem beginning: "O thou that knowest naught of Love—sleep on." Of quite another stamp is the dialogue between a Baluch and a maiden of the desert:

"O child of springtime, linger a moment!"

"No, I cannot linger here."

"I will be a hare in the fields and hide in a hollow."

"Then I will be a hunting falcon and pick you up in my claws."

"I will be an unconscious child sleeping in a cradle."

"Then I will be death and enfold you in my arms."

The author's love for the weird music of the desert is shown in his description of a man who played in an inspired manner and said: "We should die here without music."

Upon reaching law and order on the British side of the frontier,

Kennard feels stifled and sneers at the hospitality he received from British officers, who hardly merited this treatment. Apart from this defect, the book will deeply appeal to men who have lived, as I have done, among these primitive people, sharing their hardships and enjoyments. It will also, unless I am mistaken, appeal to a much wider audience.

P. M. SYKES.

The review *Syria* for 1927 (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 13, Rue Jacob VI^e) contains an interesting article by the Rev. Père Poidebard entitled "Les Routes Anciennes en Haute-Djézirah," summarizing observations made by the writer on foot and from the air regarding ancient trade routes between the Tigris and Euphrates, particularly along the Khabur.

He has succeeded in identifying, by the position of mounds, wells, and ruined bridge heads, thirteen ancient caravan tracks, and three cross-roads or trivials, as they were once called even in England. Seen from the air, the regular lines of mounds placed at fairly regular intervals along the routes were most impressive, and in what appeared, on the ground, to be a meaningless distribution of deserted *tépés* was at once shown, from the air, to be a carefully constructed series of road posts.

Members only are responsible for their statements in the "Journal."

BOOK NOTICES

THE attention of members of the Central Asian Society is drawn to the leaflet circulated herewith regarding the "Survey of Iraq Fauna," made by members of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force between 1915 and 1919. The book, which is being sold at a reduced price of Rs. 5, consists of a collection of reprints of articles printed in the *Journal of the Bombay Natural History Society* between 1920 and 1922, dealing successively with: "Mammals," by Major Cheesman; "Snakes," by Mr. Boulanger; "Orthoptera," by Messrs. Buxton, Evans, and Uvarov; "Hymenoptera," by Mr. Morice; "Fresh-Water Crustacea," by Mr. Gurney; "Butterflies," by Mr. Peile; "Myriapods" by Mr. Brolemann; "Birds," by Messrs. Ticehurst, Buxton, and Cheesman; "Isopoda," by Mr. Omer-Cooper.

There is probably no country in the Middle East for which so complete a natural history handbook has been published at such a low price within the compass of a single volume. Publication collectively was made possible by a financial guarantee given to the Bombay Natural History Society by one or two public-spirited individuals, and it is in order to reduce the amount of their liability, which is considerable, that members of the Society are urged to purchase copies if they have not already done so. The book is published by the Times of Mesopotamia Printing and Publishing Company (Mesopotamia), Ltd., Basrah, and is obtainable from them or from Messrs. Dulau and Company, Ltd., Margaret Street, Cavendish Square, W. 1.

The following books have been received for review :

- "Antiquities of Indian Tibet," by A. H. Francke, Ph.D. Part (Volume) II. The Chronicles of Ladakh and Minor Chronicles. 12" x 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". 810 pp. Texts and translations with notes and maps. Edited with Foreword by F. W. Thomas. (Calcutta: Superintendent, Government Printing, India. 1926. Rs. 30, or 45s.)
- "Ur Excavations," by H. R. Hall and C. L. Woolley. Vol. I., Al-Ubaid. 13 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 244 pp. lxviii plates. (Oxford University Press. 1927.)
- "Mother India," by Katherine Mayo. 392 pp. 8 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". (London: Jonathan Cape. 1927. 7s. 6d., paper; 10s. 6d., cloth.)
- "Suhail," by Coleridge Kennard. 8" x 6". 281 pp. (London: The Richmond Press. 1927. 10s. 6d.)
- "The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement," by A. J. Toynbee. 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 6 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". 611 pp. Map. (Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. £1 1s.)
- "Arabia before Muhammad," by de L. O'Leary. Trübner's Oriental Series. 8 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 234 pp. 3 maps. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner. 1927. 10s. 6d.)
- "Indian States and the Government of India," by Pannikar. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 169 pp. (London: Martin Hopkinson. 10s. 6d.)
- "Letters of Gertrude Bell," edited by Lady Bell. 2 volumes. 791 pp. (London: Ernest Benn. 1927. £2 2s.)

HON. MEMBERS.

Professor D. S. Margoliouth, Professor of Arabic, Oxford University.
Dr. Nicholson, Litt.D., Cambridge.

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Beamish, Captain R. P., 3/14 Punjab Regt., I.A.
Bosshard, W.
Bradshaw, Captain J. L. R., Indian Political Department.
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Brunt, R. N. B.
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Palmer, Commander I. M., R.N.
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Taylor, G. W. R.
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CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY ACCOUNTS, 1926

RECEIPTS.		£	s.	d.
To Subscriptions	891	0	0
" Journal: Subscriptions, sales, etc.	...	31	17	7
" Annual Dinner receipts...	...	122	12	4
" Dinner Club receipts	28	4	6
" Lectures: From Royal Asiatic Society	...	3	14	10
" " Persia Society	3	14	10
" Sundries	2	6	6
" Interest on Deposit ...	£10 19 0			
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" Balance at bank, January 1, 1926	...	15	19	0
" " of petty cash, January 1, 1926	...	75	14	10
		10		
		£1,175	5	3

The Society's holdings are:
 5 per cent. War Loan ... £100
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We have examined the above statement with the books and vouchers, and certify it to be in accordance therewith.

(Signed) CLAUD W. JACOB
 (Field-Marshal).
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1927.

EXPENDITURE.		£	s.	d.
By Office Expenses: Rent	...	50	0	0
Rates	13	4	5
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Income tax on War Loan and deposit	...	2	0	0
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Telephone	6	8	5
Clerical help, duplicating, etc.	...	24	12	11
Reference books, etc.	...	1	7	0
Cleaning and heating	...	2	12	8
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Postage	44	19	1
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" Journal: Printing	...	348	7	5
Postages	...	30	4	3
Map plates, etc.	...	13	4	2
Reporting	...	36	6	7
" Lectures: Rent of hall	...	28	7	0
Lantern slides	...	18	8	9
Lantern operator	14	11	0
Printing and sundry expenses	...	32	0	3
Expenses of joint lecture	...	11	4	6
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Postages, notices, etc.	...	23	17	5
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New York Natural History Museum's	...			
Central Asiatic Expeditions	...	10	10	0
Permanent Committee on Spelling	...			
Geographical Names	...	1	1	0
" Bank charges, cheque book, etc.	...	31	11	0
" Balance at bank, December 31, 1927	...	76	11	11
		£1,175	5	3